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A Note on Enquiry Method: Standardisation of Key Terms Meanings and a 
‘Representative Firm’ Approach to Naming and Tracking Prequels  
The key terms of this enquiry are Science, Ethics and Polis and the enquiry ranges over 
a long period in Western history. Consequently, as explained in the Introduction and 
further developed in Chapters 2 and 10, a method had to be found which, inter alia, 
would permit consistant usage of these key terms in a manner compatible with changing 
nuance in them. 
By way of further explanation, and focussing on Plato for discussion purposes, there are 
a number of words he uses in his efforts to identify kinds of knowledge—the true as 
opposed to the false, sophistic conjecture as opposed reasoned argument, and logical 
reasoning as opposed to eristic obstructive filibuster. At Statesman 258e (Plato, 1903c; 
1952t, p. 580) the dialogical Young Socrates voices an assumption that Science consists 
of two divisions, one practical (praktikos), the other pure or intellectual (gnostikos), 
Science in the first place being used in one sense of episteme (ἐπιστήμη) full knowledge 
about matters, including arts, professions and the like Philebus 55d (Plato, 1925f; 1952p, 
p. 633), and gnosis appearing to have no sense of personal mystical truth as it later came 
to have. Science so used comes from ἐπι = upon and ἵσταμαι = to stand upon and in this 
sense science as episteme Republic 477b (Plato, 1925c; 1952r, p. 371) Ion 536c (Plato, 
1925c; 1952h, p. 145) is a kind of true and tried knowledge upon which other knowledge 
may be built. The word sophia (σοφία), which may be used to mean cleverness or skill 
in handicraft in the sense of knowledge of the handicraft Republic 406b (Plato, 1952r, p. 
335; 1969a), Protagoras 321d (Plato, 1952q, p. 44; 1967d) can also serve to mean skill 
in life matters, practical wisdom, sound judgment and the like Protagoras 360d (Plato, 
1952q; 1974, p. 64), or in the sense of learning or wisdom Apology 20e (Plato, 1952a, p. 
201; 1966a). Phronesis (φρόνησις) may also be used in the sense of a reliable kind of 
knowledge, namely practical wisdom or prudence in government and affairs Symposium 
209a (Plato, 1925g; 1952r, p. 166). Techne (from the Greek τέχνη) refers to art and trade 
qua making, the knowledge of techne, being practised trade knowledge Protagoras 317c 
(Plato, 1952q, p. 42; 1974) or learned professional knowledge Protagoras 312b, 315a, 
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(Plato, 1952q, pp. 39, 41; 1974). Techne also signifies a set of rules or system of 
making, crafting, doing Phaedrus 245a, 271c (Plato, 1925e, pp. 124, 137; 1952o), 
Phaedo 90b (Plato, 1952n, p. 237; 1966c), Euthydemus 282d (Plato, 1952e, p. 71; 
1967a) in a collective noun sense as knowledge. Nous (νοῦς) is implicated in perceiving 
or thinking, Republic 619b (Plato, 1925c; 1952r, pp. 439 - 440) or in act of recalling or 
remembering Republic 490a (Plato, 1925c; 1952r, p. 376) or as having sense or being 
sensible Laws 887e (Plato, 1952j, p. 759; 1967/68a), or mind as resolve or purpose as in 
putting one’s mind to a subject or issue Republic 334d (Plato, 1925c; 1952r, p. 299) or 
as reason or intellect Timaeus 51d (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 457) or as active principle of 
universe Timaeus 48a (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 455), Sophist 249a (Plato, 1921b; 1952s, 
p. 568), Philebus 30c (Plato, 1925f; 1952p, p. 619). Dialectike (διαλεκτική) is used in a 
sense of skill in discussion by question and answer as a philosophical method used by 
Plato Cratylus 390c (Plato, 1921a; 1952c, pp. 88 - 89), Republic 534e (Plato, 1925c; 
1952r, p. 398) and in a sense of argument by general principles as opposed to scientific 
argument Philebus 17a (Plato, 1925f; 1952p, p. 612), Meno 75d (Plato, 1952l, pp. 176 - 
177; 1967c). Eristike (εριστικός, in the sense of squabble or quarrel) is found in Lysis 
211b (Plato, 1903a; 1952k, p. 18) or as sophistry in Sophist 231e (Plato, 1921b, p. 559; 
1952s). It is associated with merely verbal antagonism Euthydemus 278a, 301b, (Plato, 
1952e, pp. 68, 81; 1967a) Theaetetus 164c (Plato, 1921d; 1952v, p. 524), and employed 
in a sense of neglecting to differentiate and divide, Philebus 17a (Plato, 1925f; 1952p, p. 
612), Phaedrus 265e, 266a-b (Plato, 1925e; 1952o, p. 134), in a sense of failure to 
distinguish hypothesis from consequence, Phaedo 101e (Plato, 1952n, p. 242; 1966c), 
Parmenides 135-136 (Plato, 1925d; 1952m, pp. 490 - 491) and as an opposite to 
dialectic Republic 454a (Plato, 1925c; 1952r, p. 358). Anagnorisis (ἀναγνώρισις) is used 
in a sense of a sudden recognition of something, an epiphany, or dénouement as in a play 
when all the parts are brought together and matters are clarified Theaetetus 193a (Plato, 
1921d; 1952v, pp. 539-540).  
Attempting to decipher clear cut distinctions bretween branches of knowledge by 
endeavouring to tie down specific word meaning, in this case for the key term Science, 
is already complex and becomes more so when the process is extended to other extant 
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writers, or to the fragments, or forward past Aristotle, or to earlier works, and, except for 
a skills explanation of virtue as some kind of knowledge, and brief clarification of early 
Greek ideas of justice, god and happiness for set-up purposes, key terms meaning and/or 
nuance is not traced in such a manner, there yet being collections of instructive 
scholarship which, inter alia, employ exegesis of this kind (Montanari, Matthaois, & 
Rengakos, 2015a, 2015b; Stern-Gillet & Corrigan, 2007, 2008) and a long rich 
established heritage as well.   
In this enquiry key terms meaning and nuance are consistently measured in the 
following way. First, specific meanings are assigned to key terms at the outset and these 
attributed meanings do not change over the duration of the enquiry. Second, a key terms 
hierarchy of relationships amongst those attributed key terms meanings is identified and 
how political philosophy is generally made within that hierarchy is explained. The key 
terms relationships hierarchy and its general method of making political philosophy do 
not change over the duration of the enquiry. All key terms nuance, and consequential 
attendant nuance in political philosophy measured in the manner next explained in the 
third step, occurs within the unchanging attributions of the first and second steps 
outlined in this paragraph. Third, key terms nuance and attendant political philosophy is 
traced throughout the enquiry by reiterative measurement of esoteric key terms meaning 
captured by consistent chapeau questioning of three vectors of esoterism for each key 
term, these vectors being cognitive method, cognitive domain of operations, and 
cognitive constraints, the chapeau questions being How do I come to know?, What do I 
come to know? and What limits my knowing?  
The measurement of key terms in this manner is thus a measurement by transform and 
was constructed from first principles for enquiry purposes. Nevertheless, from hindsight, 
its legitimacy may be rationalised by depicting it as a kind of literary version of ideas of 
transform which underly logarithmic notation, La Place transforms, two dimension 
Cartesian tracking of that legendry insect, or the whole geometric saving the 
appearences, the idea in this latter case not being defective, but rather the geocentric 
premise on which it was required to operate. Caveats about this measurement-of-
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meanings-part of enquiry methodology are given in the Introduction, Chapter 2 on 
method, Chapter 10, and in footnotes to tables. Elsewhere, text boxes within the enquiry 
address relevant meanings contention in specific instances. Meanings of foreign words 
used in the enquiry, but outside of the third step measurement process just explained 
above, are specified in an index provided on pages xii to xviii. 
An inspection of the tabular representation of method on page 609 reveals that prequel 
marker names Republic of Ideas through Leviathan are matched with particular 
representative names Plato through Hobbes. Such linking identifies what, in this enquiry 
is called a ‘representative firm’ convenience after the fashion of political economists 
who—after having defined various kinds of market structures and finding a plethora of 
possible firm types emerging within, and sharing characteristics across, those 
structures—alleviate the issue through a ‘representative firm’ construct, that is, through 
identifying or describing a ‘representative’ firm typical of each market structure 
category. Thus the enquiry may well have proceeded by applying its chapeau 
questioning to a different series of ‘representative firms’, for example, Xenophon instead 
of Plato, Magnus instead of Aquinas, Locke, Rousseau and Campanella as a job lot 
instead of Bacon, or Machiavelli instead of Hobbes, to likely arrive at different 
conclusions. As well, none of the identified enquiry prequels alone may likely explain a 
detected quickening change in political philosophy during Bacon’s time. Detection of 
quickening change and likely emergence of a new era is an outcome of method itself as 
explained on page 611. In addition, ideas progress throughout the prequel series is by 
ebb and flow rather than discreet Kuhnian paradigm shift, and as stated in the 
Conclusion, almost every important claim made, or finding conjectured, is admitted 
contestable. 
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Index of Foreign Words Used 
(French-English, German-English, Greek-English, Italian-English and Latin-English Equivalents 
for Enquiry Purposes) 
 
a 
agon Contest or struggle in a sense of improvement through resolution of conflict in human society.  
andiamo Let’s go. 
affliction  
(πένθος) 
Affliction in mystic language connotes “fall” or “sin.” 
a fortiori 
From a position of higher reason: for example, if a person of one skin colour were seen stealing 
then, on the face of it, there being no falsity or disguise involved in the seeing, others of 
different skin colours may be reasoned out of contention. The fact of the seeing sets up the a 
fortiori on which the ruling out of others is more confidently acceptable. 
aínigma 
Expressing words so that they do mean what they are intended to mean but bequeathing to 
them obscure symbolism and meaning accessible only to those keyed ready through prior 
initiation. 
aliquid Something otherwise or anything else again. 
anámnesis 
The idea Plato develops in the Meno and Phaedo that knowledge of earthly beings results from 
blurred memory of knowledge gained through processes of reincarnation(s). 
anschauung (Kant) 
Kant’s word translated as intuition or intuitive reason or sensibility or internal sensation, or 
sense perception. Consciousness to itself at the beginning, that given by the patternmaking of 
time and space. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on 
page 159. 
ante rem Before the thing  
apatheia A condition of the wise, a state in which the mind is free of disturbance from the passions. 
apeiron Unending, infinite, indefinite. 
a posteriori 
Later, following—in philosophy a posteriori knowledge is associated with scientific 
knowledge. 
architectonic 
(αρχιτεκτονικός) 
Master or chief: for example in the list theology, physics, politics and economics, theology 
might be architectonic, governing or blueprinting the rest. 
arete 
Virtue either (a) in a technical sense of good-at-what, that is, professional and technical know-
how for a task, or (b) in a moral sense depending on the era and purpose of usage. For example 
a good or virtuous shoemaker is one fully appraised of the technical skills of shoemaking while 
a good and morally virtuous mankind is, in Plato’s exegesis of it in which nous discerns 
happiness predicated on obedience to the law, justice and self-control, one in which virtue is 
some kind of knowledge.  
articuli fidei Precepts of divine revelation. 
askesis In more general usage: training oneself, transforming oneself towards a chosen state of being.  
ἄστυ A city as a gathering of bricks and mortar and its streets and institutions and the like. 
atomi Particles, atoms. 
b 
bacchoi 
Literally, branches carried by some participants of the Eleusian Mysteries thiasos in their 
journey from Athens to Eleusis; figuratively initiates. 
begriffe (Kant) 
Conceptions. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on page 
159. 
bios politikos 
A marker signifying political life or active life in the communal space of the P(p)olis which 
evokes practical wisdom’s action as phronesis.  
bios theoretikos 
A marker signifying contemplative life which evokes theoretical wisdom’s contemplation of 
the unchanging and its attendant sophia. 
c 
carte blanche Metaphor for full authority to act. 
χαῖρε 
χ = chi =phonetically 
kai = ch 
Hail as in a greeting to a personage such as Persephone in the gold tablets or in “Hail to thee 
blithe spirit” (Shelley, 1961, pp. 602 – 603.) 
collegium 
A group of people joined by law, Romanised from the Greek hetaireia or company of persons, 
in the first instance, bodyguards. 
communis opinio Common opinion or a generally accepted view on a mater. 
cosmos or kosmos 
Colloquially cosmos or kosmos = world. In another usage however Guthrie informs that it is an 
untranslatable word combining notions of “order, fitness and beauty” (Guthrie, 1975a, p. 37) 
this enquiry, when not used colloquially, and unless otherwise stated, cosmos or kosmos 
signifies a grown or strived for order, a right order in a community or state.  
 
d 
dz/zita 
 
 
dasein 
For Heidegger the Presocratic’s phusis is the original coming out of concealment (di Pippo, 
2000, pp. 32 - 34), an original letting itself be seen kind of idea. Heidegger considers Being, 
signified in his word Dasein, as that from “beyond Being, yet manifesting itself in an 
understanding of Being which permeates all our comportments” (Taminiaux, 1991, p. 11). In 
particular three dispositions, poiesis, praxis, theoria and their corresponding action or 
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d 
dz/zita 
 
movement twins techne, phronesis and sophia constitute Dasein, understood as being in the 
world, and of these praxis = phronesis provides the right way to Dasein, to being and caring in 
the world and a realisation of the temporal ephemerality of Being so understood. Within 
Dasein, poiesis is a principle of origination, and bringing forth from concealment or leading 
into unconcealment, which yet does not reveal itself in the praxis or doing of the 
unconcealment. (Heidegger, 1950/2002, pp. 41, 47 - 48). For example, at the level of 
artisanship, craft being done, that is, craft as praxis, has left the sphere of poiesis. Taminiaux 
names Dasein Heidegger’s “ontical foundation of fundamental ontology” (ibid.) (Taminiaux, 
1991, p. 11) which brings another set of definitional issues. 
Dum inter homines 
sumus, colamus 
humanitatem. 
So long as we are among men, let us cherish humanity, more colloquially since we are humans, 
let us live as humans. 
déjà vu Already seen. 
differentia Difference, differentiation. 
daimones 
In Middle Platonism (1) the human soul itself, (2) souls which have left their bodies, and (3) 
daimones who never enter bodies. Daimones as disembodied souls help humans reach the 
afterlife (Cline, 2011, p. 2011).  
dike 
Generally a marker for justice. There is a habitually right way is in a custom of a tribe and a 
morally right way predicated doing the so-called right thing. Such tensions are present in 
debates about killing and eating whales. In Greek mythology Dike is the daughter of Zeus and 
Themis, the goddess of law. Guthrie uses dikaiosyne as a longer form of the noun. Plato uses 
dikaios. 
ding an sich 
A thing/things in itself/themselves, Kant’s word for noumena postulated existing beyond the 
phenomena themselves pattern made by space and time. 
doxa 
Opinion as differentiated from techne as knowledge of craftsmanship, the art of making or 
doing, episteme as scientific knowledge or true belief, phronesis as practical wisdom, sophia as 
theoretical wisdom and nous as pure apprehending. 
δημιουργός One who works for the people, a skilled workperson or a handicraftsperson.  
dunameis Souls.  
e 
ἐγκώμιον Encomium, laudatory ode, eulogy, panegyric, warm and enthusiastic praise 
en arrivant In an act or state of arriving. 
en précis By way of pinpoint or summary. 
ἐντελέχεια  Entelechy, or fullness or completeness of the being to the service of final cause. 
empfindung (Kant) 
Sensation. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on page 
159. 
episteme 
Scientific knowledge or true belief as differentiated from doxa or opinion, techne as knowledge 
of craftsmanship, the art of making or doing, phronesis as practical wisdom, sophia as 
theoretical wisdom and nous as pure apprehending.  
epistomia 
Epistomia is an archaeological term for objects placed on or inside mouths of the dead, instead 
of a burial coin. 
epithumia 
Appetite, desire, passionate longing in a neutral sense, the thing being desired determining a  
pejorative dimension   
erscheinung (Kant) 
Phenomenon. The undefined object of an empirical intuition. Inter-relationships amongst 
Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on page 159.  
ergazesthai 
Arendt attempts to associate ergazesthai with work in a sense of human body at slavish 
working. For Sprague ergazesthai = working as distinguished from making ponein or doing 
prattein. 
ergo Therefore. 
eros The god Eros or erotic love depending on context. 
eudaimonia 
In simple form Happiness or flourishing in humans  
In a specific form blessed happiness won through theoretical wisdom as the highest intellectual 
virtue’s contemplation of the unchanging.  
ex nihilo Out of nothing. 
extinctus amabitur 
idem 
He shall be had in honour after Horace (1888, p. 42). 
f fundamentum in re 
Foundation within the thing. Concepts are not a function of mind alone but have a 
fundamentum in re, a foundation within the thing perceived/conceived. 
g gemiith (Kant) 
A certain affection of the mind. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a 
dialogue box on page 159.  
h 
haecceitas Scotus’ term for whatness. 
hedone 
Pleasure which, depending on contextual usage, may be associated with or differentiated from 
hedonism and/or striving for and achieving the good. 
hêgemonikon Ruling faculty of mind, control centre of the sense organ in Stoic theory. 
xiv 
 
h hieros logos 
Sacred account 
Note: “Hieros-logos—a sacred tale, sacred word or book (e.g. possessed by the initiation 
priests of Dionysus and by the Pythagoreans); there were logoi (accounts, explanations) within 
practical mysteries and additional logoi adduced from the outside; they were both esoteric and 
exoteric, within the mysteries and about the mysteries priests containing information within the 
mysteries or about the mysteries, developed on three different hermeneutical levels, those of 
myth, allegory, and metaphysics” (Uždavinys & Finamore, 2004, p. 300) 
i 
in foro externo In open court, in person made law: Hobbes’ adaption is explained in the text. 
in foro interno  In closed court, in conscience. Hobbes’ adaptation is explained in the text. 
inter alia Among other things. 
imprimatur  Authoritative approval. 
isonomia Equality before the law. 
j no entry No entry. 
k 
kalon A combination of nobleness, kindness and beauty. 
katabasis Descent, in Orphism a descent to the underworld. 
kleos Renown or glory. 
kosmos or cosmos 
Colloquially cosmos or cosmos = world. In another usage however Guthrie informs that it is an 
untranslatable word combining notions of “order, fitness and beauty” (Guthrie, 1975a, p. 37) 
this enquiry, when not used colloquially, and unless otherwise stated, cosmos or kosmos 
signifies a grown or strived for order, a right order in a community or state.  
l 
lex naturalis Law of nature. 
logoi en paideia Logoi as educators or trainers. 
Logos/logos 
Depending on context: (a) God’s word, or the Greek divine element of mind, or Christ 
incarnate as Logos on earth, or Adam as Logos within, or (b) as small l logos a rational as 
opposed to mythical account for example of natural beings and occurrences, not the speech or 
discourse of the Sophists; or a speech or discourse or an account depending on the context in 
which the word is used.  
logos endiathetos Internal Logos, Logos within the soul, with a capital or lower case depending on context. 
logos prophorikos External logos, Logos without the soul, with a capital or lower case depending on context. 
lamellae Thin plates, in this case of metal. 
lingua franca A bridge or shared language between differing mother tongues. 
m 
magoi 
Translated meaning is contested (R. G. Edmonds, 2008, pp. 16-17). Edmonds allows magoi to 
be priests or magicians associated with the abnormal (ibid., p. 35), whether the association is 
pejoratively positive or negative, positive or negative being conative perspectives brought to 
usage by attitudes and values held by the user. Unless otherwise stated the general usage 
implied in this enquiry is that magoi are magicians rather than mystai, either priests or initiates 
considered ready to witness the greater mysteries.  
materia-prima Aquinas’ primordial material. 
materia primo-prima 
Duns Scotus’ name for a formless and incorporeal matter which can never exist on its own 
unless God wills it. It is the first material of the world. 
materia secondo-prima 
Duns Scotus’ name for what the world is made of. It is Aquinas’ primordial materia prima. It is 
a substrate of materia primo-prima and is the material of becoming and change. 
medicina-cultura-animi 
In short form = cultura-animi in Corneanu’s usage = collective descriptor for the genres, texts, 
literatures, themes attitudes, and approaches embodying medicine of mind perspective. 
medietas A medium or midpoint. 
mētēr Mother. 
mimesis Imitation, resemblance, mimicry. 
μύστης  Initiate, initiated member. 
moira Fate. 
mystai 
Translated meaning is contested (R. G. Edmonds, 2008, pp. 16-17). Unless otherwise stated the 
general usage implied in this enquiry is that mystai are either priests or initiates considered 
ready to witness the greater mysteries, rather than magoi or magicians. 
mythos 
A mythical, as opposed to rational account of beings and occurrences, for example gods 
causing lightning and thunder. 
n 
nomos 
In a general sense culture or law. In this enquiry its figurative connotation is the rule of man-
made law away from rule of nature as brute force. 
nous 
An essential and divine element of human soul. Pure apprehending as differentiated from doxa 
or opinion, techne as knowledge of craftsmanship, the art of making or doing, episteme, or 
scientific knowledge or true belief, phronesis as practical wisdom, and sophia as theoretical 
wisdom. 
nunc dimittis 
Now you dismiss from Luke 2:29 – 32 (Holy Bible, 2009b) where the first words of the canticle 
is established as “Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart” (ibid.).  
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o 
Ο ἒξω λόγος Spoken word, logos outside the soul. 
Ο έν τή ψυχή The discourse within the soul, logos inside the soul.  
officina omnium Workshop of all things. 
ὁμοούσιον Of one substance.  
όργή Anger, rage, wrath. 
ousia Being. 
oeuvre A body of creative work by one person, for example a writer or artist. 
p 
paideia 
In a simple sense training and thus when, used with qualifying words, particular kinds of 
training for example, reparation, including education and training, for membership of a Greek 
Polis. 
pari passu Moving together, with equal step. 
patria eqh Fatherland laws (Simple translation is troublesome (Mason, 2007, p. 19).  
πένθος 
Affliction 
 
(I) grief, sadness, sorrow, (Homer) especially of the outward signs of grief, for example 
mourning for the dead Herodotus 
(II) a misfortune, Herodotus, Pindar 
(III) of persons, a misery, Sophocles. 
per se In itself. 
phantasia  
In Stoic theory a form of a sensed object carried back to the hêgemonikon by a current of 
rational logos. Sense impression and its cognitive affection in the material soul. The usage is 
technical or clinical it having no association with notions of unreality, uncertainty or 
extraordinariness. 
phantasia kataleptike 
In Stoic theory, phantasia after certification by kataleptike, phantasia certified as bringing 
objective and subjective reality of a sensed object to mind.  
philosophia prima Bacon’s first philosophy or natural history.  
philosophia secunda Bacon’s second philosophy or active Science. 
φρόνησις Phronesis. 
phronesis 
The intellectual virtue of practical wisdom at work in discerning right action. Scholars have 
adapted phronesis to their own projects shades of such usage being explained in appropriately 
located text boxes within the enquiry.  
phusis or physis Nature, natural beings and their possible inter-relationships. 
physis or phusis Nature, natural beings and their possible inter-relationships. 
Φιλων ο πρεσβυτερος Philo the Elder. 
poiesis 
In narrow usage = technical or craft skill. Shades of meaning in use of this term, for example 
by Plato, Aristotle and Heidegger, are addressed in a text box on page 166.  
politeuma (πολίτευμα) 
1. Civil affairs administration of a state or commonwealth (2) Laws and constitution and form 
of government. (3) A state or commonwealth.  
politique 
After Francis Bacon’s usage a person making their way in civil service qua politics. One 
having to make their own fortune or chance. 
ponein 
Arendt’s identifies labour as hurtful activity associated with acts of deriving essentials, 
growing food and the like in the manner of unchosen labour to survive drudgery in ancient 
times. She associates this activity with the word ponein as different from ergazesthai or artisan 
making by relying on differing connotations of work signified between say travailler and 
ouvrer in French and arbeiten and werken in German. Such survival labour is the work of 
animal labourers and is a consequence of biological-life (zōē) necessity imposed on humans. 
Such animal labour is differentiated from work qua fabrication or making of more durable 
goods like schools, museums, literature, artworks and complementary existences and these are 
made with societal ends (sic) in view. The work or fabrication by artisans freed from necessity 
is part of existence between life and death, part of human life (bios) and is designated poiesis. 
Arendt’s attempted differentiation between ergazesthai and ponein is not without its own 
complications because of the range of meanings carried by ergazesthai itself. An example of 
terms cloudiness can be found at Charmides 161e – 163c (Plato, 1952b, 1955a; 1992a, pp. 71-
74) 
polis A cognitive or esoteric political gathering. 
P(p)olis 
P(p)olis is a marker derived from Polis qua esoteric gathering to identify either a touchable, 
visible, manufactured, constructed or exoteric gathering of bricks and mortar and institutions 
and regulations and the like, or illness of fit of the term Polis depending on context. A 
gathering in an exoteric sense identified by laws, institutions, bricks and mortar and the like. 
praxis 
Either in a simple modern form as a combination of theory and application combined, or 
particular usages explained in appropriately located text boxes within the enquiry, for example 
on page 166. 
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p 
praxis qua phronesis 
After usage by Arendt as political action or working out of ideas as phronesis or prudence 
practical wisdom in contrast to her usage of theoria qua sophia understood as theoretical 
wisdom’s pursuit of wisdom as a patron of action. Theoria qua sophia marks intellectual 
mankind and praxis qua phronesis action mankind, the full souled version not being given an 
epithet. 
primum mobile 
In Bacon’s day the movement of the outermost sphere of the heavens, generic meaning being 
first moved. 
principia exempla Eriugena’s phrase for divine names such as goodness, truth, virtue, and wisdom. 
profanum vulgus Vulgar herd. 
psyche Soul 
q 
qua In the capacity of. 
quidditas Scotus’ term for thisness. 
Qui longum note 
scriptori proroget 
ævum. 
Which will secure a long age for the known writer. (Ben Jonson’s translation (Jonson, 2015b, 
p. 127) of Ars Poetica by Horace (Horace, 1942, pp. 450 - 489). 
r 
regimen 
Corneanu’s word for operations performed on the human mind = cure, cultivation, education, 
training, government or discipline. 
reine anschauung 
(Kant)  
Pure intuition. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on 
page 159.  
s 
sensus communis 
Either Aristotle’s construct of a common sense understood as an ability occurring in animals 
when, by virtue of individual senses acting in unison, those animals may recognise existences 
of movement or bulk dimension, or more generally an intuitive kind of working understanding 
shared amongst people about social conditions and situations—use-your-nous use your 
common sense. Arendt’s appropriation of common sense is idiosyncratic as explained in the 
text. 
sinnlichkeit (Kant) Sensibility. Terms relationships are further discussed in the dialogue box on page 159.  
sitz-im-leben 
Either (a) in biblical study a setting in life of a passage e.g. the passage might be a psalm, a 
parable or a letter, or (b) in a more general way as position or place in a community. 
sophia 
The knowledge product of theoretical philosophy. The knowledge product of theoria narrowly 
differentiated from doxa or opinion, techne as knowledge of craftsmanship, the art of making 
or doing, episteme, or scientific knowledge or true belief, phronesis as practical wisdom, 
sophia as theoretical wisdom and nous as pure apprehending. 
s’ouvrir To open oneself to. 
sparagmos 
Tearing apart, rending or mutilating as in Dionysiac cult ritual. The following quotation 
illustrates the nature of sparagmos. “Two maenads are dancing in an ecstatic trance; possessed 
by the spirit of the god, they can perform superhuman feats of strength, are impervious to 
weapons and can handle wild animals and poisonous snakes without harm. Here, one carries a 
deer on her shoulders and the other dangles a young lion by its tail. The moment is approaching 
the sparagmos, the climactic act of communion with the god, when they will tear the animals to 
pieces with their bare hands and eat the raw flesh. These maenads are to be considered nymphs 
rather than contemporary mortal worshippers, but this violent form of Dionysiac cult continued 
to be practised in Thrace, and possibly in some parts of Greece, in the Classical period” (H. A. 
Shapiro, 2014, entry 16). 
synkatathesis 
In Stoic theory a free and conscious act, under patronage of hêgemonikon, of judging the 
correctness and moral status of the phantasia. 
 
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank to accommodate software formatting 
imperatives. 
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t 
tabula logica 
A table of concordance of degrees of abstraction with degrees of real existence in a context of 
emanation literature. 
taxis and cosmos  
Taxis is made order, for example order in a battle or order in a procession to distinguish it from 
cosmos as right order in a community or state. The phrase taxis and cosmos as when used in 
this enquiry signifies a condition of right order, procedure and place occurring when wisdom’s 
effectively discernment between the harmful and unharmful leads mankind to that which never 
harms. 
techne  
Craftsmanship, or art of making or doing and its knowledge as differentiated from doxa or 
opinion, episteme as scientific knowledge or true belief, phronesis as practical wisdom, sophia 
as theoretical wisdom and nous as pure apprehending. 
τελετή Ceremony or rite. 
themis 
Themis, Dike’s mother, announces law so that themis is a marker of social order. Simple 
translation is problematic. 
theoria. 
In a narrow sense as state of knowledge and mind occasioned by speculative wisdom’s 
contemplation of the unchanging, or, more loosely, states of mind and knowledge associated 
phronesis and poiesis by scholarly attribution As outlined in text boxes appropriately located 
within the enquiry..  
theoria qua sophia 
After usage by Arendt as theoretical virtue’s pursuit of wisdom as a patron of action in contrast 
to her use of praxis qua phronesis as political action or working out of ideas as phronesis or 
prudence. Theoria qua sophia marks intellectual mankind and praxis qua phronesis action 
mankind, the full souled human not being given an epithet. 
Θεός 
Θ = th 
God or with no capital, god in the pagan Greek sense. 
theos God with a small g. 
thiasos 
Procession and/or retinue of people associated with, or followers of, a personage. 
Note: “Thiasos: a group or band of associated deities or other figures, sometimes participating 
in a feast or celebration, as with Dionysus’s thiasos” (Perseus Digital Library, 2014). 
thymos Spiritedness. 
travailler To work or toil. 
u 
uberwindung 
Breaking through, triumphing over, going beyond or leaving behind that which no longer has 
relevance or meaning as distinguished from verwindung  as overcoming or getting over or 
surpassing by winding or twisting or deviation without completely leaving behind or 
consigning to oblivion that overcome. One overcomes fear, or illness or obstacle in this 
manner. 
universalia ante rem Universals before the thing. 
universalia in re Universal essences existing within the thing. 
universalia post rem Universals after the thing. 
v 
vernuft 
(reason) 
Comprehension at work in distilling principles, and in systematisation of concepts brought to it 
by understanding into one unified whole. The ideas, namely soul, cosmos and god are its a 
priori. Pure reason “never refers direct to objects, but to the concepts of objects brought to it by 
the understanding (Kant, 1896, pp. 272 – 273). 
verstand 
(understanding) 
Understanding making intuitions into conceptions. Whatever objects may be, there is in human 
mind a receptivity called sensibility, or sinnlichkeit, and this sensibility is capable of receiving 
representations or vorstellungen as affects of objects. Sensibility so constructed provides mind 
with intuitions or anschauungen. Verstand qua understanding is that which converts intuitions 
into conceptions or begriffe. Pure intuitions are empirical and are given by space and time, pure 
forms existing a priori in mind independent of experience.  
verwindung 
Overcoming or getting over or surpassing by winding or twisting or deviation without 
completely leaving behind or consigning to oblivion that overcome. For example one 
overcomes fear, or illness or obstacle. Verwindung is differentiated from uberwindung qua 
breaking through, triumphing over, going beyond or leaving behind that which no longer has 
relevance or meaning. 
Video meliora, 
proboque, deteriora 
sequor. 
I see and approve of the better but follow the worse. after a translation from Ovid  
Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or VII 25 – 30 (1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144). 
vorstellungen (Kant) 
Representations (in the mind) of something without, of some object. Inter-relationships 
amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a dialogue box on page 159. 
vorstellungsfahigkeit 
(Kant) 
The faculty of representation. Inter-relationships amongst Kant’s terms are explained in a 
dialogue box on page 159.  
w werken Work, connatively creation as opposed to arbeiten qua work connatively slavery. 
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x xynon In Heraclitus, the common reality. 
y no entry No entry. 
z no entry No entry. 
 
Index of Foreign Word Usage  
(Hebrew-English Equivalents for Enquiry Purposes)  
 
(alef) 
 
םיהלא 
(L ← R) 
God(s).  
Caution: “This conception [of mine that Israelite religion included a council of gods ( םיהלא ) 
and servant angels (םיכאלמ) under Yahweh-El] included the idea that Yahweh was “species 
unique” in the Israelite mind, and so terms such as henotheism, polytheism, and even 
monolatry are not sufficiently adequate to label the nature of Israelite religion. Those who 
use such terms also assume that הלאםי  is an ontological term in Israelite religion, denoting 
some quality or qualities that points to polytheism if there are more than one םיהלא. This fails 
to note the use of the term within and without the Hebrew Bible for the departed human dead 
and lower messenger beings םיכאלמ(13). Rather, םיהלא in Israelite religion denotes “the plane 
of reality” or domain to which a being properly belongs (for example, the “spirit world” 
versus the “corporeal world”). For these reasons and others it is more fruitful to describe 
Israelite religion than seek to define it with a single term” (Heiser, 2006, pp. 1-2). 
 
מ 
(mem) 
םיכאלמ 
(L ← R) 
Servant angels  
ו 
(vav/vau) 
 
היהו 
(L ← R) 
YHWH, Yahweh 
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Abstract 
Relationships amongst Science, Ethics and Polis in Pre-Modern Times 
The major aim of the enquiry is to effect a multiple-voice interpretation of conditions of 
political philosophy both prequel to, and then metamorphosing coincident with, a new 
era discerned emerging during the times of Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. Political 
philosophy prequels are detected, measured and tracked within an enquiry method 
constructed for such purposes. Three key terms—Science, Ethics and Polis—are central 
to the whole enquiry (a) because key terms meanings and interrelations amongst them 
generate those political philosophy prequels, and (b) because those same key terms 
meanings and interrelationships inform three Thesis Proposition Statements articulated 
and evaluated throughout the enquiry. The key terms are shown to contain both esoteric 
and exoteric dimensions and within the method, esoteric key terms nuance is 
sequentially and consistently transformed into political philosophy through chapeau 
questioning of three elements of esoterism inhering in each key term. As the enquiry 
progresses, and prequel political philosophies emerge, geographies of mind intrinsic to 
them are brought to a common neuroscientific base for comparison purposes, this 
linking process serving the enquiry’s minor aim which focuses on philosophy’s ongoing 
efficacy in analysis of human condition and Polis.  
The enquiry proceeds as follows: first political philosophies representative of the times 
of Plato and Aristotle (BC 384 – 322) are derived from works written during the period 
from Homer (circa 8th century BC) to Aristotle (BC 384 - 322) inclusive, and from 
recent scholarship about those works. Next follows articulation of perceived ongoing 
change of Aristotelian political philosophy coincident with (a) intermingling of Greek, 
Jewish and Christian traditions from after Aristotle (BC 384 – 322) to the time of 
Augustine (AD 354 – 430), and (b) the spread of monastery and cathedral school 
education, rediscovery of Aristotle and the wider Greek tradition in the West, and 
transition of cathedral schools into universities in the centuries after Augustine. In the 
time from Aristotle to Augustine a transition from political philosophy predicated on 
rational Ethics and an impersonal god to one predicated on faith Ethics and a personal 
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God is conjectured to have occurred. After Augustine an integrated, complex, erudite, 
unified political philosophy representative of the time of Thomas Aquinas (AD 1225 - 
1274) is conjectured unravelling and fracturing by the time of Jean Buridan (AD 1300 - 
1358). In turn, re-emergence of experimental Science conjectured to have occurred 
during the period from Albert Magnus (AD 1193 - 1280) to Isaac Newton (AD 1643 - 
1727) is discussed and its possible contributions to emerging political philosophy are 
evaluated in the light of works by Francis Bacon (AD 1521 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes 
(AD 1588 - 1679). Other influences are acknowledged and brought to the enquiry in the 
form of multiple-discipline, multiple-voice constructions of exoteric backgrounds—
historical events, specific discoveries, well documented scientific inventions, artworks, 
military battles and the like—amongst which exoteric backgrounds, progressively 
measured esoteric prequels and their attendant political philosophies are situated for time 
marking purposes. A discernibly new political philosophy is detected emerging during 
the lifetimes of Bacon and Hobbes, and is conjectured so different in nature from any of 
those identified, long standing, integrated, political philosophy prequels that developed 
incrementally over the preceding two millennia so as to signal their quickening decline 
coincident with dawning of a new era.  
Qualified conclusions are derived and, within constraints imposed by the constructed 
methodology, and in fulfilment of the minor aim, questions are raised about 
contributions philosophy may make to ongoing investigation of human condition and 
Polis.  
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Introduction 
Relationships amongst Science, Ethics and Polis in Pre-Modern Times is the title given 
to this enquiry into Pre-Modern heritage and its basis for, and possible contributions to, 
fundamental conditions from which a new era, subsequently named the Modern Age, 
may have begun its emergence. The enquiry does not then identify tenets of modernism 
and search for their Pre-Modern origins. 
Rather its focus is on Western political 
philosophy prequels to what later was to be 
called Modernism, and detection of a new era 
through application of an analytical method 
to derive those prequels, a new method 
developed independently of them and of what 
is now called a Modern Age.  
The major aim of the enquiry is to effect a 
multiple-voice interpretation of conditions of 
political philosophy both prequel to, and then 
metamorphosing coincident with, emergence 
of a new era subsequently named the Modern 
Age. There is one minor aim, namely to 
focus, from a geography of mind perspective, on mankind’s struggle with the fact-value 
and theory-action divides, and glean from that focus and from insights gained from 
ongoing application of enquiry methodology, an opinion about contributions philosophy 
might offer to ongoing enquiry about human condition and consciousness, and twenty-
first century speculation about Polis.  
The major aim is effected by articulating meanings of, and relationships amongst, 
Science, Ethics and Polis through engagement with socio-cultural, socio-political and 
socio-physical conditions that may have informed these meanings and relationships from 
the times of Presocratic thinkers and Plato (BC c.428 – c.348) up to and including the  
 
Enquiry Usage of Esoteric and Exoteric  
Esoteric 
Of ideas as opposed to materiality, thus Plato’s city of ideas 
is esoteric and Pericles’ beautiful physical Athens is 
exoteric. Likewise Plato’s Science qua soul’s beholding of 
forms is esoteric while his own reliance on watertightness 
to explain the soul’s imprisonment is, like Anaximander’s 
explanation of earthquakes in terms of physical elements 
rather than in terms of gods, exoteric. An esoteric Rousseau 
qua educator of youth might inhere in his artistic creation of 
Émile (Rousseau, 1918). An exoteric Rousseau qua 
educator of youth might reveal itself in his depositing 
children in an orphanage or poorhouse say. An exoteric 
Rousseau may too reveal itself in a French education 
system partly informed by that work Émile (Rousseau, 
1918) years after books by that name were burnt.  
Exoteric 
Actual as sensed rather than ideal as thought about, the 
making or doing of, rather than the thinking of alone.  
 
This enquiry contains a posit that while differentiation 
between esoteric and exoteric in the manner explained is 
plausible for discussion purposes yet the esoteric and 
exoteric inform one another, the nature of the bridge 
between them constituting a perpetual conundrum. 
 
Enquiry methodology’s employment of an esoteric/exoteric 
divide is discussed further on pages 186 to 189. The manner 
in which enquiry usage of these terms differs from their use 
elsewhere in the literature is discussed on page 184. 
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times of Francis Bacon (AD 1521 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 - 1679). 
Science, Ethics and Polis are key terms and engagement is understood as interpretation 
of selected and justified texts germane to these terms, and analysis and application of 
philosophical and other-discipline construct 
considered relevant for enquiry purposes. The 
enquiry progresses by bringing traced and 
articulated nuance in these key terms to 
reiterative interpretation of three Thesis 
Proposition Statements containing those terms, of 
which more later in this Introduction and Chapter 
2.  
Foundational attributions of enquiry key terms, 
and other important ancillary terms, inform the 
enquiry. Science means the pursuit of true 
knowledge—knowledge of that which can be no other. Ethics means correct action and 
just desire in personal and social affairs, and Polis means political gathering. Political 
philosophy is critical moral evaluation of political 
gathering. These foundational meanings 
attributions, which do not change over the 
duration of the enquiry, are derived from a 
number of sources and are further clarified as the 
enquiry progresses. Each of these key terms is 
postulated to have an esoteric dimension and an 
exoteric dimension and, after qualifications are made and caveats drawn, and even 
though the foundational key terms attributions apply to both dimensions, the enquiry 
focusses on the former of these, that is, on the esoteric dimension. The accompanying 
dialogue box on page 1 provides a working explanation of the distinction between the 
words esoteric and exoteric as these are employed in this enquiry, of which more later. 
The term Pre-Modern refers to the first of the three era names explained in the dialogue 
box on page 2, such names being widely and conventionally used to categorise 
 
Geography of Mind? 
For example, all of the hierarchies constructed to 
help explain Bacon’s divisions of knowledge in 
Chapter 8, if joined together, constitute a geography 
of mind. Likewise the information in the text box on 
page 540, if converted into a chart, might better 
represent another geography of mind. Similarly the 
content of Table 23 on page 230 might form part of 
Aristotle’s geography of mind, if one dare be 
constructed from the five components of soul he 
names—nutrition, perception, cognition, imagination 
and desire—and interrelations amongst them, and 
one for Aquinas drawn up on the basis of 
interrelationships amongst the virtues outlined on 
page 416, and explanations of synderesis and infused 
cardinal virtues explained in the accompanying text. 
Hobbes has his Bacon-hierarchy equivalent and so 
too Kant and so on up to neuroscience’s ongoing 
mapping. This geography of mind construct is 
employed in a general maner in this enquiry under 
severe caveat only in respect of tentative articulation 
of the enquiry’s minor aim. 
 
 
Received Convention: Pre-Modern, Modern and 
Post–Modern Ages 
Pre-Modern 
The era from Hesiod (c. BC 750 – 65) to AD the 
1650s.  
Modern 
The era from circa the 1650s to circa the 1950s. 
 
Post-Modern 
The era from circa the 1950s to the present with 
postulations and urgings of emerging eras such as 
Digimodernism and Post Protomodernism. 
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development of Western society. The enquiry does not in respect of its first aim, except 
in some limited cases for benchmarking purposes, engage much beyond the times of 
Niccolò Machiavelli (AD 1469 – 1527), Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626), and Thomas 
Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679). That is, while a new political philosophy is discerned 
emerging amongst works by these authors, the enquiry does not follow that discerned 
emerging political philosophy’s continuance and change during the times of an era now 
referred to as a Modern Age. Thus the term Modern Age serves as no more than an 
arbitrary enquiry-purpose convenience to identify the Pre-Modern Age as an era in 
sunset in the second half of the seventeenth century. While ages may come and go, ideas 
may remain and subsequently reappear in new settings. P(p)olis, a marker derived from 
Polis qua esoteric gathering identifies a touchable, visible, and otherwise sensible 
exoteric human gathering including its constructions of bricks and mortar and its trades 
and skills, institutions, laws and regulations and the like. An enquiry such as this cannot 
help but approach its subject from a general position of hindsight.  
An unchanging and fixed ideas relationship hierarchy which binds the key terms 
together, and which applies in both esoteric and exoteric domains, also informs the 
enquiry. To wit, on the esoteric side, thinking about adjustment of societal arrangements 
aimed at improving conditions of gathering qua Polis begets political theory. Thinking 
about justly-desired right action to effect political theory begets Ethics theory and 
thinking about the purpose for which such adjustments might be made begets political 
philosophy, generally understood as critical moral evaluation of political gathering. 
Polis, political and ethical thought and political philosophy so linked qua esoteric 
knowledge domains can hardly be discrete categories and each also has its paired 
exoteric existential associate, respectively P(p)olis, policy strategy, ethical condition qua 
active state of being and politics which in turn generate an exoteric relationships 
hierarchy. Science, esoterically that which can be no other, whose source is reason, 
inheres everywhere within the esoteric relationships hierarchy and when sought for 
exoterically is postulated found in various forms of applied scientific method.  
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The thinking of Polis and the making of P(p)olis inform each other and the question of 
which came first, if indeed answerable in simple specification of one-before-the-other, is 
not considered crucial for enquiry purposes. Arrival of Polis/P(p)olis is postulated 
coeval with arrival of human consciousness and dawning apperception of mankind’s so-
called break from nature. In addition, focus on the esoteric dimension of these domains 
and their attributed ideas-relationships framework hierarchy inevitably, and sometimes 
involuntarily, invokes their exoteric associates.  
Again, foundational attributions of key terms meanings, and of an attendant ideas-
relationships hierarchy framing them, remain 
constant throughout the enquiry which yet 
attempts to track key terms nuance and carry it 
to progressive interpretation of the Thesis 
Proposition Statements outlined in the dialogue 
box on page 4, which Proposition Statements 
employ those key terms. Such a task, that is the 
task of tracking such nuance amongst 
attributed definitions and an ideas framework 
considered unchanging, might appear absurd—
a case of have-your-cake-and-eat-it, and a 
contradiction in terms—and is also discussed 
further in this Introduction and in Chapter 2 
where the enquiry’s methodology and its exoteric/esoteric divide construct are clarified 
further. Until then an analogy might help clarify the apparent contradiction. Were a 
house being discussed, the foundations qua unchanging base and framing patterning 
perimeter might represent the foundational attributions while subsequent above-base 
renovations and alterations might represent change or nuance. Nevertheless, analogy can 
only go so far and the enquiry is not about such exoteric constructs as houses and the 
like but rather about meanings of key terms words per se and ideas-relationships 
amongst them. Consequently, foundational attributions of key terms and their 
relationships framework might be considered as denotative meanings and tracked 
 
Thesis Proposition Statements(1) 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in 
the psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of 
reason is divine and for whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in 
natural social instinct implanted in mankind for whom 
virtue is some kind of knowledge.  
 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from 
scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical 
Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its new form 
as conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own 
right for direct benefits it could bring to society and 
state.  
 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity 
by Ethics as active obedience to the law of the state. 
 
Notes: (1) The term Modern Age simply marks an era 
posited arriving circa the 1650s and departing circa the 
1950s.  
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nuance as connotative variation. Of course foundations do crumble, that is root meaning 
can become lost under new layers, yet such an issue, briefly discussed further in Chapter 
2, is not considered fatal to enquiry methodology. Until then, traced incremental changes 
in key terms meanings and relationships and progressive interpretation of Thesis 
Proposition Statements in terms of these are intended to be understood within the 
boundaries and limitations of those denotative attributions of key terms meaning and 
ideas-relationships hierarchy earlier explained.  
I turn to general discussion of the context and scope of the three Thesis Proposition 
Statements and then to explanation of enquiry structure and chapter content.  
Context and Scope of Three Thesis Proposition Statements 
As earlier explained, the major aim is realised through articulation of Thesis Proposition 
Statements which in themselves frame enquiry scope. These Thesis Proposition 
Statements are: 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of 
reason is divine and for whom knowledge is power, which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in natural 
social instinct implanted in mankind for whom virtue is some kind of knowledge.  
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it could bring to society and state.  
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law of the state. 
These Thesis Proposition Statements emerge in part from reading Straus’s Political 
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, (L. Strauss, 1966) in part from uncertain notions, ideas 
and wonderings formed during undergraduate days, and in part from general reading and 
discussions with colleagues since those days. Although Strauss is mentioned, the enquiry  
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is not Straussian and Strauss’ 
subsequent acknowledgement of 
Machiavelli’s earlier-than-
Hobbes contribution to 
substantial change in political 
philosophy is acknowledged (L. 
Strauss, 1966, p. xv). 
Articulation of the Thesis 
Proposition Statements 1, 2 and 
3 by virtue of which the major 
aim is realised is effected 
through critical analysis of, and 
questioning engagement with, 
English translations of original 
works. 
Where such translations are not 
available I engage with scholarly 
commentary and opinion 
provided in English by writers 
fluent in the native language of 
those original works. 
For instance, in the case of say 
Abelard’s Theologia Christiana  
(Abaelardus, 2014) I engage 
with scholarly opinions and 
explanations provided by 
Ueberweg who lived closer to the times of these thinkers, who was fluent in Latin, and 
whose work continues to be read. I also consult some histories of philosophy, Ethics, 
 
Reading Caveats 
(1) In this enquiry I trace nuance of key enquiry terms Science, Ethics and 
Polis in the context of a development of Western ideas. There is engagement 
with writings of scholars who were also men of Churches. Nonetheless, the 
enquiry is primarily about political philosophy. The enquiry is not about 
theology, or creation, or so-called Post-Modern tensions between Science and 
religion and takes no sides, nor offers findings or criticisms in such matters. 
Rather the enquiry is simply an attempt to contribute to understanding of so-
called Pre-Modern conditions which may have helped occasion an emergence 
of a new era. The enquiry is also, inter alia, an attempt at an alternative 
approach to articulation of Western history of ideas from which to enquire into 
philosophy’s continuing efficacy for analysis of human condition and 
Polis/P(o)lis, and identify possible areas for future research..  
(2) I follow a convention of using lower case nouns and pronouns when 
referring to so-called pagan gods and first letter capitalisation thereafter. Thus 
Plato’s so-called one has a lower case first letter and is a god, rather than a 
God.  
(3) In parts of the enquiry I indirectly touch on expressed beliefs respectively 
important to Christians and/or peoples of Islamic and Jewish faiths. In such 
discussions, I may, in spite of my best efforts to the contrary, have used words 
which might offend. No offence is intended and deliberate pejorative 
interpretation of perceived theological or religious differences has no place in 
this enquiry.  
(4) Centre aligned font 10 small capital and lower case headings, rather than 
margin annotations, are provided as reading guides and aide memoirs. These 
devices are employed because in many of the chapters much development 
work has to be done before key terms nuance can be traced in a consistent 
manner. Even with these headings, some of the chapters take a long time to 
bring ideas together before getting to main points, but there is no escaping 
such apparent inertia which is dictated by the nature of the enquiry and the key 
terms developments investigated in it. Sections on Aristotle, Eriugena, 
Aquinas, Roger Bacon, and Francis Bacon are named in this respect. As noted 
in (5) below in this box, so-called in-text aids are employed to help alleviate 
this burden. 
(5) In-text aids to reading include first letter capitalisation of key terms 
Science, Ethics and Polis, italicisation of foreign words and book titles, 
frequent use of the word so-called as a qualifier to signal underlying 
contestation and/or invite interpretive caution, occasional use of single 
inverted commas to alert possible presence of additional connotative meaning, 
or that a seemingly out-of-place word usage is intended. Numbers in square 
brackets, for example [5], may form part of conventional translations of 
writers like Plato and Aristotle. Square bracket inclusions other than these are 
identified within citations by the words “my square brackets”, or “my brackets 
or “my round brackets’ as the case may be. 
(6) Text boxes are used to carry forward and repeat information developed in 
earlier chapters when such information is referred to again in enquiry text, 
after pages of dormancy. Background information and/or contention is also 
sometimes included in text boxes and tables so as to separate it from main 
ideas flow. Summary tables throughout the chapters are designed to provide 
helpful guides to tracking of key terms nuance and integrating articulation of 
Thesis Proposition Statements 1, 2 and 3 in terms of that nuance. 
(7) While historical background contexts provided serve as buoys to anchor 
developments in ideas, ideas-temporality takes priority over historical-events 
temporality in respect of enquiry focus. Likewise, in so far as it is possible to 
separate them, ideas themselves are sometimes of more importance than their 
respective progenitive ideologies.  
(This dialogue box continues on the next page.) 
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religion, church dogma, education and Science, and other literature, as guides to 
historical trends, conventions, etymology and countervailing opinion.  
Uncertainties about the hand or hands of authorship of classical and mediaeval texts, 
questions about quality of translation, and difficulty of divining accurate meanings of 
past usage of terms all 
constitute constraints to the 
enquiry. To countervail, I select 
well accepted and enduring 
translations of classical works, 
and refrain, unless where 
otherwise qualified, from basing 
claims on original works whose 
authorship is disputed. Such 
countervailing strategy is not 
necessarily without its own 
defects. Problems concerning 
authorship and temporality of 
scripture are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
The conclusions of most 
enquiry chapters contain tables 
of key terms nuance and 
progressive articulation of 
Thesis Proposition Statements 
to assist a reader to follow the integrating argument of the enquiry. When offered, 
discussion of historical events is designed to provide simple where-and-when beacons 
within an already mentioned esoteric approach taken in the enquiry, of which esoteric 
approach again more later in this Introduction and in Chapter 2.  
 
Reading Caveats (Continued) 
(8) The so-called ‘falls’ discussed in this enquiry, for example a fall of 
Aristotelian reasoned Ethics to Christian faith Ethics, are not falls in the sense 
of Khunian paradigm shifts. That is, newly arrived ideas do not completely 
annihilate old ones. Cultural richness and complexity is taken to increase by 
assimilating change and by accommodating and modifying ideas. 
(9) Illustrations employed serve as an open-ideas complement to the text, their 
chronology being generally relevant but of lesser importance. Facial likenesses 
are subject to sculpting and painting conventions which might obscure faithful 
representations. 
(10) Enquiry text is a mixture of active and passive voice and involves some 
use of first person for efficiency of expression purposes. In no cases is 
correctness or incorrectness of argument, opinion and the like asserted through 
use of the first person singular which when used has no intended egotistical 
content. The enquiry is performed as quiet exploration and learning in full 
acceptance of contestability of progressive claims and final conclusions. 
Writing condition is such that the writer is in the writing, whether present in the 
first person or covert through its absence.  
(11) In citations the abbreviation n. p. indicates that no page number can be 
provided because the source cited, being an electronic document or the like, 
carries no page numbers. Likewise the term n. d. indicates that the source cited 
does not provide its year of publication as is the case for an issue of the 
complete works of Francis Bacon issued over some ten or twelve years. 
(12) Curtin University rules governing submission of this PhD thesis prescribe 
American Psychological Association (APA) citation and referencing formats 
and the 6th edition of APA is the working default. Slight variation of APA 
format is used to accommodate in-text citation convention specific to such 
authors as Plato and Aristotle. In such cases two citations are always given to 
confirm translated meaning and the name of the work is provided together with 
further information about book and/or chapter and/or chapter line details within 
the work. For example in the in-text citation Metaphysics XI 7 1064a30 – 35 
(Aristotle, 1952, p. 592;Aristotle, 1989) Metaphysics is the title of the work, XI 
the number of a book within the work, 7 is a chapter within that  book, 1064a30 
– 35 specifies line sections within that chapter and the bracket content specifies 
publication/reference list details, one of the two bracketed references always 
containing a page number to satisfy APA requirements. Sometimes chapter 
number is not provided. Similar slight variation is used for other ancient writers 
and also in some cases for Bacon and Hobbes.  
(13) Caveat 13, which addresses the manner in which Damasio’s Self Comes to 
Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (Damasio, 2010) is used as a basis for 
comparison of earlier geographies of mind, is contained in a dialogue box in 
Chapter 10 on page 613.  
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In all enquiry chapters except Chapter 2, a general component provides background and 
context, and a specific component traces key terms nuance, changing key terms 
relationships meanings and progressive articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
against that background, summary tables provided in conclusions to these chapters being 
an outcome of that process. One set of summary tables presents key terms nuance 
progressively drawn from chapter content. A second set of summary tables presents 
progressive articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements 1, 2 and 3 in the light of that 
captured key terms nuance outlined in the first summary tables. Placement of summary 
tables of key terms nuance and progressive articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
in chapter conclusions constitutes a general pattern partly developed in Chapter 1, 
explained further in Chapter 2 and fully present in each of Chapters 3 through 9. 
Important general qualifications to enquiry structure, delivery, process and procedure are 
provided in the accompanying reading caveats box continuing over pages 6 and 7. 
General discussion of such issues of who, dialogical Socrates vis a vis Plato, originally 
generated ideas, and of a correct chronological order of Platonic works containing such 
ideas, is generally discussed in the dialogue boxes on pages 9, 10, and 11 provided for 
background referent purposes when such issues are subsequently raised in the enquiry 
on pages 109, 142 and elsewhere briefly in passing.  
The minor aim depends on progress and completion of the major aim so that further 
discussion of the minor aim is postponed until Chapter 10. 
Explanation of Enquiry Structure Begins 
The enquiry is divided into three parts.  
Part One consists of Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and begins with discussion about emergence of 
Polis from nature, a Presocratic flowering of Science as knowledge of the natural world, 
and notions of Science and Ethics inherent in philosophy emerging in Plato’s time. After 
engagement with works by Plato and Aristotle Part One ends with a statement of 
Aristotelian political philosophy. By building on Plato, Aristotle had developed a 
political philosophy that remained influential for some two millennia. 
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In particular, in Chapter 1 I first examine three kinds of philosophical enquiry said to be 
extant during the time of Plato’s life and 
search for information each reveals about 
the nature of Science and Ethics in those 
times. Both Science and Ethics are found 
to be conditions of soul. Because 
philosophical enquiry per se is said to 
have emerged from primitive religion as a 
logical consequence of growth and 
development of human settlements, the 
chapter’s enquiry also ventures beyond 
that extant philosophy in search of first 
principles of Science and Ethics.  
Taking the lead from Cornford that first 
stirrings of soul are found in an awareness 
of otherness and out of body feeling said 
to accompany ritual frenzy, an attendant 
claim is investigated, namely, that the 
origins of Science and Ethics themselves 
are inherent in natural law, that is, in 
practices emerging from a need to obtain 
sustenance from tribal habitat and place. 
If my interpretations of the Cambridge 
Ritualists and Aristotle are valid then it appears that neuroscience, as represented by 
Damasio, has arrived in a similar place (Damasio, 2010, pp. 2 – 152, 159 - 160). 
Chapter 1 also articulates possible then-extant usage of some clearly defined terms 
considered germane to philosophy in Plato’s times. These terms—justice, virtue, god 
and happiness—are subsequently used to engage with some of Plato’s works, and with  
 
Dating Plato’s Works and Managing a Dialogical 
Socrates/Plato Divide  
Dating of Plato’s works in the manner of say Jowett (1892, pp. 
xxix – xxxvii) or Guthrie (1975b, pp. 39 - 56) bespeaks a 
received convention in which Plato’s development, variously 
defined, is gleaned from his works chronologically ordered, 
relatively, into early, middle and late groups. Received 
scholars, commenting or building on this tradition, for 
example, Fine (1999, pp. 200 – 226), Irwin (1977, passim; 
1992, pp. 51 - 89; 1995, passim), Kahn (1981, pp. 305 – 320; 
1988, pp. 69 - 102), Tarrant (1982, pp. 2 - 22; 1994, n. p.) and 
Vlastos (1957, pp. 496 – 516; 1988, pp. 362 - 396; 1991) have 
contributed to articulation and refinement of this convention.  
 
In this relative chronology tradition, early works, in so much 
as they differ from late works, may, inter alia, allow insights 
into both the character and ideas of that man Socrates, while 
middle, and/or now-called transition dialogues, together with 
later dialogues, may provide further insights about Socrates, 
and about Plato’s own development and breaking away from 
the so-called spell of Socrates. For example, the development 
of the theory of ideas outlined in Table 6 may owe much to 
Plato himself. There is in this convention an element of 
circularity in that exegesis of a Socrates/Plato divide might be 
employed to establish chronological order, and vice versa or if 
the question is one of dating, ideas development might be used 
to establish chronology and vice versa. Nevertheless the work 
is fine, insightful and impressive and in Jowett’s case (1892, p. 
xxxvii) recognises unity and development of Plato without 
imposing a system on him. Stylometric dating technique took 
a new step in line with emerging electronic computing 
technology, Brandwood (1990/2009) and Ledger (1989) being 
leading examples. Nails (1995) claims in her enquiry into how 
Plato might be read, and in respect of stylometric approaches 
to dating Plato’s works, that if Thesleff (1982) is right—
Thesleff’s stylometry is focussed on elements of biography 
and history and his work is hardly dominated by electronic 
computation alone—then no amount stylometric analysis will 
untangle Plato’s chronology (Nails, 1995, p. 6).  
 
Alternatively, if Ledger (1989) is right—Ledger investigates 
style by electronic stylometric methodology applied to 
counting letters, words and word strings—new levels of 
accurate dating of Plato’s works have arrived (Nails, 1995, p. 
6). If either Thesleff or Ledger is wholly right says Nails the 
other is wrong, and so to, leading developmentalist views 
(ibid., p. 6). As the accompanying text box on page 11 reveals, 
Ledger and Thesleff, who offer publication dates by year, 
differ about the number and chronology of Plato’s works. 
(This box continues on page 10.) 
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commentaries by other scholars, to derive detailed starting expressions of the enquiry 
terms Science, Ethics, and Polis. These meanings are used to help explain a manner in 
which Science and Ethics 
inform the political philosophy 
of a Platonic Polis. To wit: 
Science occurs when, through 
partaking of forms, soul arrives 
at knowledge of the beautiful, 
good and unchanging. Ethics 
occurs when wisdom, through 
discerning between what is 
harmful and unharmful, leads 
mankind to that which never 
harms and thereby facilitates 
achievement of right order, 
procedure and place in Polis, 
that is, with what the ancient 
Greeks called taxis and cosmos 
of Polis. Polis qua city of ideas 
and final cause of cognitive 
gathering, is predicated on four 
classic Greek values that inhabit 
soul. In an ideal Polis Science 
guides ethical choice that 
correctly leads mankind in 
obedience to law, justice and temperance. 
Some major methodological issues become apparent as Chapter 1 progresses, 
particularly that one commented upon earlier, concerning how, across an extended 
period covered by the enquiry, general consistency in key terms usage can be maintained 
in an enquiry predicated on capturing incremental changes in the meanings of those  
 
Dating Plato’s Works and Managing a Dialogical Socrates/Plato Divide 
(Continued) 
Nails (1995, p. 65) finds one point of general but not unanimous agreement 
between Ledger, Thesleff and traditional groupings—common acceptance, on 
the basis of style, of a group of dialogues, namely, Timeous, Critias, Sophist, 
Politicus, Philebus and Laws as late dialogues. Nails (1995, pp. 58, 59, 60, 
76) also provides examples of chronologies grouped under general names—
stylometric after Campbell (1867), Brandwood (1990/2009) and Ledger 
(1989); philological after Lesky (1966) and Thesleff (1982) philosophical 
after Fine (1999), Guthrie (1975b, pp. 39 - 56), Irwin (1977), Kahn (1981, 
1986, 1988), Kraut (1992), and Vlastos (1991), and a stand-alone example for 
Vlastos (1991) and provides clarifying analysis of similarities and differences 
amongst their chronologies and groupings. 
 
Keyser (1992, pp. 50 - 74), not without contestation (Clayman, Crane, & 
Guthrie, 1993, pp. 75 - 81), imagines a battlefield of dead or dying 
stylometries, (Keyser, 1992, p. 72), is sceptical towards stylometry in general 
and argues that practitioners of it appear not to know what they are doing on 
statistical grounds, Ledger and Brandwood in his view not being wholly 
innocent on this account. Questions about chronology, about interpretation 
based on style, philosophical content or historical likelihood, and about the 
Socrates/Plato divide are acknowledged in a variety of contexts (Annas, 1999, 
pp. 72 - 162; Cormack, 2006, pp. 7 – 16 then passim; Rutherford, 1995, pp. 1 
– 69).  
 
Whether back with Jowett and his caution against analysing words “without 
reference to their connection … [or by piecing] together different parts of 
dialogues in a purely arbitrary manner” (Jowett, 1892, p. xxxiii, my square 
brackets), or more lately with Nails’ caution against stylometry’s assumption 
of a linear development in Plato’s dialogues (Nails, 1995, pp. 97 – 98, 124 – 
127), stylometry narrowly defined qua computer analysis is not without its 
own issues. For example, Cryzbek (p. 66) is unable to succinctly define 
stylometry because of its own his-called unilinear and overlapping lines of 
development, let alone other issues of applied statistics per se (Eder & 
Rubicki, 2013, pp. 229 - 236; Herz & Bellaachia, 2014, n . p.). 
 
Notwithstanding such issues, and even acknowledging James’ modern claim 
that the only states of consciousness in which thoughts exist are personal 
consciousnesses (James, 1892, p. 153)—there being as many interpretations 
of words as there are readers or hearers, so that taken to extremes under 
radical constructivism say (von Glasersfeld, 1995, pp. 1 - 2) one of us, strictly 
speaking, is unable to tell the other where they might find the car keys—the 
whole subject is quite some treat, the purpose of this brief explanation being 
to provide explanatory and general background information only. Of course 
personal independent ideas appear to overlap sufficiently to solve most 
where-are-the-keys-type problems and Plato’s own confrontation with words 
and how to make them into meaningful definitions upon which thoughts 
might be shared is instructive in its own way.  
(This box continues on page 11.) 
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terms. How, under such circumstances, can key terms be consistently and meaningfully 
applied in articulation 
of the Thesis 
Proposition 
Statements 1, 2 and 
3? 
This question and 
others are addressed 
in Chapter 2 where 
the enquiry 
methodology 
generally discussed 
earlier on pages 2 to 
5, and again 
continuing below 
from this page until 
page 13, is further 
explained. In 
particular, esoteric 
meanings for Science, 
Ethics and Polis are 
measured by asking 
chapeau questions of 
three esoteric referent 
components 
attributed to each of 
those key terms, 
namely, cognitive 
method, cognitive domain of operations, and cognitive constraints. 
 
Dating Plato’s Works and Managing a Dialogical Socrates/Plato Divide (Continued) 
Comparative Chronologies of Absolute Dates of Platonic Works Thesleff v. Ledger 
Ledger (1989) Thesleff (1982, 1989) 
400? Lysis  
399 Death of Socrates  
Euthyphro  
(Minos)  
Hippias Minor  
395? Ion <392 proto-Republic2,3,5,7 
Hippias Major 392-1 (394-380) Polykrates's pamphlet 
Alcibiades 1 392 Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae 
Theages <390 Thrasymachus (later Republic1) 
Crito 390 Isocrates: founds school, Against the Sophists 
389 First visit to Sicily <389 Apology 
387? Founding of Academy 388-387 First visit to Sicily; Gorgias1 386 
Gorgias 386 Peace of Antalcidas; Menexenus1 (a speech) 
Menexenus Phaedrus1, Protagoras 1 (without prologue) 
Meno 384 Symposium1 (without prologue) 
Charmides Republic1,4 
Apology Meno 
Phaedo 380 Gorgias2 (Socrates's report dropped) 
Laches Phaedo 
(Hipparchus) Euthydemus 
(Amatores) Symposium2 
380? Protagoras Protagoras2 
Euthydemus Menexenus2 (prologues added) 
Symposium Lysis 
Cratylus Charmides 
Republic Theaetetus1 (narrated dialogue) 
Parmenides Cratylus 
369 Theaetetus Phaedrus2 (latter part added) 
 Theaetetus2 (Socrates's report dropped) 
Second visit to Sicily 367 Aristotle joins Academy 
366 Epistle 13  
365? Phaedrus 362 Parmenides (with second hand) 
361-0 Third visit to Sicily Republic2 
355? Philebus  
Clitophon 350s Republic completed 
354 Murder of Dion  
352-3 Epistles 7,3,8 "with secretary"25 
Sophist Timaeus (early 50s) 
Politicus Critias (early 50s) 
350? Laws Sophist (early 50s) 
Epinomis Politicus (early 50s) 
Timaeus Philebus (>354) 
Critias Epistle 7 (353-2) 
348-7 Death of Plato Laws (347) 
Notes provided by Nails: 25 = According to Thesleff: "school accumulation" or "semi-
authentic": Clitophon (379); 370s: Crito, Laches, Alcibiades 1, Theages, Hippias Minor, Ion; 
360s: Amatores, Eryxias, Euthyphro; Hippias Major (360); 350s: Epistles 2,3,4,6,8,13, 
Hipparchus, Sisyphus, Minos, Demodocus, De Virtute, De Justo; Epinomis (>347); L[edger]: 
parentheses = dubia/spuria. T[hesleff.]: superscripts = editions (Gorgias1, Phaedrus1, and 
Theatetus1 being narrated dialogues, the others as described).  
 
Source: Adapted by Ian Eddington from Nails, D. (1995). Agora, Academy and the Conduct 
of Philosophy. (p. 134). Springer: Dordrecht. (Nails, 1995). 
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The first chapeau question, how do I come to know, is asked of method. The second 
chapeau question, what do I come to know, is asked of domain of operations and the 
third chapeau question, what limits my knowing, is asked of constraints. 
These esoteric referents are short form expressions for particular mental procedures, 
processes and/or attendant cognitive domains. For example cognitive method refers to 
the mental process by which the esoteric key term produces human knowledge. Thus 
when the chapeau question, how do I come to know, is asked say of Aristotle’s Science, 
an answer might be for example ‘by syllogistic reasoning of universals from universally 
commensurate premises’. Likewise an answer to the same chapeau question asked of 
Aquinas’s Ethics might be ‘by contingent will’s free choice of means to ends under 
necessary will’s adherence to happiness as mankind’s end’.  
Domain of operations is short form for cognitive domain or domains in which particular 
forms of knowledge inhere and function, constraints is short form for cognitive 
impedance of method and operations. Answers to respective chapeau questioning of 
these three esoteric referents for each key term completes a profile or measure of key 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF A CHAPEAU QUESTIONING PROCESS TO DERIVE ESOTERIC KEY TERMS MEANINGS 
Chapeau Questions by Esoteric Referent(1) 
by Key Terms 
Esoteric Key Terms Meaning(2) 
(Generic Form of Answers to Chapeau Questioning of Esoteric Key Terms Referents) 
How do I come to know? Meth. 
S
cien
ce 
By the cognitive method by which Science provides knowledge. 
What do I come to know? Ops. 
The kind of knowledge Science provides and the cognitive domains or states in which 
it resides.  
What states and conditions 
of mind limit my knowing? 
Cons. States of human condition that impede method and operations in Science are identified. 
How do I come to know? Meth. 
E
th
ics 
By the cognitive method by which Ethics discerns knowledge of ethical condition. 
What do I come to know? Ops. 
The kinds of knowledge Ethics provides and the cognitive domains or states or 
conditions in which it resides.  
What states and conditions 
of mind limit my knowing? 
Cons. States of human condition that impede method and operations in Ethics are identified. 
How do I come to know? Meth. 
P
o
lis 
By the cognitive method by which Polis as final cause engenders intellectual like-
mindedness, that is intellectual gathering. 
What do I come to know? Ops. 
By the kinds of knowledge Polis provides and the cognitive domains and states in 
which it resides. 
What states and conditions 
of mind limit my knowing? 
Cons. 
States of human condition that impede method and operation in Polis are identified. 
Notes (1) Taken esoterically Meth. = Method = cognitive or pure method by which the term produces its knowledge; Operations = 
Domain of Operations = Cognitive Domains or states in which knowledge operates; Cons. = Constraints = cognitive impedance to 
attainment of Method and Operations. (2) Key terms meaning qua answer to chapeau questioning is given a generic explanation in 
this overview box and can be brought into sharper focus through a quick perusal of Table 11 on page 183 and its attendant text and 
Table 12 on page 186 and attendant text which illustrate esoteric key terms meanings derived by application of the method in Plato’s 
case. Change in key terms meaning discerned through progressive application of the method to writer after writer is the surrogate 
measure of nuance employed in this enquiry in the manner illustrated in the method overview box on page 609. 
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terms meaning. Caveats discussed in Chapter 2 accompany the esoteric key terms 
referents. Change detected in esoteric key terms meanings progressively so measured 
becomes the enquiry’s surrogate measure of key terms nuance, the combined impact of 
this nuance being a surrogate measure of changing political philosophy by virtue of the 
presence of the three esoteric key terms in the Thesis Proposition Statements being 
articulated. A general overview of the chapeau questioning process is given in the 
diagram box on page 12 and further clarified in complementary boxes on pages 183 and 
609 and their surrounding texts. 
Chapter 3 focuses on Aristotle and his demolition of Plato’s journey-of-soul explanation 
of noesis. I suggest that Aristotle achieved this end by allowing human reason to access 
eternal forms in nature beginning with a premise that individual beings exist, and 
continuing on to develop a unified political philosophy based on detailed explanations of 
Science, Ethics and Polis predicated on mankind’s psyche and inherent social being. The 
chapter first addresses Aristotle’s argument that form brings name to matter and that 
human understanding is made possible when human reason accesses the forms in 
composite beings. It then continues in articulation of Aristotle’s system of rational 
Ethics wherein reason informs desire under practical reason’s cognitive appeal to 
scientific reason and theoretical wisdom, when it, practical wisdom, is confronted with 
challenges arising in the realm of the lower moral virtues.  
In next explaining Aristotle’s foundation of Science as a process of induction and 
subsequent deduction operationalised through syllogistic method, the chapter proceeds 
to an interpretive understanding of the role of Science and Ethics in his political 
philosophy. Aristotle announces a Polis which, because it is none other than a 
development of a natural social instinct implanted in mankind, and also because of 
political mankind’s penchant for justice with happiness, holds out promise of a gathering 
that is stable and good.  
Chapter 3’s derived understanding of Aristotle’s political philosophy is essential to 
ongoing articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements 1, 2, and 3 which, en précis, 
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express a general view that a new era might be discerned emerging coincident with, inter 
alia, (a) Polis as a natural state being met by Polis/P(p)olis as an artificial state, (b) 
Science’s estrangement from Ethics and theology, and (c) Ethics’ estrangement from 
theology.  
Part Two of the enquiry consists of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and in it I enquire into changing 
meanings of, and relationships among, Science, Ethics and Polis that occurred first 
during the seven centuries from Aristotle’s lifetime (BC 384 – 322) to Augustine’s 
lifetime (AD 345 – 430) and secondly, during the ten centuries from the lifetime of 
Augustine (AD 345 – 430) to that of Buridan (AD 1300 – 1358). 
The first time period from Aristotle’s earthy Polis to Augustine’s city of God is the 
subject of Chapter 4 wherein key terms and relationships meanings germane to Greek 
soul and its rational virtues are differentiated from key terms and relationships meanings 
germane to Christian Logos and its faith virtues. Chapter 4 contains interpretive 
understanding of the ways in which Christian faith virtues might be said to have 
subsumed classic rationalist Greek virtues. After first tracing possible Persian influence 
on Judaism in consolidation I discuss intermingling of Greek and Hebrew traditions and 
ongoing fusion of that intermingling with Christianity in development and suggest that, 
through these latter encounters, Aristotelian rational moral virtues were displaced by, 
even partly transformed into, absolute virtues of faith, and that theology alienated 
philosophy and sidelined Aristotelian Science. This reported change from virtues of 
reason to virtues of faith is postulated coincident with waning of Aristotle’s four-causes 
explanation of being in favour of a moral teleology informed by God in Christ as the 
cause and explanation of all in all. Faith virtue is depicted as permeating a rational 
Greek soul while revealed truth is depicted as deposing reasoned scientific truth about 
the natural world. In turn, Polis became a heavenly gathering and final cause of 
attainment of grace through personal acceptance of God through Christ as Logos. 
Chapters 5 and 6 contain discussion of that earlier mentioned second era from Augustine 
(AD 345 – 430) to Buridan (AD 1300 – 1358) which discussion addresses a slow 
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rehabilitation of Science and its attendant reason and how this occurred under a 
restraining patronage of revealed faith, and vicariously through a re-emergence of 
experimental method. There is some continuing focus on elucidation of that process by 
which classical Greek rational virtues might have been usurped by revealed faith virtues. 
I accept a view that a unified relationship amongst Science, Ethics and Polis was 
developing during this time of rehabilitation of Science, and that reason, through the 
new position of influence Science’s rehabilitation allowed it, together with a re-
emergence of experimental method itself, were soon to participate in destabilisation of 
Aristotelian political philosophy.  
Chapter 5 which covers the time from Augustine (AD 345 – 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 
– 1142), employs historical records and commentary on curriculum structure, content 
and teaching method in monastery and cathedral schools to assist in considering ways in 
which reason was employed to defend church dogma. I suggest that by the close of the 
twelfth century, reason was once again indispensable to Ethics. Although revealed truth, 
faith Ethics, and the heavenly Polis were to maintain a dominant position for a long 
time, reason, Science as syllogistic logic, was gradually becoming known as dialectic, 
and steadily being found indispensable to the needs of the authorities. 
In Chapter 6, which covers the time from Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) to Buridan (AD 
1300 – 1358) in the context of a return to the West of Aristotle’s wider corpus, I discuss 
how Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) and Aquinas (AD 1225 - 1274) allowed that human 
mind can obtain objective truth through God’s gift of divine reason. Aquinas’ detailed 
explanation of Science as syllogistic demonstration and his teaching that Ethics involves 
will’s free choice of means to ends in search of happiness are also discussed. In 
Aquinas’s system, in which reason is compatible with faith, this explanation is given a 
more complex expression: Science is syllogistic demonstration a priori and a posteriori 
and Ethics is contingent will’s free choice of means to ends under necessary will’s 
adherence to happiness as mankind’s end.  
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In particular, Chapter 6 contains an interpretation of the nature of relationships amongst 
Science, Ethics, theoretical reason, syllogistic reasoning, and practical reason or 
prudence in Aquinas’s system as well as discussion of Aquinas’ detailed explanation 
that through adherence to theological virtues and God’s gift of grace, mankind might 
enter an eternal Polis and city of God. Aquinas’ explanation of entry to Polis is complex. 
Wisdom or theoretical reason, and Science or syllogistic reasoning, under the intellect’s 
necessary adherence to first principles of understanding, counsel practical reason called 
prudence. Prudence in its own way, under the intellectual appetite of the will’s necessary 
adherence to precepts of natural law, determines, through syllogistic reasoning, choice 
of best means to ends. When such ethical reasoned choice is made in grace and under 
infused theological virtues, mankind is prepared for entrance to an eternal Polis and city 
of God.  
Chapter 6 also conjectures that Aquinas’ system began to unravel under the influence of 
John Duns Scotus (AD 1274 – 1308), William of Ockham (AD 1289 – 1349) and Jean 
Buridan (AD 1300 – 1358). I discuss how this unravelling allowed Science, 
metaphysics, and philosophy to win their freedom from theology when Duns Scotus 
(AD c. 1265 - 1308) announced that theology was a practical rather than a speculative 
faculty, and a faculty capable of direct perception of principles. I propose that Ockham’s 
revival of nominalism, and his argument that universals exist nowhere in reality, also 
further questioned Aristotelian understanding of Science as knowledge of universals and 
discuss how, in part, this challenge prepared a way for emergence of natural Science as 
syllogistic reasoning about relationships amongst individual phenomena. Under Buridan, 
reason alone no longer separates mankind from the beasts. The will now plays a 
dominant role. 
Chapter 6 is, as well, an interpretation of the last Pre-Modern political philosophy. 
Aristotle had been given modified residence in a heavenly Polis and city of God, which 
city was soon, under reasoned questioning by clerical and secular minds alike, to lose 
efficacy as an explanation of final cause of moral behaviour. The Part Two explanation 
of the possible nature of a transformed Aristotelian system provides insight into how 
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Aristotelian political philosophy lost much of its influence in an era when Science was 
expelled from theology and dogmatic rules were set against change. It is an important 
preparation for further elucidation of thesis Propositions 1, 2 and 3. 
Part Three of the enquiry consists of Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
Chapter 7 focuses on re-emergence of experimental Science during the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries and emergence of new applied scientific methods that occurred in 
the period from Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) to Newton (AD 1643 – 1727). I suggest that 
natural philosophy was turning into natural Science and that this development, in the 
ferment of humanism, was soon to be part of a mix of so-called isms. 
Chapters 8 and 9 respectively focus on works by Francis Bacon (AD 1521 - 1626) and 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 - 1679) in whose combined writings I find a beginning 
estrangement or separation of Science from metaphysics and Ethics, and of Ethics from 
theology. I also find in works by Bacon (AD 1521 - 1626) and Hobbes (AD 1588 - 
1679) elements of a new political philosophy and detect in these elements a political 
philosophy so different from scholastic accumulation of Aristotelian philosophy as to 
signal dawning of a new era.  
Machiavelli’s works The Prince (Machiavelli, 1968) and Discourses on Levy 
(Machiavelli, 1996) can also serve to signal emergence of a new era (Bloom, 1983a, 
Lecture 1 of 5 audiorecording, n. p.; Fischer, 2006, pp. xxxiv - xxxvi; Hornqvist, 2004, 
pp. 225, 275; L. Strauss, 1966, pp. xv - xvi; Sullivan, 2000, pp. 41 - 44). Machiavelli is 
acknowledged but not discussed in detail. There is no counting mechanism on the 
digitally remastered Bloom lectures so that the citation of Bloom above carries no time 
lapse marker number. Yet within the first half of Lecture One of five available lectures 
Bloom adds Machiavelli (AD 1469 – 1527) to Hobbes (AD 1588 - 1679), Locke (AD 
1632 - 1704) and Rousseau (AD 1712 – 1778) as progenitors of liberal democracy. 
Explanation of the claimed Bacon-Hobbes shift is followed in Chapter 10 by discussion 
of the veracity of the Thesis Proposition Statements, original contribution or otherwise 
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made through the enquiry, achievement of enquiry aims, and implications of enquiry 
findings for further research in philosophy, after which the enquiry closes.  
Table 1 on page 18, which offers a summary of the articulation of Thesis Proposition 
Statements contained in this Introduction, is the first of a number of such tables given 
chapter by chapter as the enquiry progresses.  
Again, the Thesis Proposition Statements are:  
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of 
reason is divine and for whom knowledge is power, which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in natural 
social instinct implanted in mankind for whom virtue is some kind of knowledge.  
Table 1: Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements Begins 
 
INTRODUCTION 
# Proposition Statements Chapter 
Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to 
Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
arriving recognition of a binding sentiment of 
Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is divine 
and for whom knowledge is power, which 
recognition provides an alternative to a long 
held standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis 
is situated in natural social instinct implanted in 
mankind for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge.  
Introduction 
Foundational unchanging key terms meanings are 
established: The Modern Age is an era emerging circa the 
times of Francis Bacon (AD 1561 - 1626) and Thomas 
Hobbes (AD 1588 - 1679) and continuing to circa the 
middle of the twentieth century. Polis means cognitive or 
esoteric political gathering. P(p)olis is a marker derived 
from Polis qua esoteric gathering and it serves to identify 
either (a) a touchable, visible, manufactured, constructed or 
exoteric gathering of humans including for example their 
constructions of bricks and mortar, and their institutions and 
regulations and the like, or (b) illness of fit of the term Polis, 
depending on the context in which it is used. Political 
philosophy is critical moral evaluation of political gathering. 
Articulation of divine is not yet begun. Articulation of virtue 
is not yet begun.  
2 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident 
with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science 
ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its 
own right for direct benefits it could bring to 
society and state.  
Introduction 
Attribution of the Modern Age as the era from circa the 
times of Bacon (AD 1561 – 1621) and Hobbes (AD 1588 – 
1679) until circa the middle of the twentieth century. 
Articulation of metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Foundational attributions of meaning: Science means the 
pursuit of true knowledge—knowledge of that which can be 
no other. Ethics means correct action and just desire in 
personal and social affairs.  
Articulation of practical Ethics is not yet begun. 
3 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law 
of the state. 
Introduction 
Modern Age as the era emerging from circa the times of 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 - 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (AD 
1588 - 1679) until circa the middle of the twentieth century. 
Foundational attribution of meaning: Ethics means correct 
action and just desire in personal and social affairs. 
Articulation of practical Ethics is not yet begun.  
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(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it could bring to society and state.  
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law of the state. 
In Part One next following I turn to the work of Chapter 1. 
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Part One 
 
 
 
Early Transition from Religion to Philosophy, Socratic Turning and 
Subsequent Emergence of a Unified Political Philosophy 
 of Aristotle (BC 384 – 322)
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Chapter 1 
Movement from Religion to Philosophy, Emergence of Science and Ethics, and 
their Presence in Plato’s Political Philosophy 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
In this chapter I trace development of relationships between Science and Ethics from the 
end of the Greek Dark Ages, heralded in with the first Olympic games circa BC 776, 
through the entire Archaic Period from BC 750 to Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in BC 
480, to Plato’s life (BC c. 428 – c. 348) in the Classical Period, which period is taken as 
the time from the fall, in BC 510, of Hippias, the last tyrant of Greece, to the death of 
Alexander the Great in BC 323. In order to better articulate an Ethics-of-place theme 
that emerges as the chapter progresses I also venture beyond the so-called Dark Ages to 
search for origins of Science, morality and Ethics in natural law preconditions for human 
settlements.  
I draw on insights provided by received authors—for example (Ackrill, 1980, 2001; J. 
Adam, 1908; Annas, 1981, 1982; Barnes, 1982, 1987; Bloom, 1968a, 1983a; Brisson, 
1995a; Burkert, 1968, 1972, 1985; Caird, 1904; Cherniss, 1935, 1945, 1951; F. M. 
Cornford, 1923, 1932, 1957, 1967; Dodds, 1951; Durkheim, 1915; Fraser, 1925; 
Freeman, 1948; Gadamer, 1980b; Gomperz, 1901-12; Grube, 1935; Guthrie, 1952, 1962, 
1965, 1975a, 1975b; J. E. Harrison, 1905, 1908; James, 1902; C. H. Kahn, 1960; Kirk & 
Raven, 1957; Linforth, 1941; McGahey, 1994; Naussbaum, 1985, 1992; Oakeshott, 
1933, 1975b; Reinach, 1909, 1912; H. J. Rose, 1936; W. D. Ross, 1930, 1961; Rouse, 
1940; J. Sandys, 1915; L. Strauss, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1987; Swanson, 1974; Voegelin, 
1957; Zuntz, 1971) and others; on translations of some of the works of Plato or imitators 
of Plato, Timaeus, Cratylus, Phaedrus, Ion, Meno, Phaedo, Philebus, Republic, Laws, 
Seventh Letter, Alcibiades I and II (Plato, 1921a, 1925c, 1925e, 1925f, 1925h, 1952c, 
1952h, 1952j, 1952l, 1952n, 1952o, 1952p, 1952r, 1952w, 1966c, 1967c, 1967/68a, 
1969a; Plato or an imitator of Plato, 1952, 1955, 1966, 2006); on translations of some of 
the works of Aristotle, or imitators of Aristotle, for example Metaphysics, Physics, On 
Generation and Corruption, Nicomachean Ethics, De Anima, Meteorology, On 
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Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias, acknowledged as spurious, (Aristotle, 1926, 1936a, 
1952b, 1952d, 1952e, 1952f, 1952g, 1952i, 1952n, 1984b, 1984c, 1989, 2005; Aristotle 
or another, 1984b); on translations of Aeschylus—the Oresteia and Prometheus Bound 
(1893, 1912, 1926c, 1977), Homer—Iliad and Odyssey (1898, 1915, 1924, 2008), 
Virgil—Aeneid (1910; 1997), Ovid—Metamorphoses (1826, 2008), Nonnos—
Dionysiaca (1940a, 1940b, 1942), and Sophocles—Antigone and Oedipus the King 
(1887a, 1887b, 1891, 1900, 2003a, 2003b); and on the work of received scholars 
continuing to contribute mainly since 2000, for example (Baltzly, 2009; Bernabé, 2007a, 
2007b, 2011, 2012; Bernabé 2013; Bernabé, 2004; Bernabé & Jiménez San Cristóbal, 
2008, 2010; Betegh, 2007; Borgeaud, 2004; Bradshaw, 2004; Burkert, 2004; Calame, 
1999, 2002; Carru, 2011; Casadio & Johnston, 2009; Cavero, 2009; S. M. Cohen, Curd, 
& Reeve, 2005; Cohn & Russell, 2012; Corcoran, 2006; Curd, 1996, 2007; Curd & 
Graham, 2008; de Jáuregui, 2010; Destrée & Herrmann, 2011; Dousa, 2010; R. G. 
Edmonds, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Flensted-Jensen, 2000; Freely, 2012; 
Graf, 2010; Graf & Johnston, 2007/2013; Graham, 2009, 2010; Griffith, 2008, 2009; 
Hopfe, 1994; Huffman, 2006, 2008; R. Janko, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 
2013; Kingsley, 1996; Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2002; McKirahan, 2005, 2011; 
Morford & Lenardon, 2003; G. Murray, 2004; M. J. Murray & Rea, 2008; Nachtegael, 
2013; Naddaf, 2005; Natali, 2013; Newbold, 2014; Oakeley, 2007; Obbink, 2010; Osek, 
2013; Pantel & Zaidman, 2002; R. Parker, 1995; Parker, 1997, 2007, 2011; Petsalis-
Diomidis, 2007; Propp, 2009; Riedweg, 2002, 2008; Roller, 1999; Sattler, 2011; Scalera 
McClintock, 1991; Schuré, 2010; Tarrant, 2000; Tortorelli Ghidini, 2006; 
Tsantsanoglou, 1997; Y. Z. Tzifopoulos, 2010; Uždavinys & Finamore, 2004; van 
Gennep, 2004; Vlastos, 1991; Waterfield, 2009; M. L. West, 2002) and others. The 
contributions of the second tranche of researchers consist of both original works and/or 
ongoing complementary and progressive articulation of those earlier cited first tranche 
works on which they are partly predicated. A wish to draw more from the contributions 
of scholars like those cited explains, in part, my decision, through this enquiry, to search 
out and understand the basic ideas of the great classical writers on which the 
contributions of the cited writers themselves are also partly predicated.  
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I have provided two citations for every quotation of a translated classical work and/or 
for every mention of such a work. In particular for Plato, except for the disputed Sixth 
and Seventh Letters, a Jowett citation is accompanied by a second one under the 
imprimatur of either the Loeb Classical Library, or the Perseus Digital Library project, 
or both. Thus Jowett’s elegant Victorian English and delicate smoothing of same sex 
relationships for example is balanced by more literal approaches. Likewise, cited 
translations of Aristotle’s works under the general editorship of W. D. Ross are paired 
with citations of those works contained in the Loeb Classical Library and/or Perseus 
Digital Library. Yet selecting translations under the imprimatur of these libraries does 
not necessarily resolve issues of translation. For example Bloom (1968b, pp. xiv-xviii), 
in his preface to his literal translation of The Republic takes Cornford to task on the 
appropriateness of his translation yet Cornford is one of the translators of Aristotle’s 
Physics in the Loeb Classical Library. 
Translator’s notes sometimes provided in 
the Perseus Digital Library project, and that 
project’s provision of Greek and English 
text and links to English-Greek lexicons, 
have been instructive and edifying.  
In general this chapter is an attempt at 
consolidation wherein, through discussion 
about a wide and diverse range of issues of 
the human condition, I establish some of the 
foundations on which the remainder of the enquiry and its thesis rest. In particular, I 
begin to articulate some of the word usage and context of the Thesis Proposition 
Statements. For the first Thesis Proposition Statement I investigate the meaning behind 
claims that reason is divine and that virtue is some kind of knowledge. For the second 
Thesis Proposition Statement I articulate Science understood as theoretical philosophy 
and Ethics understood as practical philosophy. Various approaches to interpreting Plato 
are discussed in Appendix I, located as a coda to Chapter 1. 
 
Thesis Proposition Statements 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the 
psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of reason is 
divine and for whom knowledge is power, which recognition 
provides an alternative to a long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in natural social instinct 
implanted in mankind for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge.  
 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific 
enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as conditional 
fact, Science becoming valued in its own right for direct 
benefits it could bring to society and state.  
 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
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In its work of consolidation outlined in the previous paragraph this chapter progresses in 
three steps. In Step 1 I examine the proposition that three divisions of philosophy were 
extant at the time of Plato’s life and that the emergence of the three divisions is coeval 
with a general transition from religion to philosophy. The first division, scientific 
philosophy, is interpreted as emerging from mankind’s interest in knowledge about the 
world for its own sake. The second division, ethical philosophy, is interpreted as 
emerging from mankind’s need to find the best way to live in communities. The third 
division, critical philosophy, is explained as an outcome of human introspection. I 
maintain that in its transition from religion, philosophy carried within itself 
preoccupations with nature or physis, with god or theos, and with soul or psyche, and 
that morality and soul are themselves extensions of natural law, that same kind of law 
that Science subsequently sought to understand. 
In Step 2 I describe Platonic usage of the terms justice, virtue, god, and happiness in 
some detail because they are germane to, and intended referential predicates for, a Step 3 
discussion of Science, Ethics and Polis. Specific meanings of non-English words used 
elsewhere in the enquiry, except for those constituting long quotations in French, are 
provided in an index beginning on page xii.  
In Step 3, in light of the explained Platonic usage of those terms, and against the 
background of the transition from religion to philosophy discussed in Step 1, I attempt 
an explanation of how Science as scientific philosophy, and Ethics as practical 
philosophy, inform the political philosophy of a Platonic Polis. Again the work of 
consolidation referred to earlier on page 23 occurs within an integrating exposition of 
the three steps. 
THREE DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY INTRODUCED AND CONSECUTIVELY EXPLAINED  
I begin Step 1 by drawing on claims by Guthrie (1975a, pp.16 - 21) and Diogenes 
Laertius (1925b, Prologue, 18; Yonge, 1915, pp. 11 - 12) that three divisions of 
philosophical enquiry were discernible at the time of Plato’s life. These three divisions 
are described in Table 2.  
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The speculative philosophy of Table 2 is also known as scientific philosophy because it 
consists of a curiosity driven interest in the physical world (Burnet, 1908, p. 28). It 
began to emerge in Ionia in the late seventh and early sixth centuries BC when high 
living standards and curiosity partly engendered through trade led the Greek Ionians into 
attempts to explain the world by reason rather than by magic (Burnet, 1908, pp. 37 - 38; 
Graham, 2009, pp. 1 - 2; Guthrie, 1975a, pp. 22 - 23; Kirk et al., 2002, p. 7; Sarton, 
1993, p. 162).  
Ionia, the Greek islands extending to and including the coastal regions of present-day 
Turkey, then geopolitically abutted the western 
extremity of the Persian Empire and as a result this 
early scientific or speculative curiosity-driven 
enquiry became known as Ionian materialism. Sarton 
additionally argues that Ionia at the time was 
essentially a new Crete, in essence not unlike the 
New England of the Pilgrim Fathers, and that the 
political environment the Cretan colonists made for 
themselves, together with the cosmopolitan 
geography of Western Anatolia, explains an 
emergence of curiosity-driven Science as knowledge for its own sake. Lindberg (2008, 
Table 2: Three Divisions of Philosophy Discernible at the Time of Plato’s Life 
 
Speculative or Scientific 
Philosophy 
Practical or Ethical and Political 
Philosophy 
Critical of Psychological 
Philosophy 
 
Mankind’s attempt to explain the 
macrocosm, the universe in which 
they live. It is largely speculative 
because it is driven by curiosity. 
 
 
Mankind’s attempt to explain the 
microcosm, mankind themselves 
and their nature and place in the 
macrocosm. It is largely practical 
because it is driven by a desire to 
find out how human life and 
conduct can be improved. 
 
 
Mankind’s attempt to understand the 
nature of their own minds and the 
implications of such understanding 
as it impacts on speculative and 
practical philosophy.  
 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Guthrie, W. C. K. (1975). The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. (pp. 16 – 
21). New York: Harper and Row; Hicks, R. D. (2008). (Ed.). Lives of Eminent Philosophers, (Prologue 18); Yonge, C. D. (Ed.). 
(1915). The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. (pp. 11 - 12). London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 
 
 
Source: (Raffaello, 1509). Diogenes the Cynic, 
cropped by Ian Eddington from Raffaello’s The 
School of Athens. (1509). (fresco). Stanza della 
Segnatura, Vatican City: Web Gallery of Art. 
Diogenes the Cynic, about whom Diogenes 
Laertius wrote, sits alone. 
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p. 12) finds the origins of Greek Science in Mesopotamia and Egypt but also counts the 
high literacy of Greek society as a factor in the flowering. 
The practical philosophy of column 2 of Table 2 has been called Italiote mysticism (F. 
M. Cornford, 1912/2009, p. vi; Orsucci, 2002, p. 14; Planinc, 2001, p. 99; Yonge, 1915, 
p. 10) because it is thought to have emerged from Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily as a 
heritage of mystic cults such as those of Orpheus and Dionysus of the 6th century BC, 
and later of Pythagoras in the 5th century BC (Bianchi, 1976, pp. 1-7; Casadio & 
Johnston, 2009, pp. 1 - 5). Italiote philosophy also includes Eleatic philosophy 
established at then Elea, now Velia, in southern Italy, variously associated with 
Parmenides (BC c. 510 – c. 450), Zeno (BC. c. 490 – c. 430), Melissus, (born c. BC 500) 
and Xenophanes (BC c 570 – c.475) and generally with the doctrine of unity of being 
likely posited by Melissus of Samos (DK 30B8.1-8.10) to admit a unified god among 
gods who, on the likely say so of Xenophanes of Colophon (DK 21B23-25), creates 
through thought. Euclid (BC 435 – 365) and others, mainly centered on the Greek town 
of Megara are said to have synthesised Eleatic and Socratic philosophy (Drozdek, 2007, 
p. 145; Lomas, 2013, p. 95).  
The critical philosophy of Table 2 is discernible in the dialogical Socrates’ turning to 
human nature in his search for answers to questions about the world around him, 
however as Janko persuasively argues, political and religious tensions may also be 
implicated, of which more later beginning on page 32. The earlier mention of the 
dialogical Socrates in this paragraph acknowledges a widely accepted tenet that Socrates 
left no writing for posterity.  
I discuss each of these kinds of philosophy in more detail beginning, in the next 
paragraph, with speculative philosophy. 
This speculative philosophy of curiosity driven knowledge about the real world is not 
the speculative philosophy Whitehead (1978, pp. 3 - 17) defined in his 1927 Gifford 
Lectures, which speculative philosophy Siebers (2002, p. 1) found more useful than ever 
in the first years of our present millennium (ibid., 15 – 18). Whitehead’s speculative  
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philosophy would admit and remodel all of the Table 2 categories under its own 
definitions and 
rigour. Nor is it the 
pursuit of holistic 
self- knowledge as 
Verene (2009, p. xiv) 
would define 
speculative 
philosophy. Rather 
the speculative 
philosophy of Table 2 
is its own flowering, 
that kind of human 
enquiry that may not 
have been destroyed in a night had Plato not fallen under the “spell of Socrates” 
(Nietzsche, 2007, pp. 123- 124). 
Schmidt (2001, pp. 150 - 153), drawing on Holderlin’s translations of Sophocles’ 
Oedipus and Antigone, now translated into English (Holderlin, 2001), focuses on 
Oedipus’ driven curiosity to know and offers him as a symbol of ancient Greece’s entry 
to the West and a trajectory of Western culture’s unfolding into a condition where 
incessant curiosity leads mankind to know more than it can bear. The end result for 
Oedipus is madness, a condition Holderlin himself is said to have experienced 
(Corngold, 2013, pp. 37 -54), other afflictions being postulated to explain his 
documented insanity. Holderlin’s translations have, until recently, been considered 
extreme but he is progressively being brought in from the cold (Pfau, 1988, pp. 1 - 3). 
Antigone was written circa BC 441, and Oedipus the King circa BC 431/30 and, as 
subsequent engagement with Janko’s work on the Derveni Papyrus beginning on page 
32 reveals, the last decades of the 5th century BC were so increasingly difficult for the 
survival of speculative or scientific philosophy as to dampen the curiosity and desire to  
Greek and Phoenician Settlements in the Mediterranean Basin about BC 550 
 
 
 
Source: Shepherd, W. R. (1923). Historical Atlas. (p. 12). New York: Henry Holt and 
Company. 
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know in new ways of quite some many. Subsequent discussion of Janko’s work reveals 
that a developing speculative or scientific philosophy, now beginning to be called 
Presocratic physics, was likely to 
have endured a social and religious 
backlash.  
The speculative or scientific 
philosophy under discussion is 
said to have begun its emergence 
at a time when religion, as the 
worship of the pantheon of 
Olympian gods, was practised as 
an accepted part of a State 
calendar of events, and except 
perhaps in Orphic cults, was not 
predicated on the basis of salvation through a personal soul (J. Adam, 1908, pp. 7 - 8; 
Barnes, 2002, p. xviii; Guthrie, 1975a, p. 82; Sarton, 1993, pp. 194 - 198). 
So called state calendar religion is also referred to as polis religion (Burkert, 1985, pp. 
246 -247, 216 - 272; Kindt, 2012; Schmitt Pantel & Bruit Zaidman, 1993, pp. xiv, 3 - 16; 
Sourvinou-Inwood, 2000a, 2000b)—the polis “anchored, legitimated and mediated all 
religious activity” (Sourvinou-Inwood, 2000b, p. 15) and there is renewed interest in 
polis-theory readings of Greek history (Vlassopoulos, 2007, pp. 52 - 63). Hereafter in 
this enquiry, except in quotations where author usage is respected, the term P(p)olis as 
opposed to Polis will signify an exoteric gathering within the context of the 
esoteric/exoteric divide employed for methodology purposes as explained on pages xv 
and 3. The esoteric/exoteric division catches all of the discussion of this paragraph so 
that in the present discussion the words state religion, polis religion and P(p)olis religion 
might be used interchangeability. P(p)olis in this sense is literally a town or city or city 
state as Xenophon for example uses the term (Nielsen, pp. 133 - 140) or historians in the 
late 5th and early 4th centuries BC (Hansen & Nielsen, 2000, pp. 141 - 150) used it.  
The Athenian Empire at its Height About BC 450 
 
 
Source: Shepherd, W. R. (1923). Historical Atlas. (p. 23). New 
York: Henry Holt and Company. 
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Henceforth in this enquiry Polis denotes an esoteric gathering and the term polis 
signifying a physical exoteric town or city is replaced by P(p)olis. For example, Plato’s 
esoteric Polis qua city of ideas articulated in The Republic IX 592a-b (Plato, 1952r, p. 
427; 1969a) might, by the time of Laws IV 711e - 712a 
(Plato, 1952j, p. 680; 1967/68c), be thought of as morphing 
towards a P(p)olis, Heaven excepted. 
This renewed scholarly interest in P(p)olis or state religion, 
together with Derveni Papyrus scholarship, which partly 
focuses on personal eschatology in cult religion and 
possible wider socio-religious and socio-political pressures 
impacting on state religion, provide an opportunity to test 
the validity of the general statement about state religion 
made in the opening sentence of the preceding paragraph 
namely, that speculative or scientific philosophy began its 
emergence at a time when religion, except in the cults, 
might be viewed as state calendar worship of a pantheon of 
gods. This validation occupies pages 29 to 38 after which I 
return to discussion of speculative philosophy broken off here.  
P(p)olis and Derveni Papyrus Research Insights into State Religion and Cults 
To wit: so-called cult religion with its attendant definitional difficulty is generally 
understood for the purposes of this enquiry as a form of religious praxis distinguished 
from that of official, or established religion through being perceived as different or 
deviant, whether in pejorative connotation or otherwise. Such an understanding, like that 
of duty of care in present times, is nevertheless workable even though it is predicated on 
circularity and its own moving benchmarks. The cult religions discussed in this chapter 
and elsewhere are some of those of ancient Greece and Rome which came to an end, and 
if not to an end then to a possible transformation, with the adaption by Christianity of 
cult-type initiation and confirmation rituals. I provide examples of such cult religions in 
the next paragraph, some being relevant to the period under discussion and others not, 
 
Nutshell Expression of 
Esoteric/Exoteric Divide 
Cities of ideas, cities of God are 
esoteric cities, cities of ports, 
harbours, legal frameworks and the 
like are exoteric cities. Rousseau rears 
children esoterically in his constructed 
Émile (Rousseau, 1918) and 
exoterically by abandoning them in an 
orphanage.  
 
Esoteric marks ideal dimensions, 
exoteric marks physically active 
and/or material dimensions. 
 
If it be accepted for simplicity’s sake 
that things and/or situations exist, that 
thoughts following things and/or 
situations, that words follow thoughts 
and that actions precede, accompany 
or follow words, then the esoteric is at 
the thinking end and the exoteric is at 
the being qua doing or action end. In 
this enquiry, in search of an esoteric 
Aristotle say, it is assumed than when 
Aristotle writes about nous as part of 
the divine in mankind he is sincerely 
expressing his thoughts, likewise 
Plato when he writes of a republic of 
forms. 
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and after that focus on Orphism in further articulation and assessment of the P(p)olis 
religion and personal eschatology claims accepted earlier.  
Examples of the kinds of cults under discussion are the so-called Orphic Mysteries 
dating from 5th to the 4th centuries BC (R. Parker, 1995, pp. 484 - 488) associated with 
the Zagreus Myth which records the creation of humans from the dust of the Titans 
destroyed by Zeus in punishment of their killing and eating all but the heart of Dionysus, 
and with Orpheus themselves, there being three of Orpheus, and Orpheus’s journey to 
Hades and back; the Pythagorean Mysteries, associated with reincarnation and 
immortality of the soul, dating from the 6th century BC; the Cult of the Mithras, in 
existence during the 1st to the 4th century AD duration of the Roman Empire, interpreted 
to be a mystery religion which might also be considered as one of the threats to arriving 
Christianity (Hopfe, 1994, p. 147), whether it moved from Babylon, in ancient 
Mesopotamia now in Iraq, through Phrygia, 
now part of Turkey, to Rome via returning 
Roman soldiers, slaves and freedom  seekers, 
rather than through mainland Greece, 
(Cumont, 1903b, pp. 10 - 12, 81 - 84), or 
whether Roman troops carried it eastwards 
(Hopfe, 1994, p. 156); the cults of the Sibyls, 
particularly that of Demo, the possible Sibyl 
of Cumae, Greek-colony prophetess of 
Apollo’s oracle at Cumae and associated with 
Aeneas’ arrival and progeneration of the 
Romans Metamorphosis XIII 624 – 681, XIV 
78 – 603, XV 437 – 861 (Ovid, 1826, 2008) 
and journey to the underworld Aeneid VI 
(Vergil, 1910; Virgil, 1997), some of the Sibyl’s ‘writings’ storied to have been acquired 
and held by Romans until burned in the 5th century AD in Rome; the Greek cult-
following of Cybele—Cybele being a possible continuation of an 8th century BC 
Mesopotamian earth-mother goddess depicted in art and subsumed into Greece from 
 
Notes: Cybele and her youthful Phrygian-capped 
consort Attis are seated in a chariot pulled by lions and 
accompanied by a possible ecstatic thiasos.  
 
Source Cropped by Ian Eddington from a photo taken 
by Giovanni Dall'Orto, in 2012 of the silver embossed 
plate known as Parabiago Patera circa AD 363 on 
display at the Museo Archeologico di Milano 
(Anonymous, c. AD 363).  
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Phrygia during and after the 6th century BC as Mētēr or mother and, perhaps through 
association with Rhia and Demeter (Roller, 1999, pp. 19, 174), subsequently attaining 
foreign god status (Burkert, 1985, p. 177) in Athens circa BC 500 (Borgeaud, 2004, pp. 
11 - 30) and in Rome during the last decade of the 3rd century BC. The Parabiago 
Patera pictured on page 30 is dated at circa AD 363, a time of revival of paganism in 
Rome. It depicts Cybele and her Phrygian-capped consort drawn by lions and leopards 
and accompanied by a likely ecstatic thiasos. While acknowledging Roman beliefs that 
their god Mithra was of Phrygian origin, more recent scholarship (Clauss, 2001, pp. 1,7) 
views the Roman mystery Cult of Mithra as a modern construction and distinguishes 
between it and the god Mitra or Mithra of Zoroastrianism, consolidating as a 
monotheistic religion circa the late sixth century BC.  
Notwithstanding some of the cults mentioned in the previous paragraph I mainly engage 
with recent studies of Orphism for further insights into personal eschatology in the 
presence of state religion and for possible caveats such insights may contain in respect 
of the validity of the received state religion theme under discussion, and more generally 
for the from-religion-to-philosophy claim being addressed in this chapter. For example, 
researchers have focussed on elements of personal or cult religion and practice which 
‘transcend’ the P(p)olis (Betegh, 2007, pp. 74 - 91; Bowden, 2010, passim; Graf & 
Johnston, 2007/2013, passim; Henrichs, 1984, pp. 255 - 268; Hernández, 2005, pp. 85 - 
105; Instone, 2009, pp. 42 - 55, 125 - 138, 206 - 224; Kearns, 2010, pp. 37 - 141; M. 
Meyer, 1999, pp. 61 - 101).  
The growing literature on the Derveni Papyrus, together with that flowing from research 
about Orphic Gold Tablets, and the Strasbourg Papyrus has, through some of these 
authors and others subsequently discussed, also allowed new insights into the nature of 
personal eschatology in respect of wider socio-political, socio-religious and Science-
religion developments in fourth century BC Greece. For example, Furley (1996, pp. 13 - 
40) discusses the turmoil and retributions surrounding the destruction, in BC 415, of the 
herms and controversy associated with profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries from  
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both political and religious perspectives. He provides a plausible reason for the Derveni 
author’s cited reconciliation of religion and Science through reference to allegorisation, 
and also adduces a fusion of vectors—unpopularity of the Sicilian expedition, political 
and/or theatrical strategy to diminish Alcibiades’ 
opposition to the priests, plague, Periclean war strategy 
and anti-democracy activism—to posit that the “whole 
Olympian system [of the Athenians and their gods] was 
damaged” (ibid., p. 22, my square brackets). Parker (1997, 
pp. 122 - 188) also attests to the socio-political and socio-
religious complexities of this time. Further discussion of 
5th century BC disruptions to religion continues in the next 
paragraph and detected discord and differences underlying 
these disruptions serve as further qualifications to the 
generality of the state-calendar religion statement made on 
page 28.  
For example Janko provides valuable insights into a 
possible conflict between Science and so-called salvation 
religion circa BC 415. Notwithstanding Janko’s then 
belief that “the Derveni Papyrus has left the scholarly 
community almost completely baffled” (2001, p. 15), his 
exegesis of that papyrus, and reasoned attribution of its 
authorship to Diagoras of Melos (R. Janko, 2001, pp. 2, 
4), likely born circa BC 469/8 and likely alive in Athens in BC 423, provide insights into 
the nature and survival fortunes of a cult, “probably that of Dionysus, i.e. of the 
Orphic/Bacchic variety” (R. Janko, 1997, p. 93). His elimination  (1997) of other 
suggested authors—Epigenes (Kapsomenos, 1964-65, pp. 3 - 12),  Euthyphro (C. H. 
Kahn, 1997, pp. 55-63), Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Burkert, pp. 1 - 5), Prodicus of Ceos 
(Laks & Most, 1997, p. 129), Anaximander of Miletus, Glaucon, Metrodorus of 
Lampsacus, and Diogenes of Apollonia (R. Janko, 1997, pp. 75 - 87), together with his 
differentiation between Diogenes of Apollonia and Diagoras of Melos—also provided  
Around the Derveni Krater 
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valuable insights into a likely battle royal between Science and cult religion that 
encompassed the economics and politics of state or P(p)olis religion—a Greek 
Reformation and Counter Reformation he calls it—in which Science came off second 
best.  
Should the Derveni Papyrus constitute part of a book, or even the book, in which 
Diagoras revealed the Eleusinian mysteries and for which he was exiled—Diagoras once 
silenced and now free—then, claims Janko, there is much 
thinking to be done. For example, has not Plato, in 
branding Diagoras an atheist in order to emphasise his 
own piety and camouflage introduction of gods in which 
he himself believed, “achieved the most successful cover-
up in intellectual and religious history[?]” (ibid., p. 93, my 
square brackets); and might not Sophocles, through a re-
appraisal of his Antigone (1891, 1900, 2003b) and 
Oedipus the King (1887b, 2003a), in the light of the 
Derveni revelations, be exposed as “a die-hard religious 
conservative[?]” (R. Janko, 1997, p. 94, my square 
brackets). The question of a cover-up by Plato is a hard 
question for philosophy, but one not directly pursued in 
detail in this enquiry. Nevertheless, it begs subsidiary 
questions of whether the dialogical Socrates’ turning was, 
in part, and in Janko’s tone, a safe cop-out for Plato as 
clever word-spinner to his Socrates’ rejection of 
Anaxagoras’s book—and possibly other writer’s books as 
well—and consequently whether Aristotle’s variously  
discussed and supposed offend-or-sin-twice-against-
philosophy rationalisation or jest  explanation for quitting 
Athens (Aelianus, 1670, Bk. 3, Ch. 36; Bearzot, 2011, pp. 
44 - 45; During, 1957, p. 402; Natali, 2013, p. 63; Stillingfleet, 1702, p. 54) is predicated 
on  Platonic gloss and dissembling insinuation about the death of an actual Socrates  
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whose game, and suspected incomplete disavowal of Anaxogorean-Diogenean-
Diagorean thought was up—whether for disparate reasons 
and whether for better or worse, the beauty and 
importance of Plato’s Socrates construct notwithstanding. 
Again, philosophy, on its very own terms must permit the 
asking of such perhaps iconoclastic questions but I do not 
pursue them further. Janko does not go unchallenged on 
issues of interpretation and papyrological technique (R. 
Janko, 2006a, 2006b; Kouremenos, Parássoglou, & 
Tsantsanoglou, 2006a, 2006b).  
Bernabé (2007a, pp. 77 - 84; 2012, no paginstion) also 
demonstrates the complex nature of new thought aroused 
by the Derveni Papyrus. He finds the author of the 
papyrus explaining that the daimones are souls and that 
the magoi and the mystai carry out their  preliminary ritual 
sacrifices to appease dead souls in the same way 
(Bernabé, 2012, 9.7), and states that a daimones qua souls 
thread—countless souls which must be propitiated—can 
be traced back to Hesiod’s mention of a race of golden 
mortals (ibid., 9.5) who, after becoming daimones, watch 
over humans. Hesiod’s mention begins at 110 in Works 
and Days (Hesiod, 1914b, p. 11; 2004, p. 68). Bernabé also adduces attestations to 
Thales (DK 11A23) and Heraclitus (DK 22A1) to support his contention and claims that 
the author of the papyrus shares a moralising tendency with Plato but whereas the author 
of the papyrus holds that punishments in the afterlife might be atoned by ritual 
performance, Plato holds that wrongdoing, rather than lack of ritual performance, 
attracts the punishments of Hades, and replaces such ritual performance with philosophy 
(Bernabé, 2012, 10.2). As an idea, τελετή, ritual atonement as ceremony or rite, is an 
offence against justice. 
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Yet the author of the Derveni Papyrus, while not disassociating himself from rituals 
performed by the magoi nevertheless distances himself from them and projects his 
authority and praxis superior to theirs. He is no magician 
claims Edmonds (2008, p. 35), this author of the Derveni 
Papyrus (Tsantsanoglou, 1997), and disqualifies himself 
from membership and heritage of that ongoing class of 
magoi negatively alluded to over time as charlatan 
magicians by Sophocles in Oedipus Tyrannus at 380 – 
405 (Sophocles, 1887a, 1900), or spoken about in the 
Sacred Disease (Hippocratic Writings, 1952a, p. 154; 
1983b, p. 237), or depicted as barbarian and incestuous 
philosophers of the Magikos (Rives, 2004, p. 36), or like 
Zoroaster and his early followers (ibid., p. 42), or a job 
lot of others put down by Aristotle at Metaphysics 14.4 
1091a25 -1092a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 624; 1989) who 
associates them with an earlier age of philosophical 
understanding, that of the old poets, or later called by 
Philo “charlatan mendicants and parasites” in the Special 
Laws III (Philo, pp. 100 - 101), and so on to Edmonds’ 
present mention of “itinerant charlatans” (R. E. 
Edmonds, 2012, p. 16). Heraclitus might well have the 
whole Orphic thiasos flogged along with Homer—
“night-ramblers, magicians, Bacchants, Maenads, 
Mystics: the rites accepted by mankind in the Mysteries 
are an unholy performance” (DK 22B14). Each of the 
commentators named above in this paragraph wrote, in 
turn, in service to their own projects and there would be 
unending caveat upon caveat were a full account to be 
given. Sophocles for instance had his audience to please, Aristotle his mother of all 
explanation to provide, Philo his harmonisation of Greek and Jewish philosophy to 
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Notes: The Derveni Krater (circa BC 
330 – 370) cropped by Ian Eddington 
from photographs taken by M. 
Greenhalgh. The relief is a hymn to 
Dionysus (Orpheus) celebrating his 
power over nature and features, inter 
alia, his marriage to Ariadne. The one-
sandalled warrior is associated with 
Pentheus rendered in an act of frenzy 
following his banning of Dionysian 
rites, or the Argonaut Jason. 
 
Source (Greenhalgh, 2006). 
(photographer). Photographie du 
Cratère de Derveni, Uutilisé comme 
Urne Funéraire dans le Tombeau de 
Derveni, et Ayant Auparavant Servi 
pour Mélanger du Vin et de l'Eau; Barr-
Sharrar, B. (2012). The Eschatological 
Iconography of the Derveni Krater. In 
Bronzes Grecs et Romains Recherches 
Récentes, Hommage à Claude Rolley: 
INHA (Actes de colloques). (Madge, 
2014) (photographer). The Derveni 
Krater, Late 4th Century B.C., Maenads 
with a Silenus, Derveni Krater, Side B. 
Thessaloniki: Archaeological Museum, 
digital images being available at 
Flickr.com.  
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defend and so on. More recently, since Cherniss’ exegesis of Aristotle’s criticism of the 
Presocratic philosophers (Cherniss, 1935) there has been renewed awareness that 
Aristotle and Theophrastus “turn out to be far from infallible guides to the interpretation 
of the Presocratics” (Kingsley, 1996, p. 3) and even of “shameless” introduction of his 
own ideas by Aristotle in his exegesis of Empedocles (Guthrie, 1965, p. 160). As this 
chapter reveals in its remaining pages, lively ongoing scholarship addresses an 
abundance of questions about Presocratic belief and practice whether near to the age of 
Presocratic magic or not.  
Like Laks and Most (1997, p. 5), Janko (2001, p. 2) proposes that the author of the 
Derveni Papyrus is an Orphic cult initiate, naming him a Sophist like Critias (BC 460 – 
403) or Prodicus (BC 465 – 395), and a likely contemporary of Socrates (ibid., p. 7), and 
that the Papyrus was written “to reconcile traditional religious belief and practice with 
the latest scientific progress” (ibid., p. 5), a view not necessarily incompatible with 
Most’s claim about cult-religion that “the Derveni author does not explain Presocratic 
physics in terms of Orpheus, but Orpheus in terms of Presocratic physics” (1997, p. 
122). The papyrus, says Janko, is the work of an Orphic, rather than a seer like Diogenes 
of Apollonia as Tsantsanogluo suggests (2001, p. 6) and one says Most “who cannot 
ignore Presocratic thought” (1997, p. 122)—one aware of a transition from mythos to 
logos (ibid., p. 123). Janko (2001, pp. 4 - 5), after Guthrie (1952, pp. 62, 161 - 163; 
1962, p. 476), acknowledges both Plato’s suggestion that the founders of the mysteries 
might be allegorists, that is, the religious teachers might speak in riddles or speak with 
hidden meaning, and Plato’s hint of the existence of Orphic allegorical philology at 
Gorgias 493a-d, particularly 493d (Plato, 1952g, p. 276; 1967b). Janko further claims 
that the Derveni author offers, in Column IV, an opinion similar to that expressed in 
Phaedo 69c, (Plato, 1952n, p. 226; 1966c) that is, that the real meanings of the Orphic 
writings could not be found in literal interpretation.  
Janko explains the nature of the Derveni Papyrus by recalling a hearsay that it is as if 
someone took the “Book of Mormon, quoted bits from it, and added that it’s actually the 
theories of Albert Einstein encoded in the Book of Mormon” (R. Janko, 2013, p. 7).  
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Other scholars of the Derveni Papyrus also glean from it a possibility of an emerging 
single god and discern in such a possibility religious conflict per se between state 
calendar religion and mystery-cult religion. For example, beginning with Burkert’s 
Orpheus and the Presocratics (1968), a number of scholars detect the idea of a single 
god creating the world out of chaos (Betegh, 2007, p. 222; Burkert, 2004, p. 63; G. W. 
Most, 1997, p. 118), which idea—air is mind and god according to the author of the 
Derveni Papyrus, and air, god, and Zeus are the same as nous according to Anaxagoras’ 
disciple Diogenes—may help explain in part animosity and discordant opposition by 
priests whose living and status depended on an existing plurality of gods. But then again, 
do the four reside in the unity or does the unity divide into four allowing priests 
ownership whichever way it may be interpreted.  
Whereas the intention of the author of the Derveni Papyrus may well have been to 
dampen the fear of atheism by reconciling religion and Science, and whereas the writing 
out of the intention may well, as Janko suggests, have resulted in unfortunate outcomes 
for the followers of an Anaxagorean line of Science, these occurrences may well have 
been coincident with a more basic and general discontent with the politics of Athens 
outlined earlier on page 31, which discontent may have found its outlet in a malaise 
between religion and politics. 
Sarton states that the Greeks were disposed to poetic myth rather than to theology, that 
they had no sacred writings or dogmas, that they were intensely religious and given to 
superstitions of every kind, that yet having no theology of their own they nevertheless 
became the founders of theology, and that they provided “the logical instruments that 
were needed for the development of the three dogmatic religions of the West: Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam” (Sarton, 1993, p. 198). 
In summary, notwithstanding both a possible hairline fracturing of P(p)olis religion and 
a possible emergence of a single god as discussed above, there were, during Plato’s time, 
gods a plenty and important ones too: Zeus, the king of the gods, Poseidon his brother, 
and others who ruled their own domains, hell, the sun and so on and, although new 
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insights into the nature and socio-political contexts of P(p)olis religion and emerging 
personal eschatology enrich understanding, the generalisation on page 28 about a state-
practice pantheon remains workable. In particular, no one god ruled the earth which was 
the domain of humans.  
Positions taken by Guthrie and Sarton on P(p)polis religion as a viable description of 
religion in in the last half of fifth century BC Greece, cited earlier on page 28, remain 
viable touchstones for still further qualifications about both the nature of P(p)olis 
religion and the journey-from-religion-to-philosophy contention under general 
discussion in this chapter. I return to these themes again in discussion of so-called 
Orphic gold tablets beginning on page 75 after continuing, in the next paragraph, the 
discussion on speculative philosophy broken off on page 29. 
Resumption of Discussion of Speculative or Scientific Philosophy 
Three thinkers associated with the emergence of the scientific or speculative philosophy 
of column 1, Table 2 on page 25 are highlighted in Table 
3 on page 39 and they provide examples of the earliest 
known Western-tradition scientific answers to the 
question what is the world made of—a question that called 
forth speculative or scientific philosophy. Because these three Ionians are traditionally 
associated with the then city of Miletus they are known as thinkers of the Milesian 
School. Thales appears to have left no writings (Graham, 2010, p. 17) but Freeman 
(1948, p. 18) provides evidence of two relevant fragments—Thales (DK 11B1-2). 
Informative doxographic information and commentary about Thales is available 
(Barnes, 2002, pp. 9 - 17; Fairbanks, 1898, pp. 1 - 7; Graham, 2009, pp. 17 - 44; Kirk & 
Raven, 1957, pp. 74 - 98; Kirk et al., 2002, pp. 76 - 99; Waterfield, 2009, pp. 3 - 21). 
Anaximander, following his master Thales, became in turn, master and associate of 
Anaximenes (Barnes, 2001, pp. 29, 33; Fairbanks, 1898, p. 17; Kirk et al., 2002, p. 95).  
Anaximander’s brief fragments, (DK 12B1-5) are available in Freeman (1948, pp. 19 - 
20) where, for Anaximenes, fragments (DK 13B1-3) are also available (1948, p. 19).  
 
Speculative or Scientific Philosophy 
Mankind’s attempt to explain the 
macrocosm, the universe in which they 
live: it is largely speculative because it 
is driven by curiosity. 
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Other works containing various selected fragments and doxographic evidence and 
commentary are available for Anaximander and Anaximenes (Barnes, 1982, pp. 18 - 23, 
24 - 27; 2002; Fairbanks, 1898, pp. 8 16, 17 - 22; Graham, 2010, pp. 45 - 71, 72 - 94; 
Kirk & Raven, 1957, pp. 99 - 142, 143 - 162; Kirk et al., 2002, pp. 100 - 142, 143 - 162; 
Waterfield, 2009, pp. 3 - 21).  
Anaximander’s fragments reveal something of the logic which may have prompted that 
vital question. For example, Anaximander likely urges that the world was thought of as  
Table 3: Ionian Science Answers to a Question—What is the World Made of? 
Thales(a) 
(BC 624- 
547) 
Anaximander(a) 
(BC 611 - 565) 
Anaximenes(a) 
(Before BC 494) 
Water or 
Moisture(1)(5) 
An undifferentiated mass of enormous extent not bounded 
externally or internally, that is, in it, separate internal 
existences of hot, cold, wet or dry could not be detected and, 
after Xenophanes, called the apeiron(2)(5); from this apeiron 
there emerged a separation of internal substance into the cold 
and wet mass of earth, and the hot and dry moon, stars and 
sun. In time the hot and dry brought forward the earth from 
the wet and cold and life emerged from the slime and mud. 
Mankind in turn evolved from a scaly fish. The earth is at the 
middle of the cosmos and falls nowhere because it is so 
placed. Underlying Anaximander’s explanation is the 
presence of the fossil record and his observation that mankind 
must have come from another animal because, due to its 
observed long period of dependence on others after birth, no 
first of the species could ever have arrived independently 
readymade. Anaximander’s natural explanation of the 
existence of the world was one step removed from Hesiod’s 
explanation of its creation through the split in a sexually 
unified heaven and earth by a third world spirit. 
Air including mist and fog(3)(5): the small part 
of air within the living animal is its soul or 
form which is part of the Universe which is 
alive and which is a god. Anaximenes’ 
explanation of first cause of the universe is 
god but it must be remembered that it is a 
Greek god in the sense of a living Gaia. It is a 
pagan god subject to the fortunes of destiny, 
not a religious Christian God, and matter and 
spirit(4) are combined in the one. According to 
Guthrie Science and philosophy had not yet 
split, there being no metaphysic in the sense 
that it is now known in Aristotelian terms. 
 
Notes: (a) Generally received material monism summary views are presented accompanied with noted caveats sufficient to signal 
alterity and contestation of opinion. (1) Waterfield (2009, p. 3) claims that Thales may as well have been a mythographer as a 
scientist, making no more than a claim that the world emerged from a watery swamp. (2) The meaning of apeiron is not clear, 
Anaximander may have been claiming that the apeiron was boundless water or boundless air, that is, something spatially infinite 
but not qualitatively infinite whatever the distinction might mean at the end of the day (ibid., p. 5). Yet the same commentator 
allows Anaximander possibly establishing an idea of natural law (DKA129) on this indefinite construct (ibid., p. 6). (3) 
Anaximenes, on Waterfield’s reading of DK13A5, may have limited the number of substances air turns into (2009, p. 9). (4) 
(Guthrie, 1975a, p. 31). (5) Material Monism, which informs the content of this table, parts of Table 4, and their attendant texts, is 
a twenty three hundred year old consensus predicated on a tenet that identification of sources for a so-called monad is possible. 
Yet it is a consensus contested on many fronts (Graham, 2009, pp. 48 – 66, 85 - 112).  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Burnet, J. (1908). Early Greek Philosophy. pp. (1 - 84). London, Adam and Charles 
Black; Guthrie, W. K. C. (1975). The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. (pp. 26 - 44). New York: Harper and Row; 
Fairbanks, A. (1898). The First Philosophers of Greece. (pp. 1 - 27). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Aristotle. (1952). 
Metaphysics (983b 20 – 30, pp. 501 – 02). Chicago: William Benton; Classen, C. (1977). Anaximander and Anaximenes: The 
Earliest Greek Theories of Change. (pp. 89 – 102). Phronesis, 22, 89 – 102; Sarton, G. (1993). Ancient Science through the 
Golden Age of Greece. (pp. 160 – 198). New York: Dover Publications. Waterfield, R. (2009). First Philosophers: The 
Presocratics and Sophists. (pp. 3 – 21). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Graham, D. W. (2006) Explaining the Cosmos: The 
Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy. (pp. 1 – 82). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Relevant Diels/Kranz content cited 
by these authors includes DK11A12-15; DK12A1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15-16, 21, 23, 26, 27, 30; DK13A5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21; 
DK13B1, 2. 
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being in constant change yet continuing to exist (DK 12B1), and this observation 
occasioned opinion about the 
nature of that particular material 
which would accommodate such 
a conundrum—that permanent 
material, subsequently referred to 
as the monad, which could form 
the successive beings of the 
observed cycles of life (DK 
12B2-3). 
The first stuff of the world, what 
the world was made of, the nature 
of nature, the physis or phusis, 
appears in first scientific 
speculation, to have been for 
Thales, on Aristotle’s say so, 
either water including moisture 
Metaphysics I, 983b 20 - 30 
(Aristotle, 1952f, pp. 501 - 502; 
1989)—a not necessarily reliable 
summary of Thales’ cosmology 
according to Kirk and Raven 
(Kirk & Raven, 1957, p. 91)—or, 
for Anaximander, the everlasting, 
ageless, immortal and 
indestructible (DK 12B2-3) non-
limited (DK 12B1); or, for 
Anaximenes, air, including mist and fog, understood as the breath of the living universe 
(DK 13B1, DK 13B3). Aristotle attributes various first stuffs thus: air to Anaximenes 
(BC 585 – 528) and Diogenes (c. BC 460), fire to Hippasus of Metapontum (born BC  
 
Behind the Text: Ongoing Scholarship About Presocratic Philosophers 
and Presocratic Fragments 
Taken together, some of the works on Presocratic philosophy cited in the 
accompanying text provide ongoing insights and updates since the time of the 
still valuable and respected scholarship of Burnett (1908) Freeman (1948) 
and Kirk and Raven (1957) even though the more recent authors take 
different approaches to doxography, typography and concordance 
management of fragments. For example, Barnes’s Early Greek Philosophy 
(1987 revised 2001) contains translations of some Presocratics, but no 
Sophists. He connects translations by commentary and there are indices, and 
maps. His typology uses italics for fragments and Roman type for contextual 
comment and he mainly focuses on a selection of B fragments. His book 
contains a subject index, an index to quotations, an index to Diels-Kranz B 
fragments and an introduction. Barnes also comments on the Strasbourg 
Papyrus segment of Empedocles’ On Nature and in his book The Presocratic 
Philosophers written in the manner of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, 
he focuses on the rational rather than the irrational dimension (Barnes, 1982, 
p. xii), and includes passages, persons, and topics indices, and a 
Barnes/Diels-Kranz concordance. In it, Barnes names the 10th Walter Kranz 
edition of Diels (1960) as the standard reference work and in the same 
paragraph accepts Freeman as an “Englished” version of the B fragments 
(Barnes, 1982, p. 525). An 11th Walter Kranz edition of Diels was published 
in German in 1964 and according to Knobloch (2010, p. 54) the 6th Walter 
Kranz edition of Diels published in 1966 reprints the fragments of a 12th 
edition of Diels. I could find little specific guidance on the nature of 
differences across the various DK editions there being expressed general 
agreement that changes since the 6th edition of Diels-Kranz are of minor 
significance. University course description increasingly accept the 6th or later 
editions of Diels-Kranz. The main difference between the 5th and 6th editions 
of Diels-Kranz concerns numbering rather than translation and in this light, 
and for ease of access, I use Freeman’s English translations for B fragment 
citation purposes.  
 
Waterfield’s The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists 
(2009) contains translations of B fragments and selected A texts, addresses 
the Strasbourg Papyrus on page 133 and, in keeping with its title, includes 
translations of some of the Sophists. The introductory content provides 
insights into the loss of mythos to logos in Presocratic times. Like Barnes 
(2001), Waterfield (2009) provides an extensive introduction, commentary 
and bibliography. There is also a concordance of his translated fragments 
with those of Diels-Kranz (1952).  
 
McKirahan (1994 revised 2010) provides commentary linked to translations 
and includes some Sophists. Greek text is not provided and contentions about 
translation and interpretation are confined to footnotes. Typology and layout 
differ amongst chapters. The 2010 revision contains a new chapter on 
Philolaus, additional material throughout, and an appendix offering 
translations of the Derveni Papyrus and three Hippocratic writings. Curd 
(1996), with McKirahan as translator, includes parts of an earlier book (S. M. 
Cohen et al., 2005). Each philosopher is given a brief introduction, and some 
of the Sophists, namely, Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, and Critias, are 
included. Schofield’s 2002 reprint (2002) of his 1983 second edition of Kirk 
and Raven (1957), carries new sections on Alcman and the Derveni Papyrus, 
contains Greek text and translation, and is recognised for the quality of its 
philology and hermeneutics. The Sophists are not included.  
(Continued on page 41) 
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500), and Heraclitus of Ephesus (BC 535 – 475), the four elements to Empedocles (BC 
495 – 430), and principles infinite in number to Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (BC 510 – 
428) Metaphysics I, 984a 5 – 15 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 502; 1989). Tables 3 and 4 of this 
thesis should be taken to support a received view that, in their speculations about the 
nature of nature, Presocratic 
philosophers, although not 
necessarily unified in thought about 
monism per se, or sufficient in 
fragmentary remnants, proposed a 
number of candidates for monad, 
and that a thread of monism links 
some of the substances they 
proposed. The Tables 3 and 4 
concordances of Presocratic 
philosophers with their likely 
preferred monads is tentative and 
the presence of references and notes 
within the tables signals this 
dimension of their validity. 
Unambiguous matching of monad 
by person remains troublesome. For 
example, in his part of the world, 
Plato, at Sophist 242d – 242e has the 
Stranger naming the Eleatics, not the 
Ionians or Sicilians as a group, claiming that “all things are many in name, but in nature 
one” Sophist (Plato, 1921b, 242d-e; 1952s, p. 565) but then again Plato, more than 
Xenophanes before him, is under suspicion of less than open disclosure of motive for his 
put-downs of earlier beliefs supposedly held by others, and of replacing or modifying 
old myths for new—some of which so-called new myths might be his own (Detienne, 
1986, p. 867; Doniger O'Flaherty, 1995, pp. 25 - 33; Eliade, 1964, pp. 1, 111 - 113, 147 - 
 
Behind the Text: Ongoing Scholarship About Presocratic 
Philosophers and Presocratic Fragments (continued) 
 
Graham (2010, pp. 191 - 192), following Janko (2002), cites the Derveni 
Papyrus to put forward that Heraclitus’s fragments DK B3 (F56a of the 
Derveni Papyrus), and DK B94 (56b of the Derveni Papyrus) go together 
and tentatively agrees with Lebedev (1985) that these fragments and 
Derveni Fragment F58 constitute a single statement. Graham generally 
though focuses on philosophy above philology in his commentaries. He 
states that Kirk and Raven’s book, The Presocratic Philosophers (1957), 
taken to include the 1983 revision of it by Schofield, has been the 
standard advanced textbook” (ibid., p. 12), acknowledges the relevance 
of past scholarship by Guthrie and Cornford in leading the Cambridge 
scholars who tended to “downplay the importance of philosophy in their 
research” (ibid.), and names Jonathan Barnes (1982) one who has 
presented a “challenging study of the Presocratic arguments examined in 
the light of contemporary philosophic methods” (Graham, 2010, p. 15). 
Barnes himself names his method as one which focuses on rationality 
content in Presocratic writings over the irrational, historical, and literary 
style and form dimensions (Barnes, 1982, pp. ix -  xi) in which he 
employs formal and structured analysis in his commentaries.  
 
Part 1 of Graham’s work contains translations of the standard DK B 
fragments and some testimonies relating to fourteen “cosmologists and 
ontologists” (Graham, 2010, p. 15) from Thales to Democritus, (ibid., pp. 
17 – 630). Part 2 contains fragments and some testimonies for the 
Sophists namely Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Porticos (ibid., pp. 
687 – 841), translated text of, and commentary on, the Anonymous 
Iamblichi (ibid., 863 - 876) and the Dossoi Logoi (ibid., pp. 877 – 904), 
and an appendix addressing Pythagoras (ibid., pp. 905 – 933). Graham 
reasons the Anonymous Iamblichi to be a Sophist whose focus on skills 
virtues in education differs from the Platonic-Socratic ideal for the want 
of a substantial theoretical dimension (ibid., p. 863) and pronounces the 
Dossoi Logoi a sophistic treatise about teaching method and technique, 
but one not extending to philosophical and logical issues germane to the 
topics surveyed (ibid., p. 877). McKirahan (2011, pp. 405 - 426) 
discusses the Anonymous Iamblichi in the context of the nomos-phusis 
debate. Translations of the Anonymous Iamblichi and Dossoi Logoi 
respectively by Reesor (2001, pp. 271 - 278) and Sprague (2001, pp. 279 
- 282) reveal rich text content which perhaps confirms a frugality in 
Graham’s general description of those so-named works. 
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157; R. Janko, 1997, p. 93). Barnes, in writing of Thales and Anaximander, states that 
“we may hazard it that nothing was clear either in the minds or the writings of those 
men” (Barnes, 1982, p. 33) and Graham (2009, pp. 48 - 66) argues that “the 
interpretation of Material Monism (MM) as applied to the early Ionians is historically 
inappropriate, philosophically incoherent, and dialectically irrelevant’ (ibid., pp. 52 – 
53).  
Of the ideas of these three thinkers from Miletus contained in Table 3, Anaximander’s 
likely concept of form is important for present enquiry purposes. Anaximander 
explained the changeability of the natural world through the concept of form, those 
various structures, things or beings themselves, into which the unchanging matter always 
successively arranged itself. That is, the unchanging non-limited or “original material of 
existing things” (DK 12B1), whatever it was, always took the various forms revealed in 
the physical objects of nature.  
A scientific tradition in philosophy associated with Miletus continued, and Table 4 on 
page 46 depicts aspects of a rich flow of thought from Heraclitus (BC 535-475) to 
Democritus (BC 460). Xenophon’s description in Memorabilia 1. 1. 9 - 16 (Xenophon, 
1845, pp. 520 - 521; 1923.1.9-16; 2009, no pagination) of a Socrates unable to 
understand Presocratic physics, or in corollary of Janko, perhaps unwilling to understand 
or be openly and fully associated with it, attests to the richness of Presocratic physics, 
and for that matter, to the precarious position of one dialogically depicted as one in 
disfavour with powerful and possibly vindictive establishments. Table 3 and Table 4, 
conjectured from quotations of, and commentaries on, Presocratic thinkers, insinuate, 
subject to the caveats earlier discussed, that a thread of monism may link attempts to 
explain the essential stuff, the physis of the world. As discussed, for Thales, the monad 
appears likely to have been water, for Anaximander likely the infinite, the boundless, the 
unlimited (DK 12B1-3) and for Anaximenes, likely air (DK 13B2-3). After Xenophanes, 
for whom the so-called monad is likely an interplay of earth and water (DK 21B27, B29, 
B33) it became known as apeiron (Popper, 1998, p. 39). For Heraclitus the monad is 
likely fire (DK 22B30), for Parmenides likely being a remote and unchanging something 
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attainable only by mind (DK 28B4-8), and for Leucippus (DK 68B7, B9) and 
Democritus, (DK 68B9) atoms, as Aristotle also explains On Generation and Corruption 
325a–325b15 (Aristotle, 1952i, pp. 423 - 424; 2005). Again, such summaries seldom 
come without caveats. For example Graham suggests that a received view that the 
Ionians were monists upset by Parmenides, a view he says both Barnes and Schofield 
support, is under challenge (Graham, 2009, p. 22) and prefers in its place ongoing 
revision of Stokes’s revival (Stokes, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1971, 1976) of Cherniss’ 
exposition of Aristotle’s historiography of the Presocratic personages (Cherniss, 1935, 
1944, 1951). Cherniss offers a view that, rather than attempting to provide a historical 
rendering of earlier philosophy, Aristotle sets up artificial debates in which the theories 
he attributes to earlier writers are assuaged to inevitably lead to his own conclusions 
(Cherniss, 1935, pp. 349 – 350, 356 - 357) an inkling of which practice Burnet may also 
have had earlier (Burnet, 1920, p. 56). Both Strauss and Voegelin rule out Popper’s 
competence in interpreting Plato in general (Emberley & Cooper, pp. 66 - 69) let alone 
for the case of the apeiron. Janko is comfortable with Ionian monads (R. Janko, 2013, p. 
24) and a possible early flowering, circa BC 430, of a physical-spiritual-three-in-one-
god pantheon—air and mind and Zeus are the same (ibid., p. 25). 
No equally conjectural underlying uniformity of cosmogony appears to have informed 
the various monad types identified in the previous paragraph, cosmogony being 
understood as enquiry into how the cosmos came into existence. Neither, it appears, is 
the identified stream of monads necessarily encompassed by uniformity of cosmology, 
cosmology being understood as enquiry into how the cosmos is structured. Nevertheless 
the conjectural cosmology and cosmogony of Table 4 gives an indication of a rich 
flowering of thought during the period. Literary and scholarly reminders of the temporal 
nearness of the period to the age of magic, recalling as they do depictions of magicians 
and quacks, might helpfully complement interpretation of Table 4’s content (Barnes, 
1982, p. 2; E. Grant, 2007, p. 1; R. Janko, 2004, p. 2; Kingsley, 1996, pp. 217 - 371; G. 
E. R.  Lloyd, 1966, pp. 178 - 181; Tambiah, 2002, pp. 8 - 11; Thorndike, 1923b, pp. 20 - 
32). Nevertheless the Presocratic philosophers were dealing with big and serious 
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questions and it is not difficult on the basis of empathy and introspection to find their 
deliberations insightful, logical and intellectually pathbreaking.  
In general, leading Presocratic scientific thinkers appear to have presented a view that 
material reality—the physis, whatever it was, was something 
other than changing visible form, and it was somewhere else 
again. Yet the physis might sometimes reveal its presence 
through noetic touch. For example, mankind as part of the 
universe and in varying degrees of harmony with it, consists, 
according to Empedocles, of elements emanating from 
combinations of hot, cold, wet and dry so that physis, as “the 
(completed) realisation of a becoming … that is to say, the nature 
[of a thing] as it is realised with all its properties” (Naddaf, 2005, 
p. 12, my square brackets) reveals itself, transmits its touch, or in 
the case of humans is sensed, through dunameis (ibid., p.28) its 
capacity to act upon and be acted upon. Paleologou (2003, pp. 
118 - 120) concludes that Plato did not develop a full model of dunameis but rather 
allowed his Socrates an older usage of the word in which dunameis are immaterial 
entities that merely signify the capacity to change or cause change. Otherwise physis 
was indiscernible in the ever changing sensible existing natural beings with which 
humans worked on a daily basis. For Parmenides, the ‘true account’, the real nature of 
the world, the physis, was remote and could only be reached by mind (DK 28B3-4). 
Perhaps Parmenides unwittingly, whether he upset the Ionians or not, may have 
provided an earlier and different but-before-its-times-functionally-equivalent version of 
a kind of so-called carbon link pathway idea, one not simply confined to the mystery of 
difference between animate and inanimate, but also between physical appearance and 
spiritual mystery, ephemerality and permanence, and Science and religion—a 
speculation not pursued further in this enquiry.  
In spite of an early enigma in atomism,—“It is a curious fact that the Atomists, who are 
commonly regarded as the great materialists of antiquity, were actually the first to say 
 
 
Source: (Raffaello, 1509). 
(Artist). (fresco). Vatican 
City, Stanza della Segnatura: 
Web Gallery of Art. Detail of 
Heraclitus cropped by Ian 
Eddington. Heraclitus, the 
obscure philosopher, who, 
like Diogenes the Cynic in 
the picture on page 25, is 
captured alone by Raffaello, 
who used Michelangelo as 
his model. 
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distinctly that a thing might be real without being a body” (Burnet, 1908, p. 389)—the 
remote physis was also the substance of the soul and consisted of material atoms 
(Barnes, 1982, p. 362; F. M. Cornford, 1957, pp. 157 - 158, 129 - 130). A kind of 
scientific materialism had arrived with a hard punch.  
The emergence of scientific philosophy, that is, the Presocratic scientific discovery of 
nature as a material physis, is celebrated as a remarkable 
achievement (Farrington, 1953, pp. 32 - 39; E. Grant, 2004, 
p. 88; 2007, pp. 1 - 12; G. E. R. Lloyd, 1970, pp. 16 - 22) 
preceded as it was by eons of reliance on magic and 
superstition as the naive solipsistic rationalisation inherent in 
totem ritual and its sustaining totem area (F. M. Cornford, 
1932, pp. 7 - 8). A common theme in this scholarship is that 
Ionian ideas of the nature of nature, and the idea that Science 
is a form of enquiry predicated on pursuit of knowledge for 
its own sake, emerged together, but that in Ionia in the sixth 
and fifth centuries BC these ideas of nature and Science 
expressed themselves in rational cosmogonies increasingly 
detached from theogony qua enquiry into origins and descent of gods. 
For example, the gods of Hesiod’s now incredible Theogony (Hesiod, 1914b, 1999), 
those gods present from the beginning of the world, are largely absent in the 
cosmogonies outlined earlier in the third column of Table 4 on page 46. These 
cosmogonies and cosmologies focus on how the world came to be, how life arose, and 
what the world was made of, but there is reduced reliance on the coupling of gods and 
the presence of Zeus to explain matters of nature. The content of Table 4 on page 46, 
especially the third and fourth columns, plausibly signifies a then de-deification of 
cosmogony and cosmology detected by prominent researchers. My study of the 
translated Presocratic fragments, from which fragments the Table 4 source authors 
obtained some of their information in the first place, has been informed by helpful 
insights these scholars have provided.  
 
 
Source: (Raffaello, 1509). (artist). 
Vatican City, Stanza della 
Segnatura: Web Gallery of Art. 
Detail of Boethius (or Anaximander 
or Empedocles), Averroes, and 
Pythagoras cropped by Ian 
Eddington from The School of 
Athens. (fresco). The women are 
unknown. Hypatia has not yet been 
found in the work. Could the 
women represent the Pythagorean 
sisterhoods?  
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Table 4: Aspects of the Rich Thought Detectable in Presocratic Cosmology and Cosmogony 
Name Location and or Philosophy Cosmology and or Cosmogony(a) Materiality and or Ideality Departure Point 
Heraclitus 
(BC 535 - 
475) 
Ephesus on the west coast of 
present day Turkey; Ionic by 
geography but not by 
philosophy. 
Everything is born of strife and everything is in flux.(1)&(2) 
His fragments reveal little if any cosmogony(4) and suggest 
that the world was, and will be, as it presently is. There is 
no harmony of opposites all things being the outcome of 
strife. 
Fire is a kind of material substance most near the materiality of his thinking(1). 
’Mankind breathes in the cosmic fire which becomes their intellect and the 
course of the world is predicated on the logos or account, given in the cosmic 
fire. The stuff of this account is in each of us and we are exhorted to look 
inwards to the logos, rather than trusting the senses, when attempting to 
discover the truth of the physical world’s unfolding change. 
The simple Ionian 
cosmogonies were, in 
themselves, seemingly not 
enough for Heraclitus. 
Distrust of the senses creeps 
in.(3)(4) 
 
Parmenides 
(BC 510 - 
450) 
Elea, Southern Italy; 
Pythagorean by geography but 
not by philosophy. 
Parmenides might be interpreted as employing the 
existential meaning of the word to be - to be means 
simply to exist - rather than the form of what is now 
understood as the predicative.(5) For example sad is a 
qualifying predicate of being in the sentence I am sad and 
he would have none of the ancestral arguments that a 
thing could be and not be, or that the one could become 
many 
His starting point was that things exist and that the observed continuous 
change was not existence: whatever existence was it was something in a 
world apart a something that could only be reached by mind: his reality was 
non-sensible and the plurality of the Ionian view was an impossibility. This 
world could not have come from the one existing reality as had been 
previously argued. 
Rejection of Heraclitus’ 
universal flux and identity 
of opposites, to be and not 
to be are the same and not 
the same, as contradictory(6). 
Matter exists and is 
knowable through mind. 
Empedocles 
(BC 490-
430) 
Pythagorean by geography - 
Sicily: a mystic and magician 
who claimed to be able to raise 
the dead and arrest the winds.(7) 
For Empedocles the observed phenomena were 
combinations of root elements or substances: fire, water, 
air and earth were root substances which existed, and will 
exist for all time. Beings like trees, fish, and humans are 
simply chance combinations of these root elements, and 
the motion of the observed natural world was explained as 
a function of physical forces named love, which drew in 
and united the elements, and strife which caused elements 
to repel one another. No god of creation existed in 
Empedocles’ world: those combinations best adapted to 
their purpose survived: others fell. 
The strife-love tug of war helped account for the observed cycles of the 
natural world and its motion and although, in the manner of Greek thinking in 
general, and Pythagorean mysticism in particular, he attributed psychological 
and moral dimensions to strife and love, Guthrie(8) argues that even at this 
stage in the development of Greek thought, there was no separation of these 
‘non-material’ or formal attributes from the ‘material’ or matter per se. 
Perhaps the first of the so-
called neo-Ionians or 
pluralists who identified sets 
of substances rather than a 
single substance to explain 
being. (9)(10) A mixture of 
Pythagorism and 
materialism. 
Anaxagoras 
(BC circa 
450) 
Geographical Ionian from 
ancient Smyrna, a province of 
Izmir in modern Turkey, one 
who settled in Athens and in 
whom the speculative enquiry 
of the Ionians is paramount.(11) 
Guthrie explains that although Anaxagoras drew a clear 
distinction between matter and mind, and boldly stated 
that mind is the mover which transforms the chaos into 
the cosmos, in no sense was Anaxagoras posing a creation 
story(12). 
There is a primeval chaos of things boundless in multitude and smallness 
(DK59B1).(13)  Everything is in everything DKB1 B4a, B4b, B6, B11, B12 and 
the cosmos emerges as mind separates these multitudinous and small things 
into separate places and concentrations allowing such entities as bone, stone, 
and the like to form. Anaxagoras was persecuted by the state as an atheist and 
his fellow philosophers criticise him as a natural philosopher for dragging 
mind in at the last moment to explain the unexplainable.(14)  
Mind is the mover. 
Democritus 
(born BC 
460) 
Abdera in Thrace: Atomist. 
The sensible world began when existing atoms, moving at 
random, bumped into one another and joined up. The 
space left when atoms join up, or existing between a 
plurality of existing substances necessitates acceptance of 
the void as an existential entity.(15) Nor apparently did the 
atomists explain the cause of the motion of the atoms.(16) 
His answer to Parmenides was that the matter announced by Anaxagoras 
consists of tiny particles, “unsplittables” or atomi: indestructible, of various 
shapes and sizes, but identical in substance, and invisible, soundless, 
scentless, colourless whose shape, size, motion, relative distance were the 
dimensions occasioning sense perception of natural objects primarily through 
touch. Hard things were closely packed, soft things less so. Sweet things are 
made of smooth atoms and bitter things of rough or hooked atoms. Streams of 
such atoms left the surface of objects to impact on the eye so that always 
touch was the paramount sense. In particular, the most perfect of atoms were 
round and it is of such atoms that the soul consists. 
Acceptance of the void, 
indivisibility of particles 
beyond the size of atomi 
and of eternal motion. 
Materialist explanation of 
even the soul. 
Notes: (a) This table presents general information consistent with received material-monism type interpretations and classifications of Presocratic philosophy. Caveats and citations noted throughout the table intimate that 
considerable contestation clouds so-called received view summarisation of the kind presented. (1) Disputed by Kirk (1954, p. 366) who, according to Graham (2009, p. 115), and along with Reinhardt (1916, pp. 206 - 207),  
(Notes continue on the next page.) 
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argued against five tenets (i) fire as monad, (ii) cycles of conflagration and regeneration, (iii) everything is in flux, (iv) the opposites of (ii) and (iii) are identical and (iv) Heraclitus violates the Law of Non-Contradiction, held to 
summarise Heraclitus. Burnet (1908, pp. 192 - 226) contests (ii), (iv) and (v). (2) Graham interprets Heraclitus as finding constancy amongst the observed ever changing flux (Graham, 2009, pp. 114 - 115) and reports 
Vlastos(1955, pp. 377 - 378), Guthrie (1962, pp. 403 - 487) and Barnes (1982, pp. 43 - 62) amongst others supporting Heraclitus qua flux theorist. (3) Barns (1982, pp. 67, 78) urges Heraclitus a monist in the tradition of his 
predecessors, one applying substantial empirical observation in his analysis of flux. Graham (2009) urges him departing from material monism by conjecturing that Heraclitus does not have one substrate always present in change. 
Perhaps a train shunt energy metaphor is helpful here. Graham says Heraclitus progresses “beyond a theory of stuffs to a theory of process … [and on to] a deeper unity, the law of transformation itself, which I take to be the 
essence of Heraclitus’s Logos” (ibid., p. 145). Graham arrives at his insightful conclusion over many pages (ibid., pp. 113 – 147) in which, in addition to refuting Barnes on material monism and interpreting Heraclitus from 
Transformational Equivalence, Lawlike Material Flux and other perspectives which he articulates through his surveys of scholars past and present, might reasonably allow one to speculate that articulation of Presocratic 
philosophy has become something of an apeiron in its own right. (4) Kirk (1954, pp. xii - xiii) names Heraclitus a cosmologist. (5) There is contestation and a number of readings of Parmenides’ meaning of being are possible, 
each having its own implications. For example, there is existential interpretation (Barnes, 1982, pp. 160 - 161; Taran, 1965, pp. 175 – 201; Wiesner, 1996, pp. 205 - 236), predicative being interpretation in various constructions 
(Curd, 1998, pp. 43 – 47, 242 - 243; Mourelatos, 1970, pp. 60 – 63, 74 – 80, 98 - 100), merged meanings interpretation (Kirk & Raven, 1957, p. 270; Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983, p. 246), and other modes of interpretation as 
well (Meijer, 1997, pp. 159 - 162). (6) Graham (2009) reads Parmenides’ refutation of Heraclitus as a radical refutation of the whole Ionian project arguing that Parmenides would not banish primary substance from philosophy 
but would rather than allow change to dissolve substance, would banish change (ibid., pp.154 – 155, 170 - 171). In astronomy, apparently, Parmenides’ successors view him as a reformer rather than a radical iconoclast (ibid., p. 
182). For Parmenides process is prior to substance (ibid., p. 161). (7) Nevertheless Empedocles is to be taken as a serious philosopher making an attempt to escape the logical net of Parmenides (8) (Guthrie, 1975a, p. 53). (9) 
(Barnes, 1982, pp. 239 - 248; Guthrie, 1975a, pp. 50 - 51). (10) Dissatisfaction with a received view that pluralism down to the atomists is a reaction to the logic of the Eleatics, and an attempt to construct a system that can 
account for coming to be and passing away (Kirk et al., 2002, p. 358), is discussed by Graham (2010, pp. 186 - 223). To wit, unlike Kirk (2002, p. 358) he views Empedocles and Anaxagoras endorsing Parmenides more than 
rejecting him (ibid., p. 190). It is no easy matter to arrive at unqualified conclusions even between Empedocles and Anaxagoras (ibid., p. 195). (11) Graham (2010, pp. 222 - 223) posits that perceived similarity between pre-
Parmenidian might be superficial, that is while the superstructure of their theories are similar, their foundations are radically different, the former working from monad, the latter working with elements having fixed natures and an 
ability, through combination, to the many sensible substances qua physical phenomena of the cosmos. (12) Guthrie (1975a, pp. 55 - 56). (13) Graham (2010, p. 197) claims that the boundless in Anaxagoras’ apeiron of boundless 
things may as likely be translated as a limited boundless thus shortening the degree of separation between Anaxagoras and Empedocles. (14) Schofield (2007, pp. 4 - 7) allows that Anaxagoras’ Fragment 12 (DK59B12) on mind 
may be taken as “dogmatic high flautin poppycock” (ibid., p. 4) or a hymn, in “solemn predication”, to nous (ibid., p. 7), downplaying the former. (15) Aristotle Metaphysics 985b4 – 9 (1952d, p. 503; 1989). The hair is split as 
follows: “‘nothing’ does not mean ‘nonexistent’ or more generally ‘not-being, but ‘not-thing’. To be nothing is not necessarily to be non-existent”. (Graham, 2009, p. 263). This enigmatic question of physics, of being and non-
being, is sometimes attenuated through logical, grammatical or semantic explanation (Barnes, 1982, p. 402; D. J. Furley, 1987, pp. 120 - 122; Schofield in Kirk et al., 1983, p. 415). Curd (1998, p. 204) posits the void as 
existentially knowable through human understanding per se. (16) One version of received theory reads the atomists as reacting to the latter Eleatics Zeno (BC 490 – 430) and Melissus (BC 5th century) and Graham (2010, p. 256) 
provides insights into the complexity of such a perceived relationship. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington through engagement with the following works: Burnet, J. (1908). Early Greek Philosophy. (passim). London, Adam and Charles Black; Fairbanks, A. (1898). The First Philosophers of 
Greece. (pp. 1-157). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Burnet, J. (1920). Greek Philosophy Part I: Thales to Plato. (passim). London: Macmillan; Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E. and Schofield, M. (1995). The Presocratic 
Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (pp. 76–402). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lloyd, G. E. R. (1970). Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (pp. 16–23, 35-50). New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company; Guthrie, W. (1975a) The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (p. 54). New York: Harper & Row; Sarton, G. (1993). Ancient Science through the Golden Age of Greece. (pp. 160–198). New York: Dover 
Publications; Waterfield, R. (2009). The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and Philosophers. (pp. 3-21, 32-68, 116-163) New York: Oxford University Press; Graham, D. W. (2010). The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The 
Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics. (pp. 17-203, 271-326, 516-630). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Kirk, G. S., & Raven, J. E. (1957). The Presocratic Philosophers: A 
Critical History with a Selection of Texts (pp. 76–402). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; McKirahan, R. (2011). Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary. (pp. 112-144; 145-173; 193-229; 
230-292). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing; McKirahan, R. (2005). (pp. (pp. 165 - 188). Assertion and Argument in Empedocles' Cosmology or What Did Empedocles Learn from Parmenides? In the Symposium Phjilosophiae 
Antiquae Tertium Myconese: The Empedoclean Kosmos: Structure, Process and the Question of Cyclicity, Patra; Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., & Schofield, M. (2002). The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a 
Selection of Texts. (pp. 181-213, 239-262, 352-384, 280-321, 402-433). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Vlastos, G. (1955). On Heraclitus. American Journal of Philology. (pp. 337 – 338). 76; Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962). 
History of Greek Philosophy (Vol. 1). (pp 403 - 487). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Barnes, J. (1982). The Presocratic Philosophers. (pp. 43 – 62, 160 – 161, 239 – 248, 402). New York: Routledge; Taran, L. (1965). 
(pp. 175 - 201). Parmenides. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Mourelatos, A. (1970). (p. 88). The Route of Parmenides. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Meijer, P. A. (1997). Parmenides Beyond the Gates: The 
Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa. (p. 88). Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben; Curd, P. (1998). The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. (pp. 43 – 47, 204, 242 – 243). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Schofield, M. (2007). An Essay on Anaxagoras. (p. 4 - 7). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., & Schofield, M. (1983). The Presocratic Philosophers (2 ed.). (pp. 246, 
415). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the information these scholars bring to explanation of the table column headings chosen for enquiry purposes.(Barnes, 1982; Curd, 1998; Graham, 2010; Guthrie, 1962, 1975a; 
Kirk & Raven, 1957; Kirk et al., 1983, 2002; G. E. R. Lloyd, 1970; McKirahan, 2011; Meijer, 1997; Mourelatos, 1970; Reinhardt, 1916; Sarton, 1993; Schofield, 2007; Taran, 1965; Vlastos, 1955; Waterfield, 2009; Wiesner, 
1996). Relevant Fragments are Heraclitus 22A1 22A6 22A10 22A16 22B1 22B2 22B3 22B5 22B6 22B7 22B9 22B11 22B12 22B13b 22B14 22B15 22B16 22B18 22B21 22B25 22B26 22B27 22B29 22B30 22B31 22B32 
22B33 22B34 22B36 22B41 22B42 22B43 22B44 22B45 22B49 22B49a 22B50 22B51 22B53 22B54 22B55 22B60 22B61 22B64 22B66 22B67 22B72 22B78 22B79 22B80 22B85 22B88 22B89 22B90 22B91 22B92 22B93 
22B94 22B96 22B101 22B104 22B107 22B108 22B110 22B114 22B116 22B117 22B118 22B119 22B121 22B123 22B125a 22B126 22B136; Parmenides 28A24 28A25 T3 28A28 T1 28A35 T7 28A37 T8 28A40a 28A46 
28A52 28B1 28B2 28B3 28B4 28B5 28B6 28B7 28B8 28B9  28B10 28B11 28B12 28B13 28B14 28B15 28B17 28B19; Empedocles 31A1 31A22 31A25 31A28 31A33 31A42 31A49 31A49b 31A50 31A51 31A53 31A54 
31A55 31A59 31A60 31A68 31A69 31A75 31A78 31A81 31A86 31A87 31A89 31B2 31B3b 31B6 31B8 31B9 31B12 31B13 31B16 31B17 31B20 31B21 31B22 31B23 31B26 31B27 31B29 31B31 31B35 31B36 31B38 
31B45 31B48 31B53 31B57 31B61 31B62 31B69 31B73 31B84 31B90 31B96 31B98 31B100 31B105 31B109 31B110 31B111 31B112 31B114 31B115 31B117 31B124 31B128 31B130 31B132 31B134 31B136 31B137 
31B141 31B146; Anaxagoras 59A1 59A41 59A42 59A43 59A45 59A46 59A52 59A63 59A80 59A81 59A89 59A92 59A110 59A117 59B1 59B2 59B3 59B4a 59B4b 59B5 59B6 59B7 59B8 59B9 59B10 59B11 59B12 59B13 
59B14 59B15 59B16 59B17 59B18 59B19 59B21; Democritus 68A9 68A37 68A40 68A43 68A47 68A48b 68A60 68A69 68A71 68A77 68A108 68A112 68A135 68A139 68A143 68A151 68A162 68A167 68A169 68B3 68B6 
68B7 68B8 68B9a 68B9b 68B10 68B11 68B31 68B117 68B155 68B156 68B159 68B164 68B166 68B170 68B171 68B174 68B187 68B188 68B191 68B211 68B214 68B219 68B234 68B235 68B251. 
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In summary, the presence of scientific philosophy in Ionia appears to constitute a 
fledgling Western revelation of an interest in 
knowledge for its own sake and, although why it 
emerged continues to be an open question, that it did 
emerge is well documented and also evidenced 
through existence of cosmogony and cosmology in which reasoning Science relies less 
and less on theogony in its attempts to understand the nature of nature. Scientific or 
speculative philosophy emerged at a time when P(p)olis religion as the practical day to 
day worship of gods was, except for a possible salvation-of-a-personal-soul-eschatology 
associated with cults, largely an affair of festivals, and votive activity, in which the 
people fervently participated. Yet, as discussed earlier, issues of religion and Science 
and politics were a cause of disquiet. Such a general characterisation of P(p)polis 
religion might be thought of as a still useful formwork and scaffold within which 
ongoing scholarship might 
continue to provide new insights 
into Greek religion and its 
changing relationship with 
Science and politics. In 
continuation of investigation of 
relationships between Greek Science and religion I turn, in the first paragraph of the next 
section beginning after Table 4, to discussion of practical or ethical philosophy, the 
second kind of philosophy said to be extant in Plato’s time and described earlier on page 
26.  
Return to Discussion of Practical Philosophy  
The so-called practical philosophy of the centre column of Table 2 on page 25 was 
brought to enhanced prominence through the life of Socrates dialogised by Plato, and 
reached a pagan and enduring high point with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Gill, 
1995, p. 86). At Metaphysics I, 987a30 – 988a18 (1952d, pp. 505 - 506; 1989) Aristotle 
implicates Socrates, Plato and Pythagoreans in an emergence of ethical enquiry and 
scholars find origins of practical philosophy in the Italiote line in Pythagorean cults in 
 
Practical or Ethical or Political Philosophy 
Mankind’s attempt to explain the microcosm, 
mankind themselves and their nature and place 
in the macrocosm. It is largely practical 
because it is driven by a desire to find out how 
human life and conduct can be improved. 
 
Working Timeline for Approximation Purposes 
Classification Era 
Presocratic Philosophy 
BC 6th – 5th centuries 
Milesian, Ionian, Eleatic, Pythagorean, Megarian 
Classic Philosophy 
BC 4th century 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 
Hellenistic Philosophy 
BC late 4th century – AD 1st century 
Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics, Sceptics 
Imperial 
AD 1st – 6th centuries 
Neoplatonists 
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Sicily and Greek colonies in southern Italy (Barnes, 2002, pp. 158 - 159), particularly 
Croton (F. M. Cornford, 1923, pp. xxv, 65; Guthrie, 1975a, p. 34; Huffman, 2006, pp. 3, 
6); in the accumulated moral endowment of the classic Greek values fossilised in the 
content of Homer (Adkins, 1960, p. 238; Hobbs, 2006, p. 141); and in intellectual 
responses to social change.  
Pythagoreanism as a precondition of practical philosophy is discussed first.  
In an exchange concerning whether or not Platonic Ethics emerged from Aristoxenus’ 
Pythagorean Precepts, Huffman (2008, pp. 104 - 119) refutes the standard scholarship 
(Burkert, 1972, p. 107 - 108; C. H. Kahn, 2001, p. 70; Rivaud, 1932, p. 784; Wehrli, 
1945, p. 59) which holds that the surviving fragments of Aristoxenus’ Pythagorean 
Precepts “are an invention of Aristoxenus ... [who drew heavily on] Platonic and 
Aristotelian Ethics to the detriment of Aristotelian and Platonic authority” (Huffman, 
2008, p. 106, my square brackets). His argument is that the similarity of the 
Pythagorean Precepts: 
“to material in Plato and Aristotle is the result not of borrowing by one party or the other, 
but rather of a shared interest in defending certain conservative strands in Greek 
traditional morality, a morality which is hardly limited to Plato and the Pythagorean 
Precepts and which can be found in Sophocles [BC c.497 – c.406], Thucydides [BC 460 – 
400/395], and Xenophon [BC 430 – 354] as well”. (Huffman 2008, p. 107, my square 
brackets)  
Pythagoras was one of the Greeks who fled westward in fear of menace from Persia 
(Lomas, 2013, p. 95) and, if not in questionable fragment form, none of his writings are 
known to survive (Burnet, 1908, pp. 91 - 93; K. Ferguson, 2010, pp. 2 - 4; Riedweg, 
2008, p. 42).  
Tentative information about Pythagoras comes to us a little from Aristotle at 
Metaphysics I 5 986a15 - 25, 987a10 – 25 (1952d, pp. 504,505) and more via Diogenes 
Laertius’s Life of Pythagoras  (2010a, n.p.), Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras (2010, n.p.), 
Herodotus’s Histories (1899, pp. 113, 289, 318, 341), Iamblichus’s Life of Pythagoras 
(1707, n.p.; 2010, n.p.), Photius’s preserved anonymous Biography of Pythagoras (2010, 
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n.p.) and Hierocles’s Golden Verses of Pythagoras (2010a, n.p.; 2010b, n.p.). From 
them, and other doxographers (Fideler, 1988, 159 - 307), a facsimile (1970) of Stanley’s 
1687 publication of Pythagoras his Life and Teachings, Rothwell’s 2008 translation of 
Schuré’s 1923 publication of Pythagoras and the Delphic Mysteries (Schuré, 2010), and 
from more recent scholarship (K. Ferguson, 2010; C. H. Kahn, 2001; Martinez, 2012; 
Riedweg, 2008), we learn, inter alia, of Pythagoras’ wide travels, of his brother and 
sisterhoods with their acetic ways of life focussed on dogmatic taboos (Hierocles, 
2010b), and of a mysticism and secrecy built around discovery of relationships in 
number and geometry: number then being demonstrated, inter alia, through 
arrangements of pebbles in the sand. The human soul, the Pythagoreans claimed, was a 
spark of the world soul, and through this kinship of souls, Pythagoreans brought 
themselves to beliefs in immortality of soul and reincarnation (Graham, 2009, p. 152).  
Cornford (1932, p. 67), Guthrie (1975a, p. 37) and Joost-Gaugier (2006, p. 6), the latter 
arguing by apophasis, name Pythagoras as the first known person to employ the word 
kosmos but none of them give their source for this claim, Joost-Gaugier arguing further 
that anyway it is irrelevant who was first. Guthrie explains that in the Pythagorean usage 
kosmos is “an untranslatable word which combined the notions of order, fitness and 
beauty” (1975a, p. 37). Marconi (2004, p. 211) notes a similar usage although Graham 
(2009, p. 26) claims that kosmos became to mean ‘world’ in the sixth century BC. Kahn 
(1960, p. 188) allows kosmos-equals-world usage earlier in the time of Anaximander 
(BC 610 - 546) and Finkelberg (1998, pp. 122 - 124) claims that this usage occurred 
later in Plato’s time (circa BC 428 – 347). Creating the world by making order out of 
chaos is certainly a so-called Old Testament theme and the same sense of cosmos as 
order might be found in Plato’s Timaeus at 27a – 48d (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 446 - 
456).  
If kosmos qua strived-for order is not the seed of practical philosophy, then it is very 
likely part of its root structure. The Pythagoreans appear to have viewed each human as 
a miniature cosmos, an organism which reproduces the structures of the world organism, 
the living world god. The human calling and way to that world order was to be found in 
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a search for it through study of both the macrocosm and the microcosm. Such study was 
the life of philosophy and in their study the Pythagoreans focussed on form rather than 
on matter which had consumed the attention of the Ionians in their search for scientific 
understandings. It is important to note at the outset that the form spoken about by the 
Pythagoreans was distinct and different from that spoken about by the Ionians. For 
convenience of reading Table 5 on page 54 illustrates the changing usage of the terms 
form and matter employed in this enquiry. 
In particular, according to Pythagoreans, so conjectures Aristotle, harmony or kosmos of 
the physical objects of the macrocosm and the microcosm was a question of balance 
achieved when number as form presided over modifications of, and permanent states in, 
nature. The following quotation from Aristotle’s Metaphysics I 4 985b20 – 986a2, 
necessarily long to achieve its purpose, illustrates one explanation of the nature of 
Pythagorean form as soul or mind found in humans, and in nature, as number.  
Contemporaneously with these philosophers and before them, the so-called Pythagoreans, 
who were the first to take up mathematics, not only advanced this study, but also having 
been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things. Since of 
these principles numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see many 
resemblances to the things that exist and come into being—more than in fire and earth and 
water (such and such a modification of numbers being justice, another being soul [italics 
added] and reason, another being opportunity—and similarly almost all other things being 
numerically expressible); since, again, they saw that the modifications and the ratios of the 
musical scales were expressible in numbers;—since, then, all other things seemed in their 
whole nature to be modelled on numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the 
whole of nature, [italics added] they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements 
of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number. And all the 
properties of numbers and scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and 
scheme; and if there was a gap anywhere, they readily made additions so as to make their 
whole theory coherent [italics added]. E.g. as the number 10 is thought to be perfect and to 
comprise the whole nature of numbers, they say that the bodies which move through the 
heavens are ten, but as the visible bodies are only nine, to meet this they invent a tenth—
the ‘counter-earth’. We have discussed these matters more exactly elsewhere. 
But the object of our review is that we may learn from these philosophers also what they 
supposed to be the principles and how these fall under the causes we have named. 
Evidently, then, these thinkers also consider that number is the principle both as matter 
for things and as forming both their modifications and their permanent states, [italics 
added] and hold that the elements of number are the even and the odd, and that of these 
the latter is limited, and the former unlimited; and that the One proceeds from both of 
these (for it is both even and odd), and number from the One; and that the whole heaven, 
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as has been said, is numbers. Metaphysics I 4 985b20 - 986a2 (1952d, pp. 503 - 504, my 
square brackets and italics) 
According to Aristotelian explanation, things were what they were not because of matter 
alone, which for the Pythagoreans was the recognisable physical objects themselves 
rather than the remote unchanging substance of the Ionians, but also because of the 
constitution of their form which consisted of number, the very same stuff and essence of 
the human soul. This soul substance, alive in both humans and nature, springs from their 
monad for the physis and consisted of numbers.  
The principle of all things is the monad or unit [italics added]; arising from this monad the 
undefined dyad or two serves as material substratum to the monad, which is cause; from 
the monad [italics added] and the undefined dyad spring numbers [italics added]; from 
numbers, points; from points, lines; from lines, plane figures; from plane figures, solid 
figures; from solid figures, sensible bodies, the elements of which are four, fire, water, 
earth and air; these elements interchange and turn into one another completely, and 
combine to produce a universe animate, intelligent, spherical, with the earth at its centre 
[italics added], the earth itself too being spherical and inhabited round about. There are 
also antipodes, and our ‘down' is their ‘up'. (Diogenes Laertius, 1925a, pp. 341 - 343 
reporting Alexander Polyhistor, first century BC, my square brackets)  
Although Aristotle was late, at Metaphysics XIII 6 1080b15 - 35 to point out that strictly 
speaking, numbers are not monadic because they extend into space and time and are 
therefore not incorporeal (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 612; 1989), the Pythagorean adoption of 
unity and its spored cascade of number as the monad of physis was to turn out to be a big 
factor in Plato’s subsequent development of practical philosophy. Plato lived mostly in 
Athens but it is possible, on the basis of the contested Seventh Letter 324a – 352a (Plato 
or an imitator of Plato, 1952, pp. 800 - 814) and other commentary, (Diogenes Laertius, 
1925b, Bk. III, 6; Lomas, 2013, p. 95; Yonge, 1915, Bk. 3, VIII), that he likely travelled 
to Italy where he may well have been exposed to, and influenced by, Pythagorean 
thought. The evidence from Diogenes Laertius is contained in one brief paragraph. The 
content of the Seventh Letter is more detailed and considered viable but the authorship 
of the letter itself is contested. Even were Plato not to have travelled to Italy he may yet 
have been influenced by Pythagorean thought and I subsequently discuss such a 
possibility beginning on page 102. 
53 
 
Although the Pythagorean usage of the term form Plato may have met in Italy, or 
otherwise appropriated, was the very antithesis of that adopted by the Ionians, it, the 
Pythagorean form as unity and then numbers, and the physis, on which the Ionians 
predicated their explanation of changing physical objects, do appear to have something 
in common: both were remote from the objects 
themselves and each was thought to be 
unextended and incorporeal.  
Under Plato the impermanence of the observed 
world, the cycles of coming to be, being, and 
ceasing to be, was largely to be given a 
Pythagorean interpretation and explained in 
terms of matter qua material objects. The 
permanence of the observed world, the cycles 
of coming to be, being, and ceasing to be that 
themselves never ceased, was explained as 
necessary for the soul’s journey to a world of 
ideal forms or templates available to it. Just as 
the earlier Greek gods of nature, after having 
been anthropomorphised, had been removed to Mount Olympus, form, Pythagorean 
physis, was in effect removed from sensible objects and made remote. This remoteness 
of form from sensible objects was a possible precondition for Plato’s real template forms 
which he made the key to human understanding explained as reminiscence because, in 
beholding of the forms, the soul glimpsed scientific truth. I discuss this condition in 
more detail below on pages 120 to 133.  
Notable scholars (G. E. R. Lloyd, 1999; A. E. Taylor, 1960; Waterfield, 2009) reveal 
that the ascendancy of practical philosophy through the intellect of Socrates qua Plato, 
and Aristotle, was not a simple or spontaneous development but rather developed in part 
from cross pollination and ferment of Pythagorean and Ionian world views and a tension 
within these views resulting from different perspectives about monad. In working  
 
Authorship of the Seventh Letter 
There are recognised scholars amongst those 
acknowledging Plato’s authorship (Brisson, 1987, p. 20; 
Momigliano, 1993, p. 60; Morrow, 1962, pp. 3-16), 
those rejecting it (Cherniss, 1945, p. 31; Edelstein, 
1966, p. 4; Shorey, 1933, pp. 40-41; Vlastos, 1981b, p. 
202), (Boas, 1949, pp. 453 - 457) and those who are 
undecided (Annas, 1991, p. 285; 1999, p. 75; Brunt, 
1993, pp. 319-325; Finley, 1977, p. 80; G. E. R. Lloyd, 
1990, p. 159). Some of the authors rejecting 
authenticity nevertheless hold its content trustworthy 
(Brunt, 1993, p. 325; Finley, 1977, p. 80; Shorey, 1933, 
pp. 40-41; Westlake, 1994, p. 693). Schofield who 
pronounces himself hesitantly against authenticity, 
believes the letter “to be the work of an ingenious and 
powerful writer, steeped in Plato’s writings and his 
habits of thinking and expression” (Schofield & Rowe, 
2000, pp. 299 - 300), also pronounces that “the jury is 
still out” (Schofield, 2006, p. 15) on the question of 
authenticity. Annas, who find’s “Tarrant’s own thesis, 
that the philosophical digression in the ‘letter’ 
represents Middle Platonist ideas, and that it was 
inserted at a late date” tempting, subject to an e silentio 
caveat question of why an author like Plutarch who 
knew of “a seventh letter” (Annas, 1999, p. 75) fails to 
refer to crucial parts of it where it might be reasonably 
expected that he would.  
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through these conflicting ideas the dialogical Socrates and Plato were confronted by 
differing understandings of matter and form as unity each in its own right, a living unity 
Table 5: Changing Usage of the Terms Matter and Form 
   
Users Matter Form 
Presocratic Scientists 
Initially a living god whose first 
appearances were manifested through 
beings such as mist, air, water and the 
apeiron, then as world soul, then as the 
dead atoms possessed of their own 
motion. 
The shapes, the things or beings, into which matter 
successively arranges itself. 
Pythagoreans 
The beings, the things or objects of 
nature. 
The soul or mind found in humans and in nature as number. 
Plato 
Poor resemblance of form brought to 
consciousness through reminiscence. 
Substance coming to be, being and 
ceasing to be. 
The ideas or real objective existences accessible by the soul; 
patterns and templates through reminiscence of which the 
objects of the universe are able to be understood. 
Aristotle 
Substance, material that is capable of 
being essentially enformed1. The 
potentiality of a thing, “the primary 
substratum of each thing, from which it 
comes to be without qualification” 
Physics I 9 192a30-35 (Aristotle, 1929; 
1952n, p. 268).  
For inanimate natural beings it is the entelechy of the body 
and that which defines what a thing is. For animate objects it 
is “the first grade of actuality of a natural organised body” 
De anima II 412a25–412b (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1957a, 
1984b). That is, it is the soul. For manufactured bodies it is 
the ‘thisness’ or ‘thatness’ brought to the proximate matter, 
for example the bronze or wood of which the artefact is 
made.  
Aquinas Christ in God is all in all. Christ as logos: all nature exists in God.  
Francis Bacon 
Substance is an aggregate of forms which 
is brought into existence through a chain 
of cause and effect beginning with the 
simple natures or essences. 
The simple natures or forms are few in number and are 
letters in the alphabet of nature. From them are made the 
essences of all substances. Bacon’s usage is as follows. The 
forms are either (a) essence or definition or differentia, as 
grasped by the sum of the underived attributes which cause 
other attributes, that is the sum of the essential accidents of 
the phenomena Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, II 25, p. 
398), or (b) the law or cause of a nature or quality of a body 
(ibid., I 51, p. 322), or (c) both (a) and (b) collapsed 
together: “The forms are “the true differences of things 
(which are in fact the simple Laws of Nature)” (ibid., I.75, 
p. 335). For Bacon the forms are not abstractions but actual 
working laws knowledge about which brings mankind 
power over nature. 
Thomas Hobbes 
There are accidents intrinsic to all 
material substance, these being extension, 
figure, magnitude and shape and these 
perish with the body. Other accidents not 
universally present, for example colour, 
hardness, odour may perish without the 
body perishing (Hobbes, 1889b, I. 2. 10; 
1913, pp. 52 - 69). 
There are no Platonic universal forms. Only singulars exist 
in reality and universals as names are only words or signs 
and exist nowhere Leviathan (Hobbes, 1904, p. 15). 
Universals are not essences. Form or essence is the 
dominant accident which identifies the matter of the singular 
being of body Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body 
(Hobbes, 1913, p. 67). There is no independent formal or 
final cause, each of these collapses into efficient cause 
(ibid., p. 801). Effects are caused by material and efficient 
causes acting together (Hobbes, 1913, pp. 69 - 76, 77). 
Notes: (1) To enform is to bring form to matter. The term enform is not, in this enquiry, an alternative usage of inform. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Burnett, J. (1920). Greek Philosophy Part I Thales to Plato. (passim). London: 
Macmillan; Copleston, F. (1966). A History of Philosophy Volume 1 Greece and Rome. (pp. 127 - 378). London: Burns and Oats 
Limited; Plato. (1952). Timaeus. (p. 457). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle (1952). Physics. (p. 
268). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. (pp. 259 - 359). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). De anima. (p. 642). In R. 
M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8, pp. 629 - 668). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle On the Soul. (1957). (W. S. Hett, Trans. 
Loeb Classical Library ed.). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; Bacon, F. (1900). The Advancement of Learning and the 
Novum Organum. (pp. 322, 335, 398). London: The Colonial Press; Hobbes, T. (1913). Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body. 
(pp. 67, 77 and 80 in the context of 52 – 69 and 69-76). In M. Calkins (Ed.). The Metaphysical Systems of Hobbes. Chicago: The 
Open Court Publishing Company; Hobbes, T. (1889). The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. (I, 2, 10). London: Simpkin, 
Marshall and Co.; Hobbes, T. (1904). Leviathan. (p. 15). Cambridge: The University Press.        
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and a god, and as discussed, they contributed to a new understanding of matter and form 
predicated on their dual presences in the various existing beings. I return to Aristotle’s 
further development of this duality in Chapter 3.  
I now turn, as the next heading signifies, to the second and third preconditions for 
practical philosophy’s emergence mentioned earlier on page 49, respectively intellectual 
response to social change, and intellectual access to the accumulated moral endowment 
of the classic Greek values fossilised in the content of Homer.  
Intellectual Response to Social Change and Intellectual Access to an Accumulated Moral 
Endowment of Classic Greek Values Fossilised in the Content of Homer 
Plato’s reaction to social change led him to resurrect classic Greek virtues fossilised in 
Homer and employ them in his own system of Ethics. For example, the work of the 
fifth-century Sophists during the leadership of Pericles (BC 495 – 429), gives an 
indication of the presence of social change which was to drive Plato. 
Pericles, builder of the Parthenon and leader of democratic Athens “is said not to have 
got his wisdom by the light of 
nature [or independently after 
Lamb’s translation ], but to have 
associated with several of the 
philosophers” Alcibiades I 118c 
(Plato or an imitator of Plato, 1892, 
p. 484, my square brackets; 1955, 
p. 155). Pericles worked with the 
Sophists, these so-called 
practitioners of wisdom, whose 
expressed role was to provide 
guidance in the practical affairs of business and government (Gagarin & Woodruff, 
1995, p. xxii).  
 
 
Source:(Lawrence Alma-Tadema, 1836). (artist). Phidias Showing His 
Friends the Frieze of the Parthenon. (oil on canvas). Birmingham: 
Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery. The friends of the sculptor Phidias 
are often attributed to be such notables as Pericles, Aspasia, and 
Alcibiades. 
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Among their number are Protagoras (c. BC 490-420), Gorgias (c. BC 487-376), Prodicus 
(c. BC 465-415), Hippias (c. 
BC 460-399), Thrasymachus 
(c. BC 459-400), Callicles 
(dates are unknown—perhaps 
Callicles is Plato’s invention 
for the progress of the 
Republic), Antiphon (last two 
decades of the 5th century 
BC), and Cratylus (late 5th 
century BC) and, as Table 6 
beginning on page 115 
reveals, some of these 
Sophists speak to us through 
the dialogues of Plato, most of which dialogues are set in or around Athens. The 
Sophists claimed to be able to teach the professional and technical know-how or arete of 
government and they carried with them a mistrust of, and scepticism about, the ability of 
humans to gain absolute knowledge of the observed world via the senses. 
In particular, some of the Sophists suggested that the law was not divine and Zeus-given, 
as it was understood to be in the times of a more isolated and self-contained Greece, but 
rather a man-made convenience. Realisation of this opinion became acute through a 
need to draft legislation compatible with a differing human values extant in the newly 
conquered colonies and Sauppe (1889, p. 1) and Gagarin and Woodruff (1995, p. xii) 
give a good example of its possible impact on the Sophists. They reveal that the 
dialogical Sophist, Protagoras, whom Socrates takes to task in the man-is–the–measure-
of-all-things discussion beginning at Theaetetus 152a (Plato, 1921c; 1952v, 152, p. 157), 
was a commissioner sent by Pericles to the new Athenian colony of Thurii in Southern 
Italy to draft its constitution, where he professionally confronted the relative and social 
nature of law.  
 
 
Source: (Gerome, 1861). (artist). Socrates Seeking Alcibiades in the House of 
Aspasia. (1861). (Oil on canvas). Private Collection: Philosophy and 
Philosophers in Art. Socrates urges Alcibiades to leave Aspasia’s house. Aspasia, 
educated and politically wise consort of Pericles, builder of the Parthenon, was 
reputed to have kept a brothel. Alcibiades, beautiful youth, then warrior and wit, 
is reputed to be a companion of Socrates although in the Symposium (Plato, 
1952u, pp. 168 - 171) Socrates is presented as rejecting Alcibiades’ advances 
which, in itself, does not resolve the question. 
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Cornford (1932, p. 39) likens the period of the fifth century Sophists to an adolescence 
of practical philosophy. Mulgan (1979, pp. 121 - 122) finds Sophists predicating law on 
social contract and explains the emergence of social contract as a movement in 
lawmaking away from the unalterable laws of nature as physis, towards culture as 
nomos, that is towards culture as man-made and alterable situations. The movement is 
away from the intractable laws of the gods, and he finds companionship with Popper’s 
expressed view that this movement was indicative of an awareness that the role of 
government was to protect its citizens (Popper, 1962, 14 - 15). Diogenes Laertius in 
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers at II, 16 (2010b, no pagination) also speaks of this 
movement from natural laws to social laws about goodness and justice, and links 
Archelaus (BC 5th century), likely Socrates’ teacher, with its early beginnings.  
Guthrie (1975a, p. 68) and Kochin (2009, p. 134) name a work by Gorgias called On 
Nature or the Non-existent and claim, Kochin adding a qualifying probably, that its title 
is a parody on the often used natural philosophy title On Nature (Physis) or the Existent. 
Their point is that Gorgias’ title is an example of the heights to which Sophistic 
scepticism rose and I take this scepticism to epitomise social change. Guthrie notes 
without citation that Gorgias argued “(a) that nothing exists, (b) that if anything did exist 
we could not know it, and (c) that if we could know anything, we could not 
communicate it to our neighbour” (Guthrie, 1975b, p. 68) and these words are close to 
fragments of Gorgias that can be found in Sextus Empiricus’ work Against the 
Schoolmasters at vii, 65 – 68 (Sextus Empiricus, 1949, 2010). The full context of 
articles (a), (b) and (c) in Guthrie’s uncited explanation can also be found in Gorgias’ 
fragments themselves (DK 82B1-3). Kochin cites Pseudo Aristotle’s On Melissus, 
Xenophanes and Gorgias at 974a12 (Aristotle or another, 1936/2015, 1984a) for the 
fragments he uses in his discussion of Gorgias on existence.  
The extent to which Protagoras may have been undermining belief in the gods and their 
divine law is also evident in other fragments: Protagoras is attributed to have written 
“About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or not exist, nor what they are 
like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, 
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and the shortness of human life” (DK 80B4). Lucas (1994, p. 9) also addresses this 
undermining of the Greek gods. Again social change is in the air. In addition, after 
Pericles (BC 495- 429), Athens fell into decline and managing the nation and its 
dominions meant that humans had likely to pay relatively more specific and acute 
attention to working and living together and solving practical problems, than to 
participation in the curiosity driven enquiry of speculative Science. Such appears to be 
the accumulated change and scepticism confronting the dialogical Socrates (died BC 
399) and Plato (BC c. 428 – c. 348) in the Athens ascendant and the Athens-in-decline 
of their times.  
Oliver (1940, p. 317) argues that the subsequent development in moral and practical 
philosophy apparently nurtured by Socrates, and continued by Plato and Aristotle, was 
in no small way a stand against that change and scepticism. Plato depicts Socrates as one 
rejecting this scepticism, and carrying his disgust in the moral decline of Athens, 
following Pericles, with him on his so-called second sailing—his revealed turning away 
from Science expressed at Phaedo 96a – 101a (Plato, 1952n, pp. 240 - 243; 1966c). 
Socrates, as a younger man, is depicted as having “had a prodigious desire to know that 
department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature: to know the causes 
of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed” Phaedo 96a (Plato, 1952n, p. 
240; 1966c). The dialogical Socrates’s announcement of his turning away from those 
sixth and fifth century Ionian cosmological explanations of the how and why of events is 
quoted at length below because it clearly raises the question of what-is-best, which 
question is to practical or ethical philosophy what the question of what-is-the-world-
made-of is to scientific or speculative philosophy. 
Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the 
disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite 
admirable, .... And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the 
causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether 
the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause 
and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best 
[italics added] and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, 
he would further explain that this position was the best, [italics added] and I should be 
satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought 
that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would 
explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active 
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and passive, and how all of them were for the best....  These hopes I would not have sold 
for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my 
eagerness to know the better and the worse [italics added].  
What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, 
I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, [italics 
added] but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. There is 
surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that 
without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. 
But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, 
and not from the choice of the best, [italics added] is a very careless and idle mode of 
speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the 
many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. ... But as I have 
failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will 
exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into 
the cause [italics added]. Phaedo 97 – 100 (Plato, 1952t, pp. 241 – 242, my italics, my 
square brackets). 
In the quote above, the dialogical Socrates links the principle of order, that is kosmos, 
with the principle of best choice, and as I demonstrate below in the Step 3 discussion on 
how Science and Ethics inform the Platonic Polis, these principles lie at the heart of 
Plato’s practical Ethics in its fully developed form. They inform the ideas found there of 
mankind’s choice of the good or best in a technical sense, and Plato’s urging that virtue 
is some kind of knowledge, which is of key 
importance for later demonstration of 
Proposition 1. I also demonstrate below in the 
discussion of Step 3 of this chapter specific 
details about how Plato turned to the classical 
Greek values fossilised in Homer to complete 
his system of Ethics. I deliberately postpone discussion of Plato’s adoption of Homeric 
values until Step 3 because it depends on specific usage of terms, which usage I discuss 
in Step 2. For present purpose I simply state that Plato finds that wisdom, justice, 
courage, and temperance, those virtues of the Iliad (Homer, 1806, 1884) and Odyssey 
(Homer, 1802, 1813), exist within the human soul, and he enshrines them in his ideal 
republic. These values are likely to have pervaded other extant literature available to 
Plato (Gagarin & Woodruff, 1995, pp. xv - xvi). Adkins’ comment is also apposite: 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (1) 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in 
the psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of 
reason is divine and for whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in 
natural social instinct implanted in mankind for whom 
virtue is some kind of knowledge. 
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“Scratch [Plato’s] Thrasymachus and you will find [Homer’s] Agamemnon” (Adkins, 
1960, p. 238, my square brackets). 
Having adjourned discussion of an emergence of practical philosophy until the 
completion of Step 2 on page 96 I now re-continue discussion of the emergence of a 
critical or psychological philosophy, the third kind of philosophy, outlined in Table 2 on 
page 25 and described on page 26. 
The remainder of this page, would, otherwise for this paragraph, be blank to 
accommodate software formatting imperatives. 
Return to Discussion of Critical or Psychological Philosophy 
The emergence of this kind of philosophy is also foreshadowed by Socrates’ second 
sailing and was further coaxed into 
consciousness by Socrates’ attributed 
exhortation to know thyself, a precondition for a 
making of better society. Xenophon (BC 430 – 
354), admirer and student of Socrates (BC 469 – 399), captures this early emergence of 
critical philosophy well in his Socratic Writings. 
[Socrates] And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge [italics added] men 
meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils? 
Because, the man who knows himself [italics added] knows what is advantageous to 
himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by doing what he knows, he provides 
himself with what he needs and so does well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what 
he knows not, he avoids mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge 
other human beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with good 
and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is mistaken as to his own 
capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of mankind and all human matters else; he 
neither knows what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; 
and being all abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in 
what is ill. Socratic Writings(Xenophon, 2009, p. 106 my square brackets) 
The quotation above notwithstanding, Socrates’ ownership of the know-thyself 
exhortation is disputed. For example Pausanias, in his Descriptions of Greece at 10. 24. 
1 (Pausanias, 1886, p. 264; 2000, p. 507), associates the know-thyself wisdom with a 
number of names and announces its inscribed presence in the fore-temple at Delphi. For  
 
Critical or Psychological Philosophy 
Mankind’s attempt to understand the nature of their 
own minds and the implications of such 
understanding as it impacts on speculative and 
practical philosophy.  
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that matter another inscription, “not too much of anything” (Pausanias, 1898, p. 264) is 
not necessarily far removed from the moderation-in-all-things idea frequently associated 
with Aristotle. Xenophon too has Socrates asking Euthydemus whether or not he has 
seen a know-thyself inscription at the temple (Xenophon, 2009, p. 105) and found it a 
useful aid for humans, enmeshed as such beings are in matters of value, introspection 
and pursuit of knowledge. 
In summary, I have to this point completed only part of the work of Step 1 of this 
chapter, that part concerned with an emergence of three kinds of philosophy extant in 
Plato’s time. I have (a) articulated a view that speculative philosophy flowered in Ionia 
when Science, in quest of knowledge for its own sake, attempted to discover what the 
world was made of, (b) begun explanation of how, in raising the question of what-is-
best, and in seeking an answer to it, Plato, by virtue of his exposure to Pythagorean 
kosmos and mysticism, and his return to the classic Greek values preserved in some of 
 
Xenophon Alcibiades 
Plato, obscured, 
and Socrates 
Aspasia Apelles 
Alexander 
the Great 
Aristotle 
 
Source: Delacroix, F. The Limbo. (cupola painting, the Senate Chamber of the Palais du Luxembourg, Paris). (1841 
– 1846). Famous Greeks cropped by Ian Eddington from The Limbo: Philosophy and Philosophers in Art.  
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the earliest works of the Western cannon—Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey—fostered a 
growth of practical philosophy, (c) posited that by announcing his second sailing, Plato’s 
Socrates ended practical philosophy’s adolescence, an adolescence characterised by 
ridicule of both the scientific and mystical explanations of nature, and by condescension 
towards the pantheon of Homer’s gods and the Zeus-given nature of law, (d) explained 
how critical philosophy was called forth by a dialogical Socrates’ second sailing and his 
championing of a know-thyself inscription, and (e) identified, within a developing 
religion-to-philosophy theme, possible social discord and personal eschatology 
dimensions coeval with state or P(p)olis religion. I continue articulation of Step 1 to 
address its claim that the emergence of three kinds of philosophy is coeval with a 
transition from religion to philosophy.  
Discussion of Step 1 Continues 
Emergence of Three Divisions of Philosophy Coeval with a Transition from Religion to Philosophy 
I take a lead from Cornford’s general explanation, and Burnet’s passing 
acknowledgement, that philosophy emerged 
because, as human settlements developed, 
religion alone, understood simplistically as 
habitual ritual behaviour, and/or everyday votive 
habit, was found insufficient as human society became more complex (Burnet, 1908, pp. 
2 - 17; F. M. Cornford, 1957, pp. 1 - 123). 
The work of F. M. Cornford (1957; 1991), J. E Harrison (1908), Gilbert Murray (2004) 
and A. B. Cook (1925) is germane to a from-religion-to-philosophy claim of this chapter 
as also too is ongoing reference to scholarly exegesis of Derveni Papyrus research now 
becoming available, which research is used to build upon and further elucidate the 
contributions of those earlier mentioned opening paragraph scholars. This earlier group 
of researchers made connections between the voluminous work of J. G. Fraser (1925) 
and the sociological theories of Emile Durkheim (1915). Cornford linked Durkheim’s 
explanation of so-called collective representations (Durkheim, 1898, p. 17 ff.; 1915, pp. 
15 - 17, 435) with Fraser’s explanation that magic, religion, and Science are inextricably 
interwoven (Fraser, 1925, pp. 56, 711, 713) thus allowing interpretation of some 
 
Step 1 
Step 1 examines a proposition that three divisions of 
philosophy were extant at the time of Plato’s life and 
that the emergence of the three divisions is coeval 
with a general transition from religion to philosophy. 
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Presocratic fragments in a new light. Fraser generally argued that society had progressed 
from magic through religion to Science and he explored an emergence of soul from 
nature (Fraser, 1925, pp. 178 - 189, 667 - 691). Durkheim had put a view that society’s 
collective representations, its shared social constructs, exist apart from individual 
representations. These collective representations, as opposed to and distinct from 
individual representations, are shared mental constructs taken up from such various 
entities as religion, morphology, morality, and economics common to a group. They are 
said to depend, inter alia, on how the sharing group was founded and organised, the time 
and space of the sharing group, and intergenerational transfer of ideas and praxis. They 
“are not abstractions which have a reality only in particular consciousnesses, but they 
are as concrete representations as an individual could form of his own personal 
environment: they correspond to the way in which this very special being, society, 
considers the things of its own proper experience” (Durkheim, 1915, p. 435). 
By virtue of these collective and individual representations mankind becomes a double.  
There are two beings in him: an individual being, which has its foundation in the organism 
and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which 
represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by 
observation - I mean society. This duality of our nature has as its consequence in the 
practical order, the irreducibility of a moral ideal to a utilitarian motive, and in the order 
of thought, the irreducibility of reason to individual experience. (Durkheim, 1915, p. 16). 
Cornford’s suggestion that the Greek flowering had its origins in a more primitive and 
savage Greece might be considered a little iconoclastic. Nonetheless, I propose that a 
general notion consistent with the Cornford-Hamilton-Murray-Fraser-Durkheim 
amalgam of ideas is sound, namely, that before an emergence of human consciousness 
of tribal collective representation as something different from individual self, it makes 
little sense to distinguish custom, that is, nomos, from nature, that is physis, but that first 
consciousness of collective representation begot first consciousness of mankind’s so-
called separation from nature. Cornford’s claim is that the early forms of speculative and 
practical philosophy are particular identifiable states of human consciousness that 
originated in, and emerged from, humankind’s necessary attachment to habitat, 
community and tribal place.  
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In the Fraser et al context outlined in the preceding paragraph, mankind’s awareness of 
their so-called separation from nature emerged when, with the development of human 
settlements, nomos and physis became 
distinguishable. I subsequently 
employ the idea of a nomos-physis 
divide originating in nature to partly 
explain traces of an Ethics and 
Science of place theme in both Plato 
and Aristotle. I employ it in full 
recognition that when examined more 
widely, and from within philosophy 
and literary criticism (Ackerman, 
1987, pp. 231 - 235; 2002, pp. 159 - 
189; Bloom, 1968a, pp. xiv - xx; A. 
Robinson, 2002, pp. 1 - 11), and other discipline perspectives like anthropology (Kuper, 
1988, pp. 105 - 151), Cornford and Frazer’s wider scholarship is contested. Taken only 
to make a point of a physis-nomos divide, the Cornford et al amalgam, I think, stands to 
reason, and is  not a troublesome referent. Scholars continue to find interest in questions 
of a physis-nomos divide in Presocratic times (Gagarin, 2002, pp. 63 - 78; Ostwald, 
1990, pp. 293 - 306 #693; Waterfield, 2009, pp. 205 - 299) and others continue to 
adduce Cornford and Fraser to development of their projects as the accompanying box 
on page 64 reveals.  
In bringing a sociological perspective to interpretation of Presocratic fragments 
Cornford posits that the period from the centuries of Anaximander (BC 610 - 546 and 
Pythagoras (born 571/570) down to the arrival of atomism (BC 460) was, in a more 
general sense, a time of transition from religion to philosophy. This period contains the 
rich cascade of cosmogonies and cosmologies from Thales to Democritus already 
discussed in Tables 3 and 4 respectively on pages 39 and 46 and their related texts. In 
the same period soul as a construct progressed from Orphic mystery to a clearly 
specified presence as Pythagorean number (F. M.  Cornford, 1991, pp. 124 - 242). The 
 
Ongoing Application of Cambridge Ritualist Ideas 
Brutus (2012) draws on Fraser (1925), Cornford (1912/2009), and 
Harrison (1908) in his discussion of the emergence of religion from 
magic and ritual, animal sacrifice, totem dance, initiation procedures 
and belief in the supernatural and surmises an escape of philosophy 
from religion (Brutus, 2012, p. 184).  
 
Brutus grounds his work in the methodological tradition of Max 
Müller (1882, 2010), James (1902, 2009) and Brown (1991) and the 
revival of their methodology by Rifkin (2009). Rifkin analyses 
empathy and takes a psychological, biological and philosophical 
approach to questions of faith versus religion, truth versus reality, 
and empathy and altruism to derive a “distributed capitalism” 
(Rifkin, 2009, pp. 512 - 553) in which global empathy may help to 
solve social problems like climate change (sic.). Part of his analysis 
is based on a study of communication and energy development from 
hunter gatherer times to the beginning of the twenty first century. 
Max Müller, James and Brown respectively, whether, in discussion 
of natural, physical, anthropological and/or psychological religion, 
or biological and psychological causes of religious experience, or 
biological, psychological and anthropological causes of universals 
unique to humans, all take an analytical and empirical approach to 
their subjects. 
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progress of a soul construct from Dionysius to an Orphic understanding, and on to the 
Pythagoreans, might be traced through some of the Presocratic fragments, and from 
references to it in Plato.  
For example the old cycle of reincarnation associated with Dionysus, although on the 
verge of being a cycle of religious salvation, appears 
to have been an earthly affair associated with the 
cycle of the seasons. The Dionysian cycle belongs to 
the mysteries, prior to Olympian understandings, the 
mystery of Demeter and Persephone being an 
example of personification of nature’s cycle of death 
and rebirth (Willoughby, 2003, p. 26).  
Only after Homer did Dionysus obtain a seat on 
Olympus (J. E. Harrison, 1905, pp. 46 - 48) and 
according to Herrero de Jáuregui (2010, p. 14) 
Orphism, classically reconstructed, emerges from a 
reform of Dionysian orgy and ecstasy redefined to 
include a personal eschatology predicated on the 
soul’s imprisonment in body and its pilgrimage back 
from whence it came through cycles of reincarnation, 
in atonement for the Titan’s outrage against 
Dionysus, son of Zeus and Persephone, the 
descendants of the Titans themselves being mortals 
formed from the dust of the Titans after Zeus 
destroyed them in anger at their murder of Dionysus. 
Those following the reformed rituals and practising 
the taboos became known as Orphics. De Jáuregui, by 
his claim of a presence of personal eschatology in reforming Dionysian cult behaviour, 
provides one possible explanation of reincarnation’s morphing from earthly cycles to 
heavenly cycles. 
 
 
Note: Triptolemus standing between Demeter 
and Persephone receives grain seeds (receives 
the knowledge of agriculture) from Demeter. 
The so-called Great Eleusinian Relief 
sculptured in marble circa BC 450 - 425 was 
found at the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis, 
and this particular image, chosen for ease of 
viewing, catches a plaster Roman copy taken 
circa BC 27–AD 14 of the original now held in 
the Archaeological Museum of Athens. The 
picture provides clearer detail than available 
pictures of the original however its depictions 
of hair style and drapery, which differ from 
those of the original, reflect an influence of 
Augustan art. There is contestation about what 
is actually being handed over. 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Fragments of a Roman Copy set in a Plaster 
Cast of the Original Greek Marble Relief. 
Fragment from the Eleusinian Relief 
(14.130.9). In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art 
History. New York: The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. (Metropolitan Museum of 
Modern Art, 2006). 
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The Dionysian soul however endlessly came and went from the underworld to daylight 
and back again without release. Under this Dionysian system the soul had not fallen, as 
Empedocles (DK 31B114-124) likely says it did, from the light of the starry heavens, 
whereupon it is subsequently breathed into animate body as reported and refuted in De 
Anima 410b30 (Aristotle, 1907, p. 42, here at 410b15-16; 1952b, p. 160; 1957a) and 
clothed in flesh as Empedocles (DK 31B100, 31B126) again likely says is the case. Its 
subsequent Orphic imprisonment in flesh is likely depicted as a result of something done 
in the place from whence it came Cratylus 400c (Plato, 1921a; 1952q, pp. 93-94). To 
escape its bodily prison, the soul, a fallen god, must endure ongoing cycles of 
reincarnation from man, to underworld, to plant, to beast, to man and on and on for 
10,000 solar years and after three of such cycles it is set to enter once again its heavenly 
abode (J. E. Harrison, 1908, p. 515, Empedocles DK 31B515-517; Plato, 1925e; 1952o, 
p. 125). Thus is given a second explanation of morphing from earthly cycle to heavenly 
cycle. Janko (2004) in convincing detail explains how Strasbourg Papyrus lines and 
earlier known fragments of Empedocles fit together, line 233 of the Strasbourg Papyrus 
corresponding with Empedocles’s line DK 31B17.1. Janko’s reconstruction of lines 233-
264 of the papyrus (R. Janko, 2004, pp. 14 - 22) reveals an Empedocles able to include 
reasoned physics of the four elements with poetic interpretations of reincarnation in one 
“body of writing, he being “a magician, a poet and a scientist too” (ibid., p. 11). 
Cornford (1957, p. 178), following Schultz (1908, p. 68), writes that the Orphic cycle is 
a superimposition of a Babylonian astral cycle onto 
the existing earthly cycles under a great astrological 
year of 10,000 solar years which great year in 
Babylonian astronomy was the time taken for the 
heavenly bodies to complete their cycles and return 
to their same relative positions and ordered places. 
He thus in part provides a third explanation of reincarnation’s morphing from earthly to 
heavenly cycle.  
 
Strasbourg Papyrus 
A papyrus dated to the first century AD 
containing lines identified by Alan Martin in 
1992 as belonging to On Nature, a poem by 
Empedocles (born c. 490 BC), and now known 
as  P. Strasb. Gr. Inv. 1665–6. A namesake 
Strasbourg Papyrus catalogued Gr. 254 and 
different in content, subject and era also exists 
but has no relevance in this enquiry.  
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Even so, although just how, under Orphism, soul became immortal, of heavenly descent 
and immutable remains uncertain, yet with Orphism came a preoccupation with 
salvation of individual soul. Plato reports in Phaedo 108 
and The Republic II, 365 – 367 that Orphics might 
labour long and hard for salvation through purifying 
ritual and abstinence (Plato, 1952r, pp. 314 – 315; 1952t, 
p. 247; 1969a, 1988) and could not so easily find god 
through Dionysian orgy and ecstasy, a shame some 
might think—except that rituals were originally quite 
terrible (H. A. Shapiro, 2014, p. 48). Apparently, 
genuine practise of practical philosophy is important for 
the effectiveness of telestic ritual. In turn, a spent 
Orphism was to be rekindled anew by Pythagoreans and 
their ways of life, in which purification of philosophy 
replaced washing away of sin via ritual. 
In general support for his religion-to-philosophy 
argument Cornford finds that, not only do the theogony 
of Hesiod’s gods and the Olympian gods of Homer lurk 
behind Thales and the transition to atomism but also, the 
mysticism of Dionysus and Orpheus lurks behind 
Pythagoras and the transition to human soul as number 
in nature. Moreover his opinion is that these two 
separate trails of enquiry into the essential stuff of 
nature, the scientific and the mystical, are but different 
expressions of a one and same human consciousness, 
and that they reflect nothing more than a presence of two 
human temperaments which spring from two permanent needs in human nature (F. M. 
Cornford, 1957, pp. v - vi). Such a leap does not take him too far from Fraser, nor 
Durkheim’s double man. 
Sparagmos 
 
Side A: Two Dancing Maenads 
 
 
 
Note: “Red beard wagging briskly, both 
feet off the ground, the satyr on side A 
leaps upon the maenad … She holds her 
thyrsos in one hand and extends the other 
toward Dionysos, begging for help, but the 
god merely stands and watches” (H. A. 
Shapiro, 2014, p. 48). 
 
Side B: Dionysos with Satyr Attacking a 
Maenad 
 
 
 
Note: “Two maenads are dancing in an 
ecstatic trance … Here, one carries a deer 
on her shoulders and the other dangles a 
young lion by its tail. The moment is 
approaching the sparagmos, the climactic 
act of communion with the god, when they 
will tear the animals to pieces with their 
bare hands and eat the raw flesh” (H. A. 
Shapiro, 2014, p. 48).  
 
Source: Photographs by Maria Daniels, of 
sides A and B of an Attic black-figured 
lekythos attributed to the Diosphos Painter 
in 1991 when the vase was then held by 
the University of Mississippi Museum. 
(Daniels, 1991). 
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In specific argument of his case Cornford (1957, pp. 1 - 123) makes a number of claims. 
First, the scientific transition to atomism is a development in which Olympian gods, 
governed as they were by a moral but uncaring fate, that is, moira, are replaced by an 
essential substance (atomi) governed by necessity and chance. Secondly, the mystical 
tradition of soul and mind can be understood as a transition from belief in a living 
reincarnated soul, to belief of its presence in nature in the form of numerical 
relationships existing there. Thirdly, that as a result of these developments, philosophy, 
encompassing Science and Ethics, when it broke from religion, carried with it 
preoccupations with three entities, namely physis, the nature of nature; god or spirit; and 
psyche or soul.  
Cornford further argues that this transition of human consciousness from religion to 
philosophy is in turn but one link in a chain of development which stretches back to the 
very emergence of mankind’s existence as a social animal. His explanation (1957, pp 1-
127) of a long primitive history which carried humanity forward to a flowering of 
atomism, and a so-called escape of human soul from nature, provides a basis for his 
transition theory which in turn provides a backdrop for interpretation of Plato’s 
subsequent return to the classical Ethics of Homer from which he extracted an Ethics to 
inform his Republic. Cornford’s insights also illuminate a theme of place in Aristotle’s 
Ethics, which I discuss in Chapter 3. 
In essence Cornford’s argument is that the physis, the nature of nature, that essential 
matter which constitutes all the beings of the world, and which the Ionians sought to 
understand and specify, is by other names the life substance, the soul, of mystic 
understanding, reborn as scientific understanding, the rebirth being occasioned by the 
arriving irrelevance of personified Greek gods, removed to Olympus, where even they 
were subject to the power of fate. The physis, that which in Ionic Science cascades 
through a number of states and names in its journey from the water or moisture named 
by Thales to the dead atoms of Democritus, and which in the Pythagorean system is 
known as soul and still later as idea, has its genesis in the first social consciousness and 
religious stirrings of primitive society. Its origin is the other-than-me feeling which is 
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coeval with the first stirrings of herd or tribe instinct engendered through totem ritual 
and frenzy. In particular, this other-than-me feeling is both empowering as a tribal spirit 
of kin, and moderating in that the group self emerges as something over and above the 
individual, who must now find her or his place within the rule of the group. This sense 
of self and group is the first stirring of soul. Again Harrison, Fraser and Durkheim are 
not far away. Although Cornford does not say it, it is as though, by virtue of ritual 
ecstasy and frenzy, soul may have made its way from nature through a realised 
colonisation of human body and from there to its own release into immortality.  
In particular, the totem of animals and plants is a totem of kinship and place, a kinship 
which unites a tribe with an area from which it derives its sustenance, and in this 
relationship of self to place and area, and to group instinct, is found the very beginnings 
of morality, understood as an expression of sense of place and of social order required 
for efficient provisioning purposes. Interpreted thus, morality, operationalised through 
its attendant social mores, is an expression and extension of nature.  
The totem area is also, in Cornford’s view, the origin of the power of fate condition, 
moira, and later more or morality, which afflicts Homer’s Olympian gods. To tempt fate 
was to go outside the established social mores which grew out of the sustaining totem 
area, or to invade another tribe’s place. Fate originally announced itself all-powerful 
when the vicissitudes of environmental change in the sustaining totem area continually 
overwhelmed the increasingly formalised and ritualised group of totem gods themselves. 
They, the totem gods, before the Greek gods of Olympus, had no power over fate and 
they also, again like the Greek gods after them, became increasingly irrelevant. What 
remained were a morality of place and an out of body experience of soul, later psyche. 
Herein lies an early sense of an idea of place and order and intellect like that caught by 
received translations of Pythagorean cosmos or kosmos which partly informs both the 
Ethics and morality of classical Greece in Homer’s time, and the first stirrings of 
political philosophy in Plato’s dialogues—and of cosmos more later beginning on page 
107. This original subjugation of individual body to place and soul, reborn in many 
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forms, led to both scientific and mystic explanations of physis, and as mentioned, is the 
manifestation of two essential streams of temperament in humankind.  
In summary, so far I have articulated Step 1 of the three steps in this chapter except for 
closure on practical Ethics which is postponed until Step 3. That is, I have supported a 
view that an emergence of three divisions of philosophy 
extant at the time of Plato’s life is coeval with a general 
transition from religion to philosophy. I have also begun 
explanations by which it can be understood that virtue is 
some kind of knowledge, that reason is divine, that 
Science is theoretical philosophy, and Ethics is practical philosophy. Taken together, 
these understandings are essential components of a knowledge base which informs 
ongoing articulation and final demonstration of the Thesis Proposition Statements. This 
articulation of Step 1 is predicated on elucidation of Cambridge Ritualist theory about 
origins of soul and morality, content of translated works of classical writers, engagement 
with works by noted Modern and Post-Modern eras scholars and interpretation of 
Presocratic fragments, and from it may be assembled a list of specific understandings 
which might serve as a tentative backdrop for continuing discussion about Science, 
Ethics and Polis in Presocratic times. First, both Pythagorean soul as number, or Ionian 
physis, whether it be after Thales moisture, or after Leucippus’ atoms, are likely but 
differing explanations of the essential stuff of nature, which explanations themselves are 
but likely differing expressions of the one human consciousness. Secondly, both 
explanations might be respectively traced back to a common origin in totem ritual and 
place. Thirdly, the basis and essence of this origin in common is possibly composed of 
awareness of group soul, and restraint and obedience and cultural structure needed to 
win sustenance and survival from that totem area and place. Fourthly, as a consequence, 
at the time of their first appearances, soul and morality are, in part, extensions of laws of 
nature; that is, soul and morality are principles of natural law predicated on a necessity 
that living beings must be nourished beings.  
 
 
Step 1 
Step 1 examines a proposition that three 
divisions of philosophy were extant at the 
time of Plato’s life and that the emergence 
of the three divisions is coeval with a 
general transition from religion to 
philosophy. 
 
71 
 
Discussion of P(p)olis, Cult Religion and a Journey from Religion to Philosophy Continues 
To continue, recent research into Strasbourg Papyrus and Orphic Gold Tablet content, 
found for example in that 
Derveni Papyrus research 
discussed earlier on page 
29, also provides 
opportunities for 
reassessment of tenets of 
received theory including 
those germane to P(p)olis 
religion and cults, and 
religion-to-philosophy 
transitions, and before 
beginning articulation of 
Step 2 of this chapter on 
page 84, I search amongst 
such recent contributions 
to P(P)olis and cult 
religion, and religion to 
philosophy research, inter 
alia, to reassess the 
validity and 
appropriateness of this 
enquiry’s use of earlier 
findings in these fields. 
Consequently, but now in 
the light of some of these 
new contributions, both 
P(p)olis religion construct and Cornford’s idea of progress of soul from Dionysian 
understandings to Orphic and Pythagorean understandings are again articulated through  
Behind the Text: Complementary Discussion of Methods by which Bernabé Claims 
Plato Amends Orphism to his Needs 
(1) 
omission 
Timaeus 40d 
Bernabé’s exegesis is finely reasoned there being many ifs and buts 
about the simplicity of linkages constructed below for explanatory 
purposes. Lamb mentions the ironical nature of the statement 
“Concerning the other divinities, to discover and declare their origin is 
too great a task for us, and we must trust to those who have declared it 
aforetime, they being, as they affirmed, descendants of gods and 
knowing well, no doubt, their own forefathers” Timaeus 40d, note 2, 
(Plato, 1903d)  
 
The ‘Orphic’ order is Time → Aether and Chaos in union → Cosmic 
Egg  → Phanes the triple god, from the hermaphroditic Cosmic Egg and 
his noetic triple night associates Nights 1, 2 and 3 → Heaven → Earth 
→ children of Heaven and Earth (Pantel & Zaidman, 2002, p. 158). 
Mead (2010, pp. 58 - 60) provides a more detailed outline. 
 
Plato’s order is Coupling of Ge and Uranus → Oceanus and Tethys → 
the children of Oceanus and Tethys, Phorkys, Cronos, Rhea, and their 
progeny → Zeus and Hera from Cronos and Rhea → “all those who are, 
as we know, called their brethren; and of these again, other 
descendants” Timaeus 41e (Plato, 1903d; 1952w, p. 452) 
(2) addition 
Laws 715e 
Bury admits the ‘probably’ of the ‘tradition’ referred to by Plato as 
“probably Orphic, quoted thus by the scholiast: Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, 
Διὸς δ᾽ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται” Timaeus 715e, note 1  (Plato, 1967/68a, n. 
p.). 
(3) 
modification 
Cratylus 
400c 
At Cratylus 400a Hermogenes agrees that the soul “holds and carries 
the whole nature of the body” Cratylus 400a (Plato, 1921a; 1952q, p. 
93) and accepts the correctness of “Anaxagoras’s doctrine that it is mind 
or soul which orders and holds the nature of all things” (ibid.)  
 
Then at Cratylus 400b comes the word letter-swap play between σῶμα 
(body) an σῆμα (tomb) which sets up the modification to come: 
 
Hermogenes 
Now what shall we say about the next word? 
Socrates 
You mean “body” (σῶμα)? 
Hermogenes 
Yes. 
Socrates 
I think this admits of many explanations, if a little, even very little, 
change is made; for some say it is the tomb (σῆμα) of the soul Cratylus 
400b (Plato, 1921a; 1952q, p. 93)  
 
The modification from tomb to prison or safe occurs at Cratylus 400c: 
 
Socrates [continuing]  
[400c] their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life; and 
again, because by its means the soul gives any signs which it gives, it is 
for this reason also properly called “sign” (σῆμα). But I think it most 
likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is 
undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an 
enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself 
denotes, the safe (σῶμα) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not 
even a letter needs to be changed Cratylus 400c (Plato, 1921a; 1952q, p. 
93). 
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references to soul in Presocratic fragments, from references to reincarnation, whether 
allegorical or otherwise, in Plato’s now called eschatological myths (Annas, 1982; 
Ward, 2002)—Phaedrus 246 – 254, Republic 614 – 621, Gorgias 523e – 527, Phaedo 
70c, 81c-e, 106e – 115a, (Plato, 1903, 1925, 1952a, 1952b, 1952c, 1952d, 1967, 1988), 
or in other works—Meno 81, Cratylus 400, Timaeus, 41d ff., 90 – 91, Laws 870d-e, 
872e, 881a, 904 (Plato, 
1903c, 1921a, 1925h, 
1952c, 1952j, 1952l, 1952w, 
1967c, 1967/68a, 1974), 
from exegeses of cult 
religion, Science-religion 
conflict and papyrological 
and archaeological 
information (Graf & 
Johnston, 2007/2013; R. 
Janko, 1997, 2001, 2002, 
2004, 2005; Osek, 2013) 
and from other relevant 
works subsequently cited 
with these.  
To wit: Ficino (AD 1433 – 
1499), in his attempt to 
reconcile Plato with 
Christianity, holds that Plato 
speaks allegorically of reincarnation, not literally (2006, 17.3-4) and Hobbler (1917) 
discusses a meeting attended by Ficino and such notables as Lorenzo and Giuliano de 
Medici, Leon Batista Alberti and others, called, inter alia, “to prove that in the Aeneid 
are to the found, concealed in allegory, all the Christian doctrine, as well as Platonic, 
which to them were one and the same” (ibid., p. 29). Elsewhere (ibid., p. 48) Hobbler 
reports Mirandola’s use of allegory to bring Plato’s philosophy into harmony with the  
Behind the Text: Complementary Discussion of Methods by which Bernabé 
Claims Plato Amends Orphism to his Needs (Continued) 
(4) 
recontextualisation 
Meno 81a 
Lamb comments that in the quotation πένθος (“affliction”) in 
mystic language means something like “fall” or “sin” and 
speculates that the lines of Plato’s quote are probably from 
one of Pindar's Dirges (Bergk, fr. 133). Jowett makes no 
comment. Plato earlier, at Meno 81a, had Socrates link 
Pindar with certain “priests and priestesses” (Plato, 1952l, pp. 
179 - 180; 1967c). Given Plato’s expressed concerns about 
tales and myth in sophistry and poetry, for example Timaeus 
22d (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 444), The Republic II 380c3 
and III 394b-c (Plato, 1952r, pp. 322, 329; 1969a), Philebus 
14a3-5 (Plato, 1873; 1952p, p. 610), Laws X 887 – 888 
(Plato, 1952j, p. 759; 1967/68c), Phaedrus 244a (Plato, 
1925e; 1952o, p. 123) and Ion 534 – 536 (Plato, 1925c; 
1952s, pp. 144 - 145) especially their so-tabbed inspired 
madness and antithesis of reason dimensions, and examined 
in the light of Janko’s earlier cover-up argument discussed on 
page 33—meaning in a Janko context, Plato’s possible 
stealthy jettisoning of the earlier poets and their increasingly 
obsolescent theogonies—Plato’s naming of Pindar may be 
less enigmatic than it is shrewd and clever, even in the sense 
that Aristotle later categorises cleverness. For example, 
Pindar was well connected politically, (S. G. Miller, 2000, p. 
281), the gods in his poetry are traditional, and revered 
(Swanson, 1974, pp. xiv - xlvi), he keeps shy of Science, the 
eclipse being explained as a potent rather than a physical 
phenomenon (Fotheringham, 1920, pp. 189 - 191; Pindar, 
1915, pp. 547 - 549, Pindar's Paean 9), his revisionism of 
myths is respectful of the gods, for example as in Pythian 
Ode 9, where he downplays Apollo’s rape of Cyrene (J. 
Sandys, 1915, pp. 273 - 285), and monotheism is difficult to 
discern in his works (M. L. West, 2002, p. 100). Such 
speculation notwithstanding, Plato’s on the face of it 
antipathy towards poetry is contested (Doniger O'Flaherty, 
1998, pp. 25 - 44; Gonzalez, 2011, pp. 93 - 110; Green, 1918, 
p. 1; G. Most, 2011, pp. 1 - 20) 
(5) 
interpretation 
Phaedo 62d 
Earlier at Phaedo 62b (1952t, p. 222; 1966c) Plato had 
introduced the body-prison metaphor in association with 
ancient teachings which introduction might prompt the 
initiated to find hidden meanings in the words which, on the 
surface, are couched in terms of piety towards the gods of 
P(p)olis religion. 
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teaching of Moses and Bernabé’s examination of Plato’s engagement with Orphic and 
Pythagorean myth suggests 
that, like Ficino, Plato himself 
was ideas-massaging from a 
particular perspective, in this 
case, his own project of 
reconstructing myths. Thus, 
authenticating the progress of 
the soul from Dionysus to 
Orphic and Pythagorean 
understandings through 
exegetic interpretation of 
Plato’s eschatological myths 
is not without complications 
engendered of its own 
complexity. Bernabé (2011; 
2013), in his analysis of 
Plato’s engagement with 
Orphism, depicts Plato as 
neither greatly nor little 
indebted to Orpheus, but 
rather one who drew 
significantly from Orphism 
subject to a need sufficient for 
his own purpose of replacing 
Orphic initiation and ritual 
with the contemplative rigour 
and moral behaviour of the philosophic life as the key to an eternal happiness, and even 
audience with, and life amongst, the gods Baracat (2013, p. 1).  
Behind the Text: Complementary Discussion of Methods by which Bernabé 
Claims Plato Amends Orphism to his Needs (Continued) 
(6) 
etymology 
Republic 364e 
Bushel ὅμαδον, literally. noise, hubbub, babel, [is] here 
contemptuous. Jowett translates ὅμαδον as “host” at 364 in The 
Republic (1952r, p. 313; 1969a).  
 
βίβλων -- ἐγγόνων. The allusion is to Orphic liturgies. Musaeus 
was the son of Selene, according to Philochorus quoted by the 
Scholiast on Ar. Frogs 1033: cf. φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε Μήνης 
Μουσαῖε in Abel Orphic. Fr. 4. Orpheus' mother was the Muse 
Calliope (Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεύς). There is no solid basis for the 
old view that ἔκγονος means ‘son,’ and ἔγγονος ‘grandson.’ 
The etymological form is ἔκγονος, but ἐκ- was often 
assimilated to ἐγ- before γ during the 4th century B.C., 
particularly in this word: cf. also ἐγγειτόνων etc. on 
Inscriptions. Elsewhere in the Republic ἔκγονος is the regular 
spelling. 
 
καθ᾽ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν: sacrificial liturgies. A θυηπολικόν is 
mentioned by Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφεύς) as one of the ‘works’ of 
Orpheus: see also Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 371 and Rohde Psyche II 
pp. 112, 113 notes πόλεις: as for instance when Epimenides the 
Cretan purified Athens (see Grote III 85—89). Plato may be 
thinking of this event, which in defiance of chronology he 
placed ten years before the Persian wars (Laws 642 D, E). Cf. 
also infra 366 A and Laws 909 B. 
 
λύσεις -- καθαρμοί: λύσεις means ‘modes of absolution’ 
(Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 810): cf. 366 A οἱ λύσιοι θεοί and Arist. 
Pol. B 4 1262. The Scholium on Ar. Frogs 1033 contains the 
remark: οὗτος (i.e. Musaeus) δὲ παραλύσεις καὶ τελετὰς καὶ 
καθαρμοὺς συντέθεικεν. For παραλύσεις Blaydes proposes 
λύσεις, while Rutherford reads περὶ λύσεις (apparently with the 
Ravenna Codex), inserting also on his own conjecture ποιήματα 
after συντέθεικεν. I have no doubt that the Scholiast wrote παρὰ 
λύσεις: ‘besides Absolutions, he has composed also τελεταί and 
καθαρμοί.’ καθαρμοί formed a distinct class of religious 
literature, and were written by Epimenides, Empedocles, and 
others: see Grote I p. 27 note 3. 
 
παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν: ‘pleasures of play.’ παιδιᾶς depends on 
ἡδονῶν, and is here used abstractly: cf. Thuc. III 38. 7 ἀκοῆς 
ἡδονῇ and (with Schneider) Paus. I 21. 7 θέας ἡδονήν. Madvig 
would eject ἡδονῶν, but without ἡδονῶν Plato would probably 
have written παιδιῶν (cf. Laws 829 B): other suggestions, such 
as καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιᾶς διὰ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ 
παιδιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν are open to graver objection. For παίζειν 
and the like in connexion with religious celebrations. Stallbaum 
cites Hdt. IX 11 Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε and VIII 99 ἐν 
θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθείῃσι: add Phaedr. 276 B, Laws 666 B. 
Plato's point is that atonement if it is made a pleasure and not a 
penance sets a premium on sin. 
(7) 
mythology 
Phaedrus 246a 
Having introduced the charioteer metaphor Plato proceeds to 
exegete the older questions of mortality and immortality 
through it. 
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On such a reading, ideas found in the content of some Orphic gold tablets, early tablets 
being in use during Plato’s lifetime and so helpful in present scholarship, appear 
compatible with Plato’s dialoguing, a good example being Plato’s replacement of a 
dead-in-body soul with an alive-in-body soul, and a complementary swap of the 
charioteer myth of the Phaedrus for the original guilt of the soul generated by the 
outrage of the Titans on Dionysus (ibid., p. 3). Baracat acknowledges Bernabé’s 
revelation that Plato’s methods of amending Orphism to his needs involve (1) omission, 
for example in Timaeus 40d where, for dialogue purposes, Plato downgrades Night 
relative to its position in Orpheus’ theogony, (2) addition, for example where Plato, at 
Laws 715, describes Zeus as the “beginning, middle, and end of all things”, (Plato, 
1967/68a) or “the beginning,  the end, and the center of all things” (Plato, 1967/68a) the 
words “the end” are additions, (3) modification, for example in Cratylus 400c (Plato, 
1921a, 1952q) where Plato modifies the body/grave construct of 400b to a body/prison 
construct, (4) recontextualisation, for example in Meno 81a (Plato, 1952l, 1967c) where 
Plato begins an implication that Orphic transmigration augments his knowledge as 
anamnesis, (5) interpretation of enigmas, for example in Phaedo 62d (Plato, 1952t, 
1966c), where Plato employs aínigma, (6) etymology, for example his choice of 
appropriate word meanings in Republic 364e (Plato, 1952r, 1969a), and (7) mythology, 
for example in Phaedrus 246a (Plato, 1925e; 1952o, p. 124) where Plato manipulates 
Orphic knowledge to the needs of the philosophical and moral system he is developing 
by introducing his charioteer metaphor. 
Some of these methods share a common technique, namely, Plato’s denotation of Orphic 
material as a sacred tale without directly naming Orpheus. Bernabé’s exegesis of Plato’s 
technique is finely drawn and the box running through pages 71 to 73 provides 
illustrative material germane to, and explorative of, Bernabé’s work. Box content, except 
where otherwise cited, was assembled from comments and explanations about Platonic 
word usage found in translations by Lamb and Bury housed in both the Perseus and 
Loeb Classical Libraries. Again tracing progress of the soul from Dionysus to Orphic 
and Pythagorean understandings through exegesis of Plato’s dialogical references to 
reincarnation itself remains a complex matter. 
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Orphic gold tablet research provides further information about a plethora of wonderings 
including the manner in which earthly reincarnation cycles might have become heavenly 
cycles, about frictional coexistence of P(p)olis and cult religion and about transition 
from religion to philosophy. These so-called Orphic gold tablets, hereafter also called 
gold tablets, plates, sheets, leaves, foil or lamellae consist mostly of small beatings of 
inscribed gold foil varying in size “between 8 and 4 cm. wide and 3 to 1 cm. long” 
(Bernabé & Jiménez San Cristóbal, 2008, p. 2) found, since 1879, in burial sites mainly 
at Thurii and Hipponium in Southern Italy but extending northwards to Rome, at 
Thessaly and Crete in Greece but extending northwards to Macedonia (Graf & Johnston, 
2007/2013, p. 1). Wendy Watkins (ibid., p. 2) provides a location map of so-called 
Orphic tablet discoveries, no tablets having been found in Attica which was once a 
region of the Eleusinian mysteries (Bernabé & Jiménez San Cristóbal, 2008, p. 4). In 
some cases inscriptions are on beaten silver. “Almost six hundred years … [separate] the 
oldest, … [datable to] c. 400 B.C., [from] the most recent, … datable to 260 A.D … 
[with] the majority … [dating] from between the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.” (ibid., p. 2, 
my square brackets).  
According to Bernabé & Jiménez San Cristóbal, the tablets provide direct insights into 
early Orphic religious belief, ritual, and literature and the influence of these on “some 
Presocratic philosophers, lyric poets like Pindar, Plato and then the Neoplatonists” (ibid., 
p. 1), a view partly differing, in respect of Pindar at least, from that held by Herrero de 
Jáuregui who pronounces Orphic salvation religion “completely inconsistent with the 
image of Olympian religion transmitted in the Iliad, in Pindar’s odes and in Aeschylus’ 
tragedies” (Herrero de Jáuregui, 2010, p. 1) where death is an inseparable boundary that 
distinguishes mortals from gods. According to Herrero de Jáuregui “there is no proof of 
any Orphic thiasos which would have blurred the boundaries of the family, and even less 
the polis, in sharp contrast with the Pythagoreans” (ibid., p. 29). He adduces Burkett to 
his urging that there was certainly no collegium of itinerant Orphic priests—there being 
guild-like organisations at best, he says—nor cities of initiates as he claims Plato 
suggests (ibid., p 29), the bacchoi themselves constituting but an imaginary spiritual 
community (ibid., p. 29). Herrero de Jáuregui’s use of the Latin collegium is 
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troublesome as in time guilds too became joined-by-law groups, that is, groups 
qualifying as collegia.  
Such gold tablets, called Pythagorean by Zuntz, Orphic by Bernabé, Ghidini and 
Jiménez San Cristóbal, so-called Orphic by Carratelli and Edmonds, Bacchic by Graf 
and Johnston, and probably Bacchic-Orphic by Tzifopoulos (Osek, 2013, p. p. 73), have 
been found in: 
a limited number of graves …[amongst] the thousands that have been excavated, 
[indicating] that the users of the tablets were a minority group, with a certain unity of 
beliefs, probably initiates, or followers of a religious movement which…we must now, 
without hesitation, call “Orphic”, and convinced that a special destiny was reserved for 
them in the beyond. (Bernabé & Jiménez San Cristóbal, 2008, p. 2) 
 
Edmonds makes a different claim: 
Recently, Burkett and others have shown that Orphism was not a single unified Church, 
but is best understood as a collection of diverse counter-cultural religious movements 
whose major proponents were itinerant “craftsmen” of purification who provided services 
for a wide variety of customers. (R. G. Edmonds, 1999, p. 37) 
 
There is also contested discussion of a possible Egyptian connection with the content of 
a so-called Orphic hieros-logos or secret account of instructions and answers postulated 
to help ensure passage to an afterlife, and a possible Egyptian origin of the idea of 
reincarnation which forms part of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Dousa (2010a, p. 125) 
discerns two approaches to explaining a possible Egyptian origin and emergence of so-
called Orphic praxis, one based on a possibility of independent parallel happenings 
converging as a result of cultural exchange and intermingling, and another based on 
continuity and lineage finding an Egyptian connection possible but improbable (2010, 
pp. 120 - 164). Other origins are proposed. Tzifopoulos (2010, pp. 93 - 235) puts a case 
for a Cretan religious tradition of gold tablet funerary praxis. Griffith (2008, pp. xxix - 
xxxvi) allows a possibility that the Greeks acquired the immortality dimension of the 
doctrine of Elysium from Egypt via Homer who, in the Odyssey 4: 561 – 569 (Kline, 
2014; A. T. Murray, 1927), allows that Menelaus will enjoy immortality in Elysium, and 
that subsequently an idea of immortality became enshrined in the mysteries of Demeter 
at Eleusis. In a separate contribution (2009, p. 134) Griffith says that the Greeks 
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acquired the reincarnation dimension of Pythagorean cult praxis from southern Italy. De 
Jáuregui (2010, pp. 271 - 290) explains his discerned consistency of gold tablet content 
by reasoning that it bespeaks the epic hero’s glory (kleos) soteriologised, made immortal 
and immune from change in the cycles of reincarnation, thus finding the origins of 
Orphism largely a Greek affair. Obbink (2010, pp. 291 - 309) links gold text recitation 
and Greek epic poetry and deems Orphism a likely continuation of Greek tradition rather 
than a totally new and separate religion.  
Prior to a renewal of interest in Orphism sparked by scholarship surrounding the Derveni 
Papyrus so-called Panorphic writers (Eisler, 1925; Gruppe, 1906; J. E. Harrison, 1908; 
Maass, 1895; Macchioro, 1930, 2003; McGahey, 1994; Nietzsche, 1909, 1999; Reinach, 
1909, 1912) that is, those urging preconditions of Christianity existing in Orphic 
mysteries, were confronted with views expressed by Orpheosceptics (Brisson, 1985, 
1995a; Dodds, 1951; Festugière, 1932; Festugière & Fabre, 1935; Linforth, 1941; 
Renam, 1866; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1931)—those averse to attempts to detect 
Christian elements in their restorations of Orphism. Boulanger (1925) appears to mark a 
turning point between the two and Guthrie, who remains highly regarded and regularly 
cited, is cautious on the question but allows similarities (Guthrie, 1993, pp. 261 - 270). 
Herrero de Jáuregui (2010, p. 8) states that the question of the origins of Christianity 
A Six Category Grouping of the So-Called Orphic Gold Tablets (1) 
Class Class Description 
A Five rectangular tablets inscribed with the deification formulas (‘pure from the pure’, ‘become a god’, ‘fallen in milk’) in 
hexameter. 
B Twelve rectangular tablets inscribed with the ‘child of Earth and starry Heaven’ formula in hexameter. 
C One amulet, the so called ‘great tablet’ from Thurii, with a magical ‘abracadabra’: in it was wrapped the folded tablet A4. 
D Four leaf-shaped plates inscribed with the mystic names of Dionysus, Persephone, and Demeter; two of them contain 
‘fallen in milk’ formula. 
E Five epistomia(1) with the χαῖρε, ‘hail’, address to Persephone and Pluton: among them are leaf-shaped pieces. 
F Countless epistomia, including leaf-shaped pieces, with only the deceased’s name or the word μύστης, ‘initiate’: only 
thirteen of them are edited. 
Notes: (1) This classification is one “originated by Günther Zuntz (1971), improved by Yannis Z. Tzifopoulos (2010) and accepted by 
Radcliffe G. Edmonds III (2011)” (Osek, 2013, p. 74). (2) Epistomia = “The word epistomion/-a, not in LSJ, does not appear to have 
been an ancient one; usually the words “tablet,” “lamella,” or “leaf” are employed to describe the gold incised objects discovered in 
graves. The word epistomion, however, has become a technical term among Greek archaeologists, who have no problem identifying 
an object by this term, when during the excavation of a grave they come upon a very small, paper-thin gold band on the mouth or near 
the cranium of the deceased, likely employed for covering the mouth. Not all epistomia are incised, and the text of those incised may 
be just one word, or a text of sixteen lines. Shapes of these vary, although they tend to approximate the shape and the size of the 
mouth.” (Y. Tzifopoulos, 2014, n. p., Footnote 1 of his Chapter) 
 
Source: Adapted by Ian Eddington from page 74 of Osek, E. (2013). Hermes Tablet (Nonnus D. 41. 343-44): An Allusion to the 
'Orphic' Gold Leaves? Littera Antiqua, 6, 73 - 104.  
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continues to be of interest to scholars, there being a drifting in focus away from 
precedence or lineage towards identification of commonalities and differences. Yet the 
precedence question remains of interest as a religious studies topic (Gordon, 1996/2012, 
pp. 1017 - 1018). 
The Panorphic-Orpheosceptic divide itself, as a topic of interest, competes for scholarly 
attention with Orphism as an anomaly of ancient Greek religion which, as the earlier 
highlighted difference of opinion between Edmonds, and Bernabé and Jiménez San 
Cristóbal suggests, is in renewed polemical and reasoned contestation. Both of these 
topics of interest, the Orphic origins of Christianity, and Orphism as an offshoot of 
classical Greek religion, are sometimes interwoven in scholarship. For example 
Edmonds (1999) argues that the cardinal myth of Orpheus, the Zagreus Myth, is a 
flawed construct by virtue of its being:  
a modern fabrication dependent upon Christian models that reconstruct the fragmentary 
evidence in terms of a unified “Orphic” church, an almost Christian religion with dogma 
based on a central myth—specifically, salvation from original sin through the death and 
resurrection of the suffering god. (R. G. Edmonds, 1999, p. 36)  
The Zagreus myth—Edmonds follows (Lobeck, 1829/61) who follows the late 4th 
century AD poet Nonnus or 
Nonnos (Nonnos, 1940a, p. 225) in 
calling the first-born Dionysus 
Zagreus —expresses the story of 
Dionysus whom the so-called 
Orphics worshipped. Morford and 
Lenardon (2003, p. 274) provide a different version of the myth.  
According to one version, here in précis, step-mother Hera, jealously enraged at the 
birth of Dionysus from a union of Zeus with his daughter Persephone, incited the Titans 
into killing and eating Dionysus, except that Dionysus’s heart, swallowed by Zeus after 
having been saved by Athena and given to him, was born again through Zeus’s thigh or 
through association with Semele. In anger, Zeus subsequently destroyed the Titans with 
 
Opening Lines Caecilia Secundina’s Tablet 
She comes from the Pure, Pure Queen of those below 
And Eukles and Eubouleus. Child of Zeus, receive here the armour 
Of Memory, ('tis a gift songful among men) 
Thou Caecilia Secundina, (armour) in due rite to avert evil for ever. 
 
Source: Harrison, J. E. (1908). Prolegomena to the Study of Greek 
Religion. (p. 586). Cambridge/London: Cambridge University Press/C, J. 
Clay and Sons. Harrison clearly demonstrates Secundina’s inscription to 
be of now-called Orphic genre (J. E. Harrison, 1908, pp. 586 - 587).  
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lightning and from their ashes mankind emerged. Nonnus’s version is much more 
colourful (ibid., 6:165 – 315, pp. 225 – 235). 
Rouse(1940), in translating Nonnus’ Dionysiaca, is at a loss to know the route by which 
Zagreus as Orpheus became so prominent in Nonnus (AD late 4th – early 5th centuries). 
He notes that Nonnus’ Zagreus is 
but a shadow of Pindar’s Zagreus 
(H. J. Rose, 1936, pp. 79 - 96), 
which early Zagreus is powerful in 
agriculture and hunting, that is, in 
providing sustenance, a dimension 
also allowed by Rouse (1940, p. xi) 
and in recent times by Newbold 
(2014, pp. 2, 21)—a dimension not 
incompatible with both a morality of place mentioned earlier on page 63 of this enquiry 
and on pages 229 and 265 in respect of Aristotelian Ethics. Osek (2013, pp. 73 - 104) 
inadvertently provides an answer for Rouse in a paper in which she addresses claims by 
Edmonds (2004, p. 31) and Burkert (Burkert, 2004, pp. 79 - 80) that “the ancient gold 
leaves … had never been mentioned in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman literature” (Osek, 
2013, p. 73). Osek names Tablet A5 to be the last gold tablet associated with the Orphic-
frescoed Roman hypogeum of the Aurelii circa AD 250—(OF 491 = L 11 = G-J 9 = 
OGT A5 = GMA 27)—and explains that although it was an amulet for Roman 
noblewoman Caecilia Secundina, it carries reproduced hexameter in the style of the 
remaining A fragments, outlined in the box on page 77 of this enquiry, all of which are 
dated to late classical and Hellenistic times, thereby establishing its so-called Orphic 
credentials. She then explains that one of the B fragments, Orphic Fragment 476 (OF 
476 = L 3 = G-J 2 = OGT B1) was reused in the times of Caecilia Secundina, half a 
millennium after its first use in classical Greek times and applies this information to 
once again date so-called Orphic  praxis in 3rd century Rome circa AD 250. Her task is 
to establish why, with no findings of so-called Orphic gold leaves dating after AD 260, 
that is, in the interim between  Caecilia Secundina and Nonnus (AD late 4th – early 5th  
Orphic Gold Tablets: Typology Key by Authors 
G-J 
Graf F. & Johnston S.I. (eds.) 2007. Ritual Texts for the 
Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Golden Tablets. London: 
Routledge 
GMA 
Kotansky R.D. (ed., tr.) 1994. Greek Magical Amulets: The 
Inscribed Gold, Silver, Copper, and Bronze Lamellae. Vol. 1: 
Published Texts of Known Provenance. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher. 
L 
Bernabé A. & Jiménez, A. I. (eds.) 2008. Instructions for the 
Netherworld: The Orphic Gold Tablets. Tr. M. Chase. Leiden: 
Brill.  
OF 
Bernabé A. (ed.) 2004–07. Poetae epici Graeci: testimonia et 
fragmenta. Vol. 2.1–2: Orphic rum et Orphic is similium 
testimonia et fragmenta. München: Saur; Vol. 2.3: Musaeus; 
Linus; Epimenides; Papyrus Derveni; Indices. Berlin: Gruyter. 
OGT 
Edmonds R.G. (ed.) 2011. The ‘Orphic’ Gold Tablets: and 
Greek Religion: Further Along the Path. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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centuries), Nonnus was able to make 
references to ancient Orphic gods in his 
Dionysiaca.  
Osek provides an answer to Nonnus’ usage 
by arguing away other suggested candidate 
nominations of references to Orphic gold 
tablets, including Bernabé’s proposal of 
Euripides’ Alcestis 667 – 669, his OF 812 
and OF 819, and then urges a possibility 
that Nonnus’ mention, circa AD 450, of the 
golden tablet of Hermes at Dionysiaca 41: 
343 – 44 (Nonnos, 1942, p. 221) “on which 
are wrought all the secrets of law” (ibid., p. 
221) might be a literary reference to so-
called Orphic gold leaves. Osek suggests 
that Nonnus learned about Zagreus and the 
host of equally ancient Orphic gods  
mentioned in his poem from his readings of 
the “Orphic Rhapsodies in 24 books (OF 90 
– 359)” (Osek, 2013, p. 79) which were in discussion during his lifetime at the 
Neoplatonic school at Athens. Osek is perhaps severe in mentioning only Orphic 
iconography in respect of the hypogeum of 
the Aurelii as frescoes there support a 
megalography of deities in which may be 
discerned syncretisation of cult of Mithra, 
Jewish and Neoplatonic Philosophy, 
Orphism, Christianity and Gnosticism in 
antecedence of a codifying Christianity 
consistent with multiple–faith 2nd and 3rd centuries Rome (Carru, 2011, no pagination; 
Petsalis-Diomidis, 2007, pp. 277 - 283). Nevertheless, the frescoed presence of various 
 
 
 
 
Sources: (Artist and Author Unknown, 2014). Photos of 
Petelia Tablet OF 461—necklace, amulet and amulet case—
cropped by Ian Eddington from the British Museum electronic 
catalogue; Graf, F., & Johnston, S. (Eds.). (2007). Ritual 
Texts and the Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Gold 
Tablets, p. 2. London: Routledge; Janko, R. (1984). 
Forgetfulness in the Golden Tablets of Memory. pp 89-100. 
Classical Quarterly, 34. Petelia OF 461 is included amongst 
Zuntz’s B fragments. The leaf, left, reused after half a 
millennium, was damaged at the bottom through being cut to 
fit the amulet, right.  
 
Johnson’s Hieros-Logos 
YOU WILL FIND TO THE LEFT OF THE HOUSE OF HADES A SPRING AND 
STANDING BY IT A WHITE CYPRESS. DO NOT EVEN APPROACH THIS 
SPRING! YOU WILL FIND ANOTHER, FROM THE LAKE OF MEMORY, 5 
COLD WATER POURING FORTH; THERE ARE GUARDS BEFORE IT. SAY, 
“I AM A CHILD OF EARTH AND STARRY SKY, BUT MY RACE IS 
HEAVENLY. YOU YOURSELVES KNOW THIS. I AM PARCHED WITH 
THIRST AND AM DYING; BUT QUICKLY GRANT ME COLD ATER 
FLOWING FROM THE LAKE OF MEMORY.” 10 AND THEY THEMSELVES 
WILL GRANT YOU TO DRINK FROM THE SACRED SPRING AND 
THEREAFTER YOU WILL RULE AMONG THE OTHER HEROES. THIS IS 
THE WORK OF MEMORY. WHEN YOU ARE ABOUT TO DIE, [LET THE 
REMEMBERING HERO WRITE IT DOWN ON THIS TABLET OF GOLD. — 
TR. E.O.] ENWRAPPED . . . DARKNESS. 
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faith gods does not rule out Orphic praxis. Cavero allows a possible put down and 
Christian bias in Nonnus’s humorous approach to the gods of his Dionysiaca (Cavero, 
2009, pp. 557 -583). 
In addition to claiming that the Zagreus myth is a myth Edmonds writes: 
that the gold tablets and their religious contexts have been misunderstood because these texts 
have been interpreted in terms of a modern fabrication dependent on Christian models, the 
Zagreus myth. The ‘Orphic’ gold tablets themselves have nothing to do with the stories of 
sparagmos and anthropogony, but instead supply important evidence for the study of Greek 
eschatological beliefs. (R. G. Edmonds, 1999, p. 38)  
Edmonds (2004) develops his argument more fully in his Redefining Ancient Orphism: 
A Study in Greek Religion in which finds dissatisfaction with scholarly construction of 
Orphism as a “category for all the religious phenomena associated with the name of 
Orpheus”(ibid., p. 4). He suggests, inter 
alia, that gold tablet verses might better be 
understood as an outcome of priests 
providing service to their clients (ibid., p. 
108), there being no common textual basis, 
whether Orphic or Chaldean, and no 
standard hieros-logos as, for example, 
Riedweg (2002) urges there is. Edmonds 
states that the association with Orpheus in the gold tablet texts signifies “a way for the 
ancient Greeks to label the extraordinary in the religious tradition, from the prestigious 
Eleusinian mysteries to innovative cosmologies [of] … the itinerant charlatans who took 
advantage of the superstitious myths of the underworld journey” (R. G. Edmonds, 2009, 
p. 82, my square brackets).  
Edmonds’ Orpheosceptic exegesis (R. G. Edmonds, 2010a, pp. 3 - 15, 220 - 257) places 
him at odds with other received Pan-Orphists like Graf (2010, pp. 53 - 67), who names 
Edmonds and Zuntz as more prominent scholars amongst “voices [that] have always 
been dissenters from a large communis opinion shaped by Comparetti” (Graf & 
Johnston, 2007/2013, p. 55, my square brackets), and from other scholars accepting the  
 
Janko’s Constructed Archetype Hieros-Logos 
YOU WILL FIND ON THE RIGHT IN HADES’ HALLS A SPRING, AND BY 
IT STANDS A GHOSTLY CYPRESS TREE, WHERE THE DEAD SOULS 
DESCENDING WASH AWAY THEIR LIVES. DO NOT EVEN DRAW NIGH 
THIS SPRING. FURTHER ON YOU WILL FIND CHILL WATER FLOWING 
FROM THE POOL OF MEMORY OVER THIS STAND GUARDIANS. THEY 
WILL ASK YOU WITH KEEN MIND WHAT IS YOUR QUEST IN THE 
GLOOM OF DEADLY HADES. THEY WILL ASK YOU FOR WHAT 
REASON YOU HAVE COME. TELL THEM THE WHOLE TRUTH 
STRAIGHT OUT. SAY: 'I AM THE CHILD OF EARTH AND STARRY 
HEAVEN, BUT OF HEAVEN IS MY BIRTH: THIS YOU KNOW 
YOURSELVES. I AM PARCHED WITH THIRST AND PERISHING: GIVE ME 
QUICKLY CHILL WATER FLOWING FROM THE POOL OF MEMORY.' 
ASSUREDLY THE KINGS OF THE UNDERWORLD TAKE PITY ON YOU, 
AND WILL THEMSELVES GIVE YOU WATER FROM THE SPRING 
DIVINE; THEN YOU, WHEN YOU HAVE DRUNK, TRAVERSE THE HOLY 
PATH WHICH OTHER INITIATES AND BACCHANTS IN GLORY. AFTER 
THAT YOU WILL RULE AMONGST THE OTHER HEROES 
. 
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idea of an Orphic hieros-logos (Riedweg, 2002), or the possibility of common Orphic 
stem origins (Dieterich, 1893;West, 1983 #917; 
Merkelbach, 1999). Janko (1984, p. 99) has constructed a 
“hypothetical archetype” (Osek, 2013, p. 75) hieros-logos 
poem of 22 lines to capture the content of Zuntz’s B 
fragments. It is given in prose in the box on page 81 along 
with an alternative version by Johnson located on page 80.  
Thus while some scholars may accept, in whole or in part, 
the sentiment of an anonymous Times newspaper  
reviewer—“Orphism is an insubstantial religion 
constructed by scholars out of myths, cults, verses, and 
ritual connected with his [Orpheus’] name … Orphism is 
now Obsolete” (Graf & Johnston, 2007/2013, p. 194, my 
square brackets)—others, judging from the resurgence of 
new scholarship and revised editions sparked in part by 
Derveni and Orphic gold tablet conundrums, are ensuring 
that Orphism, more widely defined, is far from obsolete.  
For example, in attempting to find out who the so-called 
Orphics of the gold lamellae were, and from whence they 
came, or whether the gold, and now some silver tablets (R. 
G. Edmonds, 2009, p. 85), were of funerary rather than 
ritual significance, and if primarily of ritual function, then 
in what ritual setting, or whether the texts of the lamellae 
are in the spirit of so-called Orphic katabasis or Egyptian 
Book of the Dead (Anonymous, 2008) magic, or whether the eschatology is Bacchic, 
Egyptian, Pythagorean or Eleusinian, or whether the author of the Derveni Papyrus was, 
by his/their writing, practicing his/their own equivalent of what has been recently called 
a technique of “secondary counter discourse” (Eddington, 1999), or for that matter, 
answers to a growing number of additional conundrums as well, prominent Orphic  
Orpheus Through the Ages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington with 
various sharpening and contrast 
adjustments from: (Top) Levy, E. 
(1886). (artist). Mort d'Orphe (oil on 
canvas) Musée d'Orsay: Art Renewal 
Centre. (Middle) Swan, J. M. (1896). 
(artist). Orpheus. (oil on canvas). Lady 
Lever Art Gallery, Port Sunlight, United 
Kingdom: Art Renewal Centre. 
(Bottom) Unknown artist. 
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scholars have used, among other channels, geography, papyrology, archeology, mythical 
cosmogony, linguistics, art, analysis of narrative, analysis 
of imagery, variants of van Gennep’s rites of passage 
methodology (van Gennep, 2004) and variants of Propp’s 
(1928, 2009) morphological structuralist method of 
fairytale analysis in ongoing elucidation of Orphism 
(Bernabé, 2011; Bernabé 2013; Bernabé & Jiménez San 
Cristóbal, 2008, 2010; Calame, 1995, 1999, 2002; 
Dieterich, 1893; R. G. Edmonds, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b, 2013; R.  Janko, 1984; R. Janko, 1997, 
2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Merkelbach, 1999; Riedweg, 
1998; Scalera McClintock, 1991; Zuntz, 1971), to cite but 
a few. It appears as though each attempt at clarification 
and codification of Orpheus and Orphism raises new 
questions and it is not improbable that another discovery 
such as the Derveni Papyrus may complicate matters 
further or for that matter bring clarification.  
In summary, beginning on page 72 and ending on this 
page I have, inter alia, through discussion of references to 
the journey of the soul and reincarnation in Presocratic 
fragments, through discussion of references to 
reincarnation in Platonic dialogues, and through 
discussion of Derveni Papyrus, Strasbourg Papyrus and 
Orphic gold tablet research, been assessing the robustness and validity of earlier 
established P(p)olis religion and religion-to-philosophy constructs as viable touchstones 
for ongoing exegesis. These three domains of research have permitted valuable insights 
into matters of P(p)olis and cult religion, Orphism, possible germination of personal God 
monotheism, old questions about authorship of contested books, early secondary counter 
discourse attempts to resolve the Science-religion divide and tensions within that divide, 
hermeneutical analysis of classical Greek drama and poetry, polemical dimensions of a 
Orpheus Through the Ages 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources (Top) De Chirico, G. (1979). 
Artist. Orpheus the Tired Troubadour. 
Cropped by Ian Eddington from page 34 
of Nachtegael, E. (2013). Coming Home 
to Modern Japan: An Orphic Dialogue 
between Japan and the West in 
Murakami Haruki's Norwegian Wood. 
The IAFOR Journal of Literature and 
Librarianship, 2(2), 33 – 52 (Bottom) 
Zydower, A. (1984). (sculptor). 
Orpheus. (bronze sculpture). The 
Terrace at Harward House: Cropped by 
Ian Eddington from a photo by J. 
Freckles available on her Salt and Light 
web page. 
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transition from religion to philosophy, and perhaps into the possible beginnings of a so-
called digimodern iconoclasm of even Plato and Aristotle themselves. 
In all their richness and enigma Derveni Papyrus, Strasburg Papyrus, and Orphic gold 
tablet research findings are not fatal to employment of from-religion-to-philosophy and 
state calendar religion constructs as valid frameworks for ongoing exegesis of 
relationships amongst Science, religion and society in Hellenistic and classical Greece.  
In light of this reassessment, I begin, in the next paragraph, discussion of Step 2 of this 
chapter, in which Step I describe Platonic 
usage of the terms justice, virtue, god, and 
happiness in preparation for their 
subsequent use in Step 3 in which I 
conjecture that natural law origins of 
Ethics and Science, and their attendant order, kosmos, can be detected in classical Greek 
values which inform the political philosophy of Plato.  
STEP 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE PLATONIC USAGE OF THE TERMS JUSTICE, VIRTUE, GOD AND HAPPINESS 
Justice is discussed first. In its derivation the Greek dike denotes the way or path in the 
sense of the usual manner in which a particular class of people behaves (Guthrie, 1975a, 
p. 7). This original usage carries no connotations of moral obligation or of moral 
correctness. It might as easily serve to describe the habit or way of a tribe that slaughters 
its grandfathers as to describe the habit or way of a tribe that cherishes them. The killing 
and the cherishing are, in the sense of the original usage, both right, that is, habitual 
ways of behaviour. 
This habitual usage can be found in Homer’s Odyssey Books IV and XIV (Homer, 1919, 
2008), and in Hesiod’s Theogony 899 - 925, either before, coeval with, or after Homer’s 
announcement that Dike is a daughter of Zeus and Themis the Titan (Hesiod, 1908/2010, 
p. 64; 1914a, 901 - 905), temporal priority between Hesiod and Homer being contested 
as the accompanying box on page 85 reveals. Nevertheless, irrespective of that contested 
priority and identity of authorship, ideas contained in works attributed to these writers  
 
Steps 2 and 3  
Step 2: description of the Platonic usage of the terms justice, 
virtue, god, and happiness in preparation for their use in Step 3. 
 
Step 3: application of the Step 2 terms to explain how Science, 
as scientific philosophy, and Ethics as practical philosophy, 
inform the political philosophy of the Platonic Polis. 
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remain informative. For example, at Theogony 120 - 135 (Hesiod, 1856, 1914a) Dike’s 
mother Themis, herself conceived 
of two primordial gods, Earth and 
Sky, Gaia and Uranus, is a 
goddess of law and nature, a 
goddess of divine law, of what is 
ordained, of what may or may not 
be done. In a fragment attributed 
to Pindar For the Thebans 
Fragment 180 (172) (Pindar, 
1915, p. 515) the author writes 
that the Moirai or Fates, which 
were themselves primordial gods, 
carried Themis to Zeus but 
Sandys, his translator, provides a 
caveat:  
The above passage [Fragment 
180 (172)] was one of the poet's 
earliest compositions. It was so 
full of mythological allusions that 
the poetess Corinna, who had 
suggested his turning his 
attention to mythology, told him 
"to sow with the hand, not with 
the whole sack (Plutarch, de glor. 
Athen. c. 4. ). (J. Sandys, 1915, 
note on p. 515, my square 
brackets) 
Themis counsels Zeus on matters 
of apportionment and ordination, 
a fortunate thing for him, given 
that the Olympian gods themselves were not entirely free from the rule of the Fates. 
Dike, a child of heaven, is a human face of justice. Dike announced divine judgements  
 
Behind the Text: On Temporal Priority of Hesiod and Homer  
Also Homer’s Existence as a Poet 
Temporal priority between Hesiod and Homer is contested. Amongst some of 
those urging Hesiod before Homer are Lucius Accius, (BC 170 – 86), 
Ephorus (BC 400 – 330), the Parian Marble Inscription (BC c. 264 – 263), 
Erich Bethe, 1922, Friedrich Schwenn, 1934; amongst those advocating 
overlapping lives are Varro (BC 116 – 27), Herodotus (BC c. 484 – 425), 
Aulus Gellius, (AD c. 125 – unknown), Clement of Alexandria (AD c. 150 – 
c. 215), Philostratus (AD c.171 – c.250) George the Syncellus, (died AD 
c.810), West 1966, Bethe, 1929, Sellschopp, 1929 and amongst those placing 
Homer before Hesiod may be found Xenophanes (BC c.570 – c. 475), 
Philochronus (BC c.340  – c.261), Plutarch (AD 45 – 120), Gaius Julius 
Solinus, (AD mid-3rd century), Plato (BC 427 – 347), Eratosthenes (BC 267 
– 194), Aristarchus (BC 310 – 230) Apollodorus (born BC c.180), Felix 
Jacoby, 1933, R. Janko, 1982, and J. Butterworth, 1986 (Butterworth, 1986, 
pp. 33 - 45; Graziosi, 2002, pp. 90 - 124; M. Heath, 2009, p. 265; R. Janko, 
1982, pp. 29 - 30; 1982/2007, pp. 152 - 158; Lefkowitz, 2012, pp. 1 - 29; G. 
W. Most, 2006, pp. 154 - 282; R. M. Rosen, 1997, pp. 463 - 488; M. L. West, 
1966, pp. 40 - 48). The whole argument on priority is complex and 
sophisticated, involving linguistic analysis, archeology, history, poetic style, 
content analysis, and statistics and is sometimes disadvantaged by 
unavailability of sufficient information, much epic poetry having been lost 
(R. Janko, 1982/2007, p. 9). On page 571 of the Certamen (1914)—which 
work itself may be based on work of Alcidamas of Elaea, alive in the 4th 
century BC (Kirk, 1950, pp. 149 - 167; Koniaris, 1971, pp. 107 - 129; 
Nietzsche, 1870; O'Sullivan, 1992, pp. 63 -66; J. Porter, 2000, pp. 239 – 241, 
318; N. J. Richardson, 1981, pp. 1 - 10)—the author countenances Homer 
and Hesiod each being prior to the other (sic) and also their possible 
coevality. Graziosi (2002, p. 104) and Rosen (1997, p. 464) opine that recent 
scholarship attributes priority to Homer. West adds that there are good 
arguments for temporal priority of each of Hesiod and Homer over the other 
and Rosen (ibid.) states that the question of priority is not settled. Rosen also 
suggests that the similarity of content in the Theogony and the Odyssey 
(Butterworth, 1986; Neitzel, 1977) might just as well be caused by both 
authors using traditional material as by the second in priority attempting to 
emulate the first (R. M. Rosen, 1997, p. 469). That is, similarity of content 
might not be a reliable criterion on which to predicate priority of the poets.  
 
In another contribution West argues: 
 
“that 'Homer' was not the name of a historical poet, but a fictitious or 
constructed name, and secondly that for a century or more after the 
composition of the Iliad and Odyssey there was little interest in the identity or 
the person of their author or authors. This interest only arose in the last 
decades of the sixth century; but once it did, 'Homer' very quickly became an 
object of admiration, criticism, and biographical construction. Some scholars 
nowadays consider that the Iliad and the Odyssey are the work of different 
authors. Yet people continue to use the name 'Homer' (preferably for the poet 
of the Iliad, the greater of the two epics) and to assume that there was a real 
person of that name who very likely had something to do with the creation of 
the poem” (M. L. West, 1999, p. 364). 
 
Rosen also acknowledges that a diverse poetic tradition “lies behind the 
figure we refer to as Homer” (R. M. Rosen, 1997, p. 463). 
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and with her mother carried them out. From this beginning themis is associated with 
social order.  
The morphing of the right habitual 
way into the right moral way may be 
found a century before Plato in the 
writings of Aeschylus (BC 525-
456). For example, in Prometheus 
Bound 200 – 230 (Aeschylus, 1912, 
p. 13; 1926b), Themis is called to 
the aid of Zeus where she 
distinguishes between brute force 
and guile as methods of solving 
human problems, and in the Oresteia 
Trilogy (Aeschylus, 1893, 1926a), 
beginning in The Agamemnon, 
continuing in The Libation Bearers 
and emerging in The Eumenides, 
there is a discernible shift in the 
meaning of justice away from the 
absolute and ordained killing of 
Homerian pay-back and revenge of 
the Furies, towards justice as 
reasoned and civic persuasion.  
Plato, in his attempt to design a correct Polis, and in his disillusionment with the decline 
of Athens, initially rejects morphed meaning of dike, using in its place a Homeric 
version based on clear-cut class distinctions. Guthrie argues that the final definition that 
Plato settles on in The Republic is explained as “justice, dikaiosyne, [which is] the state 
of the man who follows dike, [and it is] no more than minding your own business, doing 
the thing or following the way which is properly your own, and not mixing yourself up  
 
Behind the Text: Virtue is Some Kind of Knowledge 
Notwithstanding problems associated with chronologisation of Plato’s 
works, as discussed on pages 10 to 11 and 142 of this enquiry, Plato, 
through dialogical conjecture and refutation about the nature of virtue as 
craft knowledge in some of the so-called early dialogues, may be read as 
providing a basic working profile of one kind of virtue to serve as a basis 
for extended articulation of virtue per se in so-called middle and later 
dialogues. For example—and accepting throughout this discussion box 
that such a reading of the dialogues is valid—in some early dialogues a 
craftsperson, by virtue of their knowledge, might produce beneficial 
outcomes Euthydemus 279e – 281e (Plato, 1952e, pp. 69 -70; 1967a), a 
conjecture checked and balanced in The Republic I 333e – 334c (Plato, 
1952r, pp. 298 - 299; 1969a) where craft virtue can, as also in the 
sections immediately before cited, lead to both good and bad outcomes. 
Craft knowledge is specific to a particular trade or specialisation Ion 
537d – 539 (Plato, 1925c; 1952s, p. 146) and craftpersons in possession 
of knowledge of materials and methods, are likely to be able to teach the 
knowledge of their craft Protagoras 311b, (Plato, 1952q, p. 312; 1974), 
Laches 201a (Plato, 1952i, p. 37; 1955b), and to account for their 
knowledge where others cannot Laches 190a-c, (Plato, 1952i, p. 30; 
1955b), Apology 22d – 24 (Plato, 1952a, pp. 202 - 203; 1966a), although 
being able to account for craft knowledge is not equivalent to wisdom 
Apology 23a (Plato, 1952a, p. 203; 1966a). Craftpersons apply their 
knowledge and work their materials with a particular aim in mind, for 
example, architecture for houses, medicine health Charmides 165d-e 
(Plato, 1952b, p. 7; 1955a). From such an assembly of features—the 
purpose of this dialogue box is not to distil and/or differentiate an 
essential Plato from an essential Socrates—Plato might be interpreted as 
moving to discussion of what kinds of knowledge might constitute moral 
virtues, and in some so-called early dialogues, Euthyphro (Plato, 1952f, 
1966b), Laches (Plato, 1952i, 1955b) and Charmides (Plato, 1952b, 
1955a), as employing a craft virtue analogy in attempts to probe 
understanding of the kind of knowledge of which moral virtues such as 
piety, justice, courage and moderation might consist. For example, in 
Euthyphro 14d and 15b participants discuss whether piety as virtue might 
be understood as knowledge of how to give service to the gods in honour 
of them (Plato, 1952f, p. 198; 1966b). In Laches 194e - 195a, a possible 
craft-tending-to-moral virtue of courage is variously depicted as 
“knowledge which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything” 
(Plato, 1952i, p. 34; 1955b) or at Laches 193a-c as endurance informed 
by wisdom during war, (Plato, 1952i, p. 33; 1955b). Likewise in 
Charmides 164d, a virtue named moderation, and by association wisdom, 
is variously connected with knowledge of oneself in respect of a capacity 
for doing good Charmides 164d (Plato, 1952b, pp. 6 - 7; 1955a) or at 
166c as “knowledge of other sciences, and of itself” Charmides 166c 
(Plato, 1952b, p. 8; 1955a), or at 174b as “knowledge with which … 
[one] discerns good and evil” Charmides 174b (Plato, 1952b, p. 12; 
1955a). Each of Euthyphro, Laches and Charmides ends in aporia.  
(Continued on page 87.) 
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with other people and attempting to do their jobs for them” (ibid., p. 7, my square 
brackets). Guthrie does not cite Plato 
in his explanation but the question of 
justice is discussed in detail in 
Books II through V of The Republic 
(Plato, 1952r, 1969a) and details 
similar to those Guthrie explains can 
be found in The Republic 433a – 
433e (Plato, 1952r, pp. 349 - 350; 
1969a). Plato’s starting definition, 
being inter alia based as it is on 
place and cultural divisions in 
society, is a fundamental and earthy 
definition and it is not difficult to 
imagine its origins in moira as 
natural imperative inherent in 
sustaining tribal place. 
I now discuss virtue. Virtue, arete, 
the good, first carried a denotation of 
the practical or vocational good in 
the sense of somebody being good-
at-something, the Greek sense being good-at-what: shoemaking, soldiering, politics? 
This usage can be found in Homer. For example, Penelope was good at constancy, 
wisdom and discretion Odyssey Bk. 4, 1000 – 1010, Bk. 14, 450 - 460 (Homer, 1915, 
pp. 68, 213- 214); Achilles was intractable in battle Iliad I, 190, 280 (Homer, 1833, pp. 
9, 12; 1924) and Hector was noted for being active and vigilant Iliad Bk. 2, 990, Bk. 4, 
580 - 585, (Homer, 1833; 1928, pp. 191, 229 - 231). The good in this sense is akin to 
technical efficiency (Scharffenberger, 2004, pp. xlvii - xlviii, xxxvi, 354) and suggests 
that Plato’s reaction to, and extended application of, the term arete in Republic Bk. 1, 
 
Behind the Text: Virtue is Some Kind of Knowledge (continued) 
Virtue as some kind of knowledge—“all other things hang upon the 
soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are 
to be good” Meno 88e – 89a (Plato, 1952l, p. 184; 1967c)—is further 
articulated at Meno 89a, (Plato, 1952l, p. 184; 1967c) and The 
Republic I 350c-d (Plato, 1952r, pp. 307 - 308; 1969a), and in the later 
dialogues Euthydemus 279a – 281e (Plato, 1952e, pp. 69 - 70; 1967a), 
and Protagoras 333b, 350c, 352b-c, 360d (Plato, 1952q, pp. 50, 58, 
59, 63 - 64; 1974). However the highest truths are written in the soul 
and it is questionable whether the soul can have knowledge to wisdom 
while it is captured in body Phaedo79a – 80 (Plato, 1952n, p. 231; 
1966c). 
 
Gorgias (Plato, 1952g, 1967b) and The Republic (Plato, 1952r, 1969a), 
inter alia, raise questions about the kind of knowledge that might 
constitute a possible craft-come-moral virtue called justice. For 
example, against a background of rhetoric as a craft Gorgias 452e, 
(Plato, 1952g, p. 225; 1967b), Gorgias is worded at 454b to own a 
suspect association between rhetoric and matters of justice and 
unjustice Gorgias 454b (Plato, 1952g, p. 256; 1967b), a claim Plato’s 
Socrates debunks at Gorgias 459d, 463d, 465a, 464b – 466a (Plato, 
1952g, pp. 258, 260, 261, 261 - 262; 1967b), but just what kind of 
knowledge may constitute the moral virtue of justice is not made 
explicit. Book 1 of The Republic at 338c has Thrasymachus 
proclaiming that the moral virtue justice “is nothing else but the 
interest of the stronger” (Plato, 1952r, p. 301; 1969a)  
 
In Euthydemus 373d the brothers Dionysidorus and Euthydemus claim 
their craft is “the teaching of virtue … [which they can] do better and 
quicker than any man” Euthydemus 373d (Plato, 1952e, p. 66; 1967a). 
Protagoras is also confident of his craft ability to teach virtue 
Protagoras 318e – 319a (Plato, 1952q, p. 43; 1974) in the interest of 
affairs of state, claiming at Protagoras 328b that he has knowledge “to 
make man noble and good” Protagoras 328b (Plato, 1952q, p. 47; 
1974), Socrates however not being convinced that virtue can be taught 
Protagoras 319a-b (Plato, 1952q, p. 43; 1974), and narrating for 
conversation purposes, “that one part of virtue is unlike another” 
Protagoras 331b (Plato, 1952q, p. 48; 1974), raising a possibility of an 
existence of different kinds of virtue. At Protagoras 360d, while 
courage may well be knowledge of what is and is not to be feared 
Protagoras 306d (Plato, 1952q, p. 88; 1974), when courage is not 
guided by wisdom it is like the courage of a madman Protagoras 350 – 
351 (Plato, 1952q, p. 58; 1974). 
(Continued on page 88.) 
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351a – 353e (Plato, 1952r, I 351 - 354, pp. 308 - 310; 1969a) ushered in its now moral 
connotation.  
For example, at the time of the fifth century Sophists there appears to be little usage of 
moral connotation in the 
sense of an abstract and 
universal good even though 
the more conservative 
amongst the Sophists 
included morality in their 
teachings. The moral 
dimension of the good began 
to emerge when the 
dialogical Socrates worded 
by Plato set out to find the 
arete for humans as a 
species. That is, they sought 
to understand the collective 
human arete rather than the 
arete for the particular 
shoemaker, or fisherman. 
Thus, with an efficiency 
denotation still in place, the 
search for the human arete was to be predicated on the ergon (Santas, 2001, pp. 66 - 75).  
To begin to search for the arete of mankind as a class, through first settling on a 
definition as to what constitutes the ergon of that class, was an innovation and the idea 
of the good, virtue or goodness as it is now understood as an abstract term, is a direct 
outcome of it. Irrespective of this connotation, the predicative, the good-at-what 
denotation, remains in everyday usage, and it continues to signify a technical goodness  
 
Behind the Text: Virtue is Some Kind of Knowledge (continued) 
Things, in this case courage, are valueless in themselves and become bad or good 
depending on whether they exist in the presence of ignorance or are informed by 
knowledge qua wisdom Euthydemus 281d (Plato, 1952e, p. 70; 1967a). Furthermore 
at Meno 88c “all that the soul attempts and endures, when guided by wisdom, ends 
in happiness” (Plato, 1952l, p. 184; 1967c), unhappiness being an outcome of a soul 
guided by ignorance and folly. Consequently, virtue as a quality of soul which is 
always profitable, may be thought of as some kind of knowledge, “some kind of 
wisdom or prudence” Meno 88c (Plato, 1952l, p. 184; 1967c). Knowledge, begotten 
of recollection is higher than true opinion because it is fastened as if by a chain to 
the forms, and is thus able to tie down true opinion to cause Meno 98a (Plato, 1952l, 
pp. 188 - 189; 1967c). Consequently wisdom thus plays an important role 
establishing value in moral virtues like courage, temperance, piety and justice and is 
not far removed from temperance as knowing oneself. Again, unfortunately, 
wisdom appears out of reach to a soul entrapped in living body, and is thus 
unattainable to mankind qua living beings Phaedo 66 – 67 (Plato, 1952t, pp. 224 - 
225; 1966c).  
 
Further articulation about virtue as some kind of knowledge might be gleaned from 
sometimes-called middle dialogues Phaedo (Plato, 1952t, 1966c), The Republic 
(Plato, 1952r, 1969a) and Symposium (Plato, 1925g, 1952u). For example, there 
appears to be further development of the nature of forms and of the nature of 
recollection. The good and just are introduced at Phaedo 65d (Plato, 1952t, p. 224; 
1966c) as forms which might only be attained through mind alone Phaedo 67, 79a 
(Plato, 1952t, pp. 225, 231; 1966c). True virtue, which depends upon knowledge, is 
better than a still-admirable popular virtue Phaedo 82a-b (Plato, 1952t, p. 233; 
1966c) because true virtue, or education in search of it, might serve as a preparation 
for the soul’s flight to unity and full knowledge of the unchanging forms Phaedo 
83e (Plato, 1952t, p. 234; 1966c), philosophy being that which strives for divine 
unity with the forms at the expense of focus on objects of opinion Phaedo 84a, 
(Plato, 1952t, p. 234). Lower moral virtue, for example that possibly learned by 
practice and habit say, through a kind of education which mitigates against such 
conditions as telling lies, especially bad representation of heroes and gods The 
Republic II 377 – 378e and VII 522c – 531c (Plato, 1952r, pp. 320 – 321, 391 - 396; 
1969a) is also to be available, and when complemented by gymnastic, music, 
literature and mathematics The Republic II 376 – 377 (Plato, 1952r, pp. 320, 391 - 
396; 1969a), is to form part of the education of a guardian class for good-of-state 
purposes The Republic III 412d-e (Plato, 1952r, p. 339; 1969a).  
(Continued on page 89) 
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in the sense of skill or efficiency at a particular job. Virtue, consisting of technical 
knowledge, could, with 
varying success, be taught 
through the trades, virtue 
being some kind of 
knowledge. Whether or 
not it might prove 
possible to teach mankind 
its, now their, virtue, 
whatever that virtue might 
be, was soon to become 
an exciting and teasing 
question.  
Knowing that, in the 
Platonic dialogues, a 
technical denotation of the 
good or virtuous features 
in the search for the 
absolute virtue or good of 
mankind, simplifies 
reading of some of those 
dialogues. For example, 
knowing that skill or 
efficiency at a particular 
job, that is, goodness or 
virtue at that job, depends 
on particular knowledge required for the job, which knowledge depends on the nature of 
the job, its purpose, its ergon, brings light to understanding the very departure point 
attributed to the dialogical Socrates—his reasoning that virtue is some kind of 
knowledge is reasoning to the effect that a virtuous craftsperson has the skills 
 
Behind the Text: Virtue is Some Kind of Knowledge (continued) 
However only some guardians might be suitable as rulers, those who meet a test of 
living a virtuous life The Republic III 412d-e – 413 (Plato, 1952r, p. 339; 1969a) a life 
guided by knowledge and wisdom, a life of a philosopher The Republic V 473c-e (Plato, 
1952r, p. 369; 1969a) whose education consists of study of the form of the good and the 
beautiful, that is, study of that which causes science and truth qua knowledge, which 
wisdom may carry to virtue The Republic VI 508d-e – 509a (Plato, 1952r, p. 386; 
1969a). 
 
Again true virtue, if it is to be obtained, is obtained when the soul receives the 
knowledge of the forms through beholding the form of beauty through the eye of the 
mind Symposium 212a (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, p. 167), such beholding of form occurring 
only after death Phaedo 66d – 67a (Plato, 1952t, pp. 224 - 225; 1966c). In The Republic 
IV 433a-d (Plato, 1952r, p. 349; 1969a), after providing a working prioritisation of the 
moral virtues piety, courage, temperance and justice The Republic IV 431e – 432d 
(Plato, 1952r, pp. 348 - 349; 1969a), and on his way to defining justice as doing one’s 
job, not being a busybody The Republic IV 433 – 434 (Plato, 1952r, p. 349; 1969a), as 
discussed on pages 84 to 87 of this enquiry, and thence on to ascertaining whether these 
four virtues in the soul are also found in the state The Republic IV 435a-d (Plato, 1952r, 
p. 350; 1969a), Plato treats justice in a manner sometimes not unlike his treatment of 
wisdom in Euthydemus 281d-e (Plato, 1952e, p. 70; 1967a). Justice, he has Socrates 
narrate, “is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them [courage, 
temperance, and wisdom] and when remaining in them is also their preservative: and we 
were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or 
remaining one” The Republic IV 433c (Plato, 1952r, p. 349, my square brackets; 1969a). 
Virtue, whatever its knowledge, brings happiness Charmides 171e - 172a (Plato, 1952b, 
p. 11; 1955a), and living according to justice and virtue, whatever knowledge each 
consists of, will allow us “to live dear to one another and to the gods  … and it shall be 
well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have 
been describing” The Republic X 621d (Plato, 1952r, p. 441; 1969a). The good and the 
beautiful, which are associated with happiness, are interchanged with one another at 
Symposium 204e (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, p. 164). At Symposium 205 – 207 (Plato, 1925g; 
1952u, pp. 164 - 165) beauty, goodness and love are, inter alia, associated with one 
another and at Symposium 206 - 207 (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, p. 165) love qua its quest 
through body and soul of engendering and begetting an eternal possession of the good, 
gives rise, through procreation, to the soul’s journey to the forms as discussed on pages 
129 to 133 of this enquiry. Nevertheless, while the unexamined life is not worth living 
Apology 38a (Plato, 1952a, p. 210; 1966a), knowledge to examine it, and wisdom to 
guide a life examined, are difficult to own, and towards the end of the day Plato depicts 
Socrates as one having no adequate knowledge of the idea of the good The Republic VI 
505a (Plato, 1952r, p. 384; 1969a).  
 
Source: Plato. (1952). Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Phaedrus, Ion, 
Symposium, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo, Gorgias, The Republic. In The 
Dialogues of Plato. Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1921 – 1969). Charmides, Laches, 
Protagoras, Euthydemus, Phaedrus, Ion, Symposium, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, 
Phaedo, Gorgias, The Republic. In Plato in Twelve Volumes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; Guthrie, W. K. C. (1975). The Greek Philosophers from Thales to 
Aristotle. (pp. 81 – 121). New York: Harper and Row; Cormack, M. (2006). Plato’s 
Stepping Stones: Degrees of Moral Virtue. (passim). London: Continuum; McCabe, M. 
M. (2015). Platonic Conversations. (173 – 282). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
(Cormack, 2006; Guthrie, 1975a; McCabe, 2015; Plato, 1925c, 1925e, 1925g, 1952a, 
1952b, 1952e, 1952f, 1952g, 1952h, 1952i, 1952l, 1952o, 1952q, 1952r, 1952u, 1955a, 
1955b, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1969a, 1974) 
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understood as knowledge to do the job efficiently. This skills construct is a possible 
beginning and anchor point of subsequent Western tradition arguments in search of the 
arete or virtue of humankind in general. However, both the kind of knowledge of which 
virtue might be constituted, and identification of those who might teach it, are difficult 
questions. For example, in Meno (Plato, 1952l, 1967c) qua Socratic dialogue just when 
the work on the nature of virtue might be expected to close in aporia, Plato, through 
introducing the now-called Meno’s paradox Meno 80 (Plato, 1952l, p. 179; 1967c), 
switches general focus from morality to epistemology, to explore how to know what 
virtue is in the first place, and continues on to develop his doctrine of knowing as 
recollection of eternals already known by, and thus beholden in, soul Meno 86b (Plato, 
1952l, p. 183; 1967c). If it is possible to know what virtue is, then, presumably it, virtue, 
may be taught for. But apparently knowing what virtue is, and who might teach it, are 
difficult questions, leading to a conclusion, in Plato’s wording of Socrates, that virtue as 
some kind of wisdom or knowledge that cannot be taught Meno 96c (Plato, 1952l, p. 
188; 1967c), it being neither natural or acquired, but rather a god-given instinct not 
likely accompanied by reason, and that the certain truth of the matter of how virtue is 
given depends upon wanting enquiry of the nature of virtue itself Meno 100 (Plato, 
1952l, p. 190; 1967c)—and there we are left hanging out to dry in that tree Plato has had 
us climb, wondering if he is about to have Socrates chop it down. The problem of 
deciding the kind of knowledge of which virtue might be constituted is compounded by 
the question of what knowledge itself might be. It is neither perception Theaetetus 184b 
– 186e) (Plato, 1921c; 1952v, pp. 534 - 536), nor true belief Theaetetus 200d – 201c) 
(Plato, 1921c; 1952v, p. 544), nor true belief plus an account Theaetetus 206c – 210b 
(Plato, 1921c; 1952v, pp. 547 - 540). 
Yet Plato has Socrates explore virtue as knowledge. For example in Euthydemus 281d-e 
(Plato, 1952e, p. 70; 1967a), while wisdom is found to be the one thing that is good in its 
own right by itself, nevertheless at Phaedo 78d (Plato, 1952n, p. 231; 1966c) Plato 
words Socrates to associate absolute equality and absolute beauty with unchanging of-
itself-by-itself existential condition. McCabe (2015, pp. 244 - 257) in exegesis of 
Euthydemus 281b7-c3 (Plato, 1952e)@70(Plato, 1967a) argues that Plato establishes 
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wisdom as the only good existing itself-by-itself and consequently not a, but the, source 
of value (McCabe, 2015, p. 245), explaining away detected interpretation uncertainties 
as intentional on Plato’s part (ibid., p. 243, footnote 74). 
I now discuss the Greek idea of god. Henricks (2010, pp. 19 - 39) reasons that, from the 
time of Homer and Hesiod circa the eighth to seventh centuries BC and their 
identifications of the gods, until the last decades of the fifth century BC with its 
attendant possible emergence of monotheism and atheism, gods are characterised by 
immortality, anthropomorphism and power.  
Cornford (1957, p. 249) argues that a Pythagorean notion of universal soul as a god, 
consisting of numbers existing in real beings throughout nature, unlocked the secret that 
allowed Plato to explain human understanding of matters natural, and matters ethical, as 
reminiscence of forms. Such reminiscence led human intellect to the final and ultimate 
Science and presence of the so-called one, henceforth one—of which more later. 
Aristotle in turn would have little of the Pythagorean mysticism that bodies were 
numbers Metaphysics 487a – 487b (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989). In particular the Greek 
word theos, god, was used to denote something more than human, something 
transcending death, a force continually at work in the world, not born with us, and 
continuing on after us, superhuman in immortality (Cioffi, 2014; Grube, 1935, p. 150; 
Trépanier, 2010, p. 276). Consequently the way or habit of the Greeks of the time was to 
declare something to be a god. Love is a god, envy is a god and Guthrie (1975a, p. 11) 
notes that the Greek practice is the very opposite of stating that God is love, or God is 
good, as Jews did, and as Christians and Moslems later came to do. 
I now discuss happiness. What is pleasure and how is it different from happiness, and 
what constitutes happiness, and why does mankind’s work lead to happiness: all of these 
questions beg answers. 
Plato’s word eudaimonia is sometimes translated as flourishing and is often alternatively 
translated as happiness (Cooper, 1998, p. 233) although there is disagreement about 
whether happiness and flourishing are synonymous (Ackrill, 1980, p. 23). Pleasure, 
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hedone, is implicated in happiness and Plato sometimes uses the words synonymously. 
His understanding of pleasure emerges, inter alia, from introspection about his own 
feelings and he finds the human capacity for pleasure seated at the very basis of the soul. 
For example in The Republic IX 576c the dialogical Socrates advances an idea that “as 
State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man” (Plato, 1952r, IX, 
p. 418; 1969a). Then, after recapitulating at IX 577c, that, “bearing this [the parallel of 
the individual and the state] in mind and glancing in turn from one to the other of them” 
The Republic (Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 419, my square brackets; 1969a), he continues at IX 
580b – 580c to posit that of five States under discussion “the best and justest is also the 
happiest” The Republic (Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 420; 1969a) and that this state is royalty. By 
analogy he continues in The Republic IX 580c that the best man is “king over himself” 
(Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 420; 1969a). That is, the just man is happy.  
He proceeds with the analogy, and in The Republic IX 580d informs “that the individual 
soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles” (Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 
421; 1969a). Plato’s Socrates then begins a second demonstration of his claim that the 
just man is a happy man and, although Plato treads a very fine line between pleasure and 
happiness, he does provide something of a differentiation between the two. He reveals, 
in The Republic IX 583e that while “both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul” 
(Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 422; 1969a), and yet while they contribute to happiness, they are 
not happiness per se.  
For example, he claims in The Republic IX 580d that the “individual soul, like the State, 
… [is] … divided into three principles … and to these three principles three pleasures 
correspond; also three desires and governing powers” (Plato, 1952r, pp. 421, my 
brackets; 1969a). The principles and governing powers are reason, spirit—whether noble 
or ignoble—and appetite or desire, and the pleasures coeval with them range from joys 
associated with bodily function and money making, through those which come from the 
recognition that honour brings, and on up to the divine-like state of the philosopher 
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contemplating the one. Plato’s Socrates does not claim that three different kinds of 
happiness accompany the three kinds of pleasure.  
Depending on what principle of soul and its attendant pleasure is dominant, a human 
will be a lover of wisdom, or a lover of honour, or a lover of gain, so that at the level of 
the state there will be three distinct classes: rulers, soldiers, and artisans working for 
profit. Socrates quickly moves to anoint supreme that pleasure which the lover of 
wisdom enjoys, the anointment being made on the basis that the lover of wisdom opted 
for a speculative life after having tasted all three kinds of pleasure—logical, but 
questionable nevertheless, and it is possible that when Plato so easily selects “experience 
and wisdom and reason” The Republic IX 582a (Plato, 1952r, p. 421; 1969a) as criteria 
he is aiding the success of his dialogical Socrates’ argument. 
Even so, some of these lower pleasures are valid, because they are necessary. For 
example, sex enjoyed for procreation, and drinking and eating enjoyed for quenching 
immediate thirst and hunger, do not necessarily produce harm or enslave the passions. 
He expresses a view that “although in general, those kinds of things which are in the 
service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of 
the soul” The Republic IX 585c – 585e (Plato, 1952r, p. 423; 1969a), the pleasures they 
bring are closer to true pleasure the more they are filled with real existence and that 
which is according to nature The Republic IX 585d – 585e (Plato, 1952r, p. 424; 1969a). 
Thus: 
… lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in 
the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which 
wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is 
attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which 
are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him. Republic 
IX 586d – 586e (Plato, 1952r, p. 424; 1969a)  
Some pleasures are certainly insubstantial if not disqualified, namely the pleasure of 
those “who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and 
sensuality” The Republic IX 586a – 586c (Plato, 1952r, p. 424; 1969a) who “like cattle 
… fatten and feed and breed, [and who] … kick and butt at one another with horns and 
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hoofs which are made of iron … [and] fill themselves with that which is not substantial” 
(ibid, my square brackets). Such pleasures “implant in the minds of fools insane desires 
of themselves” (ibid., p. 424) such that those fools fight with shadows. 
Thus pleasures compete with one another in the human soul and, in The Republic IX 586 
- 587a, Plato’s Socrates differentiates happiness from pleasure by explaining that 
happiness ensues: 
…when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the 
several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best 
and truest pleasures of which they are capable. The Republic IX 586e - 487a (Plato, 1952r, 
p. 424; 1969a)  
The individual is happy and just when the pleasures inherent in the three principle and 
governing parts of the soul are balanced, no one pleasure consciously conflicting with 
another. Justice and happiness are twins of the house of the soul, and to ask why one 
may cause the other leads me nowhere further. I am tempted to find the origins of 
Socrates’ happiness, understood as a balanced state of mind and body, rather than a 
motion of the soul, in the Ethics of obedience to moira and place, as also earlier 
suggested in the case of justice.  
From this page onwards I refer to a number of the Platonic dialogues. I distinguish 
between the person and the dialogue named after him, by italicising the dialogue form. 
Thus, for example, Timaeus refers to the dialogue and Timaeus to the person.  
In The Republic IX 592a – 592b (Plato, 1952r, p. 427; 1969a) Socrates concludes that 
although no just city exists on earth, a form of such a city exists in heaven. They who 
desire it, even though they may never be statesmen in their own country, may set their—
in those days his—own houses in order and thereafter will have nothing to do with any 
other, the city of the forms, and the city of the soul, being one and the same, and the city 
of the forms being an objectively real city. There “is and ever will be one only-begotten 
and created heaven ... [and that] … that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and is 
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also visible and tangible” Timaeus 31b (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 448, my square 
brackets). 
Out of the same elements of earth, fire, water, and air the world was made, a world 
dissoluble only by the hand of the framer. 
This world, modelled on the perfect heaven 
Timaeus 28a – 29a (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 
p. 447) was, subject to slight blemishes, 
somehow a perfect whole of perfect parts 
harmonised by the right proportions. Its 
blemishes result first from evil aspects in 
the monads from which the four elements 
themselves were constructed Timaeus 53a – 
53b, (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 458), and 
secondly from participation of lesser gods 
Timaeus 41a – 43e (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 
pp. 452 - 453) in designing the mortal 
aspects of soul, namely, sensation, emotion, 
and the animal and vegetative 
requirements. The creator placed soul at the world’s centre from whence it diffused 
throughout, thereby “creat[ing] the world a blessed god” Timaeus 34a – 3b (Plato, 
1925h, my square brackets; 1952w, p. 449). 
The creation and modelling in Timaeus is by numbers, through a plethora of 
mathematical manipulations and proportioned mixing and Timaeus at Timaeus 35a 
(Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 449) explains that the creator of the earthly model of heaven 
finds monadic ingredients already in existence and from these ingredients, the 
indivisible and unchangeable, the divisible associated with material bodies, and a third 
intermediate essence compounded from the others, he created the soul first before the 
body and thus the four elements and all the rest of creation mentioned at Timaeus 32a-d 
(Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 448).  
 
 
Source: (Raffaello, 1509-11). (artist). Philosophy. (ceiling 
tondo). Vatican City, Stanza della Segnatura: Web Gallery of 
Art. The woman, ‘Philosophy’, holds two books respectively 
titled Morals and Nature. The colours of her dress represent 
the four elements, earth, water, fire and air. The books held by 
the genii share the words, causarum cognitio Cicero’s 
aphorism ‘know the causes’. This picture is situated above 
Raffaello’s fresco The School of Athens, Vatican City, Stanza 
della Segnatura, Rome  
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Steps 2 and 3 
Step 2: description of the Platonic usage of the terms justice, 
virtue, god, and happiness in preparation for their use in Step 3. 
 
Step 3: application of the Step 2 terms to explain how Science, as 
scientific philosophy, and Ethics as practical philosophy, inform 
the political philosophy of the Platonic Polis. 
In further explanation Timaeus depicts a creator associating monad with numbers 
Timaeus 54a – 56e (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 458 - 459) and mentions an intractable 
existing substance and how he, the creator, together with the lesser planet gods, 
fashioned soul and all the rest of the four elements out of it. Besides providing 
enlightening insight into Plato’s knowledge of anatomy, physiology, and physics of light 
and reflection, Timaeus 29d – 30e, 41c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 447 - 448, 452) the 
work also provides dialogical elucidations of an association of reason with the divine, 
and of the role of the immortal element of the soul in bringing understanding of the 
order and perfect design of heaven to the imperfect earthly sensual copy of it. Order and 
perfect design are close associates of Greek taxis and kosmos discussed on pages 107, 
and 112. There also appears to be an overall design in Timaeus. Divine reason, as the 
immortal part of the soul, is intellect, and intellect rules. Intellect is in the soul, the soul 
is in the body, in which its mortal components of sensation and desire inhere. The 
intelligent sensual body is real amongst real existing things.  
I have now completed Step 2, that is, discussion of meanings of the terms justice, virtue, 
god, and happiness as they are to be 
used in the work of Step 3’s discussion 
of Science and Ethics, and how these 
might inform the political philosophy 
of Polis. I begin the work of Step 3 in 
the next section by discussing Ethics first, then Science, and then the relationship 
between them and the role they play in the Platonic Polis.  
STEP 3: HOW SCIENCE AS SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS AS PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY INFORM 
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF POLIS 
Ethics as Practical Philosophy of Polis  
As earlier discussed on pages 87 to 90, just as each worker must practise their individual 
arete, in the Greek sense of efficient and good work, so too mankind as a whole might 
have and practise its work and attendant arete. To be an efficient worker a person must 
have knowledge of their trade and in particular this knowledge must serve the end in  
97 
 
view for the trade. For example the purpose of the shoe, that is, its function, determines 
the kind of knowledge skills the shoemaker must 
acquire and efficiently practise. Working on these 
ideas, and as earlier discussed on pages 87 to 91, 
Plato tasks his Socrates to anvil out a notion of 
virtue as some kind of knowledge, virtue or arete 
for mankind in general being the quarry. To do 
this Plato must ask the question, what is 
mankind’s essence? He employs Socrates and 
others in his dialogues in an attempt to answer it. 
Notwithstanding the question of the 
Socrates/Plato divide discussed on pages 10 to 
11, I continue from the next paragraph onwards, 
without necessarily acknowledging a dialogical 
Socrates and refer mainly to Plato. 
The early dialogues reveal a search for answers to the meanings of intellectual and 
ethical terms, for example piety or valour. They proceed by first assembling examples of 
actions held by different personages to typify a particular moral or ethical condition 
under discussion and then to search for and extract elements, or an element, common to 
each of the several examples, which element, if one be identified, becomes, in a more 
absolute sense, the essence of, and a standard for, that condition. For example, the 
Euthyphro (Plato, 1952f, 1966b) addresses piety, Charmides (Plato, 1903b, 1952b) 
temperance, Laches (Plato, 1903b, 1952i) courage, and the method is one of induction 
from the many particulars to the one general or absolute understanding. It is in part in 
this manner that a transition from technical-and-efficiency interpretations of goodness 
and virtue to moralistic interpretations of them progresses.  
Plato’s approach to finding mankind’s arete is predicated on the soul or psyche’s being 
the seat of the moral and intellectual faculties of practical philosophy and this big step is 
at the heart of a departure from a purely efficiency understanding of the good and  
 
 
Source: (Gandolfi, 1782). (artist). The Death of 
Socrates. (oil painting). Bologna, Private Collection: 
Philosophy and Philosophers in Art. Socrates accepts 
the hemlock.  
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virtuous. Plato attempts to unite the moral and intellectual faculties of human soul, some 
idea of the high standard he 
sets being epitomised in his 
descriptions of a/the 
philosopher king in Theaetetus 
173c – 176a (Plato, 1952v, pp. 
529 - 530; 1986) and Republic 
484e – 487b (Plato, 1952r, pp. 
374 - 375; 1969a), and the 
particular kind and method of 
education required of 
philosopher-kingship, an 
education which might turn 
reason’s focus from coming-
to-be, towards being, and the 
highest part of being, namely 
the good Republic 518b-d 
(Plato, 1952r, pp. 389 - 390 - 
375; 1969a), and certainly, 
although controlled, is 
something else again beyond a 
rote-learning kind of 
education. In preparation for 
this task he started to sort the 
real from the unreal against a 
backdrop of Heraclitus’s view 
that knowledge of the world is 
difficult to obtain, 
Parmenides’ likely urging that 
the universal and immutable could be found by mind (respectively DK 22B1, 2, 72, 78  
 
Behind the Text: Pythagorean Diatonic Scale and Other Speculations 
 
 
“This is known as the Pythagorean diatonic scale. Examining the intervals 
between each step, we can see that the scale consists of the familiar major scale 
(where the whole step is 9/8 and the 1/2 step is 256/243). Both the perfect 4th and 
5th have exact ratios, 3/2 and 4/3 as expected (The scale was constructed using 
these intervals.) The Major 3rd however, is too wide, or sharp. The ratio should be 
5/4 = 1.250 but the Pythagorean scale has this interval as 81/64 = 1.265. The 
minor 3rd between the 2nd and 4th degrees should be 6/5 = 1.20 but in fact is 4/3 
divided by 9/8 = 32/37 = 1185, i.e. it is too narrow, or ‘flat’” (Worrall, 2014, n. 
p.)  
 
A Pythagorean Tuning of the Diatonic Scale on C4 (Bain, 2014, n.p.). 
 
 
 
 
 
The Diatonic Scale on C4 (Bain, 2014, n.p.)  
 
And the Real Music of the Spheres? 
 
From the Fourth Movement of Beethoven’s 9th Symphony 
 
 
Piano for Holst’s Jupiter from The Planets 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bain, R. (2014). A Web-based 
Multimedia Approach to Harmonic Scales. (n. p.); Worrall, D. (2014). Course 
Notes for the Physics and Psychophysics of Sound and Music. (n. p.). Beethoven 
and Holst scores respectively cropped from Ode to Joy at Google Images and Red 
Balloon Technology Ltd (2009) at www.8notes.com/scores/10613.asp 
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and DK 28B3, 4, 7-8) divorced from the senses, and his own interest in Pythagorean 
mathematics. (Copleston, 
1966, pp. 143 - 144; 
Guthrie, 1975a, pp. 87 - 
89). Beginning in the next 
paragraph I further discuss 
Heraclitus (BC 535 – 475), 
Parmenides (BC 515 – 460) 
and Pythagoras (born BC 
570/571) as referent 
backdrops for Plato before, 
on page 106, refocussing 
on Ethics as practical 
philosophy of Polis. 
For example, accepting that 
Heraclitus means by logos 
nature’s account, or the law 
of the universe—other 
meanings are possible—
then in Heraclitus’ world of 
eternal change (DK 22B30, 
B49a, B91) and unified 
opposites Heraclitus (DK 
22B60-63, B88, B103), 
mankind will always be 
“incapable of 
understanding” (DK 22B1-
2) that logos. The traditional interpretation of Heraclitus I have provided in this 
paragraph, far from being discarded, is nevertheless under ongoing exegesis and  
 
Behind the Text: Music and Mathematics, Plato and Pythagoras 
Diatonic Scale or Diatonic Pitch Set 
“Thus there is no point in inquiring about the historical origins of the diatonic pitch 
set, our most fundamental musical possession. We will never know them. We can do 
no better than the legends by which the Greeks sought to explain the origins of their 
musical practice. In one of these, related by Nicomachus[I] in the second century CE, 
Pythagoras, the reputed inventor of music, heard beautiful sounds coming 
unexpectedly out of a blacksmith’s shop. Weighing the anvils the smiths were 
striking, he discovered the harmonic ratios governing the perfect (“Pythagorean”) 
consonances, as well as the whole step. Laying these intervals out on a staff, and 
adding the two extra tones that are obtained when the Pythagorean complex is 
transposed to begin on each of its own constituent pitches, we may arrive at a 
primitive five-note (“pentatonic”) scale. Plugging the “gaps”, we find that we have 
“discovered” the half-step” (Taruskin, 2010, pp. 29-30, my square bracket 
superscript).  
 
“The two most-studied late-classical texts on Musica were De musica (About Music) 
by .... St Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus, 354-430) the greatest of the Fathers of the 
Christian Church, and De institutione musica (On the organisation of Musica) by 
Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480-ca. 524), the Roman statesman and 
educational reformer …” (ibid., p 69) 
 
“St Augustine’s treatise, completed in 391 ... covers nothing but rhythmic proportions 
(quantitative measures) and contains a famous definition of music—as bene 
modulandi scientia “the art of measuring well”—that was quoted as official doctrine 
by practically every later mediaeval writer. The treatise ends with a meditation, 
reminiscent of Plato’s dialogue Timaeus, on the theological significance of the 
harmonious proportions with which it deals, and the way in which they reflect the 
essential nature of the universe [2] … Boethius’s treatise covers much more ground 
than Augustine’s. It consists largely of translations from the Hellenistic writers 
Nicomachus and Ptolemy. It thus became the sole source of mediaeval knowledge of 
Greek music theory, which included the Great Perfect System, a scale constructed out 
of four-note segments called tetrachords, and also the Pythagorean classification of 
consonances (simultaneous intervals). The treatise also contained directions for 
representing pitch intervals in terms of spatial ratios, which made possible the 
construction of “laboratory instruments” called monochords[3] … for demonstrating 
number audibly, as sound” (ibid., pp.69-70, my square bracket superscripts). 
 
“While Greek music still involved practical music for Nichomachus and Ptolemy 
(who lived in the second century CE in Arabia and Egypt, respectively), by the time of 
Boethius the actual music practiced by the ancient Greeks had fallen into oblivion, 
along with its notation. Accordingly, Boethius’s treatise concerns not practical music 
but abstract Musica, as the author declares quite explicitly” (ibid., pp. 70-71). 
 
Notes: [1] Nicomachus of Gerasa (AD 60-120). [2] There appears to be no complete 
English translation of Nicomachus’ De Musica. Book VI is available in English 
(Jacobsson, 2002) and a complete translation is available in French (Augustine, 2006). 
An English translation of Boethius’ De Institutione Musica is available (Palisca, 1989) 
where on pages 17-19 Boethius translated tells the Pythagorean anvil story and 
subsequent monochord derivation of musical scale. Some 1050 years separate the 
birth of Pythagoras (BC 570-497 from that of Boethius AD (480-524) an observation 
germane to the opening sentence in this dialogue box. Boethius’ source may have 
been Nicomachus of Gerasa (AD 60-120) or Iamblichus's Life of Pythagoras (1818, 
pp. 61 – 65, 229 - 234) or both. The science content inherent in Iamblichus’ and/or 
Boethius’ telling of the anvil story, whether inserted by themselves or possibly found 
somewhere in then-extant Pythagorean sources, is instructive.  
(This Text Box Continues on page 100) 
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challenge. For example, Kahn (1999), offering as a referent Heraclitus’ discovery of the 
essential order of the 
cosmos inhering in 
xynon qua that-
which-is-common-to-
all, claims that the 
“only political 
attitude that we may 
safely extrapolate 
from the fragments is 
a lucid, almost 
Hobbesian 
appreciation of the 
fact that civilised life 
and communal 
survival depend upon 
loyalty to the nomos, 
which all citizens 
must share, … but 
which may be 
realised under the 
leadership of one 
single man” (ibid., p. 
3).  
As for Parmenides 
(BC 515 – 460), 
Aristotle associates 
him with Melissus and claims that Parmenides holds the first principle to be one and 
motionless Physics I 2 184b15–20 (Aristotle, 1929; 1952n, p. 259), an understanding  
 
Behind the Text: Music and Mathematics, Plato and Pythagoras (Continued) 
Tuning 
“The process of regulating the pitch of an instrument. On stringed instruments the tension of 
each string is adjusted by the turning of pegs or wrest pins until it is at its specified pitch. On 
keyboard instruments c’ is tuned first, to a tuning-fork or other device, then g is tuned to c’ 
with attention to the beats between the two notes; the slower their beat-rate the more nearly 
they are in tune. Next d’, a, and so on are tuned in an alternating sequence of perfect 4ths and 
perfect 5ths until the middle octave is complete (sometimes 3rds and major 6ths are used for 
particular reasons). Tuning is then extended to the rest of the octaves and finally to other ranks 
of strings or pipes. Because of the need for temperament, there are always some beats between 
notes” (Latham, 2002, p. 1301). 
Monochord 
“A string stretched between two fixed bridges or nuts over a calibrated rule on a long, narrow 
soundbox, used for measuring intervals and demonstrating their theory, for tuning other 
instruments, and as an instrument in its own right. It is said to have been the invention of 
Pythagoras (6th century BC); the Pythagorean theory of intonation is based on string-length 
ratios on the monochord” (Latham, 2002, pp. 792-793).  
Temperament 
“Temperament A method of tuning in which some concords are made slightly impure so that 
few or none will be unpleasantly out of tune. This became essential with the introduction of 
keyboard instruments. Voices and many other instruments can modify their notes according to 
context, varying the pitch slightly to keep in tune, but with keyboards all pitches are fixed. A 
major scale which is perfectly tuned starts with a major whole tone, followed by a minor whole 
tone, and then a semitone, measuring 204, 182 and 112 cents respectively, together making a 
perfect 4th of 498 cents (one cent is 1/100 of an equal-tempered semitone). Such a scale could 
be set on a keyboard instrument but it would be impossible to start a new scale on the second of 
those notes, because the nex4t step would be a minor instead of a major tone.  
 
The first mediaeval tempered scale was the Pythagorean, where every tone is a major tone and 
all 5ths except one are pure, exactly in tune. One 5th must be smaller than the others by 24 
cents (an eighth of a tone, termed a Pythagorean comma), because the sum of 12 pure 5ths, 
each 702 cents, is 24 cents greater than that of seven 1200-cent octaves. A scale built in pure 
5ths will never return to a pure octave without compromising one of the 5ths. 
 
A further difficult arises from the fact that the sum of three major 3rds, each 386 cents, is 
smaller than an octave by 41 cents, almost a quarter-tone. The result of compensating for this is 
that the better in tune one makes the 3rds, the worse the 5ths become, and vice versa. The 
Pythagorean temperament has perfect 5ths but some appalling 3rds, so sharp that the 3rd was 
regarded as a dissonance in the middle Ages simply because it was indeed dissonant. By the 
mid-15th century, and perhaps earlier, musicians including Arnaut de Zwolle were carefully 
planning their use of Pythagorean temperament – starting on B and tuning 5ths downwards 
from there, for instance, so that the bad 5th was the little used G#-Be and there were four 
almost pure 3rds (D-F#, A-C#, E-G#, B-D#) in keys in which they wanted to write. 
 
When harmony had evolved to the stage when almost any 3rd was required, a new 
temperament had to be devised, with all 3rds pure and 4ths and 5ths as nearly pure as possible. 
This was achieved by halving the 386-cent 3rd, taking the mean, or average, size of whole 
tone: 193 cents. The resulting temperament, called mean-tone, was constructed by tuning C-E 
pure and then tuning each 5th within that 3rd (C-G, G-D, D-A, A-E) a quarter of a comma flat. 
The only disaster that resulted was the size of the discrepancy between G# and Ab: the two 
notes which are the same pitch in equal temperament, are 41 cents apart in mean-tone, and 
using one instead of the other produces a chord so out of tune that it howls like a wolf – hence 
the expression “wolf 5th.” There were also four wolf 3rds, wildly sharp, but these were kept in 
keys which composers took care to avoid (e.g. C#, F#, B and G# in a tuning cycle starting on 
C: it was always possible to move the wolves by starting the tuning on a different pitch). 
(This Text Box continues on page 101.)  
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which he, Aristotle, debunks Physics I 3 185a10; I 3 186a5 – 35 (Aristotle, 1929; 1952n, 
pp. 259, 260 - 261). 
Plato too depicts 
“Parmenides, Melissus, 
and their followers”  
Theaetetus 180 (Plato, 
1921c; 1952v, p. 532) as 
denying the universality 
of change and motion. 
Reservations about 
Aristotle’s and Plato’s 
motives for depicting 
others in various ways 
are discussed on pages 
43, and 73 - 74 in this 
enquiry. Words 
surviving in fragments 
attributed to Parmenides 
(DK 28B1 to the ‘I 
cease’ statement in 7.8) 
support a received 
traditional view of 
Parmenides as advocate 
of a unified, motionless, 
spatially limited, 
indivisible, and unified 
being, that which “Never 
was or Will Be, because 
it Is now, a Whole all together, One, continuous” (DK 28B7, 8 translator’s 
capitalisation), that which is to be followed by reason (ibid.) in the service of the “IT IS” 
 
Behind the Text: Music and Mathematics, Plato and Pythagoras (Continued) 
Quarter-comma mean-tone was first discussed by Zarlino in 1571. Sixth-comma was an 
improvement as music became more chromatic in style, because though the 3rds were very 
slightly worse, the 5ths and 4ths were equally slightly better and the wolves were smaller 
and howled less. It is often used today for performances of early music. Wolves of some 
sort are inevitable in any temperament which uses the same correction all the way (a 
“regular temperament”) with a specific fraction of a comma. The only exception is equal 
temperament, which has the disadvantage that every interval is out of tune except the 
octave and that the 3rds (400 cents instead of the pure 386) are almost as bad as the 
Pythagorean. For that reason musicians try to avoid it except when playing with a piano. It 
is produced by tempering the 5ths, flattening each by 2 cents, to spread the 24 cent comma 
equally through the octave” (Latham, 2002, pp. 1262-1263) 
Equal Temperament 
“A system of tuning the scale whereby the octave is divided into 12 equal semitones. It is 
based on a cycle of 12 identical 5ths, each slightly smaller than “pure”, the reason being 
that a chain of 12 pure 5ths exceeds the equivalent of seven octaves by an interval known 
as the “Pythagorean comma”. To compensate for this, and in order for the circle of 5ths to 
arrive at a perfect unison, in equal temperament each 5th is smaller than pure by 1/12 of a 
Pythagorean comma. Another important aspect of equal temperament is the adjustment of 
the 3rds, so that three major 3rds, or four minor 3rds, are equal to an octave. To achieve 
this, major 3rds must be tuned slightly larger than pure, minor 3rds smaller” (Latham, 
2002, p. 427). 
Pythagorean Intonation 
A system of tuning in which the 4ths and 5ths are untempered. It is named after the 
Ancient Greek philosopher Pythagoras, whose calculations of intervals in terms of string-
length ratios (octave = 2:1, 5th = 3:2, …) formed the basis of much mediaeval and 
Renaissance theory. A distinguishing feature of Pythagorean intonation is that the major 
2nds and 3rds are larger, and the minor 2nds and 3rds smaller, than those of other tuning 
systems. The expressive quality of the 2nds in particular has led to the judgment that this 
system of tuning is especially well suited to late mediaeval polyphony” (Latham, 2002, p. 
1016).  
 
Quarter-comma mean-tone was first discussed by Zarlino in 1571. Sixth-comma was an 
improvement as music became more chromatic in style, because though the 3rds were very 
slightly worse, the 5ths and 4ths were equally slightly better and the wolves were smaller 
and howled less. It is often used today for performances of early music. Wolves of some 
sort are inevitable in any temperament which uses the same correction all the way (a 
“regular temperament”) with a specific fraction of a comma. The only exception is equal 
temperament, which has the disadvantage that every interval is out of tune except the 
octave and that the 3rds (400 cents instead of the pure 386) are almost as bad as the 
Pythagorean. For that reason musicians try to avoid it except when playing with a piano. It 
is produced by tempering the 5ths, flattening each by 2 cents, to spread the 24 cent comma 
equally through the octave” (Latham, 2002, pp. 1262-1263) 
 
“Such sources as the Robertsbridge Codex (British Library Add 28550) show that fully 
chromatic keyboards were in use by the mid-14th century, and it seems likely that those 
instruments would have been tuned to a cycle of 11 pure 5ths and one “wolf” 5th, in 
accordance with the Pythagorean system … The “wolf” 5th is necessary to compensate for 
the fact that a complete chain of 12 pure 5ths would exceed the equivalent of seven 
octaves by a small amount known as the “Pythagorean comma”. Hence the wolf 5th is 
smaller than pure by a Pythagorean comma to ensure that a complete cycle will produce a 
perfect unison. In earlier instruments the wolf 5th was usually situated between G# and Eb, 
but other locations could also be used; B-F# was common in the 15th century” (Latham, 
2002, p. 1019). 
 
Acknowledgement: I sincerely thank Michele Sheumack PhD, MSc, AMusA (Pianoforte), 
AMusA (Theory of Music) for her invaluable explanations of the physics and mathematics 
of sound that lie behind musical notation.  
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(DK 28B2, translator’s capitalisation) and the ‘What Is” (ibid.), the way of truth, but not 
to the exclusion of “the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability” (DK 
28B1).  
The traditional view of Parmenides is also under continuing exegesis and challenge. For 
example Kingsley, unlike Mitchell (2006, p. 15) who finds it difficult to accept 
Kingsley’s view outright, places Parmenides in an ongoing diaspora of a Shaman class 
to whom the modern sense of witch-doctor or medicine man might apply (Kingsley, 
1999, p. 25). Parmenides however appears decidedly clear in opinion about essential 
matters of mind—“For it is the same thing to think and to be” (DK 28B3) and to think 
rightly is to think the way of “Being and Reality” (DK 28B7-8). 
Plato’s interest in matters Pythagorean is well documented and discussed. Aristotle at 
Metaphysics 1 987a (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 505; 1989) states that Plato’s system—scholars 
debate whether Plato has a system or not—most accorded with the Pythagoreans and 
that following Heraclitus and Cratylus Plato held, even in later years, the impossibility 
of knowing a world in a state of flux. As discussed earlier on pages 43 and 73 - 74 of 
this enquiry, possible gaming by Aristotle in his attributions to Plato and earlier writers, 
and by Plato too, in possible word massaging, may render both of them questionable 
referents and, depending on positions taken, may or may not require caveat grains of 
salt.  
Riedweg claims that “had Pythagoras and his teachings not since the early Academy 
been overwritten with Plato” (Riedweg, 2008, pp. ix –x, 128) Pythagoras may have 
courted relatively little scholarly interest and that present understandings of Pythagoras 
and Pythagoreans are framed within a legacy of Neoplatonism and Neopythagorism 
(ibid., 48 – 59, 114 - 134). Tarrant (2000) focussing mainly, but not necessarily only, on 
Middle Platonism provides most detailed and instructive insights into the praxis of 
Plato’s early interpreters. Inter alia, working within an overarching rubric of 
discernment of possible approaches to interpretation of Plato, and of possible criteria 
ancient interpreters may have used to group and/or separate dialogues for reading 
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purposes, for example communicative purpose, didactic content, commonality of 
doctrine or polemical content and the like, Tarrant indicates that from some perspectives 
the influence of Pythagoras might be seen in “Parmenides, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus 
and Philebus” (ibid., p. 214).  
Elsewhere (ibid., pp. 84 -86), in one section of his book, Tarrant finds Middle Platonists 
being rather a diverse group displaying varied views about interpretation, and that the 
Neopythagoreans did not consider themselves as constituting a Platonist movement 
(ibid., p. 84). 
He names Moderatus (1st century AD) viewing Plato as one who, while trying to 
conceal the fact, nevertheless plundered Pythagoras. Tarrant also names Numenius (mid-
2nd century) considering Plato to be reticent about Pythagoras, and ventures that opinions 
such as these advanced by Moderates and Numinous might contribute to a belief “that 
true Pythagoreanism can be teased out of Platonic texts by in-depth interpretation” 
(ibid., p. 84). It might be plausible he continues, to allow something esoteric being 
detected behind Plato’s text, something perhaps relevant to an “allegedly Pythagorean 
metaphysic that Pythagoreans, almost as a matter of faith, supposed to exist there” (ibid., 
p. 85). 
Tarrant notes that even Proclus’ subsequent reference to Nicomachus of Gerasa’s 
tantalising possibility that of Zeno and Parmenides may have been members of a 
Pythagorean school might be sufficient excuse for a contemporary Pythagorean to 
examine the presence of the “One in the second part of Parmenides, for Pythagorean 
doctrine, making this, and the Timaeus, along with anything which looks promising in 
the Eleatic Stranger’s teaching in the Sophist and Politicus, the key sources of 
Pythagorean doctrine in Plato” (ibid., p. 86). 
Nicomachus of Gerasa is accepted as flourishing circa 100 AD. Tarrant’s insights follow 
chapeau caveats he Tarrant, offers about obscurity and isolation of texts and uncertainty 
of meaning for some of the early commentators and interpreters he is discussing (ibid., 
p. 84). Hare (1999/2001, pp. 117 - 119) detects a broad influence of Pythagorism on 
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Plato, evidenced by the ideal republic of ideas being an esoteric version of Pythagoras’ 
alleged Croton gathering, by Plato’s use of mathematics in some of the dialogues, and 
by a commonality of approach Plato and the Pythagoreans apply to mysteries of soul.  
Earlier research by Bremer (1984) and McClain (1976, 1984) touchers on, among other 
things, Plato’s adoption and use of Pythagorean mathematics. Bremer develops a case 
that, in recitation rather than in print, the so-called divided line The Republic VI 509d – 
511e (Plato, 1952r, pp. 386 - 388; 1969a) divides the syllable count of the dialogue in a 
proportion close to that of the golden mean (Bremer, 1984, p. 85). He detects, in The 
Republic, a surrogate mathematical and musical framework based on Pythagorean 
octave and diatonic scale for which the interval is 2:1 and the generator is 3:2, perfect 
fifths. McClain (1984), working from multiple mathematical perspectives—in The 
Republic at 522c6 - 534d1 (Plato, 1952r, pp. 392 - 397; 1969a) music, astronomy, 
geometry and arithmetic are urged crucial and interdependent in education for the ruling 
class—claims that Plato’s later dialogues abound with mathematical allegories (ibid., p. 
1) which, building on foundational work by Brumbaugh (1954), he interprets as musical 
allegories (ibid., p. 1 – 16, then passim). Among other things, McClain employs 
Brumbaugh's 
circular maps of 
Plato’s cities, for 
example Atlantis, 
as tone cycles and 
makes a 
suggestion that 
the creator of The 
Republic, (Plato, 
1952r, 1969a) 
interpreted by some as a fascist, had not been interpreted as a musical humourist (ibid., 
p. 99).  
Tone Cycle Cities Constructed by McClain During his Musical Allegory 
Interpretation of Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Statesman and Laws  
City Athens Callipolis Atlantis 
Magnesia  
(Laws) 
Character 
moderate or 
best 
celestial or 
ideal 
luxurious or 
worst 
practicable or 
second best 
Tuning(1) Pythagorean tempered just Archytas 
Generator(1)(2) 2p3q 2p3q 2p3q5r 2p3q5r7s 
Limit of 
Population(2) 
≈ 20,000 <1000 12,960,000 5,040 
 
Notes: (1) Extra source material to complement this table in particular and the enquiry’s whole 
discussion of stichometric analysis of possible Pythagorean mathematical/musical framework in 
Plato’s dialogues in general is provided in text boxes on pages 98, 99, 100, and 101 (2) Further 
explanation of nomenclature and meaning is available (McClain, 1984, pp. 17 - 32) 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from McClain, (1984). Pythagorean Plato: Prelude to the 
Song Itself. (p.14 ). York Beach, Maine: Nicolas-Hays, Inc. (McClain, 1984).  
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Brumbauch had, following ideas developed by Robin (1908b), analysed mathematical 
content in Platonic texts and constructed diagrams alluded to therein to conjecture a 
presence of a metaphor predicated on a 2:1 musical scale, a metaphor he detects 
employed in Plato’s time in Timaeus 36c (Plato, 1925h, 1952w) in articulation of what 
he, Brumbauch, calls the problematic dyad (1908b, p. 226). McClain, building on 
Brumbauch’s circular Platonic cities—Platonic cities are circular; their models are ‘tone-
circles’” (McClain, 1984, p. 9)—is able to detect an underlying Pythagorean harmonic 
and tuning theory conducting dialectics in The Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Statesman 
and Laws (ibid., pp. 3 – 15, then throughout) and a shared spiritual tradition linking 
microcosm as soul and macrocosm as universe (ibid., p. 109) all be it subject to a “likely 
story” (ibid., p. 127) caveat he, McClain, inks into his conclusion.  
Kennedy (2010), employing as did Bremer and McClain, stichometric analytical 
method, and in an effort to deepen understanding of the “connection between the 
mathematical structure of the dialogues and Plato’s Pythagoreanism (ibid., p. 21), 
detects an underlying stichometric structure in some of the dialogues. He applies a 
computer algorithm—one which counts only Greek alphabet letter content—to so-called 
original texts, and marks intervals on those texts. He finds similar interval patterns in 
length and positioning of speeches contained in Apology, Protagoras, Cratylus, 
Philebus, Symposium, Gorgias, Republic and Laws; placement of positive and negative 
value concepts respectively between 8 and 9 twelfths marks, and 10 and 11 twelfths 
marks, within Apology, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium and Timaeus; 
positioning of ideas of justice and ideal philosophers at or near the centres of Apology, 
Euthydemus, Euthyphro, and Gorgias; a twelve part musical scale structure in 
Symposium and The Republic wherein positive, so-called neutral and negative verbal 
themes in these dialogues are arranged in accordance with the so-called neutral, 
harmonious and disharmonious tuning architecture of the scale; location of the divided 
line explanation in The Republic very near to the alphabetic golden mean of the work; 
and a division of twelfths and its attendant twelve part musical structure not being found 
in dialogues “which are by general consent considered spurious” (ibid., p. 27) namely 
On Justice, Minos, On Virtue, and Eryxias—but present in the First Alcibiades, 
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Cleitophon, and the Epinomis “cautiously” (ibid., p. 19) regarded as genuine by some 
named scholars. Kennedy leverages from references to allegorisation in Derveni Papyrus 
studies to legitimise his stichometry; adduces established and respected scholars 
(Betegh, 2007; Brisson, 2004; Tarrant, 2000; M. L. West, 1992),—sometimes 
questionably—to urge, smooth, enhance through juxtaposition or assimilate positions he 
takes; names scholars (Annas, 1981; Burkert, 1972; J. M. Dillon, 1977; Thesleff, 1961, 
1965) implicated in “an apparent resurgence of interest in Pythagoreanism” (J. B. 
Kennedy, 2011, p. 20), placing them next to a statement that “so-called “neo-
Pythagoreans”, also from about the first century BCE, claimed that Pythagorean 
doctrines were symbolically embedded in Plato’s dialogues” (ibid., p. 20); and cites 
some scholars, including Burkert, less disposed to Pythagoreanism in Plato (Burkert, 
1972; Huffman, 1993, 1999; W. Jaeger, 1967), concluding that his contribution “does 
clarify, in a surprising way, Aristotle’s once puzzling view that Plato was a 
Pythagorean” (J. B. Kennedy, 2010, p. 27). He cites neither McClain nor Bremer.  
Horky (2013, pp. 201 - 260) argues that Plato was influenced by mathematical 
Pythagoreanism, a kind of mathematics philosophy emanating from musical harmony, 
and that he transformed it into a philosophy concerning being at the level of the cosmos 
and the level of the human. The Republic 522c – 531c (Plato, 1952r, pp. 292 - 297; 
1969a) provides insights into Plato at work on the importance of mathematics for 
philosophy in general and education in particular.  
Refocus on Ethics as Practical Philosophy of Polis 
In returning to discussion of Ethics as practical philosophy of Polis it is acknowledged 
that, according to Demos (1927/2004, pp. i - ii), Guthrie (1975a, p. 88) and Copleston 
(1966, pp. 203, 163 - 207), Plato appears to have believed in a possibility of human 
access to absolute moral and scientific knowledge and that he expressed this belief in his 
doctrine of the forms. Real existence was to be found outside of space and time, in a 
parallel world, a condition slowly expounded in Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w).  
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What insights about such matters and about virtue or good or arete of mankind do the 
Platonic dialogues provide and by what manner of argument are these insights revealed?  
Plato found the good or virtue of mankind to be wisdom thought of as knowledge-to-the-
attainment-of-happiness Meno 88a-89a (Plato, 1952l, pp. 183 - 184; 1967c). He arrived 
at this conclusion by first demonstrating that the hedonism of the Sophists, that is, what 
brings pleasure is good, could not be the whole answer because some pleasurable actions 
lead to harm. Under this approach only those pleasures judged not to bring harm are 
good, that is, pleasure must be referred to a higher virtue or efficiency, before being 
judged good so that pleasure, in and of itself, cannot be the virtue of mankind. This 
higher virtue or efficiency which might allow mankind to differentiate between harmful 
and unharmful pleasure was knowledge understood as nous or discernment, which 
discernment at work in calculating between harmful and unharmful pleasure he names 
wisdom. In particular, wisdom so defined is the knowledge of what is good and 
beneficial rather than evil and harmful. For example, in Meno it is wisdom alone which 
calculates between good and bad courage, and good and bad justice, indeed in general, 
between the good and bad of “all that the soul attempts and endures” Meno 88c within 
87b–89a (Plato, 1952l, pp. 183, 183 - 184; 1967c). In so doing wisdom leads mankind to 
the beneficial or useful, understood as something which never harms. Plato’s pursuit of 
wisdom does not end with his revelation of its discerning power. 
As earlier discussed on pages 87 to 89, the Greek sense of the good or virtuous, arete, is 
predicative. It has the sense good–at-what and the question of the good of mankind is 
not answered until the at-what is specified. 
A general picture of the at-what begins to develop in Gorgias 503c – 505c (Plato, 1952g, 
pp. 282 - 283; 1967b). Here Plato reveals that the virtue of the tradesman is found in the 
taxis and kosmos of their work under which taxis and cosmos everything is performing 
its right function in the system and ordered relationship to the whole. He links this 
argument to the classic Greek values inherent in the human soul. This position of virtue 
as taxis and kosmos is taken up again in the Cratylus 386e – 390e (Plato, 1921a; 1952q, 
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87 - 89). Through these discussions Plato proposes that the good-at-what of the soul, its 
taxis and kosmos, is shown to consist of obedience to the law, justice, and self-control. 
This condition is found again in The Republic I 351e – 354c (Plato, 1952r, pp. 308 - 310; 
1969b) where arete as technical virtue is established through explanations referring to 
body organs, the eye and the ear, tools such as pruning hooks, and the skills of trades 
peoples. This idea of arete as good-at-what is then carried forward to a discussion about 
the emergence of the state, and specialisation within the state, and each person in their 
own specialisation and place, doing their own skilled jobs, which is nothing other than 
the taxis and kosmos of the State. He extends the argument to the presence of three 
general skills classes in the state, namely, artisans as a whole, guardians and philosopher 
kings The Republic II 368e – 376e (Plato, 1952r, pp. 316 - 320; 1969b).  
While Plato proceeds by analogy to establish the at-what of humanity, his reasoning is 
predicated on introspection, observation, and his fundamental tenet that in humans two 
coincident conflicting urgings within the 
mind cannot come from the same source at 
the same time Timaeus 52c – 52d (Plato, 
1925h; 1952r, pp. 457 - 458). Hence in 
respect of his charioteer metaphor of the soul 
expounded at Phaedrus 246a – 254e (Plato, 
1925e; 1952o, pp. 124 - 128), taking for 
example a case say of an indignantly 
courageous person who discerns on a 
particular occasion to retreat by tactically 
withdrawing rather than to give in to a desire 
to flee, nous, discernment, the power of 
thought, might be the charioteer, the desire to flee might be the recalcitrant horse, and 
courage—it is engendered by thymos understood as spiritedness plus nous and is a kind 
of strength of will begotten of righteous indignation (Guthrie, 1975a, p. 114)—might be 
the white or noble horse, which favours the side of reason. Each of these states emerges 
from a different part of soul.  
 
The Charioteer Emerges as a Conductor? 
The ultimate consciousness product occurs from those 
numerous brain sites at the same time and not in one site in 
particular, much as the performance of a symphonic piece 
does not come from the work of a single musician or even 
from a whole section of an orchestra. The oddest thing 
about the upper reaches of a consciousness performance is 
the conspicuous absence of a conductor before the 
performance begins, although, as the performance unfolds, 
a conductor comes into being. For all intents and purposes, 
a conductor is now leading the orchestra, although the 
performance has created the conductor—the self—not the 
other way around. The conductor is cobbled together by 
feelings and by a narrative brain device, although this fact 
does not make the conductor any less real. The conductor 
undeniably exists in our minds, and nothing is gained by 
dismissing it as an illusion. 
Damasio, A. (2010). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the 
Conscious Brain. (pp. 23 - 24). Random House. Kindle 
Edition. (Damasio, 2010, pp. pp. 23 -24) 
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In The Republic IV 434e -435c (Plato, 1952r, p. 350; 1969a)—Books II – X tentatively 
accepted as being written about the same time as the Phaedrus (Plato, 1925e, 1952o), 
dating of the dialogues being problematic as discussed on pages 9, 10 and 11—Plato 
introduces a partitioned soul construct to elucidate a theory of the state. He reasons that 
if the idea of justice is common to the individual soul and to the state, and if a tripartite 
soul is common in mankind and an accurate capture of mankind’s psyche, then a three-
tiered city of ideas predicated on it is, from a psychological perspective at least, 
plausibly vindicated. Establishing again in The Republic IV, 436b – 437a (Plato, 1952r, 
pp. 350 - 351; 1969a) the idea that conflicting or contradictory states of soul in respect 
of things apparently the same, when experienced at the same time, emerge from different 
parts of the soul, and employing it thereafter, Plato establishes a link between the just 
man and the just state The Republic IV 437a – 444a (Plato, 1952r, pp. 351 - 355; 1969a). 
In the partitioned soul construct of The Republic the conflict to be managed is between 
the passions, thymos or spiritedness, and the appetites, epithumia while at Phaedrus 
253d – 254e (Plato, 1925e; 1952o, p. 128) the conflict requiring management is between 
thymos, noble spiritedness, and eros, erotic love, and a reasoning controlling charioteer 
has his work tested in the ensuing battle Plato describes—“love, love changes 
everything” (Webber, Black, & Hart, 1989) so goes a recently ever-popular wisdom.  
Guthrie depicts thymos also spelled thumos as the executive arm of reason, and notes 
that without thymos reason cannot prevail over desire. He names thymos will-power and 
states, without explanation, that “it is possible (though that astonishing man Socrates 
does not know it)—[sic]—to say ‘Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor’” (Guthrie, 
1975a, p. 115, my square brackets), Socrates, he says, (sic) left that “third agent, the 
thymos, that element of will-power … strangely … out of account (ibid., p. 115). 
Socrates spoke, Plato wrote, so that when such a scholar as Guthrie states what Socrates 
does or does not know, he is working within that convention, discussed on pages 9, 10 
and 11 of this enquiry, in which information about that man Socrates is gathered, in so 
far as it can be gathered, through exegesis of so-called early and late dialogues separated 
by so-called middle and/or transition dialogues such as Gorgias (Plato, 1952g, 1967b), 
Meno (Plato, 1952l, 1967c), and Phaedo (Plato, 1952n, 1966c). For example Vlastos 
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(1991, pp. 47 - 49) outlines ten ways in which Socrates of the early dialogues differs 
from Socrates of the middle dialogues. 
Without thymos mankind might well resolve issues of conflict by a ‘video … sequor’—
an ‘I-see-and-approve-of-the-better-but-follow-the-worse solution’, a values position 
acknowledged by Ovid (BC 43-AD 18) at Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or VII 25 – 30 
(Ovid, 1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144). There is scholarly interest in parallels between 
Plato’s tripartite soul and Freud’s tripartite division of id, ego and superego Sagan 
(1977, pp. 82 – 84) and Ubersax (2012, n. p.) pronouncing Plato’s arrangement superior, 
there being a wider consensus that the two constructs do not support close comparison. 
Ubersax also attempts to link Jung’s animus possession to thumos possession as a taking 
over of one part of soul, now psyche, by thumos (ibid.). Lear (2001, p. 181) compares 
Plato and Freud. His reading is that in Plato the appetitive, being unable to harken but to 
the reasonable, is not unlike Freud’s id sometimes not being able to listen to reason, but 
he is unable to find consistency on this point in Freud (1992, pp. 156 - 181; 2001, p. 
198). Lear also compares Plato and Freud in respect of relationships between a person’s 
inner life and their cultural environment, what he calls a relationship between the 
intrapsychic and the interpsychic, and which in Plato as psyche-analysis and polis-
analysis, are two aspects of a single discipline, psychology, which holds people and 
Polis/P(P)olis together (Lear, 2001, pp. 169 - 170) . His link to Freud in this case is 
Freud’s relationship between ego and superego in a context of their being in part a 
product of internalisation of parental figures, that is, a product of intrapsychic and 
interpsychic transaction (ibid., p. 194). The relevant locations in Freud are (Freud, 1957-
1981a, pp. 29 - 31; 1957-1981b, pp. 249 – 250). A compilation by Eversen (1991) 
assembles a number of contributions on psychology of soul.  
Plato continues to be of interest to 21th century psychologists. On the matter of reason 
having to enlist cooperation from spirit in order to manage passion Oliver (2012) finds 
differences between Plato’s construction of soul qua reason, spirit and appetite—
charioteer, white horse and black horse as he reads them—and their possible equivalents 
ego, and superego and id in Freud’s construction of psyche. Freud, he says, is more 
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circumspect than Plato about ego’s ability to control passion, that is, reason’s ability to 
control appetite. He claims that Nietzsche provides a way to resolve differences through 
insight he, Nietzsche, provides about “the triumph of ‘Socratism’ over Greek tragedy’s 
elaboration on the tension between Apollonian cultural creativity through form, and 
Dionysian surrender to the obliteration of form and individuality in favour of ecstatic 
union with others” (ibid., p. 77).  
More recently, Hobbs (2006, pp. 9 - 23) argues that thymos or thumos, henceforth used 
interchangeably, the spirited element of soul, first appeared in The Republic and is 
associated with a wide range of incoherent human attributes such as courage and 
aggression, self-disgust and shame, justice and anger, and obedience to the state above 
obedience to the father, and that it emerges in Plato as a “living repository of Homeric 
values” (Hobbs, 2006, p. 141). Hobbs argues that courage is impossible without thumos 
(ibid., p. 9), that thumos is derived in part from responses to education, poetry, music, 
society and culture (ibid., pp. 11 – 12), but that unlike reason which questions, thumos is 
concerned with moral issues of self-worth conditioned by an individual’s own 
conception of what it means to be noble. Her general argument is that Plato, in The 
Republic, attempted to replace the ungoverned Homeric thumos and courage of Achilles, 
with the moderate thumos and courage of a reasoned Socrates, or a “suitably purified” 
(Hobbs, 2006, p. 239) Odysseus “recovered from his own ambition” (ibid., p. 29), but 
she is sanguine as to the likelihood of such a change occurring (Hobbs, 2006, pp. 262 - 
267). The full picture found in the Myth of Er in The Republic X 614b – 621d (Plato, 
1952r, pp. 437 - 441; 1988), from which myth Hobbs extracts the possibility of a 
purified Odyssean thumos, is more complicated. In that myth, Odysseus chose for his 
next life the soul of a private man without cares, in contrast to Orpheus who chose a 
swan out of enmity towards women, Ajax who chose the life of a lion because of 
mankind’s former injustice to him, and Agamemnon who chose the life of an eagle 
because he hated human nature so much. Such choices invite a plethora of speculation. 
Notwithstanding general contention and questioning of the role Ethics plays in the 
political philosophy of the Polis, Plato does urge in The Republic IV, 427e – 433 (Plato, 
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1952r, pp. 346 - 349; 1969a) that four classic Greek virtues are present in a three-tiered 
human soul. I briefly discussed this finding earlier on page 59. Wisdom resides in the 
discernment of nous, courage is present in the battle between reason and desire, 
temperance consists of self-control won through the combination of nous and courage, 
and justice is the soul’s arete, its proper function, the just man being the happy man. 
Plato constructs a three-tiered natural aristocracy, his Republic, predicated on his three-
tiered partitioned soul. The three classes of his Republic are, as intimated above on page 
109, rulers or philosopher kings, guardians or a kind of soldier class, and artisan citizens, 
and he builds the same four Greek virtues natural to the soul into his so-called natural 
aristocracy The Republic IV, 433 - 439 (Plato, 1952r, pp. 349 – 352; 1988). Reasoned 
wisdom resides in the ruling class. Courage resides in the soldier class, the guardians 
who defend the city. Temperance is found in agreement amongst the citizens about who 
is to rule. Arete or justice consists of cosmos and taxis begotten of each of the classes 
performing their proper functions free from interference with the legitimate functions of 
others. This structural consistency, the presence of the four virtues in the microcosm of 
humans and their Polis, and the origins of virtue in the macrocosm of nature where 
virtue is obedience to place under moira or fate, might very much reflect Plato’s 
exposure to Pythagorean thought and to ancient values petrified in Homer. The three-
tiered republic is able to emerge because not every human can be a ruler, that is, not 
every person is full-souled, some acquire all of the virtues while others acquire few. 
Socrates’ defeat of Thrasymachus and his allies in the might-is-right debate The 
Republic I 338a – 364 (Plato, 1952r, pp. 301 - 313; 1969a), and in his win in the honour-
among-thieves-argument in The Republic I 351c within the context of 351a – 352a 
(Plato, 1952r, pp. 308 - 309; 1988), both reveal that the justice so derived for Plato’s 
ideal republic leaves no room for a contention advanced by the Sophists that the best 
form of justice is the strong taking their so-called rights. Locke, all those years later, was 
to point out that honour among thieves does not prove justice innate (Locke, 1825, p. 
22). There are, though, a number of views about the kind of thinking that Thrasymacus 
represents. Johnson (2005, pp. 129 - 162) holds that Thrasymachus’ dialogical role is to 
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provide a disparaging commentary on followers of an out of date Hesiodic idea of 
justice. Nonetheless, Plato’s finding that justice, waited on by obedience to the law, 
temperance and wisdom, as the work of the soul, is a big step towards justice as the 
domain of nomos as culture, or person-made law, as explained on pages 57 to 64, and a 
shift away from the absolute justice of the gods.  
By way of this step, Pythagorean soul and Homeric virtues, even though they appear to 
share an ancient common origin in moira as totem space imperative and ritual, might, 
under reappraisal, be said together to have confronted those imperatives of fate and 
gods, and established an idea of justice as something superior to dominance through 
brute force. This long and far away development in the political philosophy of justice, 
complex now to present generations due to its entanglement in myth, ancient custom and 
heroic stories, records Plato’s dialogical Socrates’ innovative enquiry into the human 
condition and might be read, for whatever reasons, as a brave Socratic stand for nomos 
and Polis.  
In summary, four classic Greek virtues are conjectured as inhabiting the human soul: 
justice, courage, temperance and wisdom. These virtues or technical efficiencies which 
Plato enshrines in his ideal republic at the design stage are read as having their origins in 
nature, social more and morality being, inter alia, extensions of nature. So constituted 
these virtues may be viewed as bringing a pinch of real world influence to the vexing 
question of how to circumscribe human values and behaviour. Plato found the universal 
virtue or good of humankind to be wisdom understood as an ability to discern between 
harmful and unharmful pleasures. This universal virtue, humankind’s arete, discloses 
itself when nous discerns happiness. Arete’s good-at-what consists of obedience to the 
law, justice and self-control. In its work of discernment nous must know and engage 
with knowledge of the good-at-what prescribed by the multitude of job tasks, and in 
such a manner of account virtue is some kind of knowledge as earlier discussed in the 
text on pages 87 to 91 and in text boxes on pages 86, 87, 88, and 89. 
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I continue with the purpose of arguing that in Plato, Ethics and Science are inextricably 
interwoven, and so too his ontology and epistemology. In the next paragraph I resume 
articulation of Plato’s complex cosmogony by beginning a discussion on the status he 
bestows upon Science as knowledge, and on the role Science plays in human 
understanding and the political philosophy of Polis.  
Step 3 Continues 
Platonic Science and Political Philosophy of Polis 
Plato’s usage of the term Science can be ascertained from his epistemology and 
ontology. For example, as revealed earlier on pages 59 and 89, virtue in Plato’s Ethics, is 
reasoned to be some kind of knowledge and as subsequently discussed in this enquiry 
Plato calls the highest form of knowing Science. According to Copleston Plato inherited 
Socrates’ view that there can be knowledge “in the sense of objective and universally 
valid knowledge” (Copleston, 1966, p. 142) and that there can be “knowledge of eternal 
values which are not subject to the shifting and changing impressions of sense or of 
subjective opinion, but are the same for all men and for all peoples and all ages” 
(Copleston, 1966, p. 143). For Plato true knowledge must be infallible and must be 
about existence, about what is. Objects of sense can thus not be objects of true 
knowledge because sense perception reveals change, reveals a thing’s coming to be, 
being, and ceasing to be, rather than the immutable or permanent what is. Change per se 
is permanent. Sense perception can also be misleading as in the seeing of a mirage and 
true knowledge must therefore involve some further process beyond reflection and 
judgement alone. True knowledge is not the same as sense perception of individual 
objects or true belief about individual objects. 
Where then does this so-called true knowledge reside?  
 
Note: Formatting imperatives specific to the software combination being used require 
that the text continues on page 120, that is, after Table 6.  
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Table 6: The Forms in Plato from the Human Condition to the Natural and Universal 
Condition 
 
Stages of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Dialogues by 
Stage of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Definition of the Forms 
Epistemology and/or 
Ontology 
Overview 
Socratic 
Dialogues 
Euthyphro 
(piety) 
Charmides 
(temperance) 
Laches 
(courage) 
Lysis 
(friendship) 
Hippias 
Majeur 
(beauty) 
Form or idea is the element 
common to a plurality of 
beings which are called by the 
same name. It is the one in the 
many and is the basis of 
Socratic definition. Given that 
the subjects of the dialogues 
(piety, temperance, courage, 
friendship and beauty) have no 
specific physical referents in 
natural being, the forms do not 
have a separate existence. 
Rather they are “moral and 
aesthetic concepts framed by 
the individual in order that he 
may be consistent in thought, 
word and deed, and that he and 
his interlocutor may not 
misunderstand one another” 
(H. Jackson, 1918, p. 56).  
In these so-called early 
dialogues Plato employs 
Socrates in applying a 
method, that is, 
Socrates’s now-
namesake method, in 
search of consistency of 
meanings of words, that 
is consistent 
knowledge, that might, 
inter alia, be used to 
describe moral 
dimensions of action. 
One received 
assessment of this 
method is that listeners 
participating in its cross 
examining dialectic are 
presumed brought to a 
state of lesser 
ignorance, a state 
which, after aporistic 
ejection from the 
dialogue, informs and 
sustains moral 
behaviour in the active 
world. Post dialogue 
participants, once 
having drawn their own 
opinions from the 
dialectic, hopefully 
behave less badly in the 
active world.   
These dialogues reflect 
Plato’s exposure to Cratylus’ 
theory and to Socrates and 
they are his sequel to 
Democritus’ abandoned 
attempt to build a scientific 
cosmology and cosmogony 
and Cratylus’ limited attempt 
to find permanence under the 
observed flux and change of 
the natural world. The 
dialogues employ the 
destructive element of 
Socratic dialectic leaving the 
reader themselves to supply 
the constructive conclusions.  
The dialogues are a 
continuation of the Socratic 
search for consistency of 
thought about the moral 
issues of the dialogue: a 
search which stops short of 
dogmatic reconstruction of 
Socrates (sic.). 
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Table 6: (continued) 
 
Stages of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Dialogues by 
Stage of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Definition of the Forms 
Epistemology and/or 
Ontology 
Overview 
The 
Educational 
Dialogues 
which contain 
Plato’s 
rudimentary 
Theory of 
Ideas 
Protagoras 
Gorgias 
Phaedrus 
Meno 
Euthydemus 
Symposium 
Plato postulates, through myth 
within the dialogues, really 
existent unities of such entities as 
self-justice, and self-temperance, 
which temporal phenomenal 
pluralities are but imitations 
brought to consciousness by a 
process of reminiscence.  
In this stage of development the 
forms as “ideas are moral and 
aesthetic unities, eternal, 
substantial, separately existent; 
but we are not told how the 
particulars participate in them, 
nor what the things are which 
have ideas corresponding to them 
(H. Jackson, 1918, p. 56). 
Plato extends and 
develops and through 
speculative and poetic 
myth postulates a 
rudimentary theory of 
being—the reality of 
existing forms—which 
becomes the basis for a 
rudimentary theory of 
knowing. 
The dialogues reveal a 
growing awareness of the 
limitation and insufficiency 
of the Socratic dialectic as a 
basis for education and a 
perceived need to replace 
the personal consistency 
sought through the dialectic 
with an objective truth. 
The education dialogues 
criticise early and 
contemporary theories of 
education. The Protagoras 
pits the educational method 
of Protagoras and the 
Sophists against that of 
Socrates. The Gorgias and 
the Phaedrus respectively 
address moral and 
intellectual aspects of the 
forensic argument and 
debate rhetoric of Gorgias 
and the political rhetoric of 
Isocrates. The Euthydemus 
makes fun of the existing 
eristic for argument and 
debate. The Phaedrus and 
the Symposium in particular 
reveal the speculative 
mythical demonstration of 
the existence of formal 
realities. 
The beginning of the 
development of the 
closeness of the one, the 
beautiful and the good, the 
importance of Science 
above opinion, and the 
ethical authority of reason 
above sense emerge in these 
dialogues. 
 
117 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
Stages of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Dialogues by 
Stage of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Definition of 
the Forms 
Epistemology and/or Ontology Overview 
Earlier 
Theory of 
Ideas 
Republic 
Phaedo 
Cratylus 
Here the forms 
are as they are 
in the 
educational 
dialogues 
except that they 
now extend to 
the case of 
natural objects. 
(1) Beside the earthly transient 
pluralities of known, that is, sensed 
phenomena, which become objects 
of opinion, there are corresponding 
intransient immutable forms which 
really exist and become objects of 
knowledge. (2) Wherever a plurality 
of particulars is called by the same 
name there is a corresponding form. 
Thus forms exist as much for chairs 
and tables as they do for good, bad 
or ugly. (3) It is the particular’s 
participation in the idea that makes 
the particulars what they are—
Phaedo 100d; Republic 476. (4) The 
idea, that is the form of the good, is 
foremost among the ideas. As a 
result theories of being, knowing 
and predication emerge. It is a 
theory of being because the ideas are 
eternal and immutable, a theory of 
knowing because Plato ascends 
“from the observational particulars 
through Socratic definitions to a 
definition of the self-good, and thus 
converts provisional definitions of 
things into certified representations 
of ideas” (H. Jackson, 1918, p. 57). 
It is a theory of predication “in as 
much as it affords or seems to afford 
an answer to certain logical 
paradoxes which had sorely 
perplexed Plato’s contemporaries 
and for the moment himself” (ibid., 
p. 57). For example it was used to 
address the problem of the like and 
unlike appearing in the one 
particular representation. 
There emerges the beginning of 
a systematic theory to address 
the three great questions: What 
is being? What is knowledge? 
What is predication? The forms 
in (1), in the cell immediately 
to the left, which have been 
carried forward from their stage 
of development in the 
educational dialogues are 
transformed (by (2), (3) and 
(4)—again in the cell 
immediately to the left—from 
the poetical and mythical 
expression into a theory of 
being, a theory of knowing and 
a theory of predication. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Stages of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Dialogues by 
Stage of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Definition of the Forms 
Epistemology and/or 
Ontology 
Overview 
Later Theory 
of Ideas 
Parmenides 
Philebus 
Timaeus 
Theaetetus 
Sophist 
Statesman 
Plato postulates that forms 
exist only where there are 
fixities in nature. 
Wherever natural 
particulars are called by a 
common name, there exists 
an objective, immutable 
form. Here the forms “are 
unities from which 
nature’s fixities—the 
universe, the four simple 
bodies, the stars, and the 
animal and vegetable 
kinds—are respectively 
derived; they are 
substantial and eternal, 
they are the thoughts of 
universal mind; they are 
not imminent in 
particulars, but are 
imitated or reflected as 
particulars in space” (H. 
Jackson, 1918, p. 60) 
 
1 “Beside pluralities of 
phenomena, transient, 
mutable, imperfect, which 
come into being, and are 
objects of opinion, there are 
unities, eternal, immutable, 
perfect, which really exist, 
and are objects of 
knowledge” (ibid., p. 60). 
There are qualifications 
expressed below as 
supplementary articles. 2 
“The supplementary articles 
are as follows: (a) there are 
substantive, self-existent 
ideas  … of the universe: of 
fire, air, water, earth; of the 
several stars; and of the 
several animal and vegetable 
species; but of nothing else, 
(b) it is not the idea’s 
immanence in particulars, but 
the imitation or reflection of 
the idea in matter in space 
that brings particulars into 
existence and makes them 
what they are, (c) unity = 
mind = good = god is the 
cause, the sole cause of all 
things: … of the ideas, of 
particulars and even of its 
own correlative plurality 
which = space = evil = 
necessity, (d) the ideas are 
the thoughts of the sole 
cause, namely unity or mind, 
(e) infinite mind develops 
within itself a complete 
universe of thoughts, primary 
and secondary, and this 
universe of thoughts, as seen 
from within by a finite 
intelligence included in it, is 
our universe of things” (ibid., 
p. 60).  
Universal mind is the sole 
cause of the universe and 
everything that is in it. 
The Parmenides, Philebus and 
Timaeus are chiefly ontological. 
The Parmenides refutes Zeno’s 
contention that likes cannot be 
unlikes by arguing that the like and 
unlike can be in the one particular 
object by that object’s participation 
in the ideas of like and unlike. The 
Philebus and Timaeus, inter alia, 
address the manner in which the 
one can be “known, opined, 
perceived” (ibid., p. 58), and in 
which “the infinite many can be 
conjoined in the one” (ibid.) and 
“diverse predicates can be 
affirmed” (ibid., p. 58). Questions 
raised in the Parmenides become 
the foundation for discussions in the 
remaining dialogues. In these 
discussions the earlier theory of the 
ideas is replaced by the later theory 
of ideas. In particular, as a group, 
the Theaetetus, Sophist, and 
Statesman, inter alia, address the 
questions of (a) how the one, if it is 
negatively determined, that is, if it 
is determined by knowing what it is 
not, can be known through 
predicates affirmed of it, and (b) the 
otherwise nonexistence of the one 
and its impossibility of being 
known. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Stages of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Dialogues by 
Stage of 
Intellectual 
Development 
Definition of the Forms 
Epistemology 
and/or Ontology 
Overview 
Professional 
Dialogue 
Laws 
The question is open. Two world 
souls are postulated one is 
beneficent, and god and another is 
malevolent, the devil. Jackson 
(1918, p. 60) postulates that god 
and the devil are respectively the 
providence and necessity of the 
Timaeus but that there is no reason 
to assume that Plato had abandoned 
his henism or one. 
 
Having established, through the 
doctrine of the forms and natural 
kinds based upon them, that a 
foundation exists for the scientific 
study of plants and animals—
minerals provided something of a 
problem for the doctrine—Plato 
entrusts the study of biological 
species to his nephew Speusippus 
and returns to review his earlier 
Ethics and sociology. According to 
Jackson (ibid., p. 60) Plato had, in 
his maturity, come to know that 
mankind, being human and flawed, 
cannot of themselves come, through 
knowledge of the self-good, to a 
knowledge of the ideas and a 
philosophical morality based upon 
it. Consequently, society is unable 
to dispense with “popular and civic 
morality” (ibid., p. 60) and for its 
maintenance “legislation is 
indispensable” (ibid. p. 60). 
Leaving Science and metaphysics 
behind Plato proceeds in the Laws 
to provide “for the guidance of his 
countrymen, a complete code of 
enactments” ibid., p. 60. In the 
earlier Republic, he left such 
enactments and “all [of] the 
responsibilities of administration” 
(ibid., p. 60 my brackets) to “his 
trained magistrates” (ibid. p. 60).  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Copleston, F. (1966). A History of Philosophy. (pp. 142 - 265). London: Burns and Oates 
Limited; Jackson, H. (1918). Plato and Platonism. (pp. 54 - 61). In James Hastings (Ed.) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. 10). 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; Plato. (1952). Apology. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 200 - 212). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. 
(1952). Charmides. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 2 - 13). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Cratylus. In R. M. 
Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 85 - 114). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Euthyphro. In Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 191 - 199). 
Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Gorgias. In Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 252 - 294). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Laches. In R. 
M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 26 - 37). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Laws. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 
640 - 799). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Lysis. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 15 - 25). Chicago: William Benton; 
Plato. (1952). Meno. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 174 - 190). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Parmenides. In R. 
M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 486 - 513). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Phaedrus. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 
7, pp. 115 - 141). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Philebus. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 609 - 639). Chicago: 
William Benton; Plato. (1952). Protagoras. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 38 - 64). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). 
Republic. In R. M. Hutchins Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 295 - 441). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Sophist. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), 
Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 580 - 618); Plato. (1952). Statesman. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 580 - 608). Chicago: William Benton; 
Plato. (1952). Symposium. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 149 - 173). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Timaeus. In R. 
M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 442 - 447). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1974). Theaetetus. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Plato. (1952). Phaedo. In R. M. Hutchins (Eds.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 422 - 447). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). 
Symposium. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 149 – 173). Chicago: William Benton. 
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For Plato true knowledge was to be found in universals, forms accessible by 
processes beyond sense perception: and each such form carried with it an objective 
reality. 
Particular sensual objects were imperfect glimpses of objectively real forms and the 
process of objectivity extended beyond the objects of natural Science to ethical 
concepts as well. It may appear strange to a Post-Modern mind, but Plato sought to 
explain the relationship between the objective world of forms and the so-called real 
or sensual world of the earthly particulars first, by engaging with elements of the 
human condition, courage, hate, and so on, and subsequently, by extending his 
argument to physical objects of sense perception. All of the hard work of tracing 
the progress of his theory of forms from the human condition to the natural 
condition is discussed in detail below in Table 6 beginning on page 115 outlines in 
detail Plato’s intellectual journey to his final  position on forms. Its purpose is to 
provide a basis upon which, by being pronounced objectively real existences, forms 
become of central importance in Plato’s epistemology and ontology. Table 6 
intentionally breaks the white space layout conventions generally employed 
throughout the enquiry both to accommodate software formatting imperatives and 
for ease of reading and information access. 
What then is the role of the forms in Plato’s epistemology and ontology?  
Answering this question constitutes another step in this enquiry’s extraction of 
Platonic usage of the term Science from Plato’s epistemology and ontology .  
In Plato’s parable of the line in Table 7—the line is the heavy vertical line at the 
centre—mankind ascends from the lowest ignorance of opinion to the highest state 
of knowledge through a series of discreet conditions of mind. The horizontal 
double lines indicate these discreet steps but the table geometry does not 
incorporate possible golden mean proportions. 
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Opinion is not true knowledge and the basis on which it is separated from true 
knowledge is largely ontological: the 
objects of opinion are images, while those 
of knowledge are original universal forms, 
with the exception that mathematics, 
which although it is classed as knowledge, 
is not the highest form of knowledge. 
Mathematics proceeds by intelligible 
particulars rather than by sensible 
particulars. Progress up the line is not 
continuous but consists of conversions. 
Plato’s parable of the line is further 
articulated in The Republic VII 514a- 
517e (Plato, 1952r, VII, pp. 388 - 389; 
1969a) in his parable of the den or cave. Humans in a cave chained with their backs to 
its entrance are unable to look at one another. Behind them is a wall and walkway so 
constructed that statues and figures of animals and other objects can be carried across 
the walkway so that they protrude above the wall. Between the wall and walkway 
structure, and the entrance to the cave, there is a fire so positioned that it projects 
shadows of those walkway statues and figures onto the back wall of the cave. The 
chained humans can only watch the shadows projected by the fire onto the back wall of 
the cave. They as a class are slaves to rhetoric, and they inhabit the first degree of 
opinion.  
Were one of the chained persons to break away and after a time see the statues and 
figures themselves, he or she (in Plato he) would enter the second degree of opinion 
having been converted from shadow and sophistry to a more concrete and substantial 
world. If that individual perseveres and exits the cave they will see in nature, under the 
sun’s illumination, the actual beings whose likeness they saw in the cave, first in 
silhouette form, and then in statue form. Were an escapee to be able to look at the sun— 
 
 
Source: (Giorgione, c. 1510, completed by Sebastiano del 
Piombo). (artists). The Three Philosophers. (oil on canvas). 
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna: Philosophy and 
Philosophers in Art. Are the philosophers Marcus Aurelius, left, 
Averroes, centre, and Aristotle, Right, standing outside of 
Plato’s cave in this allegorical painting? Conjecture abounds 
about the content and meaning of this painting. 
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“he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible 
world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his followers have been 
accustomed to behold” The Republic VII 516b – 516c (Plato, 1952r, VII, p. 388; 
1969a)—the escapee’s final conversion to the highest state of true knowledge would be 
complete. The escapee sees the sun in its “own proper place” Republic VII 516b (Plato, 
1952r, p. 388; 1969a) and would “reason about him” (ibid., p. 389). Woe be to the so 
converted escapee who tries to return to enlighten their former cave mates for, should 
those still chained in the cave to be able to catch that individual, they would kill him or 
her because of the outrage that individual’s enlightenment would bring to their beliefs. 
Voegelin (2000, p. 39) assigns the enlightener-messenger task to philosophy. It seems, 
does it not, that some two and a half millennia later, education has not been able to 
render Plato’s enlightener-messenger assertion unreasonable?  
Table 7: Plato's System of Knowledge—His Parable of the Line 
Epistemological 
Dimension 
Conditions of Mind Objects Ontological Dimension 
k
n
o
w
led
g
e 
Pure reason: the state of mind that 
uses the hypotheses of the previous 
stage as starting points but progresses 
beyond them to ascend to first 
principles. It is a state of abstract 
reasoning and dialectic which does 
not directly use the images of 
opinion. 
Originals, archetypes, first principles 
or forms 
th
e in
v
isib
le w
o
rld
 
Hypotheses about the objects of 
opinion 
Imitations of the objects of the lower 
stages taken as hypotheses and used to 
reach conclusions: for example the 
drawings of the geometer used in 
geometrical proofs in mathematics 
The objects are “those which a person 
can only see with the eye of the 
mind”— Republic 510e – 511a (Plato, 
1952r, p. 387; 1969a). 
o
p
in
io
n
 
Second degree of opinion 
Images of real things about us 
“animals which we see, and 
everything which grows or is made”—
Republic 510a (Plato, 1952r, p. 387; 
1969a).  
th
e sen
sib
le w
o
rld
` 
First degree of opinion 
Images, shadows, reflections in 
water, and bright things, false 
understandings occasioned by 
sophistry 
Notes: (1) Double horizontal lines separate discreet conditions of mind. (2) Vertical heavy central line separates epistemology 
from ontology. It is the line in the parable of the line 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from the textual content of Copleston, F. (1966). A History of Philosophy Volume 1 Greece 
and Rome. (pp. 142 - 162). London: Burns and Oats Limited; Plato. (1952). Republic 514 – 518 (VII, pp. 388 - 389). In R. M. 
Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7, pp. 295 - 441). Chicago: William Benton. 
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Table 7 on page 122 reveals that the highest kind of human knowing is reached through 
the highest kind of being namely, the forms. Also as earlier revealed in Table 6 on pages 
115 to 119, for Plato, whenever a number of objects are called by the same name, there 
is a form—an immutable ideal objective existence of which the ever changing sensed 
particulars such as horses, monkeys, trees, rocks and clouds, coming to be, being, and 
ceasing to be, are but shadows. Humans do not invent the forms, which, as also earlier 
discussed in Table 6 on pages 115 to 119, exist as much for the case of aesthetic and 
ethical-moral dimensions as they do for natural objects: they discover them through 
mind and intelligence Phaedo 65e – 67 (Plato, 1952n, pp. 224-225; 1966c). Plato also 
refers to these forms as ideas Phaedo 102a-b (Plato, 1952n, p. 243; 1966c)—those ideas 
used in patternmaking of the objects of the physical world. Idea in this sense is different 
from the modern meaning wherein ideas are the currency of concept and construct spent 
when thinking or reflecting occurs. 
Where exactly are these forms to be found, who or what put them there, and by what 
route do humans access them?  
Where exactly are the forms to be found? The 
forms are separate immutable essences which, 
being incorporeal, have no particular place but yet 
exist in a real heaven. Although they are incorporeal, as universals they still have 
objective existence—a difficult problem for Plato. 
Who put the forms “there”? It is not clear. In Timaeus 29a – 47e (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 
pp. 447 - 455) an artisan-being, a δημιουργός or skilled worker or handicraftsman 
(Liddle & Scott, 1940, n. p.) kind of god Timaeus 40c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 452) 
models the particular beings of the natural world on the existing eternal forms, which 
forms exist apart from the artisan-being. In its occasioning of the real sensible world 
from the forms of the eternal world, the artisan-being introduces time Timaeus 37d – 38c 
(Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 450 - 451) which is subsequently taught to humans through 
the various motions of the various celestial objects. The artisan-being is also important 
 
The Demiurge 
The artisan being of Timaeus became the Demiurge 
following Cudworth’s first usage in 1678 of 
“Demiurgus or Opificer of the world” (OED, 1970a, 
p. 182), by 1845 anglicised as “Demiurge or 
architectonic framer of the whole world” (Cudworth, 
1845, p. 75). 
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in Gnosticism, of which more later, and Plotinus (AD 204 – 270) claims that the 
Demiurge, which he calls the All-Soul, emanated from the one, stating in the Enneads 
(Plotinus, 1956), preserved for posterity by his student Porphyry (AD 234 – 305), that 
“to bring this Cosmos into being, the Soul first laid aside its eternity and clothed itself 
with Time; this world of its fashioning it then gave over to be a servant to Time” The Six 
Enneads (Plotinus, 2010, p. 234, translator's capitalisation). To have the eternal soul 
transcend into time and the sensible world in this manner is a teasing conundrum 
because, while creation of time and the pattern making of the sensible world occur 
together, we may, within our current conventional understandings of time, ask how 
human reason can speak of happenings before reason had itself learned about time, and 
especially about conditions that existed, and events that happened, before time existed. 
How do humans access the forms?  
Timaeus discloses that human intellect accesses the forms while animal and vegetable 
desires of the body, aided by sensation, access the physical earthly beings. Just how 
these separate parts of the soul exchange their information is not made clear. Some early 
anticipation that this mystery will be revealed is provoked at Timaeus 49a (Plato, 1925h; 
1952w, p. 456), where, in connection with the “intelligible and unchanging” (ibid., p. 
456) and the “generated and visible” (ibid., p. 456), Timaeus tells of a third being which 
he calls the “receptacle and ... nurse of all generation” (ibid., p. 456). Then, after a large 
digression about the nature of the four elements, he discloses that: 
… the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things, is 
not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds or any of the 
elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which 
receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most 
incomprehensible. Timaeus 51a (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 457).  
Plato, through his dialogical Socrates who, as revealed earlier on page 58, he crafted to 
find Milesian school explanations of the physis unsatisfactory, may well have been 
himself satisfied with his again crafted disassociation by Timaeus of the four elements 
from the nurse of all generation. Such a sentence is by its nature highly speculative and 
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bespeaks a presence of an underlying wariness about the openness of motive outside of, 
but directing the method itself, of the Socratic dialogues. Yet in light of Bernabé’s 
contribution discussed earlier beginning on page 74 the conjecture of this paragraph is 
not necessarily entirely implausible. In continuing his discussion, Timaeus associates 
this nurse and receptacle with space, in which, in a dreamlike state, noetic recognition 
occurs. His dialogical claim is that space, being, and generation existed before the 
heaven but as to the mechanism and process of noesis we are taken no further.  
Mind is able to validate the imperfect understandings occasioned by sensation because, 
as immortal soul, it has prior scientific knowledge of the forms. For example, at 
Symposium 201d – 212c (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, pp. 162 - 168), in a so-called ἐγκώμιον or 
encomium of love speech, the dialogical Socrates tells his listeners that the prophetess 
Diotima, a stranger from Mantineia, disclosed to him that Love, the son of Plenty and 
Poverty, born on Aphrodite’s birthday and thenceforth her attendant, is neither fair nor 
foul, nor good nor evil, nor wise nor foolish, but is a mean between these opposites. 
Love is a spirit hovering between the mortal and immortal, a spirit which interprets 
between the gods and men, a spirit which also seeks wisdom which by its very nature is 
of the beautiful and the good. In one of its many guises, Love is a philosopher, and in 
some forms Love is anything but tender and fair Symposium 203b – 203e (Plato, 1925g; 
 
 
Source: (Feurerbach, 1869) Plato’s Symposium. (1869). (oil on canvas). Karlsruhe, Staatliche Kunsthalle: Philosophy and 
Philosophers in Art. The drunken Alcibiades arrives at a symposium. 
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1952u, p. 164). As Eros, the philosopher, Love directs the human soul to pursuit of the 
unchanging and eternal, that which is good, which is initially found in procreation, 
“wherein conception and generation are an immortal principle of the mortal creature” 
(ibid., 206c or p. 165), and this pursuit of beauty is the beginning of the immortal soul’s 
journey. 
In this journey the immortal part of the soul accesses first the beauty of the forms, then 
the beauty of the souls—which, in light of the earlier discussion of the inherence of the 
four Greek virtues in the soul and the Polis, of itself occasions an appreciation of the 
beauty of laws and constitutions—then the beauty of Science, and then the beauty of the 
final Science which beholds and partakes of the nature of wondrous beauty of the 
eternal, divine and everlasting which is the final cause of the toil of the soul’s journey. 
In such a state the soul as “eye of the mind” Symposium, 212a (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, p. 
167) will “be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for He has hold 
not of an image but of a reality), and [by] bringing forth and nourishing true virtue [is 
privileged] to become the friend of god and be immortal, if mortal man may” (ibid., my 
square brackets).  
In the account just given Plato has not explained what it means to ‘behold’: he has not 
explained the particular mechanism by which the incorporeal soul intermingles with and 
knows the objective forms, or for that matter the one. Nonetheless, it appears from the 
soul’s journey that Science is the lingua franca in which the forms instruct nous, the 
immortal segment of the human soul.  
Copleston (1966, p. 177 - 178), taking a lead from Aristotle, convincingly argues that 
Plato identifies the good, that is, the just and beautiful, with the one, so that for Plato 
“the Forms are the cause of the essence of all things, and the one is the cause of the 
essence of the Forms” Metaphysics I 988a10 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 506; 1989). Copleston 
further states that in The Republic “Plato speaks of the mind’s approach and access to 
the first principle of the whole, and asserts that the idea of the good is inferred to be ‘the 
universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and the lord of light in 
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this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other’” (Copleston, 1966, p. 177). 
The quotation within the quotation comes from The Republic VII 517c (Plato, 1952r, p. 
389; 1969a) and Copleston concludes that for Plato the one, the good and the beautiful 
are the same, a finding not unlike that of Jackson contained in the “Later Theory of 
Ideas” row of Table 6 on page 118 of this enquiry, and that the forms are derived from 
the one, but not by emanation, that process by which the physical world issues forth 
from the Christian God, emanation being a word not used by Plato.  
The particular nature of the relationship between the one and the Forms is difficult: “the 
Good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power … [and] … it is not 
only the source of intelligibility in all objects of knowledge, but also of their being and 
essence” (Copleston, 1966, p. 178, my square brackets), the quotation being taken from 
The Republic 509a (Plato, 1952r; 1969a, p. 386). Copleston also identifies the beautiful 
of the Symposium with the good of The Republic now in discussion, where, outside of 
the cave, the existing sun, the good, makes the objects of nature visible beings. In The 
Republic the good gives being to the objects of knowledge and is the unifying principle: 
it is an ontological principle of being. Thus the one, the good or beautiful is being per se, 
and the human intellect’s link to it occurs when, finally, the soul beholds the one.  
In essence then, Science is presented as that through which the forms reveal their 
permanent objective status, and the final Science, the soul’s partaking of the one, is 
defined by its function, its partaking activity.  
Who or what then is the one from which the forms take their reality?  
It is not the Demiurge who found the forms ready-made. The Demiurge is the symbol of 
reason, not creation, and Copleston (1966, p. 178) informs that in the Epistle 6 323d2 – 
6 (1999, p. 178) Plato requires that his friends “swear an oath of loyalty in the name of 
the God who is captain of all things present and to come, and of the father of that captain 
and cause” (ibid., p. 178). Following the Preplatonic Plotinus (2010, 5 4 1 516b - 516c, 3 
8 9 352b, 3 8 8 351d) Copleston (1966, p. 465) concludes, with caveats, that the father 
of the captain is Plato’s one or good of The Republic VI, 509a (Plato, 1952r, p. 386; 
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1969a). He argues first that Plato notes that “the father and maker of all this universe is 
past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be 
impossible” Timaeus 28c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 28 - 29, p. 447), and secondly that the 
human approach to the one is dialectical in which mankind’s vision of the good is 
reached through pure intelligence rather than through religious ecstasy. These caveats 
result from a longer subsequent discussion (Copleston, 1966, pp. 176 - 206) in which he 
argues on the basis of his exegesis of Eudemian Ethics, Metaphysics, The Republic, 
Timaeus, Parmenides, Symposium, Phaedrus, Sophist, Theaetetus, Philebus, (Aristotle, 
1935a, 1952d, 1989, 2009; Plato, 1873, 1903d, 1921b, 1921c, 1925d, 1925e, 1925g, 
1925h, 1952m, 1952o, 1952p, 1952r, 1952s, 1952u, 1952v, 1988) that “(a) we are 
certain as to the dialectical approach, and (b) we are uncertain as to any mystical 
approach, while not denying that some passages of Plato’s could be understood as 
implying such an approach, and may possibly have been meant by Plato to be so 
understood” (Copleston, 1966, p. 202). There is ambivalence about the authenticity of 
the Sixth Letter (Alican, 2012, p. 137; Thesleff, 1982, pp. 233 - 235; 1989, pp. 1-26). 
Throughout his argument Copleston, a Jesuit, downplays a Neoplatonic finding of a 
Christian God in Plato as an explanation of Plato’s meaning of the one and father of the 
captain. He stresses again and again that in Plato, access to the real is intellectual not 
sensual, that “Plato refused … as Socrates had before him, to acquiesce in the relativity 
of Science and moral values” (ibid., p. 201), that Plato “undoubtedly believed that 
experience is inexplicable, unless the objective existence of the standards [forms] is 
maintained” (ibid., p. 203, my square brackets), that Plato’s position was not that 
humans “build up a world of our own by clothing it, as it were, from within ourselves” 
(ibid., pp. 204 - 205) but was rather that they pass beyond the sensible world to a world 
of thought, the Transcendental Reality” (ibid., pp. 204 - 205), and that Plato would not 
accept a merely relativistic ethic: there are absolute standards and norms, absolute 
ideals. As a consequence, “man may be brought to the beauty of the formal sciences1, 
and the beauty of the Ideas” (ibid., p. 199) and through that to “‘the science’ of this 
universal beauty of the Good” (ibid., p. 199), so that mankind can, “by rational reflection 
… certainly come to the knowledge of the objective (and indeed transcendentally-
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grounded) values, ideals and ends, and this after all is Plato’s main point” (ibid., p. 206). 
The superscript in the short quotation above refers the reader to a passage in Philebus 
51b – 51d (Plato, 1873, p. 85). In that passage Socrates and Protarchus are speaking of 
absolute beauty and its attendant pleasures, one of many Pythagorean ideas adopted by 
Plato in the Philebus, says Paley, the translator (Plato, 1873, p. 85, footnote 1). Again 
the communication between the immortal soul and the forms is called the final Science. 
As to the one: it is the ontological principle of being and Plato takes us no further. 
In summary, true knowledge, knowledge of what is permanent and unchanging cannot 
be achieved by sense perception alone. The permanent and unchanging exist in the 
forms, and this knowledge can be accessed by intellect, the immortal element of the 
soul. The particulars of the forms, reached imperfectly by humans through the senses, 
permit learning by reminiscence. Exactly how the forms themselves were made, and 
exactly how the soul acquires scientific knowledge of them, that is, the actual 
mechanisms involved, have not yet been adequately addressed.  
I proceed to discuss these two unaddressed questions before attempting a qualified 
answer to Plato’s meaning of Science.  
How were the forms made?  
In Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952g) Plato mythicises that the world was formed out of a 
material so intractable that it could not be completely moulded to the creator’s will. This 
uncontrollable element Plato called necessity Timaeus 48a (Plato, 1925h; 1952g, 48, p. 
455) and it is difficult not to find its origins in the objective natural law imperatives of 
moira carried forward to Homer. The so-called creator gave the world a body of fire, 
water, air and earth Timaeus 31b – 32c (Plato, 1925h; 1952g, p. 448) by imposing 
numbers on the formless chaos, and a soul, whose attributes are motion and intellect 
Timaeus 36e – 37a (Plato, 1925h; 1952g, p. 450). This universe of body and soul, a 
perceivable god Timaeus 92c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 92, p. 477) is an “image of its 
creator, only begotten” (ibid., p. 477), a creator that is mysteriously remote and hard to 
discover and which, after having made the world, “remained in his own accustomed 
130 
 
nature” Timaeus 42 (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, 42 - 43, pp. 453). The mechanism and 
process of creating the forms on which sensible bodies are patterned involves division of 
the one, then mixing numbers combined in various proportions, shaking, bending and a 
whole host of further related transcendent activity which Plato’s Timaeus can only 
explain by comparison, through simile, with earthly procedures such as winnowing and 
their associated mechanisms.  
Timaeus’ mechanical explanation of the manufacturing of the forms should not hide the 
brilliance of Plato’s construct which is that forms consist of numbers generated from 
monad, the one or unity, that the intellect alone can access the forms, that the soul and 
reason consist of numbers, and that mathematics is that which proceeds through 
intellect, not sensible particulars. Timaeus does not spell it out but it is inviting to 
surmise that the mechanism and process by which the one creates the forms is pure 
mathematics, in this case arithmetic and geometry even though arithmetic may not be 
considered as mathematics, let alone pure mathematics by some present day scholars. To 
be sure, the mathematical procedures outlined in Timaeus might well keep 
mathematicians intrigued for some time to come. 
By what actual process or mechanism does the soul partake of the forms? Plato’s answer 
to this question should reveal the very nature of his scientific method. 
As noted on page 129, the attributes given to the world soul are motion and intelligence. 
The world soul causes all the ten motions Laws X, 894a – 896a (Plato, 1952j, pp. 762 - 
763; 1967/68c), the whole plethora of coming to be, being, and ceasing to be, setting 
“thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies” in motion Laws X, 894e (Plato, 1952j, p. 
763; 1967/68c). It causes the motions of the planets Timaeus 36e – 37c (Plato, 1925h; 
1952w, p. 450), which planets are enformed 1  by number. There is again some 
                                                          
1 As the note to Table 5 on page 54 informed, throughout this enquiry to enform is to bring form to matter. Enform is not an alternate 
use of inform. Thus the process of enform-ment is the bringing of form to matter, by which process, hylomorphic being comes to 
exist. 
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transcendent mixing, and bending, and intertwining. At Laws X 896a (Plato, 1952j, p. 
763; 1967/68a) Plato also informs that the world soul causes its own movement. 
Given that the immortal element of the individual soul which in human cognition 
eventually validates the sensible ideas is humankind’s endowment from the world soul, 
and given that the creator of the world soul comprehends both eternal and sensible 
beings, it is again easy to surmise, even though again Timaeus does not spell it out so 
directly, that the mechanism or process by which the individual soul beholds the one, 
and the universal forms which it subsequently employs in noesis, is again pure 
mathematics. If Science is that which partakes of the one and the forms, and if the 
mechanism or process by which it does this is mathematical, and if the sensible objects 
are copies of the forms expressed in numbers, then the claim made by Galileo so many 
years later that “the book of nature is written in mathematics” (Galileo, 1957a, pp. 237 - 
238) might be speculatively found intimated in Plato.   
Insights provided by noted commentators bring perspective to the role Plato attributes to 
noesis. Burns (1911, p. 149) contends that Plato did not precisely explain what he meant 
by creation and along with Adam (1908, p. 373), but in contradiction of Copleston 
(1966, pp. 177 - 178), settles on creation as emanation. He further contends, like 
Copleston and Adam, that Plato’s cosmogony helps to alleviate the conundrum 
presented by an incorporeal God understood as pure thought having to interact with 
objective matter. He cites Caird (1904, ninth Gifford Lecture. n.p.) to explain that the 
world soul “is a kind of bridge to connect two terms [God and matter] which it is 
impossible to unite” (Burns, 1911, p. 150, my square brackets). The relevant location in 
Plato is Timaeus 34b – 35a (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 449).  
Copleston (1966, pp. 207, 210 - 211) further articulates Caird’s bridge idea: the divine 
immortal reason partakes of the forms while the mortal parts, the spirited and 
courageous, and the appetitive, partake of the material corrupted sensual appearances of 
those forms. Copleston adds a qualification. He holds that the manner in which the 
human soul splits itself is not explained in The Republic (Plato, 1952r, 1969b) and adds 
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that in Phaedrus (Plato, 1925e, 1952o) Plato speaks as though all three elements go on 
the journey to the forms together (Copleston, 1966, p. 209).  
Adam (1908, p. 369) too is cautious on the matter of a bridge between forms and 
recognised sensible objects and is not able to find the functioning of the exchange 
explained anywhere by Plato. Adam suggests that the world soul is nothing but divine 
goodness but allows that its presence revives the macrocosm-microcosm link (ibid., p. 
366). He further speculates that the world soul is composed of Otherness, Otherness 
mixed with Sameness, and Sameness (ibid., p. 367) and that the middle component of 
Otherness mixed with Sameness is the mathematics out of which the bridge between the 
unchanging forms, and the changing this-world particulars, is constructed (ibid., pp. 368 
– 370). Such a view fits with the ontological hierarchy reaching from the sensible 
through mathematics to the forms or ideas set out by Plato in his parable of the line 
discussed earlier on page 120.  
Guthrie (1975a, p. 90) articulates the soul’s partaking of the forms by analogy to the 
manner in which an actor interprets the author’s written play but this clever insight does 
not take me far enough. In a discussion about Plato’s use of myth, Stewart (2009, p. 23) 
reminds his readers that participation in myth is itself an intellectual pathway to 
transcendence, if, as Plato’s myth might itself caution, transcendent mortals may be, 
while Voegelin finds the origins of Platonic-Aristotelian Science in myth (Emberley & 
Cooper, 2004a, p. 8). For me, the mechanism and process of the intermingling of the 
human soul with the objective forms remains as opaque as the Demiurge’s interaction 
with the forms themselves is obscure. Irrespective of this impasse I find Plato just so 
brilliant and wonderful.  
For Plato, the ensouled human body’s access to the universal forms of the final Science 
is at the heart of human understanding and learning: Science occurs when, through 
partaking of forms, the soul arrives at knowledge of the beautiful, good and unchanging, 
the permanent, that is, of the that-which-can-be-no-other. Having now completed 
discussion of Plato’s usage of the terms Ethics and Science, and their role in informing  
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Plato’s political philosophy, I turn to conclusion of the chapter in which, inter alia, I 
apply that usage in articulation of the enquiry key terms, and the Thesis Proposition 
Statements. Chapter 1 is followed by the enquiry’s Appendix I as a Coda to Chapter 1 
and is designed to be referred to on a needs basis. It discusses, inter alia, approaches to 
interpreting Plato and other matters which, although they may be considered important 
in themselves, are of general relevance to the integrating pursuit of enquiry goals 
contained in the enquiry chapters. 
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 1 
Plato predicates his work on the human soul being the seat of the moral and intellectual 
dimensions of the human condition. Through introspective reason about the inner 
turmoil known to the majority of mankind, he finds a tri-partite soul, a self-moving 
being, and accepts, after the understandings of the Pythagoreans, that as a breath of the 
world soul, it has a dual existence. An immortal part, nous, communes with the forms or 
ideas understood as incorporeal but objectively existing beings, number constituting 
their essence: and thus is Science begotten. The mortal parts of the soul, spiritedness and 
appetite, commune with the imperfect sensible world. The internal discourse of the soul 
which occurs when the mortal component presents its perceptions to nous for validation 
permits learning as reminiscence.  
 
Table 8: Key Terms Nuance—Plato (BC c. 427 – c. 347) 
  
Key Terms Sequential Articulation of Key Terms Nuance 
Science 
Knowledge of the unchanging or the that-which-can-be-no-other received through beholding of the one and 
the forms. 
Ethics Reason as nous discerning the harmful from the unharmful. 
Polis 
An ideal just and happy gathering or a city of ideas in which classical Greek values prevail and in which truth 
informs reason. 
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Table 9: Progressive Articulation of the Thesis Proposition Statements—Plato (BC c. 427 – c. 347) 
PART ONE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter 
Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition 
Statements 
1 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche 
of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of reason is divine and 
for whom knowledge is power, which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held standpoint that binding sentiment of 
Polis is situated in natural social instinct implanted in mankind for 
whom virtue is some kind of knowledge.  
Chapter 1 
Movement from Religion to Philosophy, 
Emergence of Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Polis is an ideal, just and happy gathering or a city of ideas in which classical Greek values 
prevail and in which truth informs reason. 
Platonic nous is established as a divine element in mankind. 
Virtue qua state of mind is some kind of knowledge. Technical virtue as good-at-what is 
differentiated from moral virtue as absolute goodness per se. To be virtuous in a practical sense 
is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own particular virtue, its taxis and 
cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and 
temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful and the unharmful 
2 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it could bring to society 
and state.  
Chapter 1 
Movement from Religion to Philosophy, 
Emergence of Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Articulation of Metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Science is knowledge of the unchanging or that which can be no other received through 
beholding of the one and the forms. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the 
unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its 
own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s 
own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful 
and the unharmful. 
3 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
Chapter 1 
Movement from Religion to Philosophy, 
Emergence of Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the 
unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its 
own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s 
own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful 
and the unharmful. 
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Plato finds four classical Greek virtues residing in the human soul: wisdom, courage, 
justice, and temperance. He adopts those virtues as templates for his republic of ideas, 
his ideal Polis or gathering that might guide humankind’s chances for a better life. In 
this esoteric Polis humankind might better pursue its arete of happiness with justice, 
achieved through wisdom’s knowledge, and realised when nous, always in obedience to 
its own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding 
one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, discerns between 
the harmful and the unharmful: and thus is virtue Ethics begotten.  
Furthermore, in its work, mankind needs willpower, something like courage combining 
with nous to overcome harmful appetite. Plato’s return to the classical Greek virtues of 
Homer is a return to an Ethics which first revealed itself as a behavioural response to 
objective imperatives of natural law. His reappraisal and subsequent enshrinement of 
classical Greek virtues in the political philosophy of his Polis, his city of ideas, read as 
coeval with, and a shift towards, nomos, and represents an early attempt by a section of 
mankind to supplant brute force with reasoned justice: and thus, in part, is Plato’s 
particular political philosophy qua critical moral evaluation of political society begotten. 
In Plato’s construct, nous, which communicates with the forms, also directs mankind in 
its work. Nous is crucial to learning as reminiscence. Science as the language of the 
intercourse between nous and the forms is coeval with both of them. And from this 
exalted and privileged position it informs, as best it can, an objective Ethics and political 
philosophy of Polis.  
Table 8 on page 133, which catches Plato’s key terms nuance, is extracted from the 
content of this chapter. After a full explanation of enquiry method provided in Chapter 
Two, Platonic nuance of key terms is articulated in more detail under three attributed 
dimensions, method, sphere of operations and constraints, as exemplified in Plato’s case 
on page 185, and thenceforth, chapter by chapter, tables predicated on such dimensions 
summarise nuance sequentially brought to the key terms Science, Ethics, and Polis from 
interpretation of works by milestone western tradition writers discussed in those chapters.  
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Likewise Table 9 on page 134 brings captured key terms nuance to articulation of the 
Thesis Propositions Statements. Such tables, as appropriate, are subsequently placed in 
conclusions to most of the remaining chapters.  
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Appendix I as a Coda to Chapter 1: Approaches to Reading Plato 
In this Coda, which is to be considered as an Appendix conveniently located for 
reference purposes, I comment briefly on approaches to reading Plato sufficient only for 
the purpose of explaining why so-called conservative translations—conservative 
translations being understood as those likely found in Loeb Classical Library and 
Perseus Library Holdings and generally known and respected within time honoured 
strengths and weaknesses caveats attributed to them—are used in this enquiry. More 
venturesome translations like those of say Heidegger and Benardete, although 
occasionally cited, are not widely used, they being in part predicated on translation, 
interpretation and reading constructs considered troublesome for the purposes of this 
enquiry and its method. I include further comments on reading Aristotle in the text of 
Chapter 3. Content addressing Heidegger, Arendt and some of their students is also 
included in this Coda for a more complete understanding of Straussian and other 
approaches to reading Plato while content on Kant is included for a more complete 
understanding of Arendt’s open adducing of Kant to her general argument of political 
action as public praxis. The whole Coda is provided for background purposes and might 
as profitably be accessed on a needs basis when referred to in the text, as read and 
carried forward to the text.  
Press (1993, p. 4) discerns scholarly classifications of modes of interpretive reading of 
Plato fragmenting in the last decade of the twentieth century. The question of how to 
appropriately read Plato has become complex and difficult. During the twentieth century 
so-called Traditionalist interpreters, for example, Crombie, Shorey and Taylor (I. M. 
Crombie, 1962; Shorey, 1933, 1960; A. E. Taylor, 1960, 1978), were named so on the 
basis of perceptions that they engaged dogmatically with Plato through fixed 
interpretations of dialogue lines attributed to Socrates and/or particular interlocutors. 
Their interpretative approach is said to be systematic, as is that of the sometimes-called 
Analytical, Anglo-American and Tubingen School scholars, each of which latter named 
interpretive approaches being recognisable in its twenty-first century forms, yet being 
differentiable from one another on separate if not strictly mutually exclusive grounds.  
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Analytic interpretation, exemplified say by Moore (1903a, 1903b), Vlastos (1954) and 
Sachs (1963), perhaps originating as an 
alternative to turn-of-the-nineteenth-
century idealism and initially placing 
some emphasis on linguistic analysis 
(Drummett, 1996, pp. 4 - 14), has gone 
through a number of phases during the 
twentieth century, pushed and pulled by 
logical positivism, ideal language 
analysis, ordinary language analysis, 
metaphysics and pluralism to exist in a 
condition confounding rigorous definition 
(Glock, 2008, pp. 205 - 211). Glock—his 
own approach mixes analytical and 
continental praxis (ibid., p. 3)—searches 
for, but does not find, essential and 
adequate tenets sufficient for rigorous 
definition of Analytical Philosophy and he 
settles on a club-recognition kind of 
definition based on an idea that 
communicating families of researches 
know analytic interpretation when they 
see it (ibid., 204 – 230). Analytic 
Philosophy he says, is treated as a 
historical unfolding.  
Leiter (2006, pp. 1 - 24) offers a fully Deweyan definition, one knows philosophy when 
one does it. He already provides a classification farewell to Analytic Philosophy: 
It is time to pronounce the “bogeyman” of analytic philosophy laid to rest: so-called 
“analytic” philosophers now include quietists and naturalists; old fashioned metaphysical 
 
Putting a Tag on Analytical and Anglo-American Philosophy 
 
Analytical Philosophy is a persuasion of Western philosophy 
detected in emergence since the turn of the twentieth century. It 
is characterised by rigorous attention to sentence structure and 
analysis of sentence logic, and traces its line from Frege (AD 
1848 – 1925), through Russell (AD 1872 – 1970), Wittgenstein 
(AD 1889 – 1951), Ryle (1900 – 1976) and Rorty (AD 1931 – 
2007), and its associations, in the same name order, with 
analysis of sentence logic, British empiricism qua individual 
experience as a basis for reliable knowledge, Vienna School 
logical positivism, linguistic analysis and post structuralism, 
structuralism being a persuasion that language qua mediator 
between abstract ideas and so-called reality, is a key to 
understanding culture (Leiter, 2006, pp. 1 - 18; Soames, 2003, 
pp. i - xviii; Stroll, 2000, pp. 1 - 10). Soames associates Analytic 
Philosophy as a definable genre with Cambridge University until 
World War II and then Oxford University up to 1975 but 
commences with Russell not Frege whose Basic Laws of 
Arithmetic (Frege, 2013) is associated with the foundation of 
Analytic Philosophy. Anglo-American Philosophy often named 
as philosophy of a kind taught in university departments in such 
countries as England, America, Canada, and Australia—some 
characteristics being “ a focus on small parts of larger issues, 
attention to fine details of the small parts, rigour and 
explicitness, with the latter often facilitated by the use of formal 
methods” (Longworth, 2014, n. p.)—falls under a chapeau of 
Analytical Philosophy. Defining Anglo American and/or 
Analytical Philosophy and Continental Philosophy each in terms 
of the other is increasingly losing clarity as the twenty first 
century progresses.  
 
Schwartz describes an analytical philosopher as one who: 
 
analyses problems, concepts, issues, and arguments. 
She breaks them down into their parts, dissects them, to 
find their important features. Insight comes from seeing 
how things are put together and how they can be prized 
apart; how they are constructed and how they can be 
reconstructed. (Schwartz, 2012, Introduction, n. p.) 
 
He situates Analytical Philosophy in Germany as well as 
England there being Polish, Russian, Korean, Australian, 
Austrian, German and Americans named in his list of Analytical 
Philosophers. Beaney (2013, pp. 61 - 140) gives a list of one 
hundred Analytical Philosophers and a further fifty implicated 
by association or influence. 
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philosophers and, twentieth century linguistic philosophers; historians of philosophy and 
philosophers who show little interest in the history of the field. (Leiter, 2006, p. 11)  
It does appear that readings readily admissible to one named genre may also qualify for 
part membership of other named genres discussed below. For example Vlastos (1973/81, 
1999a, 1999b), who uses analytic 
interpretation methodology, also reveals 
traditionalist and developmentalist 
affinities (Vlastos, 1991) or may even be 
thought of as a genre in his own right. 
Likewise Gaiser (1980), Kramer (1990); 
and Szlezak (1993) as high profile 
Tubingen School members are claimed as 
esoteric interpreters. Annas holds that 
Analytical Philosophy restored ancient 
philosophy to vigour (Annas, 2004, p. 41) 
while Searle (1996, p. 23) claims that 
Analytical Philosophy itself has lost its 
vigour. Leiter (2006, p. 16) writes of a 
takeover of Continental Philosophy by 
Analytical Philosophy since the 1970’s as 
a result of engagements by such writers as 
Taylor (1984), Michael Rosen (1984) and 
Forster (1998 ), while Langdon (2006, pp. 
285 - 303) in her comparison of feminine 
dimensions between the two, there being 
similarities and differences involved, signals amalgamation and convergence. Stanley 
Rosen, in his Reversal of Heidegger (2002) claims that Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche has produced:  
the absurd impression that precision, conceptual clarity, and systematic rigour are the 
property of analytical philosophy, whereas the continentals indulge in speculative 
metaphysics and cultural hermeneutics, or … in wool gathering and bathos … and that no  
 
Putting a Tag on Continental Philosophy 
Leiter and Rosen (2007) find the term Continental Philosophy 
“uninformative at best and misleading at worst” (ibid., p. 3) 
because it fails to categorise philosophers in a mutually 
exclusive manner and, after finding alternative names 
unsatisfactory on the same basis—for example post-Kantian, 
post-Hegelian—proceed to characterise Continental Philosophy 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as an overlapping mix 
of traditions from idealism to Heideggerian existentialism, each 
tradition being a reaction to an earlier one with no one tradition 
necessarily dominant. But such a classification they say does not 
catch hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism and post-
modernism. Continental Philosophy might also be grasped as a 
methodology giving priority to historicism, phenomenology and 
the like over naturalistic philosophy and its glance towards 
method in Science. Prado (2003, p. 10) also differentiates 
Continental Philosophy from Analytical Philosophy on a basis 
of method, the former being synthesis of large questions about 
modernity, history, society and the human condition and the 
latter being analysis and reduction of delineated issues of 
sentence structure, logic, knowledge, and the nature of mind 
into concomitant parts, which leaves open a question of a 
classification for those who employ both analysis and synthesis, 
whether on large or small issues. Rosen (1999, p. 665) identifies 
Continental Philosophy by perceived inherent themes—
rejection of the method of Science as best method for 
investigating phenomena; a penchant for historicism predicated 
on a belief that philosophical argument cannot be interpreted 
apart from the historical context of its emergence; that human 
consciousness can change the conditions of experience through 
concerted action; and metaphilosophy understood as access to 
plural methodologies such as hermeneutics, structuralism and 
critical theory. Glendinning (2006) can find no “internal glue” 
(ibid., p. 3) binding a clearly identifiable Continental 
Philosophy and Critchley, (2001) although explaining 
Continental Philosophy as “an invention, or more accurately a 
projection, of the Anglo-American academy onto a Continental 
Europe” (ibid., p. 32) proceeds, through discussion of perceived 
presences of critique, praxis and emancipation, to characterise 
Continental Philosophy in its continual unfolding as that 
concerned with social behaviour and emancipation in the 
modern world (ibid., p. 54 – 75). The majority of commentators 
situate their discussions of Continental Philosophy in a two-
reactions-to-Kant model. 
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intelligent person is taken in by 
the gestures towards pluralism 
that have presumably rectified 
the situation. (S. Rosen, 2002, 
p. x)  
These wool-gatherers, says 
Rosen, fill a void which 
surrounds the techne of 
Analytical Philosophy. 
Others signal a dimming of 
Analytical Philosophy and 
discuss its transformation into 
post-analytic philosophy 
(Mulhall, 2002)—but not just 
yet in the United Kingdom 
(ibid., p. 250)—and/or 
postmodernist modes of praxis 
(Zuckert, 1996). Zuckert, a 
University of Chicago graduate, 
announced an earlier arrival of a 
post-modernist interpretation 
genre in North America. She 
names Nietzsche AD (1844 – 
1900), Heidegger (AD 1889 - 
1976), Gadamer (AD 1900 – 
2002), Strauss, (AD 1899 – 
1973) and Derrida (AD 1930 – 
2004) Post-Modern interpreters 
on the basis of her claim that for 
each of these writers Plato is the 
defining factor for their thought as a whole and that they return to Plato on the basis that  
 
Putting a Tag on Tubingen School Philosophy 
Tubingen School scholarship here under discussion upholds a contention that it 
is possible to exhume unwritten Platonic doctrines and apply them in 
interpretation of the dialogues. Tubingen scholarship (Findlay, 1974; Gaiser, 
1980, 2012; Kramer, 1990, 2012a, 2012b; Reale, 1996) thus goes beyond 
attempting to adduce Platonic dogmas possibly applying and generally known 
in the Academy. That is, it delineates unwritten doctrines from dogma qua 
maxims of method and/or general pedagogical orientations then possibly extant 
and possibly then generally accepted as givens in the Academy, and conjectures 
such unwritten doctrines to have been revealed by Plato in a lecture or course of 
lectures on the good (D. W. Ross, 1976, pp. 147 - 149), which lectures are 
claimed to have extended the discussion on the good found in Republic 504e – 
509c (Kramer, 2012a, pp. 39 - 64). Thus a unified first philosophy is detectable, 
a key to reading of all of the dialogues. There is severe (Cherniss, 1935, pp. 349 
– 350, 356 - 357) and moderate (Gadamer, 1980a, pp. 124 - 155) questioning 
respectively of Aristotle’s comments on Plato’s possibly inferred separate 
lectures comments (Aristotle, 1936b; 1952n, pp. 288,) and De Anima 404b16 – 
21 (Aristotle, 1952b, pp. 633 - 634; 1957a) and Tubingen unwritten doctrine 
scholarship, Cherniss doubting that Aristotelian commentary on Plato can be 
trusted and Gadamer, upon accepting that what can be learned about Plato’s 
doctrines from a Tubingen School approach can be but “singularly skeletal and 
meager” (1980a, p. 124), continuing on the basis that “the essential core of 
Plato’s dialogue was presented in ongoing didactic discussions which engaged 
the participants for whole days at a time” (ibid.`, p. 126). Vlastos (pp. 397 - 
403) is sceptical towards Kramer’s unwritten doctrine interpretations and 
Brisson (1995b, p. 117), noting in passing the tradition raised already by 
Trendelenberg (1826) and Robin (1908a), sides with Cherniss. Dillon (2003, 
pp. 16 - 22) argues that Aristotle’s comments on Plato’s esoteric writings are 
essential for interpreting Xenocrates and Speusippus but feels no need to 
“postulate a fixed esoteric set of doctrines” (ibid., viii) in the manner of the 
Tubingen School. Mann (2006, pp. 380 – 385, 397) is averse to the Tubingen 
School conviction that the content of Phaedrus and the contested Seventh Letter 
signify an unwritten doctrines tradition.  
 
Plato’s contested Seventh Letter 340 – 345 (Plato or an imitator of Plato, 1952, 
pp. 808 - 811; 1966) and his Phaedrus 274b – 279c (Plato, 1925e; 1952o, pp. 
138-141), inter alia, explore a contention that written word is less meritorious 
than spoken word and Tubingen School scholarship cites such passages as 
evidence in its case for an unwritten Platonic doctrine Kraemer (1990, pp. 3 - 
14; Reale, 1996, pp. 7 - 22). Plato, in a Tubingen School reading, would follow 
the dialogic example in Phaedrus 276e – 277a (Plato, 1925e; 1952o, pp. 139 - 
140) and speak to the living souls rather than write to them. Tubingen School 
Scholars find evidence for unwritten doctrine in Aristotle’s one-phrase 
mentions of unwritten teaching in Physics 209b15 (Aristotle, 1952n, pp. 288; 
Aristotle, 1936 #1571) and lectures on philosophy in De Anima 404b16 – 21 
(Aristotle, 1952b, pp. 633 - 634; 1957a) and elsewhere in sections of writings 
by such persons as Aristoxenus (BC c.335), Alexander of Aphrodisias (AD 
c.200), Simplicius (AD c.490 – c 560, and Sextus Empiricus (AD c160 – 210) 
(Findlay, 1974, pp. 413 - 454) within an “indirect tradition” (Reale, 1990, p. 14) 
of commentary. The indirect tradition is associated with an esoteric or unwritten 
tradition, itself differentiated through juxtaposition with an exoteric writing 
tradition in which Plato’s doctrines are available in the lines of the dialogues, 
not between them. Exoteric writings were for those outside the school and 
esoteric or unwritten but spoken doctrines, for those within the school. For 
example Reale explains the esoteric tradition under discussion as “intra-
Academic, that is as qualifying the doctrine expressed within the Academy, and 
reserved for the followers of the Academy itself” (Reale, 1990, p. 17). At the 
heart of the unwritten doctrine or esoteric Plato scholarship lies a conviction 
that the primary principles of being and emergence of the ideas, orally revealed 
by Plato, may be discerned between the lines of his writings and the comments 
of others. 
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“modern rationalism has exhausted its promise and possibilities” (ibid., p. 1). She claims 
that rather than concentrating on 
reconstructing Plato’s position in 
philosophy they rather adduce 
him to their own projects which 
are projects of contemporary 
political philosophy. Zuckert’s 
cogently expressed argument 
notwithstanding, I find it 
difficult to imagine this group 
seated around a table in simple 
complementary understanding 
predicated on recognition of an 
interpretive reading mode even 
were perceived commonalities 
agreed upon. Williamson (2008) 
claims that “most philosophers 
are neither crude rationalists nor 
crude empiricists, nor these days 
conceptual or linguistic 
philosophers” (ibid., p. 4)—
which really does not say what 
they are—and speculates 
whether some may wonder if 
philosophy has a method at all 
(ibid., p. 3). 
While so-called Continental 
Philosophy might be said to have originated as an Anglophone term to classify French 
and German philosophy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries after Kant 
(AD 1724 – 1804), and thereafter to have survived as a classification on the basis of its 
Brandwood Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues 
Authentic 
Works 
Abbreviation Group Period 
Apology Apol. 1A (Alphabetical order) 
E
arly
 D
ialo
g
u
es 
Charmides Charm.  
Crito Cri. 
Euthyphro Euphr. 
Hippias Minor Hipp. II 
Ion Ion 
Laches Lach 
Protagoras Prot. 
Cratylus Crat. IB Alphabetical Order 
Euthydemus Euthyd.  
Gorgias Gorg. (t) (t) = transitional dialogue 
Hippias Major Lys.  
Lysis   
Menexenus Menex.  
Meno Men. (t)  
Phaedo Phdo. (t)  
Symposium Symp.  
Republic I-IX Rep. I-X II (Chronological Order) 
Middle 
Dial. 
Parmenides Parm.  
Theaetetus  Theaet.  
Phaedrus Phdr.  
Timaeus Tim. (Chronological Order) 
L
ate D
ialo
g
u
es 
Critias Crit.  
Sophist Soph.  
Politicus1 Pol. (Stsm.)  
Philebus Phil.  
Laws I-XII Laws I-XII  
Epinomis Epin.  
Epistles I-XIII Epis. I-XIII (26 dialogues, 13 letters) 
Unauthentic or Suspect Works 
Alcibiades I Alc. I (Alphabetical Order)  
Alcibiades II Alc. II   
Amatores 
(Lovers) 
Amat.   
Axiochus Ax.   
Clitopho Clit.   
Definitions Def.   
Demodocus Dem.   
Eryxias Eryx.   
Hipparchus Hipp.   
Justice Just.   
Minos Min.   
Sisyphus Sis.   
Theages Theag.   
On Virtue Virt. (14 suspect works)  
Notes: 1. Politicus = Statesman.  
Source: Adapted by Ian Eddington of a table constructed by Debra Nails 
(2003, n. p.) from Figure 2 of Brandwood, L. (1976). A Word Index to Plato. 
Leeds: W. S. Maney and Son.  
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opposition to Analytical Philosophy and the latter’s superficial engagement with it 
(Leiter, 2006, p. 12), such understanding is now inappropriate in the light of more 
substantial scholarship which reveals that Continental Philosophy itself had its own 
push-pull development with persuasions such as German materialism, German idealism, 
Marxism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism and post-
structuralism (ibid., p. 12). 
Various minor and not necessarily mutually exclusive genres of interpretation are named 
in the literature. So-called dramatic interpretation is exemplified for example by Arrieti 
(1991). Press (2000, p. 20) calls dramatic interpreters new Platonists characterised by a 
non-dogmatic reading of the dialogues in which features of form, style and the like are 
implicated in correct interpretation, and by questioning the extent to which Socrates, 
Athenian and Eleatic strangers and major voice participants such as Timaeus speak for 
Plato. Press (ibid) assembles contributions from established scholars on various aspects 
of this question.  
So-called esoteric interpretation, accepts a possibility that Plato’s most closely guarded 
doctrines were not written down but were occasionally revealed to certain groups. 
Findlay (1974, 1976) and Giovanni Reale (1996) are considered representatives of this 
group and are also named associates of the Tubingen School. So-called Neoplatonic 
interpretation, also associated with esotericism, is differentiated by its focus on 
unfolding of the creation in Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w) and the nature of Plato’s 
ideality. Dillon (J. M. Dillon, 1977, 2003) and Merlan (1968) are associated with this 
genre. 
So-called Unitarian readings, centred on Theaetetus, (Plato, 1921c, 1952v) and initially 
scaffolded by a now-contested Brandwood (1990/2009) classification of Platonic 
dialogues, proceed on a premise that there are no contradictions on such issues as 
existence of the forms or mortality of the soul across the dialogues. Such a stance seems 
to have lost prominence as the twentieth century progressed. Some scholars of Unitarian 
interpretation, for example Chapel (2005) and Sedley (2004), although they refute  
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Cornford’s stance on Unitarianism , do so in a manner not fatal to it. Others (F. M. 
Cornford, 1967; McDowell, 1973; Owen, 1965), by contrast dubbed Revisionists, 
proceed on a premise that Plato’s works did not escape amendment and retraction. 
Robinson (1950) and Runciman 
(1962) defend revisionism. 
Beversluis (2004) challenges a 
standard reading of the early 
dialogues as one in which those 
defeated in debate with Socrates, 
hapless in their ignorance of their 
own confessed specialisations, return 
to their daily lives none the better for 
their experience, and replaces it with 
a view that some of the questions the 
interlocutors ask Socrates are 
perceptive questions deserved to be 
asked. Cormack (2006) argues that a 
Unitarian reading, rather than a 
historical or developmental reading 
“is the best way to account for 
consistent ethical views found 
throughout Plato’s early and middle-
period dialogues” (ibid., p. 3). Others named developmentalists Brandwood (1992) 
1992, Kahn (2002), Thesleff (1997) of various persuasions, not unlike like those so-
called revisionists, share a view that Plato’s views change during the course of the 
dialogues, developmentalism itself being closely associated with chronology and the 
theory of forms and debates about them (Irwin, 2008; C. H. Kahn, 1966; Owen, 1953; 
Ryle, 1939; Shorey, 1960).  
Another group, very influential and labelled Straussian, named as a result of its members 
having been taught by Leo Strauss (AD 1899 - 1973) and/or by one of his students or by 
 
Straussian, Tubingen School and Enquiry Usage of the Terms 
Esoteric and Exoteric 
 
Straussian 
Esoteric: a persecution and art of writing idea that ancient writings may 
be appreciated at a second level of understanding hidden beneath literal 
meaning of written words but detectable through clues found in 
associated dimensions, for example speaker order, attribution of key 
ideas to speakers, portraying speakers as representatives of specific 
causes, location and setting, metaphor and image trope and the like.  
Exoteric: meaning discerned from the face of the words themselves. 
 
Tubingen School 
Esoteric: a conviction that primary principles of being and emergence 
of the ideas were revealed by Plato in a lecture or course of lectures on 
the good and may be discerned between the lines of his writings and the 
comments of others so that it is possible to exhume unwritten Platonic 
doctrines and apply them in interpretation of the dialogues. Plato’s 
unrecorded lectures are claimed to have extended the discussion on the 
good found in Republic 504e – 509c. 
Exoteric: acceptance that Plato’s doctrines are available in the lines of 
the dialogues, not between them, exoteric writings being for those 
outside the school and esoteric or unwritten but spoken doctrines, for 
those within the school. 
 
Enquiry Usage 
Esoteric: of ideas as opposed to materiality, thus Plato’s city of ideas is 
esoteric and Pericles’ beautiful Athens is exoteric. Likewise Plato’s 
Science qua soul’s beholding of forms is esoteric while his own reliance 
on watertightness to explain the soul’s imprisonment, or Anaximander’s 
explanation of earthquakes in terms of physical elements rather than 
gods is exoteric Science.  
Exoteric: actual as sensed rather than ideal as thought about, the making 
or doing of, rather than the thinking of alone.  
 
Mutual exclusivity dimensions of enquiry methodology’s employment 
of an esoteric/exoteric divide are further discussed on pages 186 and 
189. 
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being associated with works by him, for example (L. Strauss, 1952/88, 1959, 1963, 
1963/87, 1964, 1966, 1968/1989a, 1968/1989b, 1973, 1987, 1989, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2004, 1985; L Strauss & Cropsey, 1987), exhibit a range of individual interests and 
interpretive stances.  
Strauss’s own intense enigmatic writing, with its changes in direction which arrest one 
between and within sentences, is beautifully simple in diction yet its meaning is often 
elusive and difficult to settle on. Even most dedicated scholarship is uncertain about the 
“fundamental intentions which guided Strauss” (Pangle, 1985, p. 1) and, given this and 
the diverse independence of mind and approach displayed in works of some of his 
students mentioned subsequently in the present context, it is a wonder if rigorous and 
enduring definition of a Straussian genre might ever eventuate. Yet each of his now-
illustrious students mentioned in the next paragraph deals in their own way in Straussian 
currency of crises in liberal education and liberal democracy, sparking tension between 
Jerusalem and Athens, ancient versus modern, differences amongst political philosophy, 
political science and political economy, and issues about the nature of Platonic eros.  
Besides Strauss himself (AD 1899 - 1973), who accepts a persecution and art of writing 
kind of concealed-message writing containing exoteric, or surface, and esoteric, or 
between the lines levels of meaning (L. Strauss, 1952/88, pp. 7 – 21, 36, 22 - 27; 1989, 
pp. 63 - 71; 1998, pp. 221 - 232), leading scholars associated with a so-called Straussian 
genre are Benardete (AD 1930 – 2001)—(1984, 1989/92, 1991/2009, 1993/2009, 1997, 
2000a); Rosen (AD 1929 - )—(1967, 1969, 2005); Bloom (AD 1930 – 1992)—(1987, 
1993, 1968b; 2001); Mansfield (AD 1932 - )—(1978, 1989, 1996, 1998); and Kojève 
(AD 1902 – 1968)—(1964, 2000). Fortin and Gadamer let Strauss’s persecution and art 
of writing approach pass as an “esoteric mode of writing or what you call ‘conscious 
distortion, camouflage and concealment’” (Gadamer, 1984, p. 488), Gadamer referring 
to it as talmudic or rabbinical presence in Strauss (ibid., p. 8). Altmann refers to it as 
kabbalistic exegesis, akin to “pure speculation that few will follow in a credulous mood 
(Altmann, 1964, pp. 260 - 261): well now! The distinction I make between usage of the 
terms exoteric and esoteric for enquiry methodology purposes and their usage in 
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Straussian and/or Tubingen School literature summarised in a text box on page 143 is 
further articulated on pages 186 to 189 of Chapter 2.  
Benardete, Rosen and Bloom reach out from philosophy to life matters through poetic 
and dramatic muses, Kojève and Mansfield too, but in recognisably different ways, 
Mansfield being sometimes a little more direct and raw in his leanings from political 
philosophy to questions of training for executive office. Kojève holds that liberal 
democracy completely satisfies mankind’s need for recognition, which need for 
recognition had previously driven various stages of history (Bloom, 1969, pp. ix - xii; 
Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3; 1992, pp. 65 - 68; Kojève, 1973, pp. 123, 132, 137, 141, 145, 152 
- 154; Nichols, 2007, p. 81). Kojève, in a historical well-rounded kind of Hegelian, 
Marxist and French-Revolution articulation, develops his own end of history 
conclusions. Kojève’s celebrated Paris lectures on Hegel’s thought are, inter alia, an 
outcome of his study of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind (Hegel, 2010) over and 
over again, line by line, for more than six years (Bloom, 1969, p. ix). Irrespective of 
their shades of difference and styles of writing and philosophical orientations, when so-
called Straussians lunge they do so with fine on-point focus. 
Benardete acknowledges Strauss’ influence on his thinking (2000a, pp. 407 – 417), and 
his close anecdotal observations about Strauss reveal his personal understandings of 
Strauss and other Straussians (2002, pp. 5 – 54, 85 - 100). Benardete’s work is in the 
process of being assembled and scholars are now attempting to come to grips with his 
sometimes challenging readings of Plato. One suggested line of enquiry (Davis, 2015, 
pp. 1 - 5) is to pursue Benardete’s possible similarities and differences to Strauss by 
beginning with analysis of such works as Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic 
(1989/92)—duly noting its origins as a review of Strauss’s City and Man (L. Strauss, 
1964)—and to proceed from there to engagement with such early Benardete works as 
The Being of the Beautiful: Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman (1984), including 
revisions of it, and The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey (1997) and 
then on to his Plato’s Laws: The Discovery of Being (2000b) and finally to his collected 
essays (Benardete, 2000a), to discern Benardete’s own possible deep-writing secret, his 
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Herodotean poet muse. Benardete appears his own Plato, wrought between philosophy 
and poetry, and set on his own sailing in search of a city of forms not available in human 
affairs because it does not exist there. In such a context Benardete is presented as one 
unravelling the argument within the action. The action of a piece of writing such as a 
Platonic dialogue is communicated both literally in words, and structurally through 
speaker hierarchy, setting, order, and related dialogical details, and the argument in the 
action itself holds the key to understanding the argument of the writing as a whole, if 
such an argument might exist. In this sense Benardete’s reading is Straussian. 
Nevertheless scholars are careful to note that early Benardete does not always look so 
different from late Benardete (Davis, 2003, p. 32).  
Berger (2013, n. p.) elucidates an example of Benardete’s application of his argument-
of-and-in-the-action-approach. The suggested deliberate discrepancy between justice as 
doing no harm, doing the right thing, minding one’s own business given in The Republic 
423c-d (Benardete, 1989/92) and justice subtly changed to minding one’s own business 
well in the Republic 426b-c (ibid.) allows Benardete to conjecture that, whereas through 
all participants performing their tasks well, the city might be a perfectly just city it may 
not necessarily be a perfectly good city and this follows because for Plato philosophy, 
not political justice, is the arbiter of the philosophic good. Such a rift provides an 
opportunity for a reading-between-the-lines of the argument in the action of the 
dialogue. Benardete uses the perfect-city-qua-political-justice versus perfect-city-qua-
philosophy divide to challenge conventional arguments that Plato seriously held the 
existence of a separate world of forms and whether Socrates’ so-called perfectly just city 
of speech might serve in any way at all as a guide for matters public.  
Rosen’s reading of ancient philosophy is a kind of basis from which he draws an 
optimistic Platonic eros and yet, while admitting he uses Straussian interpretive method, 
Rosen differentiates himself from Strauss and Straussians (2001, n. p.) having little 
affinity with noble lie hegemony. Rosen says that of the three levels of text Strauss 
allows—surface, intermediate, where Rosen thinks that Strauss thought matters were 
worked out, and deep, containing open unsolvable problems—whereas Strauss mainly 
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concentrated on levels one and two, he, Rosen mainly concentrates on level three 
problems, a startling statement which might instigate lively contestation with his 
illustrious classmates were they alive to read it. Rosen is uncomfortable with the idea of 
so-called genres of interpretation but does allow that form and structure are of 
importance, and intimates that Straussian heterodoxy of recent years is now a kind of 
orthodoxy (ibid). Plato’s The Republic (1952r, 1969a) is for Rosen something of a satire 
on utopia which provides humans with an opportunity to think about political 
philosophy and its contribution to good governance. He finds in Gadamer and 
Friedlander attention to dialogical form and structure sufficient to associate them with 
the interpretive method of the Neoplatonists (S. Rosen & Bai, 2001, n. p.).  
Audio-recordings of lectures by Strauss (1973) and Bloom (1983a, 1983b) are available. 
Their delivery styles are different—Strauss lectures as he writes, speaking in something 
of a monotone as though he were reading from any one of his works. Bloom appears to 
extemporise a little say, for example, from the already captivating kind of writing to be 
found in Plato’s Symposium in Love and Friendship (Bloom, 1993) and with perhaps 
more theatricality and own-the-audience-stagecraft one may imagine from listening. 
Evidently it was standing room only in Bloom’s cigar-and-all-lectures, yet Gadamer 
notes Rustow’s being “utterly captivated by …[Strauss’s] charm, … wit, and the 
elegance of his presentation” (Gadamer, 1984, p. 2, my square brackets) of a lecture 
Strauss delivered at Marburg. Both Bloom’s writing and lectures on Plato exemplify his 
Straussian-method attention to structure, form, allocated speaking roles and the like, and 
his political philosophy, through literary criticism, leads to social criticism for his times, 
as is clearly exemplified by his treatment in Love and Friendship (Bloom, 1993) of 
longing, loneliness and isolation and his Closing of the American Mind (Bloom, 1987) 
treatment of perceived issues afflicting liberal education.  
Mansfield’s literary approach sometimes appears just a little more acerbic than that of 
Bloom. Mansfield, like his fellow Straussians, distinguishes political philosophy from 
political Science—a distinction central to the formation of the Straussian movement 
around 1955 (Benardete & Burger, 2002, p. 46; Pangle, 2006, pp. 43 - 68)—which 
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political Science, like one may also claim for economics and psychology as disciplines, 
he intimates has in error travelled a road of pseudo-positive Science. Mansfield views 
political philosophy as applying to analysis of every-day practical life conditions of 
P(p)olis, although he allows its efficacy for matters of Polis as well, his focus being 
mainly from Machiavelli forward beaconed by questioning about, and distillation of, 
right preparation for executive power through taming of Machiavellian soul (Mansfield, 
1993), recovery of thumos (Mansfield, 2007), and understanding of both the good and 
bad conditions of manliness (Mansfield, 2006), which latter work has won him little 
admiration from feminists. 
Kojève links to Straussians through a Hegel dimension, and for Kojève applied 
philosophical thought underpinned his own performance of civil and diplomatic duties 
on behalf of the French government in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
negotiations in particular, and European Economic Community matters in general. In his 
debate with Strauss on the nature of tyranny and an underlying human condition which 
might inform it, Kojève’s muse is historical—he settles on a kind of negative desire 
within a Hobbes-Hegel-Heidegger political anthropology, a desire abhorring non-being 
and reaching to others in search of recognition that will quench it (Pippin, 1993, p. 148). 
Strauss’s muse is philosophical—humans require the cooperation of others, and 
therefore relate to others in an internal and private search for completeness equivalent to 
eternal possession of the good (ibid., p. 148). Scholars that might also be included in 
respect of a so-called Straussian interpretive genre, namely, Joseph Cropsey (AD 1919 – 
2012), Michael Davis (born AD 1943), Ronna Burger (born AD 1947), Thomas Pangle 
(AD born 1944) and Mary Nichols (born AD unknown date) are not discussed in this 
Coda.  
Strauss’s influence also reaches to scholars engaging with Late Mediaeval and Early 
Modern writers and the Zuckerts, (2006, p. 29) provide a full list of such scholars. 
Strauss’s focus is said to have been on political philosophy per se (Benardete & Burger, 
2002, p. 177; S. Rosen & Bai, 2001, n. p.; Zuckert, 2006, p. 30) but this has not 
prevented his being owned and disowned in popular press controversy exemplified by 
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name calling between so-called Neoconservatives and others during and following the 
Regan presidency years (Lobe, 2003, n. p.; Spengler, 2003, p. 1; Thompson, 2011, n. p.). 
Such exchanges, emerging as they do from the cut and thrust of everyday party 
competition and ideology and interesting in their own ways, are often expressed in glib 
raw polemic, anathema in style to that of Straussian political philosophy. 
There are now Straussians, Neostraussians, Neocons and Leocons, East Coast 
Straussians, Mid-West Straussians and West Coast Straussians. Such clear cut nominal 
distinctions on paper, when used to demarcate political Science polemicists from one 
another, or distinguish political philosophers from day to day political rhetoricians, are 
not always necessarily without application problems. 
Strauss does barb out from his sanctuary of political philosophy (L. Strauss, 1959, p. 
223; 1968/1989b, p. 8) and the root cause of 
his reported many falling outs with 
colleagues is yet, if ever, to be fully 
documented. Scholarly analysis of links 
between Straussian muse and so-called 
Neoconservative praxis are emerging 
(Hawse, 2006; Xenos, 2008). That Strauss 
was all so cocooned in a political 
philosophy citadel is a scholarly insight now 
coming under inspection.  
There are reported historical big-life-event, 
as well professional and personal 
connections, between Strauss and Hannah 
Arendt. Their Jewish ethnicity and refugee status, students-of-Heidegger legacy 
including ongoing respect for their former teacher’s mind, their New School and 
University of Chicago residencies and common but differently understood interest in 
political philosophy, however defined, are documented (Beiner, 1990, p. 238). The 
 
Strauss on Widening the Gap Between Ancients and 
Moderns 
Modern political philosophy’s rejection of natural right 
exemplified by writers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and 
Locke has put modernity on a path to nihilism (L. Strauss, 
1999, p. 5). Following Machiavelli, Hobbes made necessity, 
not moral resolve, the basis for action (ibid., 179) and 
Locke, although different on surface appearances, differs 
only in degree about the need for absolute rule (ibid. 251). 
Rousseau (AD 1712 – 1778) and Burke (AD 1729 – 1797) 
unintentionally widened the gap between ancient and 
modern (ibid, 252 - 324). There is contestation upon 
contestation of Straussian claims such as these. (Lenzner, 
2009) for example finds three Burkes in Strauss and 
describes Strauss’ treatment of two of them, “messy” (ibid., 
318). Zuckert (2002, pp. 169 - 202), while sympathetic to 
Strauss’s reading of Locke as Hobbesian, declares Strauss 
defeated on that front, notes the Cambridge School’s 
historicist-approach rejection of an esoteric and pro-Hobbes 
reading of Locke, and in turn questions the Cambridge 
School’s own methodology (ibid 2 – 4). Major (2005, pp. 
477 - 485) notes the Cambridge School’s influence on 
political thought in the United States and in exegesis of 
Skinner (1969) and Strauss (1952/88) concludes that 
Strauss is closer to historicity than the work of the 
Cambridge scholars might suggest. Wootton (2003, pp. 8 - 
10) interprets Skinner’s Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas (Skinner, 1969) an epitome of both. 
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diamond cut diamond or perhaps diamond cut ruby nature of Heidegger-Arendt sexual 
and psychological entanglements appears more discussed than Strauss’s contested 
wooing of Arendt (Berkowitz, Keenan, & Katz; Hyman & Moore, 1997; Young-Bruehl, 
2004, p. 98) and subsequent apparent lasting bitterness perhaps exacerbated by her 
assessment of his assessment of National Socialism (Young-Bruehl, 2004, p. 98) and the 
popularity of her lectures. Yet it is a wonder that there has not been a Marxist analysis of 
Heidegger-Arendt entanglement in the manner of psychopathy types discussed by say 
Fromm (1973/1992, pp. 210 - 474) in his The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness 
(1973/1992) or for that matter in a chariot-metaphor tightly argued eros-battle 
framework, or a-reason-is-the-slave-of-the-passions (Hume, 2012, p. 3 3) come somatic-
marker (Damasio, 1995, pp. 165 - 204) variation on that theme. Damasio, a Spinozist 
neuroscientist, like Hume the philosopher, enhances the status of emotions in matters of 
consciousness and action, and argues that learning is substantially compromised unless 
reason is subsequently involved in reflection of somatically stored feeling operating at a 
higher level than mindless homeostatic emotion. There is a substantial divide between 
emotion qua homeostatic regulation in biological systems regulating life within a body 
within an electrochemical system of rewards and punishments management of drives 
and motivations, as Damasio initially defines emotion, and the management of emotions 
by self in mind, emotions like, anger, jealously and the like which humans later deal 
with. The former mindless homeostasis does, though, according to Damasio underwrite 
the latter as Damasio explains (2010, pp. 38, 51 - 52) and generally in Part 1 of his book 
(ibid., pp. 2 – 62).  
Ettinger reads Arendt’s essay version (Arendt, 1978a, pp. 293 – 294) of her birthday 
tribute speech as apologetic of the Magician of Messkrich (Ettinger, p. 11), Arendt’s fox 
(M. T. Jones, 1998, p. 165), the Führer-Rector of Freiburg University (Farías, 1987, p. 
39) who cleansed that university in accordance with Nazi requirements. Taminiaux 
downplays Ettinger’s reading of Arendt-Heidegger relationships claiming that Arendt’s 
Human Condition (Arendt, 1998) and Life of the Mind (Arendt, 1971/1978, 1978b) 
“reveal at every page, not at all a dependency upon Heidegger … but rather a constant, 
and increasingly ironic, debate with him” (Taminiaux, 1997, p. ix). Some in turn may 
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read Villa, who says that Arendt’s idea of action is informed by Heidegger rather than 
Aristotle (Villa, 1995, p. 4), as an apologist for both Heidegger and Arendt, while others 
may take exception to Villa’s being so interpreted. Villa:  
think[(s) that] Ettinger gets it wrong in portraying Arendt as a dupe of Heidegger. She 
respected him as a giant in the history of Western thought, and she was influenced by him, 
but she wasn't uncritical. In her last book, she expressed her distrust of philosophy as pure 
thinking divorced from moral and political judgment. (Villa quoted in Honan, 1995, p. 26, 
my square brackets)  
 
Villa says that “Heidegger was an ordinary German … who believed the Nazi line and 
… was perhaps self-deluded, but he was not part of the apparatus of killing. He hurt 
some Jews but he also helped some. He was not unique" (ibid., p. 26). Feelings run 
strong and in any event with publications like those of Farías and Wolin (Farías, 1987; 
Wolin, 1990, 1995) and/or at a deeper level by Rosen (2002), it is clear that a more 
considered partial dismantling, if not attempted demolition of Heidegger, has begun at a 
number of levels.  
Many of the reported all too human forays outside of a divine striving of contemplative 
mind, by Strauss, well known Straussians, and Arendt—here collectively assembled, and 
running to claims of racism against Sephardic Jews, petty exchanges about Bloom’s not 
quite so top-notch intellect, Strauss’ sarcasm and jealousy, Bellow’s dislike of Arendt, 
Cropsy’s continuingly-felt Straussian cold shoulder, questions of homosexuality—are 
available (Benardete & Burger, 2002; Bloom, 1974; A. Gilbert, 2009; S. Rosen & Bai, 
2001; Young-Bruehl, 2004) but these issues, although relative for psychological and 
sociological readings of Straussian, Heideggerian and Arendtian engagements with 
philosophy in general, and Plato in particular, will not be pursued further. Arendt’s view 
of such approaches is unflattering. Such approaches, which purport to see through the 
subject and reveal more about “the subject than the subject knew about herself or is 
willing to reveal … [are what she would call] the pseudoscientific apparatuses of depth-
psychology, psycho-analysis, graphology, etc., [which] fall into … [a] category of 
curiosity seeking”, (Arendt quoted in Weissberg, 1957/2000, p. 5, my square brackets). 
Arendt’s context and connotation of curiosity seeking is interesting, coming as it does  
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from one who predicates practical action on a public space agon struggle, participative 
interest being difficult to imagine in the first place in the absence of 
curiosity. Arendt herself, in a TV interview likely made in 
Germany before 1967, it being in monochrome, says categorically 
already approximately in her sixty-first year that she is not a philosopher (Arendt, 2013, 
pp. 1: 15 – 11: 50) and that she wants “to look at politics with an eye unclouded by 
philosophy” (ibid., 4:08 – 4: 09). The philosopher she says may be neutral in matters of 
natural Science but not in matters of politics. She associates philosophy with thinking 
man and politics with action man and claims that except for Kant all philosophers carry 
an enmity towards politics (ibid., 3: 45). 
Beiner (1990, p. 239) names Arendt as the latest member of a tradition running from 
Machiavelli (AD 1469 – 1567) to Heidegger (AD 1889 – 1976) in which scholars extol 
ancient political praxis qua action in practical philosophy at the expense of ancient 
political theory involving philosophical wisdom’s patronage of practical wisdom after 
the manner discussed on pages 232 to 251 of this enquiry. Arendt appears to eschew a 
view that practical wisdom has to be referred to, and countenanced by philosophical 
wisdom—a possible explanation in its own right for Beiner’s claim of disinterest 
between her and Strauss. Beiner reads Arendt’s Human Condition (Arendt, 1958/1988) 
as a demonstration of Arendt’s preference for practical philosophy yet it is ironic that in 
her tribute to Heidegger on his eightieth birthday Arendt tints him a Thales-in-the-well 
figure of possible distracted philosophical virtue in her perhaps possible canard against a 
flawed Periclean action-man portraiture, yet Pericles too as exemplary of good action is 
not without his critics anyway. For that matter there may well also have been a practical 
side to Thales, said to have profited through strategic renting and re-renting of olive 
presses Politics 1259a5 – 25 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 453), an anecdote repeated by 
Aristotle as much to demonstrate superiority of philosophy over action as to denigrate a 
common practise of monopoly. Whether or not Thales was a man renowned in both 
theoretical and practical philosophy, the point being made here is that Arendt the 
actionist placed the contemplative above the practical in a fortiori softening Heidegger’s 
reported active Nazi affiliations. Arendt in this may well have cut herself with 
Agon = contest or struggle 
in a sense of improvement 
through resolution of 
conflict in human society 
as discussed on page 165. 
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Aristotelian scissors bladed by practical wisdom’s referral to, and assessment by, 
philosophical wisdom, the highest of the intellectual virtues.  
Arendt’s argument appears Heideggerian and Stanley Rosen argues that “Heidegger’s 
continuous attempt in the Sophist lectures to transform phronesis into a crucial element 
in the ontology of human existence” (S. Rosen, 2004, p. 249) is a mistake and that “here 
and elsewhere, Aristotle saw things more clearly than Heidegger” (ibid., p. 249). 
Taminiaux (1996, p. 215) also depicts Arendt as arguing that the life of the Greek city 
state is a phenomenon of practical action, bios 
politikos, and that from Plato (BC c. 427 – c. 
347) to Heidegger (AD 1889 – 1976) there has 
been a promotion of bios theoretikos over and 
above bios politikos. As earlier mentioned 
Heidegger, before Arendt, associates Aristotle’s 
establishment of Ethics as a Science with a false 
hierarchy of theoretical philosophy over practical philosophy (Heidegger, 1997, pp. 232 
- 233) and links the actions of great statesmen with the highest order of being 
(Heidegger, 1959, p. 62). Arendt’s step to bios politikos is a big one and to accomplish it 
she adduces Kant to her project. 
Arendt reads Kant as the first 
modern to challenge the supremacy 
of theoretical philosophy, through 
which challenge she establishes bios 
politikos as a defence against a 
human condition sense of loneliness 
and longing perhaps, in her own 
case, revealed through a possible 
noetic identification of it, loneliness 
and longing, exemplified in her attempted slipping-into-the-skin-of examination 
 
Bios Theoretikos and Bios Politikos 
 
Bios theoretikos signifies theoretical wisdom’s 
contemplation of the unchanging and its attendant 
sophia.  
 
Bios politikos signifies political life or active life in 
the communal space of the P(p)olis occurring through 
mankind’s acting there with others of his species. 
When such interaction is predicated on a search for a 
good life bios politikos involves practical wisdom’s 
action as phronesis.  
 
 
Arendt’s Definitions of Work and Labour 
Arendt distinguishes labour ponein which makes the products essential 
for life, food and clothes, which labour she brands non-productive to 
distinguish it from work poiesis, which produces the more durable goods 
which make up her world, schools, museums, literature, artworks and the 
like. Her classification (Arendt, 1998, pp. 80 then 80 - 92), based on 
etymology and grammar and reference to Locke’s distinction of laboring 
body (painful slave-like-animals-pulling-ploughs-work), and working 
hands at craftsman-like activity, is idiosyncratic. Arendt introduces the 
word ergazesthai = work to further differentiate painful work from work 
of the craftsman, ponein but this brings little further clarification. There is 
a similar discussion in Charmides 163a-c (Plato, 1952b; 1992b, pp. 73 - 
74, footnotes 36 and 37) where ergazesthai = working is distinguished 
from making = ponein and doing = prattein. In her adduction Arendt 
places emphasis on enduring distinctions between work as toil and work 
as craftsmanship in various European languages, for example travailler 
(toil) and ouvrer (craft).  
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(Weissberg, 1957/2000, p. 4), of the life of Rachel Varnhagen (Arendt, 1957/2000, p. 4), 
and possibly put there in the first place through her own experience of powerful 
political, racial and early-life erotic-battle experience. Humans may, however, claim 
dignity through practical action. Arendt’s P(p)olis—it cannot easily be a capital P 
esoteric Polis in the sense of esoteric used in this enquiry—is no city of ideas but rather 
a Periclean P(p)olis in which the human condition is one of action (praxis), work 
(poiesis) and labour (ponein) characterized by distinctions between rulers and ruled and 
private and public. 
It is no simple matter to adduce Kant in part or in whole to one’s particular project nor 
for that matter to attempt a brief articulation of Kant of a kind 
which now follows. Yet some minimal working summary of Kant 
is required to serve as a backdrop to further discussion of Arendt’s 
adduction of elements of Kant to her agon. In consequence, before proceeding further in 
discussing Arendt’s adduction of Kant, I provide a brief discussion of Kant’s system in 
general, and his practical reason in particular. This discussion continues until page 165 
where I return to Arendt’s adduction of Kant. 
Brief Explanation of Kant’s So-called Transcendental Philosophy 
Kant conjectures that understanding results from reason at work in judgement, and 
reason so defined is that cogitation implicated in discerning (1) truth, inherent in human 
understanding, (2) goodness, inherent in practical action, and (3) beauty, inherent in 
aesthetics, these three divisions, generally and respectively being articulated in three 
works Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1952c), Critique of Practical Reason (Kant, 
1952b) and Critique of Judgement (Kant, 1952a) which might be thought of as 
constituting his project of transcendental criticism by which name Kant’s philosophy is 
now generally known. Judgement forms a middle term between reason and 
understanding in both pure and practical reason (Kant, 1952c, p. 461).  
Transcendental philosophy may be understood as deduction of those elements which 
constitute the conditions for knowledge itself.  
Agon = contest or struggle 
in a sense of improvement 
through resolution of 
conflict in human society 
as discussed on page 165. 
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In the case of (1) above, truth inherent in human understanding, which is the realm of 
Kant’s empirical knowledge, these 
conditions of knowledge itself are 
found to be the a priori forms of time 
and space which accommodate 
sensation, the categories, which 
accommodate judgement at its work in 
discerning and comprehending truth, 
and the ideas which accommodate 
judgement at its work of enumerating 
and systematising made judgements 
into a unified whole. The a priori forms 
time and space, the categories and the 
ideas are the essence of pure reason 
itself—that part of reason having no 
origin in experience. 
In particular, in the realm of empirical 
knowledge, the ideas do not allow 
mankind to reach the transcendent, that 
lying beyond mental phenomena. 
Kant’s position is that while all 
empirical knowledge may well begin 
with experience, it does not follow that 
all knowledge arises out of experience 
alone. In respect of (2) above, the realm 
of practical reason and human morality, 
the ontological precondition is the toughness of moral consciousness and for (3) above, 
judgement operating through taste in aesthetic discernment between differing desires 
and pleasures, it is the beautiful. That is to say, taken respectively, oughtness and the 
beautiful are to practical reason, and to judgement aestheticized as discerned taste, what  
 
Hegel on Kant’s Transcendental Criticism 
To mention one example only of big barbarous expressions, Kant 
calls his philosophy (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 19) a 
Transcendental philosophy, i.e. a system of principles of pure 
reason which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements in 
the self-conscious understanding, without occupying themselves 
with objects or inquiring what universality and necessity are; this 
last would be transcendent. Transcendent and transcendental have 
accordingly to be clearly distinguished. Transcendent mathematics 
signifies the mathematics in which the determination of infinitude 
is made use of in a preeminent degree: in this sphere of 
mathematics we say, for instance, that the circle consists of an 
infinitude of straight lines; the periphery is represented as straight, 
and since the curve is represented as straight this passes beyond 
the geometric category and is consequently transcendent. Kant, on 
the contrary, defines the transcendental philosophy as not a 
philosophy which by means of categories passes beyond its own 
sphere, but one which points out in subjective thought, in 
consciousness, the sources of what may become transcendent. 
Thought would thus be transcendent if the categories of 
universality, of cause and effect, were predicated of the object, for 
in this way men would from the subjective element 'transcend' into 
another sphere. We are not justified in so doing as regards the 
result nor even to begin with, since we merely contemplate 
thought within thought itself. Thus we do not desire to consider 
the categories in their objective sense, but in so far as thought is 
the source of such synthetic relationships; the necessary and 
universal thus here receive the significance of resting in our 
faculties of knowledge. But from this faculty of knowledge Kant 
still separates the implicit, the thing-in-itself, so that the 
universality and necessity are all the time a subjective 
conditionment of knowledge merely, and reason with its 
universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the 
truth(1). For it requires perception and experience, a material 
empirically given in order, as subjectivity, to attain to knowledge. 
As Kant says, these form its "constituent parts"; one part it has in 
itself, but the other is empirically given (2). When reason desires to 
be independent, to exist in itself and to derive truth from itself, it 
becomes transcendent; it transcends experience because it lacks 
the other constituent, and then creates mere hallucinations of the 
brain. It is hence not constitutive in knowledge but only 
regulative; it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold. But 
this unity on its own account is the unconditioned, which, 
transcending experience, merely arrives at contradictions. In the 
practical sphere alone is reason constitutive. The critique of reason 
is consequently not the knowing of objects, but of knowledge and 
its principles, its range and limitations, so that it does not become 
transcendent (3). (Hegel, 1892-96/1995, pp. 431 - 432)  
Notes: (1) Hegel’s references (1) to (3) refer to: (1) Kant: Kritik 
der renin Vernunft, pp. 255, 256), (2) Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
p. 107, and (3) Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 497, 498, Kritik der 
prakt. Vernunft (Fourth edition, Riga, 1797), p. 254, Kritik der 
Urtheilskraft (Third edition, Berlin, 1799), Preface, p. v.  
Source: Hegel, F. W. G. (1892-96/1995). Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy. (pp. 431 – 432). (E. S. Haldane & F. Simson, 
Trans.). London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. 
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the a priori time and space, the categories and the ideas are to synthetic knowledge and 
truth (Kant, 
1952a, pp. 461 - 
462; 1952b, pp. 
291 - 295). 
In the Critique 
of Pure Reason 
(Kant, 1952c), 
under the 
heading 
Transcendental 
Aesthetic (ibid., 
pp. 23 - 33), 
Kant first 
examines the 
process of 
sensation and 
establishes 
space and time 
as original 
intuitions of 
human 
perceptions—
“Space and time 
are the pure 
forms [of those 
perceptions] and 
sensation the 
matter” (Kant, 1952c, pp. 29 - 30, my square brackets). Space and time pattern-make 
manifold sensations into percept come concept. Reason, when it operates on intuited  
Behind the Text: Putting a Tag on Kant 
Term Explanation 
manifold 
The multitude of incoming sensation, or of phenomena, or of synthetic 
connection as the case may be. Judgement requires selection from among a 
manifold of alternatives whether in synthetic or analytic domains as explained 
below. 
sensation 
That through which beings are given to us; the materials for knowledge; concepts 
percolated from the manifold of sense activity through the pattern making of time 
and space. Sense perception is thus the product of an a priori given and an a 
posteriori derived. Whatever it is, the process which produces intuition, 
consciousness to itself in the beginning, is both receptive and active.  Intuition, 
intuitive reason, sensibility, internal sensation, sense perception are other terms 
used along with sensation to tag Kant’s product of Anschauung. 
phenomena and 
knowledge of 
them 
If space and time exist only as a priori givens of pure reason then beings pattern 
made by time and space and manifested in internal intuition can only exist there 
and not elsewhere because time and space do not exist independent of, outside of, 
mind. What “exists” outside internal sensation is named the thing-in-itself, 
whatever it may be. Phenomenal knowledge is thus knowledge derived from 
working over internal sense intuition. Phenomena are intuitions, outputs of the 
patterning of space and time. Phenomena are representations of things in 
themselves not relating to possible experience. “Where is to be found the third 
term, which is always requisite of a synthetical proposition, which may connect 
in the same proposition, connections which have no logical (analytic) connections 
with each other? The proposition never will be demonstrated … without making 
reference to the empirical use of the understanding, and thus … completely 
renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgement” (Kant, 1952c, pp. 98 - 99). 
the pure in pure 
reason 
A priori conditions for knowledge, the pure dimensions of sensation, 
understanding and reason owe nothing of their existence to experience. Rather 
they come into play when experience brings its material to them a posteriori, and 
when in play their function is formative.  
Activity A priori 
Sensuous intuition Time and space 
Verstand qua understanding at 
work in transforming sensuous 
intuition into concepts 
The categories: unity, plurality, totality, 
reality, negation, limitation, subsistence 
and inherence, causality and 
dependence, reciprocity, possibility and 
impossibility, existence and non-
existence, and necessity and 
contingency. 
Vernuft qua comprehension at 
work in ascending 
systematisation of the 
conditioned to the unconditioned, 
that is, systematisation upwards 
from the many concepts to 
distillation of principles. Pure 
reason “never refers direct to 
objects, but to the concepts of 
objects brought to it by the 
understanding (Kant, 1896, pp. 
272 – 273). 
The transcendental ideas: soul, cosmos, 
god which have no object corresponding 
to them in experience yet which by 
connections amongst themselves—
knowledge of self qua soul leads to 
knowledge of the world qua cosmos 
which leads to knowledge of supreme 
being qua god—occasion a unified 
system of knowledge.  
 
understanding 
(To understand is 
to judge.) 
 
That through which objects are thought: that which acts on the material of sense 
perception. To understand is to judge and judgement as verstand occurs when 
reason connects sense perceptions come concepts together according to a priori 
categories. Judgement as vernuft occurs when reason further arranges judgements 
of verstand so made according to its own a priori endowments called the ideas: 
soul, cosmos, God. 
(This box continues on the next page.) 
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sensation and is at work in articulating those various intuitions qua thought or concept 
but not at making 
linkages between 
them, produces 
analytic knowledge 
which is not 
necessarily true 
knowledge. 
In the same book, 
under the heading 
Transcendental Logic 
(ibid., p. 34 -200) Kant 
then examines the 
process of 
understanding or 
reason at its work of 
judgement and 
identifies how reason 
next operates on the 
material concepts 
formed by time and 
space from the 
manifold to make 
linkages between 
them. Such linkages 
are the substance of 
synthetic knowledge 
which for Kant is 
empirical knowledge proper. Kant’s word for reason at work in making synthetic 
judgements is verstand. 
Behind the Text: Putting a Tag on Kant (Continued) 
Term Explanation 
reason 
That cogitation charged with discerning (1) truth, inherent in 
understanding, (2) goodness, inherent in practical action, and (3) beauty 
and final cause, inherent in aesthetics. Pure reason is found in the 
conditions for knowledge itself. Pure reason is that part of reason which 
is innate, which is not derived from experience. 
analytic 
knowledge 
A judgement which articulates an idea but adds nothing new to it. The 
predicate contains nothing that is not already contained in the subject. 
For example, bodies are extended, body has shape, are examples of 
analytic judgements, extension and shape being attributes of body itself. 
For Kant analytic judgement so defined is not knowledge proper. 
synthetic 
judgements 
A judgement which links the subject to a predicate, which predicate 
contains something not contained in the subject itself, constitutes 
synthetic knowledge. The knowledge contained in the predicate, not 
being transmitted there from the subject, is postulated coming there 
from experience, that is, coming there a posteriori. For example, that 
the moon is a satellite of the earth is a synthetic judgement. For Kant, 
synthetic judgement is knowledge but not all synthetic judgement is 
scientific knowledge. Whereas Hume posits that cause and effect might 
not be related in the manner of analytic knowledge Kant allows a 
possibility that not all ideas contributing to judgement of cause and 
effect relations need necessarily rest on experience alone. Innate givens 
of pure reason, time and space, in Kant’s terms “pure forms of sensible 
intuition” (Kant, 1896, p. 17) and then the categories and the ideas, 
might play an a priori role in preparing mind for a posteriori reception 
of experience and paves a way for scientific knowledge as explained 
further below in this table.  
knowledge 
Knowledge then is synthetic judgement because it enriches and extends 
understanding. Kant is, inter alia, searching for the underlying 
conditions which make such knowledge possible. 
scientific 
knowledge 
Judgement which is necessary and universal, true in all cases, is 
scientific knowledge. In scientific knowledge the union between subject 
and predicate is not accidental. For example, is the statement bodies 
attract one another an example of a statement containing scientific 
knowledge. To answer yes is to answer too simply. Such a statement 
would fall to Hume if it is in fact only made a posteriori from 
experience and from a limited number of observations. True scientific 
knowledge for Kant cannot rest on experience alone but must include a 
rational component and consist of reason and observation. For Kant 
mathematical knowledge—geometry is the knowledge of space, and 
arithmetic, as number and duration, is the knowledge of time—is true 
scientific knowledge. Kant allows that scientific knowledge contains a 
priori synthetic contributions as principles and that metaphysics ought 
to contain a priori synthetic knowledge. For Kant scientific knowledge, 
necessary, universal true in all cases knowledge, is synthetic judgement 
a priori.  
noumenal 
knowledge 
The noumena are beings which certainly must exist, but which cannot 
be known to exist by themselves outside time and space—time and 
space being inherent in reason—but which nevertheless catalyse 
sensation. Knowledge about noumena, beyond the postulate of the 
existence of noumena themselves, is hard to come by for humans who 
employ reason in pursuit of it because the senses are baffled. The 
concept noumenon is a problematic concept which sets a limit for the 
understanding. It is a concept which contains no contradiction but the 
objective reality of which can never be known. The noumena are the 
things-in-themselves, Kant’s ding an sich, whatever they may be, as 
differentiated from the phenomena, the appearances of internal intuition 
presumably present in part as a result of noumena. 
(This box continues on the next page.) 
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Schematism, Kant’s word for the process by which phenomena of internal sensation are 
synthesised into 
knowledge (ibid., 
pp. 61 – 64), 
involves time 
acting as an 
intermediary 
between 
intuitions and 
concepts. First as 
earlier discussed 
time and space 
form the material 
of the manifold 
material sense 
impressions, 
which formed 
impressions are 
in turn 
synthesised into 
empirical 
knowledge of 
phenomena, 
through time’s 
acting to bring 
experience to the 
categories a 
posteriori 
allowing the emergence of empirical knowledge. Time is able to partake in its schemata 
by virtue of its nature.  
Behind the Text: Putting a Tag on Kant (Continued) 
Term Explanation 
empirical knowledge 
Knowledge derived from experience and which is not innate. Kant 
associates the term empirical with the a posteriori, that is, with the 
experiential operations of cognition. Empirical knowledge emerges when 
ontological predicates order and rank the phenomenal content of 
consciousness, the content that would not itself be were there no raw 
experiential sense data in the first place. Empirical is the opposite of 
transcendental.  
 
“The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation 
(Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we are affected by it, is called sensation 
(Empfindung). An intuition (Anschauung) of an object, by means of 
sensation, is called empirical. The undefined object of such an empirical 
intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung).” (Kant, 1896, p. 15). 
the transcendental and 
transcendental 
knowledge  
“I have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism … 
[which is not to be confounded with the idealism of Descartes or Berkeley]. 
My idealism concerns not the existence of things … it concerns the 
sensuous representation of things, to which space and time especially 
belong. Of these [viz., space and time], consequently of all appearances in 
general, I have only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of 
representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. But 
the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our 
cognition, i. e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to 
obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further occasion to it by 
this word, I now retract it, and desire this idealism of mine to be called 
critical” (Kant, 1909/1994, pp. 48 - 49, first square brackets are mine.). 
 
The transcendental is the realm of a kind of knowledge which is both 
synthetic and a priori. Transcendental knowledge is a kind of knowledge 
concerned with the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. 
All knowing subjects are postulated as recipients of certain transcendental 
truths, whether or not they are aware of it. The realm of transcendental 
knowledge separates the realm of empirical knowledge from the realm of 
speculation about the transcendent realm.  
transcendent 
The domain of thought operating beyond the limits of experience; the realm 
of objects that cannot be reached via sensed experience. It is the realm of 
the noumena, a realm of knowledge beyond that attainable by humans. The 
signposts, if even they can be called so, to that empirically unattainable 
transcendent realm, are the ideas. Namely, God, cosmos, and soul. 
the ideas  
Universal predicates, God, cosmos and soul, which feature in systemising a 
unified whole in empirical realms and help engender a capacity for 
metaphysical belief providing something of a reach, if reach be otherwise 
possible, to a transcendent realm. 
Kant’s primary 
postulate 
Nothing which is necessary and universal can come from experience.  
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from: Kant, I. (1952). Critique of Pure Reason. (pp. 1 - 250). 
Translated by J. D. M Meiklejohn. Chicago: William Benton; Kant, I. (1952). Critique of Practical 
Reason. (pp. 289 - 361). Translated by T. K. Abbott. Chicago: William Benton; Kant, I. (1952). 
Critique of Judgement. (pp. 459 - 613). Chicago, William Benton; Kant, I. (1896). Critique of Pure 
Reason (pp. 1 - 298). Translated by F. Max Muller. London: The Macmillan Company; Hegel, F. W. 
G. (1892-96/1995). Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (3B: Kant, pp. 4 - 5). Translated by E. 
Haldane and F. Simson. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd; Weber, A. (1908). 
History of Philosophy. (pp. 1). New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons; Kant, I. (1909/1994). Kant's 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. (pp. 48 – 49). Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company; 
Sala, G. (2008). (passim). The Concept of the Transcendental in Kant and Lonergan. Munich: Munich 
School of Philosophy. (Hegel, 1892-96/1995; Kant, 1896, 1909/1994, 1952a, 1952b, 1952c; Sala, 
2008; Weber, 1897/2012). 
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Considered as the essence of mathematics qua moments and number, time expresses the 
cardinal categories of 
quantity qua a 
number of moments, 
quality qua presence 
or non-presence of 
events, modality as 
the possible, real, 
eternal, and 
relationship or cause 
and effect. Time, of 
and in itself, is also of 
the nature of the 
cardinal categories 
and thus can inhere 
in, and partake of 
them, in its work of 
bringing internal 
intuitions to the 
ontological 
conditions of pure 
reason. Principles 
derived from the four 
cardinal categories, 
like the synthetic 
laws in turn derived 
from them, are innate 
givens not originating from experience and they inform that phenomena consist of 
quantity and quality, and are themselves possible, real and related through cause and 
 
Behind the Text: Kant in the Beginning 
“Whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects, there is 
one that reaches them directly, and forms the ultimate material of all thought, viz. intuition 
(Anschauung). This is possible only when the object is given, and the object can be given only 
(to human beings at least) through a certain affection of the mind (Gemiith). 
 
This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations (Vorstellungen), according to the manner 
in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility (Sinnlichkeit). 
 
Objects therefore are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with 
intuitions (Anschauungen). These intuitions become thought through the understanding 
(Verstand), and hence arise conceptions (Begriffe). All thought therefore must, directly or 
indirectly, go back to intuitions (Anschauungen), i.e. to our sensibility, because in no other way 
can objects be given to us. 
 
The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so 
far as we are affected by it, is called sensation (Empfindung). An intuition (Anschauung) of an 
object, by means of sensation, is called empirical. The undefined object of such an empirical 
intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung).  
 
In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sensation its matter; but that which 
causes the manifold matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I 
call its form. 
 
Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which sensations are arranged and 
placed in certain forms. The matter only of all phenomena is given us a posteriori; but their 
form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemtith) a priori, and must therefore be capable of 
being considered as separate from all sensations. 
 
I call all representations in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation, pure (in a 
transcendental sense). The pure form therefore of all sensuous intuitions, that form in which the 
manifold elements of the phenomena are seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind a 
priori. And this pure form of sensibility may be called the pure intuition (Anschauung). 
 
Thus, if we deduct from the representation (Vorstellung) of a body what belongs to the 
thinking of the understanding, viz. substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs 
to sensation, viz. impermeability, hardness, colour, etc., there still remains something of that 
empirical intuition (Anschauung), viz. extension and form. These belong to pure intuition, 
which a priori, and even without a real object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the mind 
as a mere form of sensibility. 
 
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori I call Transcendental Aesthetic. There 
must be such a science, forming the first part of the Elements of Transcendentalism, as opposed 
to that which treats of the principles of pure thought, and which should be called 
Transcendental Logic. 
 
In Transcendental Aesthetic therefore we shall first isolate sensibility, by separating everything 
which the understanding adds by means of its concepts, so that nothing remains but empirical 
intuition (Anschauung). 
 
Secondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation (Empfindung), so that 
nothing remains but pure intuition (reine Anschauung) or the mere form of the phenomena, 
which is the only thing which sensibility a priori can supply. In the course of this investigation 
it will appear that there are, as principles of a priori knowledge, two pure forms of sensuous 
intuition (Anschauung), namely, Space and Time” (Kant, 1896, pp. 15 - 17).  
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effect. These principles bring legitimacy to empirical knowledge but do not allow 
empirical knowledge access to the transcendent. 
Yet not all synthetic judgement constitutes scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge 
must be true in all cases: it must be necessary and 
universal knowledge. In Aristotle’s terms there 
should be no temporary accidence between subject 
and predicate, the linkage must be universal and 
necessary. Kant acknowledges what later became 
known as Hume’s problem: human experience can 
only provide limited confirmations so that 
knowledge derived a posteriori on the basis of 
limited confirmations, in effect knowledge derived 
empirically from experience, cannot for Kant be 
scientific knowledge. For Kant only knowledge emanating from the priori of pure 
reason and based on observation can be scientific knowledge also called synthetic 
judgement a priori, and such knowledge which is the lot of mathematics (Kant, 
1909/1994, pp. 18 – 26, 25, 40), might be found in principles of physics as Kant defines 
physics, if not physics itself (ibid., pp. 51, 64 – 65, within 50 – 90, 91), and should also 
be the knowledge of metaphysics (ibid., pp. 137, 139 – 147). 
Just as space and time unify the manifold impressions of incoming data rendering them 
analytically accessible, and just as the categories unify the manifold of analytical 
content, making synthetic knowledge possible, so too the ideas unify the manifold of 
intellectual experience allowing systematisation of thought. Vernuft, this second level of 
understanding at work in judging judgements, is discussed under the heading 
Transcendental Dialectic.  
Vernuft is superior to verstand. Vernuft systematises the plethora of judgements: under 
the idea of cosmos the physical sciences emerge, under the idea of soul psychology 
emerges and under the idea of God theology emerges, none of them without difficulty  
 
The Principal Focus of Transcendental 
Philosophy 
Kant’s principal problem, is treated in his 
“Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding 
in two parts, one treating of the objects of pure 
understanding and intended to show and explain 
the objective value of its concepts a priori. It is, 
therefore, of essential importance for my purposes. 
The other is intended to enquire into the pure 
understanding itself, its possibility, and the powers 
of knowledge on which it rests, therefore its 
subjective character; a subject which, though 
important for my principal object, yet forms no 
essential part of it, because my principal problem 
is and remains, What and how much may 
understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft) 
know without all experience? and not, How is the 
faculty of thought possible?” (Kant, 1896, pp. 22 - 
23). 
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(Kant, 1952c, p. 
119). Kant argues 
(a) that while the 
ideas cosmos, soul, 
and God cannot be 
pattern made by 
time and (b) that 
while they 
constitute the 
ultimate essence of 
pure reason, they 
do not by virtue of 
their role in making 
phenomenal 
understanding 
possible, allow 
access to the 
transcendent. For 
example, in the last 
sections of the 
transcendental 
Dialectic Kant 
argues that it is not 
possible to prove or 
disprove the 
existence of the 
soul (Kant, 1952c, 
pp. 120 - 129), 
matter as cosmos 
(ibid., pp. 129 – 172), or God (ibid., pp. 174 – 209) outside of mind by cogitation 
Kant’s Categories Referred to in the Text  
Kinds of Judgements with 
Examples. 
Categories 
C
ateg
o
ries 
F
u
n
d
am
en
tal 
Ruling Principle 
L
aw
s  
(1) The universal judgement: 
all women are mortal. 
totality 
q
u
a
n
tity
 
Institution 
“All intuitions are extensive 
quantities” (Kant, 1952c, p. 
68). That is to say every 
phenomenon (being of the 
mind) represented in space 
and time is a quantity (ibid., 
pp. 68 – 69). 
co
n
tin
u
ity
 
(2) The particular judgement: 
some women are thieves. 
plurality 
(3) The singular judgement: 
Peter is a criminal. 
unity 
(4) The affirmative 
judgement: mankind is 
mortal. 
reality 
q
u
ality
 
Anticipations of Perception 
“In all phenomena the Real, 
that which is an object of 
sensation, has Intensive 
Quantity, that is, has a 
Degree” (ibid., p.69).  
Intensity of degree is quality 
(ibid., pp. 69 – 72). 
(5) The negative judgement: 
mankind is not immortal. 
negation 
(6) The limiting judgement: 
the soul is immortal. 
limitation 
(7) The categorical 
judgement: the Devil is evil. 
subsistence 
and 
inherence 
relatio
n
 
Analogies of Experience 
“Experience is possible only 
through the representation of 
a necessary connection of 
perceptions” (ibid., p.72). In 
the proof of this axiom 
chance and fate are ruled out 
and all phenomena are 
related through causality – 
cause and effect (ibid., pp 72 
– 85). 
cau
sality
 
(8) The hypothetical 
judgement: if God is just he 
will save the meek. 
causality 
and 
dependence 
(9) The disjunctive 
judgement: either Oxford or 
Cambridge is winning the 
boat race. 
reciprocity 
(10) The problematic 
judgement: the universe is 
perhaps, unbounded 
possibility 
and 
impossibility 
m
o
d
ality
 
Postulates of Empirical 
Thought 
“1 That which agrees with 
the formal conditions 
(intuition and conception) of 
experience is possible.” 
(ibid., p. 85) 
“2 That which coheres with 
the material conditions of 
experience (sensation) is 
real.” (ibid., p. 85) 
“3 That whose coherence 
with the real is determined 
according to universal 
conditions of experience is 
(exists) necessary.” (ibid., p. 
86). 
Concerning modality then, 
phenomena (those which 
conform to the law of space 
and time) are possible, real 
and necessary (ibid.. pp. 85 – 
91). 
(11) The assertory judgement: 
humans are bipeds. 
being 
and 
non being 
(12) The apodictic judgement: 
God must be just. 
necessity 
and 
contingency 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, (pp. 68 – 
93). Translatr J. D. M. Meiklejohn, Chicago. William Benton. 
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proceeding on the basis empirical knowledge. This argument concerning soul is 
grounded in a demolition of Wolffian and Cartesian psychology. A method known as the 
antinomies is used in the case of matter. Antinomies consist of the juxtaposition of 
equally plausible theses and antithesis about the nature of matter and their purpose is to 
demonstrate that the mysteries of cosmology lie beyond the boundary of empirical 
knowledge. Kant’s criticism of the idea of God is grounded in, and bounded by, 
ontology, cosmology and theology which in turn are all found wanting in respect of 
proofs of the existence of God.  
Yet Kant’s denials are not the end of the matter in respect of inquiry beyond phenomena. 
The ideas per se remain as a basis for a moral consciousness 
which countenances reach to eternal and universal conditions 
in which higher truth inheres. Kant approaches such “pure 
practical reason” (Kant, 1952b, p. 291) in his second critique 
in which he conjectures moral law to be its own consciousness 
inherent in human will’s freedom and patronage of practical action, of which more later. 
In short, in so far as pure reason in the realm of empirical knowledge is concerned, 
outside of mathematics, reason at work in unifying the manifold of internal intuition into 
phenomena, and of unifying the manifold connections between phenomena, makes its 
reality. That is, concerning “the original laws of the understanding [the laws governing 
the making of phenomena] it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say: The 
understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but prescribes them to, nature” 
(Kant, 1909/1994, p. 82; 2004, p. 58).  
Yet Constructivists might proceed with caution before simplistically claiming Kant as 
one of their own. 
I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite 
unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations 
which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term 
signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore 
less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary. (Kant, 1909/1994, p. 43). 
 
Kant on Matter and Form 
In a phenomenon I call that which 
corresponds to the sensation its 
matter; but that which causes the 
manifold matter of the 
phenomenon to be perceived as 
arranged in a certain order, I call 
its form. (Kant, 1896, p. 15). 
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Reason at its work of understanding, of making phenomena is, according to Kant, both 
receptive and active, not solely active. In particular, and more importantly, in so far as it 
is active, reason is regulative rather than constitutive2 of phenomena (Weber, 1897/2012, 
p. 463). The made phenomena consist of something from without acted on by the 
schema of time and space which as a priori givens add nothing of themselves beyond 
regulation. For Kant, who admits the existence of noumena, the schematism of space 
and time which brings them to consciousness is “an art hidden in the depth of the human 
soul, the true sense of which we shall hardly ever be able to understand” (Kant, 2007, p. 
178). Only in the sphere of practical reason is reason allowed a constitutive role and then 
only under freedom of will.  
For example, by virtue of the Critique of Practical Reason (Kant, 1952b) Kant goes 
some way to ameliorating perceptions he may have held about skepticism and 
materialism, and restrictions imposed on empirical knowledge articulated in the Critique 
of Pure Reason (Kant, 1909/1994, pp. 70, 73, 132, 120 - 138). Under practical reason, 
reason is again regulative not constitutive except when it is under the direction of will 
which constitutes the basis of our faculties. Will is free and implies oughtness, and 
practical reason’s oughtness predicated on freedom exemplifies Kant’s face off with 
pure practical reason and is a high point in his glance towards noumenal being. Whether 
or not practical reason qua will under oughtness is a noumenon bringing forth 
consciousness of moral law itself is one question, but in respect of the question of higher 
understanding Kant pronounces “the authority of practical reason … superior to that of 
theoretical reason, and in real life the former predominates” (Kant, 1909/1994, p. 253). 
Practical reason is the form of the will, and freedom, which is denied under pure reason 
because physical law is determined through cause and effect, is allowed under practical 
reason. The sentence immediately following the previous quotation reads “Hence we 
should, in any case, act as if it were proved that we are free, that the soul is immortal, 
that there is a supreme judge and rewarder” (ibid.). This sentence makes simple 
                                                          
2 Again the term is used in the sense of “to make (a thing) what it is; to give its being to, form, determine”, to “to 
make up, form, compose; to be the elements or material of which the thing spoken of consists” (OED, 1970b, pp. 875 
- 876), a usage which began circa 1552, and has continued to this day.  
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adduction of Kant as a basis for praxis above theoria, by Arendt or others, a not so 
complete coup in respect of a moral basis for action. 
Kant explains that the moral law which binds consciousness in respect of practical 
action, as opposed to the truth or otherwise of physical law in empirical experience, 
finds its necessary and universal in the oughtness of moral consciousness. Neither 
happiness, perfection, moral sense nor pleasure informs the moral law (Kant, 1952b, pp. 
338 - 340). Rather the moral law is its own foundation consisting of oughtness, and its 
postulate of freedom to choose, and it is imposed on the will by practical reason. The 
idea of freedom, not the ideas of God and immortality, is the condition of the moral law 
which in turn provides consciousness its understanding of freedom (Kant, 1952b). Duty 
to moral law is moral law’s prescription for practical action. Will as practical reason is 
its own witness of noumenal being, free from the questioning doubt inherent in pure 
reason. The will does not derive from experience. Judgement, to think is to judge, is said 
to mediate between pure reason, the true, and practical reason, the good, on two levels: 
the teleological which regulates experience, and the aesthetic which regulates beauty. 
Judgement is:  
… the faculty by which we subsume the particular under the universal (law), or find the 
universal under which the particular is to be arranged. It refers the manifold to the one, the 
sensible order to the supersensible principle of design, and since all actualisation of design 
produces in us a sentiment of the beautiful, the faculty of judgement is also concerned 
with the aesthetic aspect of nature and art. (W. Turner, 1903/2012, pp. 544 - 545) 
In the perfect, humans find intellectual or conceptual satisfaction and in the beautiful, 
humans find emotional or aesthetic satisfaction. In the Critique of Judgement (Kant, 
1952a), under the heading of Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement (Kant, 1952a, pp. 476 - 
493) Kant determines that beauty’s quality is pursued through disinterested satisfaction 
(ibid., pp. 476 - 479), its quantity is its ability to please universally (ibid., pp. 479 - 483), 
its relation is concept free (ibid., pp. 483- 491- 493), and its mode is to please 
necessarily (ibid., p. 493). The beautiful thus of necessity universally provides 
disinterested pleasure without the concept of end or design. The beautiful brings 
emotional satisfaction and when humans feel the sublime they are transported, towards 
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the infinite, in a state of formless and boundless spiritual satisfaction. Under the heading 
of the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Judgement (ibid., pp. 540 - 548) Kant establishes the 
essential importance of the beautiful as a symbol of the moral good (ibid., pp.547 – 549). 
Kant asks hard questions about the nature of a common sense through which the 
elements of taste might be united and in passing identifies the ought as “the objective 
necessity of the coincidence of the feeling of all with a particular feeling of each” (ibid., 
p. 493) which may help in part explaining Arendt’s adduction of Kant and a community 
sense construct she brings to her practical action agon. 
If, in her adduction of Kant, Arendt’s agon is to be associated with Kant’s practical 
reason, her aestheticisation of judgement might be 
associated with Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1952a) in 
which Kant searches for the a priori principle of aesthetic 
feeling and finds it to be the beautiful (Kant, 1952a, p. 
550). 
In all, Kant’s wider system postulates noumena, and 
allows reason a constitutive role only in the case of 
practical reason and then only under the direction of will 
which itself does not emerge from experience. Mankind’s 
highest striving is for virtue and moral law, which striving 
urges them towards noumenal being. This urging, together 
with judgement reaching to the supersensible through its 
form, the beautiful, with the sublime it engenders, leads to 
the infinite which in turn leads to an ultimate noumenon 
of being. This deep conviction expressed by Kant is troublesome for commentators and 
is not pursued further. 
Return to Discussion of Arendt’s Adduction of Kant 
Arendt’s P(p)olis, in a kind of Heideggerian way, is a world coming out of nature made 
possible by work, a world at its best when there is harmony between action, work and  
 
Agon 
In a broad sense agon is struggle. 
Agonistic political philosophy centres 
on a tenet that under appropriate 
conditions of agon, reconciliation of 
opposing views may lead to 
improvement and betterment of society. 
Towards the other end of a scale would 
be “being for itself of subjectivity” 
(Adorno, 2012, p. 8), and in-between 
these ends would be disputed agons in 
the names of such persons as Marx, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Arendt, and 
Foucault (Adorno, 2012, p. 11; Honig, 
1993, pp. 528 - 533; Lightbody, 2010, p. 
24). The conventional definition of agon 
as resolutory struggle is itself coming 
under question. In a recent book 
Calaguori (2012) questions the veracity 
of agonism understood as reconciliation 
and resolution through struggle 
suggesting that there is a down side in 
that behind the veil of social and moral 
progress qua agonistic resolution, 
conflict progresses to domination in 
various domains: legitimisation of war, 
consolidation of power and opportunity, 
human instinct or otherwise for self-
preservation, competition and violence, 
and sport and art as pseudo-agonism. 
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labour. It is a sobering thought that the Periclean P(p)olis, in or out of harmony, was 
itself short lived. If there is an 
Arendtian esoteric Polis in the sense 
of esoteric employed for enquiry 
purposes as earlier addressed on 
pages 29, 143 and 186 to 189 its 
cognitive domain is the realm of doxa 
and will in communication with an 
attendant community sense, which 
combination sources active public 
speech and deed in plurality, its 
method might be the revelation or 
coming out of self, and its constraints 
might be deprivation of community 
sense. Arendt’s gathering is a P(p)olis 
by virtue of its being situated in 
praxis so that an esoteric description 
of it qua Polis is problematic.  
In adducing Kant to her general 
argument of political action as 
revelatory praxis (Norris, 1996, pp. 
165 - 166), Arendt 
detranscendentalises him, say Beiner 
(2001, p. 98) and (Degryse, 2011, p. 
345), by interpreting his sensus 
communis (Kant, 2000 , Sections 40 - 
41; 2014, Sections 18 - 22) as a 
community sense rather than a 
common sense, an interpretation 
which allows Arendt to place human judgement within a multi-spectator domain of  
 
Shades of Meaning of the Terms Poiesis and Theoria Employed in 
the Accompanying Text(1) 
 
Poiesis 
 
Plato 
Expressed in Symposium 207 – 211 (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, pp. 165 - 
167) poiesis is a kind of desire and active making for immortality 
through procreation, or attainment of renown and recognition through 
action, or the striving of the soul towards virtuous recognition of the 
beautiful and its attendant blessed happiness or eudaimonia 
 
Taminiaux (1991, pp. 111 - 114) in interpreting Heidegger and Arendt, 
delineates poiesis as an activity involving things, and praxis as an 
activity involving the agents themselves and other people—for 
example poiesis = a craftsman in act of producing a product and praxis 
= the human being acting with others under isonomia, equality before 
the law, political praxis being an equivalent of phronesis. Taminiaux 
claims that “Plato more or less says that the distinction between poiesis 
and praxis (as it was understood by the city until then) should be 
abolished” (ibid., p. 113). That is, the univocity of poiesis, everyone 
doing their right job in the right way, should replace the ambiguity of 
praxis and that the highest univocity of being is Platonic theoria 
narrowly defined—poiesis qua bios theoretikos in act of contemplating 
the unchanging—which patronises praxis qua bios politikos.  
 
Aristotle 
Taminiaux contends (ibid., p. 114) that Aristotle rehabilitated praxis 
qua bios politikos, qua phronesis as the wisdom in play in the 
resolution of doxa or opinion, in human affairs, opinion not being 
present in theoretical wisdom’s episteme or in following the right rule 
in the techne of craft.  
 
Heidegger 
Heidegger returns to the Presocratics to interpret poiesis as bringing 
fourth as in a bursting of a blossom (Heidegger, 2008, p. 317). For him 
the Presocratic phusis is the original coming out of concealment (di 
Pippo, 2000, pp. 32 - 34), an original letting itself be seen kind of idea. 
Heidegger considers Being, signified in his word Dasein, as that from 
“beyond Being, yet manifesting itself in an understanding of Being 
which permeates all our comportments” (Taminiaux, 1991, p. 115)—
an extremely clever blink and quick step, might not it be said, around 
an always there and limiting infinite regress in ontology. In very broad 
comparison, Heidegger’s Dasein solution is not unlike the world soul 
solution to being and knowing of materiality discussed in the case of 
Plato, on pages 131 to 132 yet Heidegger’s formulation of course is 
situated in different terms, settings, belief structures and 
understandings. Dasein becomes for Heidegger the “ontical foundation 
of fundamental ontology” (ibid., p. 115) and poiesis is for Heidegger, 
one of its elements. In particular three dispositions, poiesis, praxis, 
theoria and their corresponding action or movement twins techne, 
phronesis and sophia constitute Dasein, understood as being in the 
world and of these praxis = phronesis provides the right way to 
Dasein, to being and caring in the world and a realisation of the 
temporal ephemerality of Being so understood. Within Dasein poiesis 
is a principle of origination, and bringing forth from concealment or 
leading into unconcealment, which yet does not reveal itself in the 
praxis or doing of the unconcealment. (Heidegger, 1935/1975, pp. 84 - 
86). For example at the level of artisanship craft being done (praxis) 
has left the sphere of poiesis (ibid., pp. 58 – 58) 
(This box is continued on the next page.) 
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P(p)olis as practical action (Norris, 1996, p. 167). Within such a domain Arendt depicts 
judgement’s informing of action a kind of coming out from community sense. 
Specifically, says Norris, Kant’s third-critique reasoning is that judgement of beauty 
occurs through an inherently public 
common-sense above a private sense, 
and it is this public nature of judgement 
idea that Arendt appropriates in order to 
situate judgement in that multiple 
spectator practical-action public domain 
earlier mentioned by Norris (1996, p. 
167). Norris concludes that Arendt’s 
terms, work, labour, world and the like 
are not Kantian categories but rather 
supplements to Heidegger’s 
existentialist revisions of them and that 
in consequence her turn to Kant is 
illegitimate. Ultimately, Arendt's 
differentiations between politics and 
philosophy, public and private, and 
judgement and cognition remain 
unsubstantiated and undermine her 
theory of political action (ibid., p. 191). 
Dorstal (1984, p. 725) and Riley (1992, 
pp. 305-309) also question Arendt’s 
appropriation of Kant on the basis that his second critique (Kant, 2003) contains a better 
statement of Kant’s political theory, if indeed he advanced one, than does his third 
critique. 
Politics for Arendt is in the realm of doxa qua opinion, and political action consists of 
public speech and deed in a condition of plurality (Norris, 1996, p. 170). So situated she 
is separated from Aristotelian and Straussian political philosophy not because of a value 
 
Shades of Meaning of the Terms Poiesis and Theoria Employed 
in the Accompanying Text (1) (Continued from page 166 ) 
 
Theoria 
For Plato 
Contemplation of the unchanging, the forms. 
 
For Aristotle 
Either: 
Cognitive seeing or beholding of active mind, in a wider sense of 
either theoretical philosophy through wisdom’s contemplation of 
the unchanging, or in practical philosophy through practical 
wisdom’s work of phronesis, and in art poiesis understood as the 
artisan mind guiding itself in accordance with the technical right 
rule required for good making of the product., that is all cognitive 
focus in search of a right rule or good irrespective of the level of 
the intellectual and/or lower virtue involved, but arranged in the 
descending order of sophia, praxis and techne. 
Or:  
In a narrow sense, only the first of these, speculative wisdom’s 
contemplation of the unchanging isolated from the rest. 
 
For Heidegger 
Theoria and its twin Sophia are components of Dasein as explained 
above  
 
Notes: (1) There are variations on the interpretations boxed here. 
These simplified boxed explanations are provided within this Coda 
discussion of pages 137 to 173, which discussion itself constitutes 
a brief justification for adduction of conservative readings of Plato 
and Aristotle for inquiry purposes. This enquiry recognises 
Heideggerian or Benardeteian interpretation, but it was not 
designed to, and does not, make such interpretations central to its 
purpose. Volpi, under caveat (Volpi, 1996, pp. 37-39), claims that 
Heidegger’s “methodological disposition … [and] questioning … 
becomes more and more radical, to the point of ending up with a 
demand for the complete overcoming (Uberwindung, Verwindung) 
of [the Western metaphysical tradition, uberwindung, verwindung 
being used in the sense of conplete destruction] (Volpi, p. 29, my 
square brackets). Vattimo (1987, pp. 7 - 17) explains Heidegger’s 
possible different use of these words reported earlier on page xvii 
and Rosen (2002), Gadamer (1994), McNeil (1999), and 
Taminiaux (1996) and Mei (2011) all provide detailed analysis of 
Heidegger and explanations of his various terms. 
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judgement dimension but because of her downplaying of philosophical wisdom. In the 
Polis of natural right the wise define rule through consent to sophistic reason (ibid, p. 
141) while in Arendt’s P(p)olis of doxa, rule is effected through consent to action. 
Judgement within doxa qua opinion is a revelation, a coming out (Norris, 1996, p. 173). 
Norris (ibid., p. 174) argues that Arendt and Strauss also disagree about the nature of 
totalitarianism, Strauss describing totalitarianism as an egregious form of tyranny. For 
Arendt totalitarianism is a rule of no one, a rule of ideology which destroys community 
sense and plurality which are otherwise the bases for action from doxa.  
Honig (1988, p. 77) finds that Arendt's account of the will and its attendant concept of 
self are coherent and consistent across both editions of her Life of Mind (Arendt, 
1971/1978, 1978b) and compatible with her earlier accounts of action and identity. In 
Arendt’s exoteric P(p)olis, or world, political action is the actual freeing of oneself 
through discussion and action in affairs of state, a freeing of oneself from labour which 
leaves a sustenance-question lacuna within her definitions of labour and work. 
Presumably if all are free from labour, ponein, which Arendt defines by linking it to the 
drudge of agricultural production, then how is craft to be sustained without an 
agricultural surplus? Her metaphor meets something of a Platonic-Aristotelian wall of 
natural law qua extension of sustaining place and soul’s dependence, qua entelechy of 
body, on nourished body. 
In non-philosophical terms Arendt’s concerns of an action P(p)olis so understood falling 
to an administrative and economic P(p)olis, and of humankind’s consumerism of ever 
increasing redefinition of must-have-basics resulting in increasing demands for labour, 
qua her so-called non-productive toil, at the expense of work, her productive craft work 
and therefore world, brings her some distanced complementary and surface affinity with 
Strauss’ crises in Western democracy and liberal-education concerns (L. Strauss, 
1968/1989a, pp. 9 - 25; 1968/1989b, pp. 3 - 8), and Bloom’s perceived societal values 
change concerns, for example, loss of citizen as statesman, devaluation of ideas of the 
common good, and arrival of the administrative state (Bloom, 1987, pp. 85, 125), yet 
close scrutiny might well find it a surface too shallow and distance too far. Arendt’s 
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distinction between work and labour although etymologically clear, becomes blurred in 
practice.  
Some differences between Arendt and Strauss are wide. There is the already mentioned 
question of the ranking of theoretical philosophy above practical philosophy. Next, 
Strauss’s Polis appears permanent in the ideas of natural right (L. Strauss, 1999). Strauss 
explains natural right as an existence of immutable truth about right and wrong which 
extends across the ages. Natural right emerged through a discovery of nature by ancient 
Greeks. Arendt’s esoteric Polis, as mentioned, and if one might be named, is a 
Heideggerian escape or coming out. Her exoteric P(p)olis is an escape from nature, one 
she could devise through engagements with Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Kant, emphasising action man, praxis qua phronesis, above thinking man, theoria qua 
sophia, central in the political philosophy Strauss sought to rehabilitate. Also inherent in 
this distance between Arendt and Strauss is the different stance each takes towards 
historicism understood as the view that humans can only come to knowledge about right 
and wrong and good and desirable by virtue of historical experience.  Strauss contends 
that historicism so understood only allows humankind to know what historical 
experience allows it to know, and defines it in part by an assertion that it denies human 
discernment of natural right (L. Strauss, 1999, pp. 31 - 32). Just as Science per se may 
provide impressive technologies yet cannot teach the right and proper use of them, so 
too history per se may document changes across the ages yet cannot distinguish between 
the right and wrong of them. Arendt rather considers experience, including political 
experience, the subjects of human thought (Arendt, 1979, p. 308; Beiner, 1990, p. 242).  
Honig (1992, pp. 215 - 235) associates Arendt with post-Structuralism, Habermass 
(1983, pp. 171 - 188) associates her with Neoaristotelianism, and Benhabib (2003, p. 
138) suggests that she is a reluctant modernist. Villa (1992, pp. 274 - 308) receives 
Arendt’s idiosyncratic adduction of Kant favourably and suggests that Arendt is to a 
certain extent Nietzschean (Villa, 1992, pp. 275, 286) all be it a Nietzscheanism checked 
and balanced against Kant. Villa’s reads Arendt’s appropriation of Kant’s third critique 
(Kant, 2014) as a strategy to contain “Nietzsche's aestheticism and its metaphysical and 
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epistemological commitments (the will to power and perspectivism)” (Villa, 1992, p. 
276), and to “save virtuoso political action and the world of appearances from the 
subjectivism implicit in Nietzsche’s aestheticist anti-Platonism” (ibid.,  p. 291), an 
appropriation by which she is able to “preserve plurality and politics from the creeping 
subjectivism of Nietzsche's purely agonistic model” (ibid., 288) thereby rendering 
Nietzsche’s aestheticisation of practical action suitable to her development of it in The 
Human Condition (Arendt, 1958/1988).  
Honig claims that Villa’s comparison of “Nietzsche’s ‘excessive agonism’ with Arendt’s 
‘tame’ variety of it produces misleading readings of both Nietzsche and Arendt … in 
which their aestheticism is overdrawn and depoliticised” (Honig, 1993, p. 529). She 
indicates that Arendt allows presences other than Kantian judgement and that these, for 
example constitution making and amendment, promising and forgiveness, might save 
her agonism from subjectivism and stabilise a community space for it. Nietzsche’s own 
agonism is deeper and more complicated than Villa supposes, likewise Arendt’s 
engagement with Nietzsche. Nietzsche, says Honig, recognises ostracism as a force 
which might prevent the winners of an agon dominating it by shutting it down and that 
Nietzsche, like Arendt, recognises the freedom, plurality and commonality of agon 
required for “virtuosic action” (ibid., p. 530). That is to say there is another side to a 
“wild-eyed Nietzsche” (ibid., p. 529) that Villa depicts Arendt taming, and it is from 
Nietzsche’s other side so interpreted that Arendt appropriates promise-making and 
forgiveness to protect her agon and its space for meaning-directed action. Yet while 
Nietzsche’s promises and forgiving are promises made by an individual to a particular 
action, Arendt’s promises are made to political community. Honig’s suggests that 
Nietzsche’s subjectivism qua promises of oneself to an action cannot succeed outside of 
“agonistic institutions like Arendt’s [which Honig seems to suggest perhaps she found in 
part in Nietzsche anyway]” (ibid., p. 532, my square brackets) without falling into 
withdrawalism and that Arendt’s action in communal space, without a touch of 
individualism, risks sliding into mass behaviour destructive of agon. The risk that 
Nietzsche’s agonism of individual-promise to action will beget withdrawalism is not 
necessarily its fate and Honig concludes that Arendt’s error was to mistake risk for fate, 
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and that Villa’s error was to repeat Arendt’s—an invitingly nice and cogent conclusion 
which involuntarily invites recall of Alfred Marshall’s perhaps unintended contradiction 
and truth conundrum that in economics “every short statement on a broad issue is 
inherently false” (Marshall, 1996, pp. 231 - 232). 
I now bring this discussion of reading genres begun on page 137 to a close. The 
discussion has revealed a range of approaches to reading and interpreting Plato, and in 
some cases Aristotle, and found differing terms usage between so-called reading genres 
and nuance within them. A student’s first dawning awareness that they are becalmed in a 
sea of multiple reading possibilities and everywhere contested waters may be realisation 
enough for them to proceed no further. So quitting may, in subsequent currents and 
eddies of continuing life, flow into attitude formation and quick dismissive decision-
making on the part of an otherwise successful busy-world many, including academic 
administrators and/or politicians temporarily powerful in allocating funds for philosophy 
courses and other important requirements, and in family and business sector decision 
making about the efficacy of values education in general, or about any clarity in 
particular such education might bring to examination of a life, qua examined life, well 
lived. Yet may be, in some cases, those who proceed and jump such a hurdle—accepting 
that jumping it brings awareness that both ideal and practical conditions for being human 
are likely a most complex matter—and then go on to bring forward advances in society 
are on their way to being amongst the few in any one generation who make a difference 
in that Straussian sense.  
Irrespective of the surmise in the paragraph above, awareness about variety and 
complexity in reading Plato is hardly confined to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
alone. For example Tarrant, in a work aiming “not to understand little known Platonic 
figures, but to encourage fresh, almost primitive reading of Plato himself” (Tarrant, 
2000, p. vii), a work which aims at clarification of “choices available for reading Plato 
today” (ibid., p. 3) by examining choices available to earlier interpreters in Middle 
Platonic times, finds likely competitive interpretations of a true Plato across Athens, 
Rhodes, Smyrna and Rome. Focussing on principles of interpretation rather than on 
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details, but allowing that details might yet provide a key to principles, on Platonic 
corpus of works rather than on high profile dialogues alone, and on interpretation itself 
rather than on doctrine, Tarrant demonstrates intense debate about both principles and 
details, and finds antiquity struggling with issues of interpretation extant in the twenty-
first century, for example a need to recognise dramatic aspects of dialogues, possibility 
of beneath-text esoteric meaning to be reconciled with literal text, inter-textual strategies 
for interpretation, and grouping of texts marked against such criteria as commonality of 
purpose or communicative purpose, whether didactic, explanatory or polemical, but less 
so on a basis of common subject matter or doctrine. No such complexity, then and now, 
should inhibit learning which should continue on, adopting new findings and approaches 
in its stride (ibid., p. 214). 
On the basis of reading complexities discussed in this Coda, and given the design and 
methodology of this present enquiry, it appears that whatever reading genre is adopted to 
inform its method and purpose, the chosen genre would need to be defended against 
others. Two examples taken from the reading genres discussed above, Benardete’s 
persuasion that Plato doubted an existence of a city of forms and/or that such a city 
might not constitute a basis for analysis of matters public, and Heidegger’s 
reformulation of praxis as foundational ontology, are alone problematic for both enquiry 
architecture and aims, as indeed they may also presently be to efficacy, conduct and 
validity of key tenets of received Western philosophy in general. In addition, the 
examples chosen gain much of their own credibility or otherwise through comparison 
and juxtaposition with longstanding so-called received reading and interpretation 
traditions and on the basis of such considerations, and Tarrant’s positiveness in the face 
of complexity, I have adopted a so-called standard and received reading persuasion as 
the default persuasion for enquiry purposes. Accordingly, I have used translations 
available in the Loeb Classical Library, the Perseus Library, Oxford University standard 
editions, and Jowett translations from the Great Books collection, which latter 
collection, ironically, an early Strauss was involved in establishing. Notwithstanding the 
default position adopted, ideas from scholars associated with some of the different 
readings genres of Plato and Aristotle outlined above are, subject to caveat and ongoing 
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benchmarking against the chosen readings, employed in articulation of enquiry 
construct. I discuss enquiry methodology in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry Methodology 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1 discussion focussed on an early emergence of three kinds of philosophy 
and how, in the context of that emergence, Plato revealed a system of political 
philosophy in which Science as knowledge of the permanent and unchanging is the 
patron of an objective Ethics predicated on reasoned discerning of the unharmful from 
the harmful. Chapter 1 also contains discussion of a claim that Plato held mankind’s 
work to be justice with happiness and urged an ideal or esoteric Polis as a city of ideas 
predicated on a city of objectively real forms in one only begotten heaven. The 
discussion of Chapter 1 progressed through ongoing articulation of meanings attributed 
to the enquiry’s key terms Science, Ethics and Polis in the Introduction.  
In this chapter, under the heading Thesis Methodology, I discuss key terms further by 
differentiating between exoteric and esoteric dimensions of those terms, by explaining 
how the esoteric dimension will inform key-terms usage throughout the enquiry, by 
explaining how esoteric key terms meaning is derived, and how it and the 
exoteric/esoteric dimension on which it is predicated are different from those employed 
in Straussian and Tubingen School of Philosophy literature. Enquiry methodology is 
also explained in full under this heading and a brief application of it in the case of Plato 
is provided by way of example.  
Other aspects of esoteric terms usage and enquiry method, for example strengths and 
weaknesses, validity, a non-paradigm-shift interpretation of incremental nuance and/or 
more pronounced change, the so-called problem of the representational firm, in this 
enquiry the problem of which representational political philosophy or religious sect, or 
Science to use for general argument purposes and the like, are discussed under the 
heading General Matters of Method beginning on page 186. Four new terms are 
constructed for enquiry purposes, namely Ovid moment, Augustine moment, Goethe 
moment and Yahoo moment.  
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Completed summary tables of the enquiry’s progressive interpretation of key terms 
nuance and its impact on Thesis Proposition Statements, namely Summary Tables 13 
and 14 are included for convenience, such summary tables being an outcome of thesis 
methodology process. These tables, placed within the conclusion and respectively 
beginning on pages 192 and 196, are important tables because enquiry conclusions are 
subsequently partly drawn from them.  
In Chapter 10, final evaluation of the veracity of the Thesis Proposition Statements is 
offered. The validity of the Thesis Proposition Statements rests on the soundness and 
robustness of the enquiry methodology which consists of measuring and tracing esoteric 
key terms nuance and applying that nuance in ongoing articulation of the Thesis 
Proposition Statements within a constructed exoteric/esoteric divide methodology. Of 
necessity, and irrespective of their reasoned validity within the constructed 
methodology, conclusions remain limited to, and bounded by, the constraints of the 
methodology itself. In this chapter, issues associated with mutually exclusive 
definitional separation of esoteric and exoteric, and epistemology from ontology, raise a 
question of whether or not the methodology constructed has any worth or standing at all, 
a defence for its construction and use, beyond a technical uniformity of approach it 
brings to the enquiry, being that such difficulties exist throughout philosophical enquiry, 
and will continue to exist there by virtue of the very nature of philosophy and its 
preoccupation with matter and mind, with being and knowing. To baulk at further 
enquiry into matters of human condition because definitional borders might be fuzzy is 
not acceptable. Achievement of major and minor aims is also discussed in Chapter 10. 
THESIS METHODOLOGY 
Differentiation between Esoteric and Exoteric Meanings of Key Terms 
As conjectured in Chapter 1, neither Science nor Ethics nor Polis emerged from a 
vacuum and in Plato’s time each inhered within a mix of theoretical, practical, and 
critical philosophy, which domains of philosophical enquiry themselves, through their 
emergence from nature and magic, were not without cultural and social dimensions.  
176 
 
In the Chapter 1 esoteric case for Plato, Science is understanding and learning 
occasioned by beholding of forms, Ethics is discernment of the unharmful from the 
harmful, and Polis is a gathering whose final cause is a city of ideas predicated on a 
heavenly city of objectively real forms existing in one only begotten heaven. Even so, 
Plato’s esotericism would find exoteric expression.  
For example in respect of Ethics, Jowett (1875, p. 192) emphasises that Socrates has 
disappeared by the time of Laws (Plato, 1952j, 1967/68a) and that already in Timaeus 
(Plato, 1925h, 1952v), Sophist (Plato, 1921b, 1952s) and Statesman (Plato, 1921b, 
1952t) while present, his role as chief speaker is handed to the Pythagorean Timaeus in 
Timaeus and an Eleatic Stranger in Sophist and Statesman and that perhaps, for purposes 
of Plato’s further development of his own philosophy, he is moving the dialogical 
Socrates out of a role of inquirer towards a role of legislator (Jowett, 2006, p. 5). Of the 
three speakers in Laws (Plato, 1952j, 1967/68a)—they meet to discuss laws—the lion’s 
share of answers is given by Cleinias representing Crete (ibid., p. 5). Cleinias is 
presented as a leader of a new colony, a real legislator in a real earthly state. Benardete 
explains that “the Eleatic Stranger informs Cleinias that Cnossos would be the city most 
suited for the new legislation” (Benardete, 2000b, p. 161) yet that “the Stranger can do 
in speech what Cleinias can never do in deed” (ibid., p. 161). 
The laws and constitutions discussed in the work, and collected there, are exoteric in 
nature. Here is discussed a plethora of conditions of which such matters as assault by a 
slave Laws 879 (Plato, 1952j, p. 576; 1967/68b), wounding (ibid., 876— - 879a, pp. 754 
– 756), involuntary homicide (ibid., 865a – 869e, pp. 749 - 751), dilution of product 
quality (ibid., 917e, p. 773, the making of wills (ibid., 922a -  926a, pp. 776 - 778), and 
freedom to transport goods to, and trade in, a market of choice (ibid., 848e – 850e, pp. 
741 - 742) are just some examples. These laws might be interpreted as laws for a second 
best state, not an ideal republic. In The Republic (Plato, 1952r, pp. 333, 339, 391 - 398; 
1969a), where the combination of the good human in the good state is found only in the 
ideal city, education of the soul, whether it be of children (ibid., VII 536d, p. 339) or 
guardians (ibid., III 401b pp. 333, VII 521-534, pp. 391 - 398), is largely education 
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within an earthly second best state, and it is predicated on the contributions those so 
educated might make in the interests of an ideal state. Music, mathematics, astronomy, 
and gymnastics, among others, are included, and some poetry, although aspects of 
Homer are discouraged. Censorship is allowed. This search for a special kind of 
education begins with discussion of earlier existing educational practice (ibid., VII, 521c 
– 522c, p. 391). 
In general, social capital peripheral to, but essential for, the function of the city can be 
found in the form of laws, constitutions, courts and court procedures, and in the actual 
political behaviour parodied by Aristophanes (1952a, 1952b, 1952c) in Birds, Knights, 
Frogs and Wasps. Viewed a posteriori these exoteric realities constitute partial proof of 
an esoteric and cognitive dimension of Ethics which for Plato, as revealed, is Ethics as 
an act of discerning the unharmful in the interests of happiness with justice. There is no 
suggestion that Ethics so described would necessarily be found in court procedures of 
Plato’s day, just as today it is not necessarily so that humans might find the notions they 
hold about Ethics and morality in the machinations of court justice.  
In the case of theoretical philosophy, outlined in Table 2 on page 25 Science, viewed a 
posteriori, also has its exoteric associate. For example, while commentators both recent 
and ancient allude to a scarceness of experimental proof, to rash decision making and/or 
reliance on poets (Guthrie, 1975a, p. 63) “and fabulists offering[s of] … tainted 
witnesses to disputed facts” (Heraclitus cited in Polybius, 1889, p. 315), to unfounded 
speculation overriding clinical experience (Hippocratic Writings, 1983a; 1983b, p. 154 - 
160; G. E. R. Lloyd, 1983, p. 1), and to importance of experience and observation in 
medicine (Hippocratic Writings, 1952b, pp. 9 - 19), the origins of Science as it is known 
today by virtue of its exoteric tangibles—its experiments, products, demonstrations and 
explanations—is discernible in Presocratic writers and Plato. Table 10, assembled from 
Presocratic fragments, from references to the Presocratic thinkers found in Plato and 
Aristotle, from references to Plato found in Aristotle and from references found in 
selected doxographists, exemplifies a claim made in the previous sentence that applied 
or experimental Science, exoteric Science, existed in Presocratic times.  
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Furthermore, Euclid’s Elements (1952) was in the making and although in its very 
nature it is esoteric, it subsequently manifests exoterically in an applied form. These 
writings, the Elements, became available circa BC 300 (T. L. Heath, 1952, p. ix) and 
centuries later were used to measure heights of objects, to inform Newton in the proofs 
of his Principia Mathematica (Newton, 1952a, pp. 72-75, passim) and for that matter 
some students studying and applying geometry today. Hippocrates and his colleagues 
were also writing systematically about disease and its treatment and the Hippocratic 
collection which has come down to us from Alexandria, where the works were 
posthumously assembled (Hippocratic Writings, 1952a), can be read as a present-day 
operations manual and/or medical text might be read. These works were written circa 
BC 430-330 (G. E. R. Lloyd, 1983, p. 9). 
The examples contained in Table 10 may be taken as exoteric manifestations of Science. 
Just as the respective exoteric examples provided earlier to help articulate the case for 
ethical thinking, existences such as laws and courts and the like, so the Table 10 
examples partly help document and articulate the case for exoteric Science in Presocratic 
and Socratic times. 
In exoteric form, gathering qua P(p)olis consists of, inter alia, state laws and 
constitutions serving heterogeneous cultures in possession of such skills as bread and 
wine making, animal husbandry, irrigation, weaving, leatherwork, sculpture clothes 
making, metallurgy, an arithmetic that had become mathematics, geometry, map 
making, blacksmithing, carpentry, stone cutting and assembling, astronomy, clinical and 
diagnostic medicine, military Science and many other skills competencies; the bricks 
and mortar and public places of the built environment; and of course the citizens and 
their wives, children and slaves, not all of these latter classes having citizenship voting 
rights. 
Jowett, in translating The Republic 327 (Plato, 1952r, p. 295; 1969a), catches something 
of the collective sense of the exoteric P(p)olis I have described in this paragraph by 
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Table 10: Manifestations of Scientific Thinking to the Time of Plato 
 
Revealed Scientific Activity and/or Scientific Discipline Source 
Thales 
Awareness that water is life. 
Metaphysics I 983b29 – 984a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, 
pp. 501 - 502; 1989) 
Speculation about the nature of magnets based on observation of their 
properties and use of these observed properties in explanation of other 
things.  
On the Soul I 2 405a20 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 634; 
1957a) 
Elements of meteorology and geology wherein, in discussion of his monad, 
water, he allows what is now called change of state. 
Hypp. Dox. 555, pp. 4-5  
Speculative thinking about the void or nothingness: a possible pre-runner to 
the vacuum. 
Aet. Plac. 1.2; Dox. 275, p. 5 
The moon reflects the sun’s light and is eclipsed by the earth’s shadow. Aet ii 1; Dox. 327, pp. 6 - 7 
Crude geography: The Nile backs up because winds cause sea to swell up at 
the mouth.  
Aet iv 1; 384, p. 7  
Anaximander 
Ideas of separation and mixture to explain coming to be and ceasing to be. 
Physics I 4 187a10 - 187 5 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 
262; 1984c)  
Explains earthquakes as a function of the physical elements after the fashion 
of what is now called geology and geography rather than say as retribution 
of the gods. Empedokles and Anaxagoras also get a mention. 
Meteorology II 7 365a10 - 365b20 (Aristotle, 
1952e; 1952f, p. 470) 
Herakleitos (Heraclitus) 
Herakleitos cautions as to the witness of poets and rash conjecture about the 
greatest things.  
Heraclitus DK 22B47, Polybius, Historia iv 40, (p. 
37) 
Herakleitos names Pythagoras an investigator. Diogenes Laertius Lives viii 6 (p. 29) 
Herakleitos and Demokritos (Democritus) name Thales as an astronomer 
who predicts eclipses.  
DK22B38, DK11A5, (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 33) 
Wry scientific reasoning that if all things should become smoke then 
perception should be by the nostrils. 
On Sense and the Sensible 5 443a21 (Aristotle, 
1952k, p. 681; 1957b)  
A mixture separates when not stirred. DK22B125, (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 45) 
Herakleitos names a generation, that is, attainment of grandfather status, to 
be 30 years.  
Plutarch, de Orac. def. 11, p. 415, (Fairbanks, 1898, 
p. 45) 
Herakleitos holds a position not unlike that held by post-moderns: reason is 
common but most individuals live as “though they had an understanding 
peculiar to themselves.” (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 47) 
DK22B2, (Against the Mathematicians vii. 133 
Sextus Empiricus, Bury 7.133.4). 
Early statement questioning the wisdom of utility maximisation in what 
later became germane to the so-called pleasure pain calculus of Bentham 
which informs much of rational economics and psychopathy in Post-
Modern times.  
Anthology iii. 83 Stobaeus. (p. 49)  
Passion has its way at the cost of the soul. 
Nicomachean Ethics II 3 1105a8 (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, p. 350) 
God is to man as man is to ape. 
Hippias Majeur (Plato, 1925b; Plato or Pseudo 
Plato, 1851, pp. 227 - 228) 
Xenophanes 
States that if cattle had hands to paint they would paint gods in their own 
image.  
DK21B15, (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 67) 
A crude ‘web of life cycle’ from sea to winds to clouds to rain and rivers.  DK 21B30 
By searching men better find out the secrets only partly revealed by the 
gods. 
Stobaeus Anthology xxix. 41 (p. 71) 
Parmenides 
A paraphrase of the big questions about being and non being that have 
preoccupied the minds ever since and a statement of challenge questions for 
Aristotle. The idea that thought is predicated on being. 
DK 28B1-7,8  
Zeno 
Zeno’s discussion on the flight of the arrow reveals thoughts by Zeno 
germane to what later became the domain of relativity theory.  
Simp. Phys 236 v; (p. 116) 
Moon’s reflected light. 
DK28B14 – 15, (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 101; Freeman, 
1948, p. 45)  
Empedokles (Empedocles) 
The doctrine that nothing comes from nothing. 
On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias 2; 975a36 
(Aristotle or another, 1936/2015, 1984a) 
Basic anatomy: recognition that liver is well supplied with blood. Fairbanks (p. 189) 
Empedocles provides a crude explanation of atmospheric pressure and 
breathing. Democritus also gets a mention nearby.  
On Breathing 473b9 (Aristotle, 1952h, p. 719; 
2000) 
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Table 10 (continuing first with Empedokles) 
 
Revealed Scientific Activity and/or Scientific Discipline Source 
Empedokles’s provides a crude scientific explanation of vision and the senses.  
On Generation and Corruption I 8 325b26 - 325a (Aristotle, 1952i, p. 423; 2007) 
Empedokles asserts that light travels from the sun through the intervening 
space. 
On Sense and the Sensible 446a25 – 446b 
(Aristotle, 1952k, p. 684) 
Empedokles asserts that sex is mixed in plants. (Fairbanks, 1898, p. 220) 
Empedokles explains wine taste as a function of soil type.  Aet, Plac. v 26; 438, p. 229 
Anaxagoras 
Mind exists alone. DK 59B12 
Scientific idea of the mixture used to explain coming into being and ceasing 
to be. 
Simpl. Phys. 34 v 163, (p. 245) 
Explanation that the void does not exist based on observations of 
experiments in which skins are inflated “up tight” and air is trapped in 
clepsydrae: air consists of something.  
Physics IV 6 213a15 - 213b3 (Aristotle, 1936b; 
1952n, pp. 292-393; 1984a)  
The Pythagoreans in General 
The Pythagorean postulate of a fire (sun?) centred cosmology in which the 
earth’s movement about the fire produces night and day.  
 
The Pythagoreans associated the rainbow with the sun’s rays.  
 
Pythagorean attempts at inter-disciplinary studies: for example astronomy 
with geometry and music: Pythagorean opinion that the evening and 
morning stars are the same star.  
 
The Pythagorean monad for the physis involves an application of number 
and mathematics to physical existence. 
 
 
Geometry defines the cosmos. 
 
 
All of nature consists of numbers.  
 
On the Heavens II 13 293a15-25 (Aristotle, 1952m, 
p. 384; 1984a).  
 
Aet. Plac. III; Dox. 364, pp. 148 - 149 
 
Hippol Phil. 2; Dox 555, p. 151 
Dox 476, p. 151 
 
 
On the Heavens 303a5 - 303a10,  (Aristotle, 
1952m, p. 394; 1984a) Metaphysics I 985b20 - 
986a20 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 503 - 504; 1989) 
 
Metaphysics I 985b25 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 503; 
1989) 
 
On the Heavens III 300a14, I 268a10-a 14 
(Aristotle, 1952m, pp. 391, 359; 1984a); Physics III 
203a - 203b (Aristotle, 1936b; 1952n, pp. 280 - 
281) 
Plato 
Plato uses the idea of watertightness to explain the manner in which the 
desires of the intemperate and uninitiated are akin to holes in a vessel, the 
vessel being the human body which imprisons the soul.  
 
A discussion of reflection in mirrors, then shiny bronze surfaces, wherein a 
now superseded explanation of inversion, convexity and other such optical 
phenomena betrays the practical experimental that informs it.  
Earth-centred universe. 
Gorgias 493 (Plato, 1952g; 1967b, p. 276) 
 
 
 
Timaeus 46 – 47 (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, pp. 454-
455) 
The Myth of Er in The Republic 614 onwards 
(Plato, 1952r, pp. 437 – 441; 1988) 
Notes (1): For ease of access page numbers supplied for the fragments and doxographists refer to the collection in Fairbanks (1898) 
which is more readily available in English. (2) The following abbreviations apply: Dox. = Diels, Doxographi Gracci, Berlin 1879; 
Aet. = Actii de placitis reliquiae included in the Diels Dox.; Hipp. Phil. = Hippolyti philosophumena included in Diels Dox.; Epi = 
Epiphanii varia excerpta included in Diels Dox.; Herm. = Hermiae irrisio gentilium philosophorum included in Diels Dox.; Sim. 
Phys. = Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor priores edidit H. Diels, Berlin 1882; Simp. Cael. = Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Metaphysics. (pp. 495-626). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), 
Aristotle I. (Vol. 8), Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). On the Heavens. (pp. 357 - 406). In R. M. Hutchins 
(Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). Physics. (pp. 259 - 359). In R. M. Hutchins 
(Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). Meteorology. (pp. 445 - 494). In R. M. 
Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). On Generation and Corruption. 
(pp. 407 – 441). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.) Aristotle II. (Vol. 9). Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). On Sense 
and the Sensible. (pp. 671 – 689). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. 
(1952). Gorgias. (pp. 252 - 294). In Plato. (Vol. 7). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1952). Timaeus. (pp. 442 - 
447). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. (Vol. 7). Chicago: William Benton; Plato. (1851). Hippias Majeur. London: 
Henry G Bohm Covent Garden; Fairbanks, A. (1898). The First Philosophers of Greece. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons; Plato. (1952) Republic. (pp.295 – 441). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. Chicago: William Benton; 
Plato. (1952) Timaeus. (pp. 442 - 4470. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. Chicago: William Benton. 
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interpreting the Greek ἄστυ, as city in English, city qua a bricks and mortar and 
institutions existence like the Piraeus towards which the discussants were walking.  
Many of those practical Science skills outlined in the previous paragraph are also 
discernible in descriptions of a mythical Atlantis Plato provides in Timaeus 25a – 26a 
(Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 446) and Critias 114c – 117e (Plato, 1925a; 1952d, pp. 481 - 
483), and archaeological evidence from such cities as Pergamum, Syracuse, Memphis, 
and yet earlier ones like Byblos, Tyre, and Sidon already abandoned and resettled, 
speaks for itself. Such was the extent of skills development in which Plato raised his 
esoteric notions of Science, Ethics and Polis when Athena, clad in ivory and gold, stood 
resplendent in a newly rebuilt Parthenon. 
While these exoteric dimension tangibles identified in preceding tables and paragraphs 
are necessary for understandings of the key terms Science, Ethics, and Polis, they are 
insufficient as prime criteria because they do not convey a full understanding of the 
meanings attributed to these key terms for enquiry purposes. Rather, these exoteric 
referents serve as anchoring buoys for an esoteric key terms usage employed in this 
enquiry. Esoteric dimension usage is chosen because of a greater challenge it presents, 
deeper and different kind of thought it requires and so that enquiry methodology might 
be one predicated on, and robustly encompassing of, a kind of so-called geography of 
the mind enquiry prevalent during the time span covered by the enquiry. It is not as 
though geography of mind considerations are no longer relevant. Researchers, in spite of 
sophisticated technology available, continue to confront possibilities that faculties of 
mind which process reason, imagination, emotion, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and nor might it yet be possible to confidently partition the physical brain, the 
grey matter, on a basis of function other than through acceptance of fuzzy boarder 
division (Oscar-Berman, 2004, pp. 159 - 160).  
This question of interconnectedness became better understood, if not more greatly 
clarified, over the eons. 
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For when we say, the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul ... yet I 
suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused 
notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, 
and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which 
has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating 
to them (Locke, 1912, p. 132).  
Later, in the twentieth century, William James acknowledged how difficult it is for all of 
us but to store all sense perceptions of things in one place, after once, as babies, having 
experienced the “one great blooming buzzing confusion” (James, 1910, p. 16) assault by 
the senses brings. Many questions about geography of mind appear to remain 
unanswered and in the twenty-first century Damasio (1995, p. 258; 2010, pp. 5 - 6) 
suggests, in the face of neuroscientific definitional compartmentalisation of the brain, 
that it is very difficult, to say the least, to know how brain makes mind. An overview of 
his hypothesis of how self comes to brain making mind is subsequently provided on 
page 619 of this enquiry. 
How Esoteric Key Terms Meaning and Nuance is Captured for Enquiry Purposes? 
As discussed earlier on pages 9 to 13 an esoteric meaning of each of the key terms 
Science, Ethics and Polis is captured through discerned differences in answers to 
chapeau questions respectively asked of three esoteric key terms referents—method, 
domain of operations and constraints. These referents are again exhibited in the 
dimension referents row of Table 11 on page 183 which table, in spite of its different 
layout, is largely a reproduction of the text box content on page 12 except (a) that the 
aqua shaded generic answer template examples Table 11 contains are slightly more 
tailored to the respective key term being chapeau questioned, and (b) that notes (2) and 
(3) to the table reveal a kind of invisible enigma or flaw in the methodology itself. The 
enigma or flaw is itself part of a more general perplexity and knowing-being divide 
problem addressed, but not necessarily resolved, by such scholars as Plato (BC c. 427 – 
c. 347), Aristotle (BC 384 – 322), Descartes (AD 1596 – 1650), Berkeley(AD 1685 – 
1753) and Heidegger (AD 1889 – 1976). The chapeau questions call forth answers 
corralled by referent marker vectors and when these answers are known for each key
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term an esoteric understanding of the key term is known, discerned difference in 
meaning between progressive chapeau-question measurements of those terms being the 
enquiry’s surrogate measure of nuance.  
Enquiry Usage of an Exoteric/Esoteric Divide 
Enquiry usage of the terms exoteric and esoteric is different from that employed in 
Straussian and Tubingen School literature and the accompanying dialogue box on page 
184 outlines these differing meanings usages.  
Table 11: Tabular Illustration of a Process by which Chapeau Questions are Applied 
to Esoteric Key Terms Referents in Discerning Esoteric Terms Meanings 
Chapeau Questions(1) (CQ) 
by Esoteric Referent (R) 
Esoteric Key Terms Meaning(2) 
(Generic Form of Answers to Chapeau Questioning of Esoteric Key Terms Referents)(3)(4) 
CQ R Science Ethics Polis 
How do I come to know? 
 
M
eth
o
d
 
By that method or process 
through which I come to 
know truth. 
By that method or process 
through which I come to 
recognise, and inhere in, the 
good. 
By that method or process 
which enables receipt of that 
shared belief and 
understanding which binds 
humans in cognitive 
gathering.  
What do I come to 
know?(2) 
O
p
eratio
n
s 
Varies kinds of knowledge 
and understanding about the 
nature of scientific 
knowledge, about the-that-
which-can-be-no-other. 
Various kinds of knowledge 
and understandings about the 
nature of the good, about 
what it might mean to be 
ethical and about which 
faculties and conditions of 
mind might inform attempts 
to be ethical. 
Aspects of political 
philosophy on which Polis as 
an expression of gathering is 
itself predicated. 
What states and 
conditions of mind limit 
my knowing? 
C
o
n
strain
ts 
Aspects of human condition, 
human mind and cognitive 
procedural method in 
Science that might limit 
access to, and understanding 
of, scientific method and its 
knowledge and operations. 
Aspects of human condition 
and mind and cognitive 
procedural method in Ethics 
that might thwart 
understanding and 
attainment of ethical 
condition and its operations. 
Aspects of human condition 
and mind that may constrain 
Polis method and preclude 
participation in Polis and its 
operations. 
 
Notes: (1) An important qualification must accompany the chapeau-question process for Ethics method. As the enquiry progresses 
Ethics is early on and then repeatedly found not to exist until knowing, through active thought, is transformed into a condition of 
being qua doing or action. Thoughts per se are neutral and Ethics might “exist” only when thoughts are actioned. Early on, Ethics 
is as much a question of ontology on the side of the exoteric as it is of epistemology on the side of the esoteric—notwithstanding, 
as explained, that the other key terms also have their exoteric dimensions. It, Ethics, is a kind of active state of knowledge. This 
particular caveat acknowledges a general enigmatic problem inherent in the methodology as it has been constructed and of the 
human condition in general. Yet, were the methodology somehow constructed on chapeau questions primarily predicated on 
ontology rather than epistemology, it very likely would not have survived the distance of the enquiry, and its efficacy might soon 
have been exhausted. Nevertheless, some kind of visible working methodology, warts and all or not, is necessary if the planned 
enquiry is to proceed. (2) Long since before Descartes, there has been appreciation of a view that to think is to be Nicomachean 
Ethics 1170a25 – 1175b (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 424), that is, a recognition that being and knowing are closely related. 
Nevertheless all chapeau questions are framed as epistemology rather than ontology. (3) Part of the enquiry methodology involves 
depicting esoteric key enquiry terms as consisting of three referents or esoteric dimension vectors. Progressive chapter by chapter 
derivation of specific versions of the generic aqua shaded answers—such answers result from application of the olive green 
chapeau questions—allows slight difference to be detected and esoteric key terms nuance to be discerned and is the basis on which 
the series of key terms nuance tables is assembled. Thus for example, in respect of Plato say, esoteric Science is partaking of the 
forms and occasioning of learning through reminiscence (its method), informed by knowledge of the good, beautiful, eternal and 
unchanging (its domain of operations), subject to mankind’s flawed divinity (its constraint). See also page 609. (4) The slight 
difference in wording of aqua shaded generic answer forms between this table and chapeau question method overview box on page 
183 is intentionally provided to facilitate clarity of matching between each chapeau question, referent and key term across the rows 
of this table. Key term meaning, when it is measured in specific cases, emerges from reading down the columns. 
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Explanation of Enquiry Methodology 
Apart from the process by which esoteric key terms meanings are discerned, that is by 
the chapeau questioning of esoteric 
referents explained in the 
penultimate paragraph, enquiry 
methodology consists of three 
more components, viz: (a) capture 
of key terms nuance by reiterative 
progressive chapeau-question 
tracing of esoteric key terms 
meaning, chapter by chapter, 
nuance as earlier mentioned, being 
surrogately measured through 
discerned differences in 
progressively measured key terms 
meaning; (b) progressive 
interpretation of Thesis Proposition 
Statements through application of 
that captured key terms nuance—
enquiry key terms being also key 
terms in the Thesis Proposition 
Statements—and (c) exhaustion or 
breakdown of the exoteric/esoteric 
divide convention under 
methodology processes (a) and (b) and use of it, that breakdown of the exoteric/esoteric 
divide convention, as a marker of change so different as to suggest an emerging new era. 
Progressive tracing of esoteric key terms nuance through the chapeau question process, 
when that nuance is subsequently carried to progressive interpretation of Thesis 
Proposition Statements, allows that interpretation to proceed in a logical and consistent 
manner within, and not fatal to integrity of, foundational attributions of esoteric key
 
 
Straussian, Tubingen School and Enquiry Usage of the Terms Esoteric 
and Exoteric 
 
Straussian 
Esoteric: a persecution and art of writing idea that ancient writings may be 
appreciated at a second level of understanding hidden beneath literal 
meaning of written words but detectable through clues found in associated 
dimensions, for example speaker order, attribution of key ideas to speakers, 
portraying speakers as representatives of specific causes, location and 
setting, metaphor and image trope and the like.  
Exoteric: meaning discerned on the face of the words themselves. 
 
Tubingen School 
Esoteric: a conviction that primary principles of being and emergence of 
the ideas were revealed by Plato in a lecture or course of lectures on the 
good and may be discerned between the lines of his writings and the 
comments of others so that it is possible to exhume unwritten Platonic 
doctrines and apply them in interpretation of the dialogues. Plato’s 
unrecorded lectures are claimed to have extended the discussion on the 
good found in Republic VI 504e – 509c (Plato, 1952r, pp. 384 - 386; 
1969a). 
Exoteric: acceptance that Plato’s doctrines are available in the lines of the 
dialogues, not between them, exoteric writings being for those outside the 
school and esoteric or unwritten but spoken doctrines, for those within the 
school. 
 
Usage in this Enquiry 
Esoteric: of ideas as opposed to materiality, thus Plato’s city of ideas is 
esoteric and Pericles’ beautiful Athens is exoteric. Likewise Plato’s 
Science qua soul’s beholding of forms is esoteric while his own reliance on 
watertightness to explain the soul’s imprisonment is, like say 
Anaximander’s explanation of earthquakes in terms of physical elements 
rather than in terms of gods, exoteric. An esoteric Rousseau qua educator 
of youth might inhere in his artistic creation of Émile. An exoteric 
Rousseau qua educator of a youth might reveal itself in his depositing 
children in an orphanage or poorhouse say. An exoteric Rousseau may too 
reveal itself in a French education system partly informed by that work 
Émile (Rousseau, 1918) years after books of that name were burnt.  
 
Exoteric: actual as sensed rather than ideal as thought about, the making or 
doing of, rather than the thinking of alone.  
 
Mutual exclusivity dimensions of enquiry methodology’s employment of 
an esoteric/exoteric divide are discussed on pages 186 to 189.  
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terms meaning and hierarchy 
explained in the Introduction. So 
constructed, the methodologly might 
deflect have-your-cake-and-eat-it 
arrows launched against it. As earlier 
explained, while the enquiry 
conjectures an emerging new era, it 
does not proceed further in analysis of 
morphing or otherwise of the 
discerned change into what has 
subsequently been called a modern age.  
Example: Brief Application of Enquiry Methodology in Plato’s Case 
Table 12 on page 186 illustrates the esoteric meanings outcomes when chapeau 
questioning of esoteric key terms referents is applied to the content of Chapter 1’s 
discussion of Plato. Science, informed by knowledge of the good, beautiful, eternal and 
unchanging subject to mankind’s flawed divinity, occasions learning through 
reminiscence of its partaking of the forms. Plato’s Ethics which reveals nous discerning 
between harmful and unharmful pleasure informed by knowledge of taxis and cosmos of 
Polis which itself binds cognitive human gathering, is knowledge of the beneficial and 
that which never harms and which resides in obedience to the law, justice and self-
control, under constraint of recalcitrant desire and will. These meanings are constructed 
from the specific answers given in Table12 which answers are specific versions of the 
generic templates given in Table 11. 
Polis is a gathering predicated on acceptance of objectively real forms in one only 
begotten heaven, a gathering informed by idealised classical Greek virtues subject to 
constraints of flawed divinity, a constraint so powerful that an esoteric Polis so 
constituted may never materialise on earth.  
 
Thesis Proposition Statements 
(1) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving recognition of 
a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is divine and for whom knowledge 
is power, which recognition provides an alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in natural social 
instinct implanted in mankind for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge.  
 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science 
ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its 
new form as conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own right 
for direct benefits it could bring to society and state.  
 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to practical 
Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active obedience to the 
law of the state. 
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In the next and subsequent chapters, and starting with Aristotle, this enquiry progresses 
through iterative measurement and application of key terms nuance to Thesis 
Proposition Statements. Page 609 provides an overview table. 
General Matters of Method 
The exoteric/esoteric divide employed within enquiry methodology is not without its 
own problems, attendant epistemological/ontological enigma and have-your-cake-and-
eat-it issues having already been addressed. For example if it is accepted that humans 
may not imagine anything which is otherwise than a product of objects and/or emotions 
previously experienced—on this line even imagined existence of a heaven is predicated 
on something experienced, for example angels consisting of body, limbs and wings in 
turn existing in tangible forms on birds and insects—then the esoteric/exoteric 
Table 12: Tabular Example of Measurement of Esoteric Key Terms Meaning for the 
Case of Plato 
 
Chapeau Questions by Esoteric Referent by Key Terms 
Esoteric Key Term Meaning 
(Answers Derived from Chapeau Questioning of Key 
Terms Referents)   
C
h
a
p
ea
u
 Q
u
estio
n
s 
How do I come to know? 
M
eth
. 
S
cien
ce 
By partaking of the forms and occasioning of learning 
through reminiscence.  
What do I come to know? 
O
p
s. 
Knowledge of the good, beautiful, eternal and 
unchanging. 
What states and conditions of mind limit my 
knowing? 
C
o
n
s. 
Mankind’s flawed divinity.  
How do I come to know? 
M
eth
. 
E
th
ics 
Through nous discerning between harmful and 
unharmful pleasure.  
What do I come to know? 
O
p
s. 
Knowledge of taxis and cosmos of the Polis, knowledge 
of the beneficial and that which never harms and which 
resides in obedience to the law, justice and self-control. 
What states and conditions of mind limit my 
knowing? 
C
o
n
s. 
Recalcitrant desire and will. 
How do I come to know? 
M
eth
. 
P
o
lis 
Through idealistic cognitive gathering in a republic of 
ideas predicated on acceptance of objectively real forms 
in one only begotten heaven.  
What do I come to know? 
O
p
s. 
Cognitive existence of Polis as an expression and 
explanation of a political philosophy on which the 
gathering itself is predicated, in Plato’s time, a city of 
ideas a predicated on idealised classic Greek virtues and 
final knowledge of objective forms.  
What states and conditions of mind limit my 
knowing? 
C
o
n
s. 
Ideality itself of Polis itself together with mankind’s 
cognitively flawed divinity. 
Notes: Meth. = method, Ops. = domain of operations and Cons. = constraints. 
 
187 
 
differentiation can hardly be a differentiation into mutually exclusive categories. It is 
difficult to know how one set, the imagined or esoteric may be present in the absence of 
mutually shared information with the other, the somatic markers of experienced real 
objects and/or felt emotions generated in situations when human values are confronted, 
even arguably in the case of pure mathematics. For example Heidegger’s reading of 
being qua Dasein, as something from beyond being which expresses itself in an 
understanding of being, and of poiesis within Dasein as a principle of origination, and 
bringing forth from concealment or leading into unconcealment, which yet does not 
reveal itself in the work or doing of the unconcealment (Heidegger, 1950/2002, pp. 41, 
47 - 48) does not for me clarify esoteric/exoteric divide. This issue of mutual exclusivity 
of categories of mind and/or mind directing action has been ever thus a problem of 
exegesis based on mind enquiring into mind and continues to this day in psychopathy 
and neuroscience as subsequently cited in later chapters. Nevertheless this issue of mind 
and mind-body, that is, this issue of esoteric and exoteric as intersecting or merged 
domain sets, rather than non-intersecting sets, is harnessed as a key factor of enquiry 
methodology. In particular, perceived relatively quickening change in political 
philosophy as a harbinger of an emerging new era is marked by key terms nuance’s 
exhaustion of exoteric/esoteric divide methodology.  
For example, in respect of the key term Polis as esoteric gathering in The Republic 
(Plato, 1952r, 1969a), the esoteric city of ideas domain set is likely the more dominant 
set and likely has the greater part of its intersection with the P(p)olis exoteric domain 
set. By the time of Plato’s wish list of gathering exoteric laws and artefacts in Laws 711e 
- 712a (Plato, 1952j, p. 680; 1967/68b), the esoteric city of ideas probably still retains 
the greater of the intersecting esoteric and exoteric domain sets, the city of practical laws 
being likely the lesser of the two, but still in encroachment of the esoteric, such 
encroachment appearing incrementally marginal in key terms nuance until Bacon’s time. 
However in New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1952a), Bensalem qua P(p)olis or exoteric city qua 
gathering of applied Science, manufacturing, building and trade appears ascendant in 
comparison to Polis qua esoteric gathering predicated on goodliness, peace and 
prosperity per se. This arrival, in one short book, of P(p)olis as possibly the dominant of 
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the two intersecting content sets is interpreted as a quickening ascendant encroachment 
of P(p)olis on Polis. Such exhaustion of exoteric key terms usage also occurs for Science 
and Ethics at this time and as earlier mentioned this coincidence is the enquiry marker of 
emergence of a new era. Nevertheless the methodology is troublesome and use of set 
theory language in this paragraph serves only to bring imagery to explanation and 
implies no strict application of the mathematical rules governing it.  
Interpretation such as that in the last paragraph of an emerging new era, and for that 
matter interpretations of traced nuance and so-called falls of one representational 
political philosophy to another, are not paradigm-shift-interpretations. So, for example, 
ascendance of Christian faith Ethics over Aristotelian rational Ethics when described as 
a fall of rational Ethics to faith Ethics does not signal a disappearance or non-utility of 
rational ethics. The process is one of independent coevality with gradual merging and 
unification, not annihilation of one so-called paradigm by another, complete only when 
stalwart adherents to the displaced paradigm die out. The interpretation is thus not 
Kuhnian but rather Tolstoyan in that they who introduce new ideas and causes may 
likely lose control of them and be swept along with changes which follow, even to an 
extent of witnessing usage of those ideas in ways anathematic to their own carefully 
conceived and formulated intentions for them. On this adopted logic it follows within 
this enquiry that when change, whether interpreted favourably or unfavourably, is 
associated with ideas found in particular writers, no blame is attributed to those writers. 
Bases for blame there may or may not reasonably be but blame is outside of the 
principal focus of the enquiry and even in raw close to the bone moments there is no 
step, overt or covert,  to attributing blame to particular writers. 
A strength of the esoteric/exoteric divide methodology is that it is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate tracking of key terms nuance over a long period, all be it a careful 
tracking as though it were performed on thin ice. Weaknesses include singularity and 
narrowness of the three-vector measure of esotericism which partly informs the 
exoteric/exoteric divide exhaustion criterion or marker of era change, and its 
consequential limitation of boundaries within which enquiry findings might be 
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predicated, interpreted or applied. Of course it hardly needs saying that judgement about 
which of the two domains, that is the esoteric or the exoteric, is at any particular time the 
greater, and how judged so, is subjective, reasoned subjectivity without intended 
dogmatism or bias being the currency of the enquiry. Yet when terms are defined, 
humans are capable of analysing construct in ordinal rankings of those terms based on 
categories such as greater or lesser applied to them. The general problem of defining 
word meaning in terms of other words is ever present and long ago acknowledged, this 
issue being recognized from the beginning and throughout the enquiry.  
Finally under this General Matters of Method section, just as the term P(p)olis, was 
earlier derived from Polis, to mark exoteric gathering, other terms, Ovid-moment, 
Augustine-moment, Goethe-moment, and Yahoo-moment are derived to help identify 
possible esoteric states of human condition coeval with exoteric acts of transgression, an 
area of esoteric human condition relatively neglected in enquiry about Ethics and human 
being. These terms are developed to mark, but not explain, conditions of mind conjoint 
with exoteric acts of transgression, conditions of some kind of knowing accompanying 
some kind of doing qua state of being, and whatever these conditions of mind may be, 
and how measured, there is no escaping that as terms they take their meanings, including 
intensity of meaning and evoked feelings, from values interpretation of the acts of 
transgression themselves. These terms are not used until Chapter 8. 
In respect of the preceding paragraph’s claim about neglected areas of Ethics and being, 
it might be plausibly suggested that in those big impressive and long received 
contributions in Ethics, for example dialogues by Plato, contributions by Aristotle, 
scriptures of major Western religions, and scholastic constructions by the likes of 
Aquinas, general prohibitions of certain acts, along with specific taboos appear to be 
stated and/or discussed, assurances of rewards for conformity with those prohibitions 
provided, categories of rational and spiritual mind identified, procedures of mind aimed 
at assisting humans to conduct themselves ethically in accordance with those general 
prohibitions and specific taboos advocated, and ritual process and procedure mandated 
to help those procedures and processes of mind prevent or deter unethical act. In one 
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sense these measures are preventative exoteric-domain or before-act-of-transgression 
devices, something like a preventive medicine, their object being maintenance of 
esoteric vision of ethical being. But once humans step outside of such citadels of 
exoteric prevention, that is step into acts of transgression, esoteric vision of ethic ideal is 
devalued or may even collapse. Generally exoteric prescriptions of what may or may not 
be done in such situations are available. One may, after transgression, desist from further 
acts—don’t smoke, don’t look, don’t steal—until or in spite of temptation’s return, or 
during transgression itself stop smoking or looking or begin replacing stolen goods. One 
may also, after transgression enter a state of resolve, or prayer for forgiveness and 
repentance and/or a mental state of awareness in respect of actions allowed others 
against them, for example, forgiveness or ugly eyes-for-eyes or life-for-spoiled-honour 
obscenities, practical helps being available through various rehabilitation programmes 
and/or aiding and abetting criminality according as the case may be, depending on 
values held. Generally though, discussion of various states of collapse of esoteric ideals 
coincident with acts of transgression outside those preventive medicine citadels of 
morals are harder to find and to help remedy this perceived lacuna for enquiry purposes, 
four states of fallen esoteric moral vision are constructed for enquiry use.  
Thus when stepping out of such preventive citadels, stepping out understood esoterically 
as moments of mind during moments of acts of transgression, humans are, for esoteric 
meanings purposes, depicted in terms of four conditions of momentary knowing 
arbitrarily conjectured for enquiry purposes: (a) Ovid or video-sequor moment—“I see 
and approve of the better but follow the worse solution” Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or 
VII 25 – 30 (Ovid, 1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144), (b) Augustine-moment—God give me 
the strength but not just yet, (c) Goethe-moment—“I see no fault committed which I 
could not have committed myself” (Goethe, 1906, p. 86) more often found in redacted 
forms such as “There is no crime of which I do not deem myself capable” (Kardener & 
Kardener, 2010, p. 145; Reik, 1945, p. 45), and popularly stated as there is no crime so 
terrible and repulsive that I would not commit it, or (d) Yahoo-moment—that 
unfortunate condition of humanity (Swift, 1800, pp. 54, 290, 295 - 297) detected present 
from Plato’s shadow boxer mentality The Republic IX 586a – 586c (Plato, 1952r, p. 424; 
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1969a) to mentality of Nietzsche’s “most contemptible thing: that … last man” 
(Nietzsche, 1924, p. 11). The terms are not ranked by ordinal degree of immorality nor 
are they necessarily mutually exclusive. Further articulation of these terms occurs in the 
context of their use in Chapter 9, particularly in evaluation of an innovative element 
posited present in Francis Bacon’s Politique Ethics.  
Throughout the enquiry, traced esoteric key terms nuance is linked with its coeval 
associate, those exoteric realities of the day such as discoveries, technologies, political 
milestones, developments in equity law and attainments of now famous charters. This 
linking allows anchoring of esoteric nuance to more generally established milestones 
found in history and philosophy of Science and technology literature and brings some 
perspective of historical time to the esoteric thread of the enquiry.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have outlined a framework methodology developed to allow progressive 
measurement of esoteric key-terms meanings and application of those meanings in 
articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements in a systematic and consistent manner. The 
chapter also discussed strengths and weaknesses of its constructed method, provided a 
brief example application of it, explained differences amongst enquiry use of the terms 
exoteric and esoteric and their usage in Straussian and Tubingen School of Philosophy 
literature, and attributed meanings to marker terms such as P(p)olis, Ovid-moment, 
Augustin-moment Goethe-moment and Yahoo-moment, in preparation for their 
subsequent use. 
The framework methodology is simple. First esoteric definition of key terms is chosen. 
Secondly, progressive measurement of key terms nuance is effected in a consistent 
manner. Esoteric meanings of Science, Ethics and Polis are measured by calibration 
against esoteric domain referential criteria, namely, intellectual method, cognitive 
domain or sphere of operations, and faculty-of-soul constraints. Change detected in 
esoteric key terms meanings progressively so measured becomes the enquiry’s surrogate 
measure of key terms nuance. Thirdly, key-terms nuance so captured is applied in  
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Table 13: Key Terms Nuance—Plato (BC c.427 – c.347) to Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) 
Descriptor  
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
Under Plato (BC c.427 – c.347)- 
Science 
Knowledge of the unchanging or the that-which-can-be-no-
other received through the beholding of the one and the 
forms. Science makes learning through reminiscence 
possible because it is a referent for the senses. 
Intellectual knowledge of the beautiful and the good: 
knowledge of that which is unchanging and eternal, of that 
which can be no other, of that which constitutes first 
principles. 
Mankind’s flawed divinity. 
C
irca B
C
 4
0
0
 
Ethics 
Wisdom as nous discerning between harmful and 
unharmful pleasure. 
The bringing of knowledge of the taxis and cosmos of the 
Polis—the beneficial, and that which never harms, which 
resides in obedience to the law, justice and self-control. 
Recalcitrant desire and will. 
Polis 
An ideal just and happy gathering, a city of ideas in which 
classical Greek values prevail and in which truth informs 
reason. 
Its own cognitive utility as an expression and explanation 
of the sociology and political philosophy of the gathering 
itself, and the predication of that gathering on four classic 
Greek values. 
Its own ideality together with mankind’s flawed divinity. 
Under Aristotle (BC 385 - 322)—Chapter 3 
Science 
The syllogistic demonstration of universal truth from 
intuited singulars. 
The faculty of the rational soul occasioned through the 
presence of nous when philosophical wisdom contemplates 
natural physical beings, mathematics and the gods, and also 
when it informs practical wisdom. 
The difficulty of selecting correct premises through intuition 
and induction. 
C
irca B
C
 3
8
0
 
Ethics 
Practical wisdom in discernment between good and bad 
acts or when, in art, practical wisdom informs true 
reasoning of the skills needed for the job at hand. 
The calculative faculty of the rational soul and abode of 
practical wisdom; a condition and state of virtue which 
exists under the patronage of philosophical wisdom when 
practical wisdom engages with the lower moral virtues in 
sublimation of mankind’s arete of happiness with virtue. 
Human frailty inherent in the loss of will under desire and 
pleasure or the irascible. 
Polis 
The final cause of the gathering and natural state of 
happiness with honour. 
That condition prior to mankind and that social instinct 
implanted in mankind and its flowering into the natural 
stable and good of the cognitive Polis. 
The fall of reason and will to desire and the passions. 
Under a Fall of Greek Rationality to Revelation and Christian Faith to the Time of Augustine (AD 354 - 430)—Chapter 4 
Science 
Science is irrelevant and at best, as naked syllogistic 
method, has been banished to house arrest and dormant 
storage.  
The oblivion of an imposed banishment. Revealed truth. 
F
ro
m
 C
h
rist to
 A
u
g
u
stin
e 
(A
D
 3
4
5
 –
 4
3
0
) 
Ethics 
The overcoming of the absolute sin of the commandments 
through grace and faith in a personal Christ and surrender 
of  human will to God’s will, that is, surrender of irrational 
soul, containing evil and sin and the devil’s work, to 
rational soul, containing the goodness of God’s work.  
A condition and state of moral virtue attained through, and 
proportional to, acceptance of the absolute laws of revealed 
truth.  
Human free will and human frailty. 
 
Polis 
Ratification, through grace, of citizenship of the eternal 
cognitive city of God attainable by personal acceptance of 
God as Logos and the all in all. 
The human soul in various states of beatitude appropriate to 
levels of acceptance of Christ as Logos. 
Contaminated nature, flawed humanity, free will, and the 
devil’s evil presence in human irrational soul. 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
From the Time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) and on to, and as at, the Close of the Twelfth Century—Chapter 5 
Science 
Syllogistic demonstration through dialectic and-yes-and-no 
disputation of truth about Christian scriptures but outside 
of the articles of faith: the syllogistic demonstration of the 
true from the false. 
God’s created holy rational nature in its act of love and 
choice of the highest good which as a human condition 
prepares the way for faith. 
The articles of faith. 
M
id
 fifth
 cen
tu
ry
 to
 clo
se o
f th
e 
tw
elfth
 cen
tu
ry
 
Ethics 
Reasoned understanding of, and inherence in, religious 
truths revealed in Christian scriptures and associated 
authorised church dogma.  
Faith as a condition of emotions and will: moral 
consciousness understood as the degree to which individual 
subjective consciousness is at one with consciousness of 
absolute Christian commandments. 
Weakness of human will resulting in consent to transgress absolute 
Christian moral inhibitions. Good intention’s fall to evil.  
Polis 
Ratification, through reasoned faith and love of God, of 
citizenship of an eternal cognitive city of God. 
Uncompromising unquestioning belief in the articles of 
faith realised through human will’s refusal to transgress 
Christian prohibitions’.  
Intention and consent: that cognitive state occasioned 
when, within moral consciousness of the good and evil 
inhabiting the person, the will, under reason, consents, 
through love of God, to good above evil.  
Intention’s temptation by, and fall to, evil. 
The Thirteenth Century: The High Point of Faith-Science Syncretism under Aquinas (died 1275)—Chapter 6 Step One: Science, Ethics and Polis from Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274)  
Science 
The intellectual virtue of syllogistic demonstration both a 
priori and a posteriori in dialectic and logic within the 
confines of a revealed faith theology. Theology too is a 
Science in an exoteric sense, that is, it uses reasoned 
demonstration, its esoteric dimension being God’s revealed 
truths. 
The faculties of the intellectual virtues of wisdom, or 
theoretical reason, Science or syllogistic reasoning, and 
understanding or intellect inhering in the intellect’s 
necessary adherence to first principles and the intellectual 
appetite or will’s necessary adherence to the precepts of 
natural law through synderesis. 
Revealed truth. 
T
h
irteen
th
 cen
tu
ry
 to
 A
q
u
in
as (d
ied
 1
2
7
5
) 
Ethics 
Synderesis understood as the contingent will’s free choice 
of means to an end, under the necessary will’s adherence to 
happiness as mankind’s end, by which synderesis practical 
reason or prudence grasping its own first principles of 
natural law, reasons through syllogistic demonstration, to 
its own choice conclusions.  
Synderesis now understood as the highest activity of the 
moral sense: either (a) synderesis first under grace and then 
under infused theological virtues of faith, hope and love 
and cardinal moral virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance 
and fortitude, or (b) synderesis without grace whereby 
practical wisdom, on the basis of experience, must mediate 
between choice on a case by case basis.  
Human frailty expressed as the contingent or free will’s vacillation 
under the irascible and concupiscent passions. 
Polis 
Ratification, through grace, of citizenship of the eternal 
city of God attainable through sublimation of infused 
theological and cardinal virtues under God’s grace. 
Beatitude and bliss of God’s eternity and supremacy over 
nature. 
Absence of faith and/or recalcitrant free will. 
The Decline of Syncretisation of Reason and Faith from the Time of Aquinas (d. 1275) to the time of Buridan (death unknown but after 1385)—Chapter 6 Step Two: Science, Ethics and Polis from Aquinas (AD 1225 - 
1247 to Jean Buridan (AD c. 1300 – c. 1358) 
Science 
Syllogistic demonstration of the true from the false in the 
realm of experiential knowledge understood as intuition, 
sensation and reason. It is based on fundamental premises 
induced from experience.  
Divine reason’s necessary connection to the true, operating 
in the domains of sensation and cognition. 
The will’s free choice and affinity for loving rather than knowing, 
which affinity, through love of God, allows mankind to believe the 
scientifically indemonstrable. 
A
D
 1
2
7
5
 to
 B
u
rid
an
 
(aliv
e A
D
 1
3
8
5
) 
Ethics 
Active adherence to God’s will revealed in the scriptures 
and occasioned by the will’s adherence to that revelation. 
The practical faculty of theology, theology being 
understood as that which can go directly to perception of 
principles without the need for Science or philosophy.  
The will’s failure to conform to God’s will. 
Polis 
Polis is a cognitive gathering occasioned through the 
human will’s acceptance of God’s will.  
The spiritual will’s access to the grace of God. The will’s failure to conform to God’s will. 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
Intrusion: The Re-emergence of Experimental Science from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries—Chapter 7 
Science 
Various cognitive research methodology frameworks and 
conventions known by names such as resolution and 
composition, aptitudinal union, prerogatives of experimental 
Science, method of differences in falsification or verification of 
the findings of the theoretical sciences, modus tollens, Kepler’s 
sleepwalking, Galileo’s inductive-deductive method  and 
Newton’s rules of reasoning in philosophy.   
The intellectual virtues at work as the art of practical 
Science in search of true causes. 
Cautious regard for revealed truth together with the early infancy 
of experimental procedure and its attendant cognitive 
methodologies themselves. 
F
ro
m
 circa A
D
 1
2
0
0
 
to
 1
7
0
0
 
Ethics Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Polis Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
 Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Dawning of the Modern Era—Chapter 8 
Science 
Induction of axioms and laws through first cleansing mind of its 
idols and then application of Bacon’s method of tables of 
exclusions and helps to the understanding in experimental 
Science, and the application of those axioms and laws in 
deduction of further discovery. 
Sensual experimental and experiential knowledge about 
the forms or Laws of Nature residing in their own power 
over nature and competent operation of that knowledge in 
superinduction of welfare benefits for mankind.  
Idols of the mind, complexity of nature, and complexity of 
scientific method. 
F
ro
m
 circa A
D
 1
5
6
1
 to
 1
6
2
6
 
Ethics 
Active logical management of the will in correct choice between 
comparative good alternatives in both self-good and good-in-
communion domains in the interest of the welfare of the 
individual and society. It consists of internal goodness at the 
individual level and duty towards others at the societal level in 
present and future situations.  
Ethics inheres in an appetite for good native to all 
existing things including the human mind qua its truthful 
penchant for welfare of individual or society, inhering at 
self-good level in mind well-formed and composed in 
itself and at good-in-communion level in mind well-
formed towards others. It manifests in an attendant duty 
to govern others by governing oneself well towards 
others. Human rationality and the precepts of morality 
which marshal it are God given. 
Frustration of the natural movement from lower nature to higher 
nature by such human conditions as ambition, self-love and 
greed. 
Polis 
A cognitive gathering in a New Atlantis predicated on 
Godliness, peace and prosperity through  application of Science 
for the betterment of mankind. 
Power over nature which Science brings and stability and 
advancement it may bring to human society. 
The failure of the will under logic’s counsel as to the correct 
choice between comparable duties.  
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Table 13 (continued) 
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1679) and Dawning of a Modern Age—Chapter 9 
Science 
Its method is ratiocination in resolution and composition 
operational through syllogistic demonstration of fact. 
Movement or generation of bodies natural or political; 
scientific understanding of accidents and laws of those 
bodies and the power brought by such understanding for 
construction of a peaceful and prosperous artificial state. 
Its constraints are nature’s complexity, problems of definition and 
deficiencies in syllogistic demonstration.  
F
ro
m
 circa A
D
 1
5
9
9
 to
 1
6
7
9
 
Ethics 
To be ethical is to obey the Laws of Nature as these are 
expressed through the laws of a Leviathan. Politique 
Ethics, a subset of Philosophical Ethics discussed in detail 
in the enquiry, challenges the esoteric/exoteric 
methodology employed by the enquiry, and is not included 
in this table. 
The will in act of improving individual and societal 
welfare. Movement in bodies and its control in accordance 
with the Laws of Nature and the laws of a Leviathan. 
Its constraints are mankind’s egotistical selfish natural state and 
mankind’s failure of virtue understood as a failure to found an 
artificial state immune from a fear of violent death—a triumph of bad 
passions, similarly understood, over good passions.  
Polis 
Cognitive gathering in an artificial state, a Leviathan or 
Commonwealth, predicated on obeying the Laws of Nature 
discovered by reason. 
Laws of Nature expressed as civil laws and through 
obedience to them the surrender of individual vanities to 
the state in return for peace, prosperity and advancement.  
In foro interno lack of true desire to obey those laws and thus to feign 
obedience to them, and in foro externo permission not to obey the law 
when, in situations where others are not obeying it, harm might come 
to one who does obey it. 
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Table 14: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Plato (BC c. 427 – c. 347) to Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) 
 
INTRODUCTION AND PART ONE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
N
o
t 
ap
p
licab
le
 
Not applicable Introduction 
Foundational unchanging key terms meanings are established: The Modern Age is an era from circa Bacon (AD 1561 - 1626) and Hobbes (AD 1588 
- 1679) to circa the middle of the twentieth century. Science means the pursuit of true knowledge—knowledge of that which can be no other. Ethics 
means correct action and just desire in personal and social affairs, and Polis means cognitive or esoteric political gathering. P(p)olis is a marker 
derived from Polis qua esoteric gathering to identify either a touchable, visible, manufactured, constructed or exoteric gathering of bricks and mortar 
and institutions and regulations and the like, or illness of fit of the term Polis depending on context. Political philosophy is critical moral evaluation 
of political gathering. Articulation of divine is not yet begun. Articulation of virtue not yet begun. 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coeval with arriving recognition 
of a binding sentiment of Polis 
situated in the psyche of a 
rapacious mankind in whom no 
part of reason is divine and for 
whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in 
natural social instinct implanted 
in mankind for whom virtue is 
some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Polis is an ideal, just and happy gathering or a city of ideas in which classical Greek values prevail and in which truth informs reason. 
Platonic nous is established as a divine element in mankind. Virtue qua state of mind is some kind of knowledge. Technical virtue as good-at-what is 
differentiated from moral virtue as absolute goodness per se. To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience 
to its own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as 
self-control, discerning between the harmful and the unharmful 
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age.  
A methodology for esoteric definition of Science, Ethics and Polis is established and applied in Plato’s case to confirm Polis as a cognitive gathering 
predicated on acceptance of objectively real forms existing in one only begotten heaven, Science as knowledge of the unchanging or that which can 
be no other received through beholding of the one and the forms and Ethics as nous discerning between the harmful and unharmful, nous being an 
element of divine reason in mankind. Virtuous act remains unchanged. 
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of 
Aristotle (BC 384-322) 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age.  
Aristotelian nous is established as a metaphysical being and a divine element of human reason. Human divinity is understood as cognitive movement 
towards, but not full attainment of, the pure act of the impersonal unmoved mover through theoria. Polis is established as a stable gathering 
predicated on a social instinct implanted in mankind and the final cause of mankind’s arete. To be virtuous is to act under a condition in which 
practical wisdom, under philosophical wisdom’s patronage, is active in realms of the so-called lower moral virtues, truthfulness, and the like in 
search for, and sublimation of, mankind’s arête of happiness with justice. It is practical reason’s discernment between good and bad acts.  
2 
Not applicable Introduction 
Attribution of the Modern Age as the era from Bacon (AD 1561 – 1621) and Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) until the middle of the twentieth century. 
Articulation of metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Foundational attributions of meaning: Science means the pursuit of true knowledge—knowledge of that which can be no other. Ethics means correct 
action and just desire in personal and social affairs.  
Articulation of practical Ethics not yet begun. 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific 
enquiry, Science ceasing to 
inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in 
its new form as conditional fact, 
Science becoming valued in its 
own right for direct benefits it 
could bring to society and state. 
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Articulation of Metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Science is knowledge of the unchanging or that which can be no other received through beholding of the one and the forms. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of 
obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful and 
the unharmful. 
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Platonic Science is the final partaking of the forms which occasion understanding by reminiscence.  
Platonic practical Ethics is nous discerning between harmful and unharmful pleasure under the aegis of four classic Greek virtues wisdom, justice, 
valour and temperance which inhere both in the human soul and the ideal Polis. 
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of 
Aristotle (BC 384-322) 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Aristotelian metaphysics is established as the architectonic science begotten when theoretical wisdom contemplates the transcendent. 
Aristotelian practical Ethics is established to be practical wisdom’s discernment, under theoretical wisdom’s patronage, between good and bad acts 
as these are referred to it by the lower moral virtues. For art in act, practical Ethics is true reasoning of the correct rule. 
Science is syllogistically reasoned demonstration of fact understood as truth or that which can be no other. It is knowledge of the four causes of 
being.  
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Table 14 (continued) 
INTRODUCTION AND PART ONE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
n.a. Not applicable Introduction 
Modern Age as the era from Bacon and Hobbes until the middle of the twentieth century. 
Foundational explanation of meaning: Ethics means correct action and just desire in personal and social affairs. 
Articulation of practical Ethics not yet begun. 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of 
the state.  
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Articulation of Metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Science is knowledge of the unchanging or that which can be no other received through beholding of the one and the forms. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of 
obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful and 
the unharmful. 
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Platonic practical Ethics is nous discerning between harmful and unharmful pleasure under the aegis of four classic Greek virtues wisdom, justice, 
valour and temperance which inhere both in the human soul and the ideal Polis. 
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of 
Aristotle (BC 384-322) 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Aristotelian practical Ethics is established to be practical wisdom’s discernment, under theoretical wisdom’s patronage, between good and bad acts 
as these are referred to it by the lower moral virtues. For art in act, practical Ethics is true reasoning of the correct rule.  
Integrating Summary of Part One  
By building on the legacy of Presocratic writers and Plato, Aristotle established a political philosophy predicated on a naturally stable Polis, in which the intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom arbitrate in 
discerning correct reason and right desire in matters of moral conduct referred to them by thee irrational soul. In this esoteric Polis mankind realises its ergon of happiness with justice and honour under patronage of the beautiful. 
Justice is predicated either on merit or on equality of exchange. Science, as knowledge of the four causes of being, knowledge of that which can be no other, proceeds through its method of syllogistic reasoning from intuitively 
induced singular terms to deduced universal terms. Science as the universal body of true knowledge about the sub-lunar world results when philosophical wisdom contemplates existing beings. Science as metaphysics, a 
theology, occurs when theoretical philosophy contemplates the transcendent.  
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Table 14 (continued) 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
arriving recognition of a binding sentiment 
of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is 
divine and for whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an alternative to 
a long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in natural 
social instinct implanted in mankind for 
whom virtue is some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
Polis is a cognitive gathering or eternal city of God predicated on acceptance of His grace. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a now Christian God who is all reason and is present in the human soul.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusing to transgress Christian prohibitions. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis remains a cognitive gathering bound through reasoned faith and love of God. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a Christian God. 
Virtue remains obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusing to transgress Christian prohibitions.  
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and Polis—
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis is an eternal city of God occasioned through acceptance of infused theological and cardinal virtues under acceptance of God’s 
grace. 
Reason remains divine as the gift of a Christian God. 
Virtue remains obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusing to transgress Christian prohibitions. 
Chapter 6 (continued) 
Aquinas to Buridan (AD c.1300 – 
c.1358) 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the ‘one’ is replaced by unquestioning life in Christ. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion. 
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Table 14 (continued) 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident 
with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its new form 
as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it 
could bring to society and state. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one is replaced by unquestioning life in Christ. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion. 
Practical Ethics is replaced by faith Ethics. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by reasoned life in Christ. 
Science becomes syllogistic reasoning in dialectic and yes and no disputation predominantly within the confines of faith authority and 
within a developing scholastic method. Science as observation and reasoning about natural phenomena, and engagement with them, 
begins to reappear in the form of experimental Science.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and practical Ethics is living life under reasoned interpretation of 
those laws qua church doctrine. To be ethical is to act so as not to transgress prohibitions specified in Christian law. 
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and Polis—
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274)  
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by reasoned life in Christ. 
Science is again an intellectual virtue and consists of syllogistic demonstration both a priori and a posteriori in dialectic and logic within 
the confines of a revealed faith theology. Under grace it informs ethical choice as a prelude to beatitude and outside of grace combines 
with experience to inform moral choice. Science searches for truth in matters natural and theological, theology being named a Science. 
Ethics becomes the contingent will’s free choice of means to ends, under the necessary will’s adherence to happiness as mankind’s end. 
Ethics in guiding practical action is occasioned through synderesis which consists of practical reason or prudence grasping its own first 
principles of natural law and reasoning through syllogistic demonstration to its own choice conclusions. 
Chapter 6 (continued) 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) to 
Buridan (AD c.1300 – c.1358) 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Theology finds no use for metaphysics or philosophy and reason slips its faith Ethics confines. Metaphysics as contemplation of God is 
expelled from theology and continues its own independent journey.  
Science becomes syllogistic demonstration of the true from the false in experiential domains of intuition, sensation and reason, syllogistic 
demonstration being predicated on fundamental premises induced from experience. Science so understood has no place in explanation of 
revelation and the articles of faith. 
Ethics becomes active adherence to God’s revealed will. Practical Ethics is thus applied theology operating through the will’s conformity 
to Christian teaching. Human will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine reason, now separates mankind from the beasts. 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
a challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity by Ethics as active obedience 
to the law of the state. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Aristotelian practical Ethics becomes Christian faith Ethics.  
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Practical Ethics is the living of life under reasoned interpretation of the doctrine of the Church and consists in refusing to transgress 
Christian prohibitions. 
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and Polis—
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274)  
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Ethics becomes the contingent will’s free choice of means to ends, under the necessary will’s adherence to happiness as mankind’s end. 
Ethics as a practical action is occasioned through synderesis which consists of practical reason or prudence grasping its own first 
principles of natural law and reasoning through syllogistic demonstration to its own choice conclusions. 
Chapter 6 (continued) 
Aquinas to Buridan (AD c.1300 – 
c.1358) 
 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Ethics becomes active adherence to God’s revealed will occasioned by human will’s adherence to God’s will. Practical Ethics is thus 
applied theology operating through the will’s conformity to Christian teaching. Human will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine 
reason, now separates mankind from the beasts. Practical Ethics is applied theology operating through the will’s conformity to Christian 
teaching. 
4 
Integrating Summary of Part Two 
Aristotle’s unified political philosophy fractured under an intermingling of Greek heritage and Jewish revelation doctrine and the ongoing development of Christianity. By the time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430), Greek rational 
Ethics had been replaced by revealed faith Ethics, Christ as divine Logos had replaced nous as logos. Aristotle’s categorical explanation of being had been replaced by divine revelation’s announcement of God as the creator of 
the world and its beings. A personal Christian God of love became available as an alternative to a Jewish God of wrath and both had replaced an impersonal Greek god or one. A Greek city of ideas had been replaced as Polis by 
a Christian city of God. Science, now irrelevant to faith, and no longer recognised as the arbiter of truth under theoretical and practical reason, or knowledge of the four causes, but recognised as syllogistic method, is ignored to 
survive as best it can. Ethics inheres in overcoming the absolute sin outlined in the commandments. During the time from Augustine (AD 354 – 430) to the close of the twelfth century, church dogmatists could not wholly ignore 
the utility of reason which established itself as syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and disputation. Employed in this form under strict control by the authority of faith, reason begot a new Science of theology. Ethics inheres in 
willing oneself not to transgress Christian prohibitions and Ethics could employ reason subject to the constraints of the mysteries of faith. Science qua syllogistic demonstration and Ethics became compatible and reason and faith 
became one by virtue of faith Ethics’ acceptance of reason. Earlier Eriugena (AD c. 8008 – 877) had pronounced Science and faith to be the same thing. Abelard (AD 1078 – 1142) is something of a milestone of this development 
and at the time of his life, on the eve of the rediscovery of Aristotle’s wider corpus, Science is syllogistic reasoning within dialectic and yes and no disputation about truth in theology, Ethics remains that act by which humans 
will themselves not to transgress Christian prohibitions, and Polis is a city of God. During this time dialectic and rhetoric beget logic and a re-emergence in interest in experimental Science is discernible. The compatibility of 
Science and faith brought forward by Anselm (AD 1033-1109) and Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) reached its highest point with Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274). Both Aquinas and his teacher Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) were recipients 
of Aristotle’s wider corpus and through their contributions Greek understandings were for a second time blended with developing Christianity but against a very different background. Under Aquinas theology and natural Science 
are both called Science. Science remains syllogistic reasoning but it is once again an intellectual virtue which, under grace, informs ethical choice as a prelude to beatitude, or outside of grace and from experience, informs moral 
choice. Science and faith are one when syllogistic reasoning, other than in questioning of the mysteries of faith, is at work in search of truth in matters natural and theological. Ethics is synderesis, a process by which the 
contingent will is guided in its free choice of means to ends by the necessary will under its adherence to happiness. In synderesis, practical wisdom or prudence grasps its own first principles, the precepts of natural law, and 
reasons through syllogistic demonstration to reach its own conclusions. A Greek good-at-what efficiency criterion again informs Ethics. To be ethical is to be good at living a righteous Christian life. Polis remains a city of God 
consisting of the sublime occasioned through infused theological and cardinal virtues under grace. The high syncretisation of Science and faith so skilfully woven by Aquinas was gradually broken down by incremental erosion 
and can be traced from Duns Scotus (AD c. 1270 – 1308) to Jean Buridan (AD c. 1300 – 1358). Within 76 years of Aquinas’ death, compatibility of reason and faith was fractured. Theology, not reason, guided Ethics. Theology 
found little need for either metaphysics or philosophy. Reason had tasted its first days of freedom from faith Ethics. The will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine reason, now separated mankind from the beasts. Science 
transformed into syllogistic demonstration of the true from the false in the experiential domains of intuition, sensation and reason. Ethics became active adherence to God’s revealed will occasioned by the human will’s adherence 
to God’s will. The Polis became the cognitive gathering occasioned by the human will’s acceptance of God’s will. Aquinas’s Christian Aristotelian system had largely been compromised.  
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Table 14 (Continued) 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
arriving recognition of a binding sentiment 
of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is 
divine and for whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an alternative to 
a long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in natural 
social instinct implanted in mankind for 
whom virtue is some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of Experimental 
Science 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
and Dawning of a Modern Age  
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis is a peaceful, Godly and prosperous New Atlantis in which scientific knowledge is power over the Laws of Nature. Reason 
and the precepts of morality are divine. A focus on the right use of knowledge as power replaces a focus on the kind of 
knowledge of which virtue may consist. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 
1679) and Dawning of a Modern 
Age 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age 
Some capacity for reason appears to come ready made into the world with birth, after which occurrence, reason per se is learned 
both formally and also vicariously through industrial arts and activity. No part of reason is divine. 
Apperception of knowledge as power continues to override focus on a question of whether virtue is some kind of knowledge, 
and if so what kind. To be morally virtuous is to obey the law because it is the law and not to feign to obey the law. It allows 
mankind to dominate nature and/or to lift mankind from its natural state. The virtuous person acts to maintain peace and improve 
the conditions of life. Polis is an artificial state or Leviathan predicated on Laws of Nature discovered by reason and maintained 
an ongoing surrender of vanity to obedience to law for peace and prosperity purposes.  
Chapter 10 
Discussion on the Veracity of the 
Thesis Propositions and Closure 
of the Enquiry 
Thesis Proposition Statement 1 is, within the confines of the enquiry methodology, conjectured to be valid.. 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident 
with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its new form 
as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it 
could bring to society and state. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of Experimental 
Science 
Experimental Science returns and a so-called age of reason begins. Science understood as syllogistic demonstration is becoming 
replaced by Science as induction and deduction within rules for reasoning in natural philosophy.  
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
and Dawning of a Modern Age  
There is no nuance of the term modern Age 
Science is knowledge of the Forms or Laws of Nature derived from Bacon’s new kind of induction applied through his new 
machine of method, his novum organum.  
Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good understood as the welfare of the individual or society. It consists of 
making the correct choice between self-good alternatives and good-in-communion alternatives in their respective comparative 
good settings. It inheres in mind well-ordered and composed in itself and mind well disposed towards others, and it answers to 
theology. Metaphysic replaces metaphysics. Metaphysic is inquisition of formal cause in operative Science and partly informs 
superinduction and its attendant welfare benefits for mankind.  
Practical Ethics is will working towards the good of the individual or society. At the individual level it is internal goodness and 
at the societal level it is politics or external goodness. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 
1679) and Dawning of a Modern 
Age 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age 
Science is ratiocination about qualities of body effected through resolution and composition itself a product of syllogism and 
reasoned fact. Ethics and theology are expelled from Science. Ethics is no longer the servant of theology.  
Practical Ethics is the act of obeying the law of Leviathan. 
Chapter 10 
Discussion on the Veracity of the 
Thesis Propositions and Closure 
of the Enquiry 
Thesis Proposition Statement 2 is, within the  confines of the enquiry methodology, conjectured to be valid.. 
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Table 14: (Continued) 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
a challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity by Ethics as active obedience 
to the law of the state. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of Experimental 
Science 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
and Dawning of a Modern Age  
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age 
Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good understood as the welfare of the individual or society. It consists of 
making the correct choice between self-good alternatives and good-in-communion alternatives in their respective comparative 
good settings. It inheres in mind well-ordered and composed in itself and mind well disposed towards others, and it answers to 
theology. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 
1679) and Dawning of a Modern 
Age 
To act ethically is to obey the law because it is the law and not to feign to obey the law. Its end is the peace and prosperity of 
Leviathan or Commonwealth. 
Chapter 10 
Discussion on the Veracity of the 
Thesis Propositions Statements 
and Closure of the Enquiry 
Thesis Proposition Statement 3 is, within the  confines of the enquiry methodology, conjectured to be valid.. 
Integrating Summary of Part Three 
A fledgling experimental Science found in Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) had, by the time of Isaac Newton (AD 1643 - 1727), formed a basis for a method of Science presently in practice: observe, hypothesise, falsify or 
verify by testing, and tentatively accept verifications as theory. This long development of experimental Science method occurred within a system of faith Ethics and in its own way, was part of the social, political, and 
cultural change and discovery of the times: renaissance and humanism, reformation and counter reformation, European discovery of printing, European discovery of the Americas, and emergence of nation states. 
Towards the end of this period two scholars, Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) addressed Science in political philosophies so different as to constitute a clear change from 
Aristotelian political philosophy as it had become known in its western Christian dress. Under Bacon Science became a practical, experimental, operative activity in pursuit of advancement of learning and human 
welfare, a pursuit free from Aristotelian metaphysics and final cause, yet subject to Ethical constraints largely predicated on theology, Politique Ethics being predicated on other referents as well. . Under Hobbes, Ethics 
was no longer monopolised by theology and to be Ethical was to obey the laws of the state. The enquiry esoteric/exoteric divide methodology is increasingly difficult to sustain because induction and/or deduction, 
including its attendant inference, is increasingly linked to experimentation and invention and with both Bacon and Hobbes Science applies itself at the level of nature, man and society and its knowledge is a power which 
occasions mankind’s advancement through peace and economic development. Aristotle’s naturally good state and good life had fallen to an artificial state in which mankind obeyed the law in return for security and 
prosperity that Science as power over nature’s laws would bring under a peace occasioned by obedience to civil law. Divine reason no longer separated mankind from the brutes, rather capacity for reason learned and 
developed through sensual experiential occurrence. A Leviathan or a New Atlantis—and others too—were available as alternative Polies to cities of God, a republic of ideas, or a natural state prior to man. Ethics had 
descended to the will’s correct selection of the means to individual and communal welfare through simple obedience to civil law. Science had become induction and deduction of truths about nature, mankind and society, 
its knowledge being applied to gain power over nature for utility and advancement of mankind and human condition. 
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articulation of the Thesis Proposition Statements, the combined impact of this nuance 
being a surrogate measure of changing political philosophy by virtue of the presence 
of the three esoteric key terms in the Thesis Proposition Statements being articulated. 
Exoteric markers of change and passage of time, for example wars, discoveries, 
inventions, and commonly recognised historical periods are assigned milestone, 
beacon or buoy roles to locate and anchor traced esoteric change within more 
tangible and concrete history and philosophy of Science and technology contexts.  
Table 13 and Table 14 break white space conventions to accommodate software 
formatting requirements and for ease of reading. 
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Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the Political Philosophy of Aristotle (BC 384 – 322) 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1 I traced the emergence of Science and Ethics from an early era of totem 
ritual and space to the time of the historical Socrates. I suggested that Plato, as 
recipient of a Socratic heritage, was able to build a cognitive republic in which 
Ethics, emerging as a practical philosophy, was informed by Science. I also clarified 
the basis on which Science, as knowing arising from the partaking of the forms, 
made possible a discourse between ideal forms and the base materiality of perceived 
independently existing beings. Predicated as it might be on reincarnation and the 
journey of the soul, Plato’s Science, which he applied in reassessment of Homeric 
ethical values, remained compatible with an ideal or esoteric Polis based on a 
political philosophy which reached out to, and required of its citizens, an objective 
and ethical performance in the everyday practical affairs of life, city and state.  
In this chapter I trace the ongoing interconnection amongst Science, Ethics and Polis, 
by demonstrating how Aristotle further developed the Platonic heritage to establish a 
political philosophy that was to remain influential for almost two millennia. I 
complete the work of the chapter by discussing five proposals in turn, each of which 
is posited to express a foundational tenet of Aristotle’s system.  
First, I address Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings compounded of 
form and matter exist, and that such existence is brought to human understanding 
because form, when it is transmitted by a prior member of the species, brings 
definition to substrate matter.  
Secondly, I address Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical beings exist, and his 
explanation of how, through their extension in nous, they play a role in human 
understanding.  
Thirdly, I explain Aristotle’s development of so-called objective Ethics consisting 
not only of words but also of appropriate action effected under practical wisdom’s 
cognitive appeal to scientific reasoning. 
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Fourthly, I comment on Aristotle’s founding of Science as a process of induction and 
deduction based on objective understandings about natural objects, and his 
development of a logic which prescribes a procedure for reasoning in Science.  
Fifthly, I outline Aristotle’s skilful bringing of such Science and Ethics to his 
political philosophy and his argument, in that philosophy, that Polis or gathering, 
being based on natural law imperatives, is essentially stable and good.  
Henceforth I refer to these five proposals as Proposals (1) through (V).  
The proposals are stated separately for explanation purposes but they are not 
mutually exclusive. None of them is immune from the influence of the others. 
Consequently, the demonstration of each proposal is not necessarily complete in 
itself before demonstration of the next begins—a situation that arises because a basic 
understanding of the next proposal must first be established before the full impact of 
the former proposal on it can be fully appreciated. As a result, a final articulation of 
each preceding proposal is not fully realised until the articulation of Proposal (V) 
which, as the final piece to the puzzle, completes the chapter’s integrating 
articulation and brings insight to the unified system which is the child of Aristotle’s 
brilliance.  
In this chapter the articulation I have been discussing is named Level 1 articulation 
because it attempts to elucidate Aristotelian 
construct upon which, in turn, key terms 
nuance, and the Thesis Proposition 
Statement meanings it informs, depend. 
While Level 1 articulation of Proposals (I) 
through (V) carries the narrative of the 
chapter it is complemented by two more levels of articulation.  
To wit: Level 2 articulation, in which I trace the nuance in key terms brought to the 
enquiry through an unfolding of Aristotelian construct and system, occurs in 
conjunction with the Level 1 articulation—in this enquiry, that Aristotle has a system 
goes unchallenged. I employ the superscripts contained to the box on page 205 to 
 
Superscript Identification of Level 2 Articulation 
Employed in Discussions of Proposals (I) and (II) 
Δ2KTS = Level 2 thesis key terms articulation of 
Science 
Δ2KTE = Level 2 thesis key terms articulation of 
Ethics 
Δ2KTP = Level 2thesis key terms articulation of 
Polis 
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denote its coincident presence within Level 1 articulation of Proposals (I) and (II), 
where it might be overlooked because of the complexity of the Level 1 construct 
articulation contained there. I cease to employ Level 2 identifying superscripts in 
discussions of Proposals (III), (IV) and (V) because it is clearly present there. I do 
not gather the ongoing Level 2 articulation together and close discussion on it until 
page 271 near the end of the chapter.  
Level 3 articulation begins on page 273, just before the chapter concludes, and by 
virtue of it, I bring the Level 2 articulated key terms nuance to a discussion of Thesis 
Proposition Statements.  
FORM MATTER AND BEING 
Level I Articulation of Proposal (I) Begins 
There is considerable complexity behind the simple 
statement of Proposal (I) which contains Aristotle’s 
fundamental break from Plato—a break which can be 
more fully appreciated when Aristotle’s different 
usage of the word form is understood. This journey of 
understanding begins with Aristotle’s concept of being. 
Like Plato, Aristotle agrees that in nature there are discernible kinds of beings that 
can be scientifically studied in respect of their similar and different characteristics. 
Unlike Plato, whose enquiry I have shown in Chapter 1 to begin with the eternal, 
Aristotle begins with his here and now. He begins with actually existing natural 
beings themselves, beings existing in time and space, which are reliably accessible to 
human understanding. In so rejecting Plato’s idealist ontology Aristotle ended the 
journey of the soul and its attendant noesis. He made human understanding a slightly 
less esoteric and more-earthy affair yet a sophisticated and magnificent one 
nonetheless.  
Being is Aristotle’s starting point and his definition of being is inextricably 
interwoven with, and indispensable to, his deliberations on Science and Ethics Δ2KTS, 
Δ2KTE. In Categories (Aristotle, 1938a, 1952a), a work traditionally classified as part of 
Aristotle’s logic, knowledge about such independently existing beings as horses, 
trees, humans, birds and fishes is made possible by virtue of the composite nature of 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finds that substantial natural 
beings compounded of form and matter 
exist, and that such existence is brought to 
human understanding because form, when 
it is transmitted by a prior member of the 
species, brings definition to substrate 
matter. 
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those individuals which consist of substance, and qualities inhering in that substance 
Categories 4 1b25 – 2a (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, pp. 5-6). Table 15 outlines 
Aristotle’s categories of being. 
Table 15: Aristotle's Categories of Being 
Category Explanation 
Substance 
“Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that 
which is neither predicable of a subject, nor present in a subject” Categories 2a5-
15 (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, p. 6). “Thus everything except primary substances is 
either predicated on primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last 
did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.” (ibid., 2b5, p. 6). 
“Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of 
the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else.” (ibid., 2b15, p. 
6). All other substances are secondary substances and they convey meanings 
about primary substances (ibid., 3b30, p. 7). Primary substances are individuals, 
secondary substances are universals. Primary substances exist independently of 
mind, secondary substances exist in the mind. 
Quantity 
This is the extension (bulk and shape) of an object, and may be either discrete or 
continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each 
other.  
Quality 
This is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object. For example 
colour is a quality, so too smoothness, so too roughness. 
Relation This is the way in which one object may be related to another. 
Place Position in relation to the surrounding environment. 
Time Position in relation to the course of events. 
Position 
A condition of rest resulting from an action: the end point for the corresponding 
action. Also the relative position of the parts of an object when those parts are 
inseparable from that object, and the object is at rest, for example the arms of a 
sitting person. 
State 
A condition of rest resulting from an affection, that is from being acted on, for 
example being shod or armed. Physical accessories also help determine the state 
of a thing: a person’s hat or shoes, a shod horse, a bronze column’s markings. 
Action The production of change in some other object. 
Affection 
The reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It 
is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action 
is to affection as the active voice is to the passive voice. Thus for action he gave 
the examples, to lance, to cauterize; for affection, to be lanced, to be cauterized. 
The term is frequently misinterpreted to mean a kind of emotion or passion. 
 
 Primary substance 
 Secondary substances 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Categories. (1b10 p. 5, 1a25 – 2a15, p. 6, 1b25 – 
2a5, pp. 5 – 6, 2a10 – 4b20, pp. 6 - 9). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. (Vol. 8, pp. 25 - 38). Chicago: 
William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). Topics. (I 8 103b – 103b20, pp. 146 - 147). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle. 
(Vol. 8, pp. 143-226). Chicago: William Benton; Copleston, F. (1966). A History of Philosophy Volume 1 Greece 
and Rome. (p. 278). London: Burns and Oats Limited. 
Elsewhere, in Metaphysics Z3 (VII) 1038ba – 1040b, IX 1049b – 1050a20 (Aristotle, 
1952d, pp. 562 - 564, 575 - 576; 1989), Aristotle further articulates and qualifies the 
                                                          
3 A concordance of chapter numbers of the Metaphysics is provided for ease of reference. 
Greek Α α Β Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Ι Θ Κ Λ Μ Ν 
Roman I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV 
Arabic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
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manner in which components of the individual beings of the substance row of Table 
15 contribute to the identification of being. I address these qualifications below, 
beginning on page 210 but before doing so I offer a more detailed analysis of the 
explanation of being contained in the Categories (Aristotle, 1938a, 1952a). 
In the Categories Aristotle gives an account of natural beings, of the things that exist. 
He divides beings into ten categories also known as praedicamenta or predicates of 
being Categories Ib25 – 2a5 (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, pp. 5-6) and Topics I 103b20 - 
25 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 147; 1960b). The ten categories, listed in the left hand 
column of Table 15, are ways in which humans think about existing beings. Humans 
predicate the existence of beings on substance, and its accidents, quantity as bulk or 
shape, quality as colour, roughness, hardness and so on down the categories column, 
and these predicates of thought accurately capture the way beings exist. Of these 
categories, substance, ousia, which in element 2,1 of Table 15 heads the list, is that 
which is capable of existing independently in its own right. It is the primary 
substance. The remaining classes of categories inhere in it and cannot exist apart 
from it Categories 1a25 – 2b15 (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, pp. 5 - 6). These remaining 
classes named in the left hand column of Table 15 are secondary substances. Thus in 
Table 15 quantity, the extension or bulk of a body, can only exist within a primary 
substance. So too, without a primary substance quality does not exist—the red in the 
mane of a horse exists only within the substance of the horse and cannot exist 
anywhere without, that is outside of, that substance—and so on down to the last 
category class named affection.  
Within each of the ten category divisions there is a relational hierarchy of being from 
more general to less general Categories 1b10 (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, p. 5). For 
example for the substance division of Table 16, animal is predicated on man and man 
is predicated on that particular existing thing, that particular man, Thrasymachus. For 
quality, that particular shade of green, sea-green for example, is more generally 
green, which green again is more generally colour. Aristotle draws his categorical 
definition of primary substance from the logic of the categories. Primary substances 
are beings that exist independently and for which there is no lower hierarchy of 
being. Primary substances, the things that exist, are thus the individuals in the 
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substance division of the categories, that man Thrasymachus, that horse Pegasus, that 
rock, that tree, and in the classification of the categories are to be found in the left 
hand cell of row 2 of Table 15 or the first element of the second row of Table 16.  
Table 16: Examples of Hierarchies in Primary Substance and Secondary Substances 
Category 
Individual 
(Specific Thing) 
Universals 
Less Specific  Still Less Specific  
Substance1  
Thrasymachus 
spider 
ox 
a diamond 
man 
insect 
ruminant 
gemstone 
animal 
animal 
animal 
mineral 
Quality (colour) green sea green colour 
intermediate 
categories 
lacuna representing intermediate categories 
Affection (to be cut) to lance cutting dissection 
Notes  
(1)   primary substance 
  secondary substance 
 
(2) 
 
Aristotle’s chosen example is particular man, man, and animal. The other examples are mine and illustrate the idea 
of hierarchy. They may not be found as examples in Aristotle. Nor are they offered in the sense of modern 
hierarchies of species, phylum, and genus. 
    
Secondary substances consist of the particulars and their universal subjects in the 
remaining divisions of the categories together with the universals within the 
substance division itself Categories 2a10 – 4b20 (Aristotle, 1938a; 1952a, pp. 6 - 9). 
The particulars in the primary substance category exist independently outside of 
mind and consist of substance plus accidents such as colour, extension and quality. 
Aristotle makes a fundamental point that human knowledge in general must of 
necessity begin with perception of particulars and progress to the general and, except 
where physiologically defective, the senses do not err in sensing particulars: “… at 
the end, the one acted upon [the thing perceived] is assimilated to the other [the 
sensing-perceiving organ] and is identical in quality with it” De Anima II 418a5 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 648, my square brackets; 1984b). In this process while the 
particulars apprehended by sensation exist outside of the mind, the universals 
apprehended by knowledge exist within the mind De Anima II 417b20 - 30 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 648; 1984b). Aristotle posits that truth or falsity is a function of 
correct intuition and/or correct scientific reasoning, Δ2KTS there being no question of the 
existence of things, individual beings per se—Metaphysics VI 1028a – 1028a5 in the 
context of VI 1026a30 - 1028a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 548 - 550; 1989). Whereas the 
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senses accurately capture existing particulars, so also a common sense coordinates 
the five main senses—De Anima II 418a15-20 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 648; 1984b).  
In respect of the content of the previous paragraph, the claim made there that human 
knowledge must begin with perception of 
individuals which exist independently 
outside of the mind, and that universals 
exist only within the mind, announcing as 
it does a fundamental tenet of Aristotle’s system in general, and Science in particular, 
Δ2KTS also provides a building block and foundation for the subsequent work of this 
chapter. More to the point, the commentary of the previous paragraph is germane to 
articulation of part of the content of Proposal (I). Put simply, provided no lesions are 
present in the sense organs, these organs accurately present what is, as it is, to human 
consciousness, and thought is predicated on, and organised around, those presented 
sensations. Beings exist and humans perceive them. 
Even so, to hold that the existing particulars are themselves known by the accidents 
upon which they are predicated, ivory for example being in part known by its 
whiteness, is to hold an enigma. Substance, in its purest form, must be that which 
remains when, one by one, the accidental qualities are mentally removed. Taking 
away affection, then taking away action, then taking away position and so on up the 
categories list should lead to substance per se. The difficulty here is how, in some 
cases, to mentally take things away. For example what is left when one tries to 
mentally remove quantity from horse, or even quality, dapple grey say? Of what 
then, beyond the last accident mentally removed, does substance consist? What is the 
nature of substance, whose presence is revealed through the accidents? Aristotle 
attempts to answer this question in the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989) and, as 
earlier foreshadowed on page 208, I now turn to his further articulation of being, that 
is, substance, as he reveals it in Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989), and in the De 
Anima. (Aristotle, 1952b, 1957a). 
Aristotle finds that three kinds of being occasion three kinds of theoretical 
philosophy. For example at Metaphysics IV 1003b5 - 15, VII, 1028a10 - 1028a30 
(Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 522, 550; 1989), Aristotle specifies prime substance to be that 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings 
compounded of form and matter exist, and that such 
existence is brought to human understanding because 
form, when it is transmitted by a prior member of the 
species, brings definition to substrate matter. 
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which is neither in a subject nor a predicate of a subject—a definition which is not 
entirely at odds to the one given in the Categories. Copleston (1966, p. 291), who 
does not give specific references, is able, respectively, to find in the general sense of 
Books VI and I of Metaphysics, substance divided into that which is changeable and 
that which is unchangeable, and substance classified in three ways; sensible and 
perishable: for example particular objects; sensible and eternal: for example planets 
and their motions; and non-sensible and eternal: for example mind and other 
metaphysical beings, of which more later. The respective locations are Metaphysics 
VI 1025b – 1028a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 547 - 550; 1989) and Metaphysics I 980a – 
995a20 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 499 - 513; 1989).  
Table 17 reveals, through the sources on which it is based, that such classifications as 
those given in the previous paragraph are employed by Aristotle in his definitions of 
three branches of theoretical philosophy, namely Physics, Mathematics, and 
Metaphysics Δ2KTS.  
Table 17: Three Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy within One of Three 
Divisions of Philosophy  
Theoretical Philosophy Practical Philosophy 
Poetical 
Philosophy 
The study of knowledge as an end in itself rather than the study 
of its practical applications. 
The study of political Science and 
ethical action in the wider social 
and cultural domain: economics, 
strategy and rhetoric are included 
under this category. 
The study of 
production 
(rather than 
action): a theory 
of art. 
Physics Mathematics Metaphysics 
The study of 
material things 
which are subject 
to motion. 
The study of that 
which is unmoved 
but also 
unseparated from 
matter. 
The study of that 
which is unmoved 
but separated from 
matter (the 
transcendent). 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Copleston, F. (1966). A History of Philosophy Volume 1 Greece and Rome. (p. 
277). London: Burns and Oats Limited; Jackson, H. (1908). Aristotle, Aristotelianism. (pp. 786 - 791). In J. Hastings (Ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. 1). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; Aristotle. (1952). Metaphysics. (XI 7, 1064a30, p. 
592; XI 1064b – 1064b5, p. 592; XI 7 1064a5 - 30, p. 592; VI 1025b25, p. 547; VI 126a10 - 1026a30, p. 548). In R. M. 
Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle. (Vol. 8 (1). pp. 495 - 626). Chicago: William Benton. 
 
For example, under Theoretical Philosophy, Physics “deals with the things that have 
a principle of movement in themselves” Metaphysics XI 1064a30 (Aristotle, 1952d, 
p. 592; 1989)Δ2KTS. It concerns that which is inseparable from matter but which is 
subject to movement, change widely defined as coming to be, being, and ceasing to 
be. It concerns the primary existing individuals of the natural world Metaphysics VI 
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1026a10-15 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 548; 1989). When Aristotle writes of coming to be, 
being, and ceasing to be, he is writing about the bringing of form to matter, form’s 
residing in matter, and form’s departure from matter. In this manner he writes about 
change, of which, more later. 
Mathematics in turn “deals with things that are at rest, but its subjects cannot exist 
apart” Metaphysics XI 1064a30 – 35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 592; 1989). Length, 
extension, surface are examples of its objects, and such objects, which are 
motionless, are considered as separate from matter although they do not exist 
separately Δ2KTS.  
Metaphysics as “the first science Δ2KTS deals with things which exist separately and are 
immovable” Metaphysics VI 1026a15 - 20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 548; 1989). By 
concerning itself with the meaning of being which is unmoved, that is unchanging, 
but which is itself not sensible in the manner of the substance of the primary being of 
the categories, metaphysics is that cognitive playground in which human 
understanding confronts one of mankind’s most challenging questions. This first 
Science Δ2KTS is also called a theology Metaphysics VI 1026a 15 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952d, 
p. 548; 1989) and it consists of the study of being from the point of view of being 
itself, “being qua being” Metaphysics VI 1026a30 - 35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 458; 
1989). It is the study of the transcendent as transcendence was understood before 
Kant.  
To summarise, natural beings exist and are accurately and categorically Δ2KTS known by 
humans. Aristotle predicates his whole classification of theoretical philosophy on 
states of natural being which exist independently outside of mindΔ2KTS. Such 
independently existing being is the glue that binds the three divisions of theoretical 
philosophy, namely physics, mathematics and metaphysics Δ2KTS. Metaphysics is bound 
because Aristotle’s search for transcendent beings begins with existing physical 
beings some of which, the planets and their motions, subsequently serve as 
predicates for the existence of metaphysical beings. Human knowledge begins with 
perception of individual beings, and universals exist only in the mind. There does 
however remain some ambiguity about the states of being. Substance as categorical 
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being appears to be sensible and perishable, sensible and eternal, and ‘non sensible’ 
and eternal, a somewhat untidy finding.  
In what manner might Aristotle’s finding 
be untidy? The threefold classification of 
being said, in the integrating summary 
above, to inform the three divisions of 
theoretical philosophy is untidy when it is 
benchmarked against Aristotle’s 
fundamental notion of truth Δ2KTS which 
states that “… the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to 
the same subject [20] and in the same respect” Metaphysics IV 1005b20 (Aristotle, 
1952d, p. 524, translator's  square brackets; 1989). In the case under discussion, 
substance, the category in which the accidents inhere, is said to be both eternal and 
perishable, and both sensible and insensible, and such a position could scarce be 
Aristotle’s final word on the question. In particular, if substance can be non-sensible 
and eternal, something different again from the perishable sensible body of 
individual beings, then matter, thought of as the perishable body of individual beings, 
is not a sufficient categorisation of substance.  
These enigmas are troublesome because they cloud a full articulation of Proposal (I) 
which must bring clarity of understanding to three fundamental tenets of being, 
namely, natural things or beings exist, natural beings consist of form and matter, and 
natural beings are brought to human understanding because form, transferred by a 
member of the species, brings definition to substrate matter Δ2KTS. Further enquiry into 
these tenets is required because in logic, if not in metaphysics, the second tenet 
depends on the first, and the third tenet depends on the second. As a consequence, I 
turn to discussion of the sense in which Aristotle announces that beings exist by 
enquiring further into the categorical nature of substance. 
I proceed in the manner now explained. First, on pages 214 to 215 I engage with 
Book IV of the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989) where the importance of 
substance over matter is established and as a basis for more detailed articulation of 
being.  
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings 
compounded of form and matter exist, and that such 
existence is brought to human understanding because form, 
when it is transmitted by a prior member of the species, 
brings definition to substrate matter. 
 
Proposal (II) 
Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical beings exist, and his 
explanation of how, through their extension in nous, they 
play a role in human understanding. 
 
 214 
 
Secondly, respectively and collectively, beginning on page 215 I engage with Book 
VII of the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989) and Books I and II of the Physics 
(Aristotle, 1952n, 2004) wherein it is revealed that each individual natural being of 
the substance row of the categories consists of form and matter; Book II of the De 
Anima (Aristotle, 1952b, 1957a) in which Aristotle discusses the soul as the form of 
the body and the principle of life in natural organic beings; and again Book VII of 
the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989), wherein Aristotle analyses four causes of 
being.  
The whole purpose of my commentary on the primacy of substance over matter, 
existence as form and matter, and the four causes of being is to explicate Aristotle’s 
writing about being, on which, as intimated on page 206 his different usage of the 
term form in Proposal (I) rests. Such 
commentary occupies pages 214 to 236 of 
my enquiry and through this engagement 
I complete Level 1 articulation of 
Proposals (I) and (II) and begin detailed 
Level 1 articulation of proposal (III). 
Again, only after full Level 1 articulation 
of Proposals (I) through (V) is complete, 
can I finally summarise Level 2 
articulation of the key-terms nuance Aristotle brings to the enquiry and apply it in 
Level 3 articulation of the Thesis Proposition Statements themselves.  
FORM MATTER AND BEING 
Aristotle’s Argument for the Primacy of Substance over Matter 
Thus, first, of the primacy of substance over matter, Aristotle quickly establishes the 
primacy of substance for the explanation of being. 
So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one 
starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because 
they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, 
or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of 
substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these 
things [10] or of substance itself. It is for this reason we say even of non-being that it 
is non-being. Metaphysics IV 1003b5 - 10 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 522; 1989)  
 
Proposal (III) 
Aristotle’s founding of an “objective” Ethics based on 
practical action indirectly informed, through practical 
reasoning, by a cognitive appeal to scientific reasoning. 
 
Proposal (IV) 
Aristotle’s founding of Science as a process of induction 
and deduction based on objective understandings about 
natural objects, and his development of a logic which 
prescribed a procedure for reasoning in Science. 
 
Proposal (V) 
Aristotle’s skilful bringing of such Science and Ethics to his 
political philosophy, and his argument in that philosophy 
that the Polis or gathering of humans, being based on 
natural law imperatives, was essentially stable and good. 
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and 
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first 
in every sense—(1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, and (3) in time. 
Metaphysics VII 1028a30 – 35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 550; 1989)  
and 
… indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is 
always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question what is substance? 
Metaphysics VII 1028b - 1028b5 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 550; 1989)  
Secondly, in discussing substance as form and matter, soul as the form of the body, 
and the four causes of being, Aristotle is quick to establish that substance is thought 
to exist in a number of ways, and in the Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1952d, 1989) in 
Book I, three kinds of habitual recognition of substance are specified. 
We are in the habit of recognising, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and 
in several sense, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not ‘a this’, and (b) 
in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is 
called ‘a this’, and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both (a) 
[10] and (b). Now matter is potentiality, form actuality; of the latter there are two 
grades related to one another as e.g. knowledge to the exercise of knowledge. 4 On the 
Soul II Metaphysics I 412a5 – 15 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1989) 
Aristotle names beings compounded of form and matter hylomorph beings. The 
ongoing differentiation of substance from matter which unfolds as this enquiry 
chapter progresses is complex and vexed. It is an outcome of, and reflects, my 
attempt to gain a more complete understanding of Aristotle’s Science Δ2KTS which “… 
everywhere deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things 
depend, and in virtue of which they get their names” Metaphysics IV 1003b15 - 20, 
(Aristotle, 1952d, p. 522; 1989). 
FORM MATTER BEING 
Substance as Substrate Matter, Substance as Form and Substance as Hylomorph 
I now investigate in turn, Aristotle’s explanation of each of the three habitual 
understandings of substance: substance as substrate matter, substance as form, and 
substance as hylomorph. In doing this I address the required clarification  
                                                          
4 As knowledge is thought per se, and passive, and thinking and reflection are the exercise of knowledge and active, so too 
there are active and passive aspects of form.  
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foreshadowed on page 213 and also complete the articulation of Proposal (I), namely 
that an independent existence of hylomorphic beings is occasioned through form, 
which, via transmission through a prior member of the species, brings definition to 
substrate matter.  
First, in respect of substance as substrate matter, Aristotle, in Physics III 192b10 – 
193b15 (Aristotle, 1952n, pp. 268 - 70; 2004), argues that all generated beings, that 
is, all natural and manufactured beings, are said to be composites of form and matter. 
Such individual beings are classified as the primary existences of the substance row 
of the categories illustrated in Table 15 on page 207. The existence of such beings is 
predicated on qualities inhering in them. Form and matter as terms are not used in 
Categories (Aristotle, 1938a, 1952a) to explain being but in Physics (Aristotle, 
1952n, 2004), matter is said to be “… just this – the primary substratum of each 
thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the 
result” Physics I 192a30 – 35 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 268; 2004).  
For example, in the case of natural living objects, matter might be tissue per se, 
tissue not further qualified as a horse, say, rather than tissue qualified as a giraffe. In 
the case of non-natural beings, that is manufactured goods like statues and columns, 
matter might, for example, be bronze per se, bronze not further qualified as a statue 
or a column as the case may be. Thus understood, matter is implicated in being: it is 
one of four identified causes of being outlined in Table 18 on page 216 and is  
Table 18: Aristotle’s Four Causes of Being and Their Traditional Names 
 
Cause Explanation 
Material Cause 
“… that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called ‘cause’, e.g. the bronze of 
the statue, the silver [25] of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are 
species” Physics II 194b24 (Aristotle, 1952n,  p. 271; 2004).  
Essential or Formal 
Cause 
“… the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called causes” 
Physics II 194b25 - 30 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 271; 2004): a lump of bronze becomes a statue of 
Thales by virtue of the formal cause—in this case the shape or form given the bronze by the 
activity of the artist: the formal cause is the shape not the artistic action which caused the shape. 
Moving or Efficient 
Cause 
“ … the primary source of the change [30] or coming to rest, e.g. the man who gave the advice is a 
cause, the father is cause to the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes 
change of what is changed” Physics II 194b30 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 271; 2004). In the example 
above given for formal cause, the activity of the artist is the efficient cause.  
Final Cause 
“That for the sake of which a thing is done, e. g. health is the cause of walking about.” Physics II 
194b30 - 35, (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 271). The end sought: continuation and perfection of the species 
might be understood as a final cause of change, nature being careful of the type, not the individual. 
The final cause is (a) some being for whose cause an action is done, and (b) something at which 
the action aims Metaphysics XII 1072b - 1072b5 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 602; 1989).  
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Physics. (II 194b15 – 195b30, pp. 271 – 272; II 194b24, p. 
271; II 194b25 – 30, p. 271; II 194b25 – 30, p. 271). In R. M. Hutchins Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. 
(1952). Posterior Analytics. (II 94a20 – 95a10, pp. 128 - 129). In Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952) 
Metaphysics. (I 983a, p. 501; XII 1072b – 1072b5, p. 602). In R. M. Hutchins Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton. 
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specified as the material cause. And the matter of the material cause is spoken of as 
proximate matter explained further in Table 19 on page 217.  
The qualification Aristotle speaks of is that which allows the proximate matter of 
tissue to be named a horse rather than a giraffe, or bronze to be named a statue rather 
than a column, and it is due to form, shape, inter alia, being an outward 
manifestation of form, of which more later. It is the qualification announced by the 
accidents of the categories.  
Aristotle does not immediately provide a complete definition of form in his Physics 
(Aristotle, 1952n, 2004). Rather he announces that a full understanding of form must 
await “the primary type of science” Δ2KTS Physics I 192a35 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 268; 
2004), the metaphysics. It must “stand over until then” (ibid.) and can be found at 
Metaphysics XII 1072a15 – 1075a10 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 602 - 605; 1989) and 
where also substance is considerably differentiated from matter. In the Physics 
Aristotle confines his discussion of form to natural beings, beings capable of some 
kind of movement including change, and to generated and manufactured non-natural 
beings such as houses, paintings and statues. 
Table 19: Working Definitions of Classes of Matter Mentioned by Aristotle 
  
organic matter 
Living matter, the matter of plants and animals, in which organs are apparent: the soul is the principle 
of life which distinguishes living natural bodies from non-living natural bodies1. De Anima II 412a - 
412b10 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1957a). Form is responsible for the actuality of all natural bodies 
except that, in the case of organic bodies, soul, a special case of form, brings actuality. 
non organic 
matter 
Generated matter, bricks, bronze or matter such as rocks and stones. 
proximate matter 
That matter that is capable of being essentially enformed; that matter of the individuals existing in the 
substance row of the categories classification, that matter in which sensed accidents are said to exist—
Metaphysics VIII 1044b, VIII 1044a15 – 1044b20 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 569, 568 - 569; 1989). 
Proximate matter is potentially a thing—Metaphysics IX 1048a25 – 1049b5, (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 573 - 
574; 1989) and, through being enformed, becomes the body of a thing, notwithstanding that, in 
hylomorphic substances, form and body cannot be separated. For example the wood of a tree is 
potentially a bowl whereas the sunlight energy stored in the wood is not. The wood per se receives the 
form of the bowl, not the sunlight energy stored in the wood. Attempting to explain Aristotle in terms 
of post Aristotelian ideas of Science, in the manner just now attempted, is anachronistic and not 
without its own questions. 
non proximate 
matter 
Matter intermediate between original matter—which is, whatever it might be, a substance and the same 
for all things—and the proximate matter defined in the row above—Metaphysics VIII 1044a20, 
1044a15 – 1044b20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 568 - 569; 1989). 
Notes: (1) Unfortunately a contention about the manner in which soul enforms the matter of animal bodies leaves such 
attractively parsimonious statements of Aristotle’s hylomorphism wanting. Ackrill (2001) began a recent controversy when 
he argued that animal bodies—soul gives them life—remain recognisable as a particular member of a species immediately 
following death. Animal bodies cannot easily be treated in the manner of bronze say which between being contingently 
enformed in statue form as Thales and subsequently contingently enformed in statue form as Hero, is recognisable as neither. 
After death the body of the individual Thrasymachus is, for some time, recognisable as Thrasymachus. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). De Anima. (II 412a – 412b10, p. 642). Chicago: William 
Benton; Aristotle. (1952). Metaphysics. (VIII 1044a15 – 1044b20, pp. 568 – 569; IX 1048a25 – 1049b5, pp. 573 - 575). In 
R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle. (Vol. 8 (1), pp. 495 - 626). Chicago: William Benton. 
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All that I can glean from Aristotle so far is that first, individual existing beings, 
which are categorically and/or habitually known as substance, and whose existence is 
known by accidents, are composed of form and matter, secondly that matter as the 
substance of natural enformed bodies is habitually known as proximate material 
body, and thirdly that form, whatever it is, qualifies that proximate matter by giving 
it a name and making it knowable as the body of a particular existing thing. 
Fortunately, elsewhere On Generation and Corruption II 238b30 – 333a15 
(Aristotle, 1952i, pp. 428 - 431; 2007), Aristotle reveals that matter, that primary 
substratum for each thing, which constitutes the body of each individual organic 
being, is made up of particular organs and each of these organs consists of a 
particular combination of the four elements air, fire, water, and earth.  
The four elements themselves are particular compounds of four qualities - hot, cold, 
wet, and dry as outlined in Table 20. 
These four elements emerge from an 
indeterminate zone of potentiality 
which accepts the qualities. I was not 
aware of potential’s role as the mother 
through which qualities beget the 
elements of material existence, until 
finding the key Jackson’s reference provided (H. Jackson, 1908, p. 788).  
By virtue of this chain extending from the qualities through the elements to the 
“proximate matter” Metaphysics VIII 1044b (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 569; 1989) of the 
individual beings, all organic natural beings, and by extension natural inorganic 
beings, are initially beings in potential prior to their coming to be, being, and ceasing 
to be Metaphysics 1044a15 - 1045a5 (Aristotle, 1952d; pp. 566 - 69; 1989). The links 
of the chain, the various stages of coming to be between potential being, and the final 
proximate matter of the existing individual being, consist of non-proximate matter. 
Such matter, while it may not be discernible in the proximate matter of the 
individual, nevertheless underscores its being Metaphysics IX 1049a20 - 25`, 
1048b35 - 1049b5 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 574, 574 - 575; 1989). Presumably, the 
changing of non-proximate matter continues as ceasing to be progresses. The 
Table 20: Elements Expressed as Qualities 
 
Elements Qualities 
fire hot and dry 
air hot and wet 
earth cold and dry 
water cold and wet 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). On 
Generation and Corruption. (II 2-3 pp. 429 – 430). (H. H. 
Joachim, Trans. Vol. 10). Chicago: William Benton. 
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ultimate or primary existence is thus a potential. This potential state is not just a 
universal something which can be temporarily assembled, per se, into the various 
individuals of the different species (H. Jackson, 1908, p. 788). Form must be present 
before substance is recognisable as an individual ‘this’ or ‘that’.  
Such definition of the ultimate or primary matter as being qua potential, like the 
question of the nature of substance before it, begs further enquiry. In pursuing an 
answer to the question Aristotle switches his focus away from substance as 
materiality towards substance revealed as form, essence and cause. In following 
Aristotle’s change of focus I begin more detailed discussion of the second and third 
of the three notions of substance discussed earlier on page 215, substance as form, 
essence or cause, and substance as hylomorph. During this discussion I also address 
Aristotle’s four causes of being.  
In discussion of the four causes of being in Metaphysics VII 1041a5 -1042a (1952d, 
pp. 565 - 566; 1989) Aristotle intimates that “substance is a principle and a cause” 
(ibid., 1041a5-10) and that when we are inquiring into being, inquiring into what a 
thing actually is, what makes a material body a particular specified thing, we are 
inquiring into the “cause” (ibid., 1041a25 – 30) of the thing, which cause is the 
“essence” (ibid., 1041a25 - 30) and this essence is the “form by reason of which 
matter is some definite thing: and this is the substance of the thing” (ibid. 1041b5 – 
10). Form, so acting, is implicated in being and is known as the formal cause 
outlined in Table 18 on page 216. Substance as Aristotle here defines it is something 
other than materiality. It can thus also be essence or form which accepts materiality 
in some way, of which more later. The essence inherent in sensible particulars cannot 
be given by the material element because the material element is seen to be 
perishable Metaphysics VII 1039b – 1040a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 563 - 64; 1989)—
again form gives essence, and tells us what the being is, matter allows numerical 
individualisation Metaphysics VII 1033a25 – 1034a10 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 556 - 
557; 1989) and thus occasions plurality of the enformed or identified beings. 
Accidents help locate a particular individual within the plurality.  
In particular, form exists eternally and is not produced by the begetter Metaphysics 
VII 1033b18 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 556; 1989). Aristotle argues that: 
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it is obvious … that that which has been spoken of as form or substance is not 
produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced, and that in 
everything which is generated, matter is present, and one part of a thing is matter and 
the other form. Metaphysics VII 1033b15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 556; 1989)  
and that “the begetter is adequate to the making of the product and to the causing of 
the form in the matter” Metaphysics VII 1034a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, , p. 557; 1989).  
The last quote, which states that form is transferred by the begetter, and the 
paragraph content leading up to it, illustrates 
the nice difference between Aristotle and Plato 
and is germane to a second component of 
Proposal (I), namely that form is transmitted by 
a prior member of the species. Form in Aristotle 
is not found through distant reminiscent noetic grasp of separately existing 
exemplars. Form, when given by a prior member of the species—Aristotle identifies 
the male—is an essence which ensures the continuation of the species. Aristotle’s 
form, the integrated characteristics transmitted by a former member of the species, 
which identifies an existing object for what it is, replaces Plato’s form, the template 
idea, which, through being accessible via reflection and recollection permits only an 
imperfect understanding of independently existing objects.  
Aristotle agrees that the forms are eternal. They carry the ἐντελέχεια, the entelechy, 
or fullness or completeness of the being to the service of final cause—De Anima II 
417b5 – 7, Metaphysics IX 1047a30, (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 648; 1952d, p. 572; 1957a, 
1989; Bradshaw, 2004, pp. 13-19) and they operate in the here and now in the sub-
lunar world. This act of begetting, the bringing of form to matter, as opposed to the 
form per se, is itself thus implicated in the process of being and coming to be, and is 
known as the efficient or moving cause outlined in Table 18 on page 216. In the case 
of manufactured goods the activity or efficient virtue of the artisan, the playwright, 
painter, or sculptor is implicated in transmitting form to the proximate matter.  
If one were to ask for what purpose does efficient or moving cause act, Aristotle 
might answer that it acts in pursuit of, or under the influence of, final cause, that 
proper, final, and right state of being and place which constitutes the nature of the 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings 
compounded of form and matter exist, and that 
such existence is brought to human 
understanding because form, when it is 
transmitted by a prior member of the species, 
brings definition to substrate matter. 
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enformed matter in question. In this sense the final cause of the acorn is the oak tree. 
In modern terms the final cause of evolution might be the survival, or even the 
perfection, of the species. Aristotle explains that in matters of natural Science, that is 
physics, “we think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and there 
are four causes” Δ2KTS, Δ2APS Posterior Analytics II 94a 20 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 128; 
1960a).  
It is important to note that Aristotle allows that in some cases causes may collapse 
into one another. For example, he allows that formal cause and final cause may be 
one Metaphysics VIII 1044b (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 569; 1989). And in Physics II 
198b15 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952n, p. 275; 2004) he intimates that in some cases 
explanation may have to rest on material and efficient cause, there being no final 
cause to be found. Such a position is consistent with a mechanical teleology in nature 
which complements the final or metaphysical cause, the unmoved mover, discussed 
on page 222 upon which Aristotle’s cosmology is based. Cosmology is used in this 
enquiry to signify the structure of the universe, the things in it and how they are 
related, rather than to the creation of the things and that structure themselves. 
I provide, in this paragraph, a brief integrating summary and recapitulation. Things, 
substantial natural beings, exist. Matter, essence or form, and hylomorph are 
substances. In the categorical analysis, the primary beings of the substance row of the 
categories divisions are perceived as composites by virtue of substance and 
accidents. In the metaphysical analysis, individual existing beings consist of form, 
which is essence or substance, and matter or materiality, which as substance is the 
body—the divisible, changeable and perishable substratum of the existing 
individuals. Here form alone, substance as essence, allows matter to be given a 
particular name whereas in the categories, things, consisting of substance, become 
known through their accidents. In all, there are four causes of being, and scientific 
knowledge about beings emerges when the four causes of being are known. The 
previous sentence, tucked away as it is in the text of just one paragraph of this 
chapter, reiterates another of Aristotle’s fundamental tenets. By announcing that 
Science focuses on, and is reliable knowledge about, the four causes of 
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independently existing natural beings, Aristotle provides another building block for 
the subsequent work of this chapter Δ2KTS.  
The recapitulation of the preceding paragraph is germane to the ongoing articulation 
of Proposal (I), particularly that part of the proposal which claims that existing things 
consist of form and matter and that existence is brought to human understanding 
because form brings definition to substrate matter. Still, thus far, articulation of this 
part of Proposal (I) remains incomplete because I have not yet addressed the mystery 
of how form and matter combine to make a whole, a one, a ‘this’, an adventure to 
which I now turn. I begin this adventure by first discussing metaphysical beings 
which are indispensable to the process by which organic bodies are fully enformed.  
FORM MATTER BEING 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (II) Begins 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (I) Continues  
Aristotle finds that unchanging and incorporeal beings, metaphysical beings, exist. 
Contemplation of these beings begets 
metaphysics Δ2KTS which, as Table 17 on page 
211 reveals, is that branch of Aristotle’s 
philosophy in which he deals with the 
unmoved and ‘insensible’ or that which is 
named the transcendent. Such beings, as distinct from natural organic and inorganic 
beings capable of change, and manufactured 
beings, require that further account 
Metaphysics VIII 1044b5 – 10 (Aristotle, 
1952d, p. 569; 1989) discussed on page 217. Consequently, working a posteriori, 
Aristotle identifies three such transcendent beings: a primary unmoved mover, 
subsidiary unmoved movers, and nous, the latter being the active part of the human 
mind.  
In particular, in his De Anima (Aristotle, 1952b, 1984b), which as Table 21 reveals 
was part of his lectures on biology, but which now is considered part of his 
psychology, Aristotle pronounces that soul is a substance De Anima II 412a 10 – 20 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1957a). In these discussions Aristotle, inter alia, provides 
further insights into the nature of substance as a composite of form and matter.  
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings 
compounded of form and matter exist, and that 
such existence is brought to human understanding 
because form, when it is transmitted by a prior 
member of the species, brings definition to 
substrate matter. 
 
 
Proposal (II) 
Metaphysical beings exist, and, through their 
extension in nous, they play a role in human 
understanding. 
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True to his trust in the senses, Aristotle searches a posteriori amongst existing 
individuals for evidence of the existence of those unmoved and insensible 
metaphysical beings. He considered the observed “circular” movement of the earth, 
the planets and the heavenly bodies to be perfect and eternal—Metaphysics XII 
1072b5 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 602; 1989), Physics VIII 6, 258b5 – 260a20 (1952n, pp. 
344 - 346; 2004)—and in order to explain those first circular and eternal movements 
he supposes a necessary unmoved mover. The unmoved mover is in itself good, and 
a first principle upon which “depend the heavens and the world of nature” 
Metaphysics XII 1072b10 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 602; 1989). This unmoved mover 
which is exempt from matter, which exists eternally, and which is in essence 
operational, is pure act without potential Metaphysics XII 1071b – 1073a15, 
(Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 601 - 603; 1989).  
The unmoved mover is attended by subsidiary unmoved movers and Aristotle’s 
whole supposition is very much predicated on the astronomy of his day. His 
planetary system is earth-centred and from this view, a disputed number of circular 
motions could be called up to explain the observed movements of the heavenly 
bodies. Eudoxus (c. BC 410 - 347) had found need for twenty-seven, allowing for 
five planets at four spheres each, one sphere for the fixed stars, and three each for the 
moon and sun; Callippus (c. BC 370 - 300) had found need of seven more to explain 
Eudoxus’ system, and Aristotle found need for fifty-five, of which forty-seven were 
indispensable Metaphysics XII 1073b1 - 1074a15 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 603 - 604; 
1989). 
Jackson explains the subsidiary unmoved movers thus:  
Table 21: Mediaeval Classification of Aristotle’s Major Lecture Works 
  
Logic 
The Organon, including Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior 
Analytics, Topics, On Sophistical Refutations 
Physics Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology 
Biology 
History of Animals, On the Parts of Animals, On the Motion of Animals, On the Gait of 
Animals, On the Generation of Animals, On the Soul 
Philosophy Metaphysics 
Ethics and 
Politics 
Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Magma Moralia, Politics, Economics  
Literature Rhetoric. On Poetics 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Jackson, H. (1908). Aristotle, Aristotelianism. (p. 787). In J. 
Hastings (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. 1). Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.  
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… the other unmoved movents, though Aristotle does not say it, must needs be the 
thoughts of the prime unmoved movent. For at the end of Metaphysics A, criticising 
Speusippus on the ground that his system makes the universe ‘episodical’, Aristotle 
adds epigrammatically: ‘Real existences [existing individuals] refuse to submit to a 
bad constitution: as Homer says, a plurality of kings is bad; let us have one king’. 
Plainly Aristotle supposes himself to escape this condemnation: and so he does, if the 
other unmoved movents are the thoughts of the prime unmoved movent; for ‘mind and 
its thoughts are one and the same’ (1072b 21, 1075a 3). (H. Jackson, 1908, p. 788, my 
square brackets) 
The primary being, this prime unmoved mover, is thought thinking itself 
Metaphysics XII 1074b30 - 35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 605; 1989). Aristotle reveals, of 
which more later, that the active part of the human soul, in the form of pure act of 
mind, is a little bit of the eternal, a little bit of the pure act of the unmoved mover 
within us. In humans this pure act of mind is called nous. It accesses objects of 
thought, and complements a passive component of mind which serves to receive 
objects of thought Metaphysics XII 1072b20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 602; 1989). As 
earlier discussed on page 209, by virtue of sensation, perceptions accurately grasp, 
and become isomorphic with, existing objects. The mind’s own internal thoughts 
about those isomorphic perceptions are the objects of thought and they become the 
currency of the active intellect. Aristotle implies that the unmoved mover, thought 
thinking itself, is a god Metaphysics XII 1074b30 – 35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 605; 
1989) which, together with the subsidiary unmoved movers, attracts the materials of 
the universe and causes them to rotate. There is no suggestion that the prime 
unmoved mover created those materials in the first place. It is also instructive to 
recall the ancient Greek usage of the term god earlier explained on page 91. There, it 
is explained, for example, that love is a god because it continues to exist in the 
presence of the coming to be, being, and ceasing to be of the generative cycles. In 
short, mind, thought thinking itself exempt from matter and potential, and knowing 
only itself, is a first principle of being. This starting point is fundamental to 
Aristotle’s whole system and is another of the building blocks for the subsequent 
work of this chapter. It is a foundation stone of Aristotelian thought. 
The attraction by which Aristotle’s god formed the world is a manifestation of god’s 
perfection and goodness, and desire is somehow involved Metaphysics XII 1071b – 
1072a15 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 601 - 02; 1989; Copleston, 1966, pp. 314 - 16).  
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Aristotle himself explains that god, as thought thinking itself, knows only itself and 
that it would not be wise to attempt to form a friendship with god. Such a god would 
not be able to return love given, and we could not love that god in the first place 
Magna Moralia II 1208b25 – 35 (Aristotle or another, 1915, n .p.; Copleston, 1966, 
p. 317; W. D. Ross, 1930, p. 184). Irrespective of these contentions, mankind 
possesses nous, a spark of that divine first principle of being, again that something 
which is eternal pure act separate from both potential and matter. Aristotle’s nous 
partakes of the human soul, which, as the form of the body, is a substance, but I have 
yet to discuss the special features of nous which enable partaking. Given that nous, 
which is able to partake of the human soul, is also at one with the unmoved mover 
which, in turn, is pure act without potential, nous must be a special case in itself and 
somehow different from the other rarefied metaphysical existences. I revisit this 
question about the human soul and its interaction with nous again on page 231. 
I am now able to present in Table 22 on page 225 and its attendant text discussion a 
more complete explanation of the kinds of beings identified by Aristotle. There are 
physical or natural material beings such as rocks, trees, and animals. Some of these 
natural beings are known as organic beings such as trees and animals: they are, or in 
an earlier state, have been alive. Others are known as inorganic beings—rocks, 
Table 22: Beings Known to Aristotle 
 
AREAS OF 
OPERATION 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF BEING 
Kinds of 
Beings 
Natural 
Artificial or 
Manufactured 
Mathematical Metaphysical 
Organic Inorganic 
Examples of 
Beings 
animals 
and plants 
rocks, 
water, sand 
statues, houses, 
bricks, weapons 
length, breadth, 
area, volume, 
angles, circles 
prime mover and 
subsidiary 
unmoved movers 
and nous 
Content of 
Being 
form and 
(proximate) 
matter 
form and 
(proximate) 
matter 
form and 
(proximate matter) 
no separate 
existence outside 
of the proximate 
matter to which 
they pertain 
pure act without 
substance or 
potential 
The Primary 
State of the 
Being 
potential potential 
form and 
proximate matter 
no separate 
existence outside 
of the proximate 
matter to which 
they pertain1 
pure act without 
substance or 
potential 
Notes: (1) Hume would much later declare “there never were a circle or triangle in nature” (Hume, 1902, p. 25). 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from the chapter content. 
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gemstones, metals—because they are without life. Beings such as bricks, bronze 
columns, houses, which are generated from organic and inorganic natural bodies, are 
known as artificial beings. A bed made of wood, leather, silver and ivory would be 
an example. All such natural and generated bodies exist outside of the mind. The 
primary state of natural beings is potential. The primary existence of generated 
beings is the proximate matter from which the being was generated, for example the 
wood of the carved bowl is the proximate matter of the bowl. There are also 
mathematical and metaphysical beings.  
Mathematical beings such as areas, volumes, and shapes have no separate existence 
outside of the enformed proximate matter to which they pertain. Metaphysical 
beings, unmoved movers and nous are pure act having no component of potential. 
All natural and generated beings consist of form and matter.  
The explanations given in the summarising activity of the preceding paragraph are 
once again germane to the unfolding demonstration of Proposal (I) namely, the 
manner in which natural beings are hylomorphic combinations of form and matter. I 
attempt a more complete demonstration of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, beginning in 
the next paragraph. The content of the previous paragraph, and the chapter content 
from which it emerged, are also germane to, and partially complete, the 
demonstration of Proposal (II) namely, Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical beings 
exist and that, through their extension in nous, they are essential to the occasioning 
of human understanding.  
FORM MATTER BEING 
Closure of Level 1 Articulation of Proposals (I) and (II) 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (III) Begins 
Using Table 22 and its commentary as a background I proceed to further explain the 
nature of substance as a hylomorphic composite of form and matter and the manner 
in which form and matter are said to interact. Because soul is a special case of form, I 
must, in order to give a more complete explanation of substance as hylomorph, first 
address Aristotle’s psychology of soul, upon which the existence of nous as active 
mind is partially predicated. This excursion into soul will also allow completion of 
the Level 1 articulation of Proposals (I) and (II), and begin the Level 1 articulation of 
Proposals (III).  
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Given then that substance can exist as a combination of form and matter, that soul is 
the form of the body, that nous is part 
of that which is pure act without 
potential yet doubles as the divine part 
of the soul, how do form and matter 
interact, both in general, and in the 
particular case of soul as the form of 
the body? I begin discussion of these 
questions in the next paragraph. 
Aristotle, working a posteriori, predicates the existence of the soul on knowable 
feelings such as joy, anger, and courage De Anima I 403a15 - 20`, (Aristotle, 1952b, 
p. 632; 1957a), and upon other self-
evident states such as nutrition, 
perception, imagination, desire and 
thinking. He confronts this array of 
states and discusses each in turn. He 
posits that nutrition is predicated on a 
vegetative domain of soul, perception 
on an animal domain, and thinking, as 
reasoning, on a rational domain. He 
arranges these domains into a hierarchy 
and, in further elucidation of that 
hierarchy, he provides a detailed 
explanation of the nature of the soul’s 
constitution. He makes the soul the form of the body thereby giving it a central 
position in his explanation of hylomorphic organic being.  
By way of general definition Aristotle announces that soul is “the first grade of 
actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it” De Anima II 412a25- 412b 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1957a) and “the first grade of actuality of a natural 
organised body” De Anima II 412b5 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 642; 1957a). As partly 
revealed in Table 22 on page 225, natural inorganic bodies are individual bodies of 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings compounded 
of form and matter exist, and that such existence is brought to 
human understanding because form, when it is transmitted by 
a prior member of the species, brings definition to substrate 
matter. 
Proposal (II) 
Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical beings exist, and how, 
through their extension in nous, they play a role in human 
understanding 
Proposal (III) 
Aristotle’s founding of an “objective” Ethics based on 
practical action indirectly informed, through practical 
reasoning, by a cognitive appeal to scientific reasoning. 
 
 
Blurring Divisions of Soul? 
In brief, the conscious mind emerges within the history of life 
regulation. Life regulation, a dynamic process known as 
homeostasis for short, begins in unicellular living creatures, 
such as a bacterial cell or a simple amoeba, which do not have 
a brain but are capable of adaptive behavior. It progresses in 
individuals whose behavior is managed by simple brains, as is 
the case with worms, and it continues its march in individuals 
whose brains generate both behavior and mind (insects and 
fish being examples). I am ready to believe that whenever 
brains begin to generate primordial feelings—and that could 
be quite early in evolutionary history—organisms acquire an 
early form of sentience. From there on, an organized self 
process could develop and be added to the mind, thereby 
providing the beginning of elaborate conscious minds. 
Reptiles are contenders for this distinction, for example; birds 
make even stronger contenders; and mammals get the award 
and then some. Most species whose brains generate a self do 
so at core level. Humans have both core self and 
autobiographical self. A number of mammals are likely to 
have both as well, namely wolves, our ape cousins, marine 
mammals and elephants, cats, and, of course, that off-the-
scale species called the domestic dog. Damasio, A. (2011). 
Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (pp. 
25-26). Random House Edition. (Damasio, 2010, pp. 25-26) 
 
 228 
 
the physical realm, those capable of movement and change broadly defined, for 
example rocks or water which may become hot or cold or which may change in 
colour. Natural organised bodies are living bodies: plants and animals. The first 
faculty of the soul, nutrition, differentiates organised bodies from non-organised or 
inorganic bodies, those not alive, and both kinds of bodies are known 
hylomorphically through form and matter.  
Understood in this way, the soul is the form of the organized body and is a principle 
of life. It is a “substance [italics added] in the sense in which it corresponds to the 
definitive formula of a thing’s existence” De Anima II 412b10 – 15 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
p. 642, my square brackets; 1957a). Aristotle’s general position on hylomorphic 
beings is that the form, in this case the soul, is not separable from the body De 
Anima II 413a - 413a5 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 643; 1957a). But, as the discussion of his 
detailed definition of soul below reveals, he then proceeds to set up the possibility of 
eternality for part of the soul by allowing that elements of it may not be the actuality 
of any part of the body—De Anima II 413a5 - 10`, 413b25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
pp. 643, 643 - 644; 1957a) and that the power to think, nous, may exist separately 
from the body De Anima II 413b25 - 30 (Aristotle, 1952b, pp. 643 - 644; 1957a). I 
visit the question of just how nous, which is pure act without potential, partakes of 
the soul, a substance, on pages 229 to 231. 
Table 23 on page 230 provides key information about the logic underlying 
Aristotle’s detailed definition of soul. The soul is a hierarchy of three primary 
faculties of ability: nutrition, perception, and cognition this latter understood as 
thought and reason. Imagination De Anima III 427b15 – 4029a10 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
pp. 660 - 661; 1957a), and desire De Anima III 433b - 443b5 (Aristotle, 1952b, pp. 
664 - 66; 1957a) are subsequently admitted as important faculties, or abilities, of 
soul—De Anima III 432a15 – 433b30 (Aristotle, 1952b, pp. 664 - 66; 1957a). 
Nutrition is the primary faculty of the soul since “nothing except what is alive can be 
fed [and] what is fed is the besouled body, and just because it has soul in it. Hence 
food is essentially related to what has soul in it” De Anima II 4 416b 10 (Aristotle, 
1952b, p. 646, my square brackets; 1957a). Living bodies, that is ensouled bodies,  
require the nourishment food gives. Food is inalienable to life and food as 
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nourishment relates to living body which body is living because it is first nourished 
by the soul. The quotation from Aristotle in the opening sentence of this paragraph, 
and its accompanying explanation, establish nourishment as a natural right emerging 
from natural law imperatives of physiology. Such a position is compatible with the 
totem ritual and place nourishment dimension in the origins of Homeric values 
themselves, and their journey to, and enshrinement in, the political philosophy of 
Plato’s Republic (Plato, 1952r, 1969a) discussed in Chapter 1. 
Perception, which separates animals from plants, is needed by animals to allow them 
to seek out and acquire nourishment. So configured, perception contains, or at least is 
closely associated with, a capacity for discrimination so that it is not entirely passive.  
Perception is occasioned through sensory activity. Such sensory activity is 
preconfigured towards detecting the qualities, that is, the accidents of existing 
individuals and because of its link to them, perception is distinguished from mind. 
Since humans are subsequently to be distinguished from other animals because they, 
those humans, are said to be capable of reason, presumably a non-human animal, 
when it moves to eat the food it perceives and desires, of which more later, is 
somehow not thinking.  
Aristotle explains the mechanics of perception. Perception is a kind of change which 
occurs when sensory organs are altered De Anima II 416b30 – 35 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
p. 647; 1957a) in such a manner that they become like the thing sensed by taking on 
its form De Anima II 418a - 418a10, 424 10 – 25, II 424 15 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
pp. 648, 654, 656; 1957a), a process germane to the ongoing articulation of Proposal 
(I). Affecting agent and affected organ must be mutually compatible before a transfer 
of form can occur and enable perception. Mind, understood as nous, reason, intellect, 
as earlier mentioned, separates mankind from other animals. It is that “…part of the 
soul with which the soul knows and thinks” Δ2KTS De Anima III 429a10 (Aristotle, 
1952b, p. 661; 1957a).  
At Nicomachean Ethics VI 1143a20 – 1143b15 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 392 - 
393), Aristotle also predicates mind on the knowable activities of reflection, and 
strategising, and on purposeful self-directed action. Human thinking, like perception  
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before it, is said to occur when an intellectual faculty receives a form De Anima III 
429a10 – 20 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 661; 1957a) and mind is made like its object of 
thought, a process also germane to articulation of Proposal (I). Once again, form, and 
the intellectual faculty receiving it, must be compatible for thinking to occur. I would 
prefer to know more about this question. My qualification notwithstanding, Aristotle 
posits that when sensation’s product is delivered to, and unpacked by, passive 
perception, it is an isomorph of the thing sensed, a 
swan say, and subsequently when mind reflects on 
that product of perception and is made like it, made 
isomorphic to the isomorphic percept of the real 
independently existing individual, in this case a swan, 
the way in which the mind knows the form is limited but reliable. Presumably the 
mind does not know the full story for then much of Aristotle’s logic, Science and 
Ethics would be superfluous and there might be little left unknown to humans. This 
two-fold process of knowing is the mechanism behind the form and matter 
understanding of hylomorphic being in Proposal (I). 
Table 23: Attributes of Soul 
 
Hierarchy of 
Faculties 
Generic Names of 
the Faculties 
Manifestations Differentiating Factor 
nutrition vegetative 
nourishment and 
limited movement 
Nourishment is needed for life and 
helps explain growth understood as 
coming to be, being, and ceasing to 
be.  
nutrition + 
perception 
animal 
nourishment 
sensation 
movement 
Perception: is needed by animals to 
locate the food which permits 
nutrition and for other reasons 
necessary for life—De Anima, III 
434a30 - 434b15 (Aristotle, 1952b, 
p. 667; 1957a).  
nutrition + 
perception + mind 
human or intellectual 
nourishment 
movement 
sensation 
reason 
Reason, understood as mind, is 
needed to enable understanding and 
knowledge—De Anima  III 429a10 
– 30 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 661; 
1957a).  
lacuna 
Nous which 
partakes of soul in 
some manner 
divine  active mind from without 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Metaphysics. (VI 1 1026a4 - 6, p. 548). In R. M. Hutchins 
(Ed.), Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1953). De Anima. (II 412b10 – 15 p. 643; II 413a - 413a10, p. 643; 
II 413b25 – 30, pp. 643- 644; III 427b15, pp. 660 - 61; III 433b - 443b5, pp. 664 - 66; III 12 434a20 - 434b18, p. 667; III 3, 
pp. 659 - 661; III 9 and 10, pp. 664 - 666; II 4 415a25, p. 645; II 5 416b30 - 35, p. 647; II 5 418 a – 418a5, p. 648; II 10 and 
11, pp. 653 - 656; III 4 428a – 428b10, pp. 660 - 661; III 4 and 5, pp. 661 – 662; 434b, p. 667). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), 
Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). De Sensu. (I 436b10 – 15, p. 673). In R. M. Hutchins Aristotle I. 
Chicago: William Benton. 
 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finds that substantial natural 
beings compounded of form and matter 
exist, and that such existence is brought to 
human understanding because form, when 
it is transmitted by a prior member of the 
species, brings definition to substrate 
matter. 
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Aristotle provides two important insights about mind. Mind as differentiated from 
form or soul is not “blended with the body” De Anima III 429a20 - 25 (Aristotle, 
1952b , p. 661; 1957a), there being no bodily organ which corresponds to it, and 
mind “... before it thinks, [is] not actually any real thing” De Anima III 429a 20 – 25 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 661, my square brackets; 1957a). In this way active mind as 
nous is in, and of itself, something from without and 
it has the same state as the unmoved mover, that is, 
pure act. Without the emancipation of nous from the 
unmoved mover, active mind is impossible and this 
condition advances the articulation of Proposal (II).  
In this paragraph and the next I provide a summarising recapitulation. First 
hylomorphic substances consist of form and matter and become known when active 
mind receives the passive forms. Secondly, there is, within hylomorphic substance, a 
hierarchy of enform-ment. In particular, artificial bodies become “a this”, for 
example a bowl or a column, through the act of the artisan, and such bodies are 
accidentally or contingently enformed. Such bodies qualify as substances by virtue of 
the underlying matter upon which the artisan worked, the wood or the bronze as the 
case may be. In such cases the underlying matter is more rightly called substance. 
Thirdly, soul as a special case of form, is the actuality or entelechy, the principle of 
life which separates the animate from the inanimate. Animate bodies move 
themselves from within while inanimate beings are “moved” from without – moved 
by some external agent. Uluru for example might change colour, that is, move, in this 
manner.  
This hierarchy of the actualisation of matter in hylomorphic beings is summarised in 
Table 24 on page 232. Inanimate natural beings are true substances, true composites 
of form and matter.  
So too are animate natural beings except that they are enformed by the soul, part of 
which, as nous, as active mind, might be a metaphysical and incorporeal substance 
that comes from without—a substance which might contain an element which 
corresponds with no part of the body. In general, forms, which are eternal, serve final 
cause, which is eternal. Nous, which is essential to the whole process of how beings  
 
Proposal (II) 
Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical 
beings exist, and his explanation of how, 
through their extension in nous, they play 
a role in human understanding. 
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become known, and to scientific knowledgeΔ2KTS in particular, is pure act from without, 
and I would fain know more about it. I would better know the mechanics of how 
form and matter interact, exactly what happens when proximate substrate matter 
receives essence, what actually happens at the physical level when form allows 
matter to become ‘a this.’ Neuroscience today, it appears, continues to find the 
making of mind a difficult and intriguing question (Damasio, 1995, 1999, 2003). 
Irrespective of Damasio’s qualification, the transmission of form, serving as it does 
the eternal final cause in nature, renders Aristotle’s system consistent with natural 
law.  
The recapitulation above and the relevant commentary leading up to it complete the 
articulation of Proposals (I) and (II) until I revisit them again in discussion of 
Proposal (V). I thus proceed on the basis that existing natural beings exist, which 
beings, consisting of actualising form and substrate matter, are validly brought to 
human understanding when divine nous receives the objects of perception. 
FORM MATTER BEING 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (III) Begins 
Before completing this long discussion about form, matter and being which began on 
page 213, I first discuss two remaining faculties of the soul, viz, imagination and 
desire. In so doing I sketch out in general terms, the manner in which the theoretical 
philosophy and practical philosophy of Table 1 on page 18 are linked and thus begins 
articulation of Proposal (III), Aristotle’s identification of Ethics as act informed by 
practical wisdom under the aegis of scientific reasoning Δ2KTS. 
I first discuss imagination. Shields (2003, n.p.) provides a succinct discussion on 
Aristotle’s definition of imagination and in writing this paragraph I am indebted to 
the clarifications his work afforded. Aristotle defines imagination as “that in virtue of 
which an image arises for us” De Anima III 428a - 428a5 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 660; 
1957a) and although he links imagination to perception De Anima III 429a (Aristotle, 
Table 24: Kinds of Enform-ment  
 
Attributes of Form Kinds of Substances 
divisions of substance 
natural artificial 
animate inanimate 
enforming agent soul as form essence as form art as form 
nature of enform-ment Essential(1) essential contingent, accidental 
Notes: (1) Ackrill’s contention about essentially enformed animate bodies is again acknowledged. 
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1952b, p. 661; 1957a), he does not give imagination the same standing as mind or 
belief De Anima III 428a15 - 428b10 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 660; 1957a). Rather, he 
finds it functioning in humans and in some other animals as an activity of soul which 
is implicated in dreams, memories, images and image recall, motivation and action 
De Anima III 428a - 429a10 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 660 - 661; 1957a). Although 
imagination is an important human faculty it does not appear to be heavily implicated 
in Aristotle’s explanation of being. Consequently, I do not discuss it further. 
I now, second, discuss desire, that state Plato implicated in the structuring of the 
system of the planets Timaeus 30a-d (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 448), which also 
catches Aristotle’s attention. Because animals are sensate beings Aristotle allows that 
they are capable of desire which is also taken to be a manifestation and faculty of 
soul. The existence of desire is predicated on everyday examples of purposive or 
goal directed action whereby animals of all kinds move to obtain food, or in other 
ways to maintain life.  
Aristotle finds no one cause, no one mental faculty sufficient to explain purposive 
action and/or the various motions which sometimes appear to accompany it. Rather 
such motion, and the purposive or goal directed action it appears to facilitate, is 
explained in terms of mind influenced by appetite De Anima III 432b14 - 433a5 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 665; 1957a). It is against such an explanation that Aristotle 
states that it is clear that “such power in the soul as has been described, that is, that 
called appetite, originates movement” De Anima III 433a30 - 433b (Aristotle, 1952b, 
p. 666; 1957a), wish and desire being forms of appetite De Anima III 433a20 – 30 
(Aristotle, 1952b, p. 666; 1957a). Elsewhere Aristotle qualifies this statement by 
noting that some people, he calls them continent people, desire a thing but do not 
move to attain it, and such restraint indicates that even desire alone is a questionable 
explanation of movement. He finds temporary respite from this impasse by arguing 
that motion, and its accompanying purposive action, are occasioned by desire and a 
state of mind called practical thought, henceforth practical wisdom,Δ2KTE acting 
together—De Anima III 433a5 – 20 (Aristotle, 1952b, p. 665; 1957a) but with desire 
providing the fuel —De Anima III 10 433a15 - 20 (Aristotle, 1952b, , p. 665; 1957a). 
Practical wisdom, a term I continue to use throughout this enquiry, is also known as 
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prudence, and it is a prominent English translation of the Greek φρόνησις or 
phronesis, of which more later. 
Practical wisdom is, in Nicomachean Ethics III 433a15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, 
p. 665) revealed to be an intellectual virtue of the calculative or practical soul Δ2KTE. 
The presence of practical wisdom in humans is the basis upon which Aristotelian 
practical or ethical philosophy is founded. Nous, from without, is implicated and, 
inter alia, existing physical objects are desired, and in this manner metaphysics is 
linked to physics and Ethics Δ2KTE. Movement, or absence of it, is a recurring theme in 
both theoretical and practical philosophy. Aristotle’s system is thus demonstrated to 
be a unified whole and this claim is highlighted as yet another building block for the 
subsequent work of this chapter. I further discuss, inter alia, practical wisdom’s 
central importance in Ethics beginning on page 236 but for clarification purposes, in 
the next eight paragraphs extending to page 236, I sum up Aristotle’s position on 
form, matter and being 
Four kinds of being exist: natural beings, mathematical beings, metaphysical beings, 
and artificial or manufactured beings.  
Depending on whether or not they possess life, existing natural beings may be either 
organic, or inorganic, and they consist of form and matter. Soul, which is a special 
case of form, is the principle of life which differentiates the living beings from the 
non-living beings. Natural organic beings may be arranged upwards in an integrating 
hierarchy from vegetative through animal to intellectual-human, each lower level in 
the hierarchy being a subset of the level immediately above it. Nutrition is a specific 
faculty of soul which separates organic beings from inorganic beings, and amongst 
organic beings perception further separates the animal from the vegetable while the 
ability to reason further separates again the intellectual-human from the lower 
animals. The perceived matter of all actual natural beings is its enformed proximate 
matter and all such beings in their primary state exist in potential. The primary 
existence of being is potential. Form actualises, makes proximate matter a ‘this’ or a 
‘that’, while matter allows numerical individuality of such ‘thisness’ and ‘thatness’. 
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Metaphysical beings, described as pure act without potential, also exist in a 
hierarchy. There is a prime unmoved mover, a secondary unmoved mover, or 
movers, and nous, active human thought, active mind. Irrespective of their rarefied 
nature, one of them, nous, is in some yet unexplained way, able to partake of the 
human soul and in so doing allows human perception of, and knowledge about, 
independently existing natural beings.  
Such cognition, nous occasioning active thought about existing bodies, occurs 
through a two-step process involving first the largely passive receipt of the forms by 
perception, and secondly, the active receipt of objects of thought, isomorphic copies 
of the forms, through reflection and reason. Perception of natural beings occurs at the 
level of their independently existing individuals while universals exist only in the 
mind. The prime unmoved mover, thought thinking itself, which Aristotle 
pronounces a god, which exists nowhere in actuality before thinking, which is fixed 
with structuring the world, but not creating it, and which as pure act without 
potential, is a first principle of being. The forms, transmitted through perception and 
reflection, are eternal, and are transmitted in accordance with the natural law 
ordained by final causes which, may, presumably answer the structural imperatives 
of the first principle of being. Desire is somehow implicated in the process by which 
the unmoved mover attracts objects, such that cosmology is somehow predicated on 
desire. 
Mathematical beings like area and length are at rest. They are unchanging and in a 
sense eternal but they are inseparable from the changing natural material beings to 
which they pertain. They are a kind of half-way house between the physical and 
metaphysical beings. Manufactured beings come to be when artisans transmit form to 
matter: through crafted plot, words become a play, through carving to design, ivory 
is formed into a comb.  
Scientific knowledge of beings is knowledge of the four causes of being Δ2KTS. 
In humans, nous, as active thought proceeding under the influence of desire and the 
counsel of practical wisdom, produces purposive or goal directed activity and 
movement Δ2KTE. Nous thus also has an ethical dimension Δ2KTE. Existing beings are thus  
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linked metaphysically to Science through the four causes in natural law and to the 
purposive action of ethical behaviour 
through practical wisdom in the 
everyday affairs of life Δ2KTS, Δ2KTE. 
As discussed earlier on page 206 
Aristotle’s definition of being is 
indispensable to his discussion on 
Science and Ethics. Before proceeding to specific discussions of Science and Ethics I 
first sum up the Level 2 articulation of these terms contained in my discussion of 
form, matter and being. Thus: metaphysics, a theology, mathematics and physics, in 
so far as they are all implicated in understanding the nature of being, are named 
sciences. Science is one of two ways by which truth can be separated from falsity. 
Intuition, as Aristotle defines it, is the other way. Scientific understanding of being 
exists when the four causes of being are known. Ethics is active mind realising goal 
directed activity under the influence of desire and the counsel of practical reason. 
As foreshadowed on page 234 I now turn, in the next section, to further discussion, 
among other things, of practical wisdom’s central importance in Ethics. I proceed 
consecutively through specific discussions of Ethics and Science, before 
demonstrating in discussion of Proposal (V), how each informs the political 
philosophy of the Polis. In discussing Ethics I complete Level 1 articulation of 
Proposal (III) and in discussing Science I complete Level 1 articulation of Proposal 
(IV). This discussion of Ethics and Science occupies pages 236 to 263 of my 
enquiry. Level 2 articulation is clearly discernible within it and for this reason I cease 
employing superscripts to identify its coincident presence. The Level 2 articulation 
continues to be particularly important for subsequent Level 3 articulations of Thesis 
Proposition Statements (2) and (3). 
ETHICS 
Continuing Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (III)  
Aristotle addresses the human ethical condition as though it were an extension of 
soul. He brings a very practical and teleological perspective to his analysis by 
questioning again, mankind’s purpose, and by seeking to identify anew those human  
 
Proposal (III) 
Aristotle’s founding of an “objective” Ethics based on practical 
action indirectly informed, through practical reasoning, by a 
cognitive appeal to scientific reasoning 
Proposal (IV) 
 
Aristotle’s founding of Science as a process of induction and 
deduction based on objective understandings about natural 
objects, and his development of a logic which prescribed a 
procedure for reasoning in Science 
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virtues germane to the attainment of that purpose. In particular, Aristotle finds 
mankind’s purpose, its arete in the sense earlier established in the case for Plato, to 
be happiness with virtue 
Nicomachean Ethics I 1097b - 1098a 
20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 342 - 
43), or happiness with justice and 
virtue Nicomachean Ethics I 1098b30 
- 1099a30 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 
344). This goal of mankind is the highest because it is desired for its own sake and 
other goods are desired for its sake and not vice versa Nicomachean Ethics I 1094a - 
1094a25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 339).  
Mankind’s work is thus effected through three conditions: justice, happiness and 
virtue and I proceed to outline what Aristotle means by each of them. 
Justice, Aristotle argues, means either general justice or particular justice. General 
justice is obedience to the law—virtue towards others under constitutions which 
respect natural rights and which serve the common good. Particular justice is that 
which is equal when measured against general formulae which define what it means 
for the State to be fair in the distribution of its resources and honours to citizens, and 
what it means for those citizens in turn to be fair in their exchanges with one another. 
The subdivisions of particular justice are distributive justice and commutative justice. 
Distributive justice relates to the distribution of benefits from the state to the 
individuals, based on merit. Commutative justice relates to equality of exchanges 
between citizens. Some exchanges of commutative justice are involuntary on the part 
of one of the parties, for example murder, rape, maiming are of this kind. In such 
cases commutative justice has to allow for rectification of inequalities, that is, the 
injustice has to occur before equality can, in some way, be restored if indeed it can 
ever be restored in such cases as murder and maiming. It is tempting to find in 
Aristotle’s justice, an early development of what might be now understood as the 
domains of civil and criminal law.  
Table 25 on page 239 provides more information about Aristotle’s definition of 
justice. The laws of specific justice are themselves unjust if they are enacted under a 
 
Thesis Proposition Statements (2) and (3) 
(2) Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science 
becoming valued in its own right for direct benefits it could 
bring to society and state.  
 
(3) Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
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deviant constitution, such constitutions being those predicated on private benefits for 
rulers, whether democrats, oligarchs or aristocrats, rather than on benefit for the 
common good.  
Aristotle also speaks of political justice which is part natural, “that which everywhere 
has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking” Nicomachean Ethics V 
1134b20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 382) and part legal, “that which is originally 
indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner’s 
ransom shall be a mina” (ibid). Under political justice the constitution cannot be 
regarded as the arbiter of justice if it violates natural law and rights. Natural rights, 
unlike civil rights, are not conferred by the state. For example the state should not 
legislate that each soldier should fight with his right hand or that the citizen shall live 
on biologically insufficient amounts of water. The state cannot rescind natural rights 
which inhere in the individual. Just acts are those which “tend to produce and 
preserve happiness and its components for the political society” Nicomachean Ethics 
V 1130b15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 377). Lawful or just acts are thus those 
which are for the common good or the good of others: unjust acts do injury to others 
or despoil society. “Justice alone of the virtues ... is thought to be ‘another’s good’, 
because it is related to our neighbour” Nicomachean Ethics V 1130a (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, p. 377) and of all the virtues justice contains a notion of duty.  
In general terms:  
it is plain that just action is intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly 
treated  … [so that] … justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other 
virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the 
extremes”. Nicomachean Ethics V 1133b30 - 1134a (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 381, 
my square brackets) 
I comment further on the difference between Aristotle’s definition of justice and his 
definition of the moral virtues in a subsequent discussion about the moral virtues 
themselves.  
A perusal of Table 25 reveals that the principles upon which justice rests are 
unambiguous. These principles—obeying the law and treating others fairly in the 
case of general justice; State awards based on merit in the case of distributive justice; 
and fairness based on either equality of conditions of exchange or equality through  
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Table 25: Kinds of Justice 
DESCRIPTORS CLASSIFICATIONS OF JUSTICE 
Name General Justice Particular (Specific) Justice 
General Definition 
Fulfilling the whole of the law 
Nicomachean Ethics IV 1130a - 1139b30` 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 378) under 
correct constitutions, that is, constitutions 
which are disposed to the common, not the 
private good. 
A special virtue alongside (similar but different to) the moral virtues: rectification according to certain kinds of proportion. “For it is by proportional requital that the city holds 
together” Nicomachean Ethics V 1132b 30 - 1133a (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 380) 
Sub Division 1 n. a. 
distributive justice 
(fairness in distribution) 
commutative, corrective, remedial justice  
(fairness in exchange) 
Definition n. a. 
Whole to part: justice in the domain of how the whole (the 
state) relates to the part (the citizen). 
Part to part: justice in the domain of how part of the state, that is one citizen, interacts with another part of the 
state (another citizen) “which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man.” Nicomachean Ethics 
1130b30 - 1131a10 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 378), justice which is corrective in the case of contractual wrongs 
arising out of fraud or force. 
Subdivision 2 n. a. n.a.(3) voluntary transactions involuntary transactions 
Domain n. a. 
The distribution of honour, property, money or anything 
else which is divisible amongst those who share in the 
constitution Nicomachean Ethics V 1130b30 - 1131a 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 378). 
Sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for 
use, depositing, letting when these are entered into 
voluntarily between parties. 
Clandestine: theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, 
enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness 
Violent: assault, rape, imprisonment, murder, robbery 
with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult 
Criterion 
Treating others as yourself, complete 
virtue in relation to your neighbour, virtue 
entire. 
Fairness, just deserts based on merit1 Nicomachean Ethics 
V 1131a35 (Aristotle, 1926; 1952g, p. 378) 
Fairness, equality of conditions. 
Restitution 
For involuntary transactions of a “civil” nature: being 
made quits,  
For involuntary transactions of a “criminal” nature: 
finding a requital (punishment) which fits the crime.  
Mathematical 
Proportion 
n. a. 
Direct geometric proportion Nicomachean Ethics V 
1131b10 - 15`(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 379).  
 
Citizens are not born or treated as equals and commodities 
are distributed between citizens in proportion to their, the 
citizen’s, relative merits. If the proportion is violated 
injustice occurs because one has more and the other less 
than their just share. If A is ten times more meritorious 
than B then A should be awarded 10 times the honours or 
of the land distribution (1). 
Arithmetic mean Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, V 1131b30 - 1132a5, p. 379). 
 
Citizens per se are treated as equals and commercial 
exchange is just when there is mutual reciprocity in the 
values of the products exchanged. For example if in one 
hour A produces 6 pairs of sandals and B produces one 
bronze lamp then justice is violated if A and B do not 
exchange sandals and lamps such that A gets one lamp 
for every 6 pairs of sandals B gets(2). 
Arithmetic mean Nicomachean Ethics V 1132a25 - 
1132b (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 379 - 80). 
Notes: (1) Aristotle accepts that merit is a subjective term: under oligarchy it may mean one thing and under democracy another and so on Nicomachean Ethics V 1131a35 - 30 (Aristotle, 1926; 1952g, p. 378): the principle is consistent. (2) There 
is no suggestion in the example used that Aristotle did or did not formally institute a labour theory of value. (3) n. a. = not applicable. 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from: Aristotle. (1952). Nicomachean Ethics. (I 1101b10 – 1103a10; V 1129b14 - 19, V 1129b25 – 1130a13 – b8, 1130b 17 - 29,  1130b30 - 34, 1131b27 - 33, 1132b11, 1132b29, 1133a5 - b29, 1133b16 - 23, 
1133b30 – 1134a15, 1134a24 - 1134b17, 1135a14, 1136a10 – 1136b14, 1136b15 – 1137a 4, 1138b5, 1138a28 – 1138b4, 1138b5 – 13, 1144a11 - 20,; VIII 1155a22 - 28). 1158b12 - 33, 1253a14 – 15; VIII 1159a15 – 1160b23, 1161b11, 162a35- 
1163b25, 1287a10 – 23. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle II. Chicago: William Benton; Ritchie, D. G. (1894). (pp. 185– 92). Aristotle’s Subdivisions of Particular Justice. In The Classical Review Vol. 8, No 59. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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restitution respectively for voluntary and involuntary transactions under commutative 
justice—are simple to understand and in the case of particular justice even invoke 
mathematical principles of proportion. Even given these caveats of unambiguity and 
simplicity, application of the principles of justice—for example determining units of 
merit for use in distributive justice, or fixing the manner in which money might be 
used as a medium of exchange under voluntary commutative justice, or finding a 
punishment which correctly compensates the crime, in the case of involuntary 
commutative justice—was troublesome for Aristotle. It remains so in extant 
societies. How, for example, can one compensate a murdered person?  
Irrespective of these problems the principles on which Aristotle bases his justice are 
unambiguous and provide workable criteria to determine whether or not states, and 
distribution, exchange and restitution within them, are 
just. Aristotle’s identification of the divisions of 
justice and their governing principles is relevant to the 
ongoing articulation of Proposal (III): justice as virtue is a practical affair which 
inheres in act, and justice is violated when clearly expressed conditions which 
prescribe it are not fulfilled. Certainly the definition that just states serve the 
common good rather than the private good involves what post-moderns call a value 
statement, but once the definition is accepted there is room under that definition for 
an element of disinterested determination of which constitutions and states might be 
just. 
In particular once the definitions of distributive and commutative justice are accepted 
there is room for disinterested determination of which awards of the State are to be 
judged good, which exchanges are equal and just, and which compensations justly 
rectify the aberrations of involuntary exchange.  
I now turn to discussion of the second and third conditions affecting mankind’s 
ergon, namely happiness and virtue. 
Happiness, Aristotle argues, is “the best, noblest and most pleasant thing in the 
world” Nicomachean Ethics, I 1099a25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 344). But chance 
and good fortune can play a role: they who are ugly, ill born or solitary have  
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Table 26: Faculties and Virtues of the Soul 
AREA OF 
OPERATION 
THE SOUL AND ITS VIRTUES 
Faculty of the 
Soul 
Rational Irrational 
Scientific Calculative Vegetative Appetitive and Desiring 
Functions and 
Objects of the 
Faculties 
That which contemplates “the kind of things 
whose originative causes are invariable” 
Nicomachean Ethics VI 1139a5 - 10 (Aristotle, 
1934; 1952g, p. 387). Thus for Aristotle its 
objects are natural beings, mathematical beings 
and metaphysical beings, beings which in the 
earlier language of this chapter were identified 
as contingent beings. The contemplation of the 
scientific faculty calls forth theoretical 
philosophy. 
The faculty that contemplates “variable things” Nicomachean 
Ethics VI 1139a5 - 10, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 387). Its 
objects are the works of art and craft and the universals of 
mankind, family and state together with the disciplines they call 
up, arranged as follows: 
 
That which accounts 
for nutrition and 
growth and which 
beyond this function 
“in no way shares in a 
rational principle” 
Nicomachean Ethics 
II 1102b30, (Aristotle, 
1952g, p. 348) p. 
348)(Aristotle, 1934). 
The appetitive, desiring 
faculty which in a general 
sense is able to partake of 
reason positively (by 
being influenced by it) or 
negatively (by being 
hostile and going against 
it). 
The Objects of the Calculative Faculty and their Derived Political 
and/or Moral Domains 
mankind family State 
 
economics 
political Science 
Architectonic1 
(legislative) 
administrative 
deliberative judicial 
Kind of Virtue intellectual virtue intellectual virtue not applicable moral virtue 
Specific Virtues 
(1) scientific reason understood as the 
capacity for scientific demonstration 
(2) intuitive reason or nous understood as the 
capacity for grasping universals from 
experience of a number of individual 
occurrences.  
Combined, these two virtues result in 
theoretical or philosophical wisdom. 
(1) art: “a state concerned with making, involving a true course 
of reasoning” Nicomachean Ethics VI 1140a20 (Aristotle, 
1934; 1952g, p. 389).  
(2) practical wisdom: “ a true and reasoned state of capacity to 
act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man” 
Nicomachean Ethics VI 1140b5, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 
389). It is the capacity to discern between good and bad acts.  
not applicable 
The so-called moral or 
lower virtues, the virtues 
of character set out in 
Table 27. They are means 
of emotion and feeling 
located between vices of 
excess and deficit.  
Notes: (1): An architectonic Science is a Science which is the end of all other sciences; it is the Science for which all other sciences are done. It is the master Science and the remaining sciences are slave sciences. 
Theology is the architectonic Science of the theoretical intellectual virtues. Politics, especially its legislative aspects, is the architectonic Science of the practical intellectual virtues Metaphysics III 996a20 – 999a8 
(Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 514 - 518; 1989) and Nicomachean Ethics I 1094a25 – 1094b10 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 339). Architectonic Science is discussed further beginning on page 262.  
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Nicomachean Ethics. (I 1094a25 - 1094b10; II 1102b30; VI 1139a5; 1139a5 – 10, 1140b5, 1140a20). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle II. Chicago: 
William Benton; Aristotle. (1952); Metaphysics. (III 996a20 – 999a8). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. Chicago: William Benton; Aristotle. (1952). (Aristotle, 1934; 1952d, pp. 415 – 418; 1952g, pp. 339, 348, 387, 
389; 1989). 
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generally less a chance at happiness than those who have good friends, political 
connections and wealth Nicomachean Ethics I 1099a30 - 1099b10, (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, pp. 344 - 45) and “those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who 
falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good are, whether they mean it or not, 
talking nonsense” Nicomachean Ethics VII 1153b20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 405). 
Justice and happiness are related in this manner: justice is done for the sake of 
happiness. 
Virtue is very important for Aristotle who posits that mankind’s work, mankind’s 
quest for happiness with justice, is made possible because, by its disposition, the 
human soul develops and hones its own particular virtues for the attainment of that 
work. On the basis of a general understanding of the tripartite soul not unlike that 
developed by Plato, Aristotle divides the virtues of the soul into intellectual virtues 
or virtues of the rational soul and moral virtues or virtues of the irrational soul. Table 
26 on page 241 provides further details. Also as in the case established earlier for 
Plato, the virtues are to be thought of generally in a Greek way as skills, and know 
how, and can do, for the attainment of mankind’s work and this in itself supports the 
Level 1 articulation of Proposal (III): virtue as goodness is a practical thing. 
The virtues are thus technical attributes, good-at-what attributes in the sense of say a 
sword maker being good or virtuous at forge 
work, or a map maker being good or virtuous at 
geography and drawing. The word virtue as it 
is used in the discussions which follow is thus 
not an easy synonym for the word moral even though Aristotle’s so-called moral 
virtues, which are also known as the lower virtues and as virtues of character, might 
easily be confused with the absolute virtues of the Modern and Post-Modern Ages, 
honesty or patience, say, which by and large they are not, but to which they were to 
gradually give way. While generically Aristotelian virtues are skills and know how, 
their substance is broadly known. 
The intellectual virtues of the rational soul are subdivided into virtues of the 
scientific soul and virtues of the calculative soul. The intellectual virtues of the 
scientific soul, scientific reason, and intuition, respectively, are excellences of mind  
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consisting of reason or intellect. When they act together they result in theoretical or 
speculative wisdom known as philosophical wisdom which is the skill peculiar to 
theoretical philosophy and its objects of physics, metaphysics and mathematics. 
Nous, that metaphysical being, is directly involved. Table 26 on page 241 illustrates 
those relationships. 
The intellectual virtues of the calculative rational soul illustrated in Table 26 are art, 
in the sense of the skill of the artisan, and practical wisdom, and they are excellences 
of mind for practical everyday living and the appropriate conduct of goal directed 
activity. Practical wisdom in particular is “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act 
with regard to human goods [in the everyday unfolding of life]” Nicomachean Ethics 
1140b20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 389, my square brackets). Aristotle argues that 
discerning how to act in order to attain the best possible life implicates humans in 
Ethics as a practical affair, an affair of action Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, II 1106b25, p. 352) which again reinforces the demonstration of Proposal  
Table 27: Ross’ Compilation of Aristotle’s Moral Virtues 
Feeling 
(Passion) 
Action Excess 
Mean 
(The Moral 
Virtues) 
Defect 
Fear 
Confidence 
Lacuna1 
Cowardice 
Rashness 
Courage 
Courage 
Unnamed 
Cowardice 
Certain 
Pleasures of 
Touch 
Lacuna1 Profligacy Temperance Insensibility 
Pain Arising 
from Desire of 
Such Pleasures 
Giving of Money 
Taking of Money 
 
Giving of money on a large scale 
 
Claiming of honour on a large 
scale 
 
Pursuit of honour on a small scale 
Prodigality 
Illiberality 
 
Vulgarity 
 
 
Vanity 
 
 
Ambition 
 
Liberality 
Liberality 
 
Magnificence 
 
 
Self-respect 
 
 
Lacuna1 
 
Illiberality 
Prodigality 
 
Meanness 
 
 
Humility 
 
 
Unambition 
 
Anger Lacuna1 Irascibility Gentleness Unirascibility 
Social 
Intercourse 
 
Telling truth about oneself 
 
 
Giving of pleasure by way of 
amusement 
in life generally 
 
 
Boastfulness 
 
 
Buffoonery 
Obsequiousness 
 
Truthfulness 
 
 
Wittiness 
Friendliness 
 
Self-depreciation 
 
 
Boorishness 
Sulkiness 
Shame Lacuna1 Bashfulness Modesty Shamelessness 
Pains at Good 
or Bad Fortunes 
of Others 
 
Lacuna1 
 
Envy 
Righteous 
Indignation 
 
Malevolence 
Notes: (1) Signifies a gap in the information I could glean from the sources used to construct the table. 
 
Source: Modified by Ian Eddington from Copleston, F. (1966) History of Philosophy. Volume 1 (p. 341). London: Burns and 
Oats Limited; Ross, Sir W. D. (1930). Aristotle. (p. 203). London: Methuen. 
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(III). Because practical wisdom appeals to theoretical wisdom as a kind of arbitrator 
over its decision-making it also indirectly 
involves nous.  
The moral virtues of the desiring and 
appetitive irrational soul outlined in Table 
27 are discerned emotional states in the 
form of means between extremes of excess 
and deficit and they are germane to human 
character. They are a state or disposition 
of mind that might be thought of as 
reasoned emotion. 
Thus the whole construct is wonderfully 
complex. The substance of the moral 
virtues by which humans interact with one 
another is emotion generated by the 
pleasure or pain of activity. The discerning 
of the appropriate disposition towards 
those emotions, which discerning makes 
the virtuous person proper, involves 
calculative rational soul acting under the 
patronage of scientific reason in particular, 
and philosophic wisdom in general, both 
of which cognitive activities themselves 
rely on the metaphysical and divine 
substance nous.  
In so far as I can discern, Aristotle provides further but tantalisingly incomplete 
information about the intellectual and moral virtues. I revisit the intellectual virtues 
of intuition and reasoned demonstration in a discussion about Science beginning on 
page 252. For the present I continue to discuss in turn the moral virtues of character 
and the intellectual calculative virtue of practical wisdom, both of which are central 
to Aristotle’s explanation of Ethics. 
 
And How Might One Jump from the Mindless 
Biological Values of Homeostasis in the Last Sentence 
Below to Articulation of the Interpreted Felt Lower 
Moral Virtues of Everyday Life to Improve on the 
Exquisite Aristotle  
To date, neuroscience has dealt with this set of questions 
by taking a curious shortcut. It has identified several 
chemical molecules that are related, in one way or another, 
to states of reward or punishment and thus, by extension, 
are associated with value. Some of the best-known 
molecules will sound familiar to many readers: dopamine, 
norepinephrine, serotonin, cortisol, oxytocin, vasopressin. 
Neuroscience has also identified a number of brain nuclei 
that manufacture such molecules and deliver them to other 
parts of the brain and the body. (Brain nuclei are 
collections of neurons located below the cerebral cortex in 
the brain stem, hypothalamus, and basal forebrain; they 
should not be confused with the nuclei inside eukaryotic 
cells, which are simple sacs where most of the cell’s DNA 
is housed.) The complicated neural mechanics of “value” 
molecules is an important topic that many committed 
neuroscience researchers are attempting to unravel. What 
prompts the nuclei to release those molecules? Where in 
the brain and body are they released precisely? What does 
their release accomplish? Somehow discussions about the 
fascinating new facts come up short when one turns to the 
central question: Where is the engine for the value 
systems? What is the biological primitive of value? In 
other words, where is the impetus for this byzantine 
machinery? Why did it even begin? Why did it turn out to 
be this way? Without a doubt, the popular molecules and 
their nuclei of origin are important parts of the machinery 
of value. But they are not the answer to the questions 
posed above. I see value as indelibly tied to need, and need 
as tied to life. The valuations we establish in everyday 
social and cultural activities have a direct or indirect 
connection with homeostasis. That connection explains 
why human brain circuitry has been so extravagantly 
dedicated to the prediction and detection of gains and 
losses, not to mention the promotion of gains and the fear 
of losses. It explains, in other words, the human obsession 
with assignation of value. Value relates directly or 
indirectly to survival. In the case of humans in particular, 
value also relates to the quality of that survival in the form 
of well-being. The notion of survival—and, by extension, 
the notion of biological value—can be applied to varied 
biological entities, from molecules and genes to whole 
organisms. Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes to Mind: 
Constructing the Conscious Brain.  (pp. 47 - 48). Random 
House. Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, pp. 47-48) 
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I discuss the moral virtues of character first. Ross (1930, p. 203) has done the hard 
work of extracting and listing Aristotle’s moral virtues and these are displayed in 
Table 27 on page 243. In that table, proceeding from left to right, the emotional state 
in the left hand column is matched with 
the actions that provoke it, and then in 
turn, in the means column, with a named 
moral virtue. The table particularly reinforces the ongoing demonstration of Proposal 
(III), namely that moral virtues pertain to act.  
Aristotle explains that humankind is born fitted with dispositions for moral virtue, 
one has a tendency towards rashness, another towards temperance and so on. Such 
virtue may be aided and abetted in childhood through culture, experience, and 
habituation but until it somehow partakes of reason it remains an inferior form of 
virtue which he calls natural virtue. In and of itself natural moral virtue may even be 
hurtful to its possessor Nicomachean Ethics VII 1144b10, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 
394). Under the influence of reason, such natural moral virtue becomes moral virtue 
in the strict sense, and without this more rigorous form of virtue, practical wisdom, 
of which more later, is not possible. 
The moral virtues proper, in spite of being associated with passions like appetite, 
anger, joy, hate, pity and so on, which passions culminate in pleasure or pain, are not 
passions. Neither through their association with the appetitive and desiring faculty of 
the soul, which allows the experience of such feelings, are they desires. Rather the 
moral virtues are dispositions or states of character “in virtue of which we stand well 
or badly with reference to the passions” Nicomachean Ethics II 1105b25 - 30 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 351). Choice is the factor which differentiates raw passion 
per se from moral virtue per se as a discerned state of passion. Whereas humans are 
involuntarily moved to feel passions, the moral virtues result in states which emerge 
as a result of choices made in determining the level of feeling or passion appropriate 
to the situation in progress.  
As Table 27 on page 243 reveals, the adopted position, the moral virtue per se, is 
always a mean between vices of excess and deficiency. But the mean is not an 
arithmetical mean and, other than the general prescription that moral virtue requires 
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the adoption of a mean position through choice under kalon, that is, under nobleness, 
kindness and beauty, there is no hard and fast rule. 
The position adopted will depend on the circumstances. 
[Moral virtue] is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is 
excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and cowardice and 
appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much 
and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in 
the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. 
Similarly with actions also there is excess, defect and the intermediate. Now virtue is 
concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is 
defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised 
and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of 
mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. Nicomachean Ethics II 
1106b15 – 30 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 352, my square brackets)  
The previous quotation notwithstanding Aristotle does claim that there are moral 
absolutes: 
But not every action nor passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already 
imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy and in the case of actions, adultery, 
theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names, that they are 
themselves bad, and not the excesses and deficiencies in them. It is not possible, then, 
ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nicomachean 
Ethics II 1107a10 – 15 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 352) 
 
I would better understand Aristotle’s inclusion of shamelessness with the moral 
absolutes, and Ross’ inclusion of it as an extreme in the shame row of Table 27 on 
page 243. Moral virtue, which is done for the sake of human happiness, is also 
somehow its own reward and its final cause is its kalon, its nobleness or fineness or 
beauty. For example, courage “chooses or endures things, because it is noble to do so 
or because it is base not to do so” Nicomachean Ethics III 1116a10 - 15, (Aristotle, 
1934; 1952g, p. 362) and virtuous persons choose to do virtuous acts “for their own 
sakes” Nicomachean Ethics II 1105a30 - 1105b (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 351), “as 
the rule directs, for honour’s sake; for this is the end of virtue” Nicomachean Ethics 
III 1115b10 - 15 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 361). Again, the magnificent man is 
liberal and acts for honour’s sake and “he will consider how the result can be made 
most beautiful, and most becoming rather than for how much it can be produced, and 
how it can be produced most cheaply Nicomachean Ethics IV 1122b5 – 10 
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(Aristotle, 1934; 1952m, p. 369). Honourable persons are of course just: 
consequently justice, virtue and happiness are inextricably interwoven in this 
amalgam that Aristotle brings to meaning and usage of the key term Ethics. 
To adopt a virtuous mean is, by its very nature, to make choices appropriate to given 
situations. And even though the moral virtues of character are differentiated from the 
intellectual virtues outlined in Table 26 on page 241 by the very claim that they, the 
moral virtues, are virtues of a faculty of soul that has no rational principle of its own, 
a rational principle is nevertheless involved in the choice process and it is called 
practical wisdom which, as earlier explained, is an intellectual virtue of the 
calculative soul. 
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the 
mean relative to us, this being determined by the rational principle, and by that 
principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it”. Nicomachean 
Ethics II 1107a - 1107a 5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 352).  
Aristotle also offers general comment about moral virtue. First, moral virtue is 
difficult because it involves pleasure and pain which result from action. “We must 
take as a sign of states of character the [5] pleasure or pain that ensues from acts” 
Nicomachean Ethics II 1104b5, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 350, translator's square 
brackets). Secondly, moral virtue is different because the so-called right rule is a 
relative thing which emerges from discernment of the relevant circumstances: “ ... 
the accounts [of matters of conduct] we demand must be in accordance with the 
subject matter: matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us 
have no fixity” Nicomachean Ethics II 1104a - 1104a5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 
349, my brackets). It is thus:  
possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited as the 
Pythagoreans conjectured, and good [30] to that of the limited), while to succeed is 
possible only in one way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult—to 
miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult). Nicomachean Ethics II 1106b30 (Aristotle, 
1934; 1952g, p. 352)  
Thirdly Aristotle characterises conditions of moral failure amongst humans by 
identifying three kinds of moral states that are to be avoided namely, vice, 
incontinence and brutishness—and by identifying their preferred contraries which he 
names virtue, continence, and superhuman or godlike virtue Nicomachean Ethics VII 
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1145a - 1145a 25`, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 395). He discusses continence as 
endurance, and incontinence as softness or effeminacy, informing at the outset that 
“we must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor as a 
different genus” Nicomachean Ethics VII 1145b (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 395). I 
think of them as classes, or even types of character, rather than as virtue states, but 
still would grasp the distinction better.  
Whereas the continent person when experiencing passions that conflict with their 
practical calculations of soul does not yield to those passions, the incontinent one 
does. Weakness and impetuosity are characteristics of incontinence Nicomachean 
Ethics VII 1015b15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 401). Under weakness the 
incontinent person correctly calculates that an action is bad yet acts under the 
influence of passion. The impetuous person acts as it were without thinking and may 
or may not be wise after the event. Interestingly Damasio qua neuroscientist and 
defining emotions electrochemically qua homeostatic control of drives and 
motivations in a mindless rewards and punishments electro-chemistry reports, among 
many other things, a basis for something like emotionally impetuous action in the 
mindless structure and functions of the central nervous system (Damasio, 1995, pp. 
165 – 204, 245 - 252) and suggests that the benefits of such action can be enhanced 
or diminished depending on whether or not something like reflection is subsequently 
involved in a conscious mind consideration of emotions and actions. Pleasure and 
anger of the kind being generally discussed are implicated in incontinent character, 
and weakness and/or impetuosity can be caused by either of these passions. The most 
chronic form of incontinence is caused by the appetite for pleasure Nicomachean 
Ethics VII 1149a10 – 25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 399).  
Fourthly, Aristotle uses his findings about pleasure, pain and continence to define 
other character traits or types. For example, the temperate man is something else 
again:  
… for both the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing 
contrary to the rule 1152a for the sake of the bodily pleasures, … the former has and 
the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to 
the rule, while the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it. 
Nicomachean Ethics VII 1151b30 - 1152a5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 402)  
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I am not sure where one might find such temperate mankind today. 
There is a self-indulgent man “and the incontinent and self-indulgent man are also 
like another; they are different [5], but both pursue bodily pleasure—the latter, 
however, also thinking that he ought to do so, while the former does not think this” 
Nicomachean Ethics VII 1152a5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 402 - 403, translator's 
square brackets).  
Cleverness is consistent with incontinence but practical wisdom is not Nicomachean 
Ethics VII 1152a5-15(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 403).  
There is a faculty called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do things that tend 
towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, 
the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad the cleverness is mere smartness; 
hence we call men of practical wisdom clever or smart. Practical wisdom is not the 
faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty. Nicomachean Ethics VI 1144a25 – 
30 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 394)  
In particular:  
…there is however nothing to prevent [10] a clever man from being incontinent; this is why 
it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, 
viz, because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our first 
discussions [that is, in the manner outlined in the last quote]. Nicomachean Ethics VII 
1152a10 – 15 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 403, my second square brackets) 
Prudence as earlier mentioned on page 234 is another name for practical wisdom.  
Although pleasure is all consuming for human beings, and is essential to human 
happiness, it is not per se the good of humanity. This is because pleasures compete 
with one another and crowd one another out. Rather, in essence, pleasure is 
something which accompanies human activity—Nicomachean Ethics X 1174b2 - 
1175a (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 429), and is something which “completes the 
activity”—Nicomachean Ethics X 1174b30 - 1175a, (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 429) 
so that humans need not contemplate the pleasures themselves to order and rank 
them. The right ranking of pleasures will be that which accompanies the right 
ranking of actions, and the man of practical wisdom is the measure of the right 
ranking of actions. 
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Before further discussing the role of practical wisdom in virtue, I provide, in this 
paragraph, both a brief recapitulation of the 
progress in articulation of Proposal (III), and a 
guide to the direction the continuing 
discussion of practical wisdom narrative will 
take. I have, in respect of Proposal (III), demonstrated that Ethics in Aristotle is a 
practical affair and that it involves both emotion and reason. I now work towards 
closing the demonstration of Proposal (III) by further exploring the manner in which 
Aristotle has practical wisdom rely on theoretical wisdom, which itself, involves 
scientific reasoning. I thereby demonstrate another sense in which Ethics can be said 
to be objective. This further discussion of practical wisdom contains ongoing Level 1 
and Level 2 articulation.  
So, what is this condition called practical wisdom and how does it involve itself in 
facilitating states of moral virtue?  
As the earlier quotation on page 247 intimated, and Table 26 on page 241 illustrates, 
practical wisdom is the rational principle of the calculative soul and it is a necessary 
condition in the process through which natural moral virtue might become moral 
virtue in the strict sense. Its influence differentiates clever action from virtuous 
action: 
Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness 
and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and 
virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom. 
Nicomachean Ethics VI 1144b10 - 20 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 394)  
Practical wisdom effects this differentiation between clever action and virtuous 
action by providing the right rule. 
… all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects, 
add, ‘that [state of character] which is in accordance with the right rule’; now the right 
rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. Nicomachean Ethics VI 
1144b20 - 25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 394, my square brackets)  
and 
… we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right 
rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule that is, virtue; and practical 
 
Proposal (III) 
Aristotle’s founding of an “objective” Ethics based 
on practical action indirectly informed, through 
practical wisdom, by a cognitive appeal to scientific 
reasoning. 
 
 251 
 
wisdom is the right rule about such matters. Nicomachean Ethics VII 1144b25 – 30 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 394) 
And here it is in a nutshell: 
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict 
sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue. 
Nicomachean Ethics VI 1144b30, (Aristotle, 1934, 1952g) 
No circularity is implied by this last quote because “the one [moral virtue] 
determines the end and the other [practical wisdom] makes us do the things that lead 
to the end” (ibid., 1145a - 1145a 5, p. 394, my square brackets).  
In particular, practical wisdom “is not supreme over philosophical wisdom, i.e. over 
the superior part of us” Nicomachean Ethics VII 1145a5 – 10 (Aristotle, 1934; 
1952g, p. 394). Rather “it [practical wisdom] does not use it [philosophical wisdom] 
but provides orders for its coming into being; it offers orders, then, for its sake, but 
not to it” (ibid., p. 394 my square brackets). When practical wisdom appeals to 
philosophical wisdom, when it offers orders not to it but for its sake, it appeals in 
part to scientific reasoning and, in this sense also, Aristotle’s Ethics is objective in 
the sense expressed in Proposal (III). Aristotle’s Ethics is “objective” in another 
sense, too. Happiness serves justice and justice occurs when action can be partly 
defined by, and be seen to conform to, ideas of mathematical proportion. There are 
no ifs and buts about justice. While virtue involves choice, justice involves duty, and 
notwithstanding duty being a value, duty is non-negotiable.  
I have now completed the Level 1 articulation of Proposal (III) in so far as it can be 
completed without further investigation of Aristotelian Science. Much of Proposal 
(III)’s Level 2 articulation is also complete. Before 
continuing to discuss Aristotle’s meaning of 
Science I summarise the Level 2 articulation of the 
key term Ethics. To wit: mankind’s ergon, 
happiness with justice, or happiness with justice and honour, under the patronage of 
kalon, the noble and beautiful, is achieved through virtues appropriate for that work. 
These virtues or skills are the intellectual virtues of scientific and practical wisdom 
and the moral virtues which are discerned emotional states which inform correct 
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actions and just desire. The moral virtues are means and justice in general is defined 
in terms of just deserts based on human merit and equality in exchange. 
The summary content of the previous paragraph notwithstanding, Proposal III’s 
import can be further enhanced, and 
Level 2 articulation of Ethics further 
advanced, through a study of 
philosophical wisdom, to which 
practical wisdom defers, because philosophical wisdom is made up of Science or 
reasoned demonstration, and intuition. I thus now continue as foreshadowed on page 
236 to discuss Aristotle’s Science. I proceed by discussing the nature of intuition and 
scientific reason, and in doing so, I complete Level 1 and 2 articulation of Proposals 
(III) and (IV). This discussion occupies pages 252 to 263. I then return to the 
question of how the intellectual virtues, philosophical wisdom and practical wisdom, 
and the moral virtues, are linked—a question germane to the political philosophy of 
the Polis.   
SCIENCE 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (III) Continues  
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (IV) Begins  
The syllogism is central to Aristotle’s definition of Science and the logic through 
which Science may occasion objective understanding. Technical dimensions inform 
the structure of the syllogism. For example, the three indented lines below constitute 
an Aristotelian syllogism. 
                                     All animals are mortal. …………... (1) 
All men are animals. ……………... (2) 
                                     All men are mortal. ………..……... (3) 
 
In these lines “certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily 
comes about through them” Topics I 100a25 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 143; 1960b). These 
three lines taken together reveal the process of deduction formalised by Aristotle. 
The certain-things-having-been-laid-down are those contained in lines (1) and (2) 
and the something-other-than-those which necessarily results is contained in line (3). 
The knowledge flow from those things laid down to that something other which 
necessarily results is also called inference. Each of lines (1) and (2) is an asserted 
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premise and line (3) is a deduced conclusion. In line (1) animals and mortal are 
terms. In line (2) men and animals are terms. The term animals is common to 
premises (1) and (2) and is called the middle term. The terms of (3), the conclusion, 
are men and mortal. The term mortal which is the predicate of the conclusion is 
called the major term and the term men, which is the subject of the conclusion, is 
called the minor term. Because premise (1) contains the major term, mortal, it is 
called the major premise. Because premise (2) contains the minor term, animals, it is 
called the minor premise.  
The syllogism “is a ‘demonstration’ when the premises from which the reasoning 
starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally 
come through premises which are primary and true” Topics I 100a25-30 (Aristotle, 
1952r, p. 143; 1960b). “Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ [18] which are believed on 
the strength not of anything else but of themselves; for in regard to the first principles 
of Science it is improper to ask any further for the why and the wherefore of them" 
Topics I 100b18 - 20 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 143; 1960b). As I subsequently reveal in 
the discussion of pages 256 to 262, the sentence immediately above is not so trite as 
it might, on its face, appear to be. It is very demanding when taken in a strict 
Aristotelian sense.  
In general, if inference is to occur, then, first, terms which can be of individuals, for 
example, dog or hat, or of universals, animal or reptile, must be the subjects or 
predicates of premises; secondly, every premise must affirm or deny the predicate of 
its subject; thirdly, terms that are predicates must be universals; and fourthly, the 
syntax of premises and conclusion sentences must be of the kind outlined. Complex 
and compound conjunction additions are not permitted.  
Such are the technical specifications of the syllogism. I turn to the epistemological 
dimension.  
In a nutshell, the terms of the premises and conclusion are the individuals and the 
universals of the categories earlier outlined in Table 15 on page 207. As revealed in 
that discussion, while perception and cognition are of the individuals, which consist 
of substance, Science deals with the universals, which are of the mind, so that it is 
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not by coincidence that the major term of the conclusion of the syllogism is a 
universal. Aristotle’s position is that first, individual beings exist, then perception of, 
and thought about those beings follows, and then language follows that thought. The 
terms of language are terms which signify both individuals and universals so that 
Science, because it trades in universals, is of the mind. What is more to the point, the 
linkage of syllogism terms to the categories, and categories to substances, 
immediately links Science, understood as induction and deduction, to metaphysics, 
understood as the contemplation of substance in its various forms. Deduction, as 
earlier explained on pages 252 to 253 is central to Aristotle’s theory of inference. I 
subsequently reveal, beginning on page 261, that induction is also implicated in 
Aristotle’s scientific method. In the syllogism used above, the conclusion, that 
something-other-than-these, that something which results-of-necessity, is a reasoned 
fact, a scientific fact, a that which cannot be “other than it is” Posterior Analytics I 
73a20 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 100; 1960a).  
For Aristotle “the conviction of pure science must be unshakable” Posterior 
Analytics I 72b - 72b5 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 99; 1960a).  
In particular:  
We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing … 
when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause 
of that fact and of no other, and further, that the fact can be no other than it is. 
Posterior Analytics I 71b5 - 15, (Aristotle, 1952p, pp. 97 - 99; 1960a) 
Furthermore, Aristotle informs that every conceivable proposition or problem that 
can be dealt with through syllogistic induction inheres in four general orders of 
predication that can be found in the categories namely, definition, property, as in 
speech is a property of man, genus, and accident. 
For if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one, it would be seen 
that each was formed either from the definition of something, or from its property, or 
from its genus, or from its accident. Topics I 103b5 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 146; 1960b)  
and 
The classes of predicates in which the four orders are found … are ten in number: 
Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, and 
Passivity. For accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always 
be in one of these categories. Topics I 103b20 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 147; 1960b)  
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Aristotle’s explanation of each of the four general orders of predication is contained 
in Table 28. 
Table 28: Definitions of Four Classes from Which all Propositions and Problems 
Emerge 
  
Class Definition 
definition 
“A ‘definition’ [of a term] is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence Topics I 101b35 - 102a 
(Aristotle, 1952r, p. 144, my square brackets; 1960b). “Definition is mostly concerned 
with questions of sameness or difference” Topics I 102a5 – 10 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 144; 
1960b). Difference demolishes definition, sameness may not be definition. Definition 
involves essential predication. Thus the statement man is an animal is not a definition of 
man because animal can, for example, be predicated of fish, or ox, or monkey and of other 
species too. Man is a featherless biped Statesman 266e (Plato, 1921a; 1952t, p. 585) 
would come closer to the mark in a strict logical sense but Aristotle defines mankind quite 
differently. 
property 
“A property is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs 
to that thing alone and is predicated convertibly on it … [but] no one calls anything a 
‘property’ which may possibly belong to something else” Topics I 102a15 - 25, (Aristotle, 
1952r, p. 145, my square brackets; 1960b). It is a property of man that he can learn 
grammar. Sleep on the other hand is not convertibly a property of man because it is shared 
with other animals. It is not an absolute (convertible) property but a relative or temporary 
property. 
genus 
“A genus is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting 
differences of kind” Topics I 102a30 - 35, (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 145; 1960b). Animal is, in 
the example of the previous row, the genus of fish, ox, and monkey. Essence is that which 
defines “all such things as would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question “What 
is the object before you?” (ibid.).  
accident 
An accident is something which, although it is neither definition, nor property, nor genus, 
may yet belong or not belong to the self-same thing. The redness, blackness or greyness of 
soil are accidents. Accidents may become temporary or relative properties but never 
absolute properties. 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Topics. (I 101b35 - 102a, p. 144, 102a5 - 10, p. 144, 103a15 - 30, 
p. 145, 102a15 - 35, p. 145, 101b35 – 102b25, pp. 144-145). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Aristotle I. Chicago: 
William Benton; Plato. (1952). Statesman. (266e, p. 585). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Plato. Chicago: William 
Benton. 
 
In respect of the classes outlined in Table 28 Aristotle links difference to genus 
Topics I 101b15 - 20 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 144; 1960b). Subsequently commentators 
have tended to admit difference as a fifth member of Aristotle’s four-class group. 
Species is not included in the four classes because species is a defined entity. As 
Table 28 reveals, definition is concerned with essence, that elusive state of substance 
investigated in the earlier discussion about substance. The species is the repository of 
essence and the species is found by naming the genus to which a thing belongs and 
isolating the controvertible properties of the thing not shared by other things of the 
genus. In this manner species within the same genus are separated out. The 
predication in a definition must be essential predication, that is, the predicate of a 
definition must affirm or deny its subject. Although essential predication is necessary 
for definition it is not, per se, sufficient. For example, the statement that man is an 
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animal contains an essential predication but it does not define man. In general, when 
a predicate essentially confirms a number of different subjects—men are animals, 
fish are animals, sheep are animals—the predicate is the genus of those subjects. 
When a predicate confirms only one subject—spiders are air breathing eight legged 
arthropods—it is the species.  
It is immediately clear that the terms used in the premises, which of necessity are 
prior to the conclusion, must be clearly defined and understood, and the premises 
factual, if the deduction is to be trusted.  
But how is the factual status of the premises confirmed? Aristotle claims that 
intuition is a higher order of knowledge than Science understood as inference and 
induction, and that intuition, through experience, informs true premise. He states that 
there is a body of indemonstrable fact, prior to demonstration. His demarcation of 
demonstrated knowledge from intuited knowledge, knowledge which is true, 
primary, immediate, better known, and prior to demonstrated knowledge, rests on 
two pillars. The first pillar is his explanation of how each kind of knowledge comes 
into being. The second pillar is his formal definition and fine articulation of each 
kind of knowledge within the structure of his epistemology. I discuss these pillars 
further by examining Aristotle’s answer to the question next proposed. 
How then does this body of intuited knowledge occur? Aristotle’s explanation 
proceeds as follows.  
First he asks: 
…whether it [intuition, primary knowledge] is of the same kind as the apprehension of 
the conclusions [demonstration] but also whether there is or is not scientific 
knowledge [demonstration] of both [premises and conclusions]; or scientific 
knowledge of the latter and of the former a different kind of knowledge, and whether 
the developed states of knowledge [primary knowledge] are not innate but come to be 
in us, or are innate but at first unnoticed. Posterior Analytics II 99b20 - 30 (Aristotle, 
1952p, pp. 136, my square brackets; 1960a)  
He then answers that primary knowledge could not be possessed from birth because 
it is absurd that we should “possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration 
and fail to notice them” Posterior Analytics II 99b25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 136; 
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1960a), and that if we acquire primary knowledge, if it comes to be in us and we did 
not previously possess that primary knowledge, there could be no comprehension of 
it without “a basis of pre-existent knowledge” Posterior Analytics II 99b25 - 35, 
(Aristotle, 1952p, p. 136; 1960a). He then goes to details about the nature of, and the 
process leading to, intuited knowledge. First the higher forms of knowledge are not 
innate. Rather they are the outcome of experience, which consists of perception and 
memory. Perception in its own right is occasioned by a congenital discriminative 
capacity which is called sense perception, and memory, in its own right, is 
occasioned by systematisation of perceptions:  
So it emerges that neither can we possess them (intuition, primary knowledge) from 
birth nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent 
of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a capacity of 
some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than those developed states. And 
this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital 
discriminative capacity which is called sense perception. But though sense perception 
is innate in all animals, in some the sense impression comes to persist, in others it does 
not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have no knowledge at 
all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression 
persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to 
retain the sense impression in the soul. And when such persistence is frequently 
repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence 
of such sense impressions develop a power of systematising them and those which do 
not. So out of sense perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of 
frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of 
memories constitute a single experience. From experience again [comes intuitive 
knowledge]—i.e. from the universal now established in its entirety within the soul, the 
one beside the many which is a single identity within them all—originate the skill of 
the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming 
to be and science in the sphere of being. 
We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, 
nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense perception. It is 
like a rout in a battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until 
the original formation has been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of 
this process. Posterior Analytics II 99b30 - 100a15 (Aristotle, 1952p, pp.136, my 
brackets; 1960a)  
Secondly, he argues that intuitive knowledge is established by induction: 
When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the 
earliest universal is present in the soul; for though the act of sense perception is of the 
particular, its content is universal—is man for example not that man Callias. A fresh 
stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and the process does not cease 
until the indivisible concepts, the true universals, are established: e.g. such and such a 
species of animal is a step towards the genus animal, by which the same process is a 
step towards a further generalisation. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the 
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primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense perception 
implants the universal is inductive. Posterior Analytics II 100a15 - 100b5 (Aristotle, 
1952p, p. 136; 1960a)  
Thirdly, he argues that intuition, which grasps the primary premises, is the higher 
form of knowledge: scientific knowledge comes next in turn because, through 
inference, it carries the intuitive grasp of the premises to the universal body of fact:  
Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others 
admit of error—opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and 
intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more 
accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than 
demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations 
it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since 
except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that 
apprehends the primary premises—a result which also follows from the fact that 
demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor consequently, 
scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If therefore it is the only other kind of 
true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of 
scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic 
premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the 
whole body of fact. Posterior Analytics II 100b5 - 100b15 (Aristotle, 1952p, pp. 136 - 
137; 1960a)  
Even though the premises are grasped by intuition, and scientific facts are inferred 
from those premises, there are methodological constraints. As the quotation next 
below reveals. 
… the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better 
known than and prior to the conclusion which is further related to them as effect to 
cause. Unless these conditions are satisfied the basic truths will not be ‘appropriate’ to 
the conclusion. Syllogism there indeed may be without these conditions, but such 
syllogism, not being productive of scientific knowledge, will not be demonstration. 
Posterior Analytics I 71b20 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 98; 1960a) 
In addition to the technical rules for the syllogism, outlined earlier on pages 252 to 
253, Aristotle does not provide an easy decision rule for determining the 
appropriateness of premises but his further articulation of Science as demonstration 
does reinforce the soundness of his theory of inference. In particular, the manner in 
which Aristotle introduces the principle of cause into the syllogism makes the logic 
of the syllogism, and its attendant inference, compatible with his definition of 
Science as that-which-can-be-no-other and of knowledge of the cause.  
Now since the required ground of our knowledge—i.e. of our conviction—of a fact is 
the possession of such a syllogism as we call demonstration, and the ground of the 
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syllogism is the facts constituting its premises, we must not only know the primary 
premises—some if not all of them—beforehand but know them better than the 
conclusion: for the cause of an attribute inhering in a subject always itself inheres in 
the subject more firmly than that attribute; e.g. the cause of our loving anything is 
dearer to us than the object of our love. So since the primary premises are the cause of 
our (scientific) knowledge—i.e. of our conviction—it follows that we know them 
better—that is, are more convinced of them—than their consequences, precisely 
because of our knowledge of the latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premises. 
Posterior Analytics I 72a25 - 35 (Aristotle, 1952p, pp. 98 - 99; 1960a) 
Aristotle’s use of the word attribute is a key to further understanding of his position. 
We have already seen from our discussion of the categories that individuals are 
known through their attributes which are given to us by the accidents which inhere in 
their substance. And we also know from our earlier discussion about metaphysics 
that those same individuals of the categories are composites of form and matter, 
matter occasioning the numerical individuality of the thing, form bringing that 
essence which makes each numerical individual a member of a class of similar 
things, and accidents which differentiate the numerical individuals of a class, each 
from the other. And as we have seen, the terms of the premises and conclusion of the 
syllogism are made up of individuals Aristotle discusses in his Categories (Aristotle, 
1938a, 1952a) and Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1934, 1952d), and their universals. Thus 
the key to understanding the truth status and appropriateness of intuited premises lies 
in Aristotle’s explanation of how the essential attributes of form allow the discovery 
of classes upon which the truth content of the terms of the premises, and the premises 
themselves, rest. And this brings Aristotle, and us, to the problem of definition of 
terms.  
In particular, essential attributes of a thing specified as a term in a premise must first 
belong to their subject as elements of its essential nature, for example, as in point to 
line, animal to man, two right angles to triangle, and secondly, must be contained in 
their subjects by virtue of the subjects themselves belonging to the attribute’s 
defining formula. Normally, an essential attribute is an attribute not predicated on a 
subject other than itself, although, when a thing is not predicated on a subject other 
than itself, but is consequentially connected, it is admitted as an essential attribute. 
For example, while death is an essential attribute of animal, per se, it is also, for 
animal, an essential attribute of throat cutting. Essential attributes differ from 
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attributes which inhere in a subject by coincidence or accident. For example, white is 
a coincidence of animal.  
Attributes are true-in-every-instance-of-their-subjects when they are truly predictable 
in all instances of the subject. A commensurately-universal-attribute is one which is 
true in every instance of it subject, which is essential to its subject, and therefore 
which inheres necessarily in its subject, and is the first subject to which the attribute 
can be found to belong. Thus the equality of its angles to two right angles is not a 
commensurately universal attribute of figure, or of isosceles, but rather of triangle 
which is prior to isosceles, and figure. The primary subject to which an attribute 
belongs and therefore in which it inheres commensurately and universally is found 
through the elimination of inferior differentiae and it is the first differentiae which 
destroys the attribute that decides the primary subject. In the example above, 
isosceles, or figure, will not eliminate or destroy two right angles but triangle will. 
Attributes related to subjects in other than the ways specified are accidental or 
coincidental. 
Thus when differences of accidence and coincidence are eliminated and where terms 
of premises are correctly inducted classes of commensurately universal attributes, 
and the premises are appropriate to the conclusion, it is safe to proceed to 
demonstration via the syllogism. And the demonstration of the syllogism is either the 
proof that a predicate belongs to its first subject, that is, commensurately and 
universally, or that it belongs to other subjects to which it attaches, such 
demonstration being of a secondary unessential sense. Herein lies the Aristotelian 
hypothesis. Such hypotheses “postulate facts on the being of which depends the 
being of the fact inferred” Posterior Analysis I 76b35 – 40 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 105; 
1960a).  
There is so much contained in this simple description of the hypothesis. First, it is 
predicated on the three general principles of all reasoning. These principles are the 
principle of non-contradiction which states that is it is impossible to be or not to be 
the same thing at the same time under the same conditions Metaphysics IV 1005b35 - 
1006a5 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 525; 1989), the principle of the excluded middle which 
states that contradictories cannot be at the same time true of the same thing so that 
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there cannot be an intermediate or middle between contradictories Metaphysics IV 
1011b20 – 25, IV 1011a35 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 531; 1989), and the principle of 
identity which states that a thing is itself and is inseparable from itself Metaphysics 
VII 1041a15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 565; 1989). 
Secondly, it encapsulates the whole of the inferential part of Aristotle’s scientific 
method. This method involves induction of the principles which underlie the 
observed phenomena. This part of his method further requires that these induced 
principles be expressed in language terms isomorphic with reality, and employed as 
premises for inference of scientific or causal statements about those premises.  
Thirdly, it encapsulates the first principles and definitions of the particular Science 
involved in the demonstration at hand. These principles and definitions are expressed 
in terms used to describe individuals, species and genus. Choosing appropriate 
premises was the virtue or skill of the taxonomist who must be so exact as to allow 
false premises to be detected and eradicated from the syllogism Posterior Analytics 
72b – 72b5, 75b 20 – 76a30 (Aristotle, 1952p, 72b, pp. 99, 104; 1960a). Aristotle 
also allows two cases in which premises not ‘appropriate’ to the subject can 
nevertheless allow scientific demonstration—theorems in harmonics demonstrable 
by arithmetic, and optics demonstrable by geometry.  
As the quotation following next reveals, the whole process is not necessarily easy. 
It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to be sure whether one’s 
knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute—the differentia of 
true knowledge. We think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true 
and primary premises. But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with 
the basic facts of science. Posterior Analytics I 76a25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 104; 
1960a) 
Demonstrative knowledge, being knowledge of a necessary nexus Posterior 
Analytics I 75a10 – 15 (Aristotle, 1952p, p.103; 1960a), is obtained through a 
necessary middle term of the syllogism. This middle term “must be consequentially 
connected with the minor [term], and the major [term consequentially connected] 
with the middle [term]” Posterior Analytics I 75a35 – 40 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 103, 
my square brackets; 1960a) and be a term in which the attribute being demonstrated 
inheres. Under these conditions, the inference of a nexus between premise and 
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conclusion is scientific knowledge. This realisation in all its simplicity is one of 
Aristotle’s major contributions and given that it comes close in time to Plato and 
before him to the age of magic, and given the intricacies that lie behind it, and in 
spite of the manner in which some Post-Modern commentators dismiss it, I find 
Aristotle’s system in general, and the crucial role of the syllogism within it, simply 
stunning.  
I have now completed the Level 1 articulation of Proposal (IV) in so far as it can be 
completed without reference to its entanglement with the other proposals. Before 
continuing I sum up the Level 2 articulation of Science so far contained in the 
discussion of Proposal (IV). Science, that knowledge which Aristotle has already 
argued separates the true from the false and brings humans to knowledge of the four 
causes of being, is inferior only to intuitive knowledge, for example horses eat grass. 
Its method is inference consisting of induction employed in syllogistic reasoning by 
which Science carries the intuitive grasp of premises to the universal body of fact. 
More widely defined Aristotelian Science also embraces deduction. Science deals in 
universals and is of the mind. It is just this depiction of Science that Aristotle brings 
to Level 2 articulation of the key term Science. I have still to discuss Aristotle’s view 
about which of the particular sciences, for 
example, physics, mathematics, or biology, is 
the architectonic (αρχιτεκτονικός) or master 
Science served by all other sciences, and to 
which those other sciences are slaves. His case for theology as the architectonic 
Science is presented at Metaphysics III 996b10 – 25 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 515; 1989). 
His case for politics as the architectonic Science of the social sciences is presented at 
Politics I 1094b - 1094b10 within 1094a - 1092b10 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 339). I 
have yet to discuss Aristotle’s views about which objects are most worthy of the 
contemplative reflection of philosophical wisdom.  
Having now differentiated between intuitive knowledge and scientific knowledge I 
am able, as foreshadowed on page 214 to proceed to close the Level 1 articulation of 
Proposals III and IV by further articulation of the manner in which intuitive 
 
Proposal (IV) 
Aristotle’s founding of Science as a process of 
induction and deduction based on objective 
understandings about natural objects, and his 
development of a logic which prescribed a 
procedure for reasoning in Science. 
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knowledge and scientific knowledge are implicated in philosophical or theoretical 
wisdom, and how, through practical wisdom they are linked to the moral virtues.  
Nous, which comes from without, which is the substance of the unmoved mover, and 
which enforms no part of the body, partakes of the intellective domain of the soul. In 
sparking intuition, nous is first implicated in the generation of the highest form of 
factual knowledge, self-evident or intuitive truth—things exist, birth is followed by 
death, water quenches. As earlier explained on page 257 such truths are established 
through a process of induction occasioned by sense perception and memory which 
account for experience. Intuitive fact so established, when it defines terms of 
premises correctly formulated and appropriately commensurate with the terms of 
conclusions, serves as the foundation for scientific reason, that process of inference 
which results in scientific fact, and knowledge of the universals which constitute the 
body of Science. When acting in unison as philosophical wisdom, intuition and 
scientific reason may contemplate the unmoved mover, and from such 
contemplation, which is the highest cognitive state available, theology, a Science, 
emerges. Philosophical wisdom may contemplate mathematics, or it may 
contemplate the physical realm, from which contemplation the universal body of 
Science emerges. 
Intuition and scientific reason, when they arbitrate over appeals thrown before them 
by practical wisdom, that agent of the calculative soul charged with determining 
everyday activity appropriate for the virtuous life, thus lie at the heart of the human 
ethical dimension and at the same time inform practical wisdom in its capacity as 
intellectual referent for the moral virtues. And from practical wisdom’s repeated 
appeals to philosophical wisdom emerge, inter alia, economics, known then as 
household management, and political philosophy.  
I have now completed Level 1 articulation of Proposals (III) and (IV) in so far as 
they can be completed without reference to their connection to Proposal (V). I begin 
discussion of Proposal (V). on the next page. 
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POLIS 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (V) Opened and Closed 
I proceed to discuss Aristotle’s political philosophy and during the discussion I 
complete Level 1 articulation of Proposal (V), 
and its attendant Level 2 articulation of the term 
Polis. In discussing Aristotle’s political 
philosophy and the central position Science and 
Ethics occupy within it, I also close Level 1 articulation of all Proposals (I) through 
(IV).   
Aristotle’s lectures on political Science, which we know today as the books called 
the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1934, 1952g) and Politics (Aristotle, 1944, 
1952r), were prepared for, and attended by, citizens in preparation for the practical 
art of statesmanship (Burnet, 1913, pp. 10 - 11) in a polity in which they, the citizens, 
participate in government, and rule one another in turn. These facts in themselves 
announce Aristotle’s politics as an active practical Science. As earlier discussed on 
page 237, the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1934, 1952g) focuses on the individual 
and how they may become virtuous, just and happy. I also reveal below that the 
Politics (Aristotle, 1944, 1952r) focuses, inter alia, on the state and how a virtuous, 
just and happy state may be brought into existence. Aristotle posits, on the basis of 
scale, and on final and material cause, that the happiness, virtue and justice of the 
state is a higher order of importance than that of the individual.  
Out of the relationships between man and woman, and master and slave, family 
arises, and it is a natural order for sustaining life, since for this purpose neither man 
nor woman is whole or complete in themselves Politics I 1252a25 – 30 (Aristotle, 
1944; 1952r, p. 445). Assemblies of families constitute a village which provides 
“something more than supply of daily needs” Politics I 1252b15 (Aristotle, 1944; 
1952r, p. 445). When a number of villages join together such that as a group they 
approach self-sufficiency, the state is formed and the state is better able to meet the 
temporal needs of the gathering of people, the exoteric P(p)olis. The state is the 
natural end of the natural emergence of family and village and because “what each 
thing is when fully developed we call its nature” Politics I 1252b30 – 1252a 
(Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 446), and because “self-sufficing is the end and the best” 
 
Proposal (V) 
Aristotle’s skilful bringing of such Science and 
Ethics to his political philosophy, and his argument 
in that philosophy that the Polis or gathering of 
humans, being based on natural law imperatives, 
was essentially stable and good. 
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Politics I 1252a (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 446), the state is in this sense the final 
cause of the good or virtuous life. “A consideration of the prominent types of life 
shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness 
with honour. For this is roughly speaking the end of the political life” Nicomachean 
Ethics I 1095b20 – 25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, pp. 340 - 341). Eternal forms inhere 
in final causes and it is in this sense that the state, as the final cause of the good life, 
is stable—a conclusion germane to the demonstration of discussion Proposal (V).  
Because the state is a creation of nature, it is naturally prior to man.  
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the 
individual, when isolated, is not self sufficing and therefore he is like a part in relation 
to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is 
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he has no part of a state. A 
social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state 
was the greatest of benefactors. Politics I 1253a25 - 35` (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 
446)  
The exoteric state emerges from natural law imperatives of the gender divide, and 
from the nourishment and security opportunity inherent in human settlement and 
place. Thus in a second sense at the level of material cause, the state is natural and 
stable—a second demonstration of the claim made in discussion Proposal (V). There 
is no contradiction in the state’s being prior to man and also being founded by a 
human, when someone or perhaps some group formed a constitution, because 
whereas the natural state is the final cause, after founding, the ongoing nurture, law 
making and administration are efficient causes (F. D. Miller, 2007, p. 15). The idea 
or essence which informs the gathering, when expressed as a constitution, and 
subsequently transferred to the efficient cause for action, may be thought of as the 
formal cause (F. D. Miller, 2007, p. 14). The form of the constitution would be 
coeval with the binding sentiment that occasions the cognitive gathering of the 
esoteric Polis. According to Aristotle, to have a just state which brings happiness to 
many is more important than to have one or a few happy citizens. The esoteric Polis 
is the cognitive gathering predicated on social instinct implanted in mankind by 
nature. It is a gathering which is also predicated on a balanced soul contemplating 
happiness with justice. 
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Aristotle is certainly under no illusion about what a problem it is for mankind to be 
imbued with a seeking for justice, and about the consequences abandonment of that 
seeking might bring: 
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and 
justice he is the worst of all: since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is 
equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used with intelligence and virtue, which he 
may use for the worse ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy 
and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is 
the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination 
of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. Politics I 1253a30 - 1253b 
(Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 446)  
The work of promoting justice will not be easy: the young baulk at the hardy life, and 
strong law should fix their “nurture and occupation” Nicomachean Ethics X 1079b35 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 434). Reinforcing habituation is required even in 
adulthood. Such laws should “generally speaking cover the whole of life; for most 
people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of 
what is noble” Nicomachean Ethics X 1180a - 1180a5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 
434).  
Furthermore, “punishments and penalties should be imposed on those who disobey 
and are of inferior nature, while the incurably bad should be completely banished” 
Nicomachean Ethics X 1180a5 – 10 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 434). Again, the 
punishment should fit the crime Nicomachean Ethics X 1180a10 – 15 (Aristotle, 
1934; 1952g, p. 434). 
Aristotle identifies the “points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his 
law” Politics VII 1333a35 - 40`, (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 538): 
…he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better 
and the end; he should also remember the [40] diversities of human lives and actions. 
For men must be able to engage in business 1333b and go to war, but leisure and 
peace are better; they must do what is necessary and indeed what is useful, but what is 
honourable is better. On such principles children and persons of every age which 
requires education should [5] be trained. Politics VII 1333a35 - 1333b5 (Aristotle, 
1944; 1952r, p. 538) 
In addition, when it comes to the question of what Polis is the best kind of Polis 
either in the esoteric and ideal, or the exoteric and practical realms, Aristotle’s 
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findings, for all the enduring and relevant advice they contain, also provide 
instructive insight into the then Athenian society in which they were grounded.  
Aristotle held that the actual “constitution or government [is] an arrangement of the 
inhabitants of the state” Politics III 1274b35 – 40 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 471, 
my square brackets), its formal cause, as Miller earlier explained on page 265, and in 
Aristotle’s Athens it was only the citizens who might participate in governing—
slaves, resident aliens, children “too young to be on the register” Politics III 1275a10 
– 15 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 471 - 472) old men “relieved of their duties” (ibid), 
and accidental citizens, those who enjoy the benefits of citizenship through 
patronage, may not govern. In the strict sense, “he [literally that is, not she] who has 
the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said 
by us to be a citizen of the state” Politics III 1275b15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 
472, my square brackets). The exoteric state “is a body of citizens sufficing for the 
purposes of life” Politics III 1275b20 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 472). The 
population of citizens, slaves, artisans, women, and protected visitors, and the “size 
and character [the natural resources] of the country”—Politics VII 1326a5 – 10 
(Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 530, my square brackets) are manifestations of the 
exoteric state.  
Within such classical Greek understandings, and a prospect of Greek city-stateness 
increasingly under the influence of victorious Macedonian Kings, the Stagirite, 
Aristotle, found the courage to persevere with, and answer that key question—what 
does it mean to be well governed? While at the outset Aristotle is critical of Plato’s 
so-called utopian republic Politics II 1260b30 – 1264b24 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 
455 - 460) and he is particularly scathing of shared wives and children, he does 
define an ideally best Polis. In esoteric form it is a state in which the individual 
virtues of each and every citizen coincide with, and inform, a constitution predicated 
on happiness with honour under the patronage of the noble Nicomachean Ethics I 
1095b20 - 25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 340), Politics VII 1325b - 1326a5 
(Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 529 - 530). In esoteric form, the Polis is a gathering 
predicated on a balanced soul contemplating happiness with justice.  
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In the exoteric form of such a state individuals, citizens and the constitution are of 
one accord and the three paths to goodness and virtue, nature, habit and reason, are in 
harmony, such harmony being the outcome of legislation and education Politics VII 
1332a40 - 1332b10 (Aristotle, 1952r, p. 537). Such a state, even were it possible to 
achieve, is not a matter of chance and the legislator’s task is to “provide [for]” 
Politics VII 1332a25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 536 – 537, my square 
brackets) its coming to be. Worldly details are offered about various aspects the best 
state, for example, its size of population and area, its geography and defensibility, its 
education system, and the number and presence of non-citizens. Aristotle’s starting 
point is that the perfect state “cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life” 
Politics VII 1325b35 – 40 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 530) and neither can it be 
predicated on anything “impossible” (ibid).  
Unfortunately, the state practically achieved will be a kind of second best even 
though the wish was that “our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed 
with the goods of which fortune disposes (for [30] we acknowledge her power)” 
Politics VII 1332a 25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 537). The natural law 
imperatives of Moira, or fate, present in totem ritual and space, and in Platonic times, 
continue their lingering presence in Aristotle’s Polis but under the guise of fortune.   
Ever the realist, Aristotle searches for the second best state by starting from the 
reality which surrounds him. He surveys the range of options, justifies his choice of 
second best, and as earlier explained, provides guidance to politicians charged with 
governance and practical affairs of state. Aristotle’s views on imperfect humanity in 
general, and his general definition of justice in particular, play a crucial role in his 
final choice of the so-called second best form of government. He classifies the six 
possible forms of government according to rule-by-one, few or many and whether 
rule is for the common interest, in which case it is correct rule, or whether rule is for 
the private interest of the rulers and consequently perverse rule Politics III 1278b5 - 
1279a20 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, pp. 475 – 476). These six forms of government are 
illustrated in Table 29. 
Aristotle finally opts for polity, rule by the many for the common interest, the many 
being citizens in possession of arms who are capable of both obeying the law and  
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ruling by it, which law in the first place gives office based on merit or deserts 
Politics III 1288a10 – 15 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 486). Aristotle reaches his final 
choice through compromise predicated first on the disqualification of kingship, his 
preferred choice, because of the impossibility of finding the perfect ruler and second, 
on the disqualification of aristocracy, rule by a few good men, his second choice, 
because not enough men of excellence are to be found even for this form of 
government. Under polity, which combines the best parts of democracy and 
oligarchy, a kind of middle class rules because it separates the very rich from the 
very poor. The law giver and administrator must be ever watchful for the state’s 
preservation because it will fall if citizens of superior quality wanting the regime 
become outnumbered by citizens of inferior quality not wanting it Politics IV 
1296b15 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 496). Quality is measured by freedom, wealth, 
education, and good birth. 
Aristotelian political Science which treats of “fine and just actions” Nicomachean 
Ethics I 1094b15 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 339), and in which legislators “stimulate 
men to virtue and urge them forward by the motive of the noble” Nicomachean 
Ethics X 1180a5 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 434) and which aims at making the 
citizens “good and capable of noble acts” Nicomachean Ethics I 1099b30 – 1100a 
(Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 345) is the architectonic Science of all the practical 
Sciences. It is the Science: 
... that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class 
of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even 
the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, 
rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates 
as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must 
include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. … These, then, 
are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that 
term. Nicomachean Ethics I 1094a25 - 1094b10 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 339)  
Table 29: Six Forms of Government 
 
# Ruling 
Common Interest 
(Correct) 
Private Interest of the Rulers 
(Perverse) 
one kingship Tyranny 
few  aristocracy Oligarchy 
many 
constitutional 
government (polity) 
democracy of the needy 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aristotle. (1952). Politics. (3 7, pp. 476 – 477). In R. M. Hutchins 
Aristotle II. Chicago: William Benton.  
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The good person, and therefore the happy person, and more particularly the good 
ruler, will: 
... be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will 
be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life 
most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is truly good and four square beyond 
reproach. Nicomachean Ethics I 1100b15 – 25 (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 346)   
What then is the esoteric Polis? It is the cognitive gathering predicated on the social 
instinct implanted in mankind by nature. Its necessary condition is a balanced 
harmonious soul in contemplation of happiness with justice. 
I am now able, through summary, to complete the Level 1 articulation of Proposal 
(V), which completion is the key that at once closes the Level 1 articulation of 
Proposals (1) through (IV) and opens the way to completion of Level 2 and 3 
articulation, and the conclusion of the chapter.  
Level 1 Articulation of Proposal (V) Completed 
Level 1 Articulation of Proposals (I) through (V) Closed 
In the next five paragraphs, I provide an integrating summary closure of Proposals (I) 
through (V).  
In so much as man is a political 
animal, that is, he will esoterically 
and exoterically gather in a Polis, his 
chief political activity is the exercise 
of practical wisdom, a rational 
process which employs nous but 
which engages with the ongoing 
vicissitudes of life in the Polis. There 
is also another deployment of the 
divine nous which, through its virtue of philosophical wisdom understood as 
intuition plus Science, contemplates the unchanging. Such rational contemplation 
also occurs when the mind is in act at the theoretical level in reflection about physics, 
mathematics and metaphysics and in search of understanding of beings that rank 
higher than mankind. Such movement occurs when the mind contemplates the 
 
Proposal (I) 
Aristotle’s finding that substantial natural beings compounded of 
form and matter exist, and that such existence is brought to 
human understanding because form, when it is transmitted by a 
prior member of the species, brings definition to substrate 
matter. 
Proposal (II) 
Aristotle’s finding that metaphysical beings exist, and his 
explanation of how, through their extension in nous, they play a 
role in human understanding.  
Proposal (III) 
Aristotle’s founding of an “objective” Ethics based on practical 
action indirectly informed, through practical reasoning, by a 
cognitive appeal to scientific reasoning 
Proposal (V) 
Aristotle’s skilful bringing of such Science and Ethics to his 
political philosophy, and his argument in that philosophy that the 
Polis or gathering of humans, being based on natural law 
imperatives, was essentially stable and good. 
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unchanging. All rational contemplation, theoria, activity of the mind, moves 
mankind closer to the divine.  
Of the various scientific disciplines generated through theoria politics is 
architectonic to the practical sciences and metaphysics is architectonic to all sciences 
theoretical and practical. Mankind unfortunately cannot live continuously, or even in 
temporary fullness in a divine state, but can only approach it.  
It is clear then, that both Science, earlier shown to be an act of mind proceeding to an 
end and not a passive meditation at all, and Ethics, earlier shown to be a correct 
discernment of the best practical means to the achievement of an end, inform the 
Polis. Science and intuition, as the two kinds of true knowledge, inform prudence or 
practical wisdom, and practical wisdom in turn answers calls made upon it by the 
raw emotions of the moral virtues. The chief purpose of the practical life is to pave 
the way for the higher order theoretical and contemplative life which occasions 
mankind’s ergon—his work of realising the good life.  
I have now completed Level 1 articulation of Aristotle’s system in general, and his 
political philosophy in particular. In the next paragraphs, I proceed to close the Level 
2 and Level 3 articulation first, by gathering up the key terms nuance inherent in the 
Level 1 articulation, and second, by discussing the manner in which that nuance 
informs development and understanding of the Thesis Proposition Statements. 
Level 2 Articulation Closed 
While Aristotle’s forms, like the Platonic forms, are eternal, they have been brought 
down to earth and, through their role in the cause of nature, they inhere in it. Like 
Plato, Aristotle confines change to the sub-lunar world and in that world the bringing 
of form to matter accounts for change, for coming to be, being, and ceasing to be. 
Besides his theories of art and Ethics, Aristotle identified three areas of enquiry as 
rightful candidates for the study of knowledge largely for its own sake: physics, 
mathematics and metaphysics. Science concerns itself with isolating that which is 
unchanging in each of these fields.  
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In esoteric definition Science occurs when we know the four causes of being. Its 
method is the syllogistic demonstration of universal truths from intuited singulars, 
truth being that which can be no other. Science’s domain is nous, and that part of the 
rational soul in which philosophical wisdom contemplates natural physical beings, 
mathematics, and the gods. Its constraints are the difficulty inherent in the selection 
of correct premises by induction and intuition. Because there are three classes of 
beings, metaphysical beings, organic beings and non-organic beings, and a diversity 
of beings within those classes, Science will beget numerous exoteric divisions of 
enquiry, the architectonic Science being theology, and the most noble among the 
practical Sciences being politics.  
Ethics occurs esoterically when practical wisdom discerns between good and bad 
acts, or when in art, understood as skill of the artisan, that artisan acts from true 
reason of the skill needs of the job. Such is its method. Its cognitive domain is the 
calculative faculty of the rational soul in contemplation of the variable components 
of its objects, art, mankind, family and state. In this domain it engages with the lower 
moral virtues under the patronage of philosophical wisdom, and substantiates itself in 
mankind’s highest purpose for work, his arete, or end, or final cause of happiness 
with virtue and justice, which arete cannot be obtained without the presence of 
practical wisdom and the right rule. Its cognitive constraint is human frailty and loss 
of will under desire and pleasure. Ethics is essential for politics, which in its 
legislative dimension, becomes the architectonic Science of all the practical 
Sciences.  
The method of the esoteric Polis is cognitive gathering emerging from its final cause, 
the virtuous self-sufficient life. Its domain is the social instinct implanted in mankind 
by nature, which social instinct substantiates a political philosophy which explains 
the natural state as stable and good. Its constraint is the will’s fall to desire and the 
passions.  
Table 30 on page 273, assembled from the chapter content, captures my 
understanding of Aristotle’s influence on the meaning of the key terms of this 
enquiry.  
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It is clear in Aristotle that the esoteric and exoteric are not separated by the barrier of 
Platonic form so that esoteric Science can more easily slip seamlessly into its 
exoteric existence as a reasoned body of practical expectations about the behaviour 
of real existing beings. So too can esoteric Ethics slip seamlessly into its exoteric 
existence as a component of general, specific and political justice and the practical 
activity of decision making in everyday life. The exoteric Polis, the gathering of the 
natural state, exists as a second best solution, discernible by virtue of such existences 
as the laws, policing and punishment, education, and habituation it calls up.  
Level 3 Articulation Opened and Closed 
Table 31 on page 274 contains an integrating summary interpretation of the impact of 
the Table 30 key terms nuance on the three Thesis Proposition Statements.  
CONCLUSION 
In a sense, Aristotle made humankind more directly responsible for its own learning 
and for its own ethical behaviour. Gone was the partaking of the forms and their 
subsequent noetic recognition and in its place in the sub-lunar habitat was the hard 
grind of reason predicated on inference from carefully selected premises about 
existing real objects. Gone with noesis was the heavenly ethical utopia of the ideal 
Polis and in its place was a natural Polis which, when expressed exoterically, 
occasioned a state in which, every waking moment, mankind must continuously 
discern their own moral virtue according to circumstances. Even in the presence of 
all the problems faced by the intellectual virtues tasked with these responsibilities, 
Table 30: Key Terms Nuance—Aristotle (BC 384 - 322) 
  
Descriptor  
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Under Aristotle 
Science 
The syllogistic demonstration 
of universal truth from intuited 
singulars. 
The faculty of the rational soul occasioned 
through the presence of nous when 
philosophical wisdom contemplates natural 
physical beings, mathematics and the gods, 
and also when it informs practical wisdom. 
The difficulty of 
selecting correct 
premises through 
intuition and induction. 
Ethics 
Practical wisdom in 
discernment between good and 
bad acts or when, in art, 
practical wisdom informs true 
reasoning of the skills needed 
for the job at hand. 
The calculative faculty of the rational soul 
and abode of practical wisdom; a condition 
and state of virtue which exists under the 
patronage of philosophical wisdom when 
practical wisdom engages with the lower 
moral virtues in sublimation of mankind’s 
arete of happiness with virtue. 
Human frailty inherent 
in the loss of will under 
desire and pleasure or 
the irascible. 
Polis 
The final cause of the gathering 
and natural state of happiness 
with honour. 
That condition prior to mankind and that 
social instinct implanted in mankind and its 
flowering into the natural stable and good of 
the cognitive Polis. 
The fall of reason and 
will to desire and the 
passions. 
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Table 31: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Aristotle (BC 384 – 322)  
 
 
PART ONE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche 
of a rapacious mankind in whom no part 
of reason is divine and for whom 
knowledge is power, which recognition 
provides an alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding sentiment of 
Polis is situated in natural social instinct 
implanted in mankind for whom virtue is 
some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Polis is an ideal, just and happy gathering or a city of ideas in which classical Greek values prevail and in which truth informs 
reason. 
Platonic nous is established as a divine element in mankind. 
Virtue qua state of mind is some kind of knowledge. Technical virtue as good-at-what is differentiated from moral virtue as 
absolute goodness per se. To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own 
particular virtue, its taxis and cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and 
temperance as self-control, discerning between the harmful and the unharmful. 
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
 
The Pre-Modern and Modern Age attributions remain unchanged. 
A methodology for esoteric definition of Science, Ethics and Polis established and applied. Under this methodology Plato’s Polis 
is found to be the cognitive gathering in the republic of ideal and absolute forms. 
Platonic nous established as the divine element in mankind.  
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of Aristotle 
(BC 384-322) 
The Pre-Modern and Modern Age attributions remain unchanged. 
Aristotelian nous established as a metaphysical being and the divine element of human reason. Human divinity understood as the 
movement towards but not full attainment of the pure act of the impersonal unmoved mover through theoria. Polis established as 
a stable gathering predicated on a social instinct implanted in mankind and the final cause of mankind’s arete. To be virtuous is 
to act under a condition in which practical wisdom, under philosophical wisdom’s patronage, is active in realms of the so-called 
lower moral virtues, truthfulness, and the like in search for, and sublimation of, mankind’s arête of happiness with justice. It is 
practical reason’s discernment between good and bad acts. 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coincident with a conscious excision of 
Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific 
enquiry, Science ceasing to inform 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits 
it could bring to society and state. 
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science, and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Articulation of Metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Science is knowledge of the unchanging or that which can be no other received through beholding of the one and the forms. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own particular virtue, its taxis and 
cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, 
discerning between the harmful and the unharmful.  
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
 
The Pre-Modern and Modern Age attributions remain unchanged. 
Platonic Science is the final partaking of the forms which occasion understanding by reminiscence. Platonic practical Ethics is 
nous discerning between harmful and unharmful pleasure occasioned by the four classic Greek virtues wisdom, justice, valour 
and temperance which inhere both in the human soul and the ideal Polis. 
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of Aristotle 
(BC 384-322) 
The Pre-Modern and Modern Age attributions remain unchanged. 
Science is the syllogistically reasoned demonstration of fact understood as truth or that which can be no other. It is knowledge of 
the four causes of being. Similarly: Aristotelian practical Ethics is established to be practical wisdom’s discernment, under 
theoretical wisdom’s patronage, between good and bad acts as these are referred to it by the lower moral virtues. For art in act, 
practical Ethics is true reasoning of the correct rule. Aristotelian metaphysics is established as the architectonic Science begotten 
when theoretical wisdom contemplates the transcendent.  
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Table 31 (Continued) 
 
PART ONE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of the state. 
Chapter 1  
Movement from Religion to 
Philosophy, Emergence of 
Science and Ethics, and their 
Presence in Plato’s Political 
Philosophy 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Articulation of Metaphysics is not yet begun. 
Science is knowledge of the unchanging or that which can be no other received through beholding of the one and the forms. 
Ethics is reasoned moral activity inherent in nous’ discernment of the harmful from the unharmful.  
To be virtuous in a practical sense is to be in act on behalf of nous, always in obedience to its own particular virtue, its taxis and 
cosmos of obedience to the law, justice as minding one’s own and not another’s business, and temperance as self-control, 
discerning between the harmful and the unharmful. 
Chapter 2 
Key Terms Usage and Enquiry 
Methodology 
 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Platonic practical Ethics is nous discerning between harmful and unharmful pleasure under the aegis of four classic Greek virtues 
wisdom, justice, valour and temperance which inhere both in the human soul and the ideal Polis. 
Chapter 3 
Science, Ethics and Polis in the 
Political Philosophy of Aristotle 
(BC 384-322) 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Aristotelian practical Ethics is established to be practical wisdom’s discernment, under theoretical wisdom’s patronage, between 
good and bad acts as these are referred to it by the lower moral virtues. For art in act, practical Ethics is true reasoning of the 
correct rule.  
4 
Integrating Summary of Part One  
By building on the legacy of Presocratic writers and Plato, Aristotle established a political philosophy predicated on a naturally stable Polis, in which the intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom 
arbitrate in discerning correct reason and right desire in matters of moral conduct referred to them by thee irrational soul. In this esoteric Polis mankind realises its ergon of happiness with justice and honour 
under patronage of the beautiful. Justice is predicated either on merit or on equality of exchange. Science, as knowledge of the four causes of being, knowledge of that which can be no other, proceeds through its 
method of syllogistic reasoning from intuitively induced singular terms to deduced universal terms. Science as the universal body of true knowledge about the sub-lunar world results when philosophical wisdom 
contemplates existing beings. Science as metaphysics, a theology, occurs when theoretical philosophy contemplates the transcendent.  
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the natural state of the now more earthy and actual Aristotelian Polis, by virtue of 
mankind’s predisposition and social instinct to gather, was stable and inherently 
good. Mankind, with a little help from culture and habituation, education, and the 
law and punishment, could more fully realise its ergon and arete. 
Aristotle describes Science to be that which searches as best it can across the three 
dimensions of theoretical philosophy, and even within the calculative and critical 
domains too, to know the unchanging, the-that-which-can-be-no-other. He 
pronounces metaphysics a theology distinct from totem ritual, religion and votive 
rites, and names it the architectonic Science of theoretical philosophy, with physics, 
broadly defined, then mathematics respectively next in nobility. All of these three 
sciences are compatible components of theoretical philosophy. Within its practical 
domain philosophy encompasses Ethics and a range of so-called practical sciences of 
which political Science is architectonic. Science informs Ethics in a stable Polis 
predicated on a natural instinct implanted in mankind.  
As further chapters of this enquiry demonstrate, Aristotle’s explanation of the good 
life was to remain influential until the arrival of a so-called Modern Age.  
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Part Two  
 
 
From Aristotle (BC 384 – 322) to Jean Buridan (AD c.1300 – 
c.1358): Science, Ethics and Polis and Transition from Philosophy to 
Theology 
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Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the Fall of Rational Metaphysics to Christian 
Theology  
INTRODUCTION 
General Work of the Chapter Outlined 
Chapter 3 revealed Aristotle’s teaching that mankind is possessed of a tripartite soul 
in which intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom not only serve its 
scientific and calculative domains, but also arbitrate over questions of moral virtue 
addressed to them by an irrational domain and its appetitive needs. Ethics in this 
construct is a practical affair and mankind, possessed of divine reason, exists in a 
universe of independent beings accessible through that reason. The one, the first 
principle of being, is not a personal god nor does the one create the materials of 
which the world was assembled. Scientific knowledge, second only to intuitive 
knowledge, is obtained through reasoned demonstration. Such depiction, by way of 
general statement, is the starting point of this chapter. 
In the integrating postulation of this enquiry Aristotle’s heritage is a mixture of 
essential preoccupations underlying a transition from religion to philosophy. These 
preoccupations, mentioned earlier on page 24, are physis, the nature of nature, 
represented by physics and related so-called Sciences; god, as thought thinking itself, 
represented by metaphysics considered to 
be a Science and a theology; and soul part 
biological, part divine.  
Aristotle’s construct of physis, god and 
soul was to fracture over the next millennia 
and first fault lines appeared as a result of 
intermingling of Greek rational heritage 
with Jewish revelation doctrine. These 
fault lines widened under impact of a 
developing Christianity. By the time of Augustine (AD 354 - 430), Aristotelian 
rational Ethics had been sidelined by absolute Ethics of revealed faith, Christ as 
divine Logos—God’s revelation of His creation of the world and all beings within 
it—had become favoured above nous as logos and Aristotle’s categorical explanation 
 
Source: (Gozzoli, 1464-65). (artist). Detail from 
Augustine Departing for Milan. (fresco). Psidal Chapel, 
Sant'Agostino, San Gimignano: Web Gallery of Art.  
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of such being, and a personal loving Christian God had largely superseded Aristotle’s 
impersonal one. A Jewish God of wrath had for some become a Christian God of 
love. The depiction of this paragraph, arrived at through engagement with 
translations of original and/or redacted writings checked and balanced against 
twentieth and twenty-first century research, is, by way of general statement, the 
finishing point of this chapter.  
I link the starting point to the finishing point by tracing a changing relationship 
between Science and Ethics from Aristotle’s esoteric but earthy Polis to Augustine’s 
Christian and spiritual Polis. I attend to the chapter’s general purpose and work in 
three sections. In Section I, after first addressing elements of Semitic Mythology and 
Persian thought considered germane to development of Judaism, I trace a largely 
Alexandrian emergence and intermingling of Hebrew and Greek traditions, also 
acknowledging Jewish-Greek intermingling in Judea and Palestine. Section 1, which 
engages with commentary and exegesis by twentieth and twenty-first century 
scholars and with works cited or not cited by those scholars, reaches to a range of 
specialisations—history, church history, archeology, religious studies, philosophy, 
and literary analysis—in its task of tracing Judeo-Greek intermingling to the time of 
Table 32: First Explanation of Names Used in the Text 
Term Usage 
Hebrew and Jewish 
Distinctions in meaning can be made between the words Hebrew and Jewish but for the purposes of 
this enquiry the two words are considered synonymous in that they are used in a simple sense to 
differentiate the views revealed in Alexandria through translation of the Septuagint from those 
found amongst Greeks.  
Septuagint 
The Septuagint is a version of the Jewish Bible in development, a version which was translated into 
common Greek circa BC 285 - 247 (Abrahams, 1902, p. 321; DeSilva, 2004, p. 42). It was used by 
Jews in the Alexandrian diaspora and includes books not present in the Jewish Bible in use today. 
The full authorised version of the King James Bible (Holy Bible, 2009b) contains these books, with 
the exception of Psalm 151, in its Apocrypha. These books are Judith, The Wisdom of Solomon, 
Tobit, Sirach (or Ecclesiasticus), Baruch, First and Second Maccabees, the two books of Esdras, 
various additions to the Book of Esther (10: 4 - 10), the Book of Daniel (3: 2 4- 90; 13; 14), and the 
Prayer of Manasseh and they range in age from the fourth century BC to so-called New Testament 
times. The Septuagint is the version of the Jewish bible referred to in the so-called New Testament 
and by the Apostolic Fathers (Baltzly, 2009, n. p.). Codification of the so-called New Testament is 
conjectured occurring circa (AD 49 – 150) and there is no escaping the fact that Greek was the 
language used (R. Brown, 1997, p. xxxv). 
Apostolic Fathers 
Church Fathers is a term reserved for theologians and teachers whose work served as precedent for 
a then developing Church. Apostolic fathers are those Church Fathers who lived within one or two 
generations of the Apostles: for example Clement of Rome (c. AD 96), and Ignatius of Antioch (c. 
AD 35 - 110). 
Early Greek Fathers 
Greek, the language of the New Testament, was used by the early Christian Fathers until the time of 
Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) who, circa AD 200 wrote a work in Latin. After this time Latin gradually 
became the language of the Western Church Fathers. But in Byzantium the Eastern Church Fathers 
continued to write in Greek. In other places some writers (St. Ephrem, AD 306 - 373) wrote in 
Semitic vernaculars such as Aramaic and Syriac-Aramaic. Greek Fathers is the general name used 
for those who wrote in Greek. The so-called Early Christian Fathers were writers implicated in 
establishing early church dogma. 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from Baltzby, D. (2009). Stoicism. (n. p.). Metaphysics Research Institute, Stanford 
University: Stanford; Aquilina, M. (1999). The Fathers of the Church. (pp. 1 - 17). Huntington, Illinois: Our Sunday Visitor, 
Inc.; Brown, R (1997). An Introduction to the New Testament. (p. xxxv). Doubleday: New York. (Aquilina, 1999; Baltzly, 
2009; R. Brown, 1997)  
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Philo and the advent of Christ. In Section 2, which traces Jewish-Greek 
intermingling from Philo and the advent of Christ to Augustine (AD 345 – 430) 
during a time of Christianity in development, I discuss how Aristotelian rational 
moral virtues fell to absolute virtues of faith, and how philosophy, theology and 
Science might be said to have become alienated each from the other. Engagement 
with Johannine-Pauline Christology, Hellenisation theory, critical commentary again 
by twentieth and twenty-first century scholars and works cited or not cited by them, 
and with general exegesis and analysis of scriptures constitutes the methodology of 
Section 2. Section 3 is a brief check and balance of the validity of the chapter’s use 
of Christology, Hellenisation Theory and exegesis of scripture conventions, given 
dating and author uncertainties of books of the Christian biblical canon, and possible 
redaction of some books by others than their original writers. 
Discussion of Section 1 occupies pages 306 to 307, that of Section 2, pages 307 to 
338 and that of Section 3 pages 340 to 357. 
Tables like Table 32 progressively outline 
conventional and widespread meanings of terms 
employed in enquiry discussion, some of those 
terms themselves not being entirely free from 
contestation. However these terms serve only 
general and descriptive marker purposes.  
Specific Work of the Chapter Outlined 
The specific purpose and work of the chapter is 
to trace changes in meanings of the enquiry’s key terms Science, Ethics and Polis, 
over the seven and a half centuries from Aristotle (BC 384 – 322) to Augustine (AD 
354 – 430), and to bring those changed meanings to articulation of the Thesis 
Proposition Statements. This specific work runs throughout Sections 1, 2 and 3. The 
task is complex and for ease of understanding I begin with a bare and simple four-
article statement of the integrating argument from which key terms nuance is 
subsequently extracted. The four article statement is constructed on an understanding 
that authorship of scriptures attributed to John (AD c.6 – 100), Paul, (AD c. 5 – 67) 
and others is contested and that such contestation is inherent in names usage 
employed throughout this enquiry. For example a phrase according to Paul means 
 
Source: (di Cristoforo Fini, 1428-30). (artist). St. 
Catherine Alexandria Disputes with the Pagan 
Philosophers before the Emperor. (fresco). 
Barda Castiglioni Chapel of San Clemente in 
Rome: Web Gallery of Art. Masolino da 
Panicale is a nickname of Tommaso di 
Cristoforo Fini (c. 1383 – c. 1447). 
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according to the author or authors of the writing attributed to Paul including possible 
redaction as well. Such a convention is in widespread use and the focus in this 
enquiry is first and foremost on meaning perceived in the writing and the date of the 
writing and/or redaction rather than on still important questions about original and/or 
redacting authorship and the like.  
Integrating Argument of the Chapter Stated in Four Articles 
Article (I)  
(Ia) In general, prior to intermingling of Greek and Hebrew ideas in Alexandria, 
detectible in works by Philo (BC 20 – AD 50) written some two centuries after 
translation of the Septuagint into Greek likely circa BC 283/5 - 246/7 during the 
reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the Greek god was impersonal, moral virtues were 
reasoned, god did not create the materials out of which the world was assembled, and 
god, thought thinking itself, was present in the form of nous as an essential part of 
mankind’s soul and nature.  
(Ib) Under a Hebrew explanation, God created the universe, revealed His presence, 
provided for His people, gave the law and made prophesy. This personal God was 
transcendent and His work on earth was done through the agency of angels. There 
was no sense in which fate had power over this Hebrew God and no sense in which 
the Hebrew God of the Septuagint, the Jewish Bible in development, was a nature 
god in the Greek way. 
Article (II)  
Through cultural intermingling, scholarly activity, and translation work that 
accompanied Egypt’s transition from Greek to Roman rule, Greek logos or nous was 
identified with the Hebrew Memra understood as God’s creation, revelation and 
providence expressed in a personified form as the Word of the Lord, and 
subsequently, as the Wisdom of the Lord.  
Article (III)  
Through the advent of Christ, God became more transcendent, the historical Christ 
found no evil in nature, and subsequently the sin of man’s fall became redeemable 
through Christ’s death and resurrection. The apostle John identified Christ incarnate 
with the L(l)ogos and later, the Jewish Roman citizen and missionary, Paul, 
developed and consolidated the identity of Christ as Logos. Even so, evil and sin 
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remained clearly present after Christ’s resurrection and Paul discerned sin in the 
flesh of mankind.  
Article (IV)  
Early Greek Fathers reinforced the idea of Christ as Logos, in part to counteract a 
return of Greek rationalism. During this period and ending with Augustine (AD 345 
– 430) a number of developments occurred. 
(IVa) The Logos was placed in the rational domain of the Greek soul, and sin in the 
irrational domain, thereby beginning a colonisation of Greek rational and practical 
virtue by Christian absolute virtue, and Greek moral virtue by a moral good-bad 
divide of sin. 
(IVb) Sin, which was found in the will of man and not in nature, was also found to 
have tainted nature thereby making nature’s evil a moral evil redeemable through 
Christ as Logos, rather than to be addressed in a Greek way through reason as logos. 
(IVc) Aristotle’s four-causes explanation of being, and through that being, mankind’s 
rational access to Science and Ethics, was, along with the philosophy on which it was 
partly based, ejected in favour of a moral teleology with God in Christ as the cause of 
all in all—a full colonisation, by a Christian moral virtue, of both the Greek 
explanation of being and its attendant scientific and metaphysical soul. 
(IVd) Following Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) and adoption of Latin by Christian fathers 
Logos understood as nous was translated as Word. Use of the word nous was 
prohibited in the Nicaean Symbol (AD 325). Later, following condemnation of the 
Stoic duality doctrine of Logos-as-thought-or-potential and Logos-as-action-or-
God’s-thought-in-action at the Synod of Sirmium (AD 451), the word Logos fell into 
disuse as Latinisation progressed. God the Father, as-Memra-as-Word, and Christ the 
son, as-Logos-as-Word, were one in creation, in nature, and in the moral soul of man. 
Greek rational virtues had been temporarily replaced by Christian virtues of faith. 
Again, Aristotelian scientific understanding of cause and being had become, 
relatively speaking, temporarily irrelevant.  
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Full discussion of Articles (I) through (IV) begins in Section 1 below with its focus 
on Persian thought, Semitic 
mythology and intermingling of the 
Hebrew and Greek traditions, as 
intimated earlier on page 280. 
SECTION 1: ELEMENTS OF PERSIAN 
THOUGHT, SEMITIC MYTHOLOGY AND 
INTERMINGLING OF HEBREW AND GREEK 
TRADITIONS 
Integrating Discussion of Articles (I) 
Through (IV) Running Throughout the 
Chapter Begins.  
A short statement by Rees frames 
the whole discussion of Section 1 
and informs its structure and 
procedural logic. 
To wit: according to Rees, Christ’s 
advent was coeval with an ongoing 
announcement of a transcendent 
Jewish God who made the universe 
and it occurred against “a heritage 
of ideas about the world consisting 
of a background of Semitic 
mythology, the revelation of the OT 
[Old Testament] with Jewish 
developments of it, certain 
elements from Persian thought, and 
ultimately the whole framework of 
Greek philosophy” (T. Rees, 1917, 
p. 210, my square brackets). Rees’ 
general statement echoes in views 
expressed by Meeks (2002, p. xvii), 
who acknowledges a similarly wide 
 
Background Comment on the Use of Hellenisation and Pauline-
Johannine Christology as Partial Scaffolding for Elucidation of 
Articles (I) through (IV) 
In part of this chapter I employ, inter alia, received theory of both 
Hellenization, (Barclay, 1996; Casey, 1964/2009; Danielou, 1964; 
Dunn 2006; J. Dunn, 2012; R. M. Grant, 1966; Guitton, 1963; 
Harnack, 1961, 1978; Hengel, 1974; A. J. Holmes, 2001; 
MacMullan, 1984; Metzger, 1989; G. F. Moore, 1997; Plantigna, 
2001; Rothschild & Schröter, 2013; Stark, 1996; van Groningen, 
1967; R. M. Wilson, 1959) and Johannine and Pauline Christology 
(R. Brown, 1994, 1997; Brueggemann, 2008; Burns, 1911; J. 
Crossan, 1991, 1994; Ehrman, 2007; Fee, 2013; Inge, 1917a; 
Karkkainen, 2003; J. F. McGrath, 2001; Nietzsche, 1924; Pollard, 
2005; T. Rees, 1917; van Kooten, 2003) in enunciation of Articles I 
through IV. In these fields of enquiry so-called received theory is not 
to be taken as ‘the’ received theory, or ‘a’ received theory, but rather 
at the very least in the case of Hellenisation, an acceptance that 
through earlier and ongoing intermingling of Greek and Jewish 
thought, Greek influences are carried into early Christianity in 
development. Likewise, Judaic and Greek influences are present in 
Johannine and Pauline Christology and subsequently during 
Christianity in development to the time of Augustine (AD 345 – 430) 
within a broad framework of Hellenisation so understood.  
 
A revived interest in Gnosticism following discovery of the Nag 
Hammadi codices in 1945 has produced a large body of literature 
providing new insight, challenging questioning, and attendant 
rejoinder about matters Judeo-Greek which in turn has led to further 
articulation of Hellenisation and Johannine-Pauline Christology—a 
small sample now cited (Braake, 2012; J. D. Crossan, 2008; 
Desjardins, 1994; Gieschen, 1998; Goldingay, 2010; Hill, 2004; 
Hurtado, 2005; K. King, 2003, 2005, 2010; Koester, 1997; Mayer, 
2005a, 2005b, 2011; M. Meyer, 2012; Pagels, 1989a, 1989b, 1992; J. 
M. Robinson & Smith, 1997; Schäfer, 2012; Szulc, 2001; Wilken, 
2003; M. A. Williams, 1999). Such literature addresses a plethora of 
wonderings. For example, interesting socio-political explanations are 
introduced, and contentions raised about such issues as: which voice 
is dominant, was Christianity Hellenised or Hellenism Christianised, 
was Mary Magdalene Christ’s mouth-kissing consort, Christ as 
Adam, whether Thomas was really a doubter or Judas really a 
betrayer, Paul’s belief in Christ as the one true God of Israel, that the 
LXX remained Paul’s consistent source, Christ as personified 
Wisdom, Paul the monotheist as proto-trinitarian, whether the 
Qumran community were Essenes, whether John the Baptist and/or 
Christ spent parts of their lives in the Qumran community, whether 
or not the Gnostics were the unified sect earlier scholars accepted 
them to be, and whether or not there was as much antagonism 
between Gnostics and so-called early Christian fathers as earlier 
scholars had contended, whether the Gnostics splintered from 
Christianity or whether Christianity was selectively assembled from 
vetted gnostic belief, or from push-pull-each-way-and-all from a 
turbulent or cooperative many, whether Gnosticism is a dubious 
category that should be dismantled, along with such terms as 
orthodox, heretical, proto-orthodox, proto-gnostic and many more as 
well, whether the gap between the Synoptic Gospels and the Gnostic 
Gospels is wide or otherwise, whether or not the Gospel of Thomas is 
a collection of Jesus’ sayings which dates from as early as AD 60 
and whether Matthew and Mark used it as a source, and whether or 
not it is the very basis of the Q source sayings, whether in the face of 
argued widespread redaction and recension, certainty is a casualty, 
whether Abraham ever lived at all, and the list goes on. 
 
When checked and balanced against research about Johannine-
Pauline Christology and Gnosticism since Nag Hammadi, 
Hellenisation, under caveat, remains valid for enquiry purposes, of 
which more later beginning on page 340.  
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range of influences in his discussion of the rise of Christianity, by Smith (2003b, pp. 
27 - 143), who detects Western Semitic influences and a likely pre-Yahweh Jewish 
polytheism, and by Brueggemann (2008, pp. 5 - 6) in a more general context.  
Discussion of intermingling of Greek and Jewish ideas thought to have occurred in 
Egypt as well as in other parts of the then Greek empire begins on page 291 
following a background discussion of Rees’ elements of Persian thought, Semitic 
mythology and their possible influence on Judaism, which occupies pages 284 to 
291. 
Persian Thought, Semitic Mythology and Their Possible Influence on Judaism 
The Jewish component of Rees’ ‘heritage of ideas about the world’ may have 
emerged from Semitic mythology but to have been differentiated from that 
mythology through its characteristic monotheistic revelation of one all-powerful God 
named Yahweh (Holy Bible, 2010, Exodus 20: 1 - 2). Differentiation of a Jewish 
monotheistic heritage from Semitic mythology is supported by Armstrong (1994, pp. 
11 -14) who finds Yahweh a pagan god of polytheistic Canaan transported to Israel 
through migrations of cult followers and displacing other gods to become the only 
and one God of Israel.  
Some scholars share a view, centred on a hint of redaction detected through exegesis 
of Deuteronomy 32: 8-9, and Psalm 82: 8, that the God Yahweh of the Septuagint 
emerged from a pre-exilic Divine Council of Gods worshiped before establishment 
of the Kingdom of Israel. Under such scholarship Yahweh was, prior to the exile of 
Jews to Babylon, one god (םיהלא), whether chief or otherwise, of a pantheon of gods 
who, after the exile—other gods having become servant angels (םיכאלמ) during and 
after the exile—emerged as the one and only God over all nations. So portrayed, 
Yahweh-El of Genesis becomes Yahweh of Exodus with Deuteronomy 32: 8 – 9 and 
Psalm 82 taken together revealing evidence of both pre-exilic theology and post-
exilic redacted theology (Heiser, 2006, p. 1; M. S. Smith, 2003b, p. 49).  
Smith (2003a, pp. 39 - 42) conjectures Yahweh emerging from a Baal cycle of gods 
urging that the God Yahweh of the Septuagint at Deuteronomy 32: 6 is a god of the 
southern desert whose prior name Yahweh-El at Exodus 34: 6 results from an earlier 
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merger with, rather than displacement of, El—which god El may well have occupied 
one position in a Mother, Father, Son triad at the top of a Ugaritic pantheon. 
Israel’s entry into Canaan may thus have occasioned, or have been facilitated by, 
such a merger. Ugarit, the mound Ras Shamra, accidently unearthed in 1928 by a 
farmer and investigated in that same year by Albanèse (1929, pp. 16 - 21), and by 
Schaeffer in the following year and written up later (1939, passim), has an 
archaeological reach to late Neolithic times—fifth millennium BC—being called 
Ugarit since the beginning of the second millennium BC (Schaeffer, 1939, pp. 2, 8). 
Schaeffer notes an “intimate relationship 
existing between the Ras Shamra tablets 
and the literature of the Old Testament” 
(ibid., p. 77). 
Day (2002, pp. 22 - 25) also allows that 
Yahweh and Yahweh-El of the 
Septuagint are the same God but, on the 
basis of an LXX Deuteronomy and a Dead Sea Scroll Deuteronomy, urges their 
transition to monotheism from their separate existence in a Divine Council of Gods 
where Yahweh may have been one of the sons of El. Cross & Freedman (1975, p. 45) 
and Parker (1995, pp. 548- 553) also urge Yahweh’s emergence from a polytheistic 
pantheon.  
The explicatory square bracketed insertions [Elyon1, 2] and [Yahweh’s] in the 
Deuteronomy row of Table 33, and [Yahweh] and [Elyon as chief or presiding god 
referring to El] in the Psalm 82 row of that same table are central to exposition of a 
dispute about Yahweh’s pre-exilic inferior god status or otherwise. The argument is 
constructed around a question of whether El and Yahweh, in both Deuteronomy 32: 8 
– 9 and in Psalm 82, are the same or separate gods. My square bracket insertions 
help explicate the position taken by scholars holding that Deuteronomy 32 Verses 8 – 
9, considered scribed earlier than Psalm 82, provide a referent allowing a contention 
that Psalm 82 contains traces of redaction of a pre-exilic understanding that El and 
Yahweh were separate gods. Polytheism is not in question. The argument hinges on 
whether the Most High [Elyon] of verse 8 of Deuteronomy 32 must be El rather than 
[Yahweh], the LORD of verse 9 (Heiser, 2006, p. 6). Parker (1995, p. 536) and 
 
Background Information – Dead Sea Scrolls  
The Dead Sea Scrolls, discovered from 1946 to 1956/7, 
consist of some 100,000 fragments, mostly on animal skin 
parchment, representing some 1400 literary works ranging 
from a complete Great Isaiah Scroll to those in limited 
fragment remains. Found to the West of the Dead Sea near 
Qumran and North and South of it (Qumran), the Qumran 
cache dates from BC 250 to circa AD 65, and some from 
other locations to circa AD 135. Next to the scrolls, the 
earliest known manuscripts, in part or in whole, of the 
Hebrew Bible, date from AD 800 – 1008. Scroll languages 
include Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek and Nabataean, and to date 
include some of the earliest known texts of the now Hebrew 
Bible.  
 
 286 
Smith (2003b, pp. 48 - 49) are representative of those associated with favouring a so 
called must-be position. Psalm 82: 1 appears to demonstrate plurality of gods but 
does not necessarily confirm that Yahweh is chief amongst them. Belying Psalm 82: 
8 is a thread of belief in seventy so-called nations in Canaanite antiquity each nation 
with its own god. 
Redaction is detected at verse 8 when a prophetic voice asks Elyon, and not Yahweh, 
the god 
standing in 
council in verse 
1, to assume 
the position at 
the top of the 
gods of all 
nations. Here at 
once the 
Psalmist is said 
to be 
preserving the 
older theology 
being rejected, the theology of Yahweh’s inferior god status, coincident with a 
process of redaction through which Yahweh becomes the one judge of all the world 
(M. S. Smith, 2003b, p. 49).  
Heiser (2006, pp. 6 - 9) is an example of scholars who question the generality of such 
arguments. He discusses six incongruities confronting studies which rely on broadly 
based interpretations of Deuteronomy 32: 8-9 and Psalm 82 to leverage Yahweh’s 
emergence from a pre-exilic pantheon, stating that these incongruities have yet to be 
addressed. He cites Cross as one sceptical towards a “common scholarly position that 
the concept of Yahweh as reigning or King is a relatively late development in 
Israelite thought” (F. M. Cross & Freedman, 1975, p. 45).  
Possible Jewish adoption or otherwise of Semitic and Persian ideas has been further 
investigated through comparing Babylonian and Assyrian ideas, particularly 
Table 33: Name Attribution Characteristic of Scholars Urging a 
Hint of Redaction in Psalm 82 and Deuteronomy 32: 8 – 9 
 
  Deuteronomy 32.8-9 
When the Most High [Elyon1, 2] gave the nations as an inheritance, 
when he divided mankind, 
he fixed the borders of the peoples 
according to the number of [the sons of God].(3) 
But the LORD’s [Yahweh’s] portion is his people, 
Jacob his allotted inheritance. 
ם ִ֔ יוגּ ןֹ֙וי ְּלֶע ל ֵ֤  ח ְּנַה ְּב 
ם ָָ֑דָא י֣נ ְּב ו֖די  ר ְּפַה ְּב 
םי ִ֔ מַע ת ֻב ְּגּ ֙ב  צַי 
׃]םיהלאה ינב[19 רַ֖פ ְּס  מ ְּל 
ו ָ֑מַע ה֖וָה ְּי קֶל ֵ֥  ח י ִּ֛  כ 
׃וֽתָלֲחַנ לֶב ֵֶ֥ח ב ֖ קֲעַי 
8 
 
 
 
9 
Psalm 82 Versus 1and 8 
God [Yahweh] stands in the divine council; 
in the midst of the gods he holds judgment 
 
Arise, O God, [Elyon as chief or presiding god referring to El] 
judge the earth; 
for you shall inherit all the nations!  
 
ל ָ֑  א־תַדֲעַב ב ֵָ֥צ  נ םי ִ֗ ה א 
׃ט ֽ פ ְּש  י םי ֣  ה ֱא בֶר ֶ֖ק ְּב 
 
 
ץֶר ָָ֑אָה ה ָ֣ט ְּפָש םי  ה ֱֱ֭א ה ָ֣מוּק 
׃םֽי  וגַּה־לָכ ְּב ל ִַ֗ח ְּנ ִ֝ ת ה ֵָ֥תַא־י ֽ  כ 
 
 
 
 
8 
Notes: (1) God in chief, the El of Ugaritic polytheism and Psalm 82 at some time redacted to 
Yahweh. (2) All blue [ ] insertions are mine. The superscript 19 in the Deuteronomy Hebrew is 
given by Heister and is not pursued further. (3) The LXX (2015, Deut. 32:8-9) gives ‘angels of 
God’ and the Masoretic Text (1917, p. 299) gives ‘children of Israel’. Other translations are also 
contended, for example sons of Israel. 
 
Source: Adapted by Ian Eddington from Heiser, M. S. (2006). Are Yahweh and El Distinct 
Deities in Deut. 32:8-9 and Psalm 82? (pp. 4, 5-6), Hiphil 3: Liberty University.(Heiser, 2006) 
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Babylonian creation myth recorded by Sumerians in the Enuma Elish (W. L. King, 
1999), with ideas found in the Septuagint in development. 
Commonality of ideas has been detected and scholarly exegesis and contestation 
about possible sharing mechanisms, 
and provenance as well, is ongoing 
there also being interest in a wide 
variety of social, theological and 
historical questions—Assmann, 
Beaulieu, and Collins respectively in 
(Johnston, 2007, pp. 17 – 31, 165 – 
172, 181 - 187; M. S. Smith, 2010, pp. 
91 – 340). Armstrong (1994, p. 13) 
says that by the eighth century BC the 
Israelis had begun to establish a 
distinct creation myth of their own—
the Septuagint version of the creation 
by then already being but a 
perfunctory retelling of that in the 
Enuma Elish.  
Scholarly comparisons of the flood sequences in Tablet 11 of the Epic of Gilgamesh 
(Kendall, 2012, pp. 190 - 211; Sandars, 1972, pp. 108 - 113)—a work anonymously 
pressed in Akkadian cuneiform some 2700 - 2500 years BC and unearthed in 1829 in 
excavations near or at Nineveh—with the flood sequences in Genesis 6 – 9 (Holy 
Bible, 2009b) also explore a possibility of Persian influence in Genesis, or an earlier 
common source for the two (George, 2003, p. 70; O'Brien, 1986, p. 61; Rendsburgh, 
2007, p. 117; Wexler, 2005, p. 338). Seduri’s advice to Gilgamesh to eat, drink and 
be merry in Tablet 10 is also compared with Ecclesiastes 9: 7 – 9 (Fant & Reddish, 
2008, pp. 21 – 22) there being questions as to whether or not writers of Ecclesiastes 
copied Gilgamesh (van der Torn, 2000, p. 22). Henze (1999, p. 98) suggests that 
mocking description of Nebuchadnezzar's madness in Daniel 4 draws from the 
description of Enkidu in Gilgamesh. West summarises scholarship attributing 
influence of Gilgamesh on Homer (M. L. West, 2003, pp. 334 - 402).  
The Gilgamesh Tablet 
 
 
 
Source: Picture of a fragment of a clay tablet, The Gilgamesh 
Tablet or Flood Tablet, or Tablet 11, being the upper right 
corner, 2 columns of inscription on either side, 49 and 51 lines + 
45 and 49 lines. Neo-Assyrian. (BC 7th century). Cropped by Ian 
Eddington from the web pages of the British Museum, London. 
 288 
Armstrong (1994, pp. 3 - 78), inter alia, traces god’s polytheist emergence from 
human ideas beginning some 12,000 years BC to a monotheistic form circa BC 600.  
In synopsis, Armstrong claims that polytheism, clearly evident in the Mesopotamian 
Enuma Elish (W. L. King, 
1999) composed circa BC 
1750, is taken as the norm 
in Mesopotamia. In 
Canaanite religion gleaned 
from cuneiform tablets of 
Ugarit, the Ugaritic stories 
stated to have been in the 
telling since some 12000 
years BC, a pantheon of 
gods is revealed, headed 
by El Elyon, father of the 
gods, Asherah his wife, and Baal a storm god, the Kingdom of Israel and its God 
Yahweh not yet being evident. Over the 500 years following the Enuma Elish, a 
discernible culture of Israel begins to emerge, traceable through writings of sources J 
and E who, between BC 950 – 850, write independent accounts of the history of 
Israel evident in Genesis 2 and 3 of the Septuagint. In Genesis 12 Abraham is said to 
worship El Shaddai, one of the names of the Canaanite god El Elyon who in Genesis 
18 talks with him. In Genesis 28: 11-19 Jacob, a descendant of Abraham, climbs a 
dream ladder to talk with El Elyon. Jacob is said to make El Elyon his choice of god, 
his ‘elohim’, from the many and, on such reasoning, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are 
said to be pagan polytheists like their contemporary Canaanites and Babylonians. El 
Elyon fades in Exodus where Yahweh, during the times of sources J and E, is said to 
have led the Jews from slavery in Egypt, being named Israel’s war god at Exodus 15: 
3. Yet polytheism is still evident at Exodus 15: 11 and 18: 11. After freedom from 
Egyptian exile—as earlier mentioned, archaeological evidence of a deliverance from 
Egypt is reported relatively meager to our times (Denver, 2002, p. 99; Meyers, 2005, 
p. 5)—during a time of threat to Israel from Assyria in BC 750, the prophets Isaiah, 
Amos and Hosea agitate against Israel’s  return to the worship of false gods and 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from William Blake’s Elohim Creating Adam. 
(1795/1805). (colour print, ink and watercolour on paper). London: Tate Britain. 
(W. Blake, 1795/1805). Blake holds the Hebrew god to be a false god, mankind’s 
fall not happening in the Garden of Eden but rather in mankind’s ripping from the 
spiritual realm into materiality. 
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invoke Yahweh’s protection, consolidating his position even in the face of Israel’s 
prophesied fall. 
Yahweh’s consolidation is 
further conjectured during 
unfolding of the boy King 
Josiah’s strict BC 641 – 609 
Yahwist rule over Judah 
with a so-called discovery, 
during temple 
reconstruction circa BC 622, 
of a claimed-lost version of 
Deuteronomy attributed to 
Moses. 
The D source now emerges 
to establish Yahweh as God 
of Israel and worship of 
other gods is forbidden. D 
source redactions follow 
with the rewriting of parts 
of the historical books 
Joshua, Judges, Samuel and 
King(s), and of J and E’s 
Exodus. 
Subsequent editors of the 
Pentateuch bring further D 
interpretations to J and E’s 
Deuteronomy, yet in the 
time of King Josiah, polytheist passages such as Deuteronomy 5: 7 remain. In the 
reign Nebuchadnezzar II BC 605 – 562 during a time of his threat to Jerusalem, a 
prophet, Jeremiah, further consolidates Yahweh’s primacy by decrying Israel’s 
devotion to other gods and advocating a now-too-late devotion to Yahweh as a 
solution to Her problems. Jerusalem’s subsequent fall and exile of Her people to  
Explanation of Sources JEDP(1) 
Wellhausen or 
Documentary 
Hypothesis 
Letter (2) 
Wellhausen or 
Documentary 
Hypothesis 
Classification 
Brief Explanation 
(3)
 
J 
 
J equals Jahwist, 
conjectured written 
circa BC 950 in the 
Kingdom of Judah. 
The J source is the oldest its writers 
active before the split of the 
Kingdom of Israel into a northern 
Israel and a southern Judah. J 
provides half of Genesis and Exodus 
and some of Numbers and has a 
focus on Judah 
E 
 
E equals Elohist, 
conjectured written 
circa BC 850 in the 
Kingdom of Israel. 
This source focusses on the 
Kingdom of Israel and uses the 
generic name Elohim rather than the 
more personal Yahweh (YHWH) 
prior to Exodus 3 and also makes 
Yahweh more remote and less 
personal. E Provides a third of 
Genesis, half of Exodus, and parts of 
Numbers. E has Elohim reveal 
himself as Yahweh during the 
happening of the burning bush and 
is prophetic, god fearing, 
‘nationalistic’ and emphasises 
Israel’s covenant with God. 
D 
D equals 
Deuteronomist, 
conjectured written 
circa BC 600 in 
Jerusalem in a time 
of religious reform. 
Restricted to Deuteronomy in the 
Pentateuch and with contributions to 
Joshua, Judges and Kings. D’s main 
focus is on the downfall of Israel 
and Judah through neglect of God’s 
covenant and subsequent 
deliverance through repentance.  
P 
(originally Q) 
 
P equals Priestly, 
conjectured written 
BC 500 by exiled 
Jewish priests in 
Babylon. 
This source uses Elohim as a 
primeval name for god and Yahweh 
after this name is revealed to Moses. 
The P conjecture that Yahweh, who 
created the world and mankind, is 
removed and unmerciful. P 
contributes about a fifth of Genesis 
and significant parts of Exodus and 
Numbers, and most of Leviticus, 
Joshua, Judges and Kings.  
Notes: (1) Incremental ongoing definitional changes to J, D, E, and P continue 
to bring complexity to the use of the nomenclature. (2) Wellhausen gives the 
chronological order as JEDP. (3) Writing style is also used to differentiate the 
four sources. 
 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from Wellhausen, J. (2003). Prolegomena 
to the History of Israel Translated by J. Sutherland Black and A. Menzies. (Ch. 
1, n. p.). Project Gutenberg E-Book # 4732; Horton, F. L, Hoglund, K G. and 
Foskett, F. S. (2003). A Basic Vocabulary of Biblical Studies for Beginning 
Students: A Work in Progress. (n. p). Wake Forest University; Friedman, R. E. 
(2005). The Bible with Sources Revealed: A New View of the Five Books of 
Moses. (passim). HarperOne Reprint Edition E-Book; Cassuto, U. (2006). The 
Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch. (pp. 3 – 17). 
Jerusalem and New York: Shalem Press. (Cassuto, 2008; Friedman, 2005; 
Horton, Hoglund, & Foskett, 2011; Wellhausen, 2003).  
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Babylon did not occasion the demise of Yahweh. An Isaiah 2 was written and 
appended to the first Isaiah wherein, now at Isaiah 44: 6, monotheism arrived 
through Yahweh’s being 
pronounced the first, last and 
only God of Israel. Source P 
redaction begins in further 
consolidation of this one and 
only god Yahweh. Genesis 1, 
not previously in existence, is 
crafted as a monotheistic 
version of the Babylonian 
creation myth. 
Exodus, now 6: 2, is revised 
to incorporate Abraham’s god 
El Shaddai, and Moses’s God 
Yahweh, as one and the same, 
El Elyon being itself 
propitiated an alternate name 
for Yahweh. Leviticus is 
edited and in Isaiah 2, now at 
Isaiah 51: 9 - 10, Babylonian 
myth is revised so that 
Yahweh not Marduk of the 
Enuma Elish slays the dragon 
Tiamat. Marduk and the gods 
no longer make the world. 
The God of Judaism, and 
later, Christianity and Islam, has arrived and the Torah is temporarily propitiated as 
though it were ever thus. The redaction discussed by Armstrong is redaction 
impacting on the Hebrew works in development, which redaction helped craft for 
Judaism a ready-made fierce and only God, soon to be met in translation by Egyptian 
Greek-speaking Jews and Greeks alike. 
Hellenisation Referents 
Timeline Historical Events 
Referents in the 
Form of Qumran 
and New Testament 
Writings 
BC 332 - 323 Greek-ideas influence occasioned in 
Judea during occupation by 
Alexander the Great’s armies. 
 
BC 312–64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BC 250–167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. BC 164 
 
Seleucid Dynasty—so-called  
Hellenistic Greek Kings of Asia—
rule over Mesopotamia and 
Northern Syria and/or other parts of 
Alexander’s Eastern empire 
depending on varying spoils of 
wars, areas variously held include 
present day Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, parts of Turkey, 
Armenia, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 
 
So-called forced Hellenisation as a 
by-product of a century of wars 
between the Greek Egyptian 
Ptolomies and the Saleucids. Judea 
annexed in BC 197 with polis (1) 
status for Jerusalem in BC 175 
 
Judah Maccabee of Maccabees I 
and II of the Septuagint and 
Christian Bible, a member of the 
Hasomean family, retakes 
Jerusalem and cleanses the Second 
Temple of Saleucid shrine evidence.  
Oldest Qumran 
fragment of Book of 
Isaiah (1Q Isaiaha) 
dated to BC 250. 
Carbon dates vary: 
(BC 230-253, BC 
230-248, BC 50–AD 
130). It contains the 
telling of the arrival 
of a Messiah. 
 
 
4Q22 paleoExodusm  
Carbon dates vary: 
BC 203-AD 83, BC 
113-AD70 
BC 167-137 
Period of Hasmonean rule which 
includes a period of civil unrest and 
disputation (BC 140 – 67) between 
Hasmoneans and Pharisees 
disputing both their interpretation of 
Jewish law and their right to rule. 
Opponents of the Hasmoneans take 
refuge in the Judean desert, some 
possibly at communal-living 
structured Qumran   
11Q19 Temple 
Scroll. Carbon date: 
BC 166-AD 67 
BC 67-37 
Rome conquers Judea in BC 67 and 
after a period of Hasmonean 
pseudo-kingship Herod I, after exile 
in Rome, returns to conquer 
Jerusalem and rule over it. 
4Q521 Messianic 
Apocalypse. Carbon 
date: BC 49-AD 116 
BC 30 
The Roman Octavius deposes the 
Greek Cleopatra VII. 
Egypt annexed to 
the Roman Empire 
c. BC 4-AD 
30 
Time of Jesus Christ 
4Q171 Psalms 
Commentarya. 
Carbon date  AD 3–
26 
This box is continued on the next page. 
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Armstrong employs the TEDP classification system of the so-called Wellhausen or 
Documentary Hypothesis, which system, explained in an accompanying box on page 
289, although contested 
(Blenkensopp, 2000; Friedman, 
1989; Nicholson, 1998; G. J. 
Wenham, 1996, 2008; 
Whybray, 1987), continues to 
be used in modified form for 
want of a replacement for it. 
Scholarly debate about the 
question of Yahweh’s journey 
from a possible pre-exilic 
polytheism to a post-exilic 
monotheism appears now to be 
damping down into a received 
but contested genre of study standing in the fog of a plethora of specific-interest but 
related questioning enquires generated in the wake of Qumran, ongoing 
archaeological work, and critical exegesis based on textual interpretation and 
religious and cultural perspectives, of which more later.  
Enquiry discussion now turns from discussion of Rees’s background of possible 
Jewish development of Semitic mythology and elements of Persian thought to focus 
more directly on his earlier cited intermingling of Jewish developments of the Old 
Testament revelation with the whole framework of Greek philosophy.  
In respect of the content of Article (Ia), earlier chapters of this enquiry reveal that the 
Greek component of Rees’ heritage of ideas consists, among other things, of a Stoic 
logos as will-of-god-and-moral-end; an Aristotelian logos as nous, that divine 
extension of the impersonal god; and Greek Science and mathematics. I very seldom 
used the word logos in earlier chapters but as Table 4 on page 46 reveals, Greek 
logos, at least qua phusis can be traced back to Heraclitus (BC 535- 475) who named 
fire as  a divine spirit breathed in by, and subsequently present in, every human. So 
understood, logos as divine soul of the world, one and homogeneous in all humans, 
might, after the Stoics, be identified a divine will of god and nature, and also the 
Hellenisation Referents (Continued) 
Timeline Historical Events 
Referents in the Form of 
Qumran and New Testament 
Writings 
AD 30-
150 
Jewish revolt of AD 66 is 
short lived with the 
consequent AD 70 
conquest of Jerusalem and 
burning of the Second 
Temple in AD 70 by the 
Romans and the fall of 
Masada in AD 73.  
Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 
dated AD c.51–57, Gospel of 
Matthew most likely date c, AD 
70-80, Gospel of Mark dated c. 
AD 68–73, Gospel of Luke 
under contestation; sometime 
during. AD c. 60–100, Gospel 
of John C. AD 90-100 
4Q521 Messianic Apocalypse. 
Carbon date: BC 49-AD 116 
 
Notes: (1) Polis here is used in simple signification of city as an 
administrative unit.  
 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from: Coogan, M. (2001). Oxford 
History of the Biblical World. New York: Oxford University Press; 
Hoover, O. (2007). Revised Chronology for the Late Seleucids at Antioch 
(121/0-64 BC). (pp. 280 – 301). Historia 65, 3; Schofield, A. and 
Vanderkam, J. (2005). Were the Hasmoneans Zadokites? In Journal of 
Biblical Literature, Vol. 24, No. 1. (pp. 73-87); Duling, D. (2010). The 
Gospel of Matthew. (pp. 288-89). In Aune, D. The Blackwell Companion 
to the New Testament. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
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source of the laws that govern both the regular cycles nature displays and the laws of 
all human being (Fernandez, 2005, p. 169; Inge, 1917a, p. 134).  
In particular, logos as immanent 
reason of the world is not said to be 
the will of a transcendent god (Inge, 
1917a, p. 135; Pannenberg, 1977, 
pp. 161, 394), a position not far 
removed from Aristotle or another’s 
impersonal god discussed earlier on 
page 225 Magna Moralia II 
1208b25 – 35 (Aristotle, 1935b; 
Aristotle or another, 1915, n. p.). As 
Table 4 on page 46 also reveals, by 
BC 450 Anaxagoras had likely 
defined logos as nous and placed it 
midway between god and the world 
as a divine intelligence and 
regulating principle of the world 
(Dunbar, 2010, pp. 5, 10 - 12; Inge, 
1917a, p. 134). This placement did 
little to hinder Plato’s later 
explanation, circa BC 360, of the 
world as a living rational organism 
resulting from union of mind as 
reason, and necessity Timaeus 48a 
(Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 455), and 
it suited the sensible and super-sensible divide inherent in Plato’s system of 
reminiscence and noetic recognition.  
The early Stoa (BC 344 - 206) further qualified in Table 34 urged, like Heraclitus, 
that fire was the primordial substance and material principle of the divine (Drozdek, 
2003, pp. 75 - 76; Garcilazo, 2007, p. 19). Fire was the seminal logos, nous or 
reason, which manifests itself in nature and which is present in all human beings.  
 
Background to a Slow Jewish-Greek Social Intermingling 
Preceding a So-called Platonic Linking, by Philo, of Hebrew and 
Greek Ideas 
While claims are made that there is scant archaeological evidence to 
support the story of Exodus (Denver, 2002, p. 99; Meyers, 2005, p. 
5) and a view is put that, except for the ancient Israel of biblical 
story, and academic construct predicated on it, archaeologists would 
not be searching for an ancient Israel at all (P. R. Davies, 2006, pp. 
11 - 46), Jews are reported to have lived and worked in Egypt soon 
after the death of Alexander the Great (BC 323), some 120,000 said 
to have been brought there as slaves by returning armies (Josephus, 
2006, Bk. XII, Chs. 1-2, p. 485).  
 
According to Runia: 
 
“In the first decades after the death of Alexander the Great, when the 
Ptolemaic dynasty came to power in Egypt, a large number of Jews 
emigrated from Palestine to Egypt. Jews settled there as 
mercenaries, labourers, farmers, merchants; sometime they were 
brought along or purchased as slaves. It did not take long before a 
considerable number of Jews settled down in the Egyptian capital, 
which at that time had only recently been founded by Alexander the 
Great in 331 B.C. In time this community became the most 
important and influential in the entire Jewish diaspora. In Alexandria 
the Jews formed, after the Greek-Macedonian citizen body and the 
native Egyptian populace, the most important ethnic minority group. 
They gained the right to form their own politeuma, i.e. they 
possessed limited rights of self-administration.  
 
It is particularly striking how quickly Greek became the primary 
language of the Alexandrian Jewish community. From the second 
century B.C. onwards there were probably few Jews there who could 
still speak or read Hebrew. … It was therefore an event of enormous 
importance for the Jewish community in Alexandria that the Hebrew 
Bible was translated into Greek.  
 
In the so-called Letter of Aristeas [(Pseudepigrapha attributed to 
Aristeas, 2014; Thackeray, 1918)] and in one of Philo’s writings we 
read an account of how King Ptolemy Philadephus, who reigned 
from 283 to 246, invited the High Priest in Jerusalem to send a 
delegation of wise men who could translate the Jewish Law, and 
how through providential intervention all 72 translators achieved an 
identical result. Not all aspects of this story, we may presume, are 
equally legendary. It is clear that we have here a kind of 
‘foundation-myth’ of the Alexandrian Jewish community. From now 
on the Jews could live in accordance with their patria eqh; by means 
of the authorized translation these had, as it were, received a divine 
imprimatur” (Runia, 1995, pp. 2 - 3, my square brackets).  
 
This box is continued on the next page. 
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The world was also a living being because the spirit of the logos inheres in all 
material things. But whether the Stoa also identified the logos with god per se, rather 
than with god’s will as law, 
is uncertain (Drozdek, 2003, 
p. 75; Inge, 1917a, p. 134).  
Very likely, logos so 
defined, reflects god’s will 
and Inge contends that the 
Stoic god also directs a 
rational and moral end. Inge 
(1917a, pp. 134 - 135) cites 
the content of the Hymn of 
Cleanthes as evidence, 
Cleanthes (BC 331 – 232) 
being a disciple of the early 
Stoic, Zeno (Jervis, 1996, p. 
146). Asmis, in her exegesis 
of the same hymn, 
conjectures a stoic god that 
can enable humans to 
change from bad to good 
(Asmis, 2007, pp. 413, 429). 
Thom identifies the final 
prayer in the Hymn to 
Cleanthes as a prayer to a 
transcendent god over and 
above the person praying 
(Thom, 2005, pp. 26 - 27). 
This god is one who can 
restore universal rational 
order (ibid., 22 – 23) so that 
Thom has extended a received idea of an early-Stoa god as one of rational wisdom in 
the face of Heraclitian understandings of a combination of opposites of good and bad  
 
Background to the Slow Jewish-Greek Social Intermingling Preceding a 
So-called Platonic Linking, by Philo, of Hebrew and Greek Ideas 
(Continued from the Previous Page) 
Greek language fragments from Exodus (7Q1, Exod. 28.4 - 7), Leviticus 
(4Q119, Lev. 26. 2-16), Deuteronomy (4Q122, Deut. 114) and the Letter of 
Jeremiah (7Q2) found amongst the Dead Sea Scrolls dating to the second 
century BC reveal signs of revision (Dines, 2004, p. 4). Some LXX fragments 
are amongst those showing revision which, in addition to indicating a possible 
rapid spread of early translations across Greek speaking communities, also 
obfuscates determination of wording of first Septuagint Hebrew-Greek 
translation. Greek Fragments of Genesis (Rahlfs number 942), Deuteronomy 
(Rahlfs numbers 963, 957, 847, 848) and Job (P. Oxyrh. 3522) from Egypt date 
from the second and/or first centuries BC, one Deuteronomy fragment being 
found with excerpts from Homer in sections of mummy cartonnage (Dines, 
2004, p. 5). Most Greek-language fragments from Egypt are said to date from 
the third to the first centuries BC (ibid., p. ix). Rahlfs numbers are from the 
2004 revised edition (Rahlfs, 2004). 
 
According to van der Horst (2013, p. 1) Kuhn (2012) conjectures, in Chapter 2 
of his Die Jüdisch-hellenistischen Epiker Theodot und Philon, Greek influence 
in fragments of the Alexandrian Jewish poets Theodotus (BC c. 100) and Philo 
(BC c. 170). Theodotus appears influenced by the Septuagint and related 
exaggerated stories, and Homer (BC 7th or 8th centuries). Likewise, Philo (BC c. 
170), influenced by the same Hebrew writings, appears also influenced by 
Lycophron (alive in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus BC 285-247). McNamara 
(1983, pp. 226 - 227) identifies the epic poet Philo as Φιλων ο πρεσβυτερος 
(Philo the Elder) referred to by Josephus (AD 37-100) and Clement of 
Alexandria (AD 150- 15). Only twenty-four obscure lines of Philo’s work exist. 
Evidence of 3rd and 2nd century Judeo-Greek ideas sharing, whether such 
speculated engagement might have been an initiative of Greek speaking Jewish 
circles in Egypt on the one hand, or of Greek and/or Macedonian circles on the 
other, is difficult to find. Of course the previous conjecture about Judeo-Greek 
ideas-sharing associated with the Septuagint is conjecture about happenings 
before the times of Christ and Philo of Alexandria (BC 20–AD 50) and his 
sometimes-called Judeo-Christian synthesis. As discussed elsewhere in the 
enquiry Christ, an Essene, is a member of a Jewish sect. Charlesworth, (1983, 
pp. 775-843) inter alia, assembles multiple author persuasion of 3rd and 2nd 
century adoption of Greek ideas by Jews in self-explanation through literature 
but the evidence is severely compromised in many ways. On the say-so of the 
Jewish Alexandrian philosopher Aristobulus (BC 3rd or 2nd century) and the 
Syrian Greek philosopher Numenius of Apamea (AD 2nd century), quoted by 
Eusebius of Caesarea (AD 263– 39), in Praeparatio Evangelica (1903, pp. 208 -
209, 260, 326 - 328), that Greeks such as Plato got their ideas from Hebrews 
among others in the first place, although of interest, are not discussed in detail in 
this enquiry. In Books 11 to 13 (ibid., pp. 251–351) Eusebius (AD 263– 39) 
makes a case that Greek philosophy is based on ancient Hebrew wisdom. While 
the fragments Eusebius (AD 263–339) attributes to Aristobulus (BC 3rd or 2nd 
century) allow the latter’s engagement with Greek ideas, and speculative long-
bowing between Aristobulus and Philo (BC 25–AD 50), Aristobulus’ dates are 
contested and his quoted claim that others, prior to Demetrius Phalereus (BC c. 
350-280) and the “supremacy of Alexander and the Persians” (ibid., p. 326) 
have “transcribed the exodus even of the Hebrews, our fellow countrymen from 
Egypt … and the exposition of the whole Law” (ibid., p. 326) is not 
substantiated. Again, evidence is severely compromised. Accompanying 
surmise that Plato and Pythagoras might have thus availed themselves of Jewish 
percepts rests on such slender evidence. Likewise it is difficult to know the 
extent, if any, of scholarly exegesis and translation by Greeks and/or Jews alike 
of various Jewish books reportedly purchased by Calliamachus (BC 3rd century) 
for the library at Alexandria. Bagnall (2002, pp. 348 - 362) questions what he 
calls scholarly ‘dreams’ about the library. It is conceivable that ideas synthesis 
of a necessarily pragmatic kind may well have occurred relatively quickly 
amongst members of different Greek and Jewish groups involved, on a day to 
day basis, in such matters as tax collecting, military strategy, diplomacy, and 
commercial exchange.   
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in the human condition. Under Thom’s exegesis god is moved an increment further 
towards transcendence. Inspection of 
Cleanthes’ hymn reveals that god, as the 
Greek Zeus, is “the origin of nature 
governing the universe by law” [and it is] 
“right for mortals to address thee” [and to 
follow] “wherever thou wilt, obeying thy 
law” [for] “nor without thee, Oh Deity 
dost anything happen in the world” [and 
only the] “wicked” seek to disobey your 
laws” (Cleanthes, 2009, my square  
brackets). Subsequent parts of the poem 
reveal wicked persons as those not 
hearing the divine law and straying away 
from the good through temptations of 
avarice, glory and sensual joys and 
pleasures. Aristotle’s technical rational 
moral virtue is possibly already under 
challenge from an absolute moral virtue 
of good or evil, a consideration relevant 
to Article (IV).  
In addition, for the early Stoa, thought, when uttered, turned from passive to active 
thereby occasioning a differentiation 
between a potential logos understood as 
un-manifested reason, and active logos 
understood as god’s thought expressed in 
action (Oakeley, 2007, p. 199). Inge 
(1917a, p.134) claims that such a division made it easier for later Jewish translators 
to link logos, through one of its secondary meanings, logos, a speech or discourse, to 
the Word of the Hebrew God Yahweh, a development relative to Article (II). 
Inge (1917a, p. 135), and more recent scholars (Hillar, 1998, pp.7 - 8 of 16; R. 
Williamson, 1989a, pp. 103 - 105), find the stoic Logos-as-thought–Logos-as-word-
 
Article (IV) 
Early Greek Fathers reinforced the idea of Christ as Logos, 
in part to counteract a return of Greek rationalism. During 
this period and ending with Augustine (AD 345 – 430) a 
number of developments occurred. 
 
(IVa) The Logos was placed in the rational domain of the 
Greek soul, and sin in the irrational domain, thereby 
beginning a colonisation of Greek rational and practical 
virtue by Christian absolute virtue, and Greek moral virtue 
by a moral good-bad divide of sin. 
 
(IVb) Sin, which was found in the will of man and not in 
nature, was also found to have tainted nature thereby 
making nature’s evil a moral evil redeemable through 
Christ as Logos, rather than to be addressed in a Greek way 
through reason as logos. 
 
(IVc) Aristotle’s four-causes explanation of being, and 
through that being, mankind’s rational access to Science 
and Ethics, was, along with the philosophy on which it was 
partly based, ejected in favour of a moral teleology with 
God in Christ as the cause of all in all—a full colonisation, 
by a Christian moral virtue, of both the Greek explanation 
of being and its attendant scientific and metaphysical soul. 
 
(IVd) Following Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) and adoption of 
Latin by Christian fathers Logos understood as nous was 
translated as Word. Use of the word nous was prohibited in 
the Nicaean Symbol (AD 325). Later, following 
condemnation of the Stoic duality doctrine of Logos-as-
thought-or-potential and Logos-as-action-or-God’s-thought-
in-action at the Synod of Sirmium (AD 451), the word 
Logos fell into disuse as Latinisation progressed. God the 
Father, as-Memra-as-Word, and Christ the son, as-Logos-
as-Word, were one in creation, in nature, and in the moral 
soul of man. Greek rational virtues had been temporarily 
replaced by Christian virtues of faith. Again, Aristotelian 
scientific understanding of cause and being had become, 
relatively speaking, temporarily irrelevant. 
 
 
Article (II) 
Through cultural intermingling, scholarly activity, and 
translation work that accompanied Egypt’s transition from 
Greek to Roman rule, Greek logos or nous was identified 
with the Hebrew Memra understood as God’s creation, 
revelation and providence expressed in a personified form 
as the Word of the Lord, and subsequently, as the Wisdom 
of the Lord. 
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action divide present in the writings of the Hellenised Jew, Philo (BC 20 – AD 50). 
Inge also finds the thought-action divide in the Greek Christian Fathers who 
differentiate between Logos as thought and Logos as God’s word in action (Inge, 
1917a, p. 134). He claims that such differentiation is really none other than the 
distinction Aristotle made in his logos-outside-the-soul and logos-inside-the-soul 
divide Posterior Analytics I 76b25 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 105; 1960a) also logos  in 
and out. Aristotle is just so powerful and in view of what is to come, it is apposite to 
recall his feet-on-the ground approach to human understanding:  
Necessary self-grounded fact, and which we must necessarily believe, is distinct both 
from the hypotheses of a science and from illegitimate postulate—I say ‘must 
believe’, because all syllogism, and therefore a fortiori, demonstration, is addressed 
not to the [25] spoken word [logos outside the soul: Ο ἒξω λόγος], but to the discourse 
within the soul [logos inside the soul: Ο έν τή ψυχή], and though we can always raise 
objections to the spoken word, to the inward discourse we cannot always object. 
Posterior Analytics I 76b20 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 105, my square brackets except 
for [25]; 1960a) 
Here Aristotle is as solid as ever: intuitive self-evident truths upon which rational 
demonstration is predicated, and, under certain conditions, that rational 
demonstration in its own right, are truths of the internal logos which begins with the 
unshakable and indemonstrable conviction that beings exist. Thought follows 
perception of beings and words follow thoughts, and no amount of poetic metaphor 
can coax beings into or out of existence and nor can physical beings be thought into 
or out of existence. Rather, thought is predicated on them. As explained in Chapter 2, 
Aristotle made nous that divine something from without and gave it an essential and 
indispensable role in both the intellectual and moral virtues, in scientific reasoning, 
and the highest levels of contemplation. These developments are relevant to 
explanations of Articles (I) and (IV).  
This Greek thought, with its god derived a posteriori from perceived permanent 
movements of the planets and the earth, and from observations on earth of earth’s 
own apparently permanent natural cycles, represents a first step in this chapter’s 
journey from reasoned virtue to revelation or faith virtue. The outline of the Greek 
heritage given in some of the previous paragraphs of this chapter, when considered 
as a coda to Chapters 1 and 3, helps elucidate the first part of Article (I) by 
specifying the nature of Greek thought before the Alexandrian intermingling. Such 
Greek thought was to be challenged by Jewish and Christian developments which, in 
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turn, it affected in substantial ways. I address this claim further as the chapter’s 
speculative commentary unfolds, linking through the next paragraph, to 
commencement of discussion of Greek-Jewish intermingling.  
As earlier discussed on pages 284 to 
291 the Jewish heritage of ideas about 
the world emerged from Semitic 
mythology but became differentiated 
from it through its characteristic 
monotheistic revelation of one all-
powerful God named Yahweh (Holy 
Bible, 2010, Exodus 20:1 - 2). This 
transcendent and all powerful personal 
Hebrew God of creation, providence 
and law was soon to challenge the 
nature gods in general, and the 
rationally derived Greek god in 
particular, and thus began an early 
colonisation of Greek Science and 
philosophy by faith Ethics. Rees 
(1917, p. 210), like Majka (2010, p. 
396), finds this Hebrew God further 
separated from the world of nature 
than were the Greek gods and 
illustrates his point by referring to a 
quotation from the Book of Jubilees, 
dated by Box (1917, p. xii) as having 
been available close to, but after BC 
250. Ongoing scholarship 
(Himmelfarb, 2006, pp. 80 - 83; 
Nickelsburg, 2005, pp. 73 - 74; 
Vanderkam, 2008, pp. 405 - 431) places The Book of Jubilees within a range of 
possible dates from pre-Hasmonean times, that is, prior to BC 164 to pre-Qumran, 
 
Article (I) 
(Ia) In general, prior to intermingling of Greek and Hebrew 
ideas in Alexandria, detectible in works by Philo (BC 20 – AD 
50) written some two centuries after translation of the 
Septuagint into Greek likely circa BC 283/5 - 246/7 during the 
reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the Greek god was impersonal, 
moral virtues were reasoned, god did not create the materials 
out of which he world was assembled, and god, thought thinking 
itself, was present in the form of nous as an essential part of 
mankind’s soul and nature.  
 
(Ib) Under a Hebrew explanation, God created the universe, 
revealed His presence, provided for His people, gave the law 
and made prophesy. This personal God was transcendent and 
His work on earth was done through the agency of angels. There 
was no sense in which fate had power over this Hebrew God 
and no sense in which the Hebrew God of the Septuagint, the 
Jewish Bible in development, was a nature god in the Greek 
way. 
 
Article (IV) 
(IV) Early Greek Fathers reinforced the idea of Christ as Logos, 
in part to counteract a return of Greek rationalism. During this 
period and ending with Augustine (AD 345 – 430) a number of 
developments occurred. 
 
(IVa) The Logos was placed in the rational domain of the Greek 
soul, and sin in the irrational domain, thereby beginning a 
colonisation of Greek rational and practical virtue by Christian 
absolute virtue, and Greek moral virtue by a moral good-bad 
divide of sin. 
 
(IVb) Sin, which was found in the will of man and not in nature, 
was also found to have tainted nature thereby making nature’s 
evil a moral evil redeemable through Christ as Logos, rather 
than to be addressed in a Greek way through reason as logos. 
 
(IVc) Aristotle’s four-causes explanation of being, and through 
that being, mankind’s rational access to Science and Ethics, 
was, along with the philosophy on which it was partly based, 
ejected in favour of a moral teleology with God in Christ as the 
cause of all in all—a full colonisation, by a Christian moral 
virtue, of both the Greek explanation of being and its attendant 
scientific and metaphysical soul. 
 
(IVd) Following Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) and adoption of 
Latin by Christian fathers Logos understood as nous was 
translated as Word. Use of the word nous was prohibited in the 
Nicaean Symbol (AD 325). Later, following condemnation of 
the Stoic duality doctrine of Logos-as-thought-or-potential and 
Logos-as-action-or-God’s-thought-in-action at the Synod of 
Sirmium (AD 451), the word Logos fell into disuse as 
Latinisation progressed. God the Father, as-Memra-as-Word, 
and Christ the son, as-Logos-as-Word, were one in creation, in 
nature, and in the moral soul of man. Greek rational virtues had 
been temporarily replaced by Christian virtues of faith. Again, 
Aristotelian scientific understanding of cause and being had 
become, relatively speaking, temporarily irrelevant. 
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that is prior to BC 125 – 100, the date range attributed to the oldest Qumran 
fragment, 4Q216.  
The numbers in the boxed text quoted from the Book of Jubilees refer the reader to 
footnotes and text references in the Charles translation of that book. They inform that 
the angels which preside over nature were a 
lower order, third in line after the angels of 
the presence, God’s media of communication, 
and the angels of the sanctification, who sing 
praises to God.  
Commenting on an earlier edition of the 
quotation under discussion, Rees (1917, pp. 
210 - 11) suggests that God had been further 
removed from nature and made more abstract 
and rare and transcendent, a contention 
supported by more recent scholarship (E. 
Ferguson, 2003, p. 538). As discussed earlier, beginning on page 223, the 
Aristotelian god was rationalised from perceived permanent movements and cycles 
of existing apparently eternal physical beings. 
Now from the Hebrews comes a God and first cause whose second causes are angels 
of various ranks, some of which angels control the processes of nature. Here from the 
Hebrews is also a God who is separate from nature but sovereign over it as a result of 
personified angels, a condition germane to the enunciation of the first part of Article 
(I). This God, unlike in the cases of the Greek Demiurge or the secondary unmoved 
movers, created all of nature along with all the substance of the universe as well. The 
Book of Jubilees purports itself “to be a revelation given by God to Moses through 
the medium of an angel” (Box & Oesterley, 2009, p.vii; Ruiten, 2012, p. 8). It is 
slightly apocalyptic and, as Table 32 reveals, is no part of the Pentateuch. Rees finds 
the Book of Jubilees to be a halfway house and mixture of deism and animism (1917, 
p. 211). Recent scholarship which upholds both the transcendence and pantheistic 
dimensions of god-en-arrivant literary exegesis associates the Book of Jubilees with 
parabiblical or rewritten Bible genres of redaction without necessarily specifying its  
 
Section from The Book of Jubilees 
2.1 For on the first day He created the heavens which 
are above and the earth and the waters and all the 
spirits which serve before Him—the angels 2 of the 
presence, and the angels of sanctification, 3 and the 
angels [of the spirit of fire and the angels] of the 
spirit of the winds, 4 and the angels of the spirit of 
the clouds, and of darkness, and of snow and of hail 
and of hoar frost, 5 and the angels of the voices 6 and 
of the thunder and of the lightning, 7 and the angels 
of the spirits of cold and of heat, and of winter and of 
spring and of autumn and of summer, 8 and of all the 
spirits of His creatures which are in the heavens and 
on the earth, (He created) the abysses and the 
darkness, eventide (and night), and the light, dawn 
and day, which He hath prepared in the knowledge of 
His heart. Box, C. H. (Ed.). (1917). The Book of the 
Jubilees or the Little Genesis Translated from the 
Ethiopic Text. (p. 41). R. H. Charles (Translator). 
New York: The Macmillan Company. (Anonymous, 
1917, p. 41, translator's square brackets).  
 
 298 
particular subcategory from a range available, and investigates commonalities 
Jubilees 11:14 – 23:8 shares with Genesis 11:26 – 25:10 in respect of the Abraham 
Cycle, stating that the Book of 
Jubilees presupposes the 
existence of Genesis stories, 
there being no settled version 
of the so-called Hebrew Bible 
at the time (Ruiten, 2012, p. 
5). Vanderkam (2008, p. 
405)—his insights are 
gleaned from Qumran 
fragments thought to be from 
Hebrew versions of 
Jubilees—calls the book a retelling of the stories from Genesis 1 through Exodus 24. 
Heathen gods of nature though no longer hold much sway. Vanderkam does not 
resolve the issue of date but suggests BC 125 – 100 as significant. Rees (1917, p. 
211) also states that the Septuagint repudiates the view that the gods, existing as 
objects of nature as in the earlier cosmological traditions, rule the world, and affirms 
that nature, as God’s design, is obedient to His will. In this system Wisdom 
personified, “for she is a breath of the power of God and an emanation of the pure 
glory of the Almighty” (Septuagint, 2009, Wisdom 7: 25), is mediator in both God’s 
creation and in the providence nature provides God’s people (Septuagint, 2009, 
Wisdom 7: 22, 13: 1 - 9, 16: 17 - 24, 19: 6).  
Unlike the earlier cosmological and teleological accounts which proceed from the 
world to god, the account in The Book of Wisdom proceeds from God into the world. 
The Book of Wisdom is also known as the Wisdom of Solomon, or Wisdom, and it is 
one of the later books of the Septuagint.  
This Hebrew God in transcendent rule over nature was to be no easy opponent for 
Aristotelian rationalism. By virtue of the legendry Jewish translators of the 
Septuagint during and after the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (BC 283 - 246) 
(Abrahams, 1902, p. 321; Dines, 2004, pp. 1 - 2), this Hebrew God now spoke in  
Table 34: Third Explanation of Names Used in the 
Text 
Pentateuch 
The Pentateuch consists of the first five books of Moses and 
is sometimes referred to as the Torah 
Tanakh The Tanakh is a compilation of Torah, Nevi'im and Ketuvim 
Torah, 
Nevi'im and 
Ketuvim 
The Torah consists of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers 
and Deuteronomy; the Nevi'im consists of Joshua, Judges, 
Samuel (I & II), Kings (I & II), Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, 
The Twelve Prophets: Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, 
Mica, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, 
Malachi; the Ketuvim consists of the so-called books of 
truth: Psalms, Proverbs, Job; The Five Scrolls: Song of 
Songs, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Ester and the 
remainder of the so-called writings: Daniel, Ezra-Nehemiah, 
and Chronicles I & II.   
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from Ehrman, B. (2007). The New 
Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings (4 ed.). 
(pp. 4 - 5). New York: Oxford University Press; King James Version of the 
Holy Bible. (2009): (Old Testament and Apocrypha): Electronic Text Centre, 
University of Virginia Library; Berlin, A., & Brettler, M. Z. (Eds.). (2004). 
Jewish Study Bible. (pp. xiii, 1, and the Table of Contents which is not 
paginated). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Koine Greek, to Egyptian Greeks and Hellenised Jews alike. By announcing His 
presence in this way the translators sowed and/or cultivated seeds of transcendence 
throughout Alexandria and beyond. Their translation activity helped prepare ground 
for colonisation of Aristotelian natural 
law, and justice of place associated with 
it, by revealed truth and faith ethics. 
The historical context in which this 
translation occurred is instructive for 
the argument of this chapter and is 
summarised briefly in Table 36 on page 
308. This newly announced God is not a 
nature god in the Greek sense, or for 
that matter in the pre-Abraham sense 
(K. Armstrong, 1994, pp. 6 - 11; R. 
Wright, 2010, p. 99).  
Coeval with the Alexandrian translation 
activity and continuing with ongoing 
translation and codification of the 
Jewish canon, God’s state of rarefaction 
and transcendence (Holy Bible, 2009a, 
Genesis 1 - 2, Psalms 23 and 104) was 
taken beyond levels reached through 
Greek rationality. Again, this newly 
announced God, completely free from 
fate, controls nature and is in no way 
controlled by it. Again and again in the 
scriptures, this God is not a nature god in the teleological and cosmological tradition. 
The scriptures are taken to proclaim that this God actually made the world out of 
nothing.  
In particular, there being no exact equivalent for the word logos in other languages, 
the translators of the Septuagint make Logos the equivalent of “the Hebrew Memra 
and its poetic synonyms, which mean primarily the spoken word [italics added] of 
Table 35: Historical Context of the Translation of 
the Septuagint from Hebrew to Greek 
 
Historical Context of the Translation of the Septuagint into 
Greek 
The Jewish canon, some of which is commonly called the 
Hebrew Scriptures, or the Jewish Bible, or the Hebrew Bible, 
but inappropriately from a Jewish perspective called the Old 
Testament, is known as the Tanakh. The Tanakh is a 
compilation of the Torah, writings which address law and 
instruction, the Nevi'im, writings containing prophesy, and the 
Ketuvim, the books of truth and the remainder of the writings. 
Codification of the Jewish canon is said to have occurred 
between BC 450 and AD 200 with finalisation circa BC 200 – 
AD 200, the Torah having been closed by 400 BC, the 
Nevi’im by 200 BC and the Ketuvim by AD 200. What in the 
Christian West is called the Old Testament with Jewish 
developments of it began its so-called Western journey during 
the Macedonian-Greek era in Egypt. 
 
The Macedonian-Greek era in Egypt began with the conquest 
of Egypt by Alexander the Great (BC 356 – 323) who ruled 
from Memphis. After his death Egypt was ruled from 
Alexandria by the Greek Ptolemaic dynasty from circa BC 320 
to BC 30 beginning with a period of rule by Ptolemy Sorter I 
(circa BC 367 - circa 283) and then co-rule with his son 
Ptolemy Philadelphus (BC 309 - 246) and ending with the 
death of Cleopatra VII (BC 69 - 30). After Cleopatra’s demise 
Egypt became a Roman province.  
 
During the so-called Greek period, Alexandria consisted of 
Greek, Jewish and Egyptian quarters and the rulers employed 
multilingual officials for administrative purposes. Beginning 
with Ptolemy Philadelphus’ patronage of learning—
establishment of a great library at Alexandria is attributed to 
him—Alexandria also became a haven for scholars and a 
centre for active learning. The translation into Greek of the 
Hebrew Bible—a then popular version of it becoming 
subsequently known sometimes as the Septuagint (2009), and 
sometimes as the LXX, a rounded figure to honour the seventy 
two Jewish translators—began in the reign of Ptolemy 
Philadelphus (BC 283-246) when he is said to have 
commissioned a translation of the Torah for the library at 
Alexandria (DeSilva, 2004, p. 42).  
 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from. An Introduction to 
the New Testament: Contexts, Methods and Ministry 
Formation. (p. 420). Nottingham: InterVarsity Press. 
(DeSilva, 2004). 
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the Deity” (Inge, 1917a, p. 134, my square brackets). As outlined on page 300, in the 
early books of the Jewish Bible Memra was the protecting care of God for His 
chosen people which care revealed itself through creation, providence and revelation, 
and sometimes also through law and prophesy (ibid., p.135). The translation of 
Memra as spoken word constitutes a slight but important change because it involves 
personification “of the self-revealing activity of Yahweh” (ibid., p. 135) occasioned 
by attempts to define the Wisdom of the Lord. This personification “is poetical 
[italics added] rather than metaphysical except in writers under the Greek influence” 
(Inge, 1917a, p. 135, my square brackets), examples of it being found in Psalm 33: 4, 
Psalm 147: 15, Isaiah 5: 10 - 13, and Jeremiah 23: 29 (Holy Bible, 2009a). Boyarin 
(2001, pp. 243 - 261; 2004, 25 - 26) suggests that the Logos-Wisdom usage emerged 
under a dwindling polytheistic Judaism precisely to enable the transcendence of God 
and that it was later to lead to the invention of the Jewish heresy of two-gods-in-
heaven. Goodenough (1969, p. 139) had drawn attention to the possible efficacy of 
logos as a link between materiality and transcendence. 
In the biblical citations provided in the previous paragraph, the Lord “sheweth his 
word” (Holy Bible, 2009a, Psalm 147) to melt 
the ice and snow, a word that “goeth forth out of 
my mouth” (Holy Bible, 2009a, Isaiah 55: 11) to 
command the rain and the snow and the budding 
of plants, a word “like a fire” [and] “like a 
hammer that breaketh the rock” (Holy Bible, 
Jeremiah 23: 29, my square brackets). Such 
translation, which has an eye towards 
personifying God’s Wisdom per se, Wisdom 
being found in words, is a movement away from 
the original usage of Memra as creation, 
provision and revelation and also a departure 
from the idea of Logos-as-nous. Questions raised 
about differences in meaning between Logos-as-
nous-as-word and Logos-as-Memra-as-word-of-
Yahweh catalysed scholars in Hellenised Jewish 
Alexandria to attempt, among other things, to fuse these two distinct meanings. This 
 
Article (I) 
(Ia) In general, prior to intermingling of Greek 
and Hebrew ideas in Alexandria, detectible in 
works by Philo (BC 20 – AD 50) written some 
two centuries after translation of the Septuagint 
into Greek likely circa BC 283/5 - 246/7 during 
the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the Greek god 
was impersonal, moral virtues were reasoned, 
god did not create the materials out of which he 
world was assembled, and god, thought thinking 
itself, was present in the form of nous as an 
essential part of mankind’s soul and nature.  
 
(Ib) Under a Hebrew explanation, God created 
the universe, revealed His presence, provided for 
His people, gave the law and made prophesy. 
This personal God was transcendent and His 
work on earth was done through the agency of 
angels. There was no sense in which fate had 
power over this Hebrew God and no sense in 
which the Hebrew God of the Septuagint, the 
Jewish Bible in development, was a nature god in 
the Greek way. 
Article (II) 
Through cultural intermingling, scholarly 
activity, and translation work that accompanied 
Egypt’s transition from Greek to Roman rule, 
Greek logos or nous was identified with the 
Hebrew Memra understood as God’s creation, 
revelation and providence expressed in a 
personified form as the Word of the Lord, and 
subsequently, as the Wisdom of the Lord.  
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understanding is germane to clarification of the second paragraph of Article (I) and 
all of Article (II). 
As a result of Jewish-Greek intermingling, the word Wisdom, in the later books of 
the Septuagint, tends to replace Memra, translated as word, and this brings the 
Hebrew closer to the Greek. As earlier revealed on pages 107 to 107 under Plato 
wisdom was a universal virtue or technical good of humankind manifested as ability 
to discern between harmful and unharmful pleasures and it was operationalised 
through nous. Also, as revealed on pages 241 to 244 under Aristotle nous, which 
nourishes philosophical wisdom’s metaphysical contemplation and practical 
wisdom’s discernment of right action, is a little bit of the divine in humankind. Now 
with the Hebrews, Wisdom becomes a personal God’s hidden purpose for man Job 
38: 36 (Holy Bible, 2009a) and a prime virtue (Holy Bible, 2009a, Proverbs 4: 7 – 
13) closer to Yahweh. On one occasion this vengeful, wrathful, terrifying and fire-
tongued Yahweh is even named a personal loving God (Holy Bible, 2009a, Jeremiah 
31: 3), something Aristotle’s god could never be, a condition germane to Articles (I) 
and (II).  
Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon (Holy Bible, 2009b) are said 
to reveal Jewish thought under the influence of Greek philosophy (E. Ferguson, 
2003, p. 368; Mahaffy, 2004, p. 483). For example Tyler detects Stoic and Epicurean 
influences in Ecclesiastes (Tyler, 1874, pp. 12-12, 34-35) as does Plumptre (1888) 
who also dismisses Solomon’s authorship and dates the work as not before BC 200 
(ibid., pp. 29, 33 respectively). Barton (1908), differentiates between scholars 
allocating Ecclesiastes to Persian times from those allocating it to Greek times as late 
as BC 100 (ibid., 22), and in his history of interpretation section (ibid., pp. 18 – 31) 
cites Zirkel detecting Greek influence in Ecclesiastes in 1792 (ibid. p. 23). Barton 
(ibid., p. 21) also reveals Martin Luther (AD 1483 – 1546) and Grotius (AD 1583 – 
1645) rejecting Solomon’s authorship. Luther’s rejection, in different words than 
those quoted by Barton, appears in The Table Talk of Martin Luther (Luther, 1872, p. 
11), and that of Grotius, according to Ginsberg (1861, p. 145), on page 258 of 
Volume 1 of Hugonis Grotii Opera, 4 vols. Londini, 167. Bartholomew (2009, p. 44) 
gives Annatationes in Vetus Testamentum I: 434 – 435 as the reference. Maurer 
(2008, p. 206) reports that since Barton, a growing consensus of opinion dates 
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Ecclesiastes to the second half of the third century BC. Brown (2011) acknowledges 
Persian and Hellenistic influences in this “canonical misfit” (ibid., p. 136) and, on 
thought, content, style and compositional grounds, dates the composition as fourth or 
third century BC (ibid. p. 8). Rudiman (2001, p. 13) concludes that the author of 
Ecclesiastes was a sage writing in the third quarter of the third century BC, who was 
profoundly influenced by Stoic ideas. Brown (2011, p. 8) accepts a Hellenistic 
presence in Ecclesiastes and Gilbert (2009, p. 125) says that Stoic themes after the 
manner of Zeno (BC 490 - 430), together with traces of Epicurus BC 341 - 270) as 
well, are manifested in the book, the influence unlikely occurring before Alexander’s 
conquest of Palestine in BC 333. Bartholomew (2009, pp. 54 - 59), after a full 
discussion based on social setting, concludes that the author of Ecclesiastes was “a 
believing Israelite who had become aware of, and attracted by, tenets of Greek 
thought that were in the air” (ibid., p. 58) and questions whether language style, 
expression or regional colloquialism and idiom usage are useful in determining dates 
for Ecclesiastes. 
As for Ecclesiasticus, Stone (1984, p. 290) dates it to the first third of the second 
century BC and detects in it tension between old Hebrew ways and Epicureanism. 
Collins (1997, pp. 85 - 87) detects a Stoic influence—shades of the doctrine of 
opposite pairs after Chrysippus (BC 280 – 207), shades of the doctrine of 
complementary opposites after Pythagoras (born BC 570/571) and Heraclitus (BC 
535 – 475), and shades of the doctrine of everything created for a purpose after 
Chrysippus (BC 280 – 207)—and also notes a rehabilitation of solar chariot 
metaphor standard in Greece after its banishment in Josiah’s reform outlined in 2 
Kings 23: 11 (ibid., p. 87). Ecclesiasticus, he says, is a hodge-podge tradition which 
bears at least a general similarity to the Stoics (ibid., p. 95).  
The Wisdom of Solomon is said to be flavoured with “Stoical and Platonic ideas” 
(Inge, 1917a, p. 135) even if, as Barton (2007, p. 625) suggests, sophistication is 
lacking. Harrington (1999, pp. 55 - 56) allows its construction during the second to 
the first centuries BC most likely at Alexandria. DeSilva (2002, pp. 132 - 133) dates 
it sometime between BC 220 and BC 100. Zeller (2006, p. 115) detects Stoic sorites 
(polysyllogism) in it and both Harrington (1999, pp. 55 - 56) and Soggin (1989, pp. 
444 - 445) conjecture Greek as its original language. Reese (1999, p. 820) names its 
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style protreptic, a type of rhetorical exhortation in Greek philosophy, and West 
(1981, pp. 464 - 465), who detects elements of Hellenistic dualism in it, also allows 
its personification of Wisdom. Here, like the Word before it, and nous before that in 
the case of the one, Wisdom in turn issues from a G(g)od, a divine essence pervading 
all things yet taking on no impurity from such engagement with matter and “in the 
human spirit she is the teacher not only of every virtue and of all theological 
knowledge, but of all the human arts and sciences” (Inge, 1917a, p. 135). 
Here Wisdom is closely identified with both Logos as nous and Logos as the Spirit of 
God. The Wisdom of Solomon might be considered a transition from the Jewish 
creation doctrine of the Septuagint to the synthesis of Jewish and Greek ideas 
subsequently produced by Philo of Alexandria (BC 20 – AD 50), a second pertinent 
finding for clarification of Article (II). Wisdom so understood has little in common 
with Aristotle’s wisdom as intellectual virtue. 
Philo’s synthesis of Greek and Jewish ideas is well documented. Philo (BC 20 – AD 
50) further synthesised the transcendence and 
personalisation of God found in the Hebrew 
writings by following “in the main the 
teachings of the Greek Science of his time but 
[expressing] it in allegories of OT language” 
(T. Rees, 1917, p. 211, my square brackets). 
Corbett (1994, pp. 205 - 222) finds the rational approach paramount in Philo. Aune, 
in his analysis of apatheia understood as absence of feelings or emotions under 
guidance by Torah as a means of mastering the passions, finds the influence of Greek 
philosophy present in Philo, and in 4 Maccabees (1994, pp. 125 - 158). Runia (1995, 
p. 152) questions Philo being known to the Christians before Clement of Rome (died 
c. AD 99). Bennema (2001, pp. 63 - 64, p. 73) finds Philo arguing God’s presence in 
lower levels of being and also finds strands of the Wisdom transformation present in 
Philo’s argument that Wisdom is the route to God through virtue as obedience to 
Torah. 
Booth (1994, pp. 159 - 172) finds Plato’s influence in Philo’s treatment of pleasure 
as the arch enemy of virtue. Baker (1992, p. 3), writing in the light of the Qumran 
scrolls, claims that pre-Christian Judaism was not monotheistic and that the roots of 
 
Article (II) 
Through cultural intermingling, scholarly activity, 
and translation work that accompanied Egypt’s 
transition from Greek to Roman rule, Greek logos 
or nous was identified with the Hebrew Memra 
understood as God’s creation, revelation and 
providence expressed in a personified form as the 
Word of the Lord, and subsequently, as the 
Wisdom of the Lord.  
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Christian Trinitarians lie in pre-Christian Palestinian beliefs about angels. For Baker, 
Philo is plausibly the leader of a Jewish community who could not have remained so 
were he to have adapted a fundamental tenet of Judaic monotheism. Rather he drew 
his Logos as mediator construct from ancient Jewish beliefs and only adapted it to 
Greek ways of thinking. He was promoting Judaic ideas not some vague syncretism, 
so-called Hellenisation being simply a matter of the skin-deepness of language (ibid., 
pp. 114 -116). 
Philo’s synthesis, which is often accomplished through allegory, speaks for itself. 
For example, that human reason is a little part of the divine can be found in De 
Opificio Mundi (Philo, 1800, LI, p. 43). In Special Laws (1855b, I, pp. 303 - 305) 
Philo states that philosophy is the contemplation of God. The best of all possible 
things is found through knowledge of this God On the Ten Commandments (Philo, 
1885, XVI, p. 155), and such knowledge will lead to peaceful society On the Virtues 
and Offices of Ambassadors (Philo, 1855a, p. 100). Philo’s adoption of the Platonic 
soul is given in On the Creation of the World (Philo, 1800, XXII-XXIII, pp. 18 - 19) 
and this soul, like that of the Greeks, is trapped in the body On the Allegories of the 
Sacred Laws (Philo, 1854b, XXXIII, p. 80). Reason, breathed into humans by God, 
serves Wisdom. Wisdom of the causes of all matters, human and divine, is given in 
the Torah, through God’s gift to Moses. Philosophy serves Wisdom De Congress 
Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia (Philo, 2011, XIV, 79) and the Logos in nature is all 
in all—On Joseph (Philo, 1894, VI, 459 - 460). Philo accepts the Greek values of 
prudence, temperance, justice and courage On the Allegories of the Sacred Laws 
(Philo, 1854b, XIX, p. 68). The Greek Demiurge for Philo becomes the Christian 
Logos (ibid., XXXI - XXXII, pp. 132 – 133). In addition, Philo states that the 
Christian Logos received its Wisdom through Moses who, as stated, received it from 
God (ibid., XXXCIII, p. 134). God’s aloofness from evil in his created world is 
preserved in Philo by his assigning evil to God’s helpers in creation On the Creation 
of the World (Philo, 1800, XXIV, pp. 20 - 22), and Philo speaks of God’s ideal city 
in Platonic terms (ibid., X, p. 9). 
Philo constitutes another important step in this chapter’s journey from rational moral 
virtue to virtue of faith. Philo is conjectured positing that through law, God made 
“equality the mother of justice” The Special Laws IV (2009, XLII, n.p.) and through 
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its “unchangeable laws and ordinances, has arranged, in their present beautiful order, 
all the things in heaven and earth” (ibid.). Philo’s allowance that God might be 
known through changes to the lower levels of His being has also been recently 
discussed by Bennema (2001, p. 73). Rees states that in Philo, the “doctrine of the 
divine transcendence and of the metaphysical antithesis between God and the world 
[is carried to] the extremist limit’ (1917, p. 211, my square brackets).  
According to Inge (1917a, p. 135), Philo combines Stoic universal causality 
understood as God’s will in material nature with the Platonic ideas understood as the 
forms as patterns. He does this by detaching the Stoic conception of universal 
causation from materiality, Logos’ presence in nature, and annexing it to the Platonic 
theory of ideas. As revealed in earlier chapters of this enquiry, the Platonic theory of 
ideas came complete with its attendant duality of beings as real world reminiscences. 
Inge’s paraphrasing is incisive and intense. Hillar provides a more recent explanation 
of that same process by which Logos began to replace nous (Hillar, 1998, pp. 1 - 3 of 
16). 
As mentioned earlier, Philo’s Logos is a Greek kind of logos. Again, for Plato, the 
one, the good, and the beautiful are the same thing. According to Aristotle Plato 
identifies the good, the just and the beautiful with the one so that, as explained on 
page 126 of this enquiry, “Forms are the cause of the essence of all other things, and 
the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms” Metaphysics I, 988a10 (Aristotle, 
1952g, p. 506; 1989). The difference is that Philo makes his Logos creatively active. 
Sometimes the Logos is personified as the eldest Son of God, Wisdom being his 
Mother, at other times the Logos is Wisdom per se. Philo took the Jewish poetic 
personifications of God in the world and “turned them from poetry to metaphysics by 
identifying the Memra [God’s word] with the Stoical logos Platonised [thus allowing 
causality through active forms as ideas]” (Inge, 1917a, p. 135, my square brackets), 
making the Logos the intermediary between God and the world. Philo’s outcome is 
both very Greek and very Hebrew.  
Philo’s augmentation of ideas is rich, and at least three strands of thought may be 
discerned in his work. These strands are first, Plato’s dualism between the world and 
God, secondly, Aristotle’s theistic interpretation of god as the first cause of the world 
including necessity of the divine presence as nous for scientific understanding of that 
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world, and thirdly, the Stoic understanding that divine Logos governs the law and 
necessity of the physical world. It is by applying these strands of thought to exegesis 
of the Hebrew creation story and its transcendent God that Philo conjectures his 
Logos mediating between a transcendent God and the world.  
In Philo’s mixture of Greek and Jewish ideas, 
nature, in and of itself being God’s creation, is not 
evil but good. Yet of more relevance to the 
transition from Greek rational moral virtues to 
Judeo-Christian moral virtues focus of this chapter 
is a claim that Philo represents an intermediate but important step away from an 
impersonal rationalised god of nature and place towards a rarefied transcendent God. 
In particular, Philo places his Logos in the rational Greek biological soul as a second 
Deity A Volume of Questions, and Solutions to those Questions, which Arise in 
Genesis (Philo, 1855c, 2.62, pp. 391 - 392). This act, which preserves the supreme 
transcendence of the Hebrew creation and its God, carries with it a tacit acceptance 
of Greek Science in the form of Aristotle’s biology of soul. Science, out by one door, 
creeps in by another. Article (IVa) is thus partly explained.  
Intermingling of the Greek and Jewish traditions may well have established 
conditions amenable to emergence of a world religion. Irrespective of this contention 
the transcendence of the Jewish God of creation, providence and law was not 
diminished by the advent of Christ or by the writings of those who subsequently took 
up His, Christ’s, cause. Hill (2004, pp. 83, 317 - 318, 324, 327) traces the subsequent 
Johannine appropriation of Logos as Christ into the early centuries of Christianity in 
development and I pursue the so-called Christianisation of Logos/logos further 
beginning in the next paragraph wherein discussion of that intermingling of Judeo-
Greek heritage with unfolding Christianity is further articulated as outlined in 
Articles (III) and (IV). I also discuss alienation of Science, theology and philosophy, 
each from the other. Such discussion, as foreshadowed on page 280, constitutes 
Section 2 of the chapter which, under formatting impositions and for improvement of 
layout purposes, begins on the next page. 
 
 
Article (IVa) 
(IVa) The Logos was placed in the rational 
domain of the Greek soul, and sin in the 
irrational domain, thereby beginning a 
colonisation of Greek rational and practical 
virtue by Christian absolute virtue, and Greek 
moral virtue by a moral good-bad divide of sin. 
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SECTION 2: JUDEO-GREEK INTERMINGLING FROM THE TIME OF PHILO (BC 20 – AD 50) AND THE 
ADVENT OF CHRIST TO THE TIME OF AUGUSTINE (AD 345 – 430) 
Integrating Discussion of Articles (I) through (IV) Continues 
Part 1 of Section 2: Logos from Philo (BC 20 – AD50) and Christ to Paul (AD c. 5 -57) and John 
(AD c. 6 -100)  
Christ’s advent during a time of blending of Greek and Jewish ideas is recorded in 
the early Gospels where threads of Persian dualism, Greek polydaemonism and 
Semitic animism yet survive (T. Rees, 1917, p. 211; van Rheenen, 1991, p. 99). 
These traces are evidenced by 
intervening angels (Holy Bible, 
2009a, Matthew 28: 2, John 5: 4), 
the presence and/or casting out of 
demons and evil spirits bringing 
injury and disease to mankind, and 
the devil and his angels—for 
example (Holy Bible, 1932, 
Matthew 8: 24 - 34, 15: 21 - 28; 
Mark: 7: 25 - 30; 9: 14 - 30: Luke 
9: 37 - 45)—all of them being 
under God’s power. In the Septuagint in development to which Philo had access, 
Logos is frequently mentioned (Hillar, 1998, p. 1 of 16). It appears as God’s 
utterances in Genesis 1: 3, 6, 9, 3: 9, 11 and Psalms 32: 9, as God's action in 
Zechariah at 5: 1 - 4, Psalms 106: 20, Psalms 147: 15, and qua prophetic messages 
as God’s communicated will to his people in Jeremiah 1: 4 – 19; 2: 1 – 7; Ezekiel 1: 
3 and Amos 3: 1 (Hillar, 1998, p. 1 of 16; Septuagint, 2010). In the New Testament 
(2009b, John 1: 1 - 14) there is to be found a clear statement that the Logos signified 
as Word is Christ incarnate—a statement which Rees interprets as a trace of the 
“Philonic doctrine of the Logos as the mediator of creation and the principle of 
nature” (1917, p. 217). In this one mention (2009b, John 1: 1 - 14), the Logos, now 
the Word, “was God” (ibid.), which “in the beginning was with God” (ibid.)  who 
“made all things” (ibid) and in whom “was life” (ibid) and “the light of men” (ibid.) 
through which true light they “might believe” (ibid.); witness of such true light being 
found in the advent of Christ incarnate who, as Word, was made flesh and dwelt 
among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the father,) 
full of grace and truth” (ibid.). 
Herod’s Masada Built Between BC 74-05 
 
 
 
Source: Photograph of Masada cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Ancient Architecture Home Page. (Ancient Architecture WebPage, 
2013). Herod’s palace is bottom left on the precipice.  . 
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Inge, too (1917a, p. 136), like more recent writers (Fuglseth, 2005, 189 - 190; Harris, 
2010, pp. 302 - 310; Olsson, 1999, 
pp. 159, 167; Quast, 1996, p. 11), 
links John to Philo and makes John a 
stepping stone from Jewish 
Alexandrian thought to the doctrine 
of Christ incarnate as the Logos, 
Word and Light found in the so-
called New Testament. 
Keener questions Philo’s efficacy as 
a source for John claiming that Philo 
“moved in much higher currents of 
Hellenistic philosophic thought than 
John approaches” (Keener, 2003, p. xxx). Lucke (1849, pp. 419, 412 - 432), like von 
Heijne (2010, pp. 203 – 205, 234, within the context of 192 - 234) speculates that 
Philo’s Logos is essentially docetic, that is, illusory, ethereal, impalpable, phantasmic 
as the heretical sect, the Docetae, would have it, and that John led the Logos into the 
path of Christian faith by making the Word of God the real man in Jesus Christ, thus 
making a real connection between the divine and the human. Keener plays down a 
docetic presence in John (Keener, 2003, pp. 163, 315) even though, as Table 36 
reveals, there was considerable metaphor in use at the time. 
Inge (1917a, p. 136) allows 1 John 1: 1 - 3, and Revelations 19: 13, as possible 
mentions of the Logos. Burns recognizes 1 John 1: 1 - 3 and Revelations 4: 11 (1911, 
p. 142). Ongoing scholarship continues to expound on potential Jesus-θεός (Jesus-
God) claims in the New Testament consistent with the λόγος (logos)-to-Jesus route 
earlier identified by Rees and Inge (Hengel, 2008, p. 271; Kennard, 2008, p. 503; 
Köstenberger & Swain, 2008, p. 113; Moo, 2008, p. 118; Plisch, 2008, pp. 76 - 77). 
Yet such fine explication has generated rich contestation.  
For example Wright (2011), noting that textual variants exist for each of the 
seventeen potential New Testament mentions of Jesus as God, identifies ten as 
immediately textually troublesome on the basis of punctuation or syntax, of which he 
allows Romans 9: 5 and Titus 2: 13 as certain; 1 John 5: 20 as almost certain; 
Table 36: Logos Metaphor 
 
 
“This cross of light is sometimes called the (or a) word by me for 
your sakes, sometimes mind, sometimes Jesus, sometimes Christ, 
sometimes door, sometimes a way, sometimes bread, sometimes 
seed, sometimes resurrection, sometimes Son, sometimes Father, 
sometimes Spirit, sometimes life, sometimes truth, sometimes 
faith, sometimes grace. And by these names it is called as toward 
men: but that which it is in truth, as conceived of in itself and as 
spoken of unto you (MS. us), it is the marking-off of all things, 
and the firm uplifting of things fixed out of things unstable, and 
the harmony of wisdom, and indeed wisdom in harmony [this last 
clause in the MS. is joined to the next: 'and being wisdom in 
harmony']. There are of the right hand and the left, powers also, 
authorities, lordships and demons, workings, threatenings, wraths, 
devils, Satan, and the lower root whence the nature of the things 
that come into being proceeded.” (The Apocryphal New 
Testament, 1924, Acts of John, n. p.). To this day the light remains 
a preferred form: “God from God, Light from Light, true God 
from true God” (The Nicene creed, 2009, n. p.). 
 
Source: Extracted by Ian Eddington from The Apocryphal New 
Testament. (Acts of John 98, n. p.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (The 
Apocryphal New Testament, 1924). 
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Colossians 2. 2, all fifteen variants of it, Matthew 1: 23, John 17: 3, Ephesians 5: 5, 2 
Thessalonians 1: 12 and Jude 4. 29 as doubtful, dubious; and 1 Timothy 3: 16 as not 
qualifying at all. Of the remaining seven, he judges John 1: 1, certain; John 1: 18 
almost certain; John 20: 28 secure, certain; Acts 20: 28 undecided, doubtful, dubious; 
Galatians 2: 20, doubtful, dubious; Hebrews 1: 8 highly probable, almost certain; 
and 2 Peter 1: 1 highly probable, certain. He concludes that the boldness to name 
Jesus θεός: 
began in the first century. It was not a creation of Constantine in the fourth century. It 
was not a doctrinal innovation to combat Arianism in the third century. Nor was it a 
sub-apostolic distortion of the apostolic kerygma in the second century. Rather, the 
church’s confession of Christ as θεός began in the first century with the apostles 
themselves and/or their closest followers and therefore most likely from Jesus himself. 
(B. J. Wright, 2011, p. 265) 
Wright’s claim does not resolve the 
question of what tradition those calling 
Jesus drew on and if the idea is down to 
Jesus Himself the question of origin 
appears to be unfathomable. However, by pronouncing John 1: 1 (Holy Bible, 2009a) 
certain, Wright at least supports a literary link of Judeo-Greek Logos to New 
Testament scripture. It is important to recall the caveat given on page 280 about 
attribution and redaction dimensions of scripture grouped by convention under book 
name or personal name.  
Nevertheless the incarnation of the Logos, as brief as it was, may be viewed as a 
problem for a wider extant tradition in which Logos in its many forms was docetic. 
Of John, or by default, of whomever the writers of the Gospel of John might be, from 
the prologue on, “the whole tendency of the treatise is quietly to transmute local and 
temporal ideas about the incarnation into a more universal and spiritual form” (Inge, 
1917a, p. 137), that is, to insert the incarnation into, and surround it by, the ever was 
and ever will be of the spiritual Logos.  
The historical Christ as Logos is reported proclaiming the goodness of God’s made 
world of nature. Its gracious providence shines on those who seek Him (Holy Bible, 
2009a, Matthew 6: 23) and provides for both evil and good persons, and the just and 
 
Kerygma 
Specifically kerygma = preaching or proclamation while in 
a collective noun sense kerygma = the received and distilled 
essence of apostolic preaching, for example the resurrection 
and promised return of Christ, repentance and forgiveness 
and the like.  
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unjust alike (Holy Bible, 2009a, Matthew 5: 45). “The order of nature is the process 
of God’s divine love and mercy” (T. Rees, 1917, p. 211). 
Rees further claims that Christ’s vision was optimistic and teleological in that God 
directs all of nature to fulfil His plan for 
mankind and that “Jesus taught no radical 
and permanent evil in the nature of 
things” (ibid., p. 211). Smoley (2007, p. 
11) complements Rees by attesting to the 
simplicity of Christ’s message yet 
O’Collins (2009, p. 2) explains that 
nowhere is it recorded that Christ left any 
writings other than John’s claim of His 
writing with his finger in the sand John 
8:6 – 8 (Holy Bible, 2009b). Even to the 
extent that man’s fall had somehow 
brought an evil influence to nature, God 
would regenerate a new world (Holy 
Bible, 2009a, Matthew, 19: 28, Luke 20: 
34 - 36). Furthermore, Christ’s vision 
brings with it “no scientific or 
philosophic theory of the universe. It was 
not then, nor is it yet, demonstrably true. But it is the attitude of Christian faith 
towards the universe, because it is the Father’s work” (T. Rees, 1917, p. 211). Christ, 
a contemporary of Philo, lived circa BC 4 to AD 30 (Ehrman, 2007, p. 32). 
Codification of the Christian canon is said to have begun during the period AD 49 to 
120/150 (R. Brown, 1997, pp. 3 - 19; Ehrman, 2007, p. xxxii - xxxiii). 
On the basis of New Testament writings attributed to him, Paul is depicted preaching 
Christ’s doctrine and teaching in various locations throughout the Roman Empire. 
He, and/or possible pseudographers, may have improvised substantially in 
interpreting Christ’s message and in so doing may have introduced interpretations 
differing from those expressed in synoptic declarations of Christ’s teachings 
(Barnett, 2008, pp. ix, 2; D. Wenham, 1995, pp. 1 - 3). 
 
Neuroscientific Explanation of a Spiritual Me 
As for my working definition of the material me, the self-
as-object, it is as follows: a dynamic collection of integrated 
neural processes, centered on the representation of the 
living body, that finds expression in a dynamic collection of 
integrated mental processes. The self-as-subject, as knower, 
as the “I,” is a more elusive presence, far less collected in 
mental or biological terms than the me, more dispersed, 
often dissolved in the stream of consciousness, at times so 
annoyingly subtle that it is there but almost not there. The 
self-as-knower is more difficult to capture than the plain 
me, unquestionably. But that does not diminish its 
significance for consciousness. The self-as-subject-and-
knower is not only a very real presence but a turning point 
in biological evolution. We can imagine that the self-as-
subject-and-knower is stacked, so to speak, on top of the 
self-as-object, as a new layer of neural processes giving rise 
to yet another layer of mental processing. There is no 
dichotomy between self-as-object and self-as-knower; there 
is, rather, the anticipated future. The multiple images whose 
ensemble defines a biography generate pulses of core self 
whose aggregate constitutes an autobiographical self. The 
protoself with its primordial feelings, and the core self, 
constitute a “material me.” The autobiographical self, 
whose higher reaches embrace all aspects of one’s social 
persona, constitute a “social me” and a “spiritual me.” We 
can observe these aspects of self within our own minds or 
study their effects in the behavior of others. In addition, 
however, the core and autobiographical selves within our 
minds construct a knower; in other words, they endow our 
minds with another variety of subjectivity. For practical 
purposes, normal human consciousness corresponds to a 
mind process in which all of these self levels operate, 
offering to a limited number of mind contents a momentary 
link to a pulse of core self. Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes 
to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. (p. 9). Random 
House. Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, p. 9)  
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Nietzsche certainly had no doubts about Pauline influence. The Antichrist, published 
in 1895, contains a blistering polemic about Paul in particular, and Christianity and 
Judaism in general (1924, paras. 41 - 44, 47, 58). In that 
polemic, Nietzsche accuses Paul of falsifying Christ’s 
teaching. Both Pauline and Deutero-Pauline letters have 
also been interpreted as defences against so-called gnostic 
sects and/or as political strategy (Detering, 2003, pp. 25 - 
26; Robbins, 2005, p. 93), the Pauline/Deutero-Pauline 
divide and attendant matters of authorship and writing 
and/or redaction dates being a field of study in its own 
right. Modern nomenclature sometimes employs the term 
Paul-Acts to communicate a view that Paul and Acts, 
including possible redactions of them, are the work of the 
same writer or writers. Given such enigmas, chapter and 
section headings used in this enquiry, for example ‘From 
Paul (AD 5 – 57) and John (AD 6 - 100) to Augustine (AD 
345 – 430)’ should be regarded as ordinal, not strictly 
cardinal. 
Modern Christological scholarship is, then, learning to live with uncertainty yet 
within the boundaries of such uncertainty it is probable that John as well as Paul 
and/or their redactors and pseudographers also went beyond Philo in their 
identification of the Jewish Messiah and the historical Christ with the Logos. For 
example Rees further contends that Paul assumed God’s existence (Holy Bible, 
2009a, Acts 14: 5 - 17, Acts 17: 24 - 26, Romans 1: 20) and proceeded to reinforce 
the mantra that “creation, providence and nature are manifestations and proofs of the 
unity, spirituality, power and goodness of God” (1917, p. 212). Conversely then, 
Pauline interpretation of nature provides insights into the manner in which Pauline 
writing appears to interpret and expand upon, Godhood. Pauline interpretation of 
nature is thus very important for the developing argument of this chapter which is 
focussed on the manner in which, inter alia, Greek rational moral virtues were 
captured by, and transformed into, absolute Christian moral virtues.  
 
One Example of the Paul-
Deutero-Pauline Divide (1) 
 
Undisputed 
1 Thessalonians 
1 Corinthians 
2 Corinthians 
Philippians 
Philemon 
Galatians 
Romans 
 
Disputed 
2 Thessalonians, 
Colossians 
Ephesians 
1 Timothy 
2 Timothy 
Titus 
 
Not Attributed to Paul 
Epistle to the Hebrews 
 
Notes: 1 The Deutero-Pauline 
letters are those whose attribution 
to Paul is disputed. 
Source: Extracted by Ian 
Eddington from Just, F.. The 
Deutero-Pauline Letters, (Just, 
2014, n. p.) 
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In particular, Pauline writing fixes the presence of sin in human flesh and in human 
nature, “the course of this world according to the prince of the power of the air, the 
spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience … [and in] … the lusts of our 
flesh and of the mind: and we were by nature [italics added] the children of wrath” 
(Holy Bible, 2009a, Ephesians 2: 3, my square brackets). As discussed earlier on 
page 281 Christ is said to have found no evil in nature.  
Pagels (1989a) traces the evolution of sin in the flesh from the time of Christ to the 
time of Augustine (AD 354 - 430). In the light of the gnostic gospels she explains 
that the codification of the church’s position of original sin—nature is corrupted 
because Adam’s transgression is continuingly carried into the world by children 
infected with it at birth—evolved from an exchange among various Christian sects 
until its settling codification in Augustine (AD 354 – 450) from whence, under the 
dogma of an imperial Roman church, it became an enduring edict within Western 
culture. Pagels adduces the Deutero-Pauline letters as evidence of attempts by sects 
holding less stringent views about human sexuality, to progress their case (ibid., pp. 
24 – 28). Her approach is historical and was written at a time when it was less 
adventurous to refer to certain groups by names such as Christian or Gnostics. 
Pagels’ contribution supports claims that Christianity in development helped 
consolidate a moral dimension in nature. Philo’s good and Paul’s evil coexist there. 
In his Letter to the Romans (Holy Bible, 2009a) Paul discusses the letter of the so-
called Old Testament law, in its relationship to sin, and the manner in which, through 
Christ, humanity can live “in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter” 
(Holy Bible, 2009a, Romans 7: 6 - 8: 3). His teaching is likely that while the old law 
and its absolute commandments are “holy and just and good” (Holy Bible, 2009a, 
Romans 7: 12), and that the law and commandments clearly define sin, sin so defined 
is to be found in the flesh. Mankind can be relieved from sin because “there can be 
no condemnation” (Holy Bible, 2009a, Romans 8: 1 - 2) of those “who are in Christ 
Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit” (ibid.) for “the law of the 
spirit” (ibid.) frees humans “from the law of sin and death” (ibid.). 
Ladd (1968, p. 10) states that, because of ongoing Christianisation of Greek 
rationality in the Johannine and Pauline traditions, the whole New Testament 
represents a movement from the Semitic to the Hellenistic world. Lash (2006, p. 98), 
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in a book written for a quite different purpose, inter alia, that of making mankind 
aware of its own ecology and habitat, and of an older form of spirituality to match it, 
also acknowledges Paul’s contribution to the Judeo-Greek-Christian blending, 
although he is not quite as harsh in word usage as is Nietzsche, his inspiration 
(Nietzsche, 1969).  
Pauline writing, because it consolidates a moral dimension in nature through 
asserting evil’s presence there, is implicated in the eclipse of Aristotelian rational 
moral virtues and nous under their impersonal god. At Acts 14: 15 - 17 and Acts 17: 
24 - 26 (Holy Bible, 2009a) Paul accepts God’s creation and at 2 Corinthians 4: 6, 1 
Corinthians 12: 18 and 1 Corinthians 15: 38 (Holy Bible, 2009a) Paul accepts God’s 
absolute commandments. At Philippians 2: 6 (Holy Bible, 2009a), and Hebrews 1: 3 
(Holy Bible, 2009a) he also puts a case that Christ is an emanation of God, and at 
Colossians 1: 16 - 17 (Holy Bible, 2009a) and Hebrews 1: 3 (Holy Bible, 2009b) he 
reveals that all of God’s creation was accomplished through Christ and resides in 
Him. In effect, all nature, all created things, all of Aristotle’s categorical beings, 
reside in Christ. Rees (1917, p. 212) claims that interpreting Christ in this way, after 
Philo and John, is not only an acceptance by Paul of Christ as Logos, but also a 
return to, and further articulation of, Philo’s doctrine of the Logos as mediator 
between God and the world.  
Research into similarities and differences between Philo and Paul, and their relative 
contributions continues. Interdependence might be acknowledged but direct 
dependence of one on the other is counterbalanced in favour of both authors writing 
within well-established Jewish conventions of the time. For example, Chadwick 
(1965) says that “both writers draw on a common stock of Hellenistic Jewish 
tradition” (ibid., p. 290) and that Philo, who was likely more than  an expert in 
cutting and pasting (ibid., p. 291), drew on previous works within a collection now 
largely lost. That Paul “fished in the same pool” (ibid., p. 292) is supported, he says, 
by similarities to Philo within Romans 1: 2, 7: 8; 1 Corinthians 2, 8, 9; Philippians 2: 
6 – 10; Colossians I and Galatians 3. Chadwick claims that “the role ascribed to the 
divine Wisdom by St. Paul is identical with the activity of the Logos in Philo, for 
whom the Logos is the world-soul” (ibid., p. 302) and that Philo and Paul signify 
continuing discussion within a Hellenistic synagogue within a Greek Judaism out of 
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sorts with rabbinic Palestinian Judaism—an idea not unlike ideas adduced by recent 
scholars (Bauckham, 2009; Boyarin, 2004, 2012; Hengel, 2003, 2008; Knohl, 2002; 
Schäfer, 2012; Schremer, 2010; Tresham, 2009) in their discussions of the emergence of 
Christianity from Judaism and discussed within the context of pages 347 to 353 of 
this chapter.  
Winters (2001), following an aside by Chadwick about existence of schools of 
rhetoric in Philo’s time, provides a possible explanation for structural argument 
similarities in Philo and Paul—their like-minded acceptance of rhetoric to defend 
arguments, their dislike of its sale and use for personal gain and political 
machination, and a stance to it predicated on the so-called Old Testament (sic., 
Winter’s term). Yet Winters’ focus is elsewhere: he seeks to move the emergence of 
the so-called Second Sophistic from the end decades of the first century AD to its 
beginning decades. (Runia, 1986, p. 148) provides a fleeting glimpse of Philo as 
rhetor and Winters (2001, pp. 2, 4, 59 – 69, 95 – 100) posits that Philo and Paul 
respectively, in Alexandria and Corinth, had but little choice to employ rhetoric, and 
then-also-taught procedures of sophistry as well, if they were to hold their audiences 
and also succeed in their negotiations with government officials and leaders on 
behalf of their constituencies.  
Worthington (2010, pp. 35, 36, 38, 88, 90, 92, 102, 117, 191 – 192) investigates 
similarities and differences between Paul and Philo by comparing Paul’s 
interpretation of creation in 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians and Romans with Philo’s 
exegesis of those same texts in De Opificio Mundi (Philo, 1854a, pp. 1-51). He 
speculates that both writer’s interpretations of God’s creation of the world, and His 
provisions for humanity within it, are predicated on their understandings of God’s 
intentions before creation. Worthington appears to argue that Paul’s understanding of 
God’s so-called ‘before’ is accessible through examination of Paul’s treatment of 
Genesis and Proverbs and that it is historical, Christocentric in the sense of Christ as 
the last Adam prepared before creation, and that Christ as Logos is the image of God. 
Likewise, Philo’s before, traceable through his use of Genesis 1 – 2 and Timaeus 
(Plato, 1925h, 1952w) is rendered ontic in the form of a predetermined paradigm of a 
structured and good nature, born of God through Wisdom His wife, the Logos being 
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an entity able to redeem a world negativity engendered through its association with 
matter.  
Kim (2007, p. 223) informs that Philo too called the Logos the image of God, and 
other names as well, for example the Son of God, 
the archangel, the viceroy of God, and that Logos as 
Wisdom is associated with theophany. Chadwick 
(1965, p. 289) finds Philo calling the Logos the life, 
light, shepherd, manna, way, high priest and 
paraclete. Kamesar (2004, pp. 163 - 181) discusses 
Philo’s claim that God sent the Logos to earth in 
Moses. He differentiates between the logos 
endiathetos and logos prophorikos, the Stoa’s 
internal and external logos respectively, elsewhere 
discussed on page 315 of this enquiry, and says that 
Philo, in allegorical exegesis of the Pentateuch, 
finds these Logoi symbolised in two brothers namely, Moses, signifying the internal 
Logos, and Aaron, signifying the external one. “Moses is mind most pure, and Aaron 
is its word, and the mind has been trained to grasp holy matters in a manner befitting 
the divine, and the word to express them in a holy manner” (Kamesar, 2004, p. 168). 
God spoke to Moses non-verbally through mind or logos endiathetos in readiness for 
Aaron to communicate God’s message to the people. Kamesar reasons that the D-
scholia to the Iliad 5.385–391, rather than Phaedrus 276A, is a most likely Greek-
ideas source used by Philo in this instance. In the D-scholia, Ares, anger, is under the 
management of the brothers Otus and Ephialtes, logoi en paideia, who “educate and 
teach men to restrain anger [here anger = όργή = rage, wrath] and desire, and to 
engage anger only occasionally” De Mutatione (Philo, 208 quoted in Kamesar, 2004, 
p. 167, my square brackets)—an ideas-string prudence which regularly surfaces, 
often, unfortunately, without sufficient effect, in Eastern and Western cultures alike. 
Training of logos prophorikos (here training = paideia) is primarily assigned to 
rhetoric and that of logos endiathetos possibly to philosophy (ibid., pp.173 - 174).  
Garcilazo links wise-man content of 1 Corinthians, particularly 15: 12 – 49 on 
resurrection, to rich members of a congregation influenced by anthropology, ethics 
 
Wise-man Content 
In a Biblical context wisdom begins with 
recognition of a living God, a wise person 
being one who is able to act in a manner 
acceptable to God. At 1 Corinthians Paul 
and Sosthenes are announced wise men and 
called on to preach. Guides about how to act 
wisely are considered scattered throughout 
the scriptures in short statements, such 
statements constituting so-called wise-man 
content. The wisdom books of the scriptures 
are Job, Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and Song of 
Solomon but wisdom sayings are more 
widespread being found in the so-called Old 
Testament at Psalm 111:10; Proverbs 1:7; 
2:1-4; 9:10; Job 28:28; Ecclesiastes 12:13; 1 
Samuel 24:13; 1 Kings 20:11; Jeremiah 
21:39 and Ezekiel 18:2. In the New 
Testament wisdom sayings can be found at 
Romans 12:1; Corinthians 13; Galatians 
5:19-23; Ephesians 5:22 – 6:9; Colossians 
3:5-17; Hebrews 3:12-19, 4:11-13, 6:1-12: 
James 1-3 and 1 Peter 2:11-17. 
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and cosmology of Roman Stoicism (Garcilazo, 2007, pp. 51 - 63), especially their 
interpretations of Seneca the Younger (BC 4 – AD 64). By Seneca’s time duality of 
body had gained some acceptance, the soul being linked with a so-called petty body 
Epistle 41: 4 (Seneca the Younger, 1925a, p. 275) otherwise described as a “heavy 
and earthly prison” Epistle 102: 22 (Seneca the Younger, 1925b, p. 181), “a chain 
fastened about my freedom”, Epistle 65: 21 (Seneca the Younger, 2007, p. 13), “a 
short-stay guest house”, Epistle 120 (ibid., p. 82)—a body, some argued, which is not 
raised with the soul during resurrection. Stoic influence is, Garcilazo implies, thus 
causally implicated in the controversy of 1 Corinthians 15.  
Brookins says that, “although Paul was rather a man of many worlds, capable of 
shifting between them at need, but never abandoning his essential, and largely 
distinctive, Christian convictions” (2012, pp. 288 - 289), the wise man throughout 
Corinthians being a wise man of Stoic philosophy rather than rhetoric. The wise man 
is Greek rather Roman (ibid., p. 286). 
Nevertheless, through Paul Philo’s dualism has to all purposes been expelled. 
Aristotle’s rational access to both moral virtues and understanding of nature has been 
challenged, and for some replaced, by a faith understanding wherein sin, understood 
in the absolute terms of the commandments, through entering the flesh, has tainted 
nature. Christ has been proclaimed Logos, 
personal sin is said to exist, and these findings 
are relevant to explication of Article (III).  
Although a so-called Christianisation of 
Logos appears plausible on the face of 
exegesis of scriptures per se, qualifications 
are in order. For example, Detering (2003, pp. 25 - 26) concludes that Paul’s letters 
are all forgeries, second century BC redactions of original Marcionite gnostic 
writings (ibid., p. 50), with gnosis allowing dual-god construct. The redaction is 
claimed to have resolved bitter differences between gnostic messianic community 
beliefs represented by Paul, and Jewish-Christian messianic community beliefs 
represented by Peter. The Acts (Holy Bible, 2009a)—mostly dating within AD 80 – 
90 with some as late as AD 90 – 100, with possible redaction in the second century 
AD—tells of Jewish rejection of Christ as Messiah, Peter’s taking the Messiah to the 
 
Article (III) 
Through the advent of Christ, God became more 
transcendent, the historical Christ found no evil in 
nature, and subsequently the sin of man’s fall became 
redeemable through Christ’s death and resurrection. 
The apostle John identified Christ incarnate with the 
L(l)ogos and later, the Jewish Roman citizen and 
missionary, Paul, developed and consolidated the 
identity of Christ as Logos. Even so, evil and sin 
remained clearly present after Christ’s resurrection 
and Paul discerned sin in the flesh of mankind.  
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Gentiles and Paul’s subsequent conversion. During (1957, pp. 50 - 51), following 
Loman, (1881) reports the dispute lasting from AD 70 to 135 until its so-called 
resolution by redaction in favor of Peter in the middle of the second century AD, 
which resolution occasioned emergence of the Catholic Church. Robins (2005, p. 92) 
acknowledges Pauline letters as political strategy and further caveats will be drawn 
from subsequent discussion about Judeo-Greek ideas within developing Christianity.  
Dunn offers an explanation of the partitioning of Judaism and Christianity on 
differences between Greek-speaking and Aramaic-speaking Jews in respect of 
Stephen’s possibly offensive-to-the-temple-cult-High-Priests statement that “the 
most High dwelleth not in temples made of hands” (Holy Bible, 1932, Acts 7: 48). 
Dunn says: 
the Stephen episode marks the beginning of a clear parting of the ways between 
Christian and Jew, as also probably to some extent between 'Hebrew' Christian and 
'Hellenist' Christian - at all events the first rending of a major seam in a Judaism still 
best designated 'second Temple Judaism’" (2006, pp. 94 - 95, Dunn's italics).  
His partitioning is not soft in the Boyarin sense discussed on page 351. 
According to Dunn, Jewish Christianity in the first century AD was able to 
consolidate itself with less reliance on temple cult (ibid., p. 99) and the Stephen 
incident is the source of the idea of Jesus in sacrifice as final savior (ibid., p. 99). 
Dunn is aware of diversity in early Christianity (J. Dunn, 2012) and that such terms 
as orthodox and heretical are wanting within more general categories such as Jewish, 
Hellenistic and Apocalyptic Christianity. Nevertheless, he argues that diversity 
beyond a central theme of love for others within a belief in Christ the man incarnate 
as God is disqualified from Christianity in the making (ibid., pp. 227, 308). 
Dunn also places Jesus “well within the diversity of Second Temple Judaism" (ibid., 
p. 74) there being traces of Jewish temple cult in the appeasement of alienated 
brothers at Matthew 5: 23 – 24. He claims that Jesus ran afoul of temple cult more on 
purity grounds through his treatment of, and association with, lepers and otherwise ill 
persons, and for forgiving sins without due deference to temple praxis of this priestly 
convention (ibid., 53 - 62). Dunne further claims that Jesus’ action in the temple is 
interpreted as an act of temple cleansing itself rather than a political act in defiance 
of a perceived temple-cosy relationship with unwanted Roman rule and that Jesus’ 
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reported words about the destruction and rebuilding of the temple at Mark 15: 58 
interpreted in the light of a son-of-David temple rebuilding adduced from 2 Samuel 7 
identifies Jesus as a possible Jewish Apocraphist who became a prey of a high-priest 
faction (ibid., p. 67 - 70).  
Baur’s earlier analysis of the Stephen event (Baur, 1878b, pp., 44 - 152), the Peter-
Paul divide and its subsequent resolution through damping down by Irenaeus (AD 
130 – 202), Tertullian (AD 160 – 
220), Clement of Alexandra (AD 
150 – 215), and Origen (AD c. 184 
– c. 253, and fabricated Pauline 
Epistles (ibid., p. 148) begins by 
naming Stephen a Hellenist 
member of the ancient Church of 
Jerusalem which congregation 
consisted of both Hellenist and 
Hebraist members. Following 
Stephen’s martyrdom Hellenist 
members fled throughout “Judea, 
Samaria, … towns of the sea coast, 
and even to Cyprus and Antioch” 
(ibid., p. 45) sowing seeds of 
Christianity, and at Antioch even 
preaching gospels to Gentiles (ibid., 
p. 45). In this way Stephen is 
viewed as a forerunner of Paul, 
Peter in Jerusalem confessing 
Hebraist interpretations. The 
Hellenist-Hebraist divide was consolidated and hardened with Peter’s refusal to 
continue sitting at the table with Hellenists in his meeting with Paul in Antioch (ibid., 
p. 54). Part of the final resolution of Peter and Paul as brothers in Christ is achieved, 
inter alia, through a myth of their martyrdom in Rome found in a spurious 2 Peter, 
Paulinising in a spurious 1 Peter, and pseudography in Acts and Chapter 15 of 
Romans (Baur, 1878b, pp., 149 - 152). 
 
Harnack’s Qualifications to His Definition of Gnosticism 
Gnosticism was always accompanied “by a great number of sects, 
schools and undertakings which were only in part related to it, and 
yet, reasonably enough, were grouped together with it. 
 
… the great Gnostic schools were flanked on the right and left by a 
motley series of groups which at their extremities can hardly be 
distinguished from popular Christianity on the one hand, and from 
the Hellenic and the common world on the other. On the right were 
communities such as the Encratites, which put all stress on a strict 
asceticism, in support of which they urged the example of Christ, but 
which here and there fell into dualistic ideas. There were further, 
whole communities which, for decennia, drew their views of Christ 
from books which represented him as a heavenly spirit who had 
merely assumed an apparent body. There were also individual 
teachers who brought forward peculiar opinions without thereby 
causing any immediate stir in the Churches. On the left there were 
schools such as the Carpocratians, in which the philosophy and 
communism of Plato were taught, the son of the founder and second 
teacher Epiphanes honoured as a God (at Cephallenia), as Epicurus 
was in his school, and the image of Jesus crowned along with those 
of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle.  
 
On this left flank are, further, swindlers who take their own way, like 
Alexander of Abonoteichus, magicians, soothsayers, sharpers and 
jugglers, under the sign-board of Christianity, deceivers and 
hypocrites who appear using mighty words with a host of 
unintelligible formulæ, and take up with scandalous ceremonies, in 
order to rob men of their money and women of their honour. All this 
was afterwards called "Heresy" and "Gnosticism," and is still so 
called. And these names may be retained, if we will understand by 
them nothing else than the world taken into Christianity, all the 
manifold formations which resulted from the first contact of the new 
religion with the society into which it entered. 
 
To prove the existence of that left wing of Gnosticism is of the 
greatest interest for the history of dogma, but the details are of no 
consequence. On the other hand, in the aims and undertakings of the 
Gnostic right, it is just the details that are of greatest significance, 
because they shew that there was no fixed boundary between what 
one may call common Christian and Gnostic Christian.  
 
Source: Harnack, A. (1961). History of Dogma. (pp. 237 – 242). New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc. (Harnack, 1961) 
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Although Baur gives the resolution slightly in favour of Peter, that is, in favour of the 
Hebraist faction, there can be no doubt of Hellenist influence which is clearly 
evidenced by engagement with Greek ideas by Ireneaus and all named above by Baur 
as important in resolution of the Peter-Paul divide.   
Yet views of a tainted nature, including but not limited to human disease, for 
example a Johannine view wherein sin has infected even the objects of creation 
(Holy Bible, 2009b, 1 John 2: 15 - 17) have been weakened through Christ’s 
redemptive spirit which allows that mankind’s flesh and spirit (Holy Bible, 2009b, 1 
Timothy 4: 4, 5, 23, Romans 6: 19), along with all evil spirits, will be brought into 
final subjugation (Holy Bible, 2009b, 1 Corinthians 15: 24 - 27, Ephesians 1: 2). 
Aristotle’s impersonal god has been banished and the wrath of the Hebrew God 
further softened through an announcement that “God is [italics added] love” (Holy 
Bible, 2009b, 1 John 4: 16, my square brackets). Aristotle’s rational Ethics has been 
deposed in favour of a Judeo-Christian virtue Ethics in which defeat of natural evil is 
resolved through Christ’s salvation.   
Part 2 of Section 2: Greek logos to Christian Logos: From Paul (AD c. 5 - 57) and John (AD c. 6 
- 100) to Augustine (AD 345 – 430) 
Paul’s assertions were yet to be tested against that heritage of Greek Science and 
cosmology which “compelled Christianity to assume a scientific and philosophic 
form, which it did by adopting the current ideas of Greek Science without change, 
and by adopting to its use such philosophic principles as would best harmonise with 
its own principles” (T. Rees, 1917, p. 212). 
Rees’ statement should not necessarily be read as though a so-called Christian church 
was ready made in either Paul’s lifetime (AD c. 5 – 67), or the second century AD 
lifetimes of Basilides (conjectured alive AD 117 – 138) and Valentinus (AD c.100 – 
160), a church with authority to ratify Greek Science or adopt philosophy to suit its 
needs at a bang of a gavel equivalent of the times, Christianity’s adoption of Greek 
Science being a gradual occurrence. For example as the dialogue box on page 318 
reveals, Harnack provides a glimpse of a plethora of competing persuasions, some 
religious, some secular and some profane, posited flourishing in the second century 
AD and his depiction of a complex second century AD mix of persuasions, subject as 
it is to a church history framework and his reasoned definition of Gnosticism itself, is 
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not unlike depictions of complex mixes of persuasions provided by Heraclitus (DK 
22B14), Radcliffe Edmonds (2012, p. 16) and Bart Ehrman (2003, p. 2) in respective 
commentary on Orphic thiasos, Derveni priesthood sincerity and quackery, and 
Judeo-Christian sect understandings of multiple Gods. 
Harnack, inter alia, posits that the scientific spirit of Greek rationalism partly informs 
Gnostic belief as he defines it—a claim that might help explain Paul’s earlier 
reported but contested adversarial stance against such conjectured so-called gnostic 
belief—and writes that, in explaining their religious universe, Gnostics, under a 
“lasting influence of Greek philosophy and of the Greek spirit generally on Judaism” 
(Harnack, 1901, p. 224), jettisoned the act of creation and returned to, and settled on, 
emanation to account for nature. He further suggests that Gnostics reintroduced a 
dualistic world in which nature, consisting of a formless matter made by lower 
spirits, was evil and against God. The Gnostics were, with their rejection of the 
Hebrew creation story, at work in “the acute secularising or Hellenising of 
Christianity” (Harnack, 1901; 1901/2006, pp. 227 - 228). Turner (1903/2012, pp. 218 
- 219) also finds Greek rationality returning in a guise of so-called pagan heretical 
syntheses of Monarchianism, Arianism and Apollinarism which, he states, tended to 
give revelation a subordinate place. Winters contends that these pagan influences can 
be found far and wide before Christ (J. Winters, 2007, p. 8). Baur had earlier 
reasoned that:  
The ingredients of Gnosticism were very multifarious; Hellenic and Jewish elements 
were blended together in it in manifold forms; but Christianity provided all these with 
a common centre, from which the numerous Gnostic systems proceeded to attempt 
ever new combinations of the most different kinds. The Church History of the First 
Three Centuries.  (Baur, 1878a, p. 1) 
Baur brought Hegelian rationality to study of church history and his scholarship, like 
that of Harnack, remains highly respected even though questioned by some as 
radical. Baur’s Tubingen School of Theology methodology, which is critically 
analytical and historical, and largely devoid of references to divine influences, has 
been in continuous use since Baur’s pioneering of it when teaching at the University 
of Tubingen from 1826 to 1860. When it comes down to it Baur (1878b) depicts 
Gnosticism essentially dualist and thus pagan (ibid., p. 193), a movement which 
regards Christianity as a system for development of the whole world rather than a 
system for salvation, a system which expresses its ideas through the symbolism of 
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Greek mythology (ibid., p. 201), a system that arose out of “speculation and 
philosophy rather than religion … [and a system which] points back to philosophy as 
the highest outcome of the human spirit in the Gentile world” (ibid., p 185, my 
square brackets).  
Gnostic thinkers such as Basilides (2nd century AD) and Valentinus (AD 100 – 160) 
were then, say both Baur and 
Harnack, recipients of a 
philosophical and rational first-
century Christian gentile influence 
containing surrogate Hellenistic 
content, and their efforts to 
reconstruct Jewish–Christian 
understandings in accordance with 
that influence repeatedly brought 
gnostic communities into conflict 
with powerful voices within a mix of Christianity of the times.  
Harnack is a protestant writer. He contrasts Gnosticism as a so-called secular or 
rational preference for Christ outside of the so-called Old Testament with an 
emerging Catholic Church, as a 
preference for Christ inside of that 
so-called Old Testament. “It is no 
paradox to say that Gnosticism, 
which is just Hellenism, has in Catholicism obtained half a victory” (Harnack, 1961, 
pp. 227 - 228). This winning of half the peace is in part occasioned by an arriving 
Christian church’s adoption of some of Gnosticism’s ideas and rituals.   
Adoption of elements of Greek Science and philosophy by Christianity in 
development is articulated further beginning in the next paragraph and continues in 
the manner of the historical and critical exegetical method employed in Section I of 
Part 2. 
To wit: nineteenth and twentieth century scholars, on the basis of engagements with 
works of, and/or about, such persons as Simon Magus (1st century AD), the writers 
 
Turner’s Definition of Gnosticism(1) 
“Cerinthus, Saturninus, Marcion(2), Carpocrates, Basilides, and 
Valentinus, all of whom flourished during the second century, 
were the principal teachers of the Gnostic doctrine” (W. Turner, 
1903/2012, p. 218) 
 
“In point of fact, the Gnostic teaching is a mixture of the 
philosophies of Philo and Plotinus with certain elements of 
Christianity. The Gnostics maintained the essential antithesis of the 
spiritual and the material; the origin, by emanation from God, of 
numberless aeons, the sum of which is the pleroma; and the final 
return of all things to God by a universal redemption. They 
recognized no mystery in the Christian sense of the word, the 
gnosis being the merest subterfuge, and human reason the really 
ultimate test of all truth, supernatural as well as natural” (ibid., p. 
219). 
Notes: (1) Turner is a Jesuit writer. (2) Harnack does not name 
Marcion a Gnostic.” (ibid., p. 219). 
  
 
Tubingen School of Theology (Baur) 
This school is not the Tubingen School of Philosophy associated 
with H. J. Kramer and K. Gaiser variously discussed within the 
context of pages 137 to 191 of the Coda to enquiry Chapter 1.  
 
 322 
of Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, Marcion (AD 85 - 160), Cerinthus (c. AD 100), 
Justin (AD 100 – 165), Basilides (early second century), Valentinus (c. AD 140), 
Carpocrates: (circa AD 140), Irenæus (alive AD 202), Tertullian (c. AD 160 – 220), 
Clement of Alexandria (c. AD 150 – 215), Origen (c. AD 185 - 254) and Augustine 
(AD 345 – 430), employed terms such as orthodox, unorthodox, gnostic, heretical, 
pagan, and apocryphal in their analyses of emerging Christianity’s ongoing 
canonisation of scripture and definition of dogma. Orthodox as a term signifies canon 
and dogma sanctioned by an emerging Christian church increasingly ascendant over 
rival persuasions while gnostic, heretical and the like mark various divergences from 
it under definitions variably similar to those provided by Harnack and Turner. Baur 
(1878b) for example convincingly discusses various gnostic sects (ibid., pp. 199 – 
236) and the origin and nature of Montanism (ibid., pp. 245 – 256) in this manner.  
Twenty-first century scholars, on the basis of their engagements with those early 
century writers before mentioned, other commentary, Nag Hammadi texts and 
Midrash as well, also employ such terms as orthodox, unorthodox, gnostic, proto-
gnostic, Jewish-Christian, Gentile-Christian and the like, in their discussions of 
emerging Christianity yet to be addressed in Section 3. Generally, but not always, 
these discussions pursue reclamation of early Christianity in development within a 
Judeo-Christian sect framework and a general but not necessarily universal feature of 
such scholarship is its penchant for inverted commas benchmarking of its terms 
against conventional classifications under a caveat of fuzzy borders definition. 
Sometimes this process, through devaluing the old terms, lessens the efficacy of the 
new. Nevertheless scholarly research since Baur and Harnack’s times contains 
enlightening insight and interpretation touching on Johannine-Pauline Christology 
and Hellenisation theory, and in Section 3 covering pages 340 to 357 of this chapter 
such scholarship is used for cross-check and balance and update purposes.  
Writers amongst those early centuries AD protagonists named in the penultimate 
paragraph are, in Church history studies, variously conventionally tagged Gnostics, 
Apologists, Greek Fathers, Latin Fathers, Apocryphists and the like and their works 
remain informative for purposes of this chapter, irrespective of whether Harnack-
Turner or fuzzy border terminology is used for interpretation purposes. For example, 
writers like Justin Martyr (AD 100 – 160) classified in church history as Greek  
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Apologists, are reasoned defending a line of developing Christianity against what 
they considered to be 
pagan influence 
(Turner, ibid., p. 
220)—such defence 
now, as earlier 
qualified and 
subsequently to be 
discussed, being also understood as competition amongst a great variety of religious 
community beliefs. Other writers, typically classified in church history as Greek 
Fathers, for example Clement of Alexandria (c. AD 150 – 215), Origen (c. AD 184 – 
254), Arnobius (died circa AD 330), and Lactantius (circa AD 240 – 320), appear, 
during the course of the third and fourth centuries, to be implicated in establishing a 
common line of explanations. Turner claims that Origen assimilated elements of 
Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism to his exposition of Christian 
dogma (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 221) and as earlier mentioned Pagels, within an 
exegesis of Christian nature-morality written as an outcome of her engagement with 
Nag Hammadi literature, is able to pronounce Justin Martyr (AD 100 – 165), 
Irenaeus (alive AD 202), Tertullian (AD c. 160 – 220), Clement (c. AD 150 – 215) 
and Origen (c. AD 185 – 254) representatives of Christian orthodoxy denouncing 
what she calls gnostic interpretations of Genesis sexual morality (Pagels, 1989a, p. 
152). Certainly, in refuting Celsus (2nd AD) on such issues as virgin birth and God’s 
spiritual and corporeal nature, Origen (AD c.185 – c. 254 leverages from 
Empedocles (BC 495 – 430). Pythagoras (BC c. 570), Plato (BC c. 426 – c. 348) , 
and Stoicism Origen contra Celsum (Origen, 1872, pp. 432, 440, 418). Likewise in 
outlining his rational Christian system of the world Origen employs Greek 
understandings of corporeality, irrationality of poetry and rational and irrational soul 
in making his case De Principiis (Origen, 1869, pp. 6, 240, 245). 
Although holding a variety of opinions about the nature of Logos, some Apologists 
and Church Fathers urged an idea of Logos as the complete rule of God over the 
world, defended the creation story of Genesis, and contended that nature, being 
God’s creation, was not evil in itself. For example, in defending the creation story of 
the Jewish Bible, and in codification of other matters of dogma, Clement of 
Example of a Typical Western Church History Classification of Greek Fathers 
Greek 
Fathers 
Church 
Fathers who 
wrote in 
Greek 
Clement of Alexandria (c. 
AD 150 – 215) 
Origen (c. AD 185 - 254)  
Athanasius of Alexandra 
(AD 293 - 373) 
John of Chrysostom (c. 
AD 347 – 407) 
 
Cyril of Alexandria (c. AD 378 – 
444) 
Cappadocian Fathers—Basil of 
Caesarea (c. AD 330 – 379), 
Gregory Nazianzus (c.AD 329 – 
389), Peter of Sebastes (c. AD 
340 – 391), Gregory of Nyssa (c. 
AD 335 – c.394) 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Turner, C. M. (2009). Primitive 
Premillennialism: A Study in Patristic Chiliasm from the Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus. (n. 
p.); Panagiotis, K. C. (2005). Greek Orthodox Patrology: An Introduction to the Study of 
the Church Fathers. (pp. 11 - 16). Rollinsford, New Hampshire: Orthodox Research 
Institute. 
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Alexandria (c. AD 150 – 215) displays his familiarity with considerable portions of 
Greek Philosophy. His knowledge of Platonic dialogues is evident even though his 
use of them may be questioned Miscellanies (1869, pp. 382, 395 - 397, 414, 422, 
443, 467, 470). In the same work he sides with Plato and Aristotle against sophistry 
(ibid., p. 376), adduces Pythagorean wisdom to make his claim (ibid., p. 385), finds 
Pythagoras transcribing from Jewish scriptures (p. 449), explains Aristotle and Plato 
in terms of Mosaic law (ibid., p. 467), all of the Greeks being but children of the 
Hebrews (ibid., p. 469 – 470), and cites a view that Pythagoreans held that Plato is 
but Moses speaking in Attic Greek (ibid., p. 449). In his Exhortation to the Heathen 
(1867), in deciding upon whom he might draw to make his case, he would not 
“wholly disown Plato” (ibid., p. 69) who may well have been so privileged, not 
because of his extensive knowledge—his geometry from Egypt, his astronomy from 
Babylon, his healing from Thracians and all that the Assyrians taught him (ibid., p. 
71)—but because he received his sentiments concerning god now God from the 
Hebrews (ibid., p. 71). He again approves Plato in his Instructor (1867, p. 212) 
whom he adduces to his argument that the God of the Hebrews might be feared 
(ibid., p. 158). On pages 168 to 169 he long-bows Plato in support of an argument for 
corporal punishment in instruction of children.  
Justin Martyr (AD 100 - 165) evidences God’s all pervasive reason by arguing that 
Christ is the total incarnation of one universal mind, God’s mind (Dhavamony, 2004, 
p. 40; E. Goodenough, 1923, p. 110). He links the Greek wisdom qua Logos—
translator’s capital L—with Christ incarnate qua Logos among the so-called 
barbarians The First Apology (1868, p. 10) and on page 58 of that work in exegesis 
of Timaeus then available, and Plato’s claimed misunderstanding of Moses, takes one 
step closer to pronouncing the Christian Logos and the Greek logos one and the 
same, the Greek logos being as it were, somehow, an imitation of the Christian 
Logos. Inge (, p. 137), Goodenough (1923, pp. 50 - 51, 83 - 85, 169) and Hellerman 
(2002, pp. 128 - 147) are scholars sympathetic to this view. Christ and Socrates are 
compared on pages 79 and 80 of The First Apology (Justin Martyr, 1868), Socrates 
being part of the Word, Christ being the whole Word. Heraclitus, and the Stoic 
school, “in so far as their moral teaching went … were admirable, as were also the 
poets in some particulars, on account of the seed of reason [the Logos] implanted in 
every race of men” (ibid., p. 78, translator’s square brackets). While Heraclitus may 
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well have settled on fire as monad or phusis, Justin Martyr’s many references to God 
as fire are validated by citation from sacred scriptures. Interpretation of Heraclitus’s 
fire as Logos is, in any case, ambiguous even in the face of a common interpretation 
held since the Stoics that Logos is all pervasive reason, something beyond material 
stuff of the universe (E. Goodenough, 1923, p. 2). Differing interpretations of what 
Heraclitus meant by Logos stand in the way of an easy link from Justin Martyr via 
the Stoics to Heraclitus. Burnet (1920, p. 133) for example interprets Heraclitus’ 
Logos as a simple account while Adam (1911, pp. 77 - 78) equates it with that of the 
Stoics and Goodenough’s conclusion on this reported difference is that it is as 
equally daring to say that Heraclitus taught a Logos doctrine as to say that he did not 
(E. Goodenough, 1923, p. 3).  
That Justin Martyr may have been influenced by Philo’s claim Questions and 
Answers in Genesis 4 152 (Philo, 1953, pp. 434 - 435) that Heraclitus obtained his 
Logos in the first place from Moses is as finely drawn by experts as is a claim that 
Moses was God’s Logos in the first place (R. Williamson, 1989b, p. 56) drawn from 
Philo’s words also found in his Migration of Abraham, 23 (Philo, 1854-1890, n. p.; 
1932, 1935) and On the Life of Moses 1 I 55 (Philo, 1854-1890, 1935). Justin 
Martyr’s acceptance of Socrates, Heraclitus and some so-called barbarians including 
Abraham as containing seeds of Christ is found in Apology 1 LVII, LXI (Justin 
Martyr, 1912, pp. 52 – 53, 57). Every man at birth participates in the universal reason 
(McLean & Aspell, 1997, pp. 53 - 55) and Justin Martyr’s belief that there is a little 
bit of Christ’s incarnate reason in every man Apology 1 LXI (Justin Martyr, 1912, p. 
56) is not unlike Aristotle’s little bit of nous in each of us Metaphysics XII 1072b20 - 
30 (Aristotle, 1952d, pp. 602 - 603; 1989). 
Hellerman acknowledges Harnack’s use of Justin Martyr’s references to Logos in 
Apology 2 for Hellenisation purposes, and Chadwick’s use of Apology 2 to adduce 
Justin Martyr to near acceptance of Abraham and Plato as Christians, but goes 
further and, on the basis of her discussion of the political setting and Justin’s 
logos/Logos-rhetoric, concludes that, while skilfully holding that only Christ as 
Logos can bring full revelation of God, partial revelation is available to non-believers 
who may thus not be pardoned for unjust treatment of Christians (Hellerman, 2005, 
p. 12).  
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For enquiry purposes Justin Martyr’s so-called spermatic logos/Logos idea Second 
Apology VIII (Justyn Martyr, 1868, p. 78)—Plato and others containing the seeds of 
the yet to arrive full Word, subsequently Christ incarnate or otherwise—which 
underlies Hellerman’s claim is cited only in support of this chapter’s argument that 
Greek rational Ethics fell prey to Judeo-Christian virtue Ethics. There is no 
suggestion of a one-Logos definition fits all during these early centuries of 
codification. Under Valentinian gnosis the Logos is reported one of six projections of 
Bythos and Sige Refutations of all Heresies I IX (Hippolytus, 1868, p. 376). In Acts 
of John 13 (Holy Bible, 1932, p. 376), Christ the man praises the Logos-as-Word 
idea, that is, He is somehow separate from it. Tatian (ADc120 – c. 180) urges his 
Stoic-Christian Logos residing in the Father before coming forth as the first begotten 
work of the Father through participation in creation of the world Address to the 
Greeks 5 (Tatian, 1868, p. 9) while Athenagoras (AD 133 – 190) separates Logos 
qua emerging personal existence of God from creation but his claim is finely drawn 
(Athenagoras, 1868a, pp. 385 - 386). For Clement of Alexandria (AD 150 – 215) 
Logos qua divine instructor has ever been present in the world Exhortation to the 
Heathen (1867, p. 21)—he takes this claim from John 1 1—operative in all of 
mankind whom He persuades through their willingness to follow, not by compulsion 
Miscellanies VI 14, VII, (1869, pp. 366 - 371, 409 - 414). So-called Unitarians 
regarded Christ to be simply a man, yet one risen from the dead and one born of a 
virgin, while Monarchians, for example that Praxeas (AD late second century) whom 
Tertullian (AD 160 -220) took to task (Tertullian, 1920), also oppose Logos 
theology.  
During codification of the Christian cannon there was diversity of view about other 
issues now accepted as dogma. For example Athenagoras in Plea for the Christians 
IV (Athenagoras, 1868a, p. 379) and Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead III 
(Athenagoras, 1868b, pp. 426 - 427), and Origen in his Origen contra Celsus VI 60 
(Origen, 1872, p. 402), have Logos making the world along Genesis cosmology lines. 
For example Athenagoras has the Logos always in God and coming forth as “the idea 
and energising power of all material things” Plea of Athenagoras for the Christians 
X (Athenagoras, p. 385) although Origen De Principiis I II 10 (1869, pp. 28 - 29) 
might construe creation in terms of emanation rather than creative act of will, such 
interpretation possibly containing threads of Neoplatonism. There was also division  
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of opinion as to whether the world was made out of pre-existing matter First Apology 
of opinion as to whether the world was made out of pre-existing matter First Apology 
I X (Justin Martyr, 1868, p. 14) or whether the matter used in creating the world was 
itself made out of nothing as for example Origen might persuade De Principiis II 1 - 
II (Origen, 1869, pp. 72 - 77).  
A kind of Greek teleology informs the codification process—human rational mind 
which separates its species from other animals is the final cause of God’s providence 
of a good and bountiful nature ordained for mankind’s needs as for example Origen 
De Principiis II I 3, IV I 7 (Origen, 2009, pp. 74 - 75, 286 - 287) conjectures. Inge 
(1917a, p. 137) names Justin Martyr (AD 100 – 165), Tatian (died AD 185), 
Theophilus of Antioch (c. AD 412 and Athanasius of Alexandra (AD 293 - 373), 
together  with the Gospel of John and the Acts of John as contributing, during times 
of “unrestrained theosophical speculation” (ibid., 137), to an orthodox Christian 
view, or what is now described a tendency or flow towards canonisation. These 
writers rejected Christ’s being a phantom or intermediate spirit somewhere in the 
hierarchy between God and mankind. Rees claims that in countering the docetic 
position, Church Fathers—a generic name used in Rees’ time, and now, to categorise 
early centuries AD so-called Christian theologians recognised as influential to, but 
not necessarily included within canonisation, during early Christian times—might 
have talked “about the Logos to show the pagans that Christianity is in agreement 
with ‘the best thought of our time’, just as our clergy talk about evolution” (ibid., p. 
137) and that the main adversary was Stoicism rather than Platonism. Were Inge 
writing in the early 2000s, he might interpret recent quantum physics-God 
discussions (Wolf, 1996; Zoeller-Greer, 2000) in a similar light or mention sermons 
which reinterpret mankind’s God-given domination over nature in light of concerns 
about global warming, world population statistics and food security. Holmes (2001, 
pp. 411 - 438) argues that Clement (c. AD 150 – 215) allows a three-fold Logos, one 
of creation, one of wisdom and reason, and another of incarnation and says that 
Clement, against the Gnostics, promotes Christianity—now a so-called trajectory of 
Christianity towards canonisation—to be the true gnosis, Greek wisdom being an 
expression of God’s rationality in a Logos-ordered world (ibid., p. 419).  
Greek Apologists, like the Pauline-Johannine writers earlier discussed also  
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confronted the doctrine of the fall and the presence of sin. With Paul they found the 
presence of sin a 
temporary affair that 
would be rectified when 
God brings “all things 
to a state of unity [so 
that all would be] all in 
one” De Principiis 
(Origen, 2009, III ix 6, 
my square brackets). 
The Greek Fathers may 
well have had little tolerance for so-called gnostic interpretations of emanation yet 
they employed ideas of emanation to account for God’s complete creation and rule of 
the world through a common ousia, the Father and Son being homooúsios in the 
manner of radiance to light. (Inge, 1917a, pp. 137 - 138; T. Rees, 1917, p. 212; 
Weinandy, 2007, pp. 49 - 79; Wolfson, 1951, p. 77). 
Latin Fathers, beginning with Tertullian (AD 160 - 220), while generally accepting 
the creation of Genesis outlined 
by the earlier Greek Fathers (T. 
Rees, 1917, p. 212), tended to 
explain creation and being as an 
act of free will of God and drew 
selectively and critically on the 
Stoics, and with less ease and 
sometimes with outright 
antagonism on Plato, to piece together their constructs (Brent, 2012, pp. 76 - 116; 
Colish, 1990, pp. 9 – 37, 142 - 232; W. L. Davidson, 2012, p. 137; Kitzler, 2014, pp. 
1 - 7; T. Rees, 1917, p. 213). 
Tertullian qua Latin father might be read as another example of an agent of a 
Christian church in development, an agent at work within a century of its claimed 
discernible beginning triggered by the Stephen incident in Acts 7: 48 discussed 
Example of a Typical Western Church History Classification of Greek Apologists 
Greek 
Apologists 
Apologists 
who wrote in 
Greek. 
Quadratus (2nd cent AD, 
alive 124) 
Aristides of Athens (2nd 
cent AD alive 126) 
Aristo of Pella (mid 2nd 
cent. AD) 
Justin Martyr (AD 100 – 
165) 
Tatian (died AD 185) 
Miltiades (d. AD 314) 
Apollinaris of Hierapolis 
(2nd cent. AD) 
Athenagoras of Athens 
(c. AD 133 – 190) 
Melito of Sardis (died AD 
180) 
Theophilus of Antioch (c. 
AD 412) 
Polycrates (c AD 130 – 
196) 
The Epistle to Diognetus 
Hermias (anon. late 2nd 
cent.) 
Arnobius (died circa AD 
330) 
Lactantius (circa AD 240 
– 320) 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Turner, C. M. (2009). Primitive 
Premillennialism: A Study in Patristic Chiliasm from the Apostolic Fathers to 
Irenaeus. (n. p.); Panagiotes, K. C. (2005). Greek Orthodox Patrology: An 
Introduction to the Study of the Church Fathers. (pp. 11 - 16). Rollingsford, New 
Hampshire: Orthodox Research Institute. 
Example of a Typical Western Church History Classification of 
Latin Fathers 
Latin 
Fathers 
Church 
Fathers who 
wrote in 
Latin. 
Tertullian (c. AD 
160 – 220)  
Cyprian of 
Carthage (died AD 
258) 
Gregory the Great 
(c. AD 540 – 604) 
 
Augustine of Hippo 
(AD 354 – 430) 
Ambrose of Milan 
(c. AD 338 – 394)  
Jerome (c. AD 340 
– 420) 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Turner, C. M. (2009). 
Primitive Premillennialism: A Study in Patristic Chiliasm from the 
Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus. (n. p.); Panagiotes, K. C. (2005). Greek 
Orthodox Patrology: An Introduction to the Study of the Church Fathers. 
(pp. 11 - 16). Rollingsford, New Hampshire: Orthodox Research Institute. 
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earlier on pages 317 to 319, an agent in selective filtration of ideas helpful for 
consolidation purposes. 
For example, that so-called barbarous heretic Marcion, Against Marcion (Tertullian, 
1878, p. 3) is vilified. Marcion that mouse who has “gnawed the gospels to pieces” 
(ibid., p. 3), that “monster more credible to philosophers than to Christians” (ibid., p. 
3), that barbarous beast whose “restless curiosity”… infected the brethren” 
Prescription against the Heretics XXX (Tertullian, 1870d, p. 34), that scatterer of 
poison, that disciple of the Stoics (ibid., p. 34), is inked in the same paragraph with 
Valentinus that disciple of Plato (ibid., p. 34).  
Tertullian’s antagonism to philosophy is elsewhere expressed. Philosophy stole from 
Jewish truth Apology of Tertullian (Tertullian, 1889, pp. 129 - 135), philosophy 
mocks truth (ibid., p. 139), philosophers live immoral lives (ibid., pp. 125 - 126) and 
religion and philosophy are markedly different from one another in no uncertain 
terms (ibid., pp. 124 - 128). When Gilbert lets fly against doubters of science 
(Gilbert, 1952b, p. 1) all those years later he is not unlike Tertullian letting fly 
against philosophers. Socrates is possessed of a devil (ibid., p. 125), philosophy is 
the parent of heresy Prescription Against the Heretics (Tertullian, 1870d, p. 8), and 
philosophers its patrons On the Soul III (Tertullian, 1870b, p. 416). By contrast no 
solution to problems of philosophy and medicine will be found by man unless it be 
learned from God who is the “sum and substance of the whole thing” (Tertullian, 
1870b, p. 416). Only the rule of faith is constant On the Veiling of Virgins 
(Tertullian, 1870c, pp. 154 - 156), and one is permitted to accept a rule in faith 
before a reason is known for accepting that rule On the Soldier’s Chaplet (Tertullian, 
1869, p. 335).  
It is a wonder then that Greek philosophy and science could get as much as a look in, 
yet Tertullian appears a skilful polemicist and strategist in these competitive times 
Example of a Typical Western Church History Classification  of Apostolic Fathers 
Apostolic Fathers 
Church Fathers who 
lived within two 
generations of the 
Apostles. 
Clement of Rome (died c. AD 
99AD) 
Ignatius of Antioch 
(Theophorus) (c. AD 35 – 98 to 
117) 
 
Polycarp of Smyrna (AD 69 – 
155) 
Didache (anon. late 1st cent. 
AD) 
Shepherd of Hermas (anon. 2nd 
cent. AD) 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Turner, C. M. (2009). Primitive Premillennialism: A Study in Patristic Chiliasm 
from the Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus. (n. p.); Panagiotes, K. C. (2005). Greek Orthodox Patrology: An Introduction to the 
Study of the Church Fathers. (pp. 11 - 16). Rollingsford, New Hampshire: Orthodox Research Institute. 
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and skilfully harbours in various ports during competitive codification storms. For 
example, he calls on Stoic thought, as opposed to Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, 
atomists and others for help with rendering the soul both a spiritual essence and a 
corporeal substance On the Soul (Tertullian, 1870b, pp. 419 - 420). Zeno along with 
Chrysippus (BC 279 – 206) and Cleanthes (born BC 330) are there also named 
helpful. God’s breathing in of soul is contrasted with various philosophical 
explanations (ibid., p. 417 – 418), Cleanthes (BC 330 – c. 230) is helpful for 
explanation of transmission of traits, and Chrysippus (BC c. 80—207) for 
inseparability of body and soul (ibid., p. 419 – 420), sleep and dreams and deception 
of the senses. Tertullian prefers Stoics over Plato on the role of the senses in 
perception (ibid., p. 444 – 445). He, Tertullian, also agrees with Stoics that sleep 
involves temporary cessation of sensual activity (ibid., pp. 507 - 510) and records 
common understanding that soul pervades the whole body (ibid., pp. 487 – 488). His 
argument against Plato’s metempsychosis, notwithstanding his ridicule, is reasoned 
in terms of the Science of the day (ibid., pp. 484 – 488). He is against Aristotle’s 
distinction between soul and mind and addresses views held by Valentinus (AD 100 
– 160), Anaxagoras (BC 500 – 428) and Democritus (BC 460 – 370) on matters of 
the nature of soul (ibid., pp. 435 - 437). He refutes Epicurus (BC 341 – 270) that 
there is nothing after death On the Resurrection of the Flesh (Tertullian, 1870a, p. 
216) but praises Pythagoras (born BC 570/571), Empedocles (BC 495 – 430) and 
Platonism for their avowal of immortality of soul, (ibid., p. 216), and while he takes 
Plato to task on pre-existence of soul, forgetting and anamnesis On the Soul 
(Tertullian, 1870b, pp. 463 - 468) it is by his very act of building on and adapting 
Plato’s construct of soul that Tertullian usurps significant portions of Greek Science 
and explanations of rationality, of which more later on page 331. 
Colish (1983, p. 34) claims that Stoic ideas of nature as ethical creation might be 
found in Cyprian’s On the Dress of Virgins (Cyprian, 1882a) and of strength and 
endurance under duress in his On the Mortality (Cyprian, 1882b). I could not find 
Cyprian (AD c.200 – c. 258) invoking Stoicism directly although the virgins to 
whom his work is addressed are certainly encouraged to prepare for a now 
colloquially understood Stoic earthly resistance to the powers of the flesh, and he 
does draw on John and Paul which writers and/or groups of writers, whoever they 
were, are, inter alia, associated with Stoicism. Cyprian draws on the scriptures in his 
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exhortations to the virgins urging them not to try to improve on nature, that is, God’s 
creation, through the use of cosmetics—a possible Stoic element of nature Ethics 
(Cyprian, 1882a, p. 344).  
Likewise, a more general audience addressed in De Mortalitate (Cyprian, 1868, p. 
461; 2006) is urged to be what is now-called Stoic in the face of plague and 
pestilence, and certainly those addressed would need to be so if confronted by the 
kind of suffering Cyprian describes. Yet his appeal is to Christianity and it is not 
difficult to form a present-age impression that he is leveraging adherence to Christ 
through fear of the abhorrence he portrays. 
Under a Latin-Father treatment of free will mentioned on page 328 of this enquiry 
nature is more independent of the maker and, as with Philo, is a domain through 
which humans can learn about resurrection even before it is revealed to them in 
scriptures On the Resurrection of the Flesh (Tertullian, 1870a, pp. 234 - 236). A 
common law of God “prevailing all over the world, engraven on the natural tables” 
On the Soldier’s Chaplet (Tertullian, 1869, p. 336) makes nature such a domain. 
Such a position, that is, that mankind can access knowledge about God, apart from 
revelation, through study of nature, is a perplexing finding given an already 
established belief in a remote transcendent Judeo-Christian God, and it is somewhat 
Greek. To be sure Plato’s one is remote and past finding out yet is accessed through 
pilgrimage of soul, and Aristotle’s unchangeable final cause is predicated inter alia 
on his observations of perceived so-called perfect cycles of the starry objects, but it is 
the presence of the full Greek Logos qua Christ in creation which quickens soul and 
life of this “huge and immense animal” De Principiis I II 3 (Origen, 1869, p. 74), the 
world, and opens a possibility that insights about the Creator may to be drawn from 
observations of nature. 
Furthermore, in a variation on a theme of Plato, Tertullian finds the human soul to be 
a Greek-Science kind of soul complete with rational and irrational components 
Treatise on the Soul (Tertullian, 1903, p. 194). He attributes God’s given reason qua 
natural soul, to the rational component of the Greek soul, and sin, the devil’s work, to 
the irrational component (ibid., pp. 194 – 195), it having been accrued subsequently 
after its triggering by the fall and first transgression On the Soul (Tertullian, 1870b, 
pp. 422 - 423). Sin is irrational and proceeds from the devil’s inherence in irrational 
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soul. By God’s grace the soul has free will Treatise on the Soul (Tertullian, 1903, pp. 
202 - 203) which can enlist its irascible and concupiscible5 faculties and in this 
manner take control of it (ibid., pp. 201 – 202). 
The irascible and concupiscible faculties of the natural soul, being breathed into 
mankind by God, are laudable under reason but sinful under the irrational component 
(ibid., pp. 194 - 195, 218 – 219) they being, as part of God’s breath, within the 
rational component in Tertullian’s 
variation on Plato, which variation 
flies in the face of Rees’ earlier page 
319 claim that Christianity in 
development adopted current Greek 
Science without change. Sin cannot 
corrupt the rational component per 
se, God being all reason but, after the 
fashion of the Stoics, it can take hold 
of the rational component through 
the free will of mankind (ibid), 
which free will, when it accepts 
God’s grace, is released from sin 
(ibid., pp. 201 – 202). Reason, under 
God’s grace as God’s will, is 
superior to free will (ibid.). Thus sin 
may be occasioned when, not heeding reason’s council, free will engages with the 
irrational components of soul.  
                                                          
5 Good temper is the mean with respect to anger ... and the extremes [are] almost without a name. The excess might [30] be 
called a sort of irascibility. For the passion is anger, and its causes are many and diverse” Nicomachean Ethics 1125b30 (1934; 
1952g, p. 372, my [are] square brackets). Irascibility is associated with being angry “with the wrong persons and at the wrong 
things, more than is right, too quickly, or too long” (ibid., 1126a10, p. 373). “Temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures” 
(ibid., 1117b25, p. 364), particularly the bodily pleasures of “touch and taste” (ibid., 1118a25, p. 364). The self-indulgent man 
is the extreme and “plainly, then, excess in regard to pleasures is self-indulgent and culpable” (ibid., p. 1118b25 – 30, p. 365). 
The self-indulgent man craves pleasant things above all else, and is led by appetite (ibid., 1119a, p. 365). He is a slave to 
gluttony and his self-indulgence can appear brutish (ibid., 1118a25 – 30, p. 365). Aquinas, following Aristotle, discusses 
whether sensuality “is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers” (ST First Part Q. 81, answer, pp. 429 - 430). 
He settles on sensuality as one generic power divided into the irascible and concupiscible and discusses their interdependence. 
In his discussion Aquinas claims that “all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible 
appetite and terminate in them” (ibid., p. 430). In explaining this claim he links sadness and joy with concupiscence and anger 
and vengeance with irascibility and agrees with “the Philosopher” that “the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible, - 
namely, food and sex” (ibid., p. 430). Aristotle explains such matters in History of Animals VIII, 571b8 – 572a5, 588b25 - 
589a10, and IX, 608b19 – 609a5 (Aristotle, 1952c, pp. 97, 115, 133 - 134; 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). 
 
Articles (IVa) to (IVc) 
(IVa) The Logos was placed in the rational domain of the Greek 
soul, and sin in the irrational domain, thereby beginning a 
colonisation of Greek rational and practical virtue by Christian 
absolute virtue, and Greek moral virtue by a moral good-bad 
divide of sin. 
 
(IVb) Sin, which was found in the will of man and not in nature, 
was also found to have tainted nature thereby making nature’s evil 
a moral evil redeemable through Christ as Logos, rather than to be 
addressed in a Greek way through reason as logos. 
 
(IVc) Aristotle’s four-causes explanation of being, and through 
that being, mankind’s rational access to Science and Ethics, was, 
along with the philosophy on which it was partly based, ejected in 
favour of a moral teleology with God in Christ as the cause of all 
in all—a full colonisation, by a Christian moral virtue, of both the 
Greek explanation of being and its attendant scientific and 
metaphysical soul. 
 
(IVd) Following Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) and adoption of Latin 
by Christian fathers Logos understood as nous was translated as 
Word. Use of the word nous was prohibited in the Nicaean Symbol 
(AD 325). Later, following condemnation of the Stoic duality 
doctrine of Logos-as-thought-or-potential and Logos-as-action-or-
God’s-thought-in-action at the Synod of Sirmium (AD 451), the 
word Logos fell into disuse as Latinisation progressed. God the 
Father, as-Memra-as-Word, and Christ the son, as-Logos-as-Word, 
were one in creation, in nature, and in the moral soul of man. 
Greek rational virtues had been temporarily replaced by Christian 
virtues of faith. Again, Aristotelian scientific understanding of 
cause and being had become, relatively speaking, temporarily 
irrelevant. 
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It is by this “noble testimony of the human soul by nature Christian” Apology 
(Tertullian, 1889, p. 54 in the context of pp. 53 - 54) and manifestation of God’s 
works that Tertullian allows access to spiritual knowledge about God from everyday 
study of nature. God constructs nature and prescribes its laws which, when rightly 
studied, instruct humankind in knowledge of God. Tertullian thus opened a door to 
full domination of rational Greek moral virtues by absolute virtues of faith—Articles 
(IVb) and (IVc). Through the human soul’s ability to accommodate knowledge about 
nature and God, the position of Science understood as physics is consolidated a little, 
as those of philosophy in general, and Greek metaphysics in particular, are 
diminished a little—a finding relevant to the clarification of Articles (IVa) and IVc). 
It is as though the Jewish distinction between an absolute thou-shalt-not sin, and be 
virtuous; thou-mayst, and sin; and thou-mayst-and-yet-choose-not-to-sin and wilfully 
not sin, has been given a Christian interpretation and inserted into the Greek soul. 
Sin, an absolute moral affair spelt out in commandments, can be absolved through 
faith in a personal Christ. In this manner, humanity has been relieved of the burden 
of Greek rational responsibility wherein, without a personal God, each one of its 
kind, on the basis of a reasoned approach to moral virtue, is required, every waking 
hour, to assess how to behave appropriately in the face of prevailing but changing 
circumstances. Of course, reasoning must take place under day-to-day Christian 
interpretation of the commandments, and the agony of the human condition cannot 
but remain, but the rules are clear and the way out of the human condition is 
specified under Christian rules, not under philosophical procedures.  
Tertullian reached his conclusions without pronouncing God’s created nature to be in 
and of itself radically evil. The sins of the flesh are neutralised by the grace of God in 
realms outside of nature. Even so it is as if Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) has set up 
conditions under which Augustine (AD 354 - 430) could find that the whole of 
nature was contaminated by sin and that this contamination occurred through an act 
of will. Such corruption happened because, early on, the human soul was, in the good 
and innocent nature of the garden, given over to the devil, the giving over being an 
act of will, not of nature. The corruption of human nature begets, in its turn, the 
corruption of human society. 
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The giving over of the will to sin is pronounced a moral act and the evil Augustine 
finds in God’s would-be-perfect created nature is a moral evil too, brought there 
through the wilful aspects of the soul. The distinction upon which Augustine can find 
God’s created nature both perfect and corrupted by sin is fine and perplexing, its 
origins likely to be found in latent and lingering Manichaeism and/or Platonism (G. 
Clark, 2005, pp. 12 - 32; Coyle, 2009, p. 263; O'Donnell, 2005, p. 47; T. Rees, 1917, 
p. 214; van Oort, 2006, pp. 716-724). 
According to O’Donnell Augustine is something of a snob and social-climbing 
showman who, in his Confessions (Augustine, 1955) at least, constructed a front-of-
house self for public consumption, a construct which might confound biography 
(O'Donnell, 2005, pp. 6, 37, 41, 87 - 109, 119). 
Rees (1917, p. 214) explains Augustine’s perfect but corrupted nature thus: 
Augustine, before his so-called conversion to Christianity, was a Manichean and, 
under the dualist Manicheans, evil and sin were opposites and sin existed alongside 
God. Clark (2001, pp. 17 - 18) explains the duality through a gnosis that Evil invaded 
Light and that our world was created as a transitory insignificance in order to free 
light, a fragment of good entrapped in the darkness of body, Jesus somehow existing 
as a divine spirit who only appeared to die on the cross. 
She claims that the Manichean in Augustine the Hearer allows him to balance his 
need for Christ with his need for his partner and still pursue his goals on earth 
knowing that through service to the Elect his so-called sins as a Hearer might be 
forgiven. Hearer and Elect constitute two membership categories in Manicheanism, 
the Elect being the higher order. Clark bases her exegesis on discoveries of 
Manichaean writings in Coptic texts from Egypt, which include psalms and a Greek 
Mani codex, that is, of sources she claims are free from a chief dependence on so-
called Christian polemic against Manichaeism (ibid., p. 16), sources which might, to 
some extent, provide an anabranch of sorts around otherwise mainly Western 
Christian accounts of Manichaeism, and complaints like those made for example by 
O’Donnell that Augustine rails against Manichaeism rather than explains it. 
Augustine, qua Christian, appears to have found difficulty with the idea that God’s 
creation could contain evil. For so-called Christians, nature together with all created 
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being, was God in Christ as creation (Holy Bible, Colossians, 1: 16 - 20). Valentinus’ 
gnostic Christian explanation discussed on page 386 of how, through many agencies 
and Aeons, and Wisdom’s actions, God’s Pleroma or unfolding emanation had 
crossed the divide between heaven and earth had, by Augustine’s time, been 
significantly replaced by God in Christ as creation. 
Augustine’s solution to the good and evil enigma is to explain evil as deprivation of 
good On Christian Doctrine XI (Augustine, 1873; 2009b, p. 181) in a sense of a 
wound being privation of good flesh, which flesh returns to good through privation 
of the wound, or in a sense that a person comes to exist in a lesser state of being 
through loving something else more than loving God, and thus moving away from 
God’s goodness. Evil, a lesser being through privation of the good as God’s 
presence, is not necessarily the same thing as evil as privation of being per se, in the 
sense of the non-being or nothing before the creation which is difficult, if at all 
possible to understand, let alone meaningfully name good or evil on the basis of 
some criterion predicated on other than circularity or arbitrariness. 
I find it easier to acknowledge that 
evil as privation of good is a possible 
Platonic thread in Augustine’s 
teaching than to acknowledge that 
Plato himself urged in Timaeus (Plato, 
1925h, 1952w) that evil is privation of 
being, and that evil is in nature from 
the very beginning because God 
created nature from nothing in the 
first place. At Timaeus 30a Plato has 
Timaeus tell that, in making the 
world, a good god “desired that all 
things should be as like himself as they could be … [this being] in the truest sense, 
the origin of creation and of the world” Timaeus (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 448, my 
square brackets) and in Theaetetus 176a Socrates informs that evils “can never pass 
away … [and that] having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they 
hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere” (Plato, 1921c; 1952v, p. 530, 
 
Source: Anonymous. (2014). Reproduction of a page from the 
Cologne Mani Codex, in Greek. (5th century AD). Cropped by 
Ian Eddington from Manichaean Writings: The Gnostic Society 
Library. (Anonymous, 2014). 
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my square brackets). In Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w) after the 28b question—
“Was the world, I say, always in existence and without beginning, or created, and 
had it a beginning” (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 447)—Plato has a Demiurge qua 
craftsperson artist creating an ordered world out of something already existing in 
disorder. Creation from nothing flies in the face of a strongly held Greek belief that 
nothing comes from nothing. Runia’s insightful analysis (1986, pp. 287 - 291 within 
pp. 71 - 353) of whether or not Philo, for example, could find a thread of ex nihilo 
creation in Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w), reveals just how finely such threads 
might be stretched. Runia explains that Plato’s primal chaos is Philo’s pre-existent 
matter (Runia, 1986, p. 147) and that Philo’s solution to the ex nihilo question is that 
God first creates matter and then orders it (ibid., p. 149).  
Irrespective of Augustine’s duality, or explanations of it by Rees and Clark, 
Augustine placed God over and above evil and allowed no escape from “this hell 
upon earth” The City of God XXII (Augustine, 1871a, p. 520; 2009a) “save through 
the grace of the Saviour” (ibid., p. 520), a grace which can aid “good men in the 
midst of present calamities, so that they are enabled to endure them with a constancy 
proportioned to their faith” (ibid., p. 521). As well, not “just any philosophy” (ibid., 
p. 521), like, say, that cited by Cicero, can contribute to grace. Only true philosophy 
can, and this is the philosophy given by the Christian Heaven (ibid., p. 521).  
In particular, God’s will is “the cause of things” The City of God IX (Augustine, 
1871a; 1871b, p. 174; 2009a), the efficient cause and spirit of life which “quickens 
all things, and is the creator of every body and of every created spirit” (ibid., p. 194). 
God is thus the formal cause as well. All other causes “make and are made [italics 
added]” (ibid., 194, my square brackets) so that “material causes, which therefore, 
may be rather said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient 
causes because they can do only what the wills of spirits do by them” (ibid., p. 194). 
Because God is prescient, He is the final cause. Whereas all bodies are subject to the 
wills of spirits, which, in turn, are subject to the will of God, and whereas all wills 
are subject to Him, God does not bestow wicked wills.  
Augustine explains that: 
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… our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that 
they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within 
most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, 
for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the 
power to do it, and would do it City of God IX (Augustine, 1871b, pp. 192, 194 
- 196). 
In general, there is no more bringing of form to matter in the Aristotelian sense and, 
along with life, form, beauty and reason, God 
created position, relation and all of those rational 
attributes and predicates of being that occasion the 
basis for knowledge in the Aristotelian categories 
outlined in Table 25 on page 239. Hence, 
Aristotle’s rational explanation of being—“we think 
we have scientific knowledge when we know the 
cause, and there are four causes” Posterior Analytics 94a20 (Aristotle, 1952p, p. 128; 
1960a)—has been substantially colonised. Greek rational being and its attendant 
rational moral virtues and justice of place, have been supplanted by a system of faith 
virtues as intimated in Articles (IVc) and (IVd).  
Through Augustine’s intermingling of scientific, 
philosophical, and theological knowledge (Fortin, 
1996, p. 2) not only were Byzantine, Neoplatonic 
and Latin influences employed (Dougherty, 1999, 
p. 352; Fortin, 1996, p. 2) and, perhaps somewhat 
reconciled, but also reason improved in status 
because it might allow the possibility of more 
certain knowledge about God (Fortin, 1966, pp. 1 – 
5). Although the new Ethics of faith was informed 
by revelation, reason, of necessity, was still 
acknowledged and is certainly employed, even if in 
slavish service to particular mantras and in simple 
logic, in the works of Church Fathers and others 
cited in this section. 
Final marginalisation of rational nous is known. As 
intimated on page 282, the word Logos was not allowed to appear in the Nicaean 
Remains of Aristotle’s Lyceum 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Athens News. (Athens-Macedonian News 
Agency, 2010, Athens News 24 September) 
 
Articles (IVc) and (IVd) 
(IVc) Aristotle’s four-causes explanation of 
being, and through that being, mankind’s 
rational access to Science and Ethics, was, 
along with the philosophy on which it was 
partly based, ejected in favour of a moral 
teleology with God in Christ as the cause of 
all in all—a full colonisation, by a Christian 
moral virtue, of both the Greek explanation 
of being and its attendant scientific and 
metaphysical soul. 
 
(IVd) Following Tertullian (AD 160 - 220) 
and adoption of Latin by Christian fathers 
Logos understood as nous was translated as 
Word. Use of the word nous was prohibited 
in the Nicaean Symbol (AD 325). Later, 
following condemnation of the Stoic duality 
doctrine of Logos-as-thought-or-potential 
and Logos-as-action-or-God’s-thought-in-
action at the Synod of Sirmium (AD 451), 
the word Logos fell into disuse as 
Latinisation progressed. God the Father, as-
Memra-as-Word, and Christ the son, as-
Logos-as-Word, were one in creation, in 
nature, and in the moral soul of man. Greek 
rational virtues had been temporarily 
replaced by Christian virtues of faith. Again, 
Aristotelian scientific understanding of cause 
and being had become, relatively speaking, 
temporarily irrelevant.  
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Creed (AD 325), which creed formalised Christ as Logos as one with the Father. In 
part it reads: 
…and in one Lord JESUS CHRIST, the Son of God, begotten of the Father [the only-
begotten; that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God], Light of Light, very God 
of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance (ὁμοούσιον) with the Father; 
[italics added] by whom all things were made [both in heaven and on earth]. (Schaff, 
1877, p. 29, my italics-added brackets)  
By the time of the Council of Constantinople in AD 381 - 382 other changes had 
been made: 
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father 
before all worlds (æons), Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, 
being of one substance with the Father [italics added]. (Schaff, 1877, p. 29, my italics-
added brackets) 
 
The doctrine of the Stoic twin Logos, which allowed Logos to be either potential in 
the form of un-manifested reason, that is, passive thought, or Logos to be thought of 
God expressed as action, that is, active thought, was eradicated through banning at 
the Synod of Sirmium in AD 541 (Inge, 1917a, p. 138; G. A. Turner, 2009, p. 451). 
The Academy, founded by Plato in BC 387, was closed in AD 526, and, in one sense, 
its closing signals the replacement of the one and the good by the Trinity, and 
symbolises something of a formal temporary closure of rational ethical Greek mind. 
Aristotle’s Lyceum had already been closed by the sacking of Athens in BC 86 or, 
after being re-established in the first century AD, again during the sacking of Athens 
in AD 267. 
Table 38 on page 358 constructed from the content of Sections 1 and 3 depicts 
changes accompanying the conjectured fall of Aristotelian rational ethics to Christian 
virtue ethics. Table 39 on page 359 constructed from the content of Sections 1 and 2, 
and in keeping with thesis methodology, summarises key terms nuance resulting 
from Judeo-Greek intermingling with Christianity in development. Likewise Table 
40 on page 367 carries the key terms nuance of Table 39 to interpretation of Thesis 
Proposition Statements. Before turning to Section 3 which, in light of recent 
research, makes a case that Johannine-Pauline Christology, Hellenisation Theory and 
historical and critical exegesis of scripture remain valid if wanting frameworks for 
enquiry purposes, I briefly comment on codification of Christian canon as a measure 
of Christianity in development.  
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The phrase Christian church in development has, in a context of Johannine-Pauline 
Christology and Hellenisation 
theory, served so far throughout 
this chapter to discuss 
Christianity’s emergence from a 
then extant mix of religious and 
secular persuasions. Some 
inklings of progress of 
Christianity in development up 
to the time of Augustine (AD 
345 – 430)—in so far as 
assembly and ratification of a 
church canon might serve as a 
marker of rate and direction of 
such development—are available 
from comments by some of the 
Church Fathers. For example 
Justin Martyr (AD 100 – 165) 
First Apology LXVII (1868, p. 
65) speaks of a Christian practice 
of reading “memoirs of the 
apostles or the writings of the 
prophets” (ibid., p. 65) on 
Sundays, and Irenaeus (AD 130 
– 202) informs that “it is not 
possible that the Gospels can be 
either more or fewer in number 
than they are” Against Heresies 
III XI 8 (1868, pp. 293 - 295).  
Eusebius’ report of Origen’s views about a Christian canon (Eusebius of Caesarea, 
1850) is given in the text box on page 340 and an almost final compilation provided 
by Augustine (AD 345 – 450) is reproduced in the accompanying box on page 339.  
 
Augustine (AD 345 - 430 ) on Canonisation 
“Now, in regard to the canonical Scriptures, he [the most skilful 
interpreter of the sacred writings] must follow the judgment of the 
greater number of catholic churches; and among these, of course, a high 
place must be given to such as have been thought worthy to be the seat of 
an apostle and to receive epistles. Accordingly, among the canonical 
Scriptures he will judge according to the following standard: to prefer 
those that are received by all the catholic churches to those which some 
do not receive. Among those, again, which are not received by all, he 
will prefer such as have the sanction of the greater number and those of 
greater authority, to such as are held by the smaller number and those of 
less authority. If, however, he shall find that some books are held by the 
greater number of churches, and others by the churches of greater 
authority (though this is not a very likely thing to happen), I think that in 
such a case the authority on the two sides is to be looked upon as equal.  
 
13. Now the whole canon of Scripture on which we say this judgment is 
to be exercised, is contained in the following books:—Five books of 
Moses, that is. Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy; one 
book of Joshua the son of Nun; one of Judges; one short book called 
Ruth, which seems rather to belong to the beginning of Kings; next, four 
books of Kings, and two of Chronicles,—these last not following one 
another, but running parallel, so to speak, and going over the same 
ground. The books now mentioned are history, which contains a 
connected narrative of the times, and follows the order of the events. 
There are other books which seem to follow no regular order, and are 
connected neither with the order of the preceding books nor with one 
another, such as Job, and Tobias, and Esther, and Judith, and the two 
books of Maccabees, and the two of Ezra, which last look more like a 
sequel to the continuous regular history which terminates with the books 
of Kings and Chronicles. Next are the Prophets, in which there is one 
book of the Psalms of David; and three books of Solomon, viz. Proverbs, 
Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes. For two books, one called Wisdom and 
the other Ecclesiasticus, are ascribed to Solomon from a certain 
resemblance of style, but the most likely opinion is that they were written 
by Jesus the son of Sirach. Still they are to be reckoned among the 
prophetical books, since they have attained recognition as being 
authoritative. The remainder are the books which are strictly called the 
Prophets: twelve separate books of the prophets which are connected 
with one another, and having never been disjoined, are reckoned as one 
book; the names of these prophets are as follows:—Hosea, Joel, Amos, 
Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, 
Zechariah, Malachi; then there are the four greater prophets, Isaiah, 
Jeremiah, Daniel, Ezekiel. The authority of the Old Testament is 
contained within the limits of these forty-four books. That of the New 
Testament, again, is contained within the following:—Four books of the 
Gospel, according to Matthew, according to Mark, according to Luke, 
according to John; fourteen epistles of the Apostle Paul—one to the 
Romans, two to the Corinthians, one to the Galatians, to the Ephesians, 
to the Philippians, two to the Thessalonians, one to the Colossians, two 
to Timothy, one to Titus, to Philemon, to the Hebrews; two of Peter; 
three of John; one of Jude; and one of James; one book of the Acts of the 
Apostles; and one of the Revelation of John.” 
 
Source: Augustine. (1872). On Christian Doctrine. (pp. 41 – 42). 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (Augustine, 1872, my square brackets). 
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Eusebius’ comments on who wrote what still raise questions in contestation in these 
first decades of 
the twenty-first 
century. It is 
interesting that 
in his comments 
on the 
authorship of the 
Epistle to the 
Hebrews 
Eusebius does 
not consider that 
a female mind 
may have 
directed the hand 
that lifted it 
above “that 
vulgarity of 
diction which 
belongs to the 
apostle [i.e. 
Paul]” (Eusebius 
of Caesarea, 
1850, p. 246, my 
square brackets). 
Hoppin (2009, p. 
xi), drawing on 
Harnack, adds 
Priscilla (likely alive AD 49) to the list of contended authors.  
SECTION 3: SUBSTANTIATION OF ENQUIRY USE OF JOHANNINE-PAULINE CHRISTOLOGY, 
HELLENISATION THEORY AND NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY EXEGESIS OF SCRIPTURE 
The purpose of this section is limited to corroboration of use made under caveat in 
Sections 1 and 2, of elements of Johannine-Pauline Christology, Hellenisation 
Theory and exegesis of scripture contributed by nineteenth and twentieth century 
 
Eusebius (AD 263 – 339) on Origen’s Version of a Christian Canon 
IN his [Origen] exposition of the first Psalm, he has given a catalogue of the books in the sacred 
Scriptures of the Old Testament, as follows: “But it should be observed that the collective books, 
as handed down by the Hebrews, are twenty-two, according to the number of letters in their 
alphabet” After some further remarks, he subjoins: “These twenty-two books, according to the 
Hebrews, are as follows, ‘That which is called Genesis, but by the Hebrews, from the beginning 
of the book, Bresith, which means, in the beginning. Exodus, Walesmoth, which means, these are 
the names. Leviticus, Waikra, and he called. Numbers, Anmesphekodlim. Deuteronomy, Elle 
haddabarim, that is, these are the words. Jesus the son of Nave, in Hebrew, Joshueben Nun. 
Judges and Ruth, in one book, with the Hebrews, which they call Sophetim. Of Kings, the first 
and second, one book, with them called Samuel, the called of God. The third and fourth of Kings, 
also in one book with them, and called, Wahammelech Dabid, which means, and king David. The 
first and second book of the Paralipomena, contained in one volume with them, and called Dibre 
Hamaim, which means the words, i. e. the records of days. The first and second of Esdras, in one, 
called Ezra, i.e. an assistant. The book of Psalms, sepher Thehillim. The Proverbs of Solomon, 
Misloth. Ecclesiastes, Coheleth. The Song of Songs, Sir Hasirim. Isaiah, Iesaea. Jeremiah, with 
the Lamentations, and his Epistle, in one, Jeremiah. Daniel, Daniel. Ezekiel, Jeezkel. Job, Job. 
Esther, also with the Hebrews, Esther. Besides these, there are, also, the Maccabees, which are 
inscribed Sarbeth sarbane el.’” 
 
These, then, are the books that he mentions in the book mentioned above. But in the first book of 
his Commentaries on the gospel of Matthew, following the Ecclesiastical Canon, he attests that 
he knows of only four gospels, as follows: “As I have understood from tradition, respecting the 
four gospels, which are the only undisputed ones in the whole church of God throughout the 
world. The first is written according to Matthew, the same that was once a publican, but 
afterwards an apostle of Jesus Christ, who having published it for the Jewish converts, wrote it in 
the Hebrew. The second is according to Mark, who composed it, as Peter explained to him, 
whom he also acknowledges as his son in his general Epistle, saying, ‘The elect church in 
Babylon, salutes you, as also Mark my son’. And the third, according to Luke, the gospel 
commended by Paul, which was written for the converts from the Gentiles, and last of all the 
gospel according to John. And in the fifth book of his Commentaries on John, the same author 
writes as follows: “But he being well fitted to be a minister of the New Testament, Paul, 1 mean a 
minister not of the letter but of the spirit; who, after spreading the gospel from Jerusalem and the 
country around as far as Illyricum, did not even write to all the churches to which he preached, 
but even to those to whom he wrote he only sent a few lines. But Peter, upon whom the church of 
Christ is built, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, has left one epistle undisputed. 
Suppose, also, the second was left by him, for on this there is some doubt. “What shall we say of 
him who reclined upon the breast of Jesus, I mean John? who has left one gospel, in which he 
confesses that he could write so many that the whole world could not contain them. He also wrote 
the Apocalypse, commanded as he was, to conceal, and not to write the voices of the seven 
thunders. He has also left an epistle consisting of very few lines; suppose, also, that a second and 
third is from him, for not all agree that they are genuine, but both together do not contain a 
hundred lines”. To these remarks he also adds the following observation on the ‘Epistle to the 
Hebrews’, in his homilies on the same: The style of the Epistle with the title, To the Hebrews, has 
not that vulgarity of diction which belongs to the apostle, who confesses that he is but common in 
speech, that is in his phraseology. But that this epistle is more pure Greek in the composition of 
its phrases, everyone will confess who is able to discern the difference of style. Again, it will be 
obvious that the ideas of the epistle are admirable, and not inferior to any of the books 
acknowledged to be apostolic. Every one will confess the truth of this, who attentively reads the 
apostles writings”. To these he afterwards again adds: “But I would say, that the thoughts are the 
apostles, but the diction and phraseology belong to some one who has recorded what the apostle 
said, and as one who noted down at his leisure what his master dictated. If then, any church 
considers this epistle as coming from Paul, let it be commended for this, for neither did those 
ancient men deliver it as such without cause. But who it was that really wrote the epistle, God 
knows. The account, however, that has been current before us is, according to some, that Clement 
who was bishop of Rome wrote the epistle: according to others, that it was written by Luke, who 
wrote the gospel and the Acts. But let this suffice on these subjects. Ecclesiastical History 
(Eusebius of Caesarea, 1850, pp. 245 - 247, my square brackets) 
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scholars. Its conjecture is that, notwithstanding the light of Nag Hammadi, recent 
Jewish-Christian interpretations of Christianity in development, and claims of 
redaction, recension, pseudography, dating uncertainties, fraud, polemics in respect 
of scriptures themselves, this chapter’s partial use of Johannine-Pauline Christology, 
Hellenisation Theory and nineteenth and twentieth century scriptural exegesis is 
valid. 
To wit, some present depictions of first century Christianity in development render it 
friendly or unfriendly ideas-exchange amongst a potpourri of differing religious 
community beliefs eddying into currents of an arriving canonistic stream later 
codified in such a manner as to allow identification of a Christian church, some 
general differentiation between Judaism and Christianity and fuzzy border use of 
terms like Gnosticism. Yet for example such depiction is not fatal to Harnack’s 
contention of so-called acute Hellenisation which, even though long since questioned 
(Casey, 1964/2009, p. 52; R. M. Wilson, 1959, pp. 161 - 170) remains respected, 
providing, with other of his contributions (Harnack, 2007), a starting point for 
ongoing analyses in Christology and Hellenisation about such contentions as 
Marcion’s gospel and Pauline canon (S. E. Porter, 2004, pp. 99 - 106; Roth, 2010, 
pp. 287 - 289). Gnosticism’s status as philosophy too has been refuted (R. M. Grant, 
1966, p. 120).  
Danielou (1964) presents an alternative to Gnosticism qua gentile Hellenism in his 
claim that the structure and expression of so-called early 
Christian theology is Semitic (ibid., p. 10) and that a 
bridge from Jewish Christianity to so-called Gnosticism 
was built of exegetical targumin, in Danielou’s case not 
of the Aramaic but of revised Greek versions, ancient 
Jewish Christian Midrash, and Jewish speculative 
commentary about the cosmology of Genesis 1 – 3 (ibid., p. 167). Elsewhere though, 
Danielou allows that so-called Gnosticism also borrowed from Hellenistic 
philosophy and other pagan ideas (ibid., p. 28) so that he has not completely 
jettisoned Greek influence which is unlikely not to be present to some degree in 
those revised Greek versions of targumin.  
 
Targumin 
Targumin, in Jewish Aramaic 
antiquity of the late first century BC, 
consisted of translations and 
explanations of Tanaka spoken in 
various common languages of 
peoples short on fluency in Hebrew. 
Some targumin sayings were written 
down and subsequently found 
contested use in Babylon. 
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Guitton (1963) offers a view that Gnosticism is a function of human condition 
exemplified, in the case of Roman Catholic Church history at least, by a recurring 
pattern of emerging gnosis in times of crises, for example in response to such so-
called heresies as Arianism, Catharism and even the Protestant Reformation. Gnosis 
so interpreted is a kind of eternal condition of humanity even though its recurrence 
happens in discrete independent steps, each gnostic truth emerging from its own 
particular crisis. While gnostic spirit is eternal its successive discrete emergences 
may be incommensurate with each other, there being no continuity between 
appearances. Given Guitton allows each gnosis an emergence from particular 
conditions it is difficult, even on the basis of such unfriendly or measured references 
to Greek philosophy and science discussed in Section 2, to rule out perceptions of 
gentile Greek dampening of a developing church’s religiosity.  
Van Groningen suggests that while Harnack recognised a contribution of “the spirit 
of scientism” (1967, p. 111) to origin and motif in Gnosticism, he did not give it 
sufficient emphasis. Yet Harnack’s references to Science throughout Volume 1 of his 
History of Dogma (Harnack, 1997, pp. 123, 241, 337, 338, 342, 362 - 363) reveal, 
given his stated focus on gentile philosophising of Christianity, that is, secularisation 
of it relative to, and at the expense of, its ongoing mystification, Harnack had 
Science’s measure. His discussion of the possible origins of Gnosticism admits 
manifold threads including Persian, Samarian and Babylonian influence reaching 
through Judaism (ibid., pp. 242 – 252) as the earlier dialogue box on page 318 
reveals.  
Porter and Pitts (2013, pp. 1 - 9) say that scholarly Jewish-roots explanations of 
primitive Christianity during the twentieth century relying on rabbinic-explanations 
exemplified for example, by Bultmann (1955) and Montefiore (1930), are 
distinguishable from many of those of the second half of that same century which 
rely on Second Temple literature (ibid 1 – 2). The so-called paradigm shift was, they 
say, occasioned by publications by Sandmel (1962) who exposed rabbinic 
explanations of Paul and Jesus to be anachronistic (ibid., p. 2); by Neusner (1971) 
whom they say, posits that “we can no longer be certain that a tradition found 
amongst the rabbis seldom goes back to traditions extant prior to AD 70” (S. E. 
Porter & Pitts, 2013, p. 2); by Hengel (1974) who conjectured that the distinction  
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between Hellenistic and Palestinian 
Judaism in the centuries prior to Christ 
is false, all Judaism during those times 
being Hellenistic (ibid., p. 3), which 
Hellenistic Judaism goes back as least 
prior to the Maccabean revolt (BC 167 – 
160); and by discovery of the Nag 
Hammadi codices which, through 
allowing inspection of a strand of 
Judaism coincident with earliest 
Christianity, facilitated a shift of focus 
away from late antiquity and medieval 
rabbinic documents. Hengel’s 
conjecture of widespread Hellenisation 
(Hengel, 2003, p. 55), is not fatal to 
Harnack. Christianity in development 
may have been Hellenised through gentiles at Alexandria and elsewhere, through 
Hellenised Jews in Judea and elsewhere, or through all of these.  
Bos rejects views of Gnosticism as a would-be corrupter of Christianity, or a wild 
offshoot of Greek philosophy, or a manifestation of Jewish tradition to conclude that 
“ties between Greek philosophy and Gnosticism go deeper than any other” (Bos, 
1994, p. 2). He notes an inability of scholars to settle on a definition of Gnosticism 
and in a passing aside opines that “scholars can seldom transcend the limitations of 
their own orientations” (ibid.)—good ballad forewarning for one attempting to 
fathom extant Nag Hammadi and Qumran scriptures—Bos’s conclusion being that 
Hellenistic Gnosticism is informed by Aristotle’s distinction between reasoned 
knowledge and intuition, his sleeping World-soul cosmo-psychology and double 
theology, rather than by Middle Platonism (ibid., pp 7 – 8). Desjardins (1994, pp. 
309 - 321) finds simultaneous developments of Christianity and Gnosticism coeval 
with a three-way struggle amongst Jews, Christians and Gnostics. King (2005, p. 
226) claims that much scholarship prior to the discovery of Nag Hammadi texts in 
1945 incorrectly presented Gnosticism as a consolidated religion which challenged 
Christianity and that little of such consolidated religion existed, an opinion not really 
 
Background to the Nag/Naj Hammadi Codices 
The Nag Hammadi legacy (M. M. Meyer, 2009; J. M. 
Robinson, 2000) consists of thirteen ancient codices 
containing some fifty books presently known to have survived 
their 1945 unearthing from beside a rock located in or near the 
Jabal al-Tárifredi range not far from Naj 'Hammádì in Egypt 
(Pagels, 1989b, pp. xiii - xiv), or thereabouts depending on 
differing versions (M. M. Meyer, 2009, pp. 2 - 5). These 
codices together with the Berlin Gnostic Codex 8502 (Groupe 
BCNH, 2014), and the Codex Tchacos (F. P. Miller, 
Vandome, & McBrewster, 2011), are commonly referred to as 
the Gnostic Library. Some of the texts in the codices 
contained more than one version and there are now various 
English translations, the Myer translation cited earlier being a 
recognised international edition which also contains 
translations of Tchacos and Berlin Codices content. The Nag 
Hammadi texts are believed to be transcriptions from Greek 
into Egyptian Coptic, evidenced by the presence of fragments 
of Greek-language versions of the Coptic found amongst a 
tranche of texts from a garbage dump (B. P. Grenfell & A. S. 
Hunt, 1898; B. P Grenfell & A. S. Hunt, 1898a, 1898b; POxy, 
2014) in the vicinity of ancient Oxyrhynchus, located by 
present-day al-Bahnasa in the Fayum. The Nag Hammadi 
gospels of Thomas, Mary, Philip and Truth have generated 
contested exegesis about the nature and content of the 
Synoptic Gospels and the manner in which the Christian 
Canon was assembled, thereby enhancing and extending 
earlier understandings gleaned from study of the words and 
reported actions of persons of various Christian persuasions 
over time, for example Irenaeus AD 130 - 202, Athanasius 
AD c.293 – 373, Origen AD c. 184 – c. 253, Marcion AD 85 
– 160, Justin, AD100 – 165, and Tertullian AD 160 – 220 yet 
without completely demolishing those earlier understandings.  
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lost on Harnack. Wilkin, in debating Harnack’s view that the identification of the 
Logos with Christ represents the fall of Christianity to Greek philosophy, would 
rather have it that early Christian thought represents the “Christianization of 
Hellenism” (Wilken, 2003, p. xvi). Yamauchi (1994, p. 29) holds that Harnack’s 
Hellenisation thesis is too simplistic and acknowledges Gnosticism’s possible 
existence in pre-Christian times. Pangels (1992, p. 3) reveals that the Gnostics took 
much from Paul, their fierce adversary. Hill (2004, p. 446) claims that the 
Christology of the Logos as it evolved up to the time of Valentinus (AD 100 – 160) 
and his followers (AD 2 - 4 centuries) is a product of an adversarial dispute amongst 
many groups. He says that a view that the Johannine Gospel was generally avoided 
or resisted by orthodox Christians, while being treasured by various dissenting 
groups throughout most of the second century, is an oversimplification.  
In short, Hellenisation as Harnack reasons it—Hellenisation of Roman Christianity in 
development largely consists of absorption of gentile Greek ideas and practices 
confronted in its engagement with so-called gnostic sects—stands alongside 
conjectures that Hellenised Christianity might well have emerged from within 
Hellenised Judaism itself, via a widespread Hellenisation of Jew and gentile alike. 
While Harnack’s thesis has been refined through challenge, Hellenisation theory per 
se has become richer for it. Thus enquiry use of Harnack’s work to outline a working 
definition of Gnosticism, and its application elsewhere under caveat, is valid as is 
enquiry use of Hellenisation Theory more widely defined to accommodate discussion 
of diaspora in Judea and Palestine. Work by Walter Bauer (AD 1877 - 1960) is 
considered valid on the similar grounds and discussion of it in the next paragraph 
leads to a question of whether or not dating uncertainties of scripture and associated 
claims of fraud, redaction, recension, polemics and so called apocryphalness in turn 
require some qualification of the validity of Johaninine-Pauline Christology, 
scriptural exegesis and Hellenisation Theory established in the preceding paragraphs.  
Walter Bauer’s classic Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Earliest Christianity (Bauer, 
1971), now further articulated and also contested (Holmberg, 2008, pp. 10 - 16; T. A. 
Robinson, 1988), yet still robust, contains an opinion that in the early centuries AD 
so-called heretical groups did not splinter from a so-called orthodox Christianity, but 
rather a proto-orthodox group finally emerged to marginalise minor groups as 
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heretical in the manner of the construct and refutations earlier exemplified by such 
writers as Ireneaus (AD 130 – 202), Origen (c. AD 184 – 253) and Tertullian (AD 
c.160 – c.225). Ehrman, in a manner after Bauer, describes what he names orthodox 
corruption of scriptures as a process through which “proto-orthodox scribes of the 
second and third centuries … [modified] their texts of Scripture to make them 
conform more closely with their own Christological beliefs” (Ehrman, 2011b, p. xiii, 
my square brackets), the scribes being motivated, inter alia, in preventing their use 
by “Christians who espoused aberrant views” (ibid., p. xi). A fuzzy borders problem 
of the kind discussed on pages 350 to 351 of this inquiry accompanies Ehrman’s 
contribution. Ehrman’s stated focus is on the process per se of alteration of text in a 
setting of ante-nicene tussle for supremacy among groups competing for so-called 
orthodoxy, rather than on the question of originality of text per se (ibid., p. xi). His 
surrogate for an original text is the NA27 (Nestle, Aland, & Aland, 2007). Yet some 
of the variations of text he addresses in the work under discussion, and elsewhere 
(Ehrman, 2011a), go to the very heart of Christianity—the resurrection, times and 
destinations of Jesus’ travels and identity of persons he met (ibid., p. 205), 
uniqueness of Jesus as Son and hence the question of the virgin birth (Ehrman, 
2011b, pp. 54, 78 - 82, 47 - 118) and Jesus forsaken on the cross (ibid., 175 – 176). 
Big names are involved in the forgery claim, for example Peter, Paul, Matthew, 
Mark, Luke and John (Ehrman, 2011a, pp. 9 - 10), attribution of text to the latter 
four, in Ehrman’s view, not occurring until the time of Irenaeus (AD c.130 – c.202) 
sometime around AD 185 (ibid., p. 225), rather than beginning earlier in the time of 
Papias (c.AD 95 – 120) as contested (M. Holmes, 2007, pp. 722 - 732; Yarbrough, 
1983, pp. 181 - 191). 
Ehrman classifies so-called heretical groups as Adoptionist, Christ was a man, but 
not a God; Docetist, Christ was a God but not a man; separationist, divine Christ and 
Christ the man are separate beings; and Patripassiantist, God the Father suffered 
along with Christ the Son. Ehrman’s method is to explain scribed variations 
discernible amongst available texts as manifestations of efforts by some of orthodox 
persuasion to counterbalance alterations made by such heretical groups mentioned in 
the sentence above. He also allows that these heretical groups might be making 
counter-variations each against the others but he does not play up this kind of 
oligopolistic counter-claim trading in theological ideas, there possibly being 
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divisions within each group anyway. It is entirely possible from a relativist 
perspective that humans of one group may deconstruct another group’s careful 
exegesis and brand it in turn eisegesis, and vice versa, and the process may go on ad 
infinitum. But in Ehrman’s case such a troublesome infinite regress is on hold in that 
orthodoxy is associated with the group recognised as coming up triumphant in the 
fourth century in ongoing adduction, or otherwise, of earlier writers to their canon, 
the so-called New Testament. Polemical treatise, pseudography, appropriation of 
apostolic works to their canon, and specified hermeneutical procedure are 
pronounced the stuff of the ideas-exchange forging of the Christian canon. Ehrman 
plays down a possibility that variations are a result of limited secretarial correction of 
text. (Ehrman, 2011a, pp. 135 - 139).  
Ehrman is not without his critics. For example Wasserman (2012), upon the basis of 
his examination of seventeen examples of orthodox corruption provided by Ehrman, 
finds Ehrman’s work seriously defective (ibid., p. 328) and problematic first, on a 
basis of sampling, Ehrman having harvested the whole crop to prove his 
preconception without careful cross referencing of the tendencies of individual 
witnesses who are not necessarily always consistent in themselves, and second, (a) 
on a basis of unsatisfactory mechanical classification of so-called variations as either 
original or orthodox corruption, and (b) on a basis of philological and text-critical 
groundworks insufficiently sensitive to contexts in which variation is discussed. 
Ehrman, he claims, has not paid due attention to such matters as “the peculiarities of 
individual manuscripts and their scribe(s), the citation habits of church fathers, and a 
familiarity with the character of a particular version and its limitations in 
representing the Vorlage from which it was translated” (ibid., p. 350).  
Messer (2011, pp. 127 - 188), in responding to Ehrman, inter alia addresses 
methodological issues associated with Ehrman’s treatment of Matthew 24: 36 and 
John 1: 1, and whether or not, in cases of textual variation, the least orthodox 
variation, or not necessarily the most orthodox variation, is to be preferred and on 
what grounds, a question of interest to Miller (2011, pp. 57 - 90) who suggests that 
Ehrman uses least preferred variations (ibid., p. 58) and questions this against a 
standard of textual criticism predicated on preference for texts that best explain the 
existence of the other variants. Messer (2011), in respect of Matthew 24: 36 which he 
 347 
says is Ehrman’s prime example of orthodox corruption (ibid., p. 130), chooses, 
against Ehrman, the shorter of the two versions as the one on which redaction was 
made.  
In summary, the preceding discussion on pages 344 to 346 and earlier of fraud, 
redaction, recension, polemic, dating uncertainties and the like in scriptures, although 
of great interest to many on a number of grounds and insightful on many counts, 
does not render this chapter’s use of Johannine-Pauline Christology, Hellenisation 
theory and nineteenth and twentieth century exegesis of scriptures invalid 
frameworks for conjecture about a fall of Aristotelian rational ethics to Christian 
virtue ethics. Irrespective of authenticity of authorship, time or times of redaction 
and recension of scriptures whether by Jewish or gentile hands, Christology, 
Hellenisation theory and exegesis of scripture have, through ongoing refinement, 
remained shared dialects of a lingua franca central to explanations of Western Judeo-
Christian tradition since the nineteenth century.  
To continue, redaction and recension are also found in explanations of Hellenisation 
and critical exegesis employed by scholars focussing more narrowly on 
Christianity’s emergence form Judaism. For example, Boyarin (2012), inter alia, 
ventures beyond a presence of binitarianism in Judaism—which presence is 
recognised elsewhere in this chapter in discussions of the wisdom literature, the 
Logos and Word interpretation, Philo and early ‘Israelite’ polytheism—to claim that 
the idea of a Trinity was also present in Jewish thought well before Jesus (ibid., p. 
102). 
Boyarin’s Son-of-God claim is based in part on his exegesis of Daniel 7 which he 
interprets as suppression of evidence of a God that was “more-than-singular” (ibid., 
p. 43), and in part on his own suggestion that “Perhaps … [Christ’s] followers saw 
him arisen, but surely this must be because they had a narrative that led them to 
expect such appearances, and not that the appearances gave rise to the narrative 
[sic.]” (ibid., p. 159, my square brackets). A corollary of Boyarin’s claim would be 
that a basis for Christ’s transformation from born-son-of-man to born Son-of-God 
might be found standing alone in Judaism outside of a Hellenised Christian 
explanation along Christ/logos lines.  
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Knohl (2002), inter alia, prompts the question of a precedence for Jesus’s presence 
as Messiah and divine in John and the 
writings attributed to Paul, and his 
lesser presence as son of man in the 
Synoptic Gospels. His answer is that 
Jesus, an Essene, possibly inherited the 
legacy of Menahem the Essene (ibid., 
p. 51) who, one generation earlier 
during the time of Hillel (c. BC 110 – 
AD 7), after being murdered for his 
unwanted Messianic claims, was said 
by his followers to have risen on the third day, and thereafter been promoted by them 
as a divine being. Knohl draws on hymn fragments 4QHodayota  and 4QHodayote in 
the thanksgiving or to-the-teacher genre, and War Scroll 4Q491, Frag. 11, Col. 1 
from the Qumran scrolls. His exegesis relies on a mention of a Paraclete at John 14: 
16, whom he declares successor to Menahem (ibid., p. 71) mentioned in Mishnah and 
Talmud (Hagiga 2.2; 77b). The Menahem-Jesus link helps explain an emergence of 
Christianity from Judaism. The 4Q and War Scroll fragments Knohl uses, even 
though they pre-date Cave  1 fragments, are grouped in the thanksgiving-teacher 
genres because of their partial style similarity to some of those Cave 1 fragments 
initially assigned the generic name 1QHodayot (Puech, 2000, pp. 365 - 369). While 
Cave 4 fragments 4QHoyayot(a-e) collectively date from “shortly after 100 BC 
(middle Hashmonean)” (ibid., p. 366) down to the first quarter of the first century BC 
(ibid., p. 366), 1QHodayota-b fragments date from “the beginning of our era or 
shortly before it” (ibid., p. 366). The fragments Kohl uses are likely recensions—1Q 
and 4Q fragments thought to be copies of earlier versions in use during the middle of 
the second half of the second century BC (ibid., p 368)—which recension status 
likely renders Knohl’s Menahem hypothesis more finely than it might his more 
general claim of a Menahem-Messiah seeding of Christianity. The eschatological war 
content of the fragments accommodates dualism, determinism, and predestination 
and tells of a coming defeat of evil gods and their demons, beginning with Belial, a 
war in which angels participate, and pagans are finally converted (ibid., p. 368). 
 
 
Source: Matson, E. (photographer). A Photograph of a 
Fragment of the War Scroll. Jerusalem: Matson Photo Service. 
(Matson, 2012). 
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Hengel (2003), conjectures that most of Judaism including that of Palestine was so-
called Hellenised before the Christian 
era and that “the whole development 
of Christological doctrine could have 
taken place completely within 
Palestinian Judaism” (ibid., p. 55) 
there being “hardly any doctrinal 
theme in the New Testament doctrine 
which could not have been thought or 
taught in Palestine” (ibid.), even a 
Son-of-God idea not being un-Jewish 
or un-Palestinian. He cautions that, although during some three hundred years of 
Greek influence, the Greek language had become widely known, Greek speaking 
Jewish Christians in Jerusalem and elsewhere, with the exception of James and the 
author of Hebrews, were wholly or substantially wanting of a complete classical 
Greek education and that very few Greek speakers in the mother country and 
Palestine would have read the Greek classic writers and philosophers in the original. 
Rather, he says, the Greek Christian word was spread by creative middle class 
orators, the influence of a more solid Greek education beginning to appear in the 
second century AD, harbingered in by Luke, now Luke-Acts (AD 80 -100) with 
possible second century redaction, Clement of Rome (died AD 99 or 101) and the 
author of Hebrews (circa AD 60s). According to Hengel, the “beginning of what, in 
Harnack’s words, was the final ‘Hellenizing of Christianity’” (ibid., p. 56), occurred 
about the time of emperor Hadrian (AD 117 – 138) with the first significant 
Gnostics, Basilides (AD first century known teaching before 138) and Valentinus 
(AD 100 – 160), with Marcion (AD 85 – 160), and around the same time with the 
Apologists” (ibid., p. 56), the dates inserted for Hadrian, Valentinus and Marcion 
being mine, Hengel not having inserted any. Harnack’s acute Hellenisation thus 
appears coincident with Hengel’s final Hellenisation. 
Treshan (2009, p. 71) posits it likely that Jesus spoke and taught in both Aramaic and 
Greek, with order of usage yet to be determined. As noted on page 310 Jesus is said 
to have left no theological writings and it is likely that variable circumstances, 
location, audience and the like might well have determined a bi-lingual Jesus’ choice 
 
Midrash and Mishnah 
Midrash is exegesis aimed at explication of difficult sections of 
the Tanaka, which when its focus is on sources of received 
laws, is Midrash halakha and when its focus is on non-legal 
matters of homily—spirits, mysticism and the like—is Midrash 
aggadah. Midrash is provided by Rabbinical Sages in the post 
temple era.  
 
Talmud is a text of Rabbinic Judaism consisting of Mishnah—
written redaction of rabbinic oral Torah or instructions, and 
Gemara—elucidation of Mishnah, and other writings of the 
Tannaim (AD 10 – 200). There are six orders of Mishnah each 
containing 7-12 tractates further divided into chapters and 
verses. Hagiga(h) is the twelfth tractate of the second order 
which addresses festivals. Chapter 2 of Hagiga(h) discusses 
purity. Talmud usually refers to the Babylonian Talmud 
although there is an earlier Jerusalem Talmud.  
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of language from day to day. In any event language is a human tool and one cultural 
construct, whether it be of Hebrew or Greek origin, may be expressed in different 
languages. Jesus may well have been a radical questioner of temple cult irrespective 
of the language he used, and projected Himself divine son of God from ideas found 
in Greek logos or Judaic polytheism or both. 
Schäfer (2012) investigates Rabbinic Judaism under the influence of Christianity in 
the first centuries following the destruction of the temple in AD 70. He brings 
historical and political dimensions to his exegesis of an emergence of Christianity 
from Judaism in an approach which, while not completely jettisoning received 
academic construct about the rigidity of boundaries between say Christianity and 
Judaism, orthodoxy and heresy, inside and outside and the like, nevertheless 
proceeds from a claim that boundaries between and within religions in the period of 
late antiquity were much more fluid than hitherto understood—and during his 
exposition of that claim he derives a number of significant propositions.  
For example, some of his claims are that Christianity and Judaism as sister religions 
fluidly borrowed from one another and that under rabbinical Judaism, ideas that 
Christianity had appropriated from Judaism were reappropriated from Christianity, 
his example being the construct of the suffering Messiah that evolved from the 
suffering servant of Isaiah, usurped by New Testament Christianity, consequently 
suppressed by rabbis, only to be reappropriated in the seventh century AD as a 
Messiah named Ephraim who is commanded to take on the sins of a humanity not yet 
created (ibid., pp. 236 - 237); that Jewish monotheism in practice was less rigorous 
than in rhetoric (ibid,. p. 2); that rabbis engaged in discourse with both Romans and 
Christians about plurality of gods on their road to a final rejection of an equally 
tempting and threatening Son-of-God Christology (pp. 27 - 54); that questions about 
an old God and a young God in the Hebrew Bible or Tanaka—and therefore a 
questioning of an ever was and unchanging God—was resolved differently in 
Palestine than in Babylon, the Babylonians leaning towards a binitarian interpretation 
where, in the Babylonian Talmud at Daniel 7: 9, the Messiah-King, David, is 
assigned a throne in heaven, his habitation in that place being described in the David 
Apocalypse, which ascendency has its parallel in the ascendency of the Lamb Jesus 
in the Book of Revelation in the New Testament (ibid., pp. 68 - 102); that a fourth 
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century AD midrash of Rav Idith, presumably a Babylonian amora who lived around 
AD 350 (ibid., p. 279), against elevation, by some rabbis, of Metatron to lesser god 
status, is an insider midrash against so-called heretical Babylonian Jews who 
deliberately elevated Metatron in defence of challenges to their religion from 
Christianity’s New Testament elevation of Jesus (ibid., pp. 103 - 149); that ancient 
Judaism was well on the way to introducing intermediate levels of angelic power and 
that rabbis in Palestine were more successful than those in Babylon in countervailing 
the trend; that according to one midrash, God made Adam mortal only after some 
angels began to worship him, a midrash which he says is corroborated by Philo’s 
identification of the heavenly Adam with the Logos and Paul’s subsequent 
identification of the Adam-Logos with Jesus Christ—again a midrash against rabbis 
believed influenced by possible Christological interpretations (ibid., pp. 197 - 213); 
that a midrash from the Jerusalem Talmud focussing on the disappearance of a 
newborn Messiah is evidence of Judaism’s attempt to expel Christianity, then 
recognised as part of Judaism, from itself (ibid., pp. 214 - 234)—to use Schäfer’s 
word, Christianity, a new religion, is excreted from Judaism (ibid., p. 17), which for 
some readers might occasion an involuntary whoa-there-why-say-it-that-way 
questioning call for speculative deconstruction about Schäfer’s motive. Subterfuge, 
polemic and attitude are likely still in there informing interpretation of scripture and 
may well be elements of scriptures themselves. 
Schäfer allows himself boundaries of a kind such as claims that the main opponents 
of the rabbis were Christianity and Greco-Roman polytheism and that Palestine and 
Babylon might be differentiated by geo-theological and political dimensions, other 
boundaries such as orthodox or heretical (ibid., p. 5 - 9) coming and going by virtue 
of the presence or absence of inverted commas. Boyarin, to some extent, (2001, 
2005, 2010) also belongs to a scholarship which, for greater or lesser contradiction, 
leads readers, if not the authors themselves, beyond the comfort of expositions 
predicated on us-and-them compartmentalisation and categorisation of groups, 
borders and the like. Such writings trend against received theory based on working 
definition categorisations such as Christian and Judaic, as can be found for example 
in Herford (1903) and Segal (2002). 
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Herford’s book Christianity in Talmud and Midrash. (1903) reprinted in 2013, 
remains a respected work which, inter alia, 
provides a full regimen of “passages from the 
rabbinic literature illustrating the rise and 
development of Christianity in the early 
centuries (ibid., pp. 35, 35 – 338). Segal’s work 
Two powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports 
about Christianity and Gnosticism (2002) 
differentiates Complementary Dualism (ibid., 
pp. 6 -7, 17) from Antagonistic Dualism (ibid., 
pp 11, 17). Complementary dualism is centred 
on the two-figures-in-heaven-vision of Daniel 
7: 9 (ibid., pp. 40, 49, 67), a possibility of an 
angelic mediator between man and God, justice 
and mercy being independent beings, and Adam 
being an angel assistant to God his creation of 
the world (ibid., pp.109 – 113). Antagonistic 
Dualism posits that the Jewish God who created 
the world is a lesser god, who unlike the most 
transcendent God, knows evil. Segal claims that 
Christianity, arriving amongst a number of complementary dualist varieties of 
Judaism, was rejected by rabbis in the first century AD on the basis of its own 
unattractive version of Complementary Dualism and consequently, during the second 
century under the influence of Gnosticism, became Antagonistic Dualism, the Jewish  
God being associated with evil. He also speculates that some rabbis would classify 
Philo and Gnosticism as strands of two-powers-in-heaven (ibid., pp. 10, 17, 23-24) 
Antagonistic Dualism.  
Schäfer’s sources cannot be the written rabbinical engagement with Herford’s 
bounded defined minim so, even though he sometimes mines the same Midrash and 
Talmud as Herford, he names it “the rabbinic literature for the rabbis’ discussion of 
all kinds of ‘heretics’” (ibid., p. 8). 
 
Herford’s Bounded Understanding of the 
Minim 
“We have seen that the term 'Min' denotes an 
unfaithful Jew, one who was not loyal at heart to 
the principles of the Jewish religion, and who 
either in thought, word, or deed was false to the 
covenant between God and Israel. We have now to 
inquire whether the term was applied to all Jews 
tainted with heresy, or whether it was restricted to 
the adherents of one particular heresy and, if so, 
which heresy?” (Herford, 1903, pp. 365-366).  
 
“The Minim, then, are unfaithful Jews condemned 
as such, but not admitting themselves to be such. 
Therefore the name applied to them was a term of 
abuse, not merely a descriptive epithet such as ' 
apostate', 'betrayer,' or ‘freethinker.' A Min might 
be an apostate, or a betrayer, and could hardly fail 
to be a freethinker but the real nature of his offence 
was rather that of a moral taint than an intellectual 
perversity.” (Herford, 1903, p. 367) 
 
“The theory that the Minim are intended to 
designate Jewish Christians I regard as having 
been now conclusively proved. This may be 
otherwise expressed by saying that wherever the 
Talmud or the Midrash mentions Minim, the 
authors of the statement intend to refer to Jewish 
Christians. The possibility is still open that the 
Rabbis attributed to Minim opinions or actions 
which in fact were not held by Christians, or that 
they occasionally used the term Min as a name for 
enemies of Judaism, and applied it to Gentiles. 
These are exceptional cases, and do not affect the 
main argument. It must, however, be admitted that 
the theory which identifies Minim with Jewish 
Christians is not free from difficulties, which 
would be serious if the evidence in favour of the 
theory were less decisive.” (Herford, 1903, p. 379) 
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Schremer (2010) argues that a theological perspective is too narrow a perspective 
from which to interpret rabbinic controversy and contestation, preferring instead, a 
wider political and social history approach to make a claim that Rome’s oppression 
following the destruction of the second temple was much more the preoccupation of 
the Palestinian rabbis than was Her religiosity (ibid., p. 22). Schremer interprets 
rabbinical literature as exegesis which, within a narrow Christian-Jewish framework, 
permits Christianisation of rabbinical Judaism. Gosen-Gottstein (2009) also finds a 
narrow Christian-Jewish framework unsuitable and after analysing two such 
Christian-Jewish framework models which he respectively names the Competitive-
Polemical Model (ibid., p. 21), and the Identity-Constructing Model (ibid., p. 23), 
proffers his own Parallel Spiritual modal (ibid., p. 26) before so-called testing all 
models against the two-powers-in-Heaven literature as a case of rabbinic polemics. 
His model approaches the two-powers-in-Heaven literature as a hermeneutical rather 
than historical response (ibid., p. 31) which allows his conjectured conclusion that 
the two-powers-in-Heaven literature was not intended as a response to Christianity or 
to any other religion (ibid., p. 40), but rather a response internal to rabbinic exegesis 
itself.  
Bauckham (2009) posits that the ways in which Jewish monotheism distinguishes its 
one God do not require a semi-divine attribution to Jesus to allow Him to be included 
in their one-God identity even though His presence there was a radical development, 
and that consequently the key to understanding the continuity between Judaic 
monotheism and Christology “is not to be found in the presence of intermediary 
figures” (ibid., p. 4).  
In summary, Hellenisation theory remains central to scholars interested in 
Christianity’s emergence from Judaism predicated in part on their urgings of 
widespread Hellenisation of Jews and subsequent carriage of Hellenism into 
Christianity through, inter alia, Jewish Christian sect preaching to Jews and gentiles 
alike. A very likely existence of such a channel does not, per se, disqualify 
Alexandrian Hellenisation and is not necessarily fatal to Harnack. 
To continue, neither it appears is post Nag Hammadi scholarship ready to jettison 
Hellenisation Theory or critical exegesis of scripture whether Johannine-Pauline or 
otherwise. For example Ehrman (2003, pp. xi - vii, 108, 113 - 134) and Metzger 
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(1989, pp. 76, 84, 75 - 84) date the Nag Hammadi so-called gnostic writings to the 
second and third centuries AD, and to about AD 400 respectively. According to 
Ehrman there were, in the second and third centuries, Christians who believed in one 
God, two gods, thirty gods and 365 gods, Christians who believed that the world was 
created by God, by an ignorant divinity, or by mistake by a malevolent god, 
Christians who believed that the Jewish scripture was inspired by one god, or was not 
inspired at all, or was inspired by the God of the Jews rather than a one true god, or 
by an evil deity, Christians who believed Jesus to be divine, or to be simply human, 
or to be human and divine, and Christians who believed Jesus’s death to bring 
salvation, or not to bring salvation, or that Jesus did not die at all—so goes early 
Christianity in the making in the presence of a now-called-gnostic-mix-of-many-
names.  
Ehrman, as earlier revealed, is writing in a new millennium genre of loose-border 
categorisation and a boxed Metzger 
benchmark is provided as a 
countervailing remedy against a 
possible infinite regress of 
interpretation of linkages between the 
various names authors now use to 
discuss what was until recently, under 
caveat, most often referred to simply 
and collectively as Gnosticism. There 
is nothing pejorative intended either 
way in this juxtaposition, and the 
benchmark, which is based on 
Metzger’s own exegesis of the role of 
so-called Gnosticism in the trending 
canonisation of what he calls the great 
church (Metzger, 1989, pp. 75 - 89), is 
not one of opposition to ongoing exegesis in the light of Nag Hammadi.  
English translations of Nag Hammadi texts are available (Mayer, 2005b), the gospels 
of Mary, Thomas, Truth, Philip, and Judas, among others, being discussed as Nag 
 
Metzger Benchmark 
“One of the chief opponents of orthodox Christianity was 
Gnosticism, a syncretistic religion and philosophy that 
flourished for about four centuries alongside early Christianity. 
 
Most of the several varieties of Gnostic thought were 
characterized by the assertion that elect souls, being divine 
sparks temporarily imprisoned in physical bodies as a result of a 
precosmic catastrophe, can obtain salvation by means of a 
special gnosis … of their origin and destiny.  
 
The purpose of the extensive Gnostic literature that developed 
was not only to instruct believers about the origin and structure 
of the visible world and of the worlds above, but to supply also 
… the means whereby one could be victor over the powers of 
darkness and return to the realm of the highest God.” (Metzger, 
1989, pp. 75 - 76) 
 
“Such syncretistic Gnosticism, if successful, would have 
obliterated the distinctive historical features of Christianity, and 
it was not surprising that Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and other 
Church Fathers vehemently opposed these tendencies in order to 
protect Christianity from internal destruction (ibid., p. 76). 
 
“[There are] … three features that seem to be characteristic of 
several Gnostic systems. These are a philosophical dualism that 
rejected the visible world as being alien to the supreme God; 
belief in a subordinate deity (the Demiurge) who was 
responsible for the creation of the world; and, in some systems, 
a radical distinction between Jesus and Christ, with the corollary 
that Christ the Redeemer only seemed to be a real human being 
…” (ibid., p. 77). 
 355 
Hammadi texts, irrespective of the dates, places, genres and methods of their 
recoveries. The Gospel of Thomas (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 1 - 30), conjectured composed 
in Greek before AD 50 (DeConick, 2007, p. 8), or in the second century AD 
(Valantasas, 2008, p. 14), or within that range at different times as the summary of 
citations given by Dorian (2014, pp. 124 - 126) reveals, consists of sayings similar 
and different to the Q source, which sayings, when compared to their parallel forms 
in John 13, 19, 24, 38, 49, 92, are said to reveal the Thomas versions more original. 
Yet the provenance of Thomas, whose status as a gnostic text is increasingly 
questioned, remains under contention (ibid., 103 – 111). There are views that 
Thomas and John are independent sources (DeConick, 2008, p. 179; Sieber, 1990, 
pp. 69 - 70) or dependent sources (Goodacre, 2012, pp. 193, 193 – 195) or perhaps 
drew from a common source (Koester, 1990, p. 114). Perhaps also the communities 
of Thomas and John were closely interrelated in Syria (G. Riley, 1995, p. 177).  
Pagels admits similarities and says that the Gospel of John is a work crafted to 
intentionally contradict the Gospel of Thomas especially on the question of God’s 
light being within all humans, or being brought to humans through Christ (Pagels, 
2003, pp. 34 - 35). Authorship of both John and Thomas is uncertain. Davies 
suggests that “the Gospel of Thomas would be a text of Christianised Hellenistic 
Judaism, sharing with such authors as Philo [(BC 25 – AD 50)] and Aristobulus [(BC 
3rd or 2nd centuries)]  various principal themes and approaches … The Gospel of 
Thomas is to Christian Hellenistic Judaism what Q is to Christian apocalyptic 
Judaism.” (S. L. Davies, 1992, p. 683, my square brackets). Such nice statements, 
inviting as they are, might yet be taken carefully. The Q source as Jesus sayings 
common to Matthew and Luke but not Mark, although widely supported, is contested 
(Edwards, 2009, pp. 1 - 6; McNicol, Dungan, & Peabody, 2002, pp. 240 - 242).  
Mirkovic (1995, p. 22) places the Gospel of Thomas in the wisdom tradition of 
Proverbs, Ben Sira, or the Wisdom of Solomon urging that it is informed by Jesus 
sayings crafted outside of early Palestine communities by ascetic wandering holy 
men and women in Syria. John and Thomas are said to share this same Sitz im 
Leben—in this case the wisdom of wandering ascetics in the first century Syria—
which explains similarities (ibid., p. 3). The wandering ascetics were informed, in 
turn, by Syrian Stoic wisdom (ibid., p. 22).  
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Mayer holds that “Jewish wisdom literature itself bears the marks of Hellenistic 
concerns” (2004, p. 17) and conjectures Thomas’ Jesus as one linked to the wisdom 
of Sophists, Diogenes 
(BC 412–323), Plato 
(BC c.428 – c.348) and 
Socrates (died BC 399). 
Bloom comments that 
Thomas “spares us the 
crucifixion, makes the 
resurrection 
unnecessary, and does 
not present us with a 
God named Jesus” 
(Bloom, 1992, p. 125). 
Clark argues that “the 
GTh [Gospel of 
Thomas] is a Christian 
Middle Platonic Gospel 
that combines the 
Christian significance 
of Jesus and his 
teachings with the 
essential tenets of 
Alexandrian Middle 
Platonism” (S. Clark, 
2014, pp. 14 - 15, my 
square brackets). Patterson allows the possibility of Thomas’ being Middle Platonist 
but offers qualifications—Thomas “does not dwell on many of the common themes 
of the Platonic revival: the Ideas and their immanent forms; the concept of the One 
and the Dyad, or the notion of Daimones as mediator figures” (Patterson, 2008, p. 
204). King depicts the Gospel of Mary (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 31 - 42) as one of the 
writings on the wrong side of the canonisation battle perhaps because, inter alia, it 
rejects the suffering and death of Jesus as a path to eternal life, and pronounces Mary 
Magdala qua prostitute to be a fiction (K. King, 2003, pp. 3 - 4).  
The Hill of Fortune 
 
 
 
Source: (Bernardino di Betto da Perugia known as Pinturicchio, 1506). (designer). 
Allegory of the Hill of Fortune. (marble pavement in the Cathedral of Siena probably 
crafted by Paolo Manucci). In Cust, R. H. H. (1906). The Pavement Masters of Siena. 
(p. 27). London: George Bell and Sons. (Cust, 1906). The colour version shown was 
cropped from Santi, B. (1982). The Marble Pavement of the Cathedral of Siena. 
Firenze, London and New York: Scala Books (Santi, 1982). Fortune has safely 
delivered seekers of knowledge to an island and in various guises they are walking 
over rocks, snakes and weeds to reach the summit where Knowledge sits. Knowledge 
holds a palm to Socrates and a book to Crates who empties earthly riches into the sea. 
The inscription above Knowledge reads as follows: Line 1: huc properate viri, Line 2: 
salebrosum scandite montem, Line 3, Pulchra laboris erunt premia palma quies, 
together liberally translated after Santi (1982) as ‘thus, the wise man who has attained 
virtue will receive serenity as his prize’. As the mosaic makes clear such a prize is not 
easily won. The mosaic might be a rare depiction of the knowledge link between 
pagan and Christian. Is peace being made with Plato? 
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The question of which Mary is the namesake is still in discussion and the 
incompleteness of the document and signs of coupling redaction of its two parts 
continue as barriers to detecting its genre. The confrontation in it between Mary and 
Peter also occurs in the Gospel of the Egyptians (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 113 – 142), the 
Gospel of Thomas (2005b, pp. 1 - 30) and the Pistis Sophia (Hurtak, 1999; Mead, 
2005). Mayer (2005a, 2005b), who holds that in usage the term Gnosticism is viable 
(Mayer, 2005b, p. XI) also questions whether the Gospel of Thomas (ibid., p. XVI – 
XVII) can be simply classified as a Gnostic text (2004, p. 10). Mayer identifies four 
groups of so-called Gnostic gospels, the sayings group, for example the Gospel of 
Thomas; the Sethian group which interpret the creation story innovatively and blend 
their interpretations with ideas from Greek philosophy, for example The Secret Book 
of John (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 143 - 184); the Valentinian group which rely in turn on 
New Testament claims, The Gospel of Thomas and the Sethian texts, Valentinian 
examples being The Gospel of Philip (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 42 - 88) and the Gospel of 
Truth (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 89 - 112); and a fourth group consisting of the Gospel of 
Mary Magdala (Mayer, 2005b, pp. 31 - 42) and The Book of Baruch (Mayer, 2005b, 
pp. 261 - 276) which Mayer says defy classification. For example Baruch with its 
Jewish approach to gnosis allows the legendry Heracles, that is, Hercules, to be a 
gentile prophet and gives Jesus the final say on good news. The presence of Greek 
influence in all four of Myer’s classifications of the Nag Hammadi gospels is 
enriching and refining of, rather than fatal to, ongoing efficacy of scriptural exegesis, 
whether Johannine-Pauline Christology or otherwise. So too it is enriching and 
refining of Hellenisation Theory. 
In summary of Section 3, recent scholarship, which in part relies on nineteenth and 
twentieth century definitions of Gnosticism and Hellenisation and scriptural exegesis 
from those same centuries to anchor and differentiate its own new meanings and 
perspectives about Jewish and Greek ideas intermingling, does not render Johannine-
Pauline Christology or early Hellenisation Theory completely obsolete. Rather, 
through refinement and enrichment of ideas originated there, recent scholarship 
establishes their contribution and validity as bases upon which, in part, their own 
new insights and sophistication rest. Likewise is it so for recent scholarship about 
authorship and/or redaction of scripture and for contributions which interpret 
Christianity in development from Jewish perspectives.  
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on how intermingling of ideas about a personal Hebrew 
God in transcendent rule over the world, and a Greek impersonal god melded into the  
world through nous in reason, may have produced cognitive conditions conducive to 
emergence of a world religion subsequently occasioned by the advent of Christ, and 
how, as a consequence of intermingling of Judeo-Greek heritage with codifying ideas 
of Christianity in development, Aristotelian rational Ethics following Christ’s advent, 
and the witness, redacted or otherwise, of His apostles, God is found in Christ, and 
through Christ, God’s presence is found anew in nature and in man. This presence is 
not simply a Greek rational nous. Rather, it is moral and personal, and behind it lies 
not only God’s love and grace but also God as the final and efficient author and 
cause of all things. 
Table 37: Fracturing of Aristotle’s Unified Scheme 
   
Theoretical Philosophy Practical Philosophy Poetical Philosophy 
Theoretical Philosophy focuses on knowledge as an end in 
itself rather than on practical applications. 
The study of political 
Science and ethical action 
in the wider social and 
cultural domain. 
Economics, strategy and 
rhetoric are included under 
this category 
The study of production 
rather than action: a theory 
of art. 
Physics Mathematics Metaphysics 
The study of 
material things 
which are 
subject to 
motion. 
The study of that 
which is unmoved 
but also 
unseparated from 
matter. 
The study of that 
which is unmoved 
but separated from 
matter (the 
transcendent). 
falls to remains falls to  falls to not applicable 
revealed truth mathematics Christian theology faith Ethics not applicable 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from Table 17 and the chapter text. 
 
Table 38: Key Terms Nuance—Rational Metaphysics to Christian Theology 
  
Field 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Under the Fall of Greek Rationality to Revealed Faith to the Time of Augustine 
Science 
Science is irrelevant and at best, as naked 
syllogistic method, has been banished to 
dormant house arrest.  
The oblivion of an imposed 
banishment. 
Revealed truth. 
Ethics 
The overcoming of the absolute sin of the 
commandments through grace and faith in a 
personal Christ and the surrender of human 
will to God’s will, that is, surrender of 
irrational soul, containing evil and sin and the 
devil’s work, to rational soul, containing the 
goodness of God’s work.  
A condition and state of moral 
virtue attained through, and 
proportional to, acceptance of the 
absolute laws of revealed truth.  
Human free will and 
human frailty. 
Polis 
Ratification, through grace, of citizenship of 
an eternal cognitive city of God attainable by 
personal acceptance of God as Logos and the 
all in all. 
The human soul in various states 
of beatitude appropriate to levels 
of acceptance of Christ as Logos. 
Contaminated nature, 
flawed humanity, free 
will, and the devil’s evil 
presence in human 
irrational soul. 
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Table 39: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Rational Metaphysics to Christian Theology 
 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of 
a rapacious mankind in whom no part of 
reason is divine and for whom knowledge 
is power, which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held standpoint that 
binding sentiment of Polis is situated in 
natural social instinct implanted in 
mankind for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
The Polis is a cognitive gathering or eternal city of God predicated on acceptance of His grace. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a now Christian God who is all reason and is present in the human soul.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusing to transgress Christian 
prohibitions. 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident 
with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics 
as reasoned moral activity and, in its new 
form as conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct benefits it 
could bring to society and state.  
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one is replaced by unquestioning life in Christ. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion. 
Practical Ethics is replaced by faith Ethics. 
 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Aristotelian practical Ethics becomes faith Ethics. 
Integrating Summary of Part Two 
Aristotle’s unified political philosophy fractured under an intermingling of Greek heritage and Jewish revelation doctrine and an ongoing development of Christianity. By the time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430), Greek 
rational Ethics had been replaced by revealed faith Ethics, Christ as divine Logos had replaced nous as logos. Aristotle’s categorical explanation of being had been replaced by divine revelation’s announcement of God 
as the creator of the world and its beings. A personal Christian God of love was available as an alternative to a Jewish God of wrath and both had replaced the impersonal Greek god. The Greek republic or city of ideas 
had been replaced as Polis by a Christian city of God. Science, now irrelevant to faith, and no longer recognised as the arbiter of truth under theoretical and practical reason, or knowledge of the four causes, but 
recognised as syllogistic method, is ignored to survive as best it can.  
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In short, nature became a Christian moral order rather than a rational natural law of 
necessity and its attendant virtues of place; a Christian God came to inhabit the 
Greek soul; Aristotle’s rational explanation of being together with its attendant 
psychology and physiology of soul were diminished but not completely extinguished.  
Philosophy and Science become estranged from each other and from faith understood 
as revelation. 
The one uniform Greek logos inherent in all mankind was taken over by Christ’s 
inherence in mankind, and technical rational virtue was replaced by moral virtue in 
the form of a Christian reformulation of virtue as obedience to the commandments of 
the Hebrew Torah in the light of Christ’s love. Science, stripped of its intellectual 
virtues richness, and seeker of wisdom and truth status, and its right to roam across 
all divisions of philosophy in search of that truth, was banished to house arrest and 
irrelevant isolation as naked syllogistic method. 
As earlier outlined, Table 37 on page 358 classifies these changes in the form of the 
template employed earlier in Table 17 on page 211. The big picture movement of 
Table 37 can be summarised as the estrangement of philosophy, Science and 
theology each from each other, and the transformation of the rational Polis into a 
spiritual city of God. 
Again, as specified, the specific purpose and work of the chapter is concluded in 
Table 38 on page 358 and Table 39 on page 359, which have been assembled from 
the content of Sections 1 and 2. Table 38 summarises the substantial key terms 
nuance resulting from the Judeo-Greek intermingling with codifying ideas of 
Christianity in development. Table 39 on page 359 brings key terms nuance outlined 
in Table 38 to interpretation of the Thesis Proposition Statements. 
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Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 - 
1142)  
INTRODUCTION 
Of the advent of Christ and attendant morphing of rational values into faith values 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter Turner simply states that Christ did not 
found a school of philosophy but rather appealed to the divine above all systems and 
in so doing “discarded all formal definition and proof” (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 
215). From this time of Christ on there would thus be a “religious view and a 
rationalistic view … [about] every question” (ibid., my square brackets).  
In the Christian narrative the period reaching from Christ to the end of the fifth 
century is known as the period of Patristic philosophy (M. Hall, 1928/2008, p. 16; W. 
Turner, 1903/2012, pp. 215 - 217) and in that period, as earlier demonstrated 
throughout Chapter 4, there was a consuming interest in the question of the 
relationships between matter and spirit. The substance of Christ had replaced 
categorical substance as Aristotelian potential, nous had become the Logos, and the 
Logos had become Christ through whom all being emerged. The faith Ethics of 
revelation had colonised rational Ethics. 
The specific purpose and work of this chapter is to trace the relationship between 
Science, Ethics and Polis from the time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430) to the time of 
Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) and his contemporaries at the close of the twelfth century. 
The esoteric descriptions of Science and Ethics derived in the previous chapter are 
the starting point, Science is syllogistic demonstration of fact but revealed faith has 
little use of it. Ethics is the overcoming of absolute sin identified in the 
commandments and its domain is grace and faith in a personal Christ and the 
surrender of the human will to God’s will. Polis remains a Christian ideal city of 
God. 
As the chapter progresses human reason emerges as the method of syllogistic 
demonstration in dialectic and disputation. When reason so understood is employed 
under authority of revealed faith it begets the Science of theology. The mysteries of 
faith remain off limits to this Science even though reason is gradually permitted to 
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participate in proofs of the existence of God and in differentiating between the 
teachings of the Church Fathers. Ethics remains that act of unwillingness to 
transgress Christian prohibitions. Revealed faith is its wellspring and Ethics too may 
access reason except in questioning of the mysteries of faith. Thus Science and 
Ethics become compatible and reason and faith become one by virtue of their 
cohabitation in reason’s method. Both serve the needs of those seeking citizenship in 
eternal Christian city. Explication of these understandings of Science, Ethics and 
Polis, and their relationships, is the finishing point of this chapter. 
During the time span covered by the specific work of the chapter the Roman Empire 
in the West fell to the Germanic 
Odoacer (AD 433 – 493) when 
Romulus Augustus (AD c. 461 – 
unknown) abdicated in AD 476. 
Its Eastern Empire continued to 
survive. The chapter’s time span 
encompasses all of the so-called 
Early Mediaeval Period, and part 
of the High Mediaeval Period. 
Before proceeding to the specific 
work of the chapter I briefly 
sketch a historical context which 
will serve as a backdrop for that 
work. I also discuss an ideas 
controversy about the nature of 
Aristotelian universals because it 
is germane to the specific work 
of the chapter. The historical sketch begins in the next section and continues until 
page 365. The discussion of the universals controversy is located on pages 365 to 
366. Together, the historical sketch and the discussion on universals constitute the 
general work of the chapter.  
In order to meet dictates of software formatting the next section follows on a new 
page. 
Naming Conventions(1)  
Classical 
Period 
From circa the eight and seventh 
centuries BC until the fifth century 
AD. 
BC 900 - 
800s to AD 
400s 
Early 
Mediaeval 
Period 
From the fifth century AD to the 
eleventh century AD. 
AD 460 to 
1000 
High 
Mediaeval 
Period 
From the eleventh century AD till 
circa the beginning of the fourteenth 
century AD. 
AD 1000 to 
1300 
Late Middle 
Age 
From the beginning of the 
fourteenth century AD until the 
beginning of the sixteenth century 
AD. 
AD 1300 to 
1500 
Pre-Modern 
Age 
From all of the classical age up to 
the seventeenth century AD.  
BC 900 - 
800s to AD 
1600s 
Modern Age 
The Modern Age is taken to be the 
period from circa the time of 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 - 1626) 
and Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 - 
1679) until the unfolding 
emergence of post-modernism in 
the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
From AD 
1600s to 
circa AD 
1930 - 50s 
Post-Modern 
Age 
From the early to mid-twentieth 
century and, as of 2013, ongoing. 
From c. AD 
1930 – 50 
and in 2013 
ongoing. 
Dark Ages 
A term less frequently used to 
describe parts of the Mediaeval 
Period following the invasion of the 
so-called barbarians. The term is 
not used hereafter. 
Not 
Applicable 
Notes: (1) Year attributions are indicative, not cardinal and prescriptive. 
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THE GENERAL WORK OF THE CHAPTER BEGINS 
Historical Context 
The decline and fall of the Roman Empire circa AD 476 was in part due to the 
migration of the Goths in the fourth and fifth centuries and the warfare associated 
with it. Whereas Europe remained largely a place of turmoil during the three 
centuries following the fall of Rome’s western empire, parts of the relatively then 
far-away lands now known as the United Kingdom and Ireland remained peaceful by 
comparison. In those lands, learning, including discursive reasoning, flourished. This 
flourishing was subsequently aided by an arrival in England in AD 597 of a monk 
named Augustine with a colony of monks from Monte Casino (Orme, 2006, p. 18), 
and during the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, aided by the unification of this 
colony with those of the North and West, monasteries and their schools began to 
develop in England (Orme, 2006, pp. 22 - 24). Some of these schools became so 
famous as to attract students from as far away as Greece and Egypt (Magevney, 
1900, p. 23).  
The Goths were subsequently converted to Christianity (Rohrbacher, 2002, p. 216). 
In a general argument in which he 
examines the growth of individualism 
throughout the middle ages, Graves (1914, 
pp. 1 - 3), as do Duiker and Spielvogel 
(2008, p. 282), explains those early Middle 
Ages as a fusion of Greek, Roman and 
Christian elements with his so-called 
German persuasions. Graves fixes the 
over-riding spirit as one of assimilation 
and suppression (Graves, 1915, pp. 2 - 3) which allowed the Christian capture of 
barbarianism through absorption.  
The Merovingian kings, from the middle of the fifth century until AD 751, when 
they were replaced by the Carolingian Pippin (sometimes Pepin) the Short (AD 714 - 
768), had gained rule over Roman Gaul. At its height under the Carolingian 
Charlemagne (AD c. 797 – 839), Gaul covered most of Western Europe. The 
Merovingian Clovis I (AD 466 - 511) is named as the King who brought Christianity  
 
Merovingian Kings 
A dynasty beginning with Childeric I (c. AD 457  – 481) 
AD and ending with Childeric III (c. AD 717 – c. 754) 
whom Pope Zachary (AD 679 – 752) replaced with the 
Carolingian Pepin or Pippin the Short (AD 714 – 768) in 
AD 751. Pippin shared a short de facto rule with his 
brother Carloman (died AD 754) from AD 741 to 747, 
jointly ruling over parts of once Roman Gaul and other 
lands. After Carolman’s retirement Pippin, with Pope 
Zachary’s support, coerced Childeric III, whom the 
brothers had appointed as King, into a monastery and 
ruled in his own right. 
Carolingian Kings 
Rulers of parts of once Roman Gaul and other lands from 
Pippin the Short (AD 714 - 768) through a high point with 
Charlemagne (AD c. 797 – 838) to a break up of its lands 
following Pepin I of Aquitaine (AD 797 – 838). 
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to his reign towards the end of the fifth century (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 238), even 
if possibly for political purposes 
(Bainton, 2000, p. 138). 
In respect of the guardianship of 
learning, the performance of the 
Merovingian kings is said to have been 
lacklustre (W. Turner, 1903b, p. 238), a 
situation which began to change with 
the Carolingians. The Carolingian 
Charlemagne (AD 768 - 814) is of 
special note. In consolidating his empire 
he established palace schools which went beyond teaching the soldier arts. These 
schools placed a greater emphasis on cultivation of mind (Barbero, 2004, pp. 232 - 
238; W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 241).  
In his rehabilitation of learning in Europe, Charlemagne made use of that repository 
of learning available then in the lands of the 
now United Kingdom and Ireland. During the 
eighth century he employed monks such as 
Alcuin (AD 736 – 804) to carry that learning 
to Europe (C. S. Jaeger, 1994, pp.23 - 33; 
Pedersen, 2009, pp. 74 - 77; A. F. West, 1892, 
p. 28). The practice continued in the ninth 
century, Eriugena (AD c. 805 – 877) being a 
most notable teacher and courtesan. In turn, 
this flame of knowledge was to return to its 
origins to rehabilitate learning there after 
destruction rendered by the Norsemen. This 
rehabilitation began when Alfred the Great 
(AD 849 - 899) assumed the throne and 
effected reforms similar to those made by Charlemagne in Gaul (Asser, 1983, p. 
219). Monastery education was to accommodate incremental change up until its 
 
Source: Alma-Tadema. (1861). The Education of the Children 
of Clovis 1. (1861). (oil on canvas). Private Collection, 
Florida: Olga’s Gallery. (L. Alma-Tadema, 1861) The Queen 
is watching her son being educated in weaponry in order to 
revenge the killing of his father. 
 
 
Source: Schnetz, J. (1830). (artist). Alcuin Presenting 
Manuscripts Discovered by His Monks to 
Charlemagne and His Court. (oil on canvas). Paris, 
Louvre Museum: Philosophy and Philosophers in 
Art. (Schnetz, 1830).  
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leading schools began to morph into universities from the twelfth century onwards 
and I discuss these changes further as the chapter progresses.  
The Controversy of the Universals 
The earlier discussion about universals beginning on page 209, explains that, for 
Aristotle, particulars, for example, that horse, that bird, existed independently outside 
of the mind. Universals such as “horseness” 
or “birdness”, in general, species and genus, 
existed in reality only within the mind, and 
Science brought truth about universals.  
Mediaeval interest in universals is said to 
have been sparked by unknown scholars 
whose curiosity was wetted by uncertainties 
found in Boethius’ commentary on 
Porphyry’s commentary (Isagoge) on 
Aristotle (Marenbon, 2006, 24 - 25; Mellone, 
1918, p. 241; Sorabji, 2006 - 160; Ueberweg, 
1889, Vol. 1 p. 368). These early Scholars had 
access to all or parts of Aristotle’s Categories (Aristotle, 1938a, 1952a) and De 
Interpretatione (Aristotle, 1938b, 1952j), Porphyry’s Isagoge (Porphyry, 1887), his 
introduction to the Categories, two commentaries by Boethius on the Isagoge, 
Boethius’ own treatises on formal logic, and some or all of Plato’s Timaeus (Plato, 
1925h, 1952w) available in Latin translation from Apuleius (AD 125 – 180) and 
Augustine (AD 345 – 340), and from Calcidius (AD 4th century), including his 
commentary. These questions about the nature of universals were argued on a basis 
of logic and reason and were first discussed in a context of differences between Plato 
and Aristotle and only later became contentious within scholastic synthesis of reason 
and faith (Ueberweg, 1889, pp. 366 - 367).  
Before Aristotle’s re-emergence in the West, during the period 1095 – 1292, the 
period of the Crusades (Hergenhahn, 2009, p. 82 - 85), two schools of thought about 
universals had been coaxed into existence. One is called nominalism or the dictum of 
universals post rem, universals after the thing. In its extreme form nominalism 
accepted that only the name of a genus as real. In its moderate form nominalism  
 
 
Source: (Dutch or Flemish miniaturist, 1428–1430, or 
after 1436) Jean de Meng presents the Consolation of 
Philosophy to Margaret of England. Jean de Meng 
was a translator of the ‘Consolation’ which Boethius 
wrote in prison during the 5th to the 6th centuries.  
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accepted that universals exist in the mind. The other school is called realism or the 
dictum known as universals ante rem, universals before the thing. In its extreme form 
realism held that universals exist objectively as beings in their own right 
independently of the individuals. In its 
moderate form, realism accepted that 
universals are understandings abstracted from 
the existing individuals of a group, such that 
the common nature of the group is captured 
by the universal, a dictum known as 
universals in re (Garcia, 1994, p. 102; 
Mellone, 1918, p. 241).  
Extreme or exaggerated realism has its origins 
in the template ideas of Plato while moderate 
realism has its origins in the Aristotelian 
doctrine that universals exist only by their 
inherence in the individuals which constitute 
the species (De Wulf, 1911, n. p.). Nominalism has its origins in the ridicule of those 
who rejected Plato’s idea of the forms Republic 476 - 477 (Plato, 1952r, pp. 370 - 
371; 1969a) and at first made little early progress against Aristotle’s realist 
categorical ontology. Modern philosophical developments about the nature of 
nominalism and realism introduce complexities which go beyond the transactions of 
the mediaeval protagonists and are not considered in this enquiry. Table 40, which 
summarises key mediaeval universals-controversy terms usage, has been constructed 
for ease of reference when these terms are subsequently used in tracing relationships 
between Science and Ethics in this chapter.  
The universals controversy lost some of its heat as the full corpus of Greek thought 
flowed back to the Christian West. Although fine divisions of thought can be found 
in the controversy, it is instructive to find, even given the head start of the Categories 
(Aristotle, 1938a, 1952a), On Interpretation (Aristotle, 1938b, 1952j), and the 
commentaries on Aristotle, just how relatively little progress had been made in 
making up for the lost Greek corpus before its re-emergence.  
 
 
Plato. (c. 1263). MS Digby23, folio 3r. (Part 1, Plato, 
Timaeus, in the Latin translation of Calcidius). 
Bodleian Library, Oxford University. (Plato, c. 1263) 
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In summary, education in general, and learning in particular, to the extent that they 
did survive, survived by virtue of the establishment and spread of palace and 
monastery schooling until the twelfth century and the beginning of universities. 
Besides Christian literature, classical texts were relatively scarce but amongst them 
were commentaries on classical logic which allowed cognitive flow from particular 
premises to general conclusions. Questioning of the commentaries occasioned two 
schools of thought about universals: nominalism and realism. This brief sketch of the 
spread of monastery education and a nominalist/realist divide in interpretation of 
universals aims at no more than providing a backdrop for more detailed articulation 
of the specific work of the chapter which begins in the next paragraph.  
SPECIFIC WORK OF THE CHAPTER BEGINS 
The specific purpose and work of this chapter is to trace the changing esoteric 
relationship between Science, Ethics and Polis from the time of Augustine (AD 354 - 
430) to the close of the twelfth century.  
Turner claims that, leaving St Augustine aside, “Patristic philosophy is fragmentary 
and devoid of unity” (W. Turner, 1903/2012, pp. 235 - 236) but that it did 
provisionally establish “the intellectual basis of the dogmatic system of the church” 
(ibid., p. 236) and “stated the question which Scholastic philosophy took up and 
Table 40: Medieval Nominalism and Realism 
 
Response Definition Dominant Features 
Extreme 
Nominalism 
Nominalism maintains that there is no universality 
either of concept or of objective reality, the only 
universality being that of the name. 
 universalia post rem or universals after 
the thing.  
In this case universals captured about existing 
real things exist only in name. 
Conceptualism, 
also Known as 
Moderate 
Nominalism 
Conceptualism concedes the universality of the idea, 
but denies that there is a universality of things 
corresponding to the universality of the mental 
representation. 
 universalia post rem or universals after 
the thing.  
In this case universal ideas about existing 
things exist only in the human mind.  
Exaggerated 
Realism 
Realism, in its exaggerated form, maintains that 
universals exist outside the mind, in other words, that 
there are objective realities which, independently of 
our minds, possess universality. 
 universalia ante rem or universals before 
the thing.  
In this case universals in the divine mind, 
universalia ante rem, are answered by 
universals existing in things themselves, 
universalia in re. 
Moderate 
Realism, also 
Known as 
Aristotelian or 
Thomistic 
Realism 
It grants that there is in things an objective, 
potentially universal reality, contends that the formal 
aspect of universality is conferred by the mind, and 
that consequently the universal in the full panoply of 
its universality exists in the mind alone, having, 
however, a fundamentum in re, a foundation within 
the thing. 
A synthesis of: 
 universalia ante rem, the types of things 
existing in the mind of God. 
 universalia post rem, concepts existing 
in the human mind.  
 universalia in re, universal essences 
existing in things themselves. 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Klima, G. (2007). The Medieval Problem of Universals. (n. p); Turner, W. (1903). 
History of Philosophy. (pp. 253 - 407). New York: The Athenaeum Press; Ueberweg, F. (1889). History of Philosophy. (pp. 
365 - 366). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.  
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answered: How can reason and revelation be shown to be distinct and, at the same 
time, consistent in truth?” (ibid., p. 236).  
Turner’s question frames this chapter’s specific discussion of relationships amongst 
Science, Ethics and Polis. Addressing the question Turner poses, I investigate only 
such ecclesiastical history and debate as is sufficient for demonstration purposes, 
drawing on secondary sources when searches for English language versions of 
original works are exhausted. Developments in the relationship between Science and 
Ethics are traced in two ways. First, beginning in the next paragraph, I examine their 
presence in curriculum structure, syllabus content, and teaching method up to the 
time of Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142). Secondly, beginning on page 380, I examine 
their presence in, and efficacy to, the works and purposes of scholarly writers.  
Roman versions of Elementary Schools, Grammar Schools, and Universities of 
Greece had emerged as Rome became increasingly under the influence of Greek 
education (A. D. Kahn, 2000, p. 61) and adopted Greek institutions and methods. 
Cicero (BC c. 106 – 44) makes many references to Greek education and its benefits 
for Roman orators in his On Oratory and Orators (Cicero, 1855, pp. 172, 179, 254, 
266, 327, 341). Starting with Julius Caesar (BC 100 – 44), public funding of 
education emerged in the form of salaries, scholarships and privileges (Schneider, 
1933, pp. 670 - 674). This system of schooling survived in an increasingly weakened 
condition in the period leading up to Rome’s Western fall and haphazardly 
afterwards (Duff, 2003, p. 208 - 216; Graves, 1909, p. 267, 230 - 271). In part, the 
Greco-Roman civil system began to be replaced by a Christian monastic system. 
Graves (1915, p. 4 - 7), like Dunn (2003, p. 1 - 24), traces the development of 
monasticism from the caves of Egypt and its spread through Syria to its emergence in 
the West circa AD 350 in the form of the communal aloneness of the Christian 
brotherhoods and sisterhoods. Not all monasteries were in isolated places, many 
being near cities or in cities (ibid., p.12). In these first monasteries there was a great 
focus on transcription and preservation of Roman Christianity particularly in the 
early years of the aftermath of the so-called barbarian destruction. This Christianity, 
and the learning it carried in its attempt to cultivate the soul, was, in the fifth century 
through Augustine (AD 354 – 430) and Cassian (circa AD 360 - 435), and in the 
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sixth century, through Benedict (AD 480 - 547), largely to inform monastic life (M. 
Dunn, 2003, pp. 111 - 137; Hassett, 2011, n.p.; Hugh of St Victor, 1911, passim). 
Magevney (1900, pp. 10 - 11) posits, through an uncited quote from Newman, that 
the early Benedictine cloister schools were little different from the former municipal 
schools of the Roman empire, which schools they replaced, and that both kinds of 
schools together were in essence transpositions of Pythagorean, Platonic and 
Aristotelian education sanctioned on the authority of St Augustine. Benedict, who it 
appears did not much like the education he received in Rome (Vauchez, 2000, p. 
167) is said to have founded his cloister at Monte Cassino in AD 529, the same year 
that the pagan Academy in Athens was finally closed (Grun & Moloney, 2006, p. 14).  
I now turn to curriculum structure in mediaeval times and how nuance of the key 
terms Science and Ethics might be gleaned from analysis of it. Augustine (AD 345 – 
430), inter alia, discusses education in his On Christian Doctrine (1872). It is clear 
early on that education is for purposes of reading and understanding Christian 
scriptures (ibid., p.32 - 33) and one must endeavour to read towards acquisition of, 
and/or in, a state of grace, hope and love (ibid., p. 33). So-called heathen knowledge 
about such matters as mathematics, astronomy, logic and the like might, under 
caveat, serve to elucidate interpretation of scriptures (ibid., pp. 55 – 80), and rhetoric 
may well be employed for teaching purposes, under caveat of bringing scriptural 
truth to hearers (ibid., pp. 120 – 171). Maxims of method of a kind might be drawn 
from various chapters. For example wisdom is more important than rhetoric (ibid., p. 
124), unite eloquence with wisdom (ibid., p. 126), avoid obscurity (ibid., p. 133), a 
variety of delivery styles should be employed (ibid., p. 161) and many more. 
Grammar is of first importance, and exegetical grammar at that, because it aids the 
discovery of truth in the scriptures. Dialectic lays out the rules for more complete 
understanding and determines what is to be understood. Under Aristotelian influence, 
dialectic had become clearly associated with the method of syllogistic logic. Under 
Augustine mathematics, as arithmetic, allowed the discovery of the mystery of 
numbers contained in the scriptures and might permit the human mind to approach 
the immutable. By Benedict’s time, meditative reading is allowed to reinforce 
community and faith, and an exalted state of mind, but criticism is fatal (Hankins, 
1990, p. 18).  
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A description of the Platonic system spoken of two paragraphs earlier can be found 
in Book 7 of The Republic (Plato, 1952r, pp. 388 - 401; 1969a). The three-tiered 
system discussed there begins with the beauty and form of gymnastic and musical 
education and then progresses through arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music to 
develop a capacity for reflection in readiness for graduation to the third tier which is 
philosophy as contemplation of God. Plato’s middle level subjects came to form the 
basis of the Quadrivium, the upper tier of the two-tier curriculum structure of the 
Middle Ages. This two-tier structure accommodated the so-called seven liberal arts 
or skills in a Trivium of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic, and a Quadrivium of music, 
astronomy, geometry and mathematics. At first, mathematics consisted mainly of 
arithmetic. The third tier had not disappeared. God’s truth had been revealed and 
reason was, in time, to be called to help with interpreting it. Contemplation of God 
could now occur through personal prayer and chant. The Sophists had, by Plato’s 
time, gone beyond the simple study of speaking and reading to the art of rhetoric 
which was then employed in the for-and-against argument of dialectic. Such freedom 
in dialectic was not always to be enjoyed in the Middle Ages. 
Aristotle’s treatment of education is to be found in Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 
1934, 1952g) and Politics (Aristotle, 1944, 1952o) and has been much discussed. 
Classic treatments of it have been made by Jowett (1913) and Davidson (1900) and 
Aristotle’s work still remains an inspiration for ongoing commentaries on a range of 
questions (Curren, 2000; Kirstjansson, 2007). Essentially, for Aristotle, political 
systems are to be predicated on happiness with virtue, virtue being the final end of 
human nature. As a consequence corrective education for people and Polis is itself to 
be predicated on nature Politics 1337a (Aristotle, 1944; 1952o, p. 542) which 
manifests itself through rational nous or intellect, rational practical reason, and an 
irrational component of the emotions and appetites. Aristotle’s education system 
mirrors this three-tier soul and provides training for development of body, 
habituation of appetites and emotions, and education through reason Politics VIII 
1332b – 1332b10, 1337b1– 1338b20 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952o, pp. 537, 542 - 544). It 
is education for harmony.  
Like Magevney, Graves (1915, pp. 4 - 21) perceives the origins of the monastery 
curriculum in Plato and Aristotle and fixes its Christianisation with Cassiodorus (AD 
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485 - 585), who popularised the phrase the seven liberal arts to describe the 
combined subjects of the Trivium and Quadrivium by linking that phrase name with 
the seven pillars of wisdom mentioned in Proverbs 10:1 (Holy Bible). Cassiodorus 
discusses the liberal arts in Book II of his Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning 
(Cassiodorus, 2004) and for him the liberal arts are helpful for understanding God 
through study of the holy scriptures (L. T. Jones, 1945, p. 433 - 436; Ueberweg, 
1889, p. 355). Ableson (1906, p. 7) claims that the seven liberal arts were established 
as a curriculum in the fourth century. 
Such study kept syllogistic reasoning alive (ibid.) all be it the captive of the 
mysteries of faith. As Chapter 3 of this enquiry revealed, the Categories (Aristotle, 
1938a, 1952a) is fundamental to ontology, while through their discourse on method, 
the Prior Analytics (Aristotle, 1938c, 1952q) and the Posterior Analytics (Aristotle, 
1952p, 1960a) contain big questions for epistemology. Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 
1952w) reaches in depth to questions of cosmology, theology understood as 
metaphysics, and teleology. 
Graves (1915, pp. 9 - 12), as does Kardong (1996, passim), discusses the nature of 
the rules for conduct of monasteries Benedict prescribed in his now-called Regula 
Benedicti (St. Benedict, 1875, 1949) and subsequently links the establishment of 
monastery schools first, to the need to read, and secondly, to the need to write and 
maintain emerging monastery libraries. Graves identifies an essential difference in 
intent between the Greco-Roman and developing Christian systems: the aims of 
education were now to inculcate Christian Benedictine ideals of obedience, chastity, 
and poverty necessary to the business of the Church—something of a weakening, if 
not a jettisoning, of fundamental pagan educational ideals of allegiance to the state, 
care of family, and economic provision for the future, an oversimplification perhaps 
but a nice difference.  
Magevney discusses Benedict first rekindling learning at Monte Cassino in AD 529 
(1900, p. 7). Like Koph (2000a, pp. 161 - 179), he also comments on the spread of 
Benedictine monastery life far and wide and the role it played in the next two 
centuries in civilising the now converting descendants of the barbarians. Perhaps 
such challenging work helps explain a need for that strong delicious liquor. 
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Cubberley (2004, pp. 66 - 71) raises a very probable likelihood that schooling 
occurred in monasteries before Benedict. Graves (1915, pp. 9 - 12) suggests that such 
schools did exist a century before Benedict and in charting their development states 
that out of sheer necessity Benedictine monastery schools admitted so-called external 
students in order to obtain and prepare educated staff for needed secular occupations. 
External students were taught in classes held in buildings outside the cloisters and it 
is possible that clergymen, laymen and nobles attended these schools to learn to read 
and write (Koph, 2000, p. 151). These schools varied in quality (ibid., pp. 156 – 157) 
due to a variety of influences associated with the professional reputations of the 
masters, cloister management, safety, and food security. In this way, through 
admission of external students, public free education held on. Students from these 
external schools left to take up work at the age of fourteen while the so-called interns 
could not become monks until the age of eighteen. It is not difficult to imagine the 
very real practical provisioning needs of these early educational organisations which 
existed to nurture both body and soul. Later, under Charlemagne (AD 742 – 814), so-
called externs could, if they chose, enter the monastery proper.  
Cubberley (Cubberley, 2004, pp. 104 - 109) further explains that as these monastery 
schools developed, reading was for understanding of the bible, writing for 
transcription and dictation, and arithmetic for calculation of church festivals and 
warehousing purposes. Grammar included study of some literature, rhetoric centred 
on mastery of skills for letter writing and drafting of legal documents. Astronomy 
was largely confined to study of the courses of the planets and calculation of the 
seasons, geometry was confined to geometrical concepts and some geography, and 
music was largely confined to sacred composition and litany. Gregorian chant was 
soon to emerge. Dialectic, still not in the greatest of favour in respect of discovery of 
truth about the scriptures, was never far removed from the use of the syllogism in 
reasoning. 
Beginning with Charlemagne, Science understood as syllogistic demonstration began 
to consolidate its importance through its role in dialectic in a very limited form in the 
Trivium and more so in the Quadrivium (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 243). The 
Trivium was on its way to becoming the preparatory bachelor study for the higher 
degree work of the Quadrivium. 
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During the ninth and tenth centuries, following Charlemagne, cathedral and 
monastery schools increasingly complemented the palace schools (ibid., pp. 242 – 
243), and under the Carolingians metaphysics, psychology and philosophy were to 
become part of the curriculum (ibid., p. 241). It is through its involvement in these 
new subjects, and the use increasingly made of it to defend orthodox faith positions, 
that Science, understood as syllogistic demonstration, gradually combined with 
dialectic to established anew its utility and find a temporary abode.  
The two-tier curriculum structure containing syllabi arranged, as earlier explained, 
into seven subjects divided into a trivial three and a more complex four was to 
remain the basic curriculum design template until the twelfth century when the 
universities began to emerge and when the philosophies, natural, moral and 
metaphysical, and later theology, law, and medicine gradually began to blossom 
(Cubberley, 2004, p. 116). Law came to be of interest from AD 1167 onwards 
through the efforts of the Lombardy League to support the Pope in his differences 
with the German King (ibid. 129). Medicine became of renewed interest when 
Robert, Duke of Normandy, returning from the First Crusade in AD 1099, was cured 
of a wound at Salerno. Greek medical texts attributed to Hippocrates (BC 460 – 370) 
and Galen (AD 130 – 200), and Arab medical writing by Avicenna (AD 980 – 1037), 
had been preserved and studied there (ibid., p. 131). 
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries rhetoric became less concerned with 
declamation and panegyric in favour of the Church, and works on rhetoric by Cicero 
(BC c. 106 – 44) and Quintilian (AD c. 35 – c. 100) began to lose some of their 
influence (Graves, 1915, p. 20). Graves, who does not directly state that the waning 
of declamation and panegyric might have contributed to the progress of Science, 
explains that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Science, that is, syllogistic 
reasoning, was employed more widely as new subjects and domains of enquiry began 
to develop (Graves, 1915, pp. 17 - 21). And progress it could, partly because of the 
influence of Arab learning and partly because of the stability, learning and food 
security provided by the monastery system it would finally help erode. 
I now enquire into mediaeval syllabus content and teaching method which served the 
two-tier seven-subject framework under discussion. I search for further insights that 
curriculum content and teaching method might provide about nuance of the terms  
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Science and Ethics, reason’s rehabilitation, and Science’s renewed utility. Leading 
maxims of teaching method in early mediaeval 
schools are known (Cubberley, 2004, pp. 102 - 
109; Graves, 1915, pp. 12 - 23; Philobiblious, 
1860, pp. 131 - 140). Instruction proceeded largely 
by dictation, rote, drill, and question and answer. In 
general, in the cloister schools, students first 
mastered reading and writing through study of the 
Psalter and then proceeded to profane study of the 
Trivium and the Quadrivium. Latin, rather than the 
vernacular, was the language of instruction and, 
given the rarity of manuscripts, there was much 
transcription. It appears from the illustration that 
women were admitted to the cloister schools. 
Manuscripts in use in mediaeval schools are known (Cubberley, 2004, pp. 109 - 
110): Capella’s Satyricon, Boethius’ 
commentaries on Aristotle and his De 
Musica, Cassiodorus’s On the Liberal Arts 
and Sciences, commentaries by Isidore, 
Origen and Alcuin on the Trivium, and 
Maurus’ commentaries On the Instruction 
of the Clergy and De Universo. De Musica 
was used well into the middle of the eighteenth century. Orme (2006, p. 28) names a 
work by Donatus, who flourished IN THE fourth century AD, which, after 
successive revisions, went to press following the European discovery of printing in 
the fifteenth century. The work, named the Ars Minor, provides a good example of 
the method of rote learning of grammar.  
How many are the parts of speech? Eight. What are they? Noun, pronoun, verb, 
adverb, participle, conjunction, proposition, interjection. What is a noun? A part of 
speech that has a case, signifying a body or a thing that is proper or common. How 
many features has a noun? Ten. What are they? Quantity, comparison, gender, 
number, figure, and case. (Donatus quoted in Orme, 2006, p. 28)  
Only six of the ten features seem to have been reported. Grant (2001, pp. 26 - 27) 
names Boethius (AD 470 - 526), Capella (flourished 5th century) and Cassiodorus 
 
 
Source: (Burgkmair) (artist). The Emperor 
Maximilian Studying the Science of Music. 
(Possible sixteenth century). (wood 
engraving). London: National Portrait 
Gallery 
 
 
Source: (Garcia, 2012). Mediaeval Scriptorium. 
(illuminated parchment). (artist and date unknown). 
 375 
(AD 485 – 585) as scholars whose influence lasted until the twelfth century. Quality 
at the various schools was uneven and students voted with their feet. I have already 
commented on Cassiodorus and curriculum structure and content on page 370. 
The content Boethius (AD 470 - 526) provided is known. Posterity has rewarded him 
for his perseverance through which he (a) translated Aristotle’s Categories (Aristotle, 
1938a, 1952a) Prior Analytics (Aristotle, 1938c, 1952q), Posterior Analytics (1952p, 
1960a), On Sophistical Refutations (Aristotle, 1952l, 1958) and On Interpretation 
(Aristotle, 1938b, 1952j), and Porphyry’s Isagoge (2009), which itself is an 
introduction to the Categories (b) wrote commentaries on De Interpretatione, the 
Categories, Isagoge, and Victorinus’ translation of the Isagoge, and (c) crafted 
treatises on formal logic and other works (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 354). These writings, 
together with some or all of Plato’s Timaeus (Plato, 1263/2012, 1925h, 1952w) 
available in Latin translation by Calcidius (circa AD 321), Apuleius (circa AD 123 – 
180) and Augustine (AD 354 - 430), were standard materials for study in the cloister 
schools thereafter (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 367).  
Isidorus Hispalensis (died AD 636), through his work in the encyclopaedic tradition 
of Cassiodorus (AD 485 – 585) and Boethius (AD 470 - 526), provides another 
insightful example of curriculum content in his discussion of the seven arts in The 
Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, (Isidore of Seville, 2010, pp. 39 – 108). The so-
called seven arts of the Satyricon were now considered the “seven pillars of 
wisdom`, or the seven steps by which one may rise to perfect science” (Ueberweg, 
1889). 
Isidore extended his school’s curriculum to include rhetoric and dialectic in a new 
combination named logic, a small but telling development in the rehabilitation of 
reason under the authority of the time. The encyclopaedic tradition continued in the 
voluminous work of the Venerable Bede (AD 673 - 735) and the seven liberal arts 
maintained their status as standard fare in the cloister schools founded by Alcuin 
(AD 736 – 804) at the behest of Charlemagne (AD 742 - 814).  
Graves gives an example of the catechetical nature of the question and answer 
method still employed in the cathedral schools of Alcuin’s day. Under a catechetical 
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method, students were “caused to hear” (Graves, 1909, p. 279) Christian truths 
before proceeding to the further benefits of education. 
Pippin: What produces speech? Alcuin: The tongue 
Pippin” What is the tongue? Alcuin: The whip of the air. 
Pippin: What is the air? Alcuin: The guardian of life.  
Pippin: What is life? Alcuin: The joy of the good, the sorrow of the evil, the 
expectation of death. (Graves, 1909, p. 29) 
 
And again: 
Pippin: What is rain? Alcuin: The reservoir of the earth, the mother of fruits? 
Pippin: What is frost? Alcuin: A persecutor of plants, a destroyer of leaves, a fetter of 
the earth, a fountain of water. 
Pippin: What is snow? Alcuin: Dry water. (Graves, 1909, p. 29) 
 
The general construction of this rote learning method not only illustrates the benign 
presence of an interest in Science as the observation of beings, and the eliciting of 
relationships amongst them, but also the manner in which so-called correct answers 
are written in the metaphor of the scriptures. Graves subsequently suggests that 
Alcuin, by developing a palace school at Charlemagne’s request, established 
conditions for a return of discursive syllogism. He postulates that the more 
sophisticated courtly manners required at the palace schools altered curriculum 
content and teaching methods in a manner erosive of dogmatic correctness, but 
provides no examples. 
Alcuin’s most famous student Rabanus Maurus (AD 776 – 856) enriched the liberal 
arts curriculum by adding literature to the study of grammar including reading of 
classical poets, by extending the study of arithmetic beyond the business of church 
festivals, and by “ascribing phenomena to natural laws rather than to some 
mysterious cause” (Graves, 1915, p. 34). The content of the seven liberal arts and 
aspects of teaching method used in Maurus’s time have been reconstructed by 
Cubberley (2004, pp. 102 - 109) from Maurus’ own description of it in De 
Institutione Clericorum (Rabani Mauri, 1900/2009) unavailable in English.  
Maurus had invited natural philosophy into the cloisters but it was to be a long time 
before syllogistic reasoning, free from faith authority, might examine nature on its 
own terms, of which more later. Eriugena (AD c 808 – 877), who succeeded Alcuin 
as head of the school at Fulda, appears to have been as much a philosopher as a 
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schoolmaster. By Eriugena’s time, teaching method for all the subjects of the seven 
liberal arts consisted of an exposition, by the master, of a relevant text. As the 
curriculum was extended, metaphysics and psychology at first, and then philosophy, 
were to be admitted into the dialectic and before long the system of learning was to 
amount to a kind of philosophical theology (Graves, 1915, p. 57). In this milieu 
Eriugena thus, inter alia, served the establishment of the Carolingian schools as a 
liberal arts master in the tradition of the Satyricon. As further discussed on pages 388 
and 398, Eriugena substantially advanced the utility of Science for the work of the 
schools, but he was ahead of his time, and some of his work was subsequently 
condemned. 
Makdesi (1974), in a discussion about the contribution Islamic culture made to the 
west, also provides insights into teaching method, and reason’s advancement, 
through dialectic, in mediaeval scholarship. Makdesi explains that dialectic was an art 
of rational discussion in which a questioner and respondent reason with each other. 
So understood dialectic is different from the eristic of On Sophistical Refutations 
171b – 172b5 (Aristotle, 1952l, pp. 236 - 237; 1958) which involves getting the 
better of an argument by any means. Dialectic is aimed at discovering fallacies and 
has other benefits such as enabling appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the many sides of an argument, and in establishing fundamentals of Science Topics 
101a – 101b5 (Aristotle, 1952r, pp. 143 - 144; 1960b). 
Dialectic is characterised by its social nature, it is a dialogue; by its honesty, the 
respondent must answer what they really think; by its continuity of argument, the 
respondent must answer and not plead ignorance; and by its disrespect for authority, 
the respondent is not allowed to answer on the basis of recognized authority but must 
answer in terms of the here and now of the discussion (Walton, 2007, pp. 51 - 52, 
61).  
Both syllogistic demonstration and dialectic were found increasingly useful during 
the high middle ages—accepted indicatively as that period from AD 1000 to 1300—
where, in combination, they provided an intellectual method which subsequently 
informed a scholastic logic of obligations and consequences as an intellectual pursuit 
played out according to rules (Hamblin, 1970, pp. 260 - 264; Stump, 1989, pp. pp. 1 - 
2). Under obligation-logic of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a respondent 
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agrees to an obligation to uphold the negative or affirmative of a statement. There 
follows an exchange of sentences between opponent and respondent in which the 
respondent affirms or denies or expresses doubt. The exchange ends when the 
respondent fails their obligation if he or she grants a statement inconsistent with rules 
of the game, or the statement being upheld. Hamblin gives full details of the rules of 
obligation logic in Chapter 8 (Hamblin, 1970, pp. 253 - 282).  
Before this time, syllogism and dialectic were to be combined with disputation. 
Abelard (AD 1078 – 1142) taught dialectic and two of the schools in which he taught 
were subsequently combined to form the University of Paris circa 1160 - 70. Abelard 
discusses dialectics in his Dialectica and Theologia Christiana, both available in 
Latin. Ueberweg (1889, p. 391) provides helpful insights: Abelard held Aristotle to 
be the highest authority in dialectic, and dialectic must distinguish between the true 
and the false. Logical distinctions are arrived at through discriminating between 
different applications of words. Physics is prior to logic. That is, objects precede 
words. Words were invented to express thoughts but thoughts must conform to 
things. Human speech is not arbitrary because it is always tied to the objects it 
expresses. Definition is the meaning of the word explained in other words and 
universals do not have an objective existence before the individual. The species arise 
from the genus by the addition of a form to the genus, but the genus is not prior to 
the species in time or existence (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 398).  
Abelard’s teaching method is not easy to reconstruct (Clanchy, 2000, pp. 85 - 90; 
Marenbon, 2006, pp. 36 - 53). Although Abelard employed rhetoric and used jocular 
exchange effectively, his dialectic needed to be robust in the face of the criticism his 
approach drew from both his superiors and young adversaries. He gave lectures, 
wrote them up as glosses both hastily and more formally, and transacted yes-and-no 
disputation, based on his collection of contradictory statements found in the work of 
church doctors. His method involves syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and yes-
and-no disputation, those same ingredients which through refinement in time became 
central to scholastic method in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Brower & 
Guilfoy, 2004, p. 9; Makdisi, 1974, p. 642). Compayre claims that through his 
method, Abelard brought “dialectic to theology and reason to authority” (Compayre, 
1893, p. 19), a position compatible with the views of Medley (2004, pp. 77, 82) and 
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Adams (2007, p. 254). Abelard is now known for his dialectical theology but in his 
time theology as an academic discipline was in its infancy. Some years were to pass 
before Aquinas (AD 1225 - 1247) would unite theology and philosophy as 
compatible sciences under Christianity, and fewer years then again before Duns 
Scotus (AD 1274 - 1308) and Ockham (AD 1289 - 1349) would occasion 
philosophy’s own estrangement from theology. 
While Abelard’s individual method might be difficult to pin down, the general 
method employed at his university, the University of Paris, is better known. For 
example, according to Williams, the liberal arts faculties of the University of Paris: 
had become something like what we would think of as a philosophy department. The 
arts masters no longer thought of themselves chiefly as providing a preliminary 
grounding in the liberal arts for budding theologians, but as practitioners of a critical, 
philosophical discipline with its own independent dignity—a dignity that they were 
not shy of asserting both on their own behalf and on behalf of the discipline of 
philosophy itself. (T. Williams, 2009a, p. 19) 
Pedagogical process was rigorous and exhaustive: 
The topic would be announced in advance so that everyone could prepare an arsenal of 
clever arguments. When the faculty and students had gathered, the professor would 
offer a brief introduction and state his thesis. All morning long an appointed graduate 
student would take objections from the audience and defend the professor’s thesis 
against those objections. (And if the graduate student began to flounder, the professor 
was allowed to help him out). A secretary would take shorthand notes. The next day 
the group would reassemble. This time it would be the professor’s job to summarise 
the arguments on both sides and give his own response to the question at issue. The 
whole thing would be written up, either in a rough-and-tumble version deriving from 
the secretary’s notes or in a more carefully crafted and edited version prepared by the 
professor himself. Records of such academic exercises have come down to us under 
the title ‘disputed questions’ (T. Williams, 2009a, p. 1). 
The dialectic method used is also known. Within the pedagogical process of 
scholastic disputation of the kind outlined above, application of Aristotelian logic 
and metaphysics proceeded in the manner outlined in the quote which next follows. 
The method consisted, first, in connecting the doctrines to be expounded, with a 
commentary on some work chosen for the purpose. The contents of this work were 
divided and subdivided until the separate propositions, of which it was composed, 
were reached. Then these were interpreted, questions were raised with reference to 
them, and (for the most part in strictly syllogistic form) the grounds for affirming and 
for denying them were presented. Finally the decision was announced, and in case this 
was affirmative, the grounds for the negative were confuted, or, in the opposite case, 
the grounds for the affirmative. The names of the persons holding the various opinions 
which were discussed were, as a rule, not given. No opinions were defended during 
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this period, which were altogether original and were not supported by some Authority. 
(Ueberweg, 1889, p. 432)  
This morphing of the liberal arts faculties from centres of clerical training to centres 
of exploration and creativity bespeaks philosophy’s ongoing estrangement from 
theology.  
To summarise, incremental change in syllabus structure and content, and teaching 
method, during the time from Augustine (AD 345 – 430) to Abelard (AD 1078 – 
1142), allows insights into the nature of relationships amongst Science, Ethics and 
Polis. During this period education occurs in palace, cathedral and monastery schools 
but particularly through the latter. In effect, the Christian church is a kind of so-
called state provider of education and it offered instruction on how to be ethical in a 
Christian way. Ethics thus remains faith Ethics and the Polis remains a city of God. 
Science changed from that free to roam Aristotelian syllogism for which the Church 
had no need, to Aristotelian syllogism as an indispensable part of reason understood 
as syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and yes-and-no-disputation, all be it under 
tight church scrutiny. Abelard successfully applied additional elements of rhetoric 
and the jocular to facilitate reason’s effectiveness.  
So much for what can be gleaned about changing relationships amongst Science, 
Ethics and Polis through enquiry into curriculum, syllabus and teaching method in 
mediaeval times—I now further enquire into such changing relationships by 
discussing the manner in which notable scholars of the times used Science and Ethics 
to help defend various views they held. 
SPECIFIC WORK OF THE CHAPTER CONTINUES 
Gleaning Understandings of the Key Terms Science, Ethics and Polis from their Presence in, 
and Efficacy to, Works by Scholarly Writers 
A discursive approach, as opposed to unquestioning acceptance of rote, can be found 
emerging during the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries. For example, Claudianus 
Mamertus (died AD 477) argued a position opposite to that in vogue (Ueberweg, 
1889, pp. 353 - 354). The accepted position was that because all beings except God 
fell within the ten Aristotelian categories, and were thus material, so too the human 
soul was material. Mamertus argued that while the human soul possesses quality, that 
Table 15 category which determines or qualifies the nature of an object, it may not 
be predicated on quantity or magnitude, except in respect of virtue and intelligence. 
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Table 15 is located on page 207. So constituted, the human soul moves in time but 
not in space and in this way is differentiated from both God and the material beings 
of the categories. The work returns a touch of reason, understood as Science in 
dialectic, to theological speculation.  
In a quieter presence, reason informed the position taken by Ratramnus (died circa 
AD 868), in his contest with Paschasius Radbertus, Abbot of Corbie (died circa AD 
860), who, in an earlier work, De Corpore et Sanguine Domini (Paschasius 
Radbertus & Bedae Paulus, 1969), had taken the position that, in the Eucharist, the 
bread and wine actually turned to flesh and blood. Ratramnus, in his own De 
Corpore et Sanguine Domini (Ratramnus, 1974) held against Radbertus that it did 
not. Ratramnus’ argument was in part based on an acknowledgement of the absence 
of sensible physical changes in the bread and wine (Mellone, 1918, p. 241). 
Another controversy involved predestination. Predestination is understood as 
prescience or foreknowledge by God of His will and acts, combined with 
provenience, or God acting out his will and revealing his foreknowledge through all 
of nature (Martin, 1918, p. 226). In this controversy, the Church employed John 
Scotus Eriugena (circa AD c. 808 - 877) to combat the unorthodox position put by 
Gottschalk (Hampden, 1848, p. 35; Mellone, 1918, p. 241). Gottschalk had taken a 
stand in favour of foreordination to salvation and foreordination to damnation 
(Schaff, 1913, pp. 525 - 300) and Eriugena’s defence of the church position was, 
unlike the scriptural proofs against Gottschalk offered by Rabanus Maurus (died AD 
840) and Hincemar (died AD 882), a reasoned theological defence based on the 
proposition that no predestination could be evil because to accept that evil is 
prescient is to accept a duality in the divine nature (Martin, 1918, p. 232; Ueberweg, 
1889, p. 364 - 65). Eriugena also defended Ratramnus’s reasoned position on the 
Eucharist (Mellone, 1918, p. 242; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 365). Eriugena could not but 
urge against duality in the Divine because a unified single God is at the centre of his 
De Divisione Naturae, also known as Periphyseon (Eriugena, 1987), in which he sets 
out his system of emanation through which all physical real existing beings come 
from, and return to God. Eriugena proved to be most influential. He marks an 
important milestone in reason’s liberation from the faith authority of the times and 
beginning in the next paragraph and continuing on until page 389 I articulate this 
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claim before returning to the main task of explicating key terms meanings and 
nuance from the works of scholarly writers.  
In establishing his system Eriugena took a position against the so-called dialecticians 
(Ueberweg, 1889, p. 365), those who argued along Aristotelian category lines that 
substance alone is the primary existence in which the accidents, the remaining 
categories, inhere, and thereby exist in a secondary sense. As explained throughout 
Chapter 2, in the Aristotelian system, only individuals alone first exist independently, 
universals, species and genus, exist in a secondary and objective sense but in the 
mind. To argue against the dialecticians, Eriugena adopted a position akin to that of 
the Platonic ideas wherein the universals in perfect real template form exist before 
individuals, that is, he adopted the dictum of universals ante rem or universals 
before-the-thing (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 358). This “layman and philosopher by 
profession” (Hampden, 1848, p.36) accepted “that grammar and rhetoric, as branches 
of dialectic, or aids to it, relate only to words (voces), not things, and that they are not 
therefore properly sciences (De Divis. Nat., V.4)” (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 364). Still, 
Eriugena “coordinates dialectic itself (De Div. Nat, III. 30) with Ethics, physics, and 
theology, defining it as the doctrine of the methodological form of knowledge” (ibid., 
p. 364).  
Unfortunately, Eriugena has not expanded on the details which inform this 
methodology, but his discussion of the Aristotelian categories in Book 1 of the 
Periphyseon (Eriugena, 1987) reveals that he employs “the four forms called by the 
Greeks division, definition, demonstration, and analysis” (Ueberweg, 1889), his 
intent being “the reduction of the derivative and composite to the simple, universal 
and fundamental” (ibid., p. 364). Armed with this arsenal, Eriugena was sought after 
for his erudition in reasoned theology and for his political skills. He became a 
favoured member of the French court (Moran, 2004, pp. 35 - 36) and, as previously 
discussed on page 364, played an important role in the schools established under the 
patronage of Charlemagne (J. O'Meara, 2004, p. 198). Hampden (1848, p. 36) and 
Moran 2006 (2006, p. 269) cannot be certain that Eriugena went beyond being a 
cleric to become a monk. 
Irrespective of the source of a Christian Neoplatonic synthesis to be found in his De 
Divisione Naturae, or Periphyseon, and even in the face of new scholarship about 
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revisions of his work by hand or hands other than his (Jeauneau & Dutton, 1996), 
Eriugena is recognized for his firm belief in the independent existence of actual real 
objects created by God, outside of the human mind. His belief in such objects is 
confirmed in Book 1 of De Divisione Naturae wherein nature, for Eriugena all 
existence and non-existence, is divided into things-which-are and things-which-are-
not. Non-existing “consists” of (1) that which is above the reach of the senses, (2) 
higher forms of emanation not known to lower forms of emanation, (3) that which is 
in potential existence, for example, the tree in the seed, (4) material existence, the 
matter in form and matter, in Eriugena’s case Christ’s substance and, (5) sin 
understood as the loss of the divine image (Mooney, 2009, p. 45; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 
361). 
The totality of nature, those things which-are and which-are-not, is divided into four 
sections:  
(1) Nature which creates and is not created: such nature is God who is the first and 
only cause.  
(2) Nature which creates and is created: such nature consists of the primordial 
causes. These primordial causes are the types of things formed by God before 
creation and in kind they are not unlike the Platonic ideas. They are God’s active 
efficient causes. They are in God, are made, and emanate from God, and the 
phenomena of nature outlined in (3) below are directly caused by them. Eriugena 
gives examples of the primordial causes in Book 1 of his De Divisione Naturae: 
goodness, essence, life, wisdom, truth, intellect, reason, and virtue (Eriugena, 1976; 
Yates, 1960, pp. 7 - 9). Yates discusses Eriugena’s incomplete definition of the 
primordial causes, those “divine names, ... those principia exempla ... goodness, 
truth, virtue, wisdom ‘and others of the like’” (1960, p. 7). They are also named 
“what the Greeks call ideas” (ibid., p. 7) and “as a unity, they constitute the Logos, 
the creative Word of God” (ibid., p. 8).  
(3) Nature which is created and does not create: such nature consists of created 
temporal effects. This division consists of things that are subject to conditions of time 
and space and to change. In Eriugena’s system they emanate from God, and through 
his primordial causes they are separated into effects understood as concrete, existing 
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things outside of the human mind. This reality is rigorous in Eriugena and in 
theology Eriugena’s earthly world of real objects is said to be a hypostasized world. 
The phenomena are ideas intertwined with matter. In spite of the active ideas, these 
primordial causes, acting as efficient causes, Eriugena’s hypostasized existing real 
world is as independent in time and space as is the world of Aristotle’s independently 
existing things. God alone is real, but God is the substance of all things. Thus for 
Eriugena “the whole realm of created being has no independent reality: it exists, 
because it exists in God. Creation and revelation are one” (Mellone, 1918, p. 242)—a 
neat conclusion and a point can be made that Greek gods in nature have been 
replaced by God in nature. Mooney makes a similar claim (2009, p. 196). But while 
existing material beings consist of God’s substance as the first stuff of the world, 
rather than Aristotelian potential being that stuff, Aristotle is still present in 
Eriugena’s system, of which more later. 
(4) Nature which is neither created nor creates: such nature is non-being. This 
category is seen as the return of all things to God. Here God, the only efficient cause, 
is also in a sense the final cause. 
Divisions (1) and (4) refer to God. Divisions (2) and (3) are cause and real effects 
and Eriugena’s explanation is theological, psychological explanation being less 
important in Eriugena (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 254). “The four stages form a 
process from God to God, which through our finiteness we think of in time; but in 
itself it is eternal and beyond time itself” (Mellone, 1918, p. 242). Eriugena makes 
use of both positive and negative reasoning. Positive reasoning proceeds towards 
establishing what God is. Negative reasoning, referred to as reasoning by apophasis 
(McIntosh, 1998, p 124), proceeds towards understanding what God is, by 
establishing what God is not.  
In the Greek and/or Byzantine scholarship, that is, in the non-Latin scholarship from 
the time of Christ onwards, the apophatic method can be found in two streams of 
thought. One stream can be called Neoplatonism and it flowed in a direct line from 
Plotinus (AD c. 204 – 270), who lived in both the East and West, through Proclus 
(AD 411 - 485) to Pseudo Dionysius, probably extant in the late fifth century, 
probably Syrian. The other stream may be called Byzantine (Meyendorff, 1979, pp. 
11, 12) it being most visible in the work of the Cappadocians Basil (died AD 379), 
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Gregory of Nyssa (AD 331 - 394), Peter (AD 340 - 391), and Gregory of Nazianzen 
(born AD c. 336). The three brothers Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Peter, were part of 
a monastic family in Asia Minor. Gregory of Nazianzen was a close friend who also 
retired to a monastery. Armstrong (1979) contends that the two streams had very 
little influence on one another. Generally, both streams are referred to as mystical or 
religious in nature (E. Moore, 2007, n. p.). In both systems the apophatic method 
employs reason in affirmation of knowledge. In both systems, the real world, God’s 
created real world in the one, and the Neoplatonic hypostasized world in the other, 
exist independently and are respectively central to functioning of reason. 
Eriugena’s apophasis comes predominantly from the Neoplatonic line not the 
Byzantine (Liebregts, 2004, p. 219) and his general argument is that all of the 
Aristotelian categories ranging from quantity through to affection as revealed in 
Table 15 on page 207, are applicable to sensual phenomena, that is to real 
individuals, and to intellectual phenomena within the liberal arts, but they are not 
applicable to God. God’s hypostasised world exists by virtue of God’s pleroma or 
unfolding. Yates claims that Eriugena treated the categories as modes of abstracting 
from the sensual real world phenomena, “the reality behind them” (Yates, 1960, p. 6) 
and employs this explanation to explain Ueberweg’s claim that Eriugena’s mistake 
was to hypostatize the Tabula Logica (A. H. Armstrong, 1967, p. 531; J. O'Meara, 
2004, p. 219; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 360; Yates, 1960, pp. 2 - 13), that is, to predicate 
God’s emanation on the basis that “the degrees of abstraction correspond to the 
degrees of real existence” (Yates, 1960, p. 6). Tracing back from the sensed real 
world objects through the levels of hypostatisation leads to the reality of a Christian 
God, not the Greek condition of substance as potential.  
Newman and Scott (1917, p. 149) trace hypostatisation ideas to their origins in the 
Cult of Mithra (Cumont, 1903a, p. 104) whose first G(g)od or Aeon, or Time, was 
itself ineffable and inconceivable. Gnostics initially knew only a single aeon. But 
under Valentinus this unity is able to manifest itself as a plurality (Mead, 1900, pp. 
307 - 09). Later Gnostics were thus able to allow aeons of time to descend first 
through successive steps to the materiality of mankind’s world by virtue of male and 
female procreating pairs, and subsequently by projection or emanation from the one 
God. In this manner, the Divine nature unfolds itself in its fullness or pleroma and 
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higher reality, which higher reality is separated from the sensed phenomena of the 
world by a great gulf.  
In the version of Valentinus, this gulf was bridged by the actions of the last higher 
reality Achamoth or Lower Wisdom who attempted to produce further aeons without 
conjugating with a male partner (Kemp, 2004, p. 46). As a result “[Achamoth] 
brought forth a ‘formless and undigested substance’ (the Demiurge) which evolved 
into the present order of things with its mixture of good and evil, and with man 
whose spirit is enslaved by matter” (A. H. Newman & Scott, 1917, p. 149, my square 
brackets). The strife caused by Achamoth’s action was finally calmed when the now 
Christian God, noting the distress felt by Achamoth, and the humble and sincere 
pleas of the other Aeons, allowed Nous and Achamoth to project Christ and the Holy 
Ghost for the purpose of destroying the Demiurge and restoring form to mankind by 
liberating light and life from the debilitating substance in which it had been 
imprisoned (Kemp, 2004, p. 46). 
Of the doctrine of the Aeons, Newman and Scott note that from the very beginning 
Aeonic theory began in nature through its recognition of “Infinite Time as the 
ultimate fact in nature” (A. H. Newman & Scott, 1917, p. 149) and that it failed in its 
attempt “to open a way out of the bondage of the natural world [because] it was itself 
grounded in ideas derived from nature worship” (ibid., p. 149, my square brackets). 
Bearing in mind this insight Newman and Scott have provided, and in the light of 
Yates’ view that Eriugena employed the Aristotelian categories as the realities 
behind the sensual real world pleroma, Eriugena’s ontology might be seen as 
circular. It is hard not to have threads of Presocratic reincarnation-cycle thinking 
intrude in attempts at understanding Eriugena’s journey along the categories ladder 
to God, and back again by emanation, to those objects.  
Mellone, in the quote next following, comments on conflict in Eriugena’s being able 
to say what God is not, by apophasis, and what God is, through nature.  
No predicate applicable to finite being is applicable to God; He is above and beyond 
all qualities that we experience in finite being. Hence ultimately we can say what God 
is not rather than what He is. On the other hand the whole realm of created nature is in 
its measure a ‘theophany’ whereby we may attain to a knowledge of God, perceiving 
his being through the being of created things, His wisdom through their order and 
harmony, His life through their activity and movement. (Mellone, 1918, p. 242)  
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Even in the face of Mellone’s no-predication comment, Eriugena is able to 
understand God by His being the “Father, by his wisdom, the Son, and by his life the 
Holy Ghost” (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 361). In defending Eriugena’s use of negative and 
positive theology, Ueberweg explains that Eriugena posits that God’s creative and 
uncreated nature is superior to Aristotle’s ten categories, and that he, Eriugena, 
acknowledges the limitations of language terms, all of which have their opposites or 
negatives in meaning, there being no opposite to God. 
In particular, Eriugena goes beyond Augustine and identifies true philosophy and 
true religion as the same thing (Alvarez, 2000, p. 527; Moran, 2004, pp. 83, 239; W. 
Turner, 1903/2012, p. 264). He also asserts that reason is central for human access to 
God (Moran, 2004, p. 90). In particular, Eriugena argues that true religion is not 
merely ecclesiastical authority, and that when reason is at odds with authorized but 
conflicting interpretations of the scriptures, preference might, within the boundary of 
faith in revealed truth, be given to reason (Eriugena, 1976, I. 71; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 
360). Reason then is useful in deciding, when reading the Church Fathers, which 
teachings are more in accordance with the scriptures. Turner (1903a, p. 248) finds in 
Eriugena qua first Schoolman an expression of Scholasticism’s characteristic trait: 
the unification of reason and revelation. Moran explains that in Eriugena the rational 
domain of human nature is free. Moreover, especially in respect of the rational 
domain of human nature, he notes Eriugena’s claim that:  
the highest dignity of human nature is that it uniquely mirrors transcendent divine 
nature. Only of human nature can it be said that it is made in the image and likeness of 
God. Not even the angels are accorded that honor, so in a sense man is greater than the 
angels. Periphyseon (IV.758b). (Moran, 2006, n.p.)  
In addition, human rationality can, by virtue of its being both of the animal and 
intelligible worlds, mediate between them: 
Eriugena, however, recognizes the role of human nature in mediating between the 
divine and created things. Human nature is the ‘workshop of all things’ (officina 
omnium, II.530d; IV.755b). Human nature is a medium between animal and angel, a 
medietas between the earthly and the intelligible worlds. Human nature contains not 
only elements from the corporeal world but also belongs to the intelligible world. 
(Moran, 2006, n.p.)  
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Human nature in Eriugena also “resembles the divine nature which too is ‘both 
beyond all things and in all things’ Periphyseon (IV.759a - b)” (Moran, 2006, n. p.). 
Moran offers the following insight:  
Erigena's cosmological account has been criticized for collapsing the differences 
between God and creation, leading to a heresy later labelled as pantheism. There is no 
doubt that Erigena's theological intentions are orthodox, but he is a bold, speculative 
thinker, who believes that philosophy uncovers the true meaning of faith. (Moran, 
2006, n. p.).  
In Eriugena’s dialectical and highly rational approach to theology, rationality need 
only be helped by “the opinions of the holy fathers where ‘the gravest necessity 
requires that human reason be supported for the sake of those who, being untrained 
in it, are more amenable to authority than reason’ Periphyseon IV.781c - d” (Moran, 
2006, n.p.). William Turner, like Moran, also notes the enigmatic nature of 
Eriugena’s reasoned dialectic and argues that although Eriugena’s dialectic was 
rational his Neoplatonism is supreme and that he is Platonic or mystical before 
rational (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 248). Eriugena, according to Turner, rather 
theosophied philosophy than rationalized theology (ibid., p. 249) but this fine 
distinction will not be pursued further—it is clear though that it is not a simple matter 
to separate his reason from his faith.  
Eriugena’s knowledge cycle proceeds from God as knowledge, to primordial causes, 
to internal sense knowledge of concrete things, and then to knowledge of the things 
themselves, and then back again over the same route (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 255). 
The cognitive faculty is sensible, wherein it is referred to as a faculty which employs 
the sense organs grouped as one, and supersensible, wherein it is a faculty which 
mirrors the Trinity. There is intellect, the mind contemplating God; reason, the mind 
contemplating the primordial causes; and internal sense, the mind attaining 
knowledge of the real existing world. All knowledge is said to begin in God. 
Intellect, which includes will, is the soul’s essence, reason is its power, and sense is 
its actuality. Turner suggests of Eriugena’s epistemology that his “psychological 
doctrines do not occupy an important place in his [Eriugena’s] thought” (W. Turner, 
1903/2012, p. 254, my square brackets). Turner is a Jesuit. 
Nonetheless Eriugena’s position admits an understanding that human reason can 
occasion reliable knowledge about the world, all be it God’s hypostasized world, and 
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through that knowledge, further understanding about God. A more formal scientific 
and logical dialectical method is being rehabilitated and strengthened and other 
traces of Aristotle may remain in Eriugena’s work as well. Ueberweg (1889, p. 363) 
finds traces of Aristotle’s ontological division of beings—unmoved mover, moved 
and moving, moved and not moving—in the first three of Eriugena’s four divisions 
of nature.  
Platonic ideas too are said to be present. Plato, through Pseudo-Dionysius, furnishes 
the fourth division of all things returning to God (ibid., p. 363). On this matter many 
of Eriugena’s sources are known (Moran, 2004, pp. 103 - 122): he drew on Cicero 
(BC 106 - 43), Gregory of Nyssa (c. AD 330 - 394), Basil (died c. AD 379), 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430), Martianus Capella (5th century AD), Pseudo-Dionysius 
(late 5th century), Boethius (AD 470 - 526), and Maximus Confessor (AD c. 580 - 
662). Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w) was also known to Irish scholars. As discussed 
earlier on page 385, Eriugena’s exposure to the apophatic method came mainly from 
the Neoplatonic line and not from the Byzantine. His awakening, and the flowering 
of his De Divisione Naturae, is by his own acknowledgement, a main consequence of 
his translations of Pseudo Dionysius (AD late 5th early 6th centuries) if not of 
Maximus Confessor (AD 580 – 662). Thus, traces of an attempt made by Christian 
theology during the period from the Council of Nicaea (AD 325 – 400) to replace a 
so-called heretical Neoplatonism of some Gnostics with a more original Platonic 
teaching (W. Turner, 1903/2012, pp. 218, 222) might be still seen working itself out 
in Eriugena’s work.  
In arguing that religion and philosophy are one and the same, and that reason is 
essential for mankind’s access to God, Eriugena is something of an early fish 
jumping out of the faith authority water. 
To summarise, in their reasoned argument about church dogma, scholars such as 
Mamertus (died AD 477)), Ratramnus (died circa AD 868), and Eriugena (AD c. 808 
- 877) played an important role in Science’s journey to independence. In their works, 
reason as syllogistic demonstration is beginning to morph into reason as syllogistic 
demonstration in dialectic under faith authority. Revealed truth remains revealed 
truth. Eriugena’s Science and faith are one in theology because they both share in the 
one divine human reason. In the next paragraph, in fulfilment of the intension 
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expressed earlier on page 381, I resume the task of gleaning key terms meaning and 
nuance from the works of scholarly writers.  
Specific Discussion About Eriugena Now Having Ended Gleaning of Key Terms Meaning and 
Nuance Resumes 
To wit: reason’s survival was also aided by the work of the rigorously careful 
schoolmaster Alcuin (AD 736 – 804) and his work in establishing the palace school. 
Following Alcuin, the seven liberal arts were consolidated as everyday curriculum 
fare in the cloister and cathedral schools at Fulda—De Rerum Naturis or On the 
Nature of Things, by Hrabanus also called Rabanus Maurus (c. AD 780 – 856); at 
Aurillac—De Rationai et Ratione Uti or On Rational and to Use Reason, by Gerbert 
(AD c. 946 - 1003) who pursued his interest in Science and mathematics, and reason 
and its uses (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 369); and at Chartres by Fulbert (AD 952 or 962 – 
1028) through his administrative capability rather than his written works. Gerbert is 
of particular interest. He was influenced by Arab scholarship from Spain. Arab 
scholars, there in possession of much of Aristotle’s corpus appear to have focussed, 
inter alia, on its scientific content, of which more later, and there is some evidence of 
Gerbert’s use of experiment in his work, whether such work be branded Science or 
magic (Thorndike, 1923a, pp. 704 - 705, 697 - 718).  
For example, Crombie (1953, p. 11) suggests that Gerbert obtained the astrolabe 
from the Arabs, that he made a technical improvement to the abacus (ibid., p. 214) by 
introducing apices or turned horn buttons or disks on which Arabic numbers were 
written, and crafted a water clock with puppet show figures for the monastery at 
Madgeberg (ibid. p. 185). These water clocks were calibrated each evening by a 
reading taken from the pole star. By AD 1050, in response to calls from orthodox 
scholars voicing their concerns that reason in dialectic would dominate the Holy 
Scriptures, the Church asserted that reason should remain subordinate to the 
revelations of the scriptures. But reason would not behave as required.  
For example, in a contest between the orthodox Lanfranc (c. 1005 AD - 1089) and 
the dialectician Berengarius (c. AD 999 – 1088), Berengarius, a student at the school 
of Chartres founded by Fulbert (AD 952 or 962 – 1028), himself a student of Gerbert 
(AD c. 946 - 1003), further articulated the so-called reasonable doctrine of the 
Eucharist defended earlier by Ratramnus. In urging against the view that the bread 
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and wine, while retaining their outward appearance throughout the Eucharist, 
actually turned to flesh and blood, Berengarius relied on the work of Eriugena. The 
dispute was resolved in favour of Lanfranc an outcome which checked, for a time, 
reason’s rehabilitation to free syllogism in dialectic and disputation, and resulted in 
condemnation of Eriugena’s De Eucharistia by the Synod of Vercelli in 1050. 
Berengarius’ defeat notwithstanding, the extent to which the revealed truth of faith 
authority had allocated reason an important and enhanced yet very limited serf and 
villein role can be determined by the existence of a book (Elucidarium Sive 
Dialogues Summan Totius Theologiae Complectens) of uncertain authorship (Marx, 
2000, p. 1) in which “the whole substance of the dogmatics of the time is set forth in 
genuine scholastic manner, in syllogistic form and with a dialectical examination of 
proofs and counterproofs.” (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 371). Yet reason is kept under a 
strict ask-and-hear-the-desired-answer transaction between master and student which 
frames the content of the work (Marx, 2000, pp. 26 - 53). In an attempt to impose 
transubstantiation from bread and wine to flesh and blood, the Church had fought 
reason with reason and before long, and particularly first through the works of 
Anselm (AD 1033 – 1109) and Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142), reason was to become 
indispensable to faith authority. 
Anselm (AD 1033 – 1109), the “second St Augustine” and Italian Archbishop of 
Canterbury, took issue with Roscellinus (c. AD 1050 – 1125). Roscellinus, like 
Berengarius (AD c. 999 – 1088), had employed nominalism in his logical 
metaphysical argument in respect of the Trinity (Bishop, 2008, p. 110), that three 
Gods should be spoken of, not one. Roscellinus, argued that the universal, the unified 
God, could only be abstracted from the three singulars, the Father, Son, Holy Ghost 
(Anselm, 2009, pp. 289 - 291). Furthermore, if God were one thing in which three 
states existed, then the Father and the Holy Ghost should have accompanied the Son 
into the flesh. Anselm countervailed using the realist logic that the generic unified 
God was a unified whole of the three (Colish, 1983, pp. 84 - 85; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 
372).  
Reason consisting of Science as syllogistic dialectic in disputation, was also used by 
Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) against the extreme realism (Vanderjegt, 2006, p. 736) of 
William of Champeaux (c. AD 1070 – 1121), who took the position that the 
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universals were essentially present in each of the individuals amongst which there 
was no diversity of essence but rather a variety of accidents. Abelard, of whom more 
later, countervailed on the reasoned basis that, were it true, each numerically 
different individual would need to receive mutually incompatible accidents. The 
confrontation (Clanchy, 2000, pp. 67 - 75) again illustrates the utility of reason for 
faith authority, as do works by Anselm about redemption and atonement Cur Deus 
Homo (Anselm, 1926a), and God’s existence Monologium (Anselm, 1926b, 1926c).  
Anselm (AD 1033 – 1109) well illustrates the important but subordinate position of 
reason to faith authority. Relying on extreme realism, Anselm argued that faith is a 
condition of the emotions and will but that capable humans must work through 
reason to obtain a comprehensive understanding of faith (Clanchy, 2000, pp. 7, 272; 
Mellone, 1918, p. 243). Faith, defined as religious truths revealed from the 
scriptures, plus personal religious experience, plus defined authorized dogma of the 
Church, precedes reasoned knowledge experience. Anselm’s so Greek-reasoned 
starting point is that: 
It is, therefore, established that rational nature was created for this end, viz., to love 
and choose the highest good supremely, for its own sake and nothing else; for if the 
highest good were chosen for any other reason, then something else and not itself 
would be the thing loved. But intelligent nature cannot fulfil this purpose without 
being holy. Therefore that it might not in vain be made rational, it was made, in order 
to fulfil this purpose, both rational and holy. (Anselm, 1926a, Book 2, Ch. 1)  
Anselm acutely fixed the nature of the relationship between faith and reason as a 
problem for scholasticism—reason can have free play but it must not contradict the 
established dogma of the Church. In later periods of scholasticism, philosophy on the 
side of free reason, and theology on the side of reasoned faith, would form a more 
equal alliance before separating, sometimes violently, and going different ways.  
Anselm’s proof of the existence of God in Chapters 1 to 7 of the Monologiun 
(Anselm, 1926c) is a realist, logically reasoned ascent from the particular to the 
universal along the lines of the Platonic ideas. From this imperfect world of existing 
singulars we are driven to the cause of causes, the perfect per se and objectively real 
God so reached through experience. His argument begins with the Platonic idea of 
the perfect as that which is caused by no other and from which all other is derived, 
and proceeds from that a priori through a long inductive chain to the proof of God’s 
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existence. Brief quotes from the early stages of the proof are enough to demonstrate 
the kind of reasoned logic Anselm is applying: 
For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. But 
nothing exists through nothing. For it is altogether inconceivable that anything should 
not exist by virtue of something. 
Whatever is, then, does not exist except through something. Since this is true, either 
there is one being, or there are more than one, through which all things that are exist. 
But if there are more than one, either these are themselves to be referred to some one 
being, through which they exist, or they exist separately, each through itself, or they 
exist mutually through one another. (Anselm, 1926c, Monologium, Ch. 3) 
and  
Since, then, it is most patent that the essence of all beings, except the supreme 
Essence, was created by that supreme Essence, and derives existence from no 
material, doubtless nothing can be more clear than that this supreme Essence 
nevertheless produced from nothing, alone and through itself, the world of material 
things, so numerous a multitude, formed in such beauty, varied in such order, so fitly 
diversified. (Anselm, 1926c, Monologium, Ch. 7)  
In the Proslogium Anselm (1926c) continues his argument of the existence of God 
but this time he uses a shorter deductive approach. A short quotation from 
Gaunilon’s refutation of Anselm will suffice both to articulate Anselm’s short 
deductive proof and to illustrate the reasoned logic being employed in the debate. 
If one doubts or denies the existence of a being of such a nature that nothing greater 
than it can be conceived, he receives this answer: 
The existence of this being is proved, in the first place, by the fact that he himself, in 
his doubt or denial regarding this being, already has it in his understanding; for in 
hearing it spoken of he understands what is spoken of. It is proved, therefore, by the 
fact that what he understands must exist not only in his understanding, but in reality 
also. 
And the proof of this is as follows.--It is a greater thing to exist both in the 
understanding and in reality than to be in the understanding alone. And if this being is 
in the understanding alone, whatever has even in the past existed in reality will be 
greater than this being. And so that which was greater than all beings will be less than 
some being, and will not be greater than all: which is a manifest contradiction. 
And hence, that which is greater than all, already proved to be in the understanding, 
must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality: for otherwise it will not be 
greater than all other beings. (Gaunilon, 2009, Paragraph 1, n.p.)  
The argument goes on and although interesting its details are not central to the point 
being established, namely, that within the bounds of revelation, and on the eve of the 
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West’s rediscovery of Aristotle’s greater corpus, Anselm employed logical reason in 
the Greek sense outlined in earlier chapters of this enquiry. He employed it to prove 
the existence of the God from which faith derived its authority.  
Abelard (AD1079 – 1142), himself a student of both the extreme nominalist 
Roscellinus (AD 1050 – 1125), and the extreme realist William of Champeaux (c. 
AD 1070 – 1121), takes as his starting point the proposition that reason must prepare 
the way for faith, we reason so that we might believe, such reason being that which 
brings faith its truth. He reminds his readers that “St. Jerome, also, when he preferred 
some ecclesiastical doctors to the rest, thus counselled us that they should be read in 
order to judge among them rather than merely accepting them” (Abelard, 1976, 
Prologue). 
Indeed this first key of wisdom is defined, of course, as assiduous or frequent 
questioning. Aristotle, the most clear-sighted philosopher of all, advised his students, 
in his preface 'Ad Aliquid', to embrace this questioning with complete willingness, 
saying (cited by Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, ii): "Perhaps it is difficult to 
clarify things of this type with confidence unless they are dealt with often and in 
detail. However, it would not be useless to have some doubts concerning individual 
points." And indeed, through doubting we come to questioning and through questions 
we perceive the truth [italics added]. In consequence of this, Truth herself says 
(Matthew 7:7), "Ask and it shall be given you; knock and it shall be opened to you." 
Teaching us this spiritual lesson with Himself as an example, He let Himself be found, 
at about twelve years of age, sitting and questioning in the midst of the teachers, 
showing Himself to us in the model of a student with His questioning, before that of a 
schoolmaster in his pronouncements, although His knowledge of God was full and 
complete. (Abelard, 1976, Prologue, my square brackets) 
In short, doubt paves the way for investigation and investigation is the true believer’s 
duty. Only the canonical scriptures “in which one should have undoubting faith” 
(Abelard, 1976, Prologue) are exempt, and no one church father is equal to the 
authority of the Apostles. Some of the questions addressed were quite confronting:  
Should human faith be based on reason, or not; is God tripartite, or not; do the Divine 
Persons mutually differ, or not; is God the Father the cause of the Son, or not; can God 
be resisted, or not; does God know all things, or not; Did man's first sin begin through 
the devil, or not; do we sometimes sin unwillingly, or not; does God punish the same 
sin both here and in the hereafter, or not. (Graves, 1915, pp. 53 - 54) 
The term aliquid, as Abelard employs it in the penultimate quote above, is a term 
used in a controversy about the Trinity which raged in Abelard’s time. Was Christ 
one or two persons, God and human, or one unified person, or something aliquid, 
something otherwise or anything else again? Abelard held that God, Christ the Son, 
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and the spirit or Holy Ghost were the one essence. The debate rages to hair-splitting 
dimensions and will not be pursued in this enquiry. 
Just where Abelard ends up between realism and nominalism is not clear and his so-
called conceptualism remains a matter of dispute, it being in his system something 
close to both the word and the object. There is also in Abelard the presence of 
Platonic-content ideas which exist in the divine understanding in the patterns of 
things even before they, the things, are created (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 393). A good 
understanding of the perceived closeness of reason to God can be glimpsed through 
Abelard’s comparison of the three parts of the Aristotelian syllogism with the 
Trinity; the unity of the three parts of the syllogism reflects the unity of the essence 
of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Ueberweg (1960a, p. 394), directed to this 
finding by Otto of Freising in his De Gesta Friderici or Deeds of Emperor Frederick 
at I: 47, argues that Augustine had earlier come close to suggesting the same thing in 
De Vera Religione, 13, but that the introduction of the syllogism into the comparison, 
to be found in Abelard’s Introduction to Theology (II), was entirely Abelard’s own 
doing. 
Abelard’s application of dialectic to theology was to place him in many difficult 
situations throughout his lifetime but he was first and foremost a Christian believer 
and “would not be an Aristotle if this should keep me away from Christ” (Workman, 
1908, p. 17). For that matter, Aristotle, for all his brilliance, could not either always 
keep Abelard from thinking about Heloise (Abelard, 2009, p. 45).  
Where reason fails and a rigorous demonstration cannot be provided, moral 
consciousness must guide. The appropriate location in Abelard is Introduction to 
Theology III, page 119 of the Latin version used by Ueberweg (1889, p. 395). 
Abelard’s position on Ethics, written as it was on the eve of the mediaeval 
rediscovery of the greater Aristotelian corpus, is something of a reformulation of the 
natural law of morals (ibid., p. 395) all be it wrapped in absolute and apposing terms 
of good and bad. 
The appropriate location in Abelard is page 1211 of the Latin text of Theologia 
Christiana II used by Ueberweg (1889, p. 395). Abelard’s position appears to be that 
sin consists of consent or intention to forego the Church’s moral prohibitions 
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(Luscombe, 1971, p. 49). At this time both dialecticians and faith authoritarians 
express a belief that the good hate sin for love of virtue and not for fear of 
punishment. Ueberweg (ibid., p. 395) further explains on the basis of Abelard’s 
Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum or Philosophical Dialogue 
between a Christian and a Jew, and the Prologue and Chapters 3, 13 and 15 of his 
Scito te Ipsun, or Ethics or Know Thyself (Abelard, 1971), that God is the highest 
good, human reason leads the way to it, and intention is the criterion which 
differentiates virtue as moral good, from moral evil.  
Both good and evil inhabit the person. Intention 
is their release: natural inclinations such as lust 
and gluttony are in themselves not sins. Actions 
per se are indifferent. Sin inheres in the ‘consent 
to absolute Christian moral prohibitions’. Moral 
consciousness can be faulty but, outside of such 
fault, sin occurs through consent to action which 
is against moral consciousness, and moral 
consciousness is what it ought to be when the 
individual subjective consciousness, occasioned 
through love of God, is coincident with the 
objective absolute commandments. They are 
virtuous who direct their will according to these 
twin guides so that under the human condition 
sin can only be avoided with great difficulty 
(Abelard, 1971, Ch 15). Whether reason might 
not instead be the slave of the will remained less 
than a fully explored question.  
Anselm (AD 1033 - 1109) and Abelard AD (1079 – 1142), both profound in their 
Christian faith, are, in a narrow sense, opposites in their husbandry of reason. As 
noted, for Anselm we reason because we believe. For Abelard we reason in order 
that we might believe and we believe by conviction rather than by authority. By 
Abelard’s time, Science in reason, that is, syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and 
yes and no disputation of matters theological, was acceptable, subject to the 
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inviolability of the articles of faith. That same reasoned theology informed would-be 
citizens of an eternal Polis and city of God of the ethical behaviour required of them 
for entry to that city. Sufficient wilful control of the emotions so as ‘not to consent to 
the Christian prohibitions’ was their passport to the eternal city of God.  
Anselm and Abelard mark a significant milestones in both reason’s journey to 
freedom and Science’s escape from faith Ethics. They also well illustrate the extent 
to which, during the period from Eriugena (AD c. 808 – 877) to circa 1200, 
Aristotelian Science as syllogism found in dialectic and yes and no disputation was 
recognised as an essential part of reasoned theology. They also illustrate the extent to 
which Neoplatonic idealism was blended and melded into church doctrine.  
Works by some of Abelard’s contemporaries provide tastes of various other 
surrogate ingredients in this blending church doctrine and I now briefly discuss a 
selection of them. Bernard of Chartres (circa AD 1070 or 1080 – after 1124), 
William of Conches (AD 1090 – after 1154) and Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 - 1152), 
while each basing their teachings on Plato, still managed to accommodate the 
opinions of Aristotle (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 397). Bernard of Chartres saw fit to argue 
that the world soul, after emerging from the permanent unchanging ideas of divine 
reason as the Logos of God, fashioned matter into existing things on the basis of 
those unchanging ideas—which is very Platonic. His belief in native forms which 
infiltrate matter is not well documented (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 293). William and 
Adelard are of particular interest because of their engagement with nature.  
William of Conches (AD 1090 – after 1154) abandoned theology for the study of 
nature after having been warned not to identify the Holy Ghost with the Platonic 
world soul (W. Turner, 1903/2012, p. 295). In his studies of nature he was influenced 
by Arabian Science (Southern, 2001, p. 68). While little allowing that the Church 
Fathers should have authority in matters of physics, he nevertheless recognizes their 
spiritual authority and the superiority of Christian doctrine above Platonism 
(Ueberweg, 1889, p. 398). 
Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 – 1152) is also a harbinger of what was to come when 
keen intellects savoured the scientific flavour of Arabian interpretations of Aristotle. 
Adelard of Bath had travelled widely in Arabia and had translated Euclid (BC c. 
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300). He placated the church masters by arguing, after he had declared Aristotle to be 
right in finding the species and genera inherent in, and abstracted from, the 
individuals, by claiming that Plato was still correct in holding that in their purest 
forms and apart from material things, individuals, species and genera exist in the 
divine mind (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 398). One of Adelard’s books, Quaestiones 
Naturals, is available in English and it well illustrates his interest in natural 
philosophy (Adelard of Bath, 1920, p. 89 - 90). 
Gilbert of Poirée (AD 1070 - 1154) felt the wrath of the establishment when he 
argued in De Sex Principiis that quantity, quality and relation are contained in the 
substance category (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 399). Herein lies a possibility, through 
relation, that things in themselves, and of themselves, might interact without God’s 
say, a sure controversy in the making. A work by Peter Lombard (AD 1100 - 1160), 
his Sentences (Lombard, 2010), written in this period and not completely free (Deely, 
2001, p. 249) from the influence of Abelard’s Sic et Non (P. Abelard, 1978), became 
the departure point for masters classes in the dialectical treatment of questions of 
theology. According to Ueberweg (1960a, p. 400), the mystics Bernard of Clairvaux 
(AD 1091 - 1153) and Hugo of St Victor (AD 1097 – 1141) continued to argue that 
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake was heathenish and that uncorrupted 
knowledge could not be obtained by reasoning, which they held to be inferior to 
mystical contemplation. Ueberweg, referring to quotes from works by Boulay and 
Launoy not available in English, reports that around AD 1180 the mystic Walter of 
St Victor (AD 1097 – 1141) accused Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142), Peter Lombard (AD 
1100 – 1160), Gilbert (AD 1070 - 1154) and Peter of Poitiers (AD c. 1130 – c. 1215) 
of being so possessed of the spirit of Aristotle that they “had treated with scholastic 
levity of the ineffable Trinity and the Incarnation” (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 400). John of 
Salisbury (AD 1120 - 1180) defended logic (1962). Works by Almarich of Bena 
(died c. 1204 – 1207), who evidently too directly identified the Creator with His 
creation, and David Dinant (AD c. 1160 – c. 1217), who also evidently offended in 
the manner in which he identified God with nous and the original matter of the 
universe, were from 1209 to 1215, along with Eriugena’s works, and Aristotle’s 
Physics and Metaphysics, forbidden to be read (Hodge, 2010, p. 166; Ueberweg, 
1889, p. 401). In the next chapter I demonstrate, among other things, that this 
condemnation of Aristotle’s works was to be short lived.  
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In summary, the specific purpose and work of the chapter, the same destination is 
reached whether the relationship between Science and Ethics is traced through an 
enquiry into curriculum structure, syllabus content and teaching method, or through 
an analysis of how leading scholars employed Science and Ethics to express and 
defend their beliefs. Reason has been brought to the aid of revelation and has 
produced the Science of theology which is compatible with revealed faith. They are 
ethical who do not transgress Christian prohibitions. 
Even now, before the European development of the printing press, Aristotle’s wider 
works were soon to be more fully discovered. But essentially, on the eve of this 
development, Science as syllogistic reasoning, as an essential ingredient of dialectic 
in yes and no disputation for truth about theological matters, is now a surrogate 
presence in that emerging combination of dialectic and rhetoric named logic. Science 
so understood, by making itself efficacious to the Ethics of faith authority, had made 
good ground in its march to independence, and some hard line theologians, being 
threatened by Science’s rehabilitation, were critical of those who used it. Humans act 
ethically when, as explained, they summon the will not to consent to Christian 
prohibitions and earn by such behaviour cognitive entry to the eternal city of God. 
CONCLUSION 
In respect of the general work of this enquiry Science as syllogistic demonstration 
had, in the period under discussion, established its relevance as part of a reasoned 
approach to theology. In this approach rhetoric, dialectic and yes-and-no disputation 
could be employed as valid means of enquiry into questions of dogma, subject to an 
embargo which forbad questioning of the articles of faith.  
The key terms nuance impact of these developments is summarised in Table 41, the 
content of which has been extracted from the discussion of the present chapter. Table 
42 on page 401 carries that key terms nuance to articulation of the Thesis Proposition 
Statements. 
The incremental key-terms nuance captured in Table 41 is coincident with a re-
emergence of an interest in experimental Science. The first whisperings of a 
fledgling secondary counter discourse between Science and Ethics can be found in 
Gerbert (AD c. 946) and Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 – 1152). Overriding all of these 
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incremental changes, and the secondary counter discourse too, but devalued 
somewhat by being ahead of its time, was Eriugena’s claim that Science and faith are 
the same thing. 
Table 41: Key Terms Nuance—Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
 
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Science 
Syllogistic demonstration 
through dialectic and-yes-and-no 
disputation of truth about 
Christian scriptures but outside 
of the articles of faith: the 
syllogistic demonstration of the 
true from the false. 
God’s created holy rational 
nature in its act of love and 
choice of the highest good which 
as a human condition prepares 
the way for faith. 
The articles of faith. 
Ethics 
Reasoned understanding of, and 
inherence in, religious truths 
revealed in Christian scriptures 
and associated authorised church 
dogma.  
Faith as a condition of emotions 
and will: moral consciousness 
understood as the degree to 
which individual subjective 
consciousness is at one with 
consciousness of the absolute 
commandments. 
Weakness of human will resulting 
in consent to transgress Christian 
moral prohibitions. Good 
intention’s fall to evil.  
Polis 
Ratification, through reasoned 
faith and love of God, of 
citizenship of an eternal city of 
God. Uncompromising 
unquestioning belief in the 
articles of faith realised through 
human will’s refusal to consent 
to transgress Christian 
prohibitions.  
Intention and consent: that 
cognitive state occasioned when, 
within moral consciousness of 
the good and evil inhabiting the 
person, the will, under reason, 
consents, through love of God, to 
good above evil.  
Intention’s temptation by, and fall 
to, evil. 
 
Table 42 begins on the next page due to formatting and layout restrictions imposed 
by the software so that the remainder of this page is intentionally blank. 
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Table 42: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the 
psyche of a rapacious mankind in 
whom no part of reason is divine and 
for whom knowledge is power, which 
recognition provides an alternative to a 
long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in natural 
social instinct implanted in mankind 
for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
Polis becomes is a cognitive gathering or eternal city of God predicated on acceptance of His grace.  
Reason remains divine as a gift of a Christian God who is all reason and who is present in the human soul.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace.  
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis remains a cognitive gathering bound through reasoned faith and love of God. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a now Christian God. 
Virtue remains obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusal to transgress Christian 
prohibitions.  
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coincident with a conscious excision of 
Aristotelian metaphysics from 
scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to 
inform practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming 
valued in its own right for direct 
benefits it could bring to society and 
state. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by unquestioning life in Christ. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion. 
Practical Ethics is replaced by faith Ethics. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by reasoned life in Christ. 
Science becomes syllogistic reasoning in dialectic and yes and no disputation predominantly within the confines of faith 
authority and within a developing scholastic method. Science as observation and reasoning about natural phenomena, and 
engagement with them, begins to reappear in the form of experimental Science.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and practical Ethics is living life under reasoned 
interpretation of those laws qua church doctrine. To be ethical is to act so as not to transgress Christian prohibitions.  
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Table 42 (Continued): Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142)  
 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of the 
state. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis and the 
Fall of Rational Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
Aristotelian practical Ethics becomes faith Ethics. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Practical Ethics remains living of life under reasoned interpretation of the doctrine of the Church and consists in refusing to 
transgress Christian prohibitions.  
Integrating Summary of Part Two 
Aristotle’s unified political philosophy fractured under an intermingling of Greek heritage and Jewish revelation doctrine and the ongoing development of Christianity. By the time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430), 
Greek rational Ethics had been replaced by revealed faith Ethics, Christ as divine Logos had replaced nous as logos. Aristotle’s categorical explanation of being had been replaced by divine revelation’s 
announcement of God as the creator of the world and its beings. A personal Christian God of love became available as an alternative to a Jewish God of wrath and both had replaced an impersonal Greek god or 
one. A Greek city of ideas had been replaced as Polis by a Christian city of God. Science, now irrelevant to faith, and no longer recognised as the arbiter of truth under theoretical and practical reason, or 
knowledge of the four causes, but recognised as syllogistic method, is ignored to survive as best it can. Ethics inheres in overcoming the absolute sin outlined in the commandments. During the time from 
Augustine (AD 354 – 430) to the close of the twelfth century, church dogmatists could not wholly ignore the utility of reason which established itself as syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and disputation. 
Employed in this form under strict control by the authority of faith, reason begot a new Science of theology. Ethics inheres in willing oneself not to transgress Christian prohibitions and Ethics could employ reason 
subject to the constraints of the mysteries of faith. Science qua syllogistic demonstration and Ethics became compatible and reason and faith became one by virtue of faith Ethics’ acceptance of reason. Earlier 
Eriugena (AD c. 8008 – 877) had pronounced Science and faith to be the same thing. Abelard (AD 1078 – 1142) is something of a milestone of this development and at the time of his life, on the eve of the 
rediscovery of Aristotle’s wider corpus, Science is syllogistic reasoning within dialectic and yes and no disputation about truth in theology, Ethics remains that act by which humans will themselves not to 
transgress Christian prohibitions, and Polis is a city of God. During this time dialectic and rhetoric beget logic and a re-emergence in interest in experimental Science is discernible.  
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Chapter 6 
Science, Ethics and Polis—Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to Aquinas (AD 1225 – 
1274) and Aquinas to Buridan (AD c.1300 – c.1358)  
INTRODUCTION 
The general work and purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical framework for 
the chapter’s specific work and purpose and is completed in one step on pages 403 to 
408. The specific purpose and work of this chapter is to trace relationships amongst 
Science, Ethics and Polis from the death of Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) until the time 
of Buridan (AD c.1300 – c.1358). It is completed in two steps, separated by Aquinas 
(AD 1225 - 1274), and occupies pages 409 to 438. During the time covered by this 
chapter, a developing secondary counter discourse on experimental Science can be 
discerned in the literature, which emerging counter discourse and its attendant 
advance in experimental method is discussed in the next chapter.  
GENERAL WORK OF THE CHAPTER BEGINS 
Major social events and changes occurred during the period under discussion. Nine 
major crusades were waged from AD 1090 to 1291 and a crusading venture in one 
form or another became part of a liberal education. A so-called age of chivalry began 
to emerge towards the middle of the twelfth century and in the second half of that 
same century, and continuing on into the next, some mediaeval cathedral schools 
began to morph into universities.  
Mediaeval cities began to grow in sophistication and along with that growth 
European city-states emerged. During the thirteenth century building began on 
Gothic cathedrals some of which are still in use today. Frescos Giotto (AD 1266 – 
1333) painted on walls of some then extant churches remain viewable in the second 
decade of this twenty-first century, for example in the Arena Chapel in Padua. As the 
Middle Ages began to draw to a close Durante degli Alighieri (AD c.1265 – 1321) 
captured for posterity a snapshot of some of its practices and beliefs (Dante 
Alighieri, 2010).  
The Renaissance had begun in now-called Italy. Petrarch (AD 1304 - 1374) gave 
nascent humanism a poetic muse (Ullman, 1972, p. 35; Witt, 2000, p. 230) which 
humanism, during the remainder of the fourteenth and through the fifteenth century 
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(Fubibi, 2003; Kraye, 1998; Liebregts, 2004), flowed northwards from Naples and 
Florence to join the main stream of the Renaissance and feed into the Reformation. 
Humanism gave rise to a humanities syllabus of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetics, 
and philosophy. The arrival of gunpowder in the 
Christian West, perhaps facilitated by William of 
Rubrick (AD 1220 - 1293) and Roger Bacon (AD 
1214 - 1294), was to weaken the power of the 
Feudal Knights. The Magna Charta was signed in 
AD 1225, and in a revised form in AD 1279, and 
is symbolic of a passage of power from castle to 
city. The dawn of the fourteenth century brought 
with it an arrival of national states and 
parliamentary governments. Constantinople fell in 
AD 1452.  
General Work Continues: Aristotle’s Wider Corpus and 
Other Greek Works Return to the West 
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a 
wider corpus of Aristotle’s works was, in what is 
now Spain, translated from Arabic to Latin. So 
translated, Aristotle’s works became a medium 
through which Greek knowledge returned to a 
Christian West. This flow of knowledge not only 
confronted existing clerical Western understandings but also carried seeds of 
scientific nuance. Circumstances surrounding the survival of Aristotelian learning in 
Arab Spain help explain how Greek Science was preserved and subsequently came to 
influence in the Christian West.  
For example, the Assyrian Church of the East separated from the Eastern Christian 
Churches which supported the condemnation of Nestorianism by the First Council of 
Ephesus in AD 431. The Nestorians—who after Nestorius (AD 386 - 451), 
Archbishop of Constantinople, held that the human and divine in Christ as Logos 
were two separate identities—avoided ongoing persecution by accepting refuge first 
in Assyria, and later in Persia under the last pre-Islamic kings of the Sassanid 
Saul and Arachne in the First or Pride 
Level of Purgatory 
 
 
O Saul! 
How ghastly didst thou look!  on thine 
own sword 
Expiring in Gilboa, from that hour 
Ne'er visited with rain from heav'n or 
dew! 
O fond Arachne!  thee I also saw 
Half spider now in anguish crawling up 
Th' unfinished web thou weaved'st to thy 
bane! 
 
Arachne is now half woman, half spider and 
Saul is depicted fallen on his sword. 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from (Dore, 
1832 - 1883). (artist). Virgil and Dante, 
Looking at the Spider Woman. (Engraving and 
text from The Divine Comedy (Dante, 1901).  
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Empire. This last pre-Islamic Persian Empire began in AD 226 with the reign of 
Ardashir I and ended with the defeat of its last king, Yazdegerd III (died AD 651) in 
AD 636. At its height, the Sassanid empire rivalled the Roman Empire and occupied 
much of present day Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Central Asia in the southwest, 
much of Turkey, coastal regions of the Arabian Peninsula, the surrounds of the 
Persian Gulf and south-western parts of Western Pakistan. It is the empire of the 
book of the Thousand and One Nights (Lane, 1847). The Nestorian schools, first at 
Nisbis in Assyria, and later at Edessa in Persia, taught religion, philosophy and 
medicine and were, in essence, centres of Aristotelian learning which held Science in 
general, and medical Science in particular, in high regard. Nearby at Gandisapora 
was a school which taught Greek medicine and philosophy and at Rasiana and 
Kinnesri, were Monophysite schools which also imparted Aristotelian learning. 
Again, the scientific dimension was preserved. The Monophysites, who against the 
Nestorians held that Christ had only one nature, were also persecuted by the 
Orthodox Church. By virtue of the custodianship of Aristotelian learning provided by 
these schools, and the fall of the Sassanid Kingdom to Islam in AD 636, a wider 
Greek corpus, largely lost to the West, was brought to, and survived by virtue of 
Arab scholarship.  
Ueberweg (1889, p. 408 - 410) reports Sprengar’s view (Sprenger, 1869, p. 17) that 
the rise of Mohammedanism amongst Arabs was occasioned by their need for a 
religion both monotheistic and anti-trinitarian but was also fuelled by a reaction 
against suppression. He further explains that in spite of a fanaticism the Arab 
reaction soon occasioned, and a natural anathema it engendered for the Greek way, 
Aristotle, by virtue of his one-god metaphysics and theology, and his work in physics 
and natural Science, was soon found compatible and acceptable with Arab 
hegemony. It is not surprising that scholars in the Christian West, when confronted 
with an emerging Arab heritage of Aristotelian thought, including the spurious 
attributions to Aristotle, would, through disputation, refashion those works so as to 
render them more compatible with Christian beliefs. 
The Islamic East then consisted of Central Asia, Iran, Egypt, and Syria, and scholars 
there, of fame then and now, include Alkendi (died AD 870), Alfarabi (died AD 
950), Avicenna (AD 980 – 1037), and Al Ghazali (AD 1059 – 1111). In the Islamic 
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West, consisting of Northern Africa and Northern Spain, Avempace (died AD 1138), 
Abubacher (AD 1100 – 1185), and Averroes (AD 1126 – 1198) were and remain, 
well known. Al Mumum (AD 786 – 833), from whose time onwards Greek 
philosophical works were translated into Syriac and Arabic by Syriac Christians is, 
like Charlemagne in the West, remembered for his commissioning and dissemination 
of Greek learning in the Arab world.  
The well-travelled and most widely respected Jewish scholar, Moses Maimonides 
(AD 1135 – 1204), in his Guide to the Doubting or 
Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides, 1904, 1963) 
named Aristotle the authority on matter’s scientific and 
sub-lunar but affirmed revelation as the authority in 
matters divine (Ueberweg p. 419). It is not easy to find 
such a division so simply expressed in any one place in 
the book but Maimonides (1951) comes close to it on 
page 210. Maimonides is squaring Aristotle with the 
Jewish scriptures, sponging away some of Aristotle’s 
so-called blasphemy and he benchmarks against 
Aristotle from beginning to end (ibid., pp. 18, 68, 103, 
121, 135, 148-149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 
160, 163, 176, 178-200, 226, 234, 249, 255, 262, 265, 273-275, 277, 281-287, 302, 
319, 353) addressing inter alia some twenty-six propositions used by philosophers to 
prove God’s existence (ibid., pp. 145 – 250). Maimonides’ knowledge of Aristotelian 
works is instructive and except for ex nihilo being a superior explanation of eternity 
of the universe he would find Aristotle acceptable (ibid., p. 156) subject to some 
difficulties (ibid., pp. 176 – 178, 189 – 190, 195 – 196). Some of Strauss’ University 
of Chicago lectures on Maimonides are available (L. Strauss, 2011, recorded 
lectures) and in them Strauss comments on how Maimonides attempts to explain how 
Jews might square Science with their religious faith and how, inter alia, the work 
itself has levels of meaning, a subject not pursued further in this enquiry. 
Maimonides entices further reading of his work by claiming that it will bring 
enlightenment about the “pin upon which everything hangs, and the pillar upon 
which everything rests” (Maimonides, 1885, p. 3). He allowed only general headings 
and there is quite some wonder about whether the guide reduces perplexity at all 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
an unknown English miniaturist. 
(miniaturist illumination on parchment). 
Cambridge University Library: 
Philosophers and Philosophy in Art. 
(English Miniaturist, circa 1300). 
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(Shatz, 2002; L. Strauss, 1963, pp. xi - lvi; 1987). As has been discussed on pages 
390 and 397, some limited exposure to Arab scholarship from Spain was evident in 
the Christian West as early as Gerbert (died AD 946) and Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 
- 1152).  
Also, as previously discussed on page 375, before this time, Western Christian 
scholars were already acquainted, via Boethius and 
others, with most of Aristotle’s Organon 
consisting of the Categories (Aristotle, 1938a, 
1952a), On Interpretation (Aristotle, 1938b, 
1952j), the Prior Analytics (Aristotle, 1938c, 
1952q), the Posterior Analytics (Aristotle, 1952p, 
1960a), and the Sophistical Refutations (Aristotle, 
1952l, 1958). It was the translation into Latin of 
the wider works of Aristotle (BC 384-322) and 
others, for example the Persian Islamic writers 
Avicenna (AD 980 - 1037) and Al Ghazali (AD 
1058 – 111), the Islamic scholar Alfarabi (died AD 950) born in either present day 
Kasakhstan or Afghanistan, and the Andalusian Jewish poet-philosopher Avicebron 
(AD 1021 - 1058), that catalysed new activity in the West. Archbishop Raimund of 
Toledo (AD 1125 – 1152) had ordered that translations of the wider works be made 
circa AD 1150 and at first there was burning of some of the newly translated 
Aristotelian works. Yet the translations had their effect in the Christian West 
(McInerny, 2004, pp. 20 - 24; Rubenstein, 2003, pp. 12 - 46). Prohibitions against 
reading them existed until circa AD 1231 to 1277 (Turley, 2004, p. 80; Ueberweg, 
1889, p. 432). Williams (2006, p. 36) finds the flow from Spain beginning in the 
tenth century.  
In spite of prohibitions church doctors were, circa AD 1254, widely reading these 
translated works which were set as reading in liberal arts at the University of Paris 
the now-called Sorbonne presently partly located on its Mediaeval foundations, the 
wider body of Aristotelian works being available in Latin from AD 1210 to 1225 
(Ueberweg, 1889, p. 432). 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
(Andrea da Firenze, 1365 - 68). (artist). Detail 
of Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) from 
Triumph of St. Thomas and Allegory of the 
Sciences. (1365 - 1368). (fresco). Cappella 
Spagnuolo, Santa Maria Novella, Florence,): 
Philosophy and Philosophers in Art. (Andrea 
da Firenze, 1365 - 68). 
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As universities grew and spread so did increasingly secular discussion of the newly 
translated Aristotelian works. The University of Paris was founded circa AD 1160 – 
1170 or in AD 1208 according to differing 
definitions. Other foundation-date claims are 
Oxford AD 1167, Moderna AD 1175, Valencia 
AD 1208, Cambridge AD 1209, Salamanca AD 
1218, Montpellier AD 1220, Padua AD 1222, 
Naples AD 1224, Toulouse AD 1229, Orleans 
AD 1235, and so the new knowledge spread. 
Not only by virtue of such progress was 
Aristotle, like Plato before him, to be further 
reconciled with church understandings, but also 
church doctors were to indulge themselves in 
removal of Arab nuance from Aristotle. Many 
names are of note. Of fame are Alexander of 
Hales (died AD 1245), William of Auvergne 
(died AD 1249), Robert Grosseteste (died AD c. 1252), and Bonaventura (AD 1221 
– 1274) but among the most notable are Albert Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) and his 
pupil Thomas Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274).  
In summary of the general work of this chapter. Partly due to the crusades, and partly 
due to scholarly enquiry, a wider Aristotelian caucus together with elements of Arab 
scholarship became known again in the West from circa AD 1150 onwards. The 
period covered was one of great social change. For example, the Crusades, the Age 
of Chivalry, the Renaissance, the Reformation, Humanism, the arrival of gunpowder 
in the West, and the beginnings of the city state, all played their parts. 
SPECIFIC WORK OF THE CHAPTER BEGINS 
The specific work and purpose of the chapter is discussed in two steps. The first step, 
ranging over pages 409 to 425, covers the period from the death of Abelard (AD 
1079 - 1142) to the whole life of Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) in whose work reason 
and faith are coeval in the Science of theology. The second step, occupying pages 
425 to 438, covers the period from the death of Aquinas to the whole life of Jean 
Buridan (AD c. 1300 – c.1358) during which time the unity of faith and reason is 
 
Source: Detail cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Lippi, F. (artist). The Triumph of St Thomas 
Aquinas over the Heretics. (fresco). Carafa Chapel 
of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Rome: Web 
Gallery of Art. The so-called triumphed over 
heretics are likely Arius, Apollinarius, and 
Averroes. (Lippi, 1489-91).  
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beginning to fracture and estrangement of philosophy, theology and metaphysics 
each from the other is discernible. In both steps, I trace esoteric relationships 
amongst Science, Ethics and Polis through an analysis of some of the works of noted 
scholars and the changing meanings of the key enquiry terms that can be extracted 
from those works.  
At the start, key terms are as they were at the end of the last chapter. Science is the 
syllogistic-demonstration part of reason’s method of syllogistic demonstration in 
dialectic and yes and no disputation. Ethics is reasoned understanding of the revealed 
truths of scriptures actualised by uncompromising belief in the articles of faith and a 
refusal of will to transgress Christian prohibitions. Polis is a cognitive gathering of 
the city of God ratified by reasoned faith and love of Him. 
Step One: Science, Ethics and Polis from Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) to Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) 
Before the end of the thirteenth century, largely due to the work of Albert Magnus 
(AD 1193 – 1280) and Thomas Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274), a contention that faith 
and reason are the same thing, in so far as it could be demonstrated, appears to have 
been demonstrated. Although Science and faith each begin from separate premises—
Science from the intuitive truths of reason, and faith from the revealed truth of 
scriptures—Thomas Aquinas was able to find them consistent in truth.  
But before Aquinas came Magnus his teacher. 
Step One Continues: Albert Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) 
English translations of Magnus’s works are scarce and in seeking to trace his 
contribution to evolving relationship between Science and Ethics I have had to rely 
heavily on secondary sources. All the same, the recent publication in English of his 
work on animals (Magnus, 1999) provides ample evidence of his prodigious output 
in natural Science. Of Magnus, Schaff holds him to have been “a philosopher, 
naturalist, and theologian; a student of God, nature, and man, [one who] wrote on the 
vegetable, [one who was] indefatigable in experimentation, the forerunner of the 
modern laboratory worker, and [one who] had much to do with arsenic, sulphur, and 
other chemical substances” (1997, Vol. V, Ch. XIII, §107, my square brackets). 
Turner (1903/2012, p. 341 - 342) supports this view and names Magnus as being 
unwilling to mention in his commentaries many doctrines he learned from natural 
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Science (ibid., p. 342). Ueberweg finds him to be the “first Scholastic who 
reproduced the whole philosophy of Aristotle in systematic order, with constant 
reference to Arabic commentators, and who remodelled it to meet the requirements 
of ecclesiastical dogma” (1889, p. 436).  
Magnus posits that the lower vegetative, animal and motive faculties of the soul are 
at one with nous, Aristotle’s divine something from without, and that together with 
nous these faculties of soul are immortal. In a sense, Magnus appears closer to the 
present church doctrine of resurrection of the body which doctrine Aristotle could 
never hold. Magnus recognises the Greek cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
temperance and fortitude, and the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love or charity, 
as equals, and makes freedom of the will a central tenet of Ethics.  
Between that which the reason recognises as desirable, and that which natural 
propensity desires, free will (liberum arbitrarium) decides; through this decision 
desire is transformed into perfect will (perfecta voluntas). The law of reason (lex 
mentis, lex rationis et intellectus), which engages us to act or not to act is conscience 
(conscientia): this is inborn and imperishable, in so far as it is the consciousness of the 
principles of action. (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 440) 
The conscience explained in the preceding quotation is not a moral capacity. 
Whereas for Aristotle the lower moral virtues consist of mental positions taken under 
the aegis of the intellectual virtues, about matters of value and just desire, for 
Magnus, moral virtue as a means of right living is a quality of mind produced by 
God. Ethics remains faith Ethics occasioned by virtue of God’s grace. Free will, 
which appears to make its own decisions, seems to be something which 
accommodates tensions between reason and bodily need. Questions arise. For 
example, in humans, is reason really superior to will and hence able to advise it?  
Magnus (AD 1193 - 1280), who engaged Aristotle through Avicenna (AD 980 - 
1037) and Maimonides (AD 1135 - 1204), and who kept the doctrine of the trinity 
and its associated mysteries outside of the reach of reason (Magnus, 1651, Vol. 
XVII, p. 6; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 438), had no option but to disagree with Aristotle on 
the eternity of the world. 
Magnus (AD 1193 - 1280), who engaged Aristotle through Avicenna (AD 980 - 
1037) and Maimonides (AD 1135 - 1204), and who kept the doctrine of the trinity  
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and its associated mysteries outside of the reach of reason (Magnus, 1651, Vol. 
XVII, p. 6; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 438), had no option but to disagree with Aristotle on 
the eternity of the world. Creation as revealed in Genesis is, in the view of Magnus, 
an act in time. For Magnus, as for Aristotle, matter gives individualisation and form 
gives essence, thingness or name, and universals exist only in the intellect. For 
Magnus, God as first cause is known not through reasoned knowledge of nature 
alone but also through faith, reason being able to access only secondary causes found 
in natural philosophy, that is, physics and its associated Sciences (Ueberweg, 1889, 
p. 439). For Magnus, Logic is a Science which teaches how to proceed from the 
known to the unknown (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 438). Science remains syllogistic 
demonstration in the sense of Aristotle. Ethics remains faith Ethics and Polis remains 
a city of God. 
Step One Continues: Thomas Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) 
Just how far natural reason could bring humans from the known to the unknown was 
further clarified by Thomas Aquinas who, in clearly stating limitations imposed on 
natural reason by the mysteries of the faith, actually loosened the shackles of 
reason’s serfdom to revelation. Under Aquinas, objective truth can be obtained by 
the human mind. Such objectivity allows humans to rethink the thoughts of the 
divine mind. First premises of truth are revealed in the scriptures and are to be 
developed by fathers of the Church. When philosophy extends beyond theology then 
a solution is to be found by reflection on Aristotle (Davies, 2003, p. 15; A. McGrath, 
 
Top from left to right: Dante Alighieri, front and Beatrice back, then Albert Magnus back and Thomas Aquinas, front. 
Bottom from left to right: Johannes Gratin, Peter Lombard, Dionysius the Areopagite, King Solomon, Unknown, Paulus 
Orosius, Boethius, Isidore of Seville, Venerable Bede, Richard St Victor, Siger of Brabent 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from (Giovanni di Paolo, between 1442 and 1450). The First Circle of the Twelve 
Teachers of Wisdom Led by Thomas Aquinas. (illuminated manuscript). The British Library, London: Philosophy and 
Philosophers in Art. (Giovanni di Paolo, between 1442 and 1450). 
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2011, pp. 38 - 39, 90, 213, 417) and the working out of every principle to its logical 
conclusion (Mellone, 1918, p. 240).  
Aquinas made natural reason a necessary precondition for engagement with the 
mysteries of faith. In his unfinished Summa Theologica (Aquinas, 2009c), the first of 
the three sections deals with God and the unfolding of all things from Him. In his 
answer in Book 1 to Question 32, (Article 2) which question asks whether the 
persons of the Trinity can be known through natural reason, Aquinas argues first that 
although:  
reason be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of 
furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient 
proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform 
velocity … [and that although] reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a 
sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by 
showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and 
epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the 
heavenly movements can be explained. Summa Theologica (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, 
Question 32, reply to Objection 2, my brackets) 
then adds a qualification that: 
it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as 
above explained (12, 4, 12) man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural 
reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as 
effects do to their cause. …. Whoever, then, tries to prove the Trinity of persons by 
natural reason, derogates from faith. Summa Theologica (Aquinas, 2009c, ibid.)  
It is impossible to prove the Trinity of persons because: 
our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, considered 
in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, 
according to its own mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, 
whence its knowledge is derived” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 32, Article 2).  
In respect of the three preceding quotations from Aquinas, the theory of eccentrics 
and epicycles Aquinas speaks about in the first quotation is an intricate machinery of 
circles moving on circles constructed to make the observed movements of the 
heavens fit with the requirements of Aristotle’s geocentric or earth-centred universe 
(Koestler, 1990, pp. 47 – 48, 70 - 71; Kuhn, 1957, pp. 59 - 64, 66 - 73; Ptolemy, 
1952, pp. 270 - 478). 
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Of the Summa Theologica as a whole, the third section, which was allocated to Christ 
and the sacraments, ceases after the sacrament of penance and, according to J. M. 
Heald (1817, p. 657), on the authority of commentaries by de Rubeis in an 
incompletely referenced twelve volume edition of the works of Aquinas, this third 
sector was completed by adding the eschatology from Aquinas’ Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard (Aquinas, 2009a). When asked why he did not complete 
the third part, Aquinas is said to have answered that his former writings now 
appeared to him as straw (B. Davies, 1992, p. 9). Speculation runs to rejection, 
stroke, or nervous breakdown. Nonetheless, Aquinas draws fine distinctions in his 
engagement with Aristotle’s works and, as mentioned on page 6, this chapter 
progresses slowly in its identification of such distinctions.  
In general, Aquinas applies his Aristotelian explanation of the psychology of human 
mind to render the articles of faith 
free from reason’s grasp thereby 
further prescribing natural reason’s 
limitations, and in a sense, its 
freedom. If natural reason is unable 
to prove the mysteries of faith, by 
what method does faith receive its 
own proofs? Aquinas answers that faith receives its own proofs in three ways, 
namely, by acceptance of God’s invitation to faith, by evidence of His fulfilled 
prophesies, and by natural reason’s ability to grasp certain truths which are 
believable through demonstration and which serve as preambles to faith. For 
example, in the following quotation, Aquinas argues the unity of God as one of the 
preambula fidei or preambles to faith: 
I answer that Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and 
is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is 
through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from 
what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, 
from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the 
existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better 
known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the 
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to 
us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us. Summa 
Theologica (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 2, Article 2)  
Table 43: The Articles or Mysteries of Faith 
(1) The creation of the world in time 
(2) Original sin  
(3) The incarnation  
(4) The sacraments  
(5) Purgatory  
(6) The resurrection of the body  
(7) Salvation and damnation and the final judgement of 
the world  
Source: Extracted by Ian Eddington from Ueberweg, F. (1889). 
History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time. (p. 443). 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
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We have met such a priori methodology before with Aristotle on page 258. The 
individuals, that is, the effects—that lady Hypatia or that man Crito say—are known 
to us before or relatively prior to their causes in this sense: to know the parentage or 
cause of that lady Hypatia or that man Crito, we must first know of the existence of 
Hypatia and Crito the relatively prior ‘effects’. It may then be possible to work a 
posteriori to the parentage whose act(s) of causation were temporarily and absolutely 
prior to the ‘effects’—Hypatia and Crito—which effects as noted are relatively prior 
or known first to us. Put simplistically we must first know the children before we can 
know their parentage. The children are the effects, the parents are the cause, and 
tracing backwards from effects to cause is a posteriori method.  
Aquinas, who would have nothing of Anselm’s a priori proofs of God’s existence, 
offers five proofs (Aquinas, 1952, pp. 12 - 13, Part 1, Question 2, Article 3) , 
favouring the first one based on Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII 6 - 10, (Aristotle, 1952d, 
pp. 601 - 606; 1989) and Physics VIII 250b15 – 252b5 (Aristotle, 1952n, pp. 334 - 
336; 2004), and focussing on motion. Copleston (1971, p. 341) claims that the third 
proof, which came to Aquinas from Avicenna (AD 980 - 1037), via Maimonides 
(AD 1135 – 1204), should be preferred. His third proof has also been linked, inter 
alia, with Aristotelian unmoved mover reasoning (Aquinas, 2009c; B. Davies, 1992, 
p. 31; Elders, 1990, pp. 83 - 139; A. McGrath, 2011, p. 176).  
The mystery of true revealed faith, the particular articuli fidei in the case under 
discussion, is knowledge of the persons of the Trinity. The naturally reasoned proof 
given above of the possibility of an existing God serves as a preamble to the article 
of faith per se, which article cannot be proved by natural reason and consequently 
might only be revealed to those accepting God’s call. Truth is occasioned by faith 
when, through confidence in God, intellect accepts God’s infusion of the theological 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity or love, together with a parallel set of virtues to 
match the natural virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. I discuss the 
infused virtues in more detail on pages 421 to 423. Science as syllogistic 
demonstration is of little consequence in demonstration of the mysteries of faith but 
it might be used to demonstrate the preambles of faith.  
In particular, in Aquinas’s system, sacred doctrine is a Science. Just as perspective is 
a higher Science illuminating the rules of geometry, and music is a higher Science 
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illuminating the rules of arithmetic, so theology, the Science of God, illuminates the 
rules of natural reason (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 1, Article 2). 
Unfortunately for Aquinas, comparison is no longer considered to be sufficient for 
proof, and few might now accept that syllogistic reasoning in dialectic about 
metaphysics is a Science rather than a theology. Nonetheless, at this time of 
compatibility between faith and reason, theology is a Science by which, a posteriori, 
it is possible to prove God’s existence. By virtue of it both faith and reason each 
share in truth, and natural reason is now a more senior partner because of the role it 
plays in the preambles to faith. Theology is a special Science with its own revealed 
truth, and it informs faith Ethics. That other Science, which reveals its presence 
through its method of syllogistic demonstration, remains a central part of reason 
wherever reason is applied. 
So far this chapter contains only general analysis of a relationship between Science 
and Ethics in Aquinas’ system. I now turn to specific analysis of that relationship. 
Aquinas addresses Ethics in Book 2 of Summa Theologica (Aquinas, 2009c, pp. 1 – 
198, 380 - 620), in the third part of Summa Philosophica known also as the Summa 
de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Gentiles or Summa Against the Gentiles 
(Aquinas, 1905, pp. 183 - 336; 1957) and in De Virtutibus or Disputed Questions on 
Virtue (Aquinas, 2005, passim). Following Aristotle, Aquinas agrees that “the 
contemplative life has greater merit than the active life” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2 
Part 1, Question 57, Article 1). He accepts the presence of intellectual virtues of 
which he names three, wisdom or theoretical reason, Science or syllogistic reasoning, 
and understanding or intellect. As earlier discussed he also accepts the presence of 
moral virtues of which he names four: prudence, justice, temperance and courage 
which four he calls the cardinal or principal virtues. In addition, Aquinas names three 
theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity or love. Hierarchically, the intellectual 
virtues are higher order virtues than the moral virtues but above both these categories 
stand the theological virtues which complete the chain to God. Love captains the 
theological virtues and wisdom and prudence respectively captain the intellectual and 
cardinal virtues. Table 44 sets out Aquinas’s hierarchy of virtues. 
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Of the cardinal virtues, prudence, operating not unlike practical wisdom, officiates 
over correct actions between mankind wherein it informs the virtue of justice 
(Aquinas, 2009c, Bk. 2, Part 2, Q. 58, Art. 2; Bk. 2, Part A, Q. 113, Art. 1).  
Prudence also adjudicates in the realm of the passions within mankind wherein it 
informs the virtues of temperance and fortitude (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Part 2, 
Question 60, Article 1). Virtue, as temperance, is a limiting countervailing power 
which emerges when prudence directs correction of the thwarting of reason arising 
from the passions of the concupiscible faculty. Virtue, as fortitude, is the equivalent 
countervailing power which emerges when prudence corrects the thwarting of reason 
resulting from the passion of fear, or of dislike of work, which passions arise from 
the irascible faculty.  
In particular, human virtue is a limiting of power attributed to reason (Aquinas, 
2009c, Bk. 2, Part 1, Q. 55, Art. 3), is found in, or exists as, active habit (Aquinas, 
2009c, Bk. 2, Part 1, Q.55, Art. 1), is a habit of the appetitive faculty (Aquinas, 
2009c, Bk. 2, Part 1, Q.60, Art. 1), and is perfectly defined as that “good quality of 
Table 44: Aquinas—Virtues and Their Functions 
 
The Virtues The Functions of the Virtues 
Theological Virtues 
Generally “the virtues of man as sharing the Grace of God” (Aquinas, 
2009c, Bk. II, Part 1, Q. 58, Art. 3) 
charity (love) 
Renders the will, that is, transforms the will into oneness with the divine 
end. 
faith 
Renders truth complete, that is, occasions rectitude of the wholeness of 
our knowledge through the truth of revelation. 
hope Renders the divine end above nature. 
Intellectual Virtues Generally rectitude of thought 
wisdom 
Contemplation of truth about metaphysical causes and to judge the 
conclusions of Science and the principles or understandings on which 
these conclusions are based. 
Science Contemplation of truth about material beings and their causes. 
understanding 
Contemplation of truth about principles which inform scientific enquiry, 
which principles are understood by the intellect. 
Moral Virtues Generally rectitude of actions and passions 
prudence 
(i) Rectitude of any actions or passions whatever in respect of appetite. 
(ii) Prudence, as wisdom, is also “an intellectual virtue … needed in the 
reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things 
ordained to the end” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Part A, Question 57, 
Article 5). It is an intellectual virtue which when assigned to adjudicate 
things to be made is art and when assigned to things to be done is 
prudence as wisdom.  
justice Rectitude of actions toward others. 
temperance Rectitude of desire or passions resulting from the concupiscible appetites.  
fortitude Rectitude of desire or passion resulting from the irascible appetites. 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Aquinas, T. (1952). Summa Theologica. (Bk. II, Part B, Q. 58, Art. 2; Bk. II, 
Part A, Q. 113, Art. 1; Bk. II, Part B, Q. 60; Bk. II, Part A, Q. 60, Art. 1; Bk. II, Part A, Q. 61, Art. 1; Bk. II, Part A, Q. 58, 
Art. 3; Bk. II, Part A, Q. 57, Art. 4; Bk. II, Part A, Q. 61, Art. 3). In R. M. Hutchings Thomas Aquinas II. Chicago: William 
Benton. (Aquinas, 1952). 
 
 417 
the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which 
God works in us, without us" (2009c, Bk. 2, Part A, Q.55, Art 4). In short, “the act of 
virtue is nothing else than the good use of free will” (Aquinas, 2009c, Bk. 2, Part 1, 
Q .55, Art. 1).  
What then is free will and how is its good use to be understood? 
Just as the intellect of necessity [naturally] adheres to the first principles, the will must 
of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness; since the end is in practical 
matters what the principle is in speculative matters (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 
82, Article 1, my square  brackets).  
The first principles Aquinas is speaking about are those earlier discussed on page 
260. They are, first, the principle of non-contradiction or that it is impossible to be or 
not to be the same thing at the same time under the same conditions Metaphysics IV 
1005b35 – 1006a (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 525; 1989); second, the principle of the 
excluded middle or that contradictories cannot be at the same time true of the same 
thing so that there cannot be an intermediate or middle between contradictories 
Metaphysics 11011b20 – 25, (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 531; 1989); and third, the principle 
of identity or that a thing is itself and is inseparable from itself Metaphysics VII 
1041a15 – 20 (Aristotle, 1952d, p. 565; 1989). 
So the will is necessitated by happiness and is not free to dismiss this necessity. The 
will, as the appetite of the intellect 
(Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Part A, 
Question 82, Article 2) is, 
notwithstanding this desire and 
necessity for happiness, and even 
though it is closely allied to reason, 
an intellective power rather than a 
rational power. While of necessity the will adheres to the end, which is happiness, 
humans freely choose the means to that end, and this free choice, known as the 
contingent will, operates in choosing between the practical alternatives which might 
lead to happiness.  
Windelband explains that when reading Aquinas it is helpful to understand 
contingent as the “possibility of being otherwise or a power of the contrary” 
 
Electrochemical Moral Worlds 
The time will come when the issue of human responsibility, in 
general moral terms as well as on matters of justice and its 
application, will take into account the evolving science of 
consciousness. Perhaps the time is now. Armed with reflexive 
deliberation and scientific tools, an understanding of the neural 
construction of conscious minds also adds a welcome dimension 
to the task of investigating the development and shaping of 
cultures, the ultimate product of collectives of conscious minds. 
Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the 
Conscious Brain. (p. 29). Random House. Kindle Edition. 
(Damasio, 2010, p. 29) 
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(Windelband, 1914, p. 330). The free will can be counselled by virtuous reasoned 
desire, of which more later, but in and of itself “the free will is indifferent to good 
and evil choice” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 82, Article 2).  
The necessary will, this higher appetite and companion of the intellect, fixed as it is 
to realisation of mankind’s potential, which is happiness, is the appetitive part of the 
soul and it is not affected by corporeal impressions, that is, by vegetative and 
sensitive impressions, because the intellectual part of the soul “is not the act of a 
corporeal organ” (Aquinas, 2009c, 
Book 1, Question 83, Article 1, 
Reply to Question 5). On this 
point, Aquinas could not but fall 
when measured against present 
neuroscientific searchings of how 
self comes to brain-made mind 
(Damasio, 1995). Intriguing 
speculation continues (L. R. 
Baker, 2007; Corcoran, 2006; 
Murphy, 2006; Searle, 1997). 
Still, in Aquinas, the lower 
appetites of the soul which emerge 
from its vegetative and sensitive 
components, which components 
require bodily organs for their  realisation, answer to the judgement of reason 
(Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 83, Article 1). Aquinas, like Magnus but unlike 
Aristotle, allowed all of the faculties of the soul an existence after death.  
At the level of the moral virtues free will, really free judgement, is the principle of 
the act by which mankind judges freely, and it is a power (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, 
Question 83, Article 2). Under free will, mankind, qua humans acting as sensual 
cognising individuals, is confronted by choice alternatives emerging within 
themselves or amongst actions between themselves and others, and this choice 
involves a compromise between reason and appetite. Reason counsels the preference 
of one thing over another and appetite accepts or rejects judgement of reason’s 
 
Damasio on How Self Comes to Mind 
It goes without saying that the construction of a conscious mind is a 
very complex process, the result of additions and deletions of brain 
mechanisms over millions of years of biological evolution. No single 
device or mechanism can account for the complexity of the 
conscious mind. The different parts of the consciousness puzzle have 
to be treated separately and given their due before we can attempt a 
comprehensive account. Still, it is helpful to start with a general 
hypothesis. The hypothesis comes in two parts. The first specifies 
that the brain constructs consciousness by generating a self process 
within an awake mind. The essence of the self is a focusing of the 
mind on the material organism that it inhabits. Wakefulness and 
mind are indispensable components of consciousness, but the self is 
the distinctive element. The second part of the hypothesis proposes 
that the self is built in stages. The simplest stage emerges from the 
part of the brain that stands for the organism (the protoself) and 
consists of a gathering of images that describe relatively stable 
aspects of the body and generate spontaneous feelings of the living 
body (primordial feelings). The second stage results from 
establishing a relationship between the organism (as represented by 
the protoself) and any part of the brain that represents an object-to-
be-known. The result is the core self. The third stage allows multiple 
objects, previously recorded as lived experience or as anticipated 
future, to interact with the protoself and produce an abundance of 
core self pulses. The result is the autobiographical self. All three 
stages are constructed in separate but coordinated brain workspaces. 
These are the image spaces, the playground for the influence of both 
ongoing perception and of dispositions contained in convergence-
divergence regions. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious 
Brain. (2011). (p. 181). Random House Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 
2010, p. 181) 
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counsel. On balance, after citing Aristotle’s leaning towards free will’s choice being 
rational, “a desire proceeding from counsel (Arist. Ethics iii, 3)” (Aquinas, 1957, 
Question 83, Article 3) rather than appetitive, Aquinas pronounces it an appetitive 
power and calls it an intellectual appetite rather than an appetitive intellect (ibid., 
Question 83, Article 3). It, the will, is the superior appetite. 
Because the will adheres of necessity to happiness and to goods necessarily 
connected with happiness, and because true happiness consists in God alone, the will 
adheres of necessity to things which lead to God. But there is a qualification:  
Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision, the necessity of such 
connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things 
which are of God. But the will of man who sees God in His essence of necessity 
adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. (Aquinas, 1957, 
Question 2, Article 2).  
In absolute terms, the intellect is a higher power than the will “because the object of 
the intellect is the very idea of the appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of 
which is in the intellect, is the object of the will” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 
82, Article 3, Answer). In Aristotelian terms, we love the object for the good in it 
more than we love the object per se which actual object the will desires at the behest 
of the idea of it held in the intellect. Mankind’s free will, expressed through 
judgement, the source of such judgement being comparisons facilitated through 
apprehension and intellect, and so understood as contingent will, may take opposite 
courses “equivalent to the various courses taken in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical 
arguments” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 83, Article 1). By allowing Science 
as syllogistic reasoning and rhetoric to inform moral or ethical choice Aquinas 
reveals his close attention to Aristotle. 
Furthermore, will, as the appetite of the intellect, has functional components in 
proportion to the components of the intellect (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 83, 
Article 4). In the intellect there is “understanding [italics added] of first principles 
which are known of themselves” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 83, Article 4, 
my square  brackets) and there is reason which “properly speaking [again after 
Aristotle], is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, 
properly speaking, we reason about conclusions which are known from the principles 
[or from conclusions necessarily connected to those principles]” (ibid., my square 
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brackets). By analogy: as intellect as understanding of first principles is to reason, so 
necessary will as the necessary desire for happiness is to power of choice, which 
power as explained on page 417 is contingent free will. Just as to understand and to 
reason belong to the same power (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 79, Article 8) 
so too, to will and to choose belong to their respective same power and “the will and 
the free will are not two powers but one” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Question 83, 
Article 4).  
Will’s necessary desire for happiness is to be found in the precepts of natural law 
which precepts are to will what the first principles of understanding are to intellect. 
Precepts of natural law are expressed in statements such as good is to be done and 
evil avoided, and every whole is greater than its part. Aquinas (2009b, Art. 8 
Response) illustrates differences between his idea of natural law and that of Aristotle. 
The precepts of natural law are grasped through synderesis. 
Step One Continues: Synderesis, Aquinas’ Highest Activity Order of the Moral Sense 
Synderesis is said to be a law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the 
precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human actions (Aquinas, 
2009c, Book 2, Part a, Question 94, Article 1). It is helpful to know that for Aquinas 
nature, and thus all things natural, should be understood as God’s inherence in the 
thing being spoken of. The precepts of natural law are there by virtue of God’s 
presence in nature. Speculative reason or wisdom searches for truth for its own sake. 
It proceeds through syllogistic reasoning from first principles grasped by the 
intellect, to conclusions. So too, practical reason or prudence, in choosing amongst 
various means to the attainment of mankind’s necessary end, proceeds to conclusions 
through syllogistic reasoning from its own first natural law principles grasped by 
virtue of synderesis. Synderesis is “the highest activity of the moral sense” (Inge, 
1917b, p. 157).  
Inge (1917b, pp. 157 - 158) gives various meanings of synderesis or sinderesis. He 
traces its usage from a corruption of a Greek word meaning preservation through 
Jerome (AD 340 or 347 – 420) as observation; Bonaventura (AD 1221 - 1274) as 
conscientia, or as the ally of intelligentia; Ruysbroeck (AD c. 1293 – 1381) as the 
natural will towards good implanted in us all; Giseler (died AD 1004) as the spark 
created in the soul of all men; Eckhart (AD 1260 – 1328) as an indistinguishable 
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Funkelein, or flash, in the soul of all men, calling it God; and Gerson (AD 1363 – 
1429) as the simple intelligence allied to contemplation (ibid., pp. 157 – 158). 
Given, as explained earlier, that virtue is the good use of free will, and that free will 
is the choice of means to ends, it is not surprising that virtue is an integral part of 
synderesis, and given that Science, understood as syllogistic logic, informs free 
choice, it is clear that Science or reason understood as syllogistic demonstration is 
also a key pillar of Aquinas’s system.  
Aquinas, like Aristotle before him in the case of the lower virtues, does not set 
specific rules for moral choice. Practical wisdom or prudence, learned from 
experience, must mediate on a case by case basis. Aquinas allows though, that under 
grace, mankind may drink from another well of practical wisdom. Through grace, 
God may instil a capacity for synderesis by infusing or pouring into mankind 
similarly functioning cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude 
and when those in grace avail themselves of such infusions they are acting for their 
own good but for God’s sake (Aquinas, 2009b, Article 10, Response).  
There is a qualification governing mankind’s access to infused cardinal virtues. 
Access to such virtues can only occur if, over and above the natural cardinal 
principles of virtue, there are also supernatural principles of action infused in man by 
God.  
The natural principles of operation are the essence of the soul and its powers, namely, 
intellect and will, which are the principles of man’s activity as such. And this is so 
because intellect has knowledge of the principles by which it might be directed to 
other things and will has a natural inclination to the good proportioned to its nature, as 
was argued in the preceding question. Therefore, in order that a man might perform 
actions ordered to the end of eternal life, there is divinely infused in him first grace, by 
which the soul has a kind of spiritual existence, and then faith, hope, and charity, so 
that by faith the intellect is illumined by certain things known supernaturally, which 
are in this order as the principles naturally known in the order of connatural activities, 
and by hope and charity the will acquires a certain inclination to that supernatural 
good to which the human will is insufficiently ordered by its natural inclination.  
Thus, over and above the natural principles by which the habits of virtue are acquired 
for man’s natural perfection in a manner connatural to him, as has been said above, 
man acquired by divine influence, beyond the supernatural principles mentioned, 
certain infused virtues by which he is perfected in operations ordered to the end of 
eternal life (Aquinas, 2005, pp. 66 - 67; 2009b, Article 10, Response).  
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Natural principles of virtue cannot then in and of themselves bring perfect happiness 
which can be found only in God and by virtue of His infusions. The virtue of faith 
brings intellectual assent by divine light (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Part 1, Question 
62, Article 3) and reveals what is not apparent: "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby 
eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent” 
(Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Part 2, Question 4, Article 1, Response). This is certainly 
some carte blanche for certain kinds of people. Hope brings the will to eternal 
happiness by perfecting it in preparation for the eternal life inherent in God’s 
supremacy over nature (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Section 1, Question 62, Article 3). 
Charity or love, “the mother … of all virtues” (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 2, Section 1, 
Question 62, Article 4) and the key to all infused virtues, further perfects the will and 
unites humans with God (Aquinas, 2009c, Book 1, Section 2, Question 62, Article 3).  
In passing, I found it chilling to read of a human contingent will linked to an intellect 
yet independent of a necessity for happiness in its choice of means to ends—an 
intellect that through grace could be induced to believe what is not apparent. Plato’s 
charioteer metaphor of a composite soul in which the charioteer as an integral but 
controlling part of that soul practicing something like what is now called 
metacognition remains valid for me. So too does the further development of a 
tripartite soul by Aristotle, wherein intellect and reason are supreme in the search for 
truth and goodness. As discussed earlier on pages 236, 243 and 263 Aristotle allows 
no respite for reason and the intellectual virtues from their checking and balancing 
duties in the realm of the moral virtues.  
It also occurred to me when reading Aquinas, and also commentary on Duns Scotus, 
that perhaps Plato’s charioteer is the will, and not the intellect or reason, and that 
scholarship may have been in error from the beginning. I do not hold this view 
although Lawton (1901, p. vii) simply states that the charioteer is the will. Plato 
likely recognises will as is evidenced by presences of noble and ignoble spirits in 
three governing powers of soul Republic X 580 - 582(Plato, 1952r, pp. 420 - 421; 
1969b). In any event, to give the will primacy over intellect, as Duns Scotus was 
later to do, and to cut contingent will free from intellect in matters of grace, that is, 
make it independent of reason in matters of beatitude, is to introduce a possibility for 
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all manner of licence and atrocity in the practical ways God’s so-called revealed 
truths might be interpreted and defended.  
While the natural human virtues which answer to reason can bring only imperfect 
this-world happiness, the infused moral virtues lean towards God’s blissful eternity 
and they answer to divine law. They are a separate kind of virtue (Aquinas, 2009c, 
Book 1, Section 2, Question 63, Article 4). In 1651 Thomas Hobbes, writing in a 
context of the correct and strict use of words, would argue that “it be false, to say that 
vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown 
Vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 
20) and that to claim that “Faith Is Infused” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 24) is an absurdity.  
Aquinas and Aristotle are similar in their approach to understanding G(g)od. 
Aristotle relied a posteriori on observed relatively near effects, for example observed 
so-called perfect cycles of the heavenly bodies, to find their absolutely prior cause in 
the first cause and unmoved mover, thought thinking itself, from whence the divine 
nous partakes of the human soul. Aquinas argues a posteriori from existing relatively 
near effects such as God’s existing creatures, to the absolutely prior first cause and 
Christian God as a preamble for faith, from which God, theological and divine 
cardinal virtues might be infused into mankind. But there the similarity ends. 
Whereas Aristotle provides little detail about possible eternity of nous, Aquinas 
assures that those who find the vision of God in heaven will have everlasting eternal 
happiness and full resurrection of the body (Aquinas, 1952, III, Q. 75, Art. 1). 
Step One Continues: Similarities and Differences Between Aristotle and Aquinas  
In both Aristotle and Aquinas, Science and Ethics are inextricably interwoven and 
scientific method as syllogistic reasoning is crucial to both theoretical and practical 
wisdom and is indispensable to mankind in its ascent to their final end in virtuous 
happiness. In both Aristotle and Aquinas, there are no specific hard and fast rules to 
assist in the multitude of decisions about how to act out best means to ends. 
Aristotle’s impersonal god, and the divine nous, are, in Aquinas, a personal Christian 
God and Logos as Christ and Aquinas allows that necessary will and appetite for 
God’s love answers not to human reason. Under Aristotle, nous remains a mystery. 
Under Aquinas, absolute truth is revealed about Christ in trinity.  
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In Aristotle, natural law is a function of place and virtue. In Aquinas, natural law is 
an expression of God’s nature and is found through faith and virtue. In Aristotle, the 
esoteric Polis is a state prior to mankind, present in mankind’s social predispositions, 
and earthy predispositions they are too. In Aquinas, the esoteric Polis remains the 
city of God. In Aristotle, mankind can sense what it is to be godlike. Aquinas holds 
out the possibility, through infused virtues, of being one with God. For those not so 
infused, Aquinas differs little in process from Aristotle in his depiction of a human 
condition in which in each waking hour, humans, if they are to be virtuous without 
God’s infusions, must struggle through application of wisdom and prudence to make 
the right choices in the everyday humdrum of life. Some 1550 temporal years 
separate this history of ideas nearness of Aquinas to Aristotle. 
Table 45 details of the incremental changes in key-terms meaning brought to this 
chapter as represented by and Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274).  
Three so-called Sciences are extant these being theology, natural Science in the 
making, and syllogistic reasoning. Science per se is named by Aquinas as the 
intellectual virtue of syllogistic reasoning. At this high point of syncretisation, when 
reason and faith are pronounced compatible, Science, understood as syllogistic 
reasoning, but barred from interrogation of the mysteries of faith, is at work in 
Table 45: Key Terms Nuance—Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) at the High Point of 
Syncretisation  
 
Field 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Science 
The intellectual virtue of syllogistic 
demonstration both a priori and a posteriori in 
dialectic and logic within the confines of a 
revealed faith theology. Theology too is a 
Science in an exoteric sense, that is, it uses 
reasoned demonstration, its esoteric dimension 
being God’s revealed truths. 
The faculties of the intellectual virtues of 
wisdom, or theoretical reason, Science or 
syllogistic reasoning, and understanding or 
intellect inhering in the intellect’s necessary 
adherence to first principles and the 
intellectual appetite or will’s necessary 
adherence to the precepts of natural law 
through synderesis. 
Revealed 
truth. 
Ethics 
Synderesis understood as the contingent will’s 
free choice of means to an end, under the 
necessary will’s adherence to happiness as 
mankind’s end, by which synderesis practical 
reason or prudence grasping its own first 
principles of natural law, reasons through 
syllogistic demonstration, to its own choice 
conclusions.  
Synderesis now understood as the highest 
activity of the moral sense: either (a) 
synderesis first under grace and then under 
infused theological virtues of faith, hope and 
love and cardinal moral virtues of wisdom, 
justice, temperance and fortitude, or (b) 
synderesis without grace whereby practical 
wisdom, on the basis of experience, must 
mediate between choice on a case by case 
basis.  
Human 
frailty 
expressed as 
the 
contingent 
or free will’s 
vacillation 
under the 
irascible and 
concupiscent 
passions. 
Polis 
Ratification, through grace, of citizenship of 
the eternal city of God attainable through 
sublimation of infused theological and 
cardinal virtues under God’s grace. 
Beatitude and bliss of God’s eternity and 
supremacy over nature. 
Absence of 
faith and/or 
recalcitrant 
free will. 
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finding truth. Its workplace is bounded by the intellect’s necessary adherence to its 
own first principles and the will’s necessary adherence to its natural law precepts. 
Within this workplace, through grace, Science informs ethical choice as a prelude to 
beatitude, or, without grace, and from experience, it informs moral choice. Aquinas 
retains the efficiency element of rational Ethics and places it in a Christian faith 
setting. To be ethical in a technical sense is now to be good at living a righteous 
Christian life.  
Aquinas’ cognitive tapestry soon began to unravel, in spite of the intricate and 
masterful weaving that had produced it. I begin to discuss this unravelling in the next 
paragraph thereby commencing the second of the two steps constituting the specific 
work of the chapter, namely, tracing the relationship between Science, Ethics and 
Polis from Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) to Jean Buridan (AD c. 1300 – c. 1358)  
Step Two Begins: Science, Ethics and Polis from Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1247) to Jean Buridan 
(AD c. 1300 – c. 1358) 
The new thought catalysed by that flow of Arab learning may well have proven an 
even more rapidly effective change agent had not that Arab learning itself been 
threatened by the growing power of Mohomedism. From the twelfth century until the 
Fall of Constantinople in 1452, translations from lands under control of 
Mohomedism became increasingly scarce and translations into Hebrew and Latin 
made by Jews were sought out and used in the West. These developments 
notwithstanding, experimental Science did begin to re-emerge during this period and 
its re-emergence is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The remainder of this 
chapter is given to examination of theological developments which, through 
weakening the faith-reason link, helped produce conditions by which natural 
philosophy and metaphysics would each take their leave from theology.  
Step Two Continues: John Duns Scotus (AD c. 1270 - 1308) 
The first unravelling began with Duns Scotus (AD c. 1270 - 1308), “master of 
theology, of philosophy, of astronomy, and mathematics” (H. O. Taylor, 1911, p. 
513). Duns Scotus provides a critical and sceptical engagement with philosophical 
arguments that sustain the articles of faith, but does it without jettisoning the absolute 
authority of revealed scripture (Duns Scotus, 2009c, 2009d). The Trinity, the 
Incarnation, the creation of the world, God’s omnipotence, God’s divinity as the 
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chief end of mankind, and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved by reason: 
the will of God is the only explanation of their truth, a truth conditional on voluntary 
submission to church teachings. 
Once such revealed truths are accepted, reason may, after pronouncing due 
acknowledgements, have full play (Duns Scotus, 2009a; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 457). 
Duns Scotus offers a proof of the existence of God. He is also implicated in 
contributing to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (Muscat, 2011, 
Destinction 3, Question 1, n.p.; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 454), which Magnus had not yet 
accepted.  
When so generally stated, Duns Scotus’ position appears not markedly different from 
that earlier explored for Aquinas but, although Duns Scotus finds reason and faith 
compatible, in him the gulf between them appears wider and deeper (Mellone, 1918, 
p. 245; Rickaby, 1911, p. 29; Ueberweg, 1889, p. 452 - 453). For Rickaby, this 
“growing distrust of reason [’s ability to justify faith, represents] the first autumn tint 
of decay” (1911, p. 30, my square  brackets), a decay hastened by a subtlety of 
thought through which Duns Scotus not only overreached himself but also triggered 
“the beginning of its [scholasticism’s] decline” (ibid., p. 27, my square  brackets). In 
Scotus’ time another kind of peaceful cognitive Polis, the Land of Cockaygne, 
announces its presence. In that land, confectionary could be plucked from the walls 
of houses, and there was no work to do—animals did not need feeding, foods 
transported themselves ready cooked to the tables and priests and nuns could have 
their ways with each other (Anonymous, Early 1330s, n. p.). Perhaps the Land of 
Cockaygne is an eternal Polis of the appetitive soul.  
Fine distinctions and subtleties can be found throughout works attributed to Duns 
Scotus and/or contested as his (T. Williams, 2009b, pp. 1 - 14), and certainly within 
commentaries widely agreed as his. These commentaries are those on Porphyry’s 
Isagoge (Duns Scotus, 2009f) and Aristotle’s Logic, Sophistical Refutations (Duns 
Scotus, 2004b), and Categories (Pini, 2002). His penchant for fine distinctions is also 
present in other of his accepted writings such as his commentaries known as Opus 
Oxoniense or Oxford Lectures or Ordinato on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Duns 
Scotus, 2009b) and his later work at the University of Paris, his Opus Parisiense also 
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known as Paris Lectures or Reportata (Duns Scotus, 2004a). These Paris lectures 
also deal with the Sentences (Duns Scotus, 2009g).  
Some scholars, who appear to be fluent in Latin (Balic, 1965; Bettoni, 1961; 
Copleston, 1971; R. Cross, 1998, 1999, 2002; Frank & Wolter, 1955; Reichmann, 
2006; Rickaby, 1911; T. Williams, 2003; A. B. Wolter, 1983, 1986, 1987; A. B. 
Wolter & Alluntis, 1975/2015; Allan B Wolter & Bychkov, 2004), have sifted 
through Duns Scotus’ subtle similarities, distinctions and differences and isolated 
defining essentials of his contribution. For example:  
(1) Duns Scotus, unlike Aquinas and Aristotle, is reported as making will a higher 
faculty than intellect and of pronouncing, again unlike Aquinas and Aristotle, that 
beatitude or extreme happiness and bliss is an act of will, not an act of the 
understanding. Bliss in the sense of blessing or beatitude is given, inter alia, to those 
who “hunger and thirst after righteousness” (Holy Bible, 2009a, Matthew Ch. 5, 
V.6).  
Knowing and willing are faculties of soul but will is spiritual and unlike sense 
appetite, and even intellect, which are both caused from without, it is free from any 
cause beyond itself. Beatitude occurs when mankind’s will functions in accordance 
with God’s will. This claim by Duns Scotus that the key to mankind’s end in God is 
found in the will through grace and love and not in the intellect through grace and 
love, as Aquinas had taught, is no small change in the Western history of ideas. Will 
is not determined by reason and cognition, but uses it.  
Taylor (1911, p. 512) cogently states Duns Scotus’ position: the will directs itself to 
the idea of the good which is higher than the true, to which the intellect or reason 
directs itself; and loving is greater than knowing. And when, in today’s world, one 
might apply Duns Scotus’ explanation to interpret actions of men and women at 
work busily carrying out the most ugly atrocities in God’s name and for the love of 
God, it can appear that in such matters the intellect, understood as intellectual virtue 
and its attendant reason and understanding, has sometimes little if any say at all. 
Certainly in the first half of the twentieth century those experimentally practicing the 
triumph of the will felt it necessary to encourage fervent spiritual loyalty to their 
leader and country above all else. 
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(2) Duns Scotus is a realist: he accepts that individuals exist independently (Duns 
Scotus, 2009e, II 3 1 Q.5 - 6) outside of mind, their existence being subject to God’s 
presence as the first principle of all (Duns Scotus, 2009h,1.2, 4.2). Understanding 
and sensing are simply two forms of knowing predicated on a fundamental axiom 
that there is immediate apprehension of independently existing objects. In answer to 
the question of what the world of these individual objects is made of, Duns Scotus 
replies materia secondo-prima, which is Aquinas’s primordial materia-prima, and 
pronounces it a substrate of a formless and incorporeal matter (sic.) which he calls 
materia primo-prima which matter, unless God so wills, can never be found existing 
on its own.  
Materia primo-prima is the first material of the world: it flowers into rational souls, 
and fruits as pure intelligences or angels. Aristotle’s hierarchy of thought thinking 
itself, secondary unmoved movers, and nous and potential seems not so far away 
after all. Materia secondo-prima is the material of becoming and change. Duns 
Scotus’ hylomorphysm is universal but it is complicated by his distinction between 
‘thisness’, haecceitas and ‘whatness’, quidditas or general essence. Duns Scotus 
introduces the principle called haecceitas, which, although it is neither form nor 
matter, still gives individuality to enformed existing things. For example, the 
‘whatness’ or quidditas of Hypatia or Socrates themselves is respectively woman and 
man, the form of the enformed matter. The ‘thisness’ or haecceitas is Hypatia rather 
than say Heloise, or Socrates rather than say, Critias—or for that matter Hypatia 
rather than Critias. To begin the further generation of subtlety Duns Scotus has 
haecceitas operating at the level of various animal, mineral and vegetable substances 
and again within that level for individual occurrences of those substances. In the 
example under discussion haecceitas operates at the level of man and Socrates.  
It is from individuals so understood that universals obtain their so-called reality 
(Windelband, 1914, p. 341) and in this Windelband holds that Duns Scotus in 
particular amongst the Franciscans was following Avicebron (ibid., p. 341). 
(3) Duns Scotus broke the link between metaphysics, understood as dialectically 
reasoned demonstration of matters transcendental, and theology, understood as 
revealed truth, without violating the articles of faith. He did this by declaring 
theology to be a practical rather than speculative faculty (H. O. Taylor, 1911, p. 510). 
 429 
At that time, after the fashion of Aquinas, theology continued to be regarded as a 
Science at Oxford (H. O. Taylor, 1911, pp. 512 - 513) and Taylor is unable to find 
Duns Scotus denying that theology is a Science (1911, p. 516). For Duns Scotus 
theology is something higher than Science because it goes directly to the perception 
of principles and it does not need either Science or philosophy. Herein reason, 
through its scientific method of syllogistic demonstration, found an escape route to 
its own independence from theology.  
For Duns Scotus, God’s revelation is said to be an expression of His own free will, 
through which He specifies mankind’s means to its end in God, and is thus a guide to 
action. Theology then, even though it acknowledges reason, is a kind of wisdom and 
understanding of principles rather than a rational method for reaching conclusions, 
and it does not take its orders from metaphysics. Theology is apart from the rest and 
above them. In particular, metaphysics as dialectic about matters transcendental was 
much less subordinated to theology and in the extreme was irrelevant to it. In a sense, 
metaphysics had also been pronounced entirely free.  
Irrespective of whether the fine difference between metaphysics and theology is 
convincing when one goes beyond definition to various psychology of mind 
understandings perceived then and now in vogue, both the perception of the 
difference, and its exposition by Duns Scotus, constitute a substantial change. Duns 
Scotus had opened a door through which reason, understood as Science as syllogistic 
demonstration, and philosophy, understood as metaphysics, would make their exit. 
By default of the break between theology and metaphysics, theology, metaphysics 
and philosophy took their leave of each other. Reason was just that one step closer to 
its own freedom and independence, and its own rite of passage was soon to occur, 
and so too blossoming of a scientific revolution, and its attendant emergence of new 
understandings of Science and philosophy.  
Step Two Continues: William of Ockham (AD 1289 - 1349) 
Another of the preconditions for the escape of reason and a re-emergence of 
experimental Science was set up by William of Ockham (AD 1289 - 1349). I have 
gained insights into Ockham from some of his available works and from 
commentaries by others (Bosley & Tweedale, 1997; Spade, 1999; William of 
Ockham, 1930, 1980, 1989, 1991). Ockham revived nominalism but not the extreme 
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forms of it defined earlier in Table 40 on page 367. The extreme nominalism of those 
earlier times accepted only the name of a genus as real, and in its moderate form 
accepted that universals exist in the mind. Under Ockham only the individual thing, 
the particular was real, the universal being a conception of the human mind, a term 
having no reality, and existing outside of the mind merely as a sign or word.  
The universal was not formed by extraction from particulars as the realists would 
have it but was rather a mediate concept accompanying the presence of two or more 
individuals. This seemingly now insignificant change was, in the ferment of the 
times, a window through which those entrapped by the abstraction of realism could 
focus on individual phenomena, and relationships amongst them: Ockham’s 
nominalism, because it fosters study of individual phenomena, is another paving 
stone in a road to natural philosophy proper. His nominal stance against realism is 
predicated on the fundamental notion “that entities must not be unnecessarily 
multiplied” (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 462), including the universal as a real existence, and 
this differentiates him from both Plato, for whom the universal existed in reality by 
virtue of the forms, and Aristotle, for whom the universal existed in reality within the 
mind.  
Ockham’s entities statement now commonly known as Ockham’s Razor, or Occam’s 
Razor, may not have been used by Ockham in the form given in the previous 
paragraph and may thus be an expression of a later scholar. W. M. Thorburn (1918, 
pp. 346 -347) finds Ockham expressing the razor in different Latin terms and has 
Ueberweg (1889) removing the citation given in the previous paragraph in a later 
edition of his book. Monahan (1953, p. 54) informs that the principle of parsimony, 
by whatever name it is called, can be found in Aristotle’s Physics I 6 189a15 – 19, 
VIII 6 259a6 – 14 (Aristotle, 1936b; 1952n, pp. 264, 344), Grosseteste’s De Iride 
(1912, p. 75), Henty of Ghent’s Quodlibet (XI 3) and Duns Scotus’s Opus Oxoniense 
(II, 16 1 n. 15). Nevertheless, now with Ockham the universal exists within the 
thinking mind only as a concept and outside the thinking mind, nowhere at all. 
This basic difference is anathema to Aristotelian Science: universals there may be, 
and sound and reliable as concepts they may be, but there is no objective reality in 
them. Aristotelian categories are relegated to a difference in words and grammar: 
universals are intuitively understood coincident thoughts accompanying the presence 
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of two or more similar individuals (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 463). For Ockham, intuitive 
knowledge remains knowledge of whether a thing is or is not, and the rest is 
judgement of mind. Such judgement, based as it is upon sense knowledge, may be 
defective so that intuitive knowledge is superior to sense knowledge (ibid., p. 463). It 
seems already that Ockham has Aristotle, in defiance of Aristotle’s rule of individual 
entity, present and not present at the same time. Ockham also claims that sensual 
soul, the feeling soul, dwells in parts of the body as form, while the intellective soul, 
like nous before it, is a substance separate from the body (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 464). 
Scientific knowledge for Ockham is knowledge of the necessarily true and it is 
obtained through syllogistic reasoning predicated on fundamental premises induced 
from experience Quodlibetal Questions (William of Ockham, 1991, I Q. 2). Yet after 
all of this, all knowledge is God’s knowledge and his alone. Not even God’s ideas 
exist separately (Ueberweg, 1889, p. 463). Human knowledge is true only to the 
extent that God allows humans to represent to themselves “the divine knowledge 
after the analogy of our own”, (ibid., p. 463). Under such arrangements Ockham 
allows only God’s existence rendered probable on reasoned grounds. The articles of 
faith are not capable of being so reasoned.  
Looked at in another way, Ockham also set reason free. Essentially, knowledge 
which transcends experiential knowledge, experiential knowledge being intuition, 
conception and reasoned demonstration, is the knowledge of faith (ibid., p. 464). It is 
knowledge not demonstrable by reason and is accessed by a will to believe the 
scientifically indemonstrable. Furthermore, will is not subordinate to understanding 
or reason as Aquinas would have it. God’s existence is only reasonable a posteriori, 
God as first cause arrived at in the fashion of Anselm being as questionable as 
Scotus’ proof from a chain of consecutive efficient cause producing efficient cause is 
insufficient Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis I Q. 135 (William of 
Ockham, 1488, Latin text) and when he, Ockham, switches from consecutive 
causation to successive conservation in that chain he has to posit a heavenly body as 
original conserver to prevent infinite regress (ibid., Q. 136). "I say that we do stop at 
a first efficient cause and there is no regress to infinity. It is sufficient that a heavenly 
body be posited because we do experience concerning such that they are the causes 
of others." (Woods, 1973, pp. 69 - 87, Ockham Quod. II Q. 1 quoted by Woods). 
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Teleological explanations are likewise uncertain because while cognate beings will 
their actions, it does not follow that human will acts as God has ordained, which, if 
postulated, supplies the final cause intended to be proved  Summa Logicae III, c. 2 
(William of Ockham, 2015). 
In spite of his reservations, Ockham at Quodlibet III, Q. 3, n. 1 informs that even 
though “that God is the mediate or immediate cause of all thing … cannot be 
demonstrated, yet I argue persuasively for it on the basis of authority and reason." 
(Quoted in Ziccardi, 2011, no pagination).  
Given Ockham’s position which essentially weakens the unity of reason and faith at 
a time of secular presence in the forming universities, it is little wonder that 
following him, the possibility of two contradictory kinds of truth began to re-emerge. 
In 1339 the arts faculty of the University of Paris forbade teaching of Ockham’s 
doctrines (Coleman, 1992, p. 563) but this was to have little lasting censorship effect. 
The so–called two truths difficulty was to work itself out in either of two ways. One 
was mysticism, which in essence worked at making faith alone, not reason, the main 
business but in a way not threatening to natural philosophy. The other was an 
ongoing emergence of natural philosophy predicated on God’s presence in nature. 
The mysticism route is beyond the scope of this enquiry and the case of an emerging 
natural philosophy is pursued in the next chapter. 
Step Two Continues: Jean Buridan (AD 1300 - 1358) 
Now somewhat free, reason was soon to turn to questioning the will’s freedom to act. 
Jean Buridan (AD 1300 - 1358) asked how the will might act when balanced equally 
between competing desires. Celebrated now as the Buridan’s Ass metaphor (M. 
Clark, 2007, p. 28), an ass placed equally between two bales of hay starves to death 
through failure of will because it is indifferent to each bale. Monahan (1953, pp. 1 - 
3) explains that Aristotle in On the Heavens II 13 (Aristotle, 1952m, pp. 384 - 387; 
1984a) had earlier set up such a condition for analysis purposes, and that a similar 
usage of the convention can be found in The Divine Comedy (Dante Alighieri, 2010, 
Paradise, Canto IV Lines 1 - 3) and that Buridan did not mention the ass, a finding 
supported by Ueberweg (1889, p. 466). Lagerland (2003, pp. 173 – 203) discusses 
Buridan’s example of a dog starving to death between two piles of food in his 
Questions on Aristotle’s De Coelo (Buridan, 1942, Latin text) Buridan’s discussion 
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of competing choices is reported located in Quaestiones super Decem Libros 
Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Buridan, 1968) at Book III Question 1. 
Buridan’s position was that it is impossible to decide the question (Ueberweg, 1889, 
p. 466). Buridan is also credited with the introduction of impetus theory (Drake, 
1999, p. 299) and a conundrum in logic known as Sophism 17 or Buridan’s Bridge 
(Buridan, 1982, pp. 74 - 76). 
It is reasonable to question Buridan in return about the nature of these barriers in the 
resolution of this enigma of free will: might the barriers be psychological, or moral, 
or even after all, might the will be not entirely free? Monahan (1953) treats such 
questions in passing and reveals that Buridan, from a sitting-on-the-fence-position, 
leans enough both ways to allow something of a resolution to indecision of the will. 
Under a “liberty of final ordination” (Monahan, 1953, n. p.) Buridan is able to 
maintain freedom of will in the presence of reason’s superiority and the will’s 
necessary connection to the final good. When the will is indifferent between two 
alternatives to the same end it may postpone choice “until reason has decided which 
is a better route to take” (Buridan, 1968, III Q. 1; Monahan, 1953, pp. 29 - 30). The 
will can “freely accept (or will) any means. It can freely reject any or all means, and 
go back to the original volition. Or it can withhold its determination until reason has 
investigated to discover the best means” (ibid., p. 30). This freedom of will 
differentiates mankind from the beasts and it is predicated on Ethics, above all, 
understood as mankind’s responsibility for their actions (Monahan, 1953, p. 31).  
Table 46: Key Terms Nuance—Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) to Buridan (AD c.1300 
– c.1358) 
  
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Science 
Syllogistic demonstration of the 
true from the false in the realm of 
experiential knowledge 
understood as intuition, sensation 
and reason. It is based on 
fundamental premises induced 
from experience.  
Divine reason’s necessary 
connection to the true, operating 
in the domains of sensation and 
cognition. 
The will’s free choice and affinity 
for loving rather than knowing, 
which affinity, through love of 
God, allows mankind to believe 
the scientifically indemonstrable. 
Ethics 
Active adherence to God’s will 
revealed in the scriptures and 
occasioned by the will’s 
adherence to that revelation. 
The practical faculty of theology, 
theology being understood as that 
which can go directly to 
perception of principles without 
the need for Science or 
philosophy.  
The will’s failure to conform to 
God’s will. 
Polis 
The cognitive gathering 
occasioned through the human 
will’s acceptance of God’s will.  
The spiritual will’s access to the 
grace of God. 
The will’s failure to conform to 
God’s will. 
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Table 47: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) to Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) and Aquinas to Buridan 
(AD c.1300 – c. 1358) 
 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with arriving recognition of a binding 
sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche 
of a rapacious mankind in whom no part 
of reason is divine and for whom 
knowledge is power, which recognition 
provides an alternative to a long held 
standpoint that binding sentiment of 
Polis is situated in natural social instinct 
implanted in mankind for whom virtue 
is some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and 
Polis and the Fall of 
Rational Metaphysics 
to Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
Polis becomes is a cognitive gathering or eternal city of God predicated on acceptance of His grace.  
Reason remains divine as a gift of a Christian God who is all reason and who is present in the human soul.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace.  
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and 
Polis from Augustine 
(AD 354 - 430) to 
Abelard (AD 1079 - 
1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis remains a cognitive gathering bound through reasoned faith and love of God. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a now Christian God. 
Virtue remains obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusal to transgress Christian prohibitions.  
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and 
Polis—Abelard (AD 
1079 - 1142) to 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 
1274) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis is an eternal city of God occasioned through acceptance of infused theological and cardinal virtues under God’s grace. 
Reason remains divine as a gift of a Christian God. 
Virtue remains obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and is practised by refusing to transgress Christian prohibitions. 
Chapter 6 (continued) 
Aquinas to Buridan 
(AD c.1300 – c.1358) 
 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis is a cognitive gathering occasioned by human will’s acceptance of God’s will. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion.  
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Table 47: (Continued) 
 
PART TWO OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is 
coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics 
from scientific enquiry, Science 
ceasing to inform practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity and, in its 
new form as conditional fact, 
Science becoming valued in its own 
right for direct benefits it could 
bring to society and state.  
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and Polis 
and the Fall of Rational 
Metaphysics to Christian 
Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by unquestioning life in Christ. 
Science as reasoned demonstration of natural truths is banished to irrelevant oblivion. 
Practical Ethics is replaced by faith Ethics. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and Polis 
from Augustine (AD 354 - 
430) to Abelard (AD 1079 
- 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by reasoned life in Christ. 
Science becomes syllogistic reasoning in dialectic and yes and no disputation predominantly within the confines of faith authority and within a 
developing scholastic method. Science as observation and reasoning about natural phenomena, and engagement with them, begins to reappear in the 
form of experimental Science.  
Virtue is obedience to God’s laws through acceptance of His grace and practical Ethics is living life under reasoned interpretation of those laws qua 
church doctrine. To be ethical is to act so as not to transgress Christian prohibitions.  
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and 
Polis—Abelard (AD 1079 
- 1142) to Aquinas (AD 
1225 – 1274) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Metaphysics as contemplation of the one remains replaced by reasoned life in Christ. 
Science again is an intellectual virtue and consists of syllogistic demonstration both a priori and a posteriori in dialectic and logic within the confines 
of a revealed faith theology. Under grace it informs ethical choice as a prelude to beatitude and outside of grace combines with experience to inform 
moral choice. Science searches for truth in matters natural and theological and theology too is named a Science. 
Ethics becomes the contingent will’s free choice of means to ends, under the necessary will’s adherence to happiness as mankind’s end. Ethics as a 
practical action is occasioned through synderesis which consists of practical reason or prudence grasping its own first principles of natural law and 
reasoning through syllogistic demonstration to its own choice conclusions. 
Chapter 6 (continued) 
Aquinas to Buridan (AD 
c.1300 – c.1358) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Theology finds no use for metaphysics or philosophy and reason slips its faith Ethics confines. Metaphysics as contemplation of God is expelled from 
theology and continues its own independent journey.  
Science becomes syllogistic demonstration of the true from the false in experiential domains of intuition, sensation and reason, syllogistic 
demonstration being predicated on fundamental premises induced from experience. Science so understood has no place in explanation of revelation 
and the articles of faith. 
Ethics becomes active adherence to God’s revealed will. Practical Ethics is thus applied theology operating through the will’s conformity to Christian 
teaching. Human will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine reason, now separates mankind from the beasts. 
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Table 47: (Continued) 
 
3 
Dawning of a Modern Age is coeval 
with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of the 
state.  
Chapter 4 
Science, Ethics and 
Polis and the Fall of 
Rational 
Metaphysics to 
Christian Theology 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age.  
Aristotelian practical Ethics becomes faith Ethics. 
Chapter 5 
Science, Ethics and 
Polis from 
Augustine (AD 354 
- 430) to Abelard 
(AD 1079 - 1142) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Practical Ethics remains living of life under reasoned interpretation of the doctrine of the Church and consists in refusing to transgress Christian 
prohibitions.  
Chapter 6  
Science, Ethics and 
Polis—Abelard (AD 
1079 - 1142) to 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 
1274) 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age 
Ethics becomes the contingent will’s free choice of means to ends, under the necessary will’s adherence to happiness as mankind’s end. Ethics as a practical 
action is occasioned through synderesis which consists of practical reason or prudence grasping its own first principles of natural law and reasoning through 
syllogistic demonstration to its own choice conclusions. 
Chapter 6 
(continued) 
Aquinas to Buridan 
(AD c.1300 – 
c.1358) 
 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age. 
Ethics becomes active adherence to God’s revealed will occasioned by human will’s adherence to God’s will. Practical Ethics is thus applied theology 
operating through the will’s conformity to Christian teaching. Human will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine reason, now separates mankind from 
the beasts. Practical Ethics is applied theology operating through the will’s conformity to Christian teaching. 
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Table 47: (Continued) 
 
4 
Integrating Summary of Part Two  
Aristotle’s unified political philosophy fractured under an intermingling of Greek heritage and Jewish revelation doctrine and the ongoing development of Christianity. By the time of Augustine (AD 354 – 430), Greek 
rational Ethics had been replaced by revealed faith Ethics, Christ as divine Logos had replaced nous as logos. Aristotle’s categorical explanation of being had been replaced by divine revelation’s announcement of God as 
the creator of the world and its beings. A personal Christian God of love became available as an alternative to a Jewish God of wrath and both had replaced an impersonal Greek god or one. A Greek city of ideas had been 
replaced as Polis by a Christian city of God. Science, now irrelevant to faith, and no longer recognised as the arbiter of truth under theoretical and practical reason, or knowledge of the four causes, but recognised as 
syllogistic method, is ignored to survive as best it can. Ethics inheres in overcoming the absolute sin outlined in the commandments. During the time from Augustine (AD 354 – 430) to the close of the twelfth century, 
church dogmatists could not wholly ignore the utility of reason which established itself as syllogistic demonstration in dialectic and disputation. Employed in this form under strict control by the authority of faith, reason 
begot a new Science of theology. Ethics inheres in willing oneself not to transgress Christian prohibitions and Ethics could employ reason subject to the constraints of the mysteries of faith. Science qua syllogistic 
demonstration and Ethics became compatible and reason and faith became one by virtue of faith Ethics’ acceptance reason. Earlier Eriugena (AD c. 8008 – 877) had pronounced Science and faith to be the same thing. 
Abelard (AD 1078 – 1142) is something of a milestone of this development and at the time of his life, on the eve of the rediscovery of Aristotle’s wider corpus, Science is syllogistic reasoning within dialectic and yes and 
no disputation about truth in theology, Ethics remains that act by which humans will themselves not to transgress Christian prohibitions, and Polis is a city of God. During this time dialectic and rhetoric beget logic and a re-
emergence in interest in experimental Science is discernible. The compatibility of Science and faith brought forward by Anselm (AD 1033-1109) and Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142) reached its highest point with Aquinas (AD 
1225 – 1274). Both Aquinas and his teacher Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) were recipients of Aristotle’s wider corpus and through their contributions Greek understandings were for a second time blended with developing 
Christianity but against a very different background. Under Aquinas theology and natural Science are both called Science. Science remains syllogistic reasoning but it is once again an intellectual virtue which, under grace, 
informs ethical choice as a prelude to beatitude, or outside of grace and from experience, informs moral choice. Science and faith are one when syllogistic reasoning, other than in questioning of the mysteries of faith, is at 
work in search of truth in matters natural and theological. Ethics is synderesis, a process by which the contingent will is guided in its free choice of means to ends by the necessary will under its adherence to happiness. In 
synderesis, practical wisdom or prudence grasps its own first principles, the precepts of natural law, and reasons through syllogistic demonstration to reach its own conclusions. A Greek good-at-what efficiency criterion 
again informs Ethics. To be ethical is to be good at living a righteous Christian life. Polis remains a city of God consisting of the sublime occasioned through infused theological and cardinal virtues under grace. The high 
syncretisation of Science and faith so skilfully woven by Aquinas was gradually broken down by incremental erosion and can be traced from Duns Scotus (AD c. 1270 – 1308) to Jean Buridan (AD  c. 1300 – 1358). Within 
76 years of Aquinas’ death, compatibility of reason and faith was fractured. Theology, not reason, guided Ethics. Theology found little need for either metaphysics or philosophy. Reason had tasted its first days of freedom 
from faith Ethics. The will, rather than Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ divine reason, now separated mankind from the beasts. Science transformed into syllogistic demonstration of the true from the false in the experiential domains 
of intuition, sensation and reason. Ethics became active adherence to God’s revealed will occasioned by the human will’s adherence to God’s will. The Polis became the cognitive gathering occasioned by the human will’s 
acceptance of God’s will. Aquinas’s Christian Aristotelian system had largely been compromised.  
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Anachronistically speaking, Buridan would have mankind maximise good, subject to a moral 
practical behaviour constraint. Positive economists, when they arrived much later in their 
numbers, were to make an art of maximising utility from points of indifference between 
bundles of goods. In their case, goods are alternative consumable products indifferently 
desired, subject to a money income constraint. Buridan might thus be seen as a pre-runner to 
the pleasure-pain calculus which, upon its later emergence in a form presented by Bentham 
(1823, p. 1), preceded the utilitarian consumer demand theory. In such theory, consumers 
satiate their desires through consumption of goods and services, with no moral constraint at 
all in the model, other than the morality of a so-called law of demand. They who can pay 
most for available goods get those goods, the fairness or otherwise of income distribution in 
the first place, and thus preclusion of many from the market as a result, being for certain 
kinds of economists, a let’s not go there blink. Such goods of course are not the goods of 
Aquinas or Buridan. 
In summary, within seventy-six years of Aquinas’s death the high compatibility of reason and 
faith was in disarray. Theology, not metaphysics, was the guide to ethical action. Theology 
had become aloof from metaphysics and philosophy, and by default, granted them their leave. 
Reason had tasted its first days of freedom from faith Ethics. The universal, although a 
reliable concept, had ceased to exist in reality within or without the mind, the individual thing 
alone being real. The will, although it consults reason, and while it remains necessarily 
connected to mankind’s final end, which connection it exercises through the power faith 
gives it to believe the scientifically indemonstrable, remains free to choose. Above all it is 
now the will, and not the divine reason of Aristotle and Aquinas, that separates mankind from 
the beasts. Science remains syllogistic logic. 
CONCLUSION 
In the syncretisation of faith and reason made possible by Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) and 
Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274), reason is superior to will so that the intellectual virtue called 
Science or syllogistic reasoning, under the influence of prudence and intellect, informs ethical 
choice. Under grace and through reason’s necessary connection to its divine first principles, 
and the will’s necessary connections to the precepts of natural law, mankind approaches its 
final end in beatitude. Deprived of infused virtue, Science remains tasked with informing 
moral action. Table 45 on page 424 and Table 46 on page 433 respectively present the nuance 
brought to key terms as represented by (AD 1193 – 1280) and Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) 
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and by various writers from Aquinas to Buridan (AD c.1300 – c.1358). Table 47 on page 434 
carries that key terms nuance to progressive interpretation of the Thesis Proposition 
Statements. 
Considerable change had occurred before the centenary of Aquinas’ passing. Reason became 
emancipated from theology; theology became aloof and independent from philosophy 
understood as metaphysics; free will was pronounced capable of accessing knowledge of the 
transcendent through faith, and higher in nobility than reason; metaphysics was excluded 
from morality; the existence of real universals was rejected; study of individual phenomena 
and relationships amongst them was accepted; and, surrounding all of these, a different and 
robust squabbling and dissention arose within an emergence of a secular spirit in the 
emerging universities. Natural philosophy was in part to re-emerge as a distillate of this 
ferment and its re-emergence is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Part Three 
 
 
 
Re-emergence of Experimental Science, Arrival of a New Political 
Philosophy and Dawning of a New Era Later Called The Modern 
Age  
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Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of Experimental Science 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 was concerned with a major discourse between reason and faith and it 
revealed that by the mid fourteenth century perceived compatibility of reason and 
faith was under challenge. Chapter 5 acknowledged a presence, during the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, of a fledgling secondary counter discourse about 
experimental Science and natural philosophy. In this chapter I chart the re-emergence 
of experimental Science through an 
examination of changes in methods of 
enquiry discernible in the work of 
notable scholars, beginning with 
Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) and 
ending with Newton (AD 1643 – 
1727).  
Again, much social change occurred 
during this period. Scholasticism 
declined, the Renaissance began in 
now-known Italy, and so too 
humanism and each in its own way 
contributed to reformation and counter-reformation in the sixteenth century. Printing 
was developed in Europe circa 1450 and God spoke in official English for the first 
time with publication of the King James Version of the Holy Bible circa 1611. The 
Roman Empire ended with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The great 
sea voyages of Columbus (AD 1451 – 1506) and Magellan (AD 1480 – 1521) 
occurred, Elizabeth 1 (AD 1533 – 1603) assumed the throne, and as the seventeenth 
century progressed European colonies were established in many parts of the world. 
The English republic which followed the death of Charles I (AD 1600 – 1649) ended 
in 1660 and Shakespeare (AD 1564 – 1616), whoever he may have been, and 
Molière (AD 1622 – 1673) gave their literary gifts to the world. The so-called 
Scientific Revolution began and progressed and it, like the so-called Reformation, 
 
Blake’s Christian Newton is captured emerging from the chaos, 
only to look directly at the results of his own reason, through 
which he prescribed the rules by which God ordered the chaos: an 
Oppenheimer moment of some force?  
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from (W. Blake, 1795). Isaac 
Newton. (copper engraving with pen and ink and watercolour). 
Tait Gallery, London: Web Museum of Art. (W. Blake, 1795). 
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helped pave a way for the dawn of a so-called age of reason or enlightenment which 
in this enquiry is taken to have begun with publication of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica in 1687. All of these developments are acknowledged as components 
of a background mix contributing to perceptions of a changing method of Science 
drawn from works of authors surveyed in this chapter. Nonetheless, I focus narrowly 
on development of experimental Science per se. The question of experimental 
Science and its implications for Science, Ethics and Polis and emergence of a 
Modern Age forms part of the discussion of Chapters 8 and 9.  
A RE-EMERGENCE OF EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE 
Experimental Science in Its Infancy 
Table 10 beginning on page 179 reveals that scientific observation and experimental 
Science were practised in antiquity. Earlier mention has also been made of Gerbert of 
Aurillac (AD c. 946 – 1003), Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 – 1152) and Magnus (AD 
1193 – 1280) and their interest in experimental Science as a result of their possible 
exposure to Arab custodianship of Aristotle’s heritage.  
Haskins reports Magnus as “original everywhere even when he seems to copy” 
(1927, p. 309) and Thorndike (1923a, p. 531), attributing that quote to Jessen (1867, 
p. 99) leads from it to an argument that Magnus, in treating of Aristotle, drew “in 
large measure from his own observations, experience and classifications” 
(Thorndike, 1923a, p. 532). On this contention, he urges that Magnus not only went 
beyond Aristotle’s idea of Science as knowledge of universals, but also proceeded 
from this “best and perfect kind of science” (ibid., p. 537), that is, observation of 
particulars, to actually carry out experiments on those individuals (Evans, 2002, p. 
127). O’Meara’s testament to Magnus’ independence in all matters including Science 
(T. O'Meara, 2011, p. 19) and his catholic interest in diverse aspects of natural 
philosophy (ibid., p. 21) complements these earlier views of Magnus interest in 
natural philosophy. Pope Pius XI anointed Magnus the patron saint of natural 
philosophy. Books by one or more of Magnus’ disciples The Book of Secrets (Best & 
Brightman, 2000, passim) and Women’s Secrets (Pseudo-Albert Magnus, 1992) 
provide insights into the nature of observation of natural phenomena at the time and
 443 
 
the mix of magic, superstition, and faith in which natural philosophy was struggling 
to establish itself.  
On experimentation, Thorndike finds Magnus able to claim that “a cicada goes on 
singing in its breast for a long time after its head has been cut off” (Thorndike, 
1923a, p. 541). Magnus (1999, XXVI i 10) also discusses other purposive 
experimentation cases involving turtles, and the kind of water they drink, and 
ostriches and the kinds of food they eat. Magnus’ trust in observation and experience 
is something different in a churchman as even then, before the inquisition’s true 
brutality was inflicted on so-called heretics and those out of favour, punishment 
could be rough. Magnus names the Magi astronomers and magicians, rather than 
sorcerers (Thorndike, 1923a, p. 553), and challenges what the ancients have said 
about whales on the basis of his own observations of these animals. Apparently, he 
dodges punishment for his insistence on the supremacy of observation and 
experience over old stories on the premise that God’s divine will works through 
nature (ibid., p. 531). Even if Pouchet (1853, pp. 203 - 320) is a little too generous in 
his claim that Magnus is the champion of a re-emergence of modern scientific 
experimental method, he, Magnus, certainly cannot easily be disassociated from the 
re-emergence of it and “with extending the scope of observation to every scientific 
field except anatomy” (Thorndike, 1923a, p. 522) after De Blainville (1847, n.p.).  
In Magnus, who refers to his co-workers as experimenters (Thorndike, 1923a, p. 
548), there is not only to be found a germ of a growing distinction between study of 
the universal and the particular in natural philosophy, but also a distinction between 
natural philosophy as observation and natural philosophy as experimentation. He also 
relies on observation and experience as aids to revelation (ibid., p. 548). For the 
present purposes natural philosophy can be thought of as a domain of physics on its 
journey to natural Science.  
Irrespective of Magnus’ championship or otherwise of modern Science, something 
like a modern scientific method can be seen emerging in the work of Robert 
Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252). 
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Thorndike (1923a, p. 451) finds the unknown author of a Summa philosophiae, 
ascribed by some to Grosseteste, dividing Science into a theoretical or speculative 
branch and a practical or operative branch which is of interest in respect of Francis 
Bacon discussed in Chapter 8. Thorndike associates Grosseteste (AD died c. 1253) 
with a mention of ‘experimenters’ (p. 439). On the basis of Roger Bacon’s eulogy on 
Grosseteste—Roger Bacon (AD 1214 – 1294) was his contemporary—and earlier 
German and English scholarship, Thorndike finds Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) 
experimenting with lenses (p. 440), and engaging in experimental examination of the 
solar spectrum through refraction, discussing experimental findings in astronomy (p. 
440), and explaining comets on the basis of a theory akin to magnetism (p. 443). He 
notes the approaching existence, if not the existence per se. of the magnifying glass, 
and its application to reading and lighting fires (pp. 440, 443). 
Crombie (1953, pp. 52 - 66) holds a view that Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) worked 
out a scientific method while writing his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics (Aristotle, 1952p, 1960a) and employed it later for his own purposes. The 
method Crombie identifies is that Grosseteste would first, in a resolutio, analyse a 
complex phenomenon by reducing it to its components, from which identified 
components and principles he would frame a hypothesis, and then, in a compositio 
deduce the validity or otherwise of the hypothesis by testing its consequences against 
experience or through practical experiment.  
Losee (1972, p. 31) interprets the resolutio and compositio as affirmations of 
Aristotle’s inductive–deductive method while Serene (1979, p. 97) finds Grosseteste 
(AD died c. 1252) revising Aristotle’s method. Dales (1961, p. 382) finds 
Grosseteste using experiment in the resolutio and also to frame the hypothesis for the 
compositio. After Grosseteste, writers referred to Aristotle’s scientific method as the 
method of resolution and composition (Losee, 1972, p. 31). Crombie (1953) finds 
Grosseteste using this method to investigate the spectrum colours. Grosseteste’s 
resolutio acknowledges that colours are found in rainbows, mill-wheel and boat-oar 
spray, and sunlight travelling through water filled spheres (ibid., pp. 64 – 66). In his 
compositio Grosseteste acknowledges that spectra are related to transparent spheres, 
that different colours result from light refracted through different angles, and that 
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colours so produced lie on the arc of a circle (ibid., pp. 64 – 66). Grosseteste’s Rules 
(1890, pp. 121 - 150) provides insights into hospitality management and animal 
husbandry emerging in their modern senses within economics as household 
management in a Aristotelian sense (ibid., p. 121 – 150). 
Crombie (1953, p. 38) discovers in Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) the natural 
philosopher reforming the calendar, associating tides with the action of the moon 
(ibid., p. 94), and using mathematics to explain laws of optics, which laws 
themselves he, Grosseteste, took to be the “foundation of physical reality” (ibid., p. 
51). Optics, which deals with light, that substance associated with Godhead at least 
since Plato, continued to have a spiritual dimension even beyond Grosseteste’s time. 
Crombie (1996) finds Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) arguing in De Natura Locorum 
that “by the power of geometry, the careful observer of natural things can give the 
cause of all natural effects by this method” (ibid., p. 45) and in De Lineis that “all 
causes of natural effects have to be expressed by means of lines, angles and figures, 
for otherwise it would be impossible to have knowledge of the reason for those 
effects” (ibid., p. 45). Mathematics, understood as geometry, is making a more 
determined return appearance. Perry (1871, pp. 43 - 44) attests to Grosseteste’s wide 
involvement with natural philosophy, naming him a precursor to Roger Bacon (AD 
1214 – 1294).  
Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252), in some respects, was alive to the efficiencies to be 
found in once-only falsification rather 
than repetitive verifications and hello 
again Karl Popper and falsification 
(Popper, 2005, pp. 15 - 19). In situations 
where more than one set of premises can 
account for an observed effect then it 
may prove expedient to disqualify the 
least likely premises by finding just one 
instance in which a predicted effect is 
absent or false. If the predicted effect is false or absent then the premise is said to be 
false. This method of falsification is now known in logic as a modus tollens (A. C. 
 
Blaise Pascal (AD 1623 – 1662) on Verification and 
Falsification 
Car quelquefois on conclut un absurde manifeste de . . . 
negation [ca va, negation d’une hypothese], et alors 
l'hypothese est veritable . . . ; ou bien on conclut un absurde 
manifeste de son affirmation, et lors l'hypothese est tenue 
pour fausse; et lorsqu'on n'a pu encore tirer d'absurde, ni de 
sa negation, ni de son affirmation, l'hypothese demeure 
douteuse; de sorte que, pour faire qu'une hypothese soit 
evidente, il ne suffit pas que tous les phenomenes s'en 
ensuivent, au lieu que, s'il s'ensuit quelque chose de 
contraire a un seul des phenomenes, cela suffit pour assurer 
de sa faussete. Reponse de Blaise Pascal au Très Bon 
Révérend Père Noël, Recteur, de la Société de Paris, à 
Paris. (Pascal, 1923, p. 99, my square brackets) 
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Crombie, 1990, p. 54) and both Crombie (ibid., p. 54, 133) and Losee (1972, p. 37) 
note that the method was available in antiquity but that Grosseteste’s achievement 
was to extend its use to evaluation of scientific procedure.  
Experimental Science Enters Its Adolescence 
Roger Bacon (AD 1214 – 1294) was to use Grosseteste’s method in further 
articulation of the rainbow (R. Bacon, 1962, pp. 588 - 596). Bacon himself outlines 
his approach to attainment of factual knowledge in that same work wherein, inter 
alia, through outlining three prerogatives of experimentation outlined in Table 48 on 
page 446, he explains the benefits of experimental Science.  
Bridges, Bacon’s translator, advises that a prerogative as Bacon uses the word, is 
best understood as a ‘leading feature’ (Bridges, 1914, p. 157). Losee (1972, p. 35) 
depicts the first prerogative as a significant advancement on Aristotelian inductive-
deductive method. He also compliments Grosseteste’s method of finding the repeated 
presence of an effect in the absence of all possible causes of the effect but one 
(Losee, 1972, p. 31 - 32, 35).  
Table 48: Roger Bacon’s Prerogatives of Experimental Method  
 
# 
Bridge’s Expression of the 
Prerogative 
Bacon’s Words about the Prerogative 
1 
Experimental Science reaches 
results which take their place in 
existing Sciences, but which are 
entirely new. 
Bacon’s first prerogative is that experimental method is a necessary 
complement to those Sciences whose “conclusions are reached by reasoning 
drawn from the principles discovered” (R. Bacon, 1962, p. 578) which 
Sciences, “if they should have a particular and complete experience of their 
own conclusions, they must have it with the aid of this noble science” (ibid., 
p. 578). 
2 
Experimental Science creates new 
departments of Science. 
 
Bacon states his second prerogative in the form of a general statement about 
the place of experiment: “Hence in the first place there should be readiness to 
believe, until in the second place experiment follows, so that in the third 
reasoning may function.” (R. Bacon, 1962, p. 615).  
3 
Experimental Science creates new 
departments of Science. 
 
The third prerogative “this science experimental without restriction” (R. 
Bacon, 2010, p. 621), is that experiment should apply to all natural 
philosophy and, by inference to astronomy which, studied the heavens, God’s 
abode,—a brave suggestion indeed, one of his exaggerated claims being that 
the third prerogative could unlock the literal truth of the scriptures (ibid., p. 
631). A reading of his fabulous treatment of the third prerogative—it will 
allow such wondrous things (ibid., pp. 327-364)1—shows, in addition to 
subsequent historical realisation of predictions emerging from his fertile 
imagination, just how much an objective and workable experimental method 
was wanting, even in his own case.  
Notes: (1) Some wonders are cited in his disputed Letter on Secret Works of Art and of Nature and on the Invalidity of Magic 
(R. Bacon, 2015, n. p., Ch. IV): self-propelled horseless chariots, a wing flapping machine for flying, instruments to allow 
humans to walk on the bottom of the ocean, used by Alexander the Great, says Bacon, and bridges without pillars or support 
able to span rivers (ibid., Ch. IV). Submarines, flying machines, locomotives, steamboats, arch and suspension bridges are 
names used to describe such wonders as they came to pass after Bacon’s time, Bacon’s speculations having been made before 
the travels of Marco Polo, the rediscovery of America, and the brilliance of Da Vinci.  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, R. (1962). The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon by Robert Belle Burke. Vol. 2. 
(pp. 578, 615, 631, 327 - 364). New York: Russell and Russell Inc.; Bridges, J. H. (1914). The Life and Work of Roger Bacon: 
An Introduction to the Opus Majus by John Henry Bridges. (p. 157). London: Williams and Norgate; Bacon, R. (2015). Letter 
on Secret Works of Art and of Nature and on the Invalidity of Magic. (Ch. IV). Princeton University. (R. Bacon, 2015, n. p., 
Ch. IV). 
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Bacon’s own words express the general sense in which he advocates the efficacy of 
experimentation. His novelty is that he began a formal commentary on the process of 
experimentation, a process that is probably as old as humanity. This process, now this 
Science of experimentation, “alone teaches us how to view the mad acts of magicians, 
that they may be not ratified but shunned, just as logic considers sophistical reasoning” 
(R. Bacon, 1962, p. 587). It has substantial benefits. For example: 
This mistress of the speculative sciences alone is able to give us important truths 
within the confines of the other sciences, which those sciences can learn in no other 
way. Hence these truths are not connected with the discussion of principles but are 
wholly outside of these, although they are within the confines of these sciences, since 
they are neither conclusions nor principles. Clear examples in regard to these matters 
can be given; but in what follows the man without experience must first seek a reason 
in order that he may first understand, for he will never have this reason except after 
experiment. Hence in the first place there should be readiness to believe, until in the 
second place experiment follows, so that in the third reasoning may function. For if a 
man is without experience that a magnet attracts iron, and has not heard from others 
that it attracts, he will never discover this fact before an experiment. Therefore in the 
beginning he must believe those who have made the experiment, or who have reliable 
information from experimenters, nor should he reject the truth, because he is ignorant 
of it, and because he does not arrive at it by reasoning. The Opus Majus of Roger 
Bacon by Robert Belle Burke (R. Bacon, 2010, p. 615 - 616) 
Roger Bacon took more words to say what today is said in fewer words: theory and 
opinion need to be validated against experience and experiment. Smith (1856, pp. 
103 - 104) finds Aristotle’s four elements alive 
and well in Bacon whose first matter, ‘yle’, is 
created. ‘Yle’ is the basis of all the four elements 
and Bacon, like Magnus before him, accepts that 
one element can be changed into another. Smith, 
in discussing Bacon’s use of mathematics as arithmetic in analysis of synthesis of 
bodies from the four elements, claims that Bacon’s syntheses are “the earliest 
examples ... and the fullest example[s] I know of early analysis, and perhaps the very 
first in which numbers are used in connection with elements. They are intellectual 
strivings after quantitative analysis” (R. A. Smith, 1856, p. 144, my square brackets). 
After the death of his patron, Pope Clement IV (AD c.1195 – 1268), Bacon’s 
atonement for his independent stance was forced through years of confinement. 
Scotus’ Method of Agreement 
Instance Possible Causes Effect 
1 ABCD e 
2 ACE e 
3 ABEF e 
4 ADF e 
Source: Modified by Ian Eddington from 
Losee, J. An Historical Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science. (p. 33). London: 
Oxford University Press. (Losee, 1972) 
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An impressive scientific experiment was made by Theodoric of Freiberg (AD 1250 - 
1310) in further investigation of the rainbow. Theodoric produced the solar spectrum 
through experimentation with water-filled globes in sunlight and explained that the 
colours of the rainbow were produced by refraction of sunlight through raindrops 
(Lee & Fraser, 2001, pp. 161 - 164; D. Lindberg, 1976, pp. 435 - 441; Theodoric of 
Freiberg, 1974, pp. 435 - 441). 
Duns Scotus (AD c.1270 – 1308), like Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) and Roger 
Bacon, (AD 1214 – 1294) is also a harbinger of what is now understood in the 
modern sense as scientific method. For example, Voss (2006, pp. 212 - 213) explains 
Duns Scotus’s view at Quaestiones Metaphysicae 
I 4 49 that causes might be found, and examines 
Duns Scotus’s claim that it is possible to set up an 
experiment to determine the causes of phenomena 
observed to occur frequently in nature. Such 
causes are fixed one way causes, free will being the only free cause, and Voss (2006, 
p. 312) invokes Weinberg’s citation of Duns Scotus wherein Duns Scotus claims 
“that no experimental inference can yield a conclusion free from doubt Quaestiones 
Metaphysicae I 4 24” (Weinberg, 1965, p. 139). Both Voss (2006, p. 317) and Losee 
(1972, pp. 32 - 34) address Duns Scotus’s Method of Agreement which might 
provide evidence of which particular one of a number of circumstances or causes 
results in an observed effect. Losee’s explanation, extracted from Wolter’s 
translation of Duns Scotus (1962, p. 109) reveals that the Method of Agreement 
involves finding the one circumstance that is present every time the regularly 
occurring effect is observed in nature. In the table for Scotus on page 447, the 
possible cause A, which is present in all observed occurrences of the observed effect 
e is said to be in aptitudinal union with e. The claim being made by Duns Scotus is 
that, for example, a particular herb can have a bitter taste and not that every sample 
of it will have a bitter taste (Duns Scotus, 1962, pp. 110 - 111; Losee, 1972, p. 33).  
William of Ockham (AD 1280 – 1349) agrees with Duns Scotus that induction 
cannot progress in certainty beyond discovery of aptitudinal unions. Unlike Duns 
Ockham’s Method of Difference 
Instance Possible 
Causes 
Effect (e) 
1 ABCD e 
2 BCD e not present 
Source: Adapted by Ian Eddington from Losee, 
J. (1972). A Historical Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science. (p. 34). London: 
Oxford University Press (Losee, 1972) 
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Scotus, Ockham approaches such discovery through difference rather than agreement 
and his Method of Difference as it is now known is a process in which aptitudinal 
union is found when an effect coincident with 
a number of suspected possible causes 
remains when all but one of the possible 
causes have been removed. Its weakness, 
known to Ockham, is that the actual cause of 
the observed effect in question may be other 
than one of the suspected possible causes. For 
example, in the table for Ockham on page 448 
the real cause could be Z elsewhere and not 
included in ABCD. A variation on this 
weakness is well illustrated by Wilhelm 
Roentgen’s chance discovery of X-rays in 
1895. Roentgen (AD 1825 – 1923) enjoyed some serendipity in his discovery in 
which an activity within a controlled experiment resulted in a fluorescent effect in an 
apparatus having no part in the experiment.  
Perhaps the growing power of observation and experimental method is best 
illustrated through its development by Nicholas of Autrecourt (AD c.1299 – c.1369) 
who like Roger Bacon (1962, V 1 d.9 Ch.2, p. 485) entertained the existence of the 
vacuum (Weinberg, 1965, p. 161). Autrecourt appears to have arrived at Hume’s 
problem before Hume (AD 1711 - 1766): “from the fact that one thing is known to 
exist, it cannot be evidently inferred that another thing exists” (Autrecourt quoted by 
Weinberg, 1948, p. 31). Furthermore, if a natural cause is defined as “that which 
produced in the past as in many cases and up to the present will produce in the 
future, if it remains and is applied” (ibid., p. 69) then there is a problem because by 
“allowing that something was produced as in many cases, it is nevertheless not 
known that it ought to be thus produced in the future” (ibid.). David Hume (AD 1711 
– 1776), who could not solve his own question (Hume, 1902, p. 33, Section IV, Part 
II, Para. 29) of how it might be valid to argue from induction and attendant inference 
of past instances to future generalisations of those inferences, was thus only one step 
 
Zoroaster holds the sphere of the stars and Ptolemy 
is likely to be the one holding the globe of the earth. 
Apelles, modelled on Raphael, looks the viewer in 
the face. Protogenes on the right is modelled on 
either Puragino (AD c.1446 – 1523), or Timoteo Viti 
(AD 1469 – 1523) or Il Sodoma (AD 1477 – 1549). 
 
Source: Detail cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Raffaello. (1509). (artist). The School of Athens. 
(fresco). Stanza della Segnatura, Vatican City: Web 
Gallery of Art. (Raffaello, 1509).  
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away. Hume’s impasse, known now as Hume’s problem, appears to be still playing 
itself out today in the epistemological uncertainties of post-modernism.  
Each of the incremental changes in scientific method discernible through the works 
discussed above is particular in itself, but when taken together they represent a clear 
challenge to Aristotle’s legacy. There were also soon to emerge bitter disputations 
between those proffering the Aristotelian 
or Ptolemaic explanation of the movement 
of the planets and those proffering a new 
explanation put forward by Nicholas 
Copernicus. (AD 1473 – 1543). The 
systems of Aristotle and Ptolemy were 
geocentric or earth-centred while that put 
forward by Copernicus was heliocentric or 
sun-centred. Given that the Church had 
based much of its theology on Aristotle’s 
geocentric cosmology it would be some 
time before the truth of the sun-centred 
system would prevail. This chapter’s 
discussion of the development of 
experimental Science is continued through 
examining the methods used by 
Copernicus (AD 1473 - 1543), and two 
other astronomer-cosmologists, Johannes Kepler (1571 - 1630) and Galileo Galilei 
(AD 1564 - 1642).  
Experimental Science Enters Its Adulthood 
Of the three astronomer-cosmologists, Galileo, more than the others, leans towards 
being modern in the sense of Science understood as practice of a scientific method 
employed under twentieth century positivism. The Modern Age is taken to be the 
period from the 1650s to the 1950s, that is from the time of Thomas Hobbes (AD 
1588 – 1679) say, until the unfolding emergence of post-modernism in the first half 
of the twentieth century. Modern Science is hallmarked by culmination of its 
Saving the Appearances 
 
“The Ptolemaic system as represented in its simplest form. 
Planets were supposed to revolve with uniform speed in a 
small circle, the deferent whose center was near the earth. 
Note that Mercury, Venus and Sun were always in a 
straight line. Attempts to justify actual observations made 
many more circles necessary” (D. Knight, 1965, p. 138). 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington frpm Knight, D. 
(1965). Copernicus: Titan of Modern Astronomy. (p. 138). 
New York: Franklyn Watts. (D. Knight, 1965). 
 451 
 
method, the so-called positive scientific method, which in its own right is a product 
of the Modern Age.  
Galileo (AD 1564 – 1642), who affirmed Aristotle’s view that Science is a two stage 
processcients from observation to induced general principles and back to 
observations of those induced principles and any deductions based upon them, is 
widely recognised as one of the founders of modern Science. In 1609, Galileo 
became the sixth member of the first Scientific Society, the Accademia dei Lincei, 
which was founded in 1603 only to close in 1630.  
Both Copernicus (AD 1473 – 1543) and Kepler (AD 1571 – 1630), like Galileo (AD 
1564 – 1642), were men of devout Christian faith. Copernicus was a little like an 
academic on permanent 
sabbatical with the luxury this 
provided for research 
purposes. Kepler was often 
wretched and poor. Both men 
were wary of the Church—
Copernicus ensured that his 
De Revolutionibus 
(Copernicus, 1952) was 
published posthumously and 
Kepler remained fearful as a 
result of claims that his 
mother was a witch. Both 
Copernicus and Kepler were 
Pythagorean: they believed that mathematical laws governed the universe (Field, 
2007, n.p.). Kepler was a profoundly religious man who believed that truth about 
God’s created real world could be obtained through God-given reason. These beliefs 
allowed his cognitive pursuit of actual planetary paths (Kepler, 1952a, pp. 845 - 
851). Copernicus, too, believed that a philosopher’s “loving duty to seek the truth in 
all things, in so far as God has granted that to human reason; nevertheless I think that 
we should avoid opinions utterly foreign to rightness” (1952, p. 506).  
 
Questions arise about whether the artist used a composite of models 
for his Brahe, and about his artistic licence in depicting instruments.  
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Ender. (c. 1855). (artist). 
Rudolph II and Tycho Brahe at the Hradschin in Prague. (oil on 
canvas). Oxford: Museum of the History of Science. (Ender, c. 
1855). 
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Unlike Galileo, Copernicus and Kepler were part of a working tradition known as 
saving-the-appearances. Under this tradition the observed appearances of the heavens 
were to be saved, that is recorded, within a classical or Aristotelian caveat: “all 
planetary appearances must be accounted for by the uniform motion of the planet in a 
circle with or without the uniform motion of this circle’s centre on another circle 
called its deferent, and so on to any required complication” (Teliaferro, 1952, p. 2). 
Geometrical illustrations of this convention can be found in the Almagest (Ptolemy, 
1952, p. 392) and De Revolutionibus (Copernicus, 1952, p. 769).  
Within this general principle, later called an axiom by Copernicus, all manner of 
theory articulation could take place. And it did: Copernicus’ adoption of a 
heliocentric model brought a new and rigorous application of the latent heliocentric 
ideas of antiquity. Such ideas might, for example, be drawn from Plato’s Timaeus 
(Plato, 1925h, 1952w) and perhaps (Eastwood, 
1992, pp. 233, 256; van der Waerden, 1978, pp. 
167 - 182) from Herakleides of Pontus (BC 390 
– 310). Heath argues that Herakleides had 
postulated that Mars and Venus revolve around 
the sun (T. L. Heath, 1921, pp. 212 - 217) but 
Eastwood urges against heliocentricity of any 
kind in Herakleides (Eastwood, 1992, p. 256).  
Tycho Brahe (AD 1546 – 1601) had the moon 
and sun revolving around the earth and Mercury, 
Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn revolving 
around the sun. Dynamic Diagrams have 
constructed electronic moving models of the 
Copernican and Tychonian systems (Dynamic 
Diagrams, 2010). Both Copernicus and Kepler wrote within the ‘architectonic’ 
convention that man and earth were respectively microcosms or little-heaven mirror 
images of the macrocosm of the heavens. Even Galileo, to some extent, was trapped 
in saving-the-appearances. While Galileo named himself Copernican in a letter he 
wrote to Kepler as early as 1597 or 1598 (Peruzzi, 2010, p. 20) he, Galileo,
Dante’s View of the Universe 
 
Man, a microcosm of the heavens, from an early 
sixteenth century drawing  
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Knight, 
D. (1965). Copernicus: Titan of Modern 
Astronomy. (p. 43). New York: Franklyn Watts. 
(D. Knight, 1965, p. 43)..  
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continued to teach the Ptolemaic earth-centred system until 1610 and his discovery 
of Jupiter’s satellites. Galileo was a man of the Church, having begun his education 
in a Camaldolese order outside of Florence and continuing on in a school in Florence 
run by that order. Both of his 
daughters took Holy Orders 
and Galileo’s remains finally 
found rest in the Basilica of 
Santa Croce in Florence—
another story in itself.  
Saving-the-appearances goes 
back via Ptolemy (c. AD 100 – 
170) to Aristotle. Whereas, in 
respect of the sub-lunar 
domain, Aristotle believed in 
the physical reality of his earth-centred cosmology, Ptolemy preferred to save the 
appearances of planetary motion through using mathematics, that is geometry plus 
observations and calculations, because it bridged the physical 
to the theological, being something that  “in essence falls, as it 
were, between the two” (Ptolemy, 1952, p. 5). As noted both 
Copernicus (AD 1473 - 1543) and Kepler (AD 1571 – 1630) 
worked in this tradition and both, by their own admission, like 
Aristotle (BC 384 – 322), and like Galileo (AD 1564 – 1642), 
believed in physical reality, and the laws of their systems. 
None of the three challenged God as the final cause of the 
objects and perceived relationships among them. 
Interpreting final cause outside of God was still off limits but reasoned-sense access 
to nature had been established under scholasticism. Under this heritage catholic and 
protestant astronomers alike entwined their reason and the laws of nature it produced, 
with theology, their faiths. From this perspective I view Galileo’s altercation with 
church authorities first as a clash between two competing paradigms in astronomy, 
and secondly as a clash between scientific and clerical personalities. I do not treat the 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Matejko. (1838 - 1893). (artist). 
Astronomer Copernicus, Conversation with God. (oil on canvas). Krakow: 
Jagiellonian University Museum. (Matejko, 1838-1893). 
Detail from Matejko 
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altercation as an intended attack by Galileo on the truth or otherwise of revealed faith 
and his relationship with the Church was not always hostile. For example, in 1588 in 
Rome, Galileo gave a celebrated lecture on the location and dimensions of Hell in 
Dante’s Inferno. 
Galileo was also a man of the world: he traded with the military establishment selling 
his telescope to the Venetians as a device that would give hours of advantage over 
the enemy. On the competing paradigms approach it was articulation within this 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic tradition that led to the Copernican split: a battle between 
competing saving-the-appearances and Pythagorean explanations rather than 
differences between two kinds of knowledge, one Science the other faith. It was 
eventually to become something of a political conflict between Science and faith.  
The saving-the-appearances crisis is formalised in Andrew Osiander’s contested 
letter-section of the preface to De Revolutionibus (Osiander, 1952, pp. 505 - 506) and 
can be seen working itself out in Kepler’s so-called sleepwalking discovery of the 
laws of planetary motion, and in a political ménage à trois involving Cardinal Robert 
Bellarmine (AD 1542 – 1621), former Cardinal Inquisitor in the burning of Giordano 
Bruno (AD 1548 - 1600), Galileo, and the condemnation of the Copernican system 
under Pope Paul V (AD 1552 – 1621). Wallis catches a sense in which Copernicus’ 
De Revolutionibus had been received “those who received it favourably numbered 
astronomers and ecclesiastics; those who received it unfavourably numbered 
ecclesiastics and astronomers” (Wallis, 1952, p. 489). Martin Luther’s comment 
catches the complexity of literal interpretation of conflicting parts of the scriptures: 
“The fool will upset the whole Science of astronomy, but as the Holy Scripture 
shows it was the sun and not the earth which Joshua ordered to stand still” (Luther 
quoted in Wallis, 1952, p. 490). The Catholic Church, which Luther opposed, had 
acknowledged Job’s explanation of God as the one “who shaketh the earth out of her 
place [italics added] and the pillars thereof tremble” Job 9.6 (Holy Bible, 1932, my 
square brackets). This difference of opinion was a difference between theologians 
within a reasoned theology that had grounded itself in Aristotelian cosmology.  
An examination of the roles of Osiander (AD 1498 – 1552) and Copernicus (AD 
1473 - 1543), in playing out the battle between Ptolemy’s appearances and 
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Pythagoras’ laws, can, in hindsight, bring understanding about the nature of the 
constrained astronomy they may be said to have been practicing. Osiander explains 
saving-the-appearances thus:  
For it is the job of the astronomer to use painstaking and skilled observation in 
gathering together the history of the celestial movements, and then—since he cannot 
by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these movements—to think up or 
construct whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases such that, by assumption of these 
causes those same causes can be calculated from the principles of geometry for the 
past and for the future too. (Copernicus, 1952, p. 505)  
His final sentence adds some humour: 
And as far as hypotheses go, let no one expect anything is certain, lest, if 
anyone take as true that which has been constructed for another use, he go away 
from this discipline a bigger fool than when he came to it. Farewell. 
(Copernicus, 1952, p. 506)  
Copernicus’ death in 1543 precludes posterity from knowing the extent to which 
Osiander’s clever appeal to a patron’s vanity may have made life easier for him, 
Copernicus. All the same, Copernicus makes no pretence about the realities he 
believes he is investigating. It is very clear from his feisty Preface and Dedication to 
Pope Paul 111 (Copernicus, 1952, pp. 506 - 509) that Copernicus has attempted to 
capture the truth about the movement of actual existing objects, that he works from 
observations of those objects, and that in no sense does he allow that he is 
constructing, as he pleases, a world to investigate. In the preface he reminds His 
Holiness that it is rumoured that there is “no medicine for the bite of a sycophant” 
(ibid, p. 509) and appeals to him, mathematician to mathematician, for protection 
against those who might attack him, those who due to “natural stupidity” (ibid, p. 
506) hold in philosophy the position that “drones hold amongst bees” (ibid, p. 506).  
Mathematics is written for mathematicians and among them, if I am not mistaken, my 
labours will be seen to contribute something to the ecclesiastical Commonwealth, the 
principate of which your Holiness now holds. (Copernicus, 1952, p. 509)  
Copernicus informs His Holiness that the diverse disagreement between 
mathematicians about the “form of the world and the certain commensurability of its 
parts” (ibid p. 507) results primarily from their method and that had they “followed 
sure principles” (ibid p. 507) they would have been able to know that “if the 
hypotheses they assumed were not false, everything which followed from the 
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hypotheses would have been verified without fail” (ibid, pp. 507 - 508) and that as a 
consequence:  
philosophers, who in other respects had made a very careful scrutiny of the least 
details of the world, had discovered no sure scheme for the movements of the 
machinery of the world, which had been built for us by the Best and Most Orderly 
Workman of all. (Copernicus, 1952, p. 508) 
Copernicus ironically notes that he thought that he too, like others of false method 
before him, might be allowed to “construct circles as [they he] pleased in order to 
demonstrate astral phenomena” (ibid, p. 508, my square brackets, my strikethrough).  
Kepler’s role in the controversy of saving the appearances is told by Arthur Koestler 
(AD 1905 - 1983) in The Sleepwalkers (Koestler, 1989, pp. 227 - 411). Koestler 
(ibid., pp. 11, 340) likens Copernicus (AD 1473 - 
1543), and Kepler (AD 1473 - 1543) to 
sleepwalkers—astronomers who discovered 
correct laws by incorrect methods and reasoning. 
In this process, successive mistakes cancel one 
another out, or applications of false premises or 
beliefs do not prevent discovery of correct 
scientific natural laws.  
For Kepler, faith and Science are not mutually 
exclusive. There is no faith and Science divide 
but rather a physical world was there to know by 
a variety of means, including through the senses 
and understanding. God’s world was knowable and, inter alia, Kepler, the 
sleepwalker, used Pythagorean regular solids and so-called harmonies of the spheres, 
as well as Tycho Brahe’s (AD 1546 – 1601) observations, to make his discoveries. 
Still, the times were troublesome: Kepler was Lutheran and in the 1500’s the 
Catholics had turned the inquisition against the Protestants. Like Osiander before 
him, Kepler was prudent to agree that his cosmology might just as easily be regarded 
as a construct. This is best seen in his To the Reader (Kepler, 1952c, pp. 845 - 851) 
preface in Epitome of Copernican Astronomy (Kepler, 1952a) in which, after making 
sure to align himself with Aristotle, Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, Kepler states: 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Anonymous. (c. 1510). (artist). (possibly oil on 
wood). Nicolavs Copernicvs. (possibly sixteenth 
century). Presently at the Town Hall, Torun, 
Poland: Iconography of Ptolemy's Portrait. 
(Anonymous., circa 1510). 
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I grant that this work of mine, the Harmonies, is nothing except as it were, a certain 
picture of the edifice of astronomy, and though it may be erased at the pleasure of him 
who spits on it, nevertheless the house called astronomy stands by itself. (Kepler, 
1952a, p. 851) 
This now-you-have-it–now-you-don’t admission of the reality of the universe and its 
knowable laws is typical of the read-what-you-will-between-the-lines method of 
survival required by the context and times. Again, Copernicus and Kepler believed in 
the independent existence of the physical world they investigated. Copernicus 
established the truth of the sun-centred system and Kepler formulated laws of 
revolution of the planets. 
As mathematicians they 
were certain of the natural 
truth expressed in their 
laws.  
Galileo’s role in saving the 
appearances controversy is 
known. In his 1616 Letter 
to the Grand Duchess 
(Favaro, 1968, pp. 309 - 
348; Galileo, 1616, n.p.; 
1957b, pp. 173 - 216) he argued for non-literal interpretation of the Bible in cases 
where facts about the physical world known through mathematics contradict literal 
interpretation. Even his statement in this letter to the effect that he held “the sun to be 
situated motionless in the centre of the revolution of the celestial orbs while the earth 
revolves about the sun” (ibid., n. p.) was known to the Inquisition but it did not bring 
him down. Rather, his downfall came when, after gaining permission from Florence 
rather than Rome, he published his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of 
the World - Ptolemaic and Copernican (Galileo, 1661, 2001). In this book, he placed 
Pope Urban VIII’s views in the mouth of Simplicio, the ridiculed dogmatic 
Aristotelian discussant. 
 
Source: (Possibly Jan Brueghel the Elder, circa 1622-29, and/or his studio). 
(artist). Art Meets Science (J. Gorman, 2009). Cropped by Ian Eddington from 
Gorman. (2009). The Linder Gallery. (oil on copper). Private Collection, New 
York. Gorman argues that the male qua Science is modelled on Kepler. 
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Action to bring Galileo before the Inquisition appears to have then come quickly and 
it was not until 1992 that the Catholic Church admitted that “errors had been made in 
the case of Galileo” (John Paul II, 1992, II 12).  
Like Kepler, Galileo shared a belief that God-given reason could provide access to 
truth about the real existing world. 
Galileo, who does “not feel 
obliged to believe that the same 
God who endowed us with sense, 
reason, and intellect intended us to 
forgo their use” (Galileo, 1616, n. 
p.), was forthright in his 
statements. 
For example, in a margin note on 
his personal copy of the Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief 
Systems of the World - Ptolemaic 
and Copernican (Galileo, 1661, 
2001), Galileo clearly indicates his belief that the route to objective certainty begins 
with sense knowledge:  
And who can doubt that it will lead to the worst disorders when minds created 
free by God are compelled to submit slavishly to an outside will? When we are 
told to deny our senses and subject them to the whim of others? When people 
devoid of whatsoever competence are made judges over experts and are 
granted authority to treat them as they please? These are the novelties which 
are apt to bring about the ruin of commonwealths and the subversion of the 
state. (Galileo quoted in J. R. Newman, 1956, p. 733)  
Galileo is in no doubt about the extent to which humans can know nature’s laws: 
SALV. [Representing the views of Galileo himself.] You put the point very sharply, 
and to answer the objection it is best to have recourse to a philosophical distinction 
and to say that the human understanding can be taken in two modes, the intensive or 
the extensive. Extensively, that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, which 
are infinite, the human understanding is as nothing even if it understands a thousand 
propositions; for a thousand in relation to infinity is zero. But taking man's 
understanding intensively, in so far as this term denotes understanding some 
proposition perfectly, I say that the human intellect does understand some of them 
 
Source for left picture: Either Domenico Robusti also known as 
Tintoretto (died AD 1594) or Apollodoro (AD 1531 – 1612) , artists. 
Cropped by Ian Eddington from Gallileus Gallileus Mathus. (1602 - 
07). (oil on canvas). London: National Maritime Museum. The image 
catches Galileo in his early forties as Master of Mathematics at the 
University of Padua. It is the earliest known portrait of Galileo. 
Source for right picture: (Cecconi, 1879). (artist). Cropped by Ian 
Eddington from Sustermans of Galileo /Copied by N. Ceco [mi (?)] / 
1879. (oil on canvas). London: British Maritime Museum. The 
painting was made in 1879 as a copy of the original made by 
Sustermans in 1636, which now hangs in the Uffizi, Firenze. The 
painting captures Galileo during his period of house arrest which 
began in 1633. Galileo died in 1642. 
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perfectly, and thus in these it has as much absolute certainty as Nature itself has. Of 
such are the mathematical sciences alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in which 
the Divine intellect indeed knows infinitely more propositions, since it knows all. But 
with regard to those few which the human intellect does understand, I believe that its 
knowledge equals the Divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in 
understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no greater sureness. (Galileo 
quoted in Drake, 2001, p. 103, my square brackets)  
Consequently, on the basis of a note written in his old age on the margin of his own 
copy of the dialogues, he is confident to advise the clerics:  
Take note, theologians, that in your desire to make matters of faith out of propositions 
relating to the fixity of sun and earth you run the risk of eventually having to condemn 
as heretics those who would declare the earth to stand still and the sun to change 
position - eventually, I say, at such a time as it might be proved that the earth moves 
and the sun stands still. (Galileo quoted in Drake, 2001, p. 75) 
These quotations demonstrate Galileo’s trust of the sense faculty and God-given 
human reason. There is no doubt about the key which opens reasoned understanding 
of God’s natural world: 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open 
to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend 
the language and read the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language 
of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures 
without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without 
these one is wandering in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1957a, pp. 237 - 238) 
The Assayer (Galileo, 1623/2015) from which the quote comes was published in 
1623, the fifty-ninth year of Galileo’s life. Galileo’s most intense mathematical work 
appears in his Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning the Two 
New Sciences (Galileo, 1952) a work written after his trial 1633, and sometime after 
the death of his daughter, Virginia, Sister Maria Celeste, in 1634, that is, a work 
written under house arrest during the last 8 years of his life.  
Many aspects of Galileo’s life continue to be of interest to scholars including his 
scientific method (De Santillana, 1976; Drake, 1957, 1999, 2001, 2003; Gower, 
1997; Hergenhahn, 2009; Machamer, 1998). While there is general agreement 
amongst these scholars that the origins of modern Science can be found in Galileo’s 
work, there is a wide variety of opinion about the specific nature of his method 
(Wisan, 1979, p. 1). It is clear from his physics that Galileo distinguishes non-
scientific explanations from scientific explanations. The key to this understanding is 
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to be found in Galileo’s conviction earlier discussed that the laws of nature are 
written in mathematics and his complementary assertion that therefore only those 
aspects of substance that can be counted or measured in some way are pertinent to 
understanding of nature and its laws.  
Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I 
immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as 
being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given 
time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and 
as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such 
a substance by any stretch of my imagination. (Galileo, 1957a, p. 274)  
And of other Aristotelian accidents: 
But that it [a substance or body] must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, 
and of sweet or foul odour, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary 
accompaniments. Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided 
would probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, odors, 
colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place 
them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence, if the living 
creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. But 
since we have imposed upon them special names, distinct from those of the other and 
real qualities mentioned previously, we wish to believe that they really exist as 
actually different from those. (Galileo, 1957a, p. 277, my square brackets) 
Size, shape, motion, rest, and number are objective accidents existing independently 
of mankind—they are Galileo’s primary qualities. Colour, odour, taste sound and 
tactile properties became subjective and exist nowhere independent of mankind. We 
have met a different classification of such phenomena in Aristotle’s categories on 
page 207. Galileo separated the scientific from the non-scientific by limiting the 
domain of physics to primary qualities. Aristotelian final cause is thus expelled from 
Science as physics but this should not be interpreted as a rejection of God, now the 
final cause of all, on Galileo’s part.  
There is agreement that Galileo’s attacks on Aristotle’s ideas (Butterfield, 1959, p. 
80) did not extend to Aristotle’s method of induction and deduction (Losee, 1972, p. 
54). Galileo extended induction by allowing intuition and idealisation some play as is 
evidenced by free fall in vacuums, ideal pendulums, and friction-free surfaces. The 
applied and experimental nature of his work is evidenced by his contributions to 
ballistics (P. L. Rose, 1968) and his celebrated experiments with inclined planes, 
motion of other sorts, pendulums and water clock measurements. Galileo’s praxis 
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encompasses observation, induction and deduction, applied mathematics, 
experimentation with apparatus and applying theory in the manufacture of 
instruments (Drake, 2003, pp. 52, 402 - 404).   
Evangelista Torricelli (AD 1608 – 1647) gives a sense of the manner in which 
experimental Science was becoming applied Science (Torricelli, 1919). He had been 
further developing Galileo’s mathematical explanation of motion and since Galileo’s 
trial had been fearful of his former association with Galileo. Torricelli dissembles in 
order to avoid controversy and in September AD 1647 writes to Vincenzio Renieri 
(AD 1606 – 1647) that “many times, to avoid controversies, ... I have deliberately 
protested repeatedly that I write for philosophers rather than bombardiers” (Festa, 
2007, n.p.; Segre, 1983, pp. 489 - 499), bombardiers being those who would actually 
rely on the truth of the laws of trajectory to hit their targets. Renieri, member of the 
Olivetan order, friend to whom Galileo entrusted the updating of his tables of the 
motions of Jupiter’s satellites, died prematurely at Pisa where he was Professor of 
Mathematics and teacher of Greek. 
Newton (AD 1643 - 1727) entered life shortly after Galileo’s departure from it, and 
in his maturity became a member of the Royal Society of London founded in 1662. 
The Royal Society of London followed by the Academie des Sciences, Paris, founded 
in 1666, were the next scientific societies to be established after the short lived 
Accademia dei Lincei founded in 1603. In Gulliver’s Travels Jonathan Swift (AD 
1667 - 1745) hilariously parodies the every manner of experimentation carried out in 
such academies (Swift, 1726/1801, pp. 107 - 115). He also gives a humorous insight 
into a battle between ancient and modern ideas in his Battle of the Books (Swift, 
1890). The savants of Galileo’s day were still known as natural philosophers as late 
as the 1770s. The word Science in the modern sense of “a connected body of 
demonstrated truths” (OED, 1970a, p. 221) did not enter the English language until 
circa 1725 (ibid., p. 221 where Watte Logic II 9 is cited). The name scientist is 
recorded as entering the English language as late as 1840: “We need very much a 
name to describe a cultivator of Science in general. I should incline to call him a 
scientist” (Whewell cited in OED, 1970a, pp. 223) .  
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The argument in the preceding paragraph is not just a play with words. The 
emergence of modern Science took some political urging and it was only towards the 
end of his life that Francis Bacon (AD 1561 -1626) argued in his Novum Organum 
(F. Bacon, 1952b) that natural philosophy should concern itself with natural causes 
and not final causes, that it should search for an improved method of enquiry, and 
that it should be institutionalised in the service of the state towards advancement of 
learning and welfare of humans. It was not until the publication of the Principia 
Mathematica (Newton, 1952a) in 1687 that Newton subsequently set down four 
“rules of reasoning in philosophy” (Newton, 1952a, pp. 270 - 271), precursors for 
modern positive scientific method, and in so doing contributed to a process of 
definition of Science as it has since become to be depicted in early chapters of many 
school Science texts of our times. In such texts, Science is often explained as that 
activity which proceeds as follows: (1) observe, (2) hypothesise, (3) test, test,…., test 
the hypothesis, and accept or reject it on the basis of repeated verification or of 
falsification, (4) give the accepted hypotheses only tentative status as theory. Newton 
is one of the giants of Science but in this section of the enquiry I discuss only his 
“rules for reasoning in science” (Newton, 1952a, pp. 270 - 271) and move on.  
NEWTON’S RULES OF REASONING IN PHILOSOPHY 
Experimental Science and its Method at the Dawn of the Modern Age 
Newton’s rules of reasoning in philosophy are contained in Table 49 and in operating 
them he “framed [feigned] no hypothesis” (Newton, 1952a, p. 371; 1972, p. 825, my 
square brackets), a hypothesis in this case being something not deduced from the 
phenomena being investigated and therefore having no place in experimental 
philosophy.  
Newton’s scientific method continues to be the subject of study (R. M. Blake, 1933; 
Butts, 1968; Gauch, 2003; Harper, 2011). Like Grosseteste (AD died c. 1252) and 
Roger Bacon (AD 1214 – 1294) before him he confirmed Aristotelian inductive-
deductive procedure calling his method of composition and resolution the ‘method of 
analysis and synthesis’ (Mamiani, 2001, pp. 8 - 11) but morphological hindsight 
attempts to differentiate between these terms can muddy the waters (Ritchey, 1991, 
pp. 21 - 41). Newton’s development of his method of composition ad resolution is 
best illustrated in Opticks (Newton, 1704) which is an outcome of his interest in the
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 “celebrated phaenomena of the colours” (Newton, 1902, p. 461).  
First, he proves by experiment (Newton, 1704, pp. 13 - 17) “that lights which differ 
in Colour, differ also in degrees of Refrangibility [refractivity]” (ibid., p. 13, my 
square brackets). Next, in a one prism experiment (ibid., pp. 18 – 45) he induces a 
proposition that “the Light of the Sun consists of Rays differently Refrangible” 
[refractive]” (ibid., p. 18, my square brackets). Using inductions from this analysis, 
he proceeds to synthesise consequences that would have to hold if indeed sunlight 
consists of colours caused by the differing refrangibilities of its component ‘rays’. 
For example, if his theory is to hold then “all homogeneal Light has its proper Colour 
answering to its degree of refrangibility, and that Colour cannot be changed by 
reflexions and refractions” (ibid., p. 87) and he goes on to prove it in a two prism 
experiment.  
Opticks (Newton, 1952b) is a stunning work and is formally written up not unlike a 
practical classroom experiment might be written up and it is difficult to read a 
simplistic interpretation of a method of analysis and synthesis from it. His intuitive 
genius gets in the way. In spite of Newton’s own claims that he also used the method 
in formulating his theory of universal gravitation, there must have been, in addition 
to observation, some modern kind of hypothesising which enabled him to make 
working assumptions about mass being concentrated at the centre (Newton, 1952a, 
Table 49: Newton’s Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy 
 
 
(1) We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their 
appearances. 
 
(2) Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes. 
 
(3) The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to 
belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all 
bodies whatsoever. 
 
(4) In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from 
phænomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, 
till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to 
exceptions. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Newton, I. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. (pp. 
270 – 271). In R. M. Hutchings (Ed.). (1952). Newton Huygens. (Vol. 34, pp. xi - 372). Chicago: William 
Benton. (Newton, 1952a, pp. 270 - 271). 
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pp. 279 - 288) and frictionless surfaces. Newton derived God a posteriori 
(Chittenden, 1846, pp. 35 - 36). 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, I have traced an ongoing development of a fledgling experimental 
Science found in Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) through to the seventeenth century to 
publication of Newton’s Principia Mathematica in 1687. During this time, Christian 
faith Ethics held its ground against real or imagined challenges. Until the times of 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679), whom I 
discuss in subsequent chapters, Polis remained a city of God. Theology had come to 
allow God’s presence in nature, and then-called experimenters sanctioned their 
method by deference to revealed truth and the efficacy of experimental Science for 
articulation of God’s natural truths. The methodology of Science had changed 
dramatically and could no longer be simply understood as syllogistic reasoning. 
Nuance brought to enquiry key terms by re-emerging experimental science is 
captured in Table 50 which has been assembled from chapter content.  
There must of course be a caveat to Table 50. As earlier revealed in this enquiry the 
meanings of the terms Science, Ethics and Polis are captured from their esoteric 
dimensions. Whereas until this point the esoteric dimensions identified could be 
discerned at some distance from their exoteric counterparts, in the case of 
experimental Science, it being often the kind of Science in which individual objects 
are held and manipulated, the link is more direct. It is consequently more difficult, 
but not impossible, to imagine experimental-Science thinking without the presence of 
actual physical objects involved in the experiment. Such was the difficulty in 
discussing Table 10 on page 179 in the case of experimental Science in antiquity.  
Table 50: Key Terms Nuance—Return of Experimental Science 
 
Intrusion: The Fledgling Re-emergence of Experimental Science in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries 
Descriptor Method Sphere of Operations Constraints 
Science 
Various cognitive research methodology 
frameworks and conventions known by 
names such as resolution and composition, 
aptitudinal union, prerogatives of 
experimental Science, method of 
differences in falsification or verification of 
the findings of the theoretical sciences, 
modus tollens, Kepler’s sleepwalking, 
Galileo’s inductive-deductive method  and 
Newton’s rules of reasoning in philosophy.   
The intellectual virtues at 
work as the art of practical 
science in search of true 
causes. 
Cautious regard for 
revealed truth together 
with the early infancy of 
experimental procedure 
and its attendant cognitive 
methodologies 
themselves. 
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Mediate reflection, and therefore somewhat esoteric reflection, is though, not 
necessarily incompatible with experimental Science and cannot easily be denied an 
important role in it. The caveat notwithstanding, Table 50 clearly signals an arrival of 
advances in cognitive methodology in Science. Key terms nuance occasioned by re-
emerging experimental Science challenges the utility of the enquiry’s esoteric-
exoteric divide methodology. Table 51 carries key terms nuance to articulation of the 
Thesis Proposition Statements. 
In the next chapter I discuss nuance and changing interrelationships amongst 
Science, Ethics and Polis through engagement with works by Francis Bacon (AD 
1561 – 1626). 
Table 51: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Return of 
Experimental Science 
 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter 
Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance 
Brought to Interpretation of Thesis 
Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with 
arriving recognition of a binding sentiment of 
Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is divine and 
for whom knowledge is power, which recognition 
provides an alternative to a long held standpoint 
that binding sentiment of Polis is situated in 
natural social instinct implanted in mankind for 
whom virtue is some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental Science 
Not applicable.  
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics 
from scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in 
its new form as conditional fact, Science 
becoming valued in its own right for direct 
benefits it could bring to society and state. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental Science  
Experimental Science returns and the 
age of reason begins. Science 
understood as syllogistic demonstration 
is becoming replaced by Science as 
induction and deduction within the rules 
for reasoning in natural philosophy. 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law 
of the state.  
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental Science  
Not applicable.  
Integrating Summary of Part Three 
Experimental Science returns and the age of reason begins. Science understood as syllogistic demonstration is becoming 
replaced by Science as induction and deduction within the rules for reasoning in natural philosophy. 
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Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Dawning of a Modern Age 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I suggest that indications of a dawning modern age can in part be 
found in works by Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
which contain a new understanding of Science and its 
method and a nuance in terms usage so different as to 
challenge received Aristotelian political philosophy.  
Bacon served Elizabeth I (AD 1533 – 1603) and 
James VI of Scotland as James I of England (AD 1566 
– 1625) soberly to his own career advantage 
eventually falling from grace upon confessing to 
accepting gifts and bribes. His better-known work on 
Science, published in his mature years, is contained in Advancement of Learning 
1605, New Atlantis written circa 1624 – 25, published posthumously in 1627, and 
Novum Organum 1629. After his fall in 1621 Bacon engaged himself and others in 
translating his works into Latin, believing that English as a language would not last.  
Bacon’s Advancement of Learning (1902a) contains his organisation of knowledge 
and classification of the Sciences. His Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c) outlines 
his Scientific method. His moral philosophy is contained in Book VII of the De 
Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 1863c, pp. 191 - 230). Although Bacon would 
treat Ethics, politics and logic inductively New Organon (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 159), 
Ethics qua moral philosophy remains for him a servant of theology Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 224) although to a lesser extent in his so-called 
Architect of Fortune Ethics (F. Bacon, 1898b, pp. 319, 330, 335). Bacon’s cognitive 
Polis is to be found in New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1909a) in which work Science is 
organised on a plan which differs from one detectable in Plato’s mythical Atlantis of 
Timaeus (Plato, 1925h, 1952w). Other works by Bacon relevant to the purpose of 
this chapter are cited during its progress. 
 
 
Source: (Vanderbank, circa 1731 or after 
c.1618) after an unknown artist. Cropped 
by Ian Eddington from Francis Bacon, 
Viscount St Albans. (oil on canvas). 
London: National Portrait Gallery. 
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I first attempt a no-fault-no-blame engagement with scholarly commentary about 
Bacon and some of his works in order to catch a first glimpse of what I conjecture to 
be his enigmatic persona, and then proceed to a more direct investigation of his 
Science, Ethics and Polis, sometimes in the process returning to that working 
glimpse to check and balance qualifications being made.  
BACON: A DISPUTED AND ENIGMATIC FIGURE 
Ben Jonson (AD 1572 – 1637), Bacon’s, “my man John” (P. Dawkins, 2004, p. 163), 
one of Bacon’s “good pens” (P. Dawkins, 2004, pp. 288 - 289; Tennison, 1679, p. 
60) “which forsake me not ” (P. Dawkins, 2004, pp. 163, 181), pronounced Bacon’s 
Novum Organum, then receiving poor press, a book “Qui longum note scriptori 
proroget ævum [that is a book ‘which will secure a 
long age for the known writer (Horat. De art 
poetica)’]” (Jonson, 1892, pp. 28, 86, my square 
brackets). Jonson states that: 
… my conceit of his person was never 
increased toward him by his place or honours; 
but I have and do reverence him for the 
greatness that was only proper to himself, in 
that he seemed to me ever, by his work, one of 
the greatest men, and most worthy of 
admiration, that had been in many ages. 
(Jonson, 1892, p. 28) 
There is a prefatory compliment to Bacon made by 
his contemporary Tobie Matthew in an Italian 
translation of Bacon’s essays (Matthew, 1618, pp. 
2 - 10) but Matthew, Bacon’s longest friend, is 
named by Bacon as his alter ego, another I, 
“another myself” (Mathew & Calthorp, 1907, p. 
299). Bacon’s eloquence was celebrated in the public domain during the century of 
his death as the reproduced line engraving on page 467 attests. Jonson however, who 
had helped Bacon in translating his works into Latin after his, Bacon’s, fall, was 
writing after Bacon’s death, but this fact does not necessarily silence the possibility 
of a-feigning-for-favour-with-Charles I motive on Jonson’s part. Jonson also praises
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from a line 
engraving by W. Faithorne contained in 
Blount, T. (1654). The Academy of Eloquence. 
(NPG D25389). London: National Portrait 
Gallery. (Faithorne, 1654, n. p.) 
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Bacon’s gravity, wit, eloquence and brevity of speech (Jonson, 1905, p. 28), as does 
Bacon’s clergyman (Rawley, 1670; 1869, p. 46), who compares him to Julius Caesar 
for his attention to 
advancement of learning. 
Yet soon after the deaths 
of James I (1625), and 
Bacon (1626), it is 
possible that Jonson may 
have satirised Bacon 
across his masque 
Neptune’s Celebration for 
the Returne of Albion 
(Jonson, 2010) and its 
expanded version as The 
Staple of the News 
(Jonson, 1905) by projecting him as Pennyboy Senior associated with Lickfinger a 
cook—Coke’s name is pronounced Cook and of Coke more later. Whether Johnson’s 
conjectured satire was to give Bacon a posthumous chance to defend himself against 
common belief that as Attorney-General and/or Lord Chancellor he “had been 
responsible by his advice for the unconstitutional imprisonments of Members of 
Parliament and Puritans by King James” (Goldsworthy, 1931, p. 54), or to hint to 
Charles I to be aware of the people’s dislike of his father’s undue use of arbitrary 
powers (ibid., p. 60), or, as questioned, simply to advance his own position at court, 
all remain matters of speculation in so far as they provide insights into Bacon’s 
character, or for that matter Jonson’s accuracy in character assessment. Yet while 
there is little doubt that, in so far as Bacon’s writing style is concerned, especially his 
essays and aphorisms, Jonson caught Bacon’s writing abilities accurately, his attitude 
towards Bacon, if contention of his satirising of him is upheld, is symptomatic of 
enigma surrounding perception of Bacon and his work, which enigma appears to fog 
scholarly interpretation to present times. 
For example, Bacon the man is reported a little too willing and clever in his 
involvement in a case against Essex (Robert Devereux) his former friend and 
 
 
Source: Part of Folio 1r cropped by Ian Eddington from Rawley, W. (1620 – 
1640). (Folio 1r) Commonplace Book. Manuscript 2086. London: Lambeth Palace 
Library. (Rawley, 1620-1660). The first lines are in cipher to protect their content 
—numerals 1 to 5 represent vowels while Greek characters are used for the 
consonants—and concealed in these lines is Bacon’s “justest judge” statement not 
published by Rawley. 
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benefactor (Emerson, 1959, pp. 323 - 324; Gajda, 2012, p. 10; Strachey, 1928, pp. 76 
- 82). McIntyre (1909, p. 321) reports Bacon’s admission to 28 charges of accepting 
gifts and bribes. Some defend Bacon’s gift and bribe taking on the basis of claims 
that accepting gifts and bribes was a common practice amongst “basket justices” (C. 
Knight, 1857, p. 380) of the time (Montagu, 1834b, p. 10). Macaulay does not and in 
no uncertain terms. (Macaulay, 1837b, pp. 317 - 320). Montagu discusses each of the 
charges in turn (Montagu, 1834a, pp. cclx - cclxix). Knight finds Bacon qua self-
proclaimed “justest judge that was in England these past fifty years” (F. Bacon, 
1826, p. 518; Rawley, 1620-1660, Folio 1r; Spedding, Ellis, & Heath, 1869, p. 44) to 
be sitting “on the highest branch of … [a] rotten tree (C. Knight, 1857, p. 380, my 
square brackets) and depicts a public and parliament intent on cutting it down (ibid., 
pp. 380 – 381). Coke and Villiers he says cannot be blamed for Bacon’s downfall.  
Both Spedding (1878, pp. 626 - 637) and Fowler (1881, p. 27), the admitted charges 
notwithstanding, argue that Bacon’s self-assessment of his status as a judge is 
probably correct, but both their and Bacon’s statements are devalued in proportion to 
the truth or otherwise of that best-of-a-possibly-rotten-lot in that tree of justices 
previously mentioned. There are ifs and buts at every turn in openly admitted 
evidential uncertainties underlying the impressive argument of Spedding—Fowler 
largely agrees with Spedding—and Coke, Bacon’s rival in love and law, is named 
proud, avaricious, and loquacious (C. W. Johnson, 1837, pp. 367, 368), his 
loquaciousness men rumour, so says Bacon, “more fitting a pleader than a judge” 
(Extract from a letter by Bacon quoted in C. W. Johnson, 1837, p. 362). Johnson 
provides a direct comparison of Bacon and Coke (C. W. Johnson, 1837, pp. 367 - 
370), pronouncing neither the better of the other and provides examples of 
favourable opinions expressed by Coke’s contemporaries about his competence as a 
judge. Spedding also provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of each of 
them (Spedding, 1861, pp. 231 - 232). Ironically though, history records that Coke, 
one by accounts not gifted with Bacon’s reported obsequiousness, nor equally 
celebrated for his own language skills, nor necessarily permanently favoured at court, 
were there ever such a person so-favoured in Elizabeth’s court, was yet a person 
whose legacy of substantial legal reforms and written jurisprudential commentary 
(Coke, 1644, 1653, 1798, 1853) is linked to revision of the third and fourth 
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amendments of the Constitution of the United States (Holland, 2013, pp. 172 - 173), 
drafting of the sixteenth amendment on taxation (Jensen, 2014, p. 812), and 
provision of precedent for defence of common law in Australia (A. M. Dillon, 2005, 
p. 386). But now Coke’s legacy is under question he being reported a willing urger of 
torturing for some thirty-four years prior to his naming it illegal in his Institutes 
(Coke, 1644, 1653, 1798, 1853) some two years after Bacon’s death (Mathews, 
1996, p. 285) which raises again the relativity of the justest judge claim. 
Notwithstanding Bacon’s gift and bribe taking and Coke’s own questionable 
behaviour in respect of torturing, both Bacon and Coke may, enigmatically, be said 
to have left considerable legacies.  
Bribe-taking and probity in judgement, strictly speaking, are different things so that 
bribe-taking, although abhorrent in judges by present Western standards, remains a 
surrogate measure of probity. Although Montagu warns that judging a person alive in 
one era by the perceived standards of another era is a questionable practice 
(Montagu, 1834b, p. cccxxxiv), Macaulay provides evidence of the people’s support 
of preaching against bribe taking even before Bacon’s time (Macaulay, 1837b, p. 
318). In New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1952a), written after Bacon’s fall, the new arrivals 
waiting in the Strangers’ House are twice informed that something like bribe-taking, 
being twice-paid, is not condoned (ibid., 200 - 201). Condoning torture also remains 
a troublesome referent when interpreted from hindsight on a basis of expressions 
against it made by large numbers of people in subsequent and presumably, but not 
necessarily, more enlightened eras. But torture is torture and if it involves maiming 
or death it embraces, in Aristotle’s view at least, the absolutely bad.  
The decade leading up to Bacon’s fall contains some of his better career years, for 
example, Attorney General 1613, Lord Keeper 1617, Lord Chancellor and Baron 
Verulam 1618. Relatively speaking these years were also years of financial ease. 
Perhaps the New Atlantis in a reflection of a once-held blueprint hope of one recently 
in power and now in lost opportunity in respect of the end—dare it be said, final 
cause (sic)—of his instauration. Perhaps the twice-paid line is a celebration of an 
experienced freedom from a hitherto relatively privileged impecuniousness and 
reliance on gifts, perhaps a rationalisation for his own actions in a less than perfect 
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world, or perhaps an expression of a genuine abhorrence of the practice. It is not easy 
to know. The speculations contained in this paragraph are not based on acceptance of 
an assumption that the narrator of New Atlantis is Bacon’s persona. For example, 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (Swift, 1726/1801) and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (Defoe, 
1719/1868) are similarly narrated and works of this genre dine out, in part, on 
excitement and mystery about the unknown and fantasy engendered by great 
exploratory voyages of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the 1960s 
manufacturers, artists and musicians similarly sold a multitude of products named 
after satellites and space craft in the wake of the explorative excitement they 
generated. New Atlantis is discussed further beginning on page 559. 
Opinion presenting Bacon qua lawyer as knowledgeable in law is counterbalanced 
by Elizabeth I’s view—whether based on her own cognisance or on the opinion of 
advisors—communicated to Bacon by Essex that “you had a great wit, and an 
excellent gift of speech, and much other good learning. But in law she rather thought 
that you could make show to the uttermost of your knowledge, than that you were 
deep” (Spedding, 1861, p. 297). But then Elizabeth’s court often appears not unlike 
the State of Denmark, and in 1593 Bacon had given offence to Elizabeth by his 
opposition in Parliament to subsidies favoured by 
the Queen. As well, the Cecils and other advisors 
to Elizabeth were against him (Macaulay, 1837a, 
pp. 20 - 21).  
After his death, but in Rawley’s seventeenth-
century lifetime, Bacon appears respected in 
England and abroad (Rawley, 1869, pp. 53 - 55). 
Rawley’s evidence is soft, limited to a few 
examples, all of which except for one mention of 
Advancement of Learning, involve Bacon’s essays and historical writings and not his 
contribution to Science. Bacon’s essays were a celebrated hit and as earlier indicated 
Bacon’s better-known Science came late so that Rawley himself may have been too 
early in time for a full appraisal. Looking back to the century of Bacon’s death and 
the following eighteenth century Peroz-Ramoz (1991, pp. 577 – 588) and Rees, 
 
Hume on Bacon 
If we consider him merely as an author and 
philosopher, the light in which we view him at 
present, though very estimable, he was yet 
inferior to his cotemporary Galileo, perhaps 
even to Kepler. Bacon pointed out at a 
distance the road to true philosophy: Galileo 
both pointed it out to others, and made himself 
considerable advances in it. The Englishman 
was ignorant of geometry: The Florentine 
renewed that science, excelled in it, and was 
the first that applied it, together with 
experiment, to natural philosophy. The former 
rejected, with the most positive disdain, the 
system of Copernicus: The latter fortified it 
with new proofs, derived both from reason and 
the senses … . (Hume, 1754/1778, p. 153) 
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(2002, pp. 379 - 394) accept that Bacon’s now-contested reputation as the father of 
experimental Science was in vogue.  
Hooke (AD 1635 – 1703) offers a qualified acknowledgement of Bacon’s 
contribution to development 
of scientific method: “Of this 
engine [scientific method] no 
Man except the 
incomparable Verulam, has 
had any Thoughts, and he 
has indeed promoted it to a 
very good pitch” (Hooke, 
1705, p. 6, my square 
brackets). The Scotsman 
Hume (AD 1711 – 1776) is 
more circumspect as the 
content of the accompanying 
information box on page 471 
indicates.  
Perhaps an epithet by Pope 
(AD 1688 – 1744) naming 
Bacon “the wisest, brightest 
and meanest of men” (Pope, 
1881, p. 67, Epistle IV, Line 
282) in one breath together 
with his reported 
championing of him in another as “the greatest genius that England (or perhaps any 
other country) ever produced” (Allott, 2014, p. 4) beacons an underlying complexity 
confronting likely scholars who would capture an essential or so-called real Bacon. 
Spence, in attributing the last quoted statement to Pope, includes it amongst Pope’s 
table talk rather than amongst his writings (Remark attributed to Pope by Spence 
discussed in Underhill, circa 1892, p. 171). In his 1878 work on Diderot (AD 1713 – 
 
D’Alembert’s Caveat on Bacon as Father of the  Encyclopédie 
D’Alembert is gracious towards Bacon’s fame and contribution to 
philosophy: 
 
“Pendant que des adversaires peu instruits ou malintentionnés faisaient 
ouvertement la guerre à la philosophie, elle se réfugiait, pour ainsi dire, dans 
les ouvrages de quelques grands hommes, qui, sans avoir l'ambition 
dangereuse d'arracher le bandeau des yeux de leurs contemporains, 
préparaient de loin dans l'ombre et le silence la lumière dont le monde devait 
être éclairé peu à peu et par degrés insensibles.  
 
A la tête de ces illustres personnages doit être placé l'immortel chancelier 
d'Angleterre, François Bacon, dont les ouvrages si justement estimés, et plus 
estimés pourtant qu'ils ne sont connus, méritent encore plus notre lecture que 
nos éloges. Oeuvres de D’Alembert (D'Alembert, 1821, p. p.62). 
 
However, D’Alembert hardly views Bacon as father of the Encyclopédie 
 
Il faut avouer que si dans le siècle ou nous sommes, le ton d'irréligion ne 
coûte rien à quelques écrivains, le reproche d'irréligion ne coûte rien à 
quelques autres. Soyez chrétiens, pourrait-on dire à ces derniers, mais à 
condition que vous le serez assez pour ne pas accuser légèrement vos frères 
de ne le point être.  
 
Il ne me reste plus qu'un mot à dire sur cet ouvrage. Quelques personnes ont 
affecté de répandre, à la vérité sourdement, et sans preuves, que le plan 
m'avait été fourni par les ouvrages du chancelier Bacon. Un court 
éclaircissement sur cette imputation mettra le lecteur en état d'en juger. Ce 
discours a deux parties; la première a pour objet la généalogie des sciences, et 
la seconde est l'histoire philosophique des progrès de l'esprit humain depuis la 
renaissance des lettres. Dans cette dernière partie il n'y a pas un seul mot qui 
appartienne au grand homme dont on m'accuse d'être le copiste. L'exposition 
et le détail de l'ordre généalogique des sciences et des arts, qui compose 
presque en entier la première partie, n'appartient pas advantage à Bacon. J'ai 
seulement emprunté, vers la fin de cette première partie, quelques unes de ses 
idées, en très-petit nombre, sur l'ordre encyclopédique des connaissances 
humaines, qu’il ne faut pas confondre, comme je l'ai prouvé, avec la 
généalogie des sciences; à ces idées que Bacon m'a fournies, et dont je n'ai 
point dissimulé que je lui étais redevable, j'en ai joint beaucoup d'autres que 
je crois m'être propres, et qui sont relatives à ce même ordre encyclopédique. 
Ainsi le peu que j'ai tiré du chancelier d'Angleterre est renfermé dans 
quelques lignes de ce discours, conune il est aisé de s'en convaiucre en jetant 
les yeux sur l'arbre encyclopédique de Bacon (i); et, ce qu'il ne faut pas 
oublier, j'ai eu soin d'avertir expressémen de ce peu que je lui dois. Voilà à 
quoi se réduit le prétendu plagiat qu'on me reproche: mais ce discours a eu le 
Bonheur de réussir; il fallait bien tâcher de me l'ôter. Oeuvres de D’Alembert 
(D'Alembert, 1821, pp. 15 - 16). 
 
 473 
 
1787) and the French encyclopaedists, Morley (1923, p. 31), surely something of a 
panegyrist, has Bacon influencing Voltaire (AD 1694 – 1778) and he, Morley, on the 
basis of a view expressed by Diderot, attributes the true parentage of the 
Encyclopédie (Diderot & d'Alembert, 1751-52/1779), edited by Diderot (AD 1713 – 
1787) and d’Alembert (AD 1717 – 1783), to Bacon (ibid., p. 118). D’Alembert, 
although he praises Bacon, does not go quite so far, as the content of the 
accompanying box on page 472 reveals. 
In respect of Voltaire’s pronouncing Bacon “the father of experimental science” 
(Voltaire, 1961/2003, p. 48), de Maistre (AD 1753 – 1821), writing in the late 
eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries, denounces Voltaire a panegyrist Examination 
of the Philosophy of Bacon (de Maistre, 1998, p. 316) not having properly read even 
Bacon’s better known works, one who is frivolous (ibid., p. 313) and one who “must 
have his say” (ibid., p. 257). De Maistre also rounds on d'Alembert for the logical 
impossibility of his claiming that Bacon “examines what is already known on each of 
the objects of all the natural sciences, and that he, Bacon, made an immense 
catalogue of what remained to be discovered” (ibid., 315) saying all that Bacon 
demonstrated was “his profound ignorance of all the objects of the natural sciences” 
(ibid., p. 315). 
De Maistre, writing in opposition to what is now referred to as an atheism, or 
scientism or empiricism or materialism of his time, and in discussion of Bacon’s 
lesser colleges or species, that is, Bacon’s cardinal virtues of which the species 
consist, dense and rare, light and heavy and the like, claims that “We see that these 
abstractions are completely Aristotelian, following Bacon’s invariable method of 
doing what he condemns and condemning what he has done, but without suspecting 
it” (ibid., p. 97) a folly which “led him [Bacon] to destruction of the sciences” (ibid., 
p. 97, my square brackets) and “to annihilate true natural history by substituting for it 
I don’t know what kind of general physics worthy of the One Thousand and One 
Arabian Nights” (ibid., p. 97). On the Advancement of Learning “is … a perfectly 
worthless and despicable work” (ibid p. 315) says de Maistre and “independently of 
the particular errors with which it [the New Organon] swarms, the general end of the 
work renders it worthy of a Bedlam” (ibid., p. 316, my square brackets). Bacon 
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himself is "a barometer who announced good weather, and because he announced it, 
was thought to have made it" (de Maistre, 1993, p. 142). And so insults fly 
throughout his work, de Maistre pardoning himself on the basis of having the right to 
speak about Bacon as “Bacon speaks of the greatest men” (ibid., p. 242), to which 
insults de Maistre adds further derisive comments made by Lascelles, Bacon’s 
translator (ibid., pp. 307 – 319). Why de Maistre did not publish his Examen de la 
Philosophie de Bacon, ou l'on Traite Différentes Questions de Philosophie Rationelle 
(de Maistre, 1860) during his own lifetime remains a question. Perhaps he thought 
better of it in terms of manners, or perhaps Science’s spectacular progress during his 
later years saw his perceived cause lost.  
If read outside of its anti-empiricist stance, free of its insult, as a critique of Bacon’s 
Science per se, de Maistre’s insights can sometimes be challenging. For example in 
respect of Bacon’s so-called exclusion of final causes from physics and their 
relegation to Metaphysics de Maistre asks for an explanation of how the clockmaker 
at work in physics in first discovering “the mainspring that turns the hand of a watch, 
… [and] gives movement to the balance wheel” (de Maistre, 1998, p. 245) could 
have done this without knowing that the spring “had been placed in the frame IN 
ORDER TO produce this effect?” (ibid., p. 245, de Maistre’s capitalisation). Where, 
de Maistre asks, is one single proof of final cause hindering physics? “Flying through 
space on the grain of matter that carries him, man has been able to grasp all its 
motions; he makes tables of them” (ibid., p. 235) and has not had to reject final cause 
to do it. De Maistre holds that Bacon’s assigning final cause to Metaphysics is in 
effect his imprisonment of it in Divine Theology, his locking it up there and not 
allowing it to come out. God is effectively quarantined from Science. I discuss 
differences between Aristotle’s metaphysics and Bacon’s Metaphysic further in the 
next section of this chapter where the words final cause are not excluded form 
Metaphysic but rather from Metaphysic qua science as Bacon defines it. 
Napier (1853, p. 2), before taking a contrary view, provides opinions from France 
and England that Bacon was simply a kind of right man at the right time but not risen 
much above the age, an opinion which might not offend Bacon as the last quotation
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in the accompanying box on page 475 reveals. But then again Bacon allows that one 
might deflect envy of one’s situation by ascribing it to good fortune and Providence 
(F. Bacon, 1909-1914e, n. p.). 
Napier (ibid., pp.16 -17), Stewart (1884, pp. 48 - 75) and Playfair (n. d., pp. 52 - 101) 
acknowledge Bacon as one providing a 
distinct method of Science and one being 
much more than the right man in the right 
time or place. Bacon employs the alchemy of 
gold rubric mentioned in the second quote in 
the accompanying box in order to explain his 
definition of forms and since then references 
to it, depending on their purpose, have 
provided a good inverse example of a working 
Idol of the Tribe Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
n. d.-d, p. 76)—in this case emphasis on one 
negative amongst many positives—to ridicule 
Bacon. Yet the nature of Bacon’s reform of 
Magic in general, and his motive in treating 
alchemy of gold within it, continue to 
generate scholarly contention. For example, 
Weeks investigates Bacon’s Magic in terms of his materialism (Weeks, 2007, pp. 38 
- 88, 271 - 203) arguing that the borders between and within Bacon’s divisions, say 
between Physic and Metaphysic on the theoretical side and Mechanic and Magic on 
the operative side are pervious, allowing a unified system of Baconian Magic qua “a 
science of matter, where the goal is the systematic manipulation and transformation 
of bodies” (ibid., p. 3). Rossi’s interpretation of Bacon transiting from magic to 
Science is misleading she says, Bacon’s project rather being “a renovation of 
corroded magic” (ibid., p. 2). Rossi (2009) argues that although alchemy and magic 
had little influence on Bacon, and although he considered them both central in 
scientific endeavour, he did borrow from their traditions (ibid., pp. 13 – 14). 
Gaukroger perceives Bacon transitioning out of philosophy into Science (Gaukroger, 
2001, p. 225) without completely breaking his link with the occult. 
 
Some Nineteenth Century Questioning of Bacon’s 
Status and a Related Quotation from Bacon 
“C'est Galilee, qui a montré I'art de l'iterroger par 
1'experiénce. On a souvent attribué cette gloire a 
Bacon; mais ceux qui lui en font honneur, ont été ( à 
notre avis) un peu prodigues d'un bien qu'il ne leur 
appartenait peut-etre pas de dispenser" (Biot quoted 
in Napier, 1853, p. 2).  
 
 “So little, indeed, can Bacon be considered as 
having risen in any great degree above the age in 
which he lived, with respect to his views as to the 
proper aim of philosophy, or the proper limits of the 
human understanding, that he even goes so far as to 
give us formal receipts for the making of gold, and 
performing other prodigies, which he tells us he 
judges very possible. With the exception of the 
disciples of Raymond Lully and Jordano Bruno, the 
extravagant speculations in which Bacon wished to 
embark philosophy, had been long abandoned by 
sober inquirers” (Unnamed Edinburgh Review 
critic—it is Macaulay—quoted in Napier, 1853, pp. 4 
- 5). 
 
“And therefore I attribute my part in all this, as I 
have often said, rather to good luck than to ability, 
and account it a birth of time rather than of wit. For 
certainly chance has something to do with men's 
thoughts, as well as with their works and deeds” 
Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-e, p. 155) 
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Other nineteenth century scholar-scientists mildly critical of Bacon (Herschel, 1831, 
p. 114; Whewell, 1837, pp. 48, 303, 386 - 395; 1847, pp. v, xiii, 10 – 11, 313, 625; 
1857, pp. 99 - 100), continued to acknowledge Bacon’s contribution by favourably 
associating him with inductive Science (Herschel, 1831, pp. 104, 114; Whewell, 
1847, p. vi). Whewell notes that irrespective of Bacon’s prohibition of its use, final 
cause qua logical technique remains indispensable in scientific investigation, for 
example in physiology (Whewell, 1857, pp. 625 - 627).  
Twentieth and twenty-first century scholars continue to debate both the nature of 
Bacon’s Science and the nature of experiment within it. For example Hacking names 
Bacon an experimental philosopher (Hacking, 1983, pp. 246 - 247) and Kuhn divides 
Baconian Science from mathematical Science by depicting Bacon’s Science as 
largely a fact-gathering operation (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 31 - 65) there being since then 
scholars in agreement (Daston, 1991, pp. 93 - 104; Findlen, 1997, pp. 239 - 261) and 
in disagreement (Perez-Ramos, 1989, pp. 270 - 285; Urbach, 1987, p. 26) with such a 
view. Urbach depicts Bacon first conjecturing or hypothesising statements and using 
experiments in further refinement of them. Manzo (2009, pp. 123 - 137) allows that 
“the criterion [Bacon employs for evaluation] is probability” (ibid., p. 129, my 
square brackets), adding a caveat that it is probability qua approvability after the 
usage of Hacking (1975, pp. 27 – 29). Facts are to be tested in part in respect of the 
degree to which they confirm or deny existing opinion. Shapiro (1983) allows a 
similar interpretation suggesting that Bacon searches for true certainty and is prior to 
Boyle AD 1627 – 1691) and Hooke (AD 1635 – 1703) in respect of glimpsing the 
utility of hypothesis in Science (ibid., pp. 45, 67, 66 – 77). Cohen (1980) makes a 
point that Hacking was mistaken in his belief that “Francis Bacon had ‘no concern 
with probability’ and ‘does not aim at inference under uncertainty’” (L. Cohen, 1980, 
p. 219). After identifying Pascalian probability as the probability of the mathematical 
calculus of chance Cohen depicts Bacon as but one of a number of representatives of 
a stream of non-Pascalian probability methodology flowing from the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth centuries, and exemplified in Bacon through a method which "though 
hard to practise, is easy to explain: it involves setting up degrees of certainty” (L. 
Cohen, 1980, p. 221) within a rubric of assigning greater or lesser reliability or 
certainty to laws qua axioms or forms (L. Cohen, 1980, p. 220) ranked according to 
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their robustness against his table of prerogative instances. Hooke (AD 1635 – 1703), 
Boyle AD 1627 – 1691), Glanville (AD 1636 – 1680), Butler (AD 1692 – 1752) and 
Hume (AD 1711 – 1776) are named amongst other non-Pascalians. For his efforts 
Cohen has Jalobeanu (2013, p. 78) naming him as depicting Bacon as proto-Bayesian 
although Cowan does not use the word in the paper under discussion.  
Such labyrinths of interpretation of Bacon are destined to continue for as long as 
scholars, of necessity, extrapolate from Bacon’s incomplete oeuvre, especially his 
Great Instauration, itself now in a sense a scaffolded meccano assembly of various 
works by Bacon, some of them fleeting, some of them semi-complete, and others 
more fully complete, the scaffolding and assembly process itself sometimes being 
informed by works not intended as part of the Instauration. The literature on Bacon is 
vast and I continue with selective use of it throughout the chapter.  
Although the soirées held by Bacon’s brother are reported to have attracted such 
literary minds as Ben Jonson (AD 1572 – 1637), George Herbert, (AD 1593 – 1633), 
John Lily (AD 1553/54 – 1606), William Shakespeare (AD 1564 – 1616) and 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679), Bacon appears lukewarm towards the work of 
William Gilbert (F. Bacon, 1850a, p. 469; Gilbert, 1952a), physician to both 
Elizabeth I and James I, and to not have attended scientific meetings regularly held at 
Gilbert’s house (Adler, 1952, p. vi). Perhaps for a circumspect Bacon, Gilbert was 
too much a spade-caller in dialogue and attitude towards possible critics of his work, 
those “most senseless corrupters of the arts, … lettered clowns, grammatists, 
sophists, sprouters, and the wrong-headed rabble” (Gilbert, 1952b, p. 1). Perhaps 
Gilbert sensed an attitude later formally expressed by Bacon that his (Gilbert’s) 
work, like that of Aristotle before him, and the fanciful chemists in one basket, might 
be thought of as “little better than useless and disputatious” Novum Organum (F. 
Bacon, 1952b, p. 111; n. d.-e, p. 84) and that Gilbert “has himself become a magnet; 
that is; he has ascribed too many things to that force, and built a ship out of shell” 
History of Heavy and Light (F. Bacon, 1864, p. 469), or “built a ship with a peg” (de 
Maistre, 1998, p. 314). Perhaps Bacon, himself rejecting diurnal motion of the earth, 
was aware of Gilbert’s description of such persons as members of the “vulgar herd” 
(Gilbert, 1952a, p. 107), wondering weaklings, simpletons and unlearned persons 
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dealing in superstition and fable (ibid., p. 108). Gilbert’s On the Loadstone  is terse, 
packed with facts, logically argued and impressive to read. Gilbert does not beat 
around the bush and at least in one place Bacon acknowledges the efficacy of 
Gilbert’s scientific acuity De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, pp. 93, 310, 
315) and experimental method (ibid., p. 451).  
More intriguing and enigmatic is Adler’s suggestion that Bacon was unaware of his 
own doctor’s work on circulation of the blood (Adler, 1952, p. vi). In 1628, some 
two years after Bacon’s passing, Harvey published a work now commonly known as 
Circulation of the Blood (Harvey, 1628/1907) having lectured on the subject in 
London for “nine years or more” 
(Harvey, 1628/1907, p. 4; 
1628/1952, p. 267). Yet Adler’s 
comment is perhaps plausible given 
Bacon’s isolation and preoccupation 
with translation towards the end of 
his own life. Harvey, on Aubrey’s 
say so, is said to have claimed that 
Bacon “… writes philosophy like a 
Lord Chancellor. I have cured him.” 
(Aubrey, 1898, p. 299), cured 
possibly being a reference to 
Harvey’s belief in Aristotelian logic 
and ongoing refusal to acknowledge 
Bacon’s scientific credentials 
(Sgarbi, 2013, p. 180; T. E. Wright, 
2013, pp. 145 - 146). Yet on Hobbes’ 
say-so to Aubrey, Bacon displayed a 
hands-on action in Science and died 
of suffocation some days after 
catching a chill while stuffing a fowl with snow, that is with coldness or so-called 
relative absence of heat to determine whether snow, like salt, may preserve the 
carcase (Aubrey, 1898, pp. 75 - 76).  
 
Examples of Experiments: Bacon, Harvey and Gilbert (a) 
 
Bacon Experiment 33, Century 1 
IT is affiimed conftantly by many, as an ufual Experiment, That 
a lump of Vre, in the bottom of a Mine, will be tumbled and 
ftirred by two Mens ftrength; which if you bring it to the top of 
the Earth, will ask fix Mens ftrength at the least to ftir it. It is a 
noble inftance, and is fit to be tryed to the full: For it is very 
probable, that the Motion of Gravity worketh Weakly, both far 
from the Earth, and also within the Earth; The former, because 
the appetite of Union of Denfe Bodies with the Earth, in refpect 
of the diftance is more dull. The latter, becaufc the Body hath in 
part attained his nature, when it is fome depth in the Earth. For as 
for the moving to a point or place (which was the opinion of the 
Ancients) it is a meer vanity. (F. Bacon, 1670, p. 10, Letter s is 
sometimes printed as f.) 
 
An experiment by Harvey 
Experimenting with a pigeon upon one occasion, after the heart 
had wholly ceased to pulsate, and the auricles too had become 
motionless, I kept my finger wetted with saliva and warm for a 
short time upon the heart, and observed, that under the influence 
of this fomentation it recovered new strength and Life, so that 
both ventricles and auricles pulsated, contracting and relaxing 
alternately, recalled as it were from death to life. (Harvey, 1889, 
p. 29) 
 
An Experiment by Gilbert  
Take two pieces of iron, one magnetized with an armed and the 
other with an unarmed loadstone, and apply to one of them a 
weight of iron proportioned to its powers: the other loadstone 
will lift the same weight, and no more. Two needles also turn 
with the same velocity and constancy toward the poles of the 
earth, though one needle may have been touched by an armed 
magnet and the other by one unarmed. (Gilbert, 1893, p. 138) 
 
Notes: (a) The letter s is sometimes represented by the letter f. 
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Bacon’s Novum Organum contains many examples of his close observation of and 
association with applied Science and industrial arts, but such information is a narrow 
base upon which to argue either for or against Bacon’s vigorous participation in 
applied Science. 
Certainly the pages of Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900b) and New Atlantis (F. 
Bacon, 1952a) leave little room for doubt about Bacon’s keen observation of material 
beings and advocacy of investigation of them. Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 
1670) discussed in more detail beginning on page 559 provides insights into Bacon’s 
engagement with applied Science. 
Harvey is reported saying of his patient: “He had a delicate lively hazel eie … it was 
like the eie of a Viper.” (Aubrey, 1898, p. 72) and certainly an eye that never saw the 
success of “[Ce] livre d’Harvey … [ce] chef-d'oeuvre. Ce petit livre de cent pages … 
le plus beau livre de la physiologic" (Flourens, 1857, p. 42, my square brackets), 
Harvey, unlike Bacon, being “the only man I [Thomas Hobbes] know, that 
conquering envy, hath established a new doctrine during his own lifetime” (1839a, p. 
viii, my square brackets). On publication of his work, Harvey’s practice declined in 
the face of vulgar criticism peddling a view that he was “crack-brained, and all the 
physitians were against him” (Aubrey, 1898, p. 300). Surely Bacon might have been 
cognisant of the notoriety surrounding Harvey’s teaching during those last eight 
years of his, Bacon’s, life. It is puzzling, given Bacon’s identification of, and 
emphasis on, experiments of light, and experiments of fruit Novum Organum (F. 
Bacon, 1863h, pp. 135, 152) that he appears unable to reasonably acknowledge some 
of Harvey’s experiments, and some of those of Gilbert too, as examples of one or the 
other of these kinds of experimentation, irrespective of the methods they were 
employing, which puzzlement begs a hypothetical question of whether or not Bacon 
was hoist on a petard of an Idol of the Den or Cave of his own making.  
Rawley (1869, p. 37) describes Bacon as one respecting Aristotle the man’s learning 
but detesting a wont of place for action in Aristotle’s philosophy—a reasonable take 
it may be postulated for many persons required to read Aristotle during their 
thirteenth to sixteenth years—but Bacon did continue an engagement with Aristotle 
after his youthful Cambridge days and in this context Rawley himself makes no 
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reference to Aristotle’s attempted involvement in politics or acknowledging that in 
Aristotle ethical behaviour inheres in the doing of an act rather than in the thinking of 
it.  
Rawley pronounces Bacon, who might be taken as an atheist, a religious man and 
Christian, a taker of Sacraments, and one holding a principle “That a little philosophy 
maketh men apt to forget God, as attributing too much to second causes; but depth of 
philosophy bringeth a man back to God again” (ibid., p. 51). Abbot (1885, p. 1) 
names Machiavelli the great authority of the times on politics and, on the basis of 
Bacon’s essay content, court intrigue, scheming in self-advancement and advice to 
his Sovereign and others, reads Bacon as Machiavellian (ibid., pp. 202, 324 – 325, 
329). De Maistre saw Machiavelli in Bacon too (de Maistre, 1860; 1998, p. 300) and 
Lebrun notes in passing that “Bacon [is] an experienced politician who knew his 
Machiavelli (Lebrun, 1998, p. xxviii). Lampert paints Bacon’s so-called overthrow 
of knowledge in Nietzschean colours (1993, pp. 20 - 21). 
Bacon uses a passage similar to Rawley’s uncited words about religion in his Preface 
to the King (F. Bacon, 1915, p. 8), a religious King, and Bacon may well have been 
at his own version of Osiander-game-preface-to-De revolutionibus, and if so, the 
quotation may not reveal Bacon’s sincere and true thoughts. Yet, in any event, 
Osiander’s motives and intentions for prefacing his own unsigned letter before 
Copernicus’s preface are not without contention and complication (Wrightsman, 
1975, pp. 213 - 242) and thus a fuzzy referent on which to speculate about Bacon’s 
possible motives.  
Rawley attributes Bacon’s hope for mankind to Bacon’s faith (ibid., p. 52), an 
attribution relative to the question of Bacon’s being first and foremost a Christian 
and also germane to interpretation of symbolism in New Atlantis, of which more 
later. It is telling that Bacon based his request for a burial service at St. Michael’s 
Church, first on the basis of nearness to the memory of his late mother, secondly 
because St. Michaels’ was his parish church, and thirdly because St. Michaels “was 
the only Christian church within the walls of Old Verulam” (Montagu, 1834a, p. 7).  
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Yet then again, the idea behind Bacon’s request for a St. Michaels’ service being 
pronounced telling, that is, the idea that a man who is not really a Christian might not 
care much about where he is buried, is itself on shaky grounds. For example a vain 
non-religious nominal Christian person may wish to be buried somewhere for show, 
a devout Christian, sure of God’s grace, as well an atheist in denial of it, may not 
care at all where they are laid to rest, and a wish for a funeral ceremony location 
based on love of a parent may have more to do with human love than with religious 
conviction. These questions of logic acknowledged, it is not difficult to accept the 
likelihood of Bacon’s being something more than a nominal Christian, yet a 
complicated one at that. Certainly though he found churchmen annoying in respect of 
his project and would avoid meeting them if he could Introductory Essay in The 
Works of Francis Bacon (F. Bacon, 1838, p. xlvii).  
Although Rawley’s delightful-to-read work might possibly now be read as innocent 
and starry-eyed, it need not necessarily be classified one of deliberate whitewash and 
expurgation, and it does provide insights. For example Bacon might revise works as 
many as twelve times before releasing them for print and such possible hard writing 
might explain the easy reading of Bacon’s essays and aphorisms. Yet enigma 
continues even within his essays where depth and lightness combine in subtle and 
tantalising criticism and commentary on significant human-condition issues.  
For example the opening lines of Bacon’s essay On Death (F. Bacon, 1868b, pp. 5 - 
7) read: 
Men feare Death as Children feare to go in the darke: And as that Natural Feare in 
Children, is increased in Tales, so is the other. (F. Bacon, 1868b, p. 5) 
His last paragraph closes with assurances: 
It is as Naturall to die as it is to be borne; And to a little Infant, perhaps, the one, is as 
painful, as the other … But above all, believe it, the sweetest Canticle is Nunc 
Dimittis; when a Man has attained worthy ends … it openeth the Gate, to good Fame, 
and extinguisheth Envie. (F. Bacon, 1868b, p. 7)  
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an ironical and enigmatic closure in Bacon’s case riding on judgements others may 
make, and have made, about his 
attainment of worthy ends. 
Sandwiched between these 
make-light-of-death sentiments, 
are Bacon’s views about, and 
knowledge of, torture and 
religious fear of dissolution of 
body, let alone human fear of 
sentences like the one for high 
treason exemplified in the accompanying box on page 482. 
To be sure Bacon is writing as a man of his times yet is such compartmentalised 
thinking his own careful expression in both his 1612 and 1625 editions—Essex was 
executed in 1618—that which sustained him in his involvement against Essex before, 
during and after the trial, or allowed him to advocate surgery on live animals De 
Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 1863c, pp. 33 - 34), or to watch interrogated 
humans stretch on the rack (Macaulay, 1837b, p. 309).  
There is contested opinion (Langston, 1950, pp. 128 - 129) that Ashton, the Puritan 
cleric attending Essex in the Tower, was a hired hand (Langston, 1950, p. 123) who, 
in “ploughing” (ibid., p. 124) the soul—and likely the earthly mind too, if not the 
branded-noble body of Essex—in accord with Elizabethan preparation-for-death 
religious procedures (Langston, 1950, pp. 109 - 129) heard his confession as treason 
and reported it back. Essex’s composure before the axeman is reported exemplary 
(Hargrave, 1766, p. 209) but depictions of his state of mind under Ashton’s 
management of preparations-for-death are confronting and pitiful. (Hargrave, 1766, 
pp. 209 - 210; Strachey, 1928, pp. 79 - 82). Spedding, whose enquiry into Bacon 
occupied thirty years of his own life, questions Ashton’s being a hired hand 
(Spedding, 1862, pp. 235 - 238). A tantalising question here, in today’s parlance, is 
whether Bacon was in the joke, assuming there was one. Bacon’s 1626 edition of the 
essay in question—he fell from grace in 1621 and died in 1626—carries a one line 
entry after the essay.  
 
A Sentence for High Treason(a) 
“THE punifhment of high treafon in general is very folemn and terrible. 
1. That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk; 
though ufually a fledge or hurdle is allowed, to preferve the offender 
from the extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement e. 
2. That he be hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive. 3. That his 
entrails be taken out, and burned, [before his eyes] while he is yet alive. 
4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into four parts. 6. 
That his head and quarters be at the king's difpofal f. 
e 1 Hal. P. C. 382 
f This punifhment for treafon Sir Edward Coke tells us, is warranted by 
divers examples in fcripture; for Joab was drawn, Bithan was hanged, 
Judas was embowelled, and fo of the reft. (3 Inft. 211.) 
 
Notes: [a] f sometimes = s 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from  Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England - Book the Fourth - Chapter the Sixth: Of High 
Treason (Blackstone, 1766/2014, p. 92, my square brackets). 
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The line, Extinctus amabitur idem, recalls Horace: 
Urit enim fulgore suo qui praegravat artes  
Intra se positas; extinctus amabitur idem. Epistles II 1 13 (Horace, 1888, p. 42, my 
underlining)  
 
For he burns by his very splendor, whose superiority is oppressive to the arts beneath 
him: after his decease, he shall be had in honor. Epistles II I (Horace, 1869, pp. 277 - 
278, my underlining)  
But it is difficult to know whose idea it was to insert the line or whether it indicates 
an attitude held by Bacon in his personal preparations for death. In his April 10 will 
he bequeaths his soul to God and his reputation to the next ages and foreign nations 
(Abbott, 1885, p. 297; Montagu, 1834b, pp. 7 - 8).  
Nor is it easy to salt Bacon’s wounds with a questioning face off: 
Dum inter homines sumus, colamus humanitatem. Of Morals III XLIII (Seneca, 2014) 
So long as we are among men, let us cherish humanity [the next words being “and so 
live that no man may be either in fear or in danger of us”]. Seneca’s Morals (Seneca, 
1882, p. 358, my square brackets) 
Each of us, to some extent, must cut our humanity from our own times before 
attempting to tailor it with Ethics and morals, the natural abilities required for such a 
task being themselves “like natural plants that need pruning by study” Of Studies (F. 
Bacon, 1868c, p. 204). A so-called true Bacon remains enigmatic. In writing his 
essays, Bacon as artist and twelve-times revisionist wordsmith may well have 
worked in detached crafting of a speculative, literary, and popular view rather than 
on expressing a personal or even didactic view, making content analysis of the kind 
undertaken in the preceding three paragraphs less valid for purposes of catching a so-
called true Bacon. The structure of On Death appears typical of a general essay 
template pattern of heavy sandwiched between light employed by Bacon. 
Macaulay (1837a), Whig politician, on the basis of those words of Jonson quoted on 
page 467, names Jonson a “most unexceptionable Judge” (ibid., p. 11) and in a warts 
and all rendering of Bacon’s life mentions Bacon’s being Registrar of the Star 
Chamber, and his role as Attorney General in the Peacham case, one of the last cases 
involving torture—a questionable statement now in the face of the West’s struggle 
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with terrorism. On the question of torture Macaulay presents Bacon “distinctly 
behind his age” (ibid., p. 37) noting Elizabeth I’s decree against it years earlier and 
the public’s detestation of it (ibid., p. 38). 
Bacon far behind his age! Bacon far behind Sir Edward Coke! Bacon clinging to 
exploded abuses! Bacon withstanding the progress of improvement! Bacon struggling 
to push back the human mind! The words seem strange. They sound like a 
contradiction in terms! Yet the fact is even so: and the explanation may be readily 
found by any person who is not blinded by prejudice. (Macaulay, 1837a, p. 37) 
Donne preached against torture (Donne, 1625 & 1626, pp. 343 - 286) in Easter 
Sermons of 1625 and 1626 and Turner (2011, n. p.), against Graham Greene’s 
suggestion (1951, p. x) that Shakespeare is short on references to torture, finds 
imagery of torture in thirteen plays, variant imagery of the word torture occurring 
fifty times, and variant imagery of the word torment fifty-three times. Imagery of 
torture and torment says Turner also appears two and three times respectively in the 
sonnets (T. Turner, 2011, n. p.).  
According to Macaulay, Bacon examined Peacham on the rack and upon being 
unable to obtain a confession, reported to the King the presence of a “dumb devil” in 
Peacham (Macaulay, 1837b, p. 309). Mathews (1996, pp. 27, 321 - 406) in turn 
downplays Macaulay, and presents Bacon as among the least tainted of the Jacobean 
Court. She goes some way to rescuing Bacon qua “meanest of mankind”, “two-
souled monster”, “creeping snake”, “venomous atheist”, “England’s one scoundrel”, 
“false persona and sterile philosopher” from his accusers (Mathews, 1996, pp. 20-24, 
353, 369, 384, 323, 337, 384, 394, 406). Mathews cites Addison (AD 1672 – 1719) 
Whig Politician, Swift (AD 1667 -1745) member with Adison of the pro-Whig Kit-
Cat Club, Hume (AD 1711 – 1776) anti-Whig , Archbishop Tennison, (AD 1536 – 
1716) who crowned Anne (AD 1665 – 1714) and George I (AD 1660 – 1727), 
Camden (AD 1551 – 1623), historian of Elizabeth I (AD1533 – 1603) and 
acquaintance of Ben Jonson (AD 1572 – 1637), and Charles Molloy (AD (1640 – 
1690) maritime lawyer, all moderate in their assessments of Bacon in whom there is 
more good than bad, Bacon she says, being a victim of attack from seventeenth 
century anti-Stuart libellers who wrote secret histories in character assassination of 
exiled princes (ibid., 326 – 330). A view emerges of Bacon as one whose services to 
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mankind outweigh his services to state. Mathews assembles other notables 
favourable towards Bacon.  
Many issues, including opinion possibly based on covert prejudice, appear to cloud 
derivation of a clear picture of Bacon’s essential character. Perhaps Rawley’s simple 
and common-sense view is a valid explanation of Bacon’s perceived enigmatic 
persona: 
His father had the gifts of humour, audacity, and duplicity essential to success at 
Elizabeth's court; his mother possessed a classical training and resultant taste, which 
were crafted upon a rigid Calvinism in religion. Some trace of all of these influences 
may be found in the character and attainments of the son. (Rawley, 1657, p. b2 + 1) 
In any event, this chapter is not focussed on judgement even though Bacon has been 
and will again be discussed in association with actions and or expressed attitudes 
popularly considered less salutary as human attributes. I now turn to sequential 
discussion of Bacon’s Science, Ethics and Polis where, except in respect of Ethics, 
Bacon’s perceived enigmatic persona is no longer in principal focus. 
BACON’S SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLIS 
Bacon’s Science 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863b) and Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1880b) 
respectively now represent parts one and two of Bacon’s Great Instauration (F. 
Bacon, 1863h, pp. 25 - 520; 1882g, pp. 12 - 479), his unfinished great scheme of 
“regeneration and restoration of the sciences” Epistle Dedicatory (F. Bacon, 1860a, 
p. 24) whereby, in the fullness of time, “philosophy and the sciences may no longer 
float in air, but rest on the solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same 
well examined and weighed” (ibid., p. 24). Bacon’s new method was to be a machine 
of Science “but the stuff must be gathered from the facts of nature” (ibid., p. 24).  
Bacon outlines his scientific method in Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c) and in 
that work he downplays Aristotelian heritage (ibid., Aphorisms 10 – 19, p. 316), 
finds fault with Aristotelian induction and deduction, and questions the cognitive 
structure of the causes on which it is predicated. For example, he is quite critical of 
the Greek contribution in general, dismissing the Greeks collectively as a job lot 
(ibid., Aphorism 71, pp. 332 – 333) all be it with some acknowledgement of the
 486 
 
Presocratic writers in general, and the atomists in particular (ibid., pp. 79 - 98`, 333) 
although, in Farrington’s opinion, Bacon’s views on atomism became critical over 
his own lifetime, distinct Democritean atomic particles falling to simple natures as a 
better fit for his interest in the alchemy of 
transmutation (Farrington, 1964, p. 51). Hesse 
(1985, pp. 141 - 152) conjectures Bacon 
changing his ideas on atoms and Rees (1980, 
pp. 549, 564) claims that Bacon at no time 
accepted principles of atomism. 
Bacon describes the long held predominant 
status of the Greek systems as dangerous 
Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, pp. 336 - 
337, Aphorism 77). He is critical of syllogistic 
method in Novum Organum (ibid., p. 316) and 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 
138) and in the latter (1902a, p. 22) rejects 
Aristotelian syllogism as a method of natural 
Science. Elsewhere, when discussing 
deficiencies in method, he regularly lets the 
blood of his ire Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. 
d.-e, pp. 84, 91 – 92, 98, 102, 108, 125, 132, 
250, 358), Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
n. d.-a, pp. 412, 413, 503).  
Much of Bacon’s downplaying of some of the 
ancients from the time of the Presocratics, 
Aristotle and Plato results from his use of their 
works as surrogate measures in his survey of the Sciences where, in Aphorisms 71 to 
77 of Novum Organum he outlines weaknesses of received philosophy, and in 
Aphorisms 78 to 92 causes of error in it. He weights these ancients heavily, touching 
relatively lightly on perceived defects or shortcomings in the work of such near-
contemporary and contemporary greats as Copernicus (AD 1473 – 1543), Galileo 
Remnant (Red Circle) of the Star,  now Called 
Tycho’s Supernova that Appeared in Cassiopeia 
from 1572 – 1574  
 
 
 
 
Source: Top picture copped by Ian Eddington from 
Tycho's Supanova Remnant. (2009). Berkeley, 
California: NASA/JPL-Caltech/WISE Team. 
(NASA/JPL-Caltech/WISE Team, 2009). Bottom 
picture cropped by Ian Eddington from Chandra 
Observation of the Tycho Supernova Remnant X-
ray: NASA/CXC/Rutgers/K.Eriksen et al.; Optical: 
DSS. (2011). Flickr Photostream: Harvard-
Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. 
(NASA/CXC/Rutgers/K.Eriksen et al.; Optical: 
DSS, 2011)  
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(AD 1564 – 1652), Gilbert AD 1544 - 1603 and others to whom he is sometimes 
complimentary. At other times his swipes at them, when not directly insulting, 
occasionally come close to being backhanded compliments Novum Organum (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-d, pp. 84, 272, 310, 315), and De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. 
d.-d, pp. 451, 502 – 504). His downplaying of Pythagoras can, strictly reading, only 
be based on work written by others about Pythagoras and it compromises to some 
extent the spirit of his own criticism of the practices, process and method of natural 
philosophers before his time. 
It is instructive to read of Bacon’s being aware of Galileo’s moons, the so-called 
stars of Jupiter, Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, pp. 272 – 273) and of 
Copernicus’ sun-centered universe and his, Bacon’s, commissioning a machine out 
of iron to test whether the senses were deceived by apparent movements of heavenly 
bodies Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 259) being tracked by Copernicus, and 
further, his not being able to personally make the step to accepting rotation of the 
earth (ibid., p. 299), which whole earth according to Gilbert “makes a diurnal 
rotation in the space of twenty-four hours” On the Lodestone and Magnetic Bodies 
and on the Great Magnet the Earth (Gilbert, 1952a, pp. 107 - 108). Likewise of 
wonder is his reluctance to smash at least one of the crystal spheres once and for all, 
given his knowledge, via Galileo, of a possibility of “several centres of motion 
among the stars” (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 273), a depiction of the Milky Way itself as “a 
cluster of small stars, entirely separate and distinct” (ibid., p. 272), and an 
appearance in 1572 of a new star in Cassiopeia and its disappearance two years later, 
during Bacon’s Cambridge nights. Elizabeth I summoned astronomer Thomas Allen 
to advise her on the appearance but unfortunately his “very learnedly” (Aubrey, 
1898, p. 28) given explanation appears not to be available. Another supernova, then a 
new star appearing in Ophiuchus the Serpent-Bearer in 1604, and much more talked 
about, was observed by Kepler (AD 1571 – 1630), Galileo (AD 1564 – 1642) and 
Helisaeus Roselin (AD 1545 – 1616) who perceived it to be “the end of slavish 
submission of a single person” (Roselin quoted in Marett-Crosby, 2013, p. 214). It is 
also a wonder if he, Bacon, were aware of the ideas of Bruno (AD 1548 – 1600) 
concerning the stars being distant suns surrounded by their own planets, some of 
which might support life (L. McIntyre, 1903, pp. 180 - 202). Galileo and Kepler were
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certainly abreast of Bruno’s speculations (Rowland, 2008, pp. 280 - 281). May be, 
too, in some instances, discretion might well have been the better part of valour on 
Bacon’s part for “if the Novum Organum had been published at Rome instead of 
London its author would have been handed over to the Inquisition” (Ball, 1838, p. 
xlvii), the churchmen having never forgiven Bacon for “casting him [Aristotle] out” 
(ibid., p. lxvii, my square brackets) and their placing Novum Organum on the banned 
books list. Again Bacon might not fan the 
windmills of churchmen but rather, as would a 
water-mill owner, pray for “peace among the 
willows” (F. Bacon, 1850d, p. 31) of those wind-
powered political churchmen, but it is likely that 
his denial is predicated on something more than a 
discretion-is-the-better-part-of-valour 
explanation.  
For example Rees, in notes about parts of 
manuscripts Bacon did not include in his works, 
is puzzled by Bacon’s unwillingness to accept a 
heliocentric universe (G. Rees, 1981, p. 377) and 
suggests that Bacon had a good understanding of 
Copernican and Gilbertian arguments for 
heliocentricity and diurnal motion. 
Rees is intrigued by the argument Bacon had with himself on diurnal rotation: can 
Bacon’s refusal to accept the rotation of the earth be explained in terms of 
competitive rivalry (ibid., pp. 382 – 386), or conflict with scriptures, or competing 
now-called Kuhnian paradigm? To form an opinion as I have that Bacon’s short, 
brief and informative On the Heavens (F. Bacon, 1882f) does not stand comparison 
with say Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus (Copernicus, 1952) or with books four and 
five of Kepler’s Epitome of Copernican Astronomy (Kepler, 1952b) is in no way to 
denigrate Bacon. So too is the case in comparisons of Bacon’s Inquiry Respecting the 
Magnet (1882d) with Gilbert’s On the Lodestone and Magnetic Bodies and on the 
Great Magnet the Earth (Gilbert, 1952a) yet such comparisons might contribute to 
 
Bacon’s Statement of an Axiom(a) 
In 1620 Bacon would state an axiom thus: 
 
“The organs of the senses, and bodies which 
produce reflections to the senses, are of a 
similar nature” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
1880b, p. 390).  
 
In 1675 Newton would state an axiom thus: 
 
“The angles of reflection and refraction lie in 
one and the same plane with the angle of 
incidence” Opticks (Newton, 1952b, p. 380). 
 
Content ignored is there really a substantial 
difference between the two as to what 
constitutes an axiom?  
 
Notes: (a) Cohen cites De Augmentis 
Scientiaurum Book II, Section V and Novum 
Organum Book 2, Section 105 as a basis for 
his claims “that a hierarchy of Baconian forms 
is a hierarchy of causal laws” (L. Cohen, 1980, 
p. 220) and that “Such laws are described in 
what Bacon calls axioms” (ibid., p. 220).  
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speculations as to why Bacon and Gilbert for example may have had little to say to 
one another on the subject of magnetism, or about Bacon’s reluctance to accept 
heliocentricity.  
Following his exposition of the defects and 
causes of errors of received philosophy, 
Bacon turns more positive and in Aphorisms 
93 – 114 of Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. 
d.-d, pp. 130 - 146) expresses hopes for 
Science and the progress of mankind. I 
proceed by attempting to glean an 
understanding of Bacon’s Science (a) from 
his description of, and rationalisation for it, 
in the Novum Organum and other works, (b) 
from his classification of knowledge in his 
Advancement of Learning and his situation of 
Science within that classification including 
his definition and clarification of terms there 
and in other works, and (c) from his 
explanation of a scientific method he 
constructs for his new Science.  
First then, in respect of (a) in the preceding 
paragraph, Bacon, in describing the task he 
sets himself, states that his goal (sic) is to 
“erect and constitute one universal science as 
to be the mother of the rest” Advancement of 
Learning Book III (F. Bacon, 1863b, p. 471), 
“a science … which may be the receptacle 
for all such axioms as are not peculiar to any 
of the particular sciences” (ibid., p. 472), Induction of axioms involving observation 
and experiment in the first place. The capital I in the word Induction in this 
 
Examples of Bacon’s Experiments(1), (2) 
 
Experiment 132 on Transmission of Sound 
 
It would be tryed, how, and with what proportion of 
difadvantage, the Voice will be carried in an Horn, 
which is a Line Arched; or in a Trumpet, which is a 
Line Retorted or in fome Pipe that were Sinuous. 
Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 1670, p. 36) 
 
Experiment 414, the Second of Seven Experiments to 
Make Flowers Arrive Early 
 
The fecond is the The Pulling of the Buds of the Rofe, 
when they are newly knotted, for then the fide 
Branches will bear. The caufe is the fame with the 
former: For cutting off the Tops, and pulling off the 
Buds, work the fame cffect, V, in Retention of thc 
Sap for a time, and Diverfion of it to the Sprouts that 
were not fo forward. Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 
1670, p. 92) 
 
Experiment 741 on Marbelling 
 
THe Turks have a pretty Art of Chamoletting of 
Paper, which is not with us in ufe. They take divers 
Oyled Colours, and put them feveraliy (in drops) 
upon Water, and ftir the Water lightly, and then wet 
their Paper (being of fome thicknefs) with it; and the 
Paper will be waved and veined like Chamolet or 
Marble. Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 1670, p. 156) 
 
Experiment 742 on the Cause of Colours in Blood 
 
IT is fomewhat ftrange, that the Blood of all Birds, 
and Beafts, and Fifhes fliould be of a Red colour, and 
onely the Blood of the Cuttle fhould be as black as 
Ink. A man would think that the caufe fhould be the 
high Concoction of that Blood; for we fee in ordinary 
Puddings that the Boyling turnifh the Blood to be 
black; and the Cuttle is accounted a delicate Meat, 
and is much in requeft. Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 
1670, p. 156) 
 
Notes: (1) Letter s is sometimes printed as letter f. (2)  
Whether it is a commonplace book (van Berkel, 
2013, p. 234), or a book to be read as promotional 
rhetoric and knowledge in announcement of Bacon’s 
Science (Rossi, 2009, pp. 219 - 220), or a “handbook 
of experiments, experimental ideas and suggestions” 
(Jalobeanu, 2013, p. 77), Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 
1670) with its content of one thousand so-called 
experiments (ibid., p. 215), provides insights into 
what Bacon may have meant by the term experiment. 
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paragraph and elsewhere in this chapter marks Bacon’s new usage of that word, as do 
capitals in the words Form, Magic, Mechanic, Metaphysic, and Physic.  
Bacon’s usages of the terms axiom and expriment are respectively explained through 
examples contained in the accompanying boxes on pages 488 and 489, which 
examples, given some minor reform and rewording, might easily serve in secondary 
school science classrooms in Australia in 2015. Bacon describes new Scientists as 
neither empiricists who, like ants, “heap up and use their store” Novum Organon (F. 
Bacon, 1900c, p. 349), nor dogmatists, who, like spiders, spin their own webs, but 
are rather a mean between the two, who, like bees, extract matter and work and 
fashion it by “their own efforts” (ibid., p. 349). Science’s true labour relies neither 
entirely on the mind’s powers nor its stored history of experimentation, nor raw 
mechanical knowledge, but rather on the working over of these latter two in human 
understanding (ibid., p. 349). The business of this new Science is to extract causes 
and axioms from works and experiments and “again from those causes and axioms 
[to extract] new works and experiments, as a legitimate interpreter of nature” (ibid. p. 
358, my square brackets).  
For Bacon, natural philosophy is Science as expained further below beginning on 
page 494, and his Science would proceed slowly through observation and 
experimentation from particulars to careful statement of universal truths Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, pp. 340, 351 – 353), Aphorism 104 cautioning that the 
understanding be weighted with “lead and ballast” (ibid., p. 353) to prevent its race 
to hasty conclusions, and Aphorism 105 announcing an invention of a new method of 
Induction different from the peurile kind of simple enumeration of the ancients, 
which new method might be used not only for the discovery and proof of principles 
but also “for the same purpose in respect of “minor, intermediate, and, in short, of 
every kind of axioms” (ibid., p. 353). In Aphorism 127 Bacon informs that his 
method with its new kind of Induction is suitable not only for natural philosophy but 
also for logic, Ethics, politics, and “every other science” (ibid., p. 364) as well.  
Axioms discussed in the two preceeding paragraphs are of two kinds, those derived 
from so-called experience and those derived through genuine Induction and 
experiment and used in further investigation of nature. Also there are experiments of  
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light and experiments of fruit and the former are of a higher order in that they supply 
practice with its instruments, the fruits of experimental Science being the “sponsors 
and sureties for the truth of philosophies” (F. Bacon, 1863h, p. 104)—technically 
speaking, a very Aristotelian a posteriori 
vindication indeed, Lord Bacon. 
Experiments of light “which are no use in 
themselves, … never fail” (ibid., p. 135) 
because they are desgned “to discover the 
natural causes of some effect (ibid., p. 
135) and settle the question equally well 
“whichever way they turn out” (ibid., 
p.135). Axioms “common and 
promiscuous” Advancement of Learning 
(F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 83) to all the 
sciences are, together with “relative and 
accidential conditions of essences” (ibid., 
p. 83), assigned to Philosophia Prima. 
When Science proceeds from “experiment 
to experiment” (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 131) 
it produces learned experience in a 
process but one step above walking in the 
dark (ibid., p. 132). For example, 
experimentation to improve paper quality by yet again making it from linnen instead 
of say silk, is dubbed the Chase of Pan and is not properley any part of Science (ibid. 
139 – 140). Recognising anachronism, might not Kuhn be déjà vu?: "Normal science 
does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none" (Kuhn, 
1970, p. 52). When Science proceeds “from experiments to axioms, which again may 
point out new experiments … [it] is called interpretation of nature, Novum Organum, 
or new machine of the mind” (ibid., p. 131) and in so doing it is walking in light 
(ibid., p. 132) on a road to Philosophia Secunda. 
The noble end (sic) of Science—that is, the discovery of truth and utility in a “real 
model of the world”, Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, pp. 363 - 364)—is 
 
Bacon’s Philosophia Prima and Philosophia Secunda 
 
Philosophia Prima 
“A Collection of General Axioms Subservient to All the 
Sciences” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 
305)  
 
But since the divisions of knowledge are not like several 
lines that meet in one angle; but are rather like branches of 
a tree that meet in one stem (which stem grows for some 
distance entire and continuous, before it divide itself into 
arms and boughs); therefore it is necessary before we enter 
into the branches of the former division, to erect and 
constitute one universal science, to be as the mother of the 
rest, and to be regarded in the progress of knowledge as 
portion of the main and common way, before we come 
where the ways part and divide themselves. This science I 
distinguish by the name of Philosophia Prima, primitive or 
summary philosophy; or Sapience which was formerly 
defined as the knowledge of things divine and human. 
Advancement of Learning, Book III (F. Bacon, 1863b, pp. 
471 - 472).  
 
Philosophia Secunda 
Its purpose is the “free investigation of individual 
existences [that is, of forms]” (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, pp. 52 - 
53, my square brackets). 
 
Lastly, there is yet … the Secondary Philosophy itself, 
which is the sixth part of the Instauration. Of the perfecting 
this I have cast away all hopes; but in future ages perhaps 
the design may bud again. Notwithstanding, in our 
Prodromie, [or prefatory works] such I mean only, which 
touch almost the universals of nature, there will be laid no 
inconsiderable foundations of this matter. A Letter Written 
in Latin by the Lord Verulam, to Father Fulgentio, the 
Venetian (F. Bacon, 1880a, pp. 64 - 65). 
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bounded, its purpose being a searching out of God’s concealed things focussed on 
regaining mankind’s God-given power over nature within confines of “right reason 
and true religion” (F. Bacon, 1900c, p. 367). On the face of Bacon’s words, Science 
is about truth and dignity but as discussed further below in the section on Ethics, 
Bacon’s ideas about, and advice on, what it may mean to act with dignity and 
goodness when making one’s way in the cut and thrust of everyday affairs, and his 
thoughts about mankind’s ability to employ Science’s power over nature ethically, 
are not necessarily without enigma and I discuss them futher beginning on page 544. 
Bacon’s work remained unfinished at the time of his death but it is possible to educe 
a general understanding of his Science from his outline of the six divisions intended 
for his Great Instauration (F. Bacon, n. d.-b, pp. 17 - 54). For example, in Division 3 
of the plan for the Great Instauration outlined on page 493, Bacon writes of a 
Natural and Experimental History or Primary History Towards a Natural and 
Experimental History (F. Bacon, n. d.-h, p. 355) which provides food for a 
“suckling” Science On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, n. d.-f, 
p. 48) and which is a “common mother of all” (ibid., p. 387), of which more later. 
That fed is to be his new Science, a Second Science, an Active Science. Humans, 
correctly prepared, might, with the aid of Bacon’s method or machine of Science, 
climb towards the heights of Second Science via a Ladder of the Intellect (ibid., p. 
38), gaining notions and anticipations of Second Science during the climb (ibid., p. 
38), the process going on across generations as outlined in Divisions 4 through 6 of 
Table 52 on page 493. 
In summary of the first of the three windows into Bacon’s Science outlined on page 
489—that is, (a) Bacon’s description of, and rationalisation for, his new Science—
there is little doubt that Bacon intends his new Science as a break from past practice. 
His new method is pronounced suitable for all Science, and proceeds through 
observation, experiment and a new kind of Induction to extract nature’s Forms, 
express them as axioms, and employ them further in investigation of nature. New 
Science may proceed from experiment to experiment, or from experiment to axiom 
to experiment, but it cannot proceed without experiment. Bacon situates his Science 
in a real world where it may maximise power over nature subject to his named
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constraints of right reason and true religion, one of which, true religion, and part of 
the other, the breath of life component, flow from sources originally outside of his 
real world. This new Science will emerge from Natural History as First Science and 
over generations grow into Second or Active Science. 
Table 52: Bacon’s Plan for the Great Instauration 
   
# Division Comment   
1 
The Divisions of the 
Sciences 
A summary of the knowledge the human race possesses including “things omitted which ought 
to be there (sic)” The Plan of the Work (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, p. 39)—a coast[ing] across the 
ancient arts (ibid.). Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a),has come to represent this 
division, the citation given being one of a number of available editions. 
2 
The Novum Organum 
or Indications 
Concerning the 
Interpretation of 
Nature 
“The doctrine concerning the better and more perfect use of human reason in the inquisition of 
things, and the true helps of the understanding: that thereby (as far as the condition of mortality 
and humanity allows) the intellect may be raised and exalted, and made capable of overcoming 
the difficulties and obscurities of nature” (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, p. 40). Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
1900c) now represents this division the citation given being one of a number of available 
editions. 
3 
The Phenomena of the 
Universe or a Natural 
and Experimental 
History for the 
Foundation of 
Philosophy 
A natural history embracing the phenomena of the universe and experience of every kind which 
might serve as a foundation for philosophy qua Science. A natural history of fact (sic) derived 
from experiment rather than raw sense, its purpose being to constitute the first food of “suckling 
Philosophy” Plan of the Work (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, p. 48) qua Science. It would be the stuff on 
which Induction was to work. It is largely unfinished but examples of the kind of desired 
content can be found in the History of Winds, (F. Bacon, n. d.-c, pp. 381 - 466), History Natural 
and Experimental of Liee (sic) and Death (F. Bacon, 1669, passim), Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 
1670, passim) and the small entrances (introductions) to, such wonting works as History of 
Heavy and Light, History of the Sympathy and Antipathy of Things, History of Density and 
Rarity, and History of Sulphur, Mercury and Salt (F. Bacon, 1850a, pp. 464 - 466).  
4 
The Ladder of the 
Intellect. 
Evidently Bacon intended to record, as they arose during the progress of his work, general rules 
to guide application of his method, which general rules are as the steps of a ladder (Montagu, 
1850, p. 331). The brief Scaling Ladder of the Intellect; or Thread of the Labyrinth (F. Bacon, 
1850c, pp. 519 - 520) appears all so far that is available.  
5 
The Forerunners or 
Anticipations of the 
New [Second] 
Philosophy to be 
Contained in a Work 
Called Prodromus 
Philosophia Secunda, 
[The Forerunner of 
Secondary 
Philosophy] 
The intention of this section may be dimly grasped from Precursors; or Anticipations of the 
Second Philosophy (F. Bacon, 1850b, pp. 521 - 522). Here the business of scientists qua 
faithful secretaries, “[is] to receive and note down as such have been enacted by the voice of 
nature herself; and our trustiness must stand acquitted, whether they are accepted, or by the 
suffrage of general opinions rejected” (ibid., p. 521) so that, “in times yet to come, individuals 
may arise who will both be able to comprehend and digest the choicest of those things, and 
solicitous also to carry them to perfection [either as ongoing anticipations or in Active or 
Second, Philosophy]” (ibid., p. 521, my square brackets). “The anticipations [of Second 
Philosophy] he intended to pay down as use, till he might furnish the world with the principal” 
(Archbishop Tennison quoted in Montagu, 1834b, p. 331). 
6 
The New Philosophy 
or Second Philosophy 
or Active Science 
The New Philosophy or Active Science, Bacon’s Philosophia Secunda, is the not-reached 
summit of his Great Instauration. “The sixth part of my work (to which the rest is subservient 
and ministrant) discloses and sets forth that philosophy which by the legitimate, chaste, and 
severe course of inquiry which I have explained and provided is at length developed and 
established. … For the matter in hand is no mere felicity of speculation, but the real business 
and fortunes of the human race, and all power of operation." its purpose being the “free 
investigation of individual existences [that is, of forms]” (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, pp. 52 - 53). 
 
Source: Bacon, F. (n. d.-f). The Plan of the Work. (pp. 39 - 40, 48, 53). In J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath (Eds.), The Great 
Instauration. Cambridge: Riverside Press; Bacon, F. (1669). History Natural and Experimental of Liee (sic) and Death. 
(passim). London: Printed for William Lee at the Turk's Head in Fleet Street; Bacon, F. (1670). Sylva Sylvarum: A Natural 
History in Ten Centuries (9 ed.). (passim). London: Printed by J. R. for William Lee; Bacon, F. (1850). History of Heavy and 
Light and History of the Sympathy and Antipathy of Things and History of Density and Rarity and History of Sulphur, Mercury 
and Salt. (pp. 464 – 466). In B. Montagu (Ed.), The Works of Francis Bacon. Philadelphia: A. Hart, late Carey & Hart; Bacon, 
F. (1850). Precursors: Or Anticipations of the Second Philosophy. (pp. 521 – 522). In B. Montagu (Ed.), The Works of Francis 
Bacon (Vol. III). Philadelphia: A. Hart, late Carey & Hart; Bacon, F. (1850). The Scaling Ladder of the Intellect; Or Thread of 
the Labyrinth. (pp. 419 – 420). In B. Montagu (Ed.), The Works of Francis Bacon (Vol. III). Philadelphia: A. Hart, late Carey 
& Hart; Montagu, B. (1834). Preface. (p. 331). In B. Montagu (Ed.), The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England 
(New Edition ed., Vol. XVI). London: William Pickering; Bacon, F. (n. d.). History of the Winds. (pp. 381 – 466). In J. 
Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath (Eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon (Vol. IX). Boston: Taggard and Thompson. (F. Bacon, 
1669, 1670, 1850a, 1850b, 1850c, 1864, n. d.-c, n. d.-g) 
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I proceed to investigate Bacon’s Science further through discussion of his 
classification of knowledge qua human learning, and of terms he uses in situating 
Science within that classification, that is via (b) the second of the three approaches to 
understanding Bacon’s Science outlined on page 489. Unless noted, I do not 
differentiate between Bacon’s interchangeable use of the terms information, 
knowledge and human learning.  
“All knowledge [says Bacon] admits of two kinds of information; the one inspired by 
divine revelation and the other arising from the senses” Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-a, pp. 470 - 471). The one, Divine Revelation, “this haven and Sabbath 
of human contemplations” (ibid., p. 471) Bacon “reserve[s] to the end” (ibid., p. 471, 
my square brackets), whereat, in order to proceed, he must “step out of the bark of 
human reason and enter into the ship of the church” Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, 1882a, p. 345). No sooner having done so, he pronounces that, save for 
“making a few remarks upon it” (ibid., p. 346), he had better to remain silent and 
proceeds relatively little further in subdividing Sacred or Inspired Divinity.  
Bacon does though differentiate it, Divine Revelation or Sacred Theology from 
Natural Theology which might also be 
called Divine Philosophy 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
n. d.-a, p. 477), which branch of 
philosophy, irrespective of its name, 
he would not borrow from Divine 
Revelation. Natural Theology, “of 
which … [he] will speak hereafter” 
(ibid., p. 471) is rather a division of 
philosophy on the sense information side of the hierarchy illustrated on page 494 and 
is to be treated scientifically as discussed further beginning on page 500. 
Thus says Bacon “Sacred Theology ought to be derived from the word and oracles of 
God, and not from the light of nature, or the dictates of reason” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1882a, p. 347). Morals and mysteries of religion are the stuff of
Bacon’s First Division of Knowledge 
 
Notes: (1) Divine Revelation (2) A division of Philosophy not 
borrowed from Divine Revelation. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1869). 
Advancement of Learning (pp. 470 - 471). Cambridge: Riverside 
Press. (F. Bacon, 1863b). 
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Divine Revelation except that under Natural Theology mankind can glean some dim 
understanding of good and evil, justice and injustice, virtue and vice from the light of 
nature, first because understanding occupies sense, Induction, and reason which are 
in turn part of God’s made laws of heaven and earth, and second because matters of 
good and evil spark the human mind through conscience which is “a relic of 
primitive and original purity” (ibid., p. 348). Carefully confining himself to the 
manner in which Divine Theology may be 
imparted Bacon asks that three works be 
prepared: first a “temperate and careful treatise 
… [which] as a kind of divine logic, should lay 
down proper precepts touching the use of 
human reason in theology” (ibid., p. 351) and 
which he would call Sophron or The Legitimate 
Use of Human Reason in Divine Subjects, second to preserve the peace of the church 
that a “treatise on the degrees of Unity in the kingdom of God” (ibid., p. 353) be 
provided—it would clarify what may or may not be understood about matters such as 
“one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism &c” (ibid., p. 352)—and third, a treatise which he 
would call Emanations of the Scriptures addressing how the scriptures might be 
interpreted. Otherwise he would leave matters of Divine Revelation to men of the 
church.  
On the sensory side, the so-called other, separated from the so-called one earlier 
mentioned on page 494, there are three kinds of knowledge corresponding with three 
faculties of the human soul: History begotten by memory, Poesy, henceforth Poetry 
begotten by imagination, and Philosophy, begotten by reason, and these first 
divisions subdivide further as shown in Table 53 on page 496. Bacon uses the word 
Philosophy qua Science narrowly to signify the three knowledge outcomes of reason 
as shown in the bottom three right hand cells of Table 53 and broadly to signify all 
sensory knowledge outcomes, namely, those of memory, imagination and reason. 
The three divisions are related thus: 
All History, excellent King, walks upon the earth, and performs the office rather of a 
guide than of a light; whereas Poesy is as a dream of learning; a thing sweet and 
varied, and that would be thought, to have in it something divine; a character which 
dreams likewise affect. But now it is time for me to awake, and rising above the earth, 
 
The Nature of Theology 
“Theology therefore in like manner consists 
either of Sacred History, or of Parables, which 
are a divine poesy, or of Doctrines and Precepts, 
which are a perennial philosophy. For as for that 
part which seems supernumerary, which is 
Prophecy, it is but a kind of history: for divine 
history has this prerogative over human, that the 
narration may be before the event, as well as 
after” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, n. 
d.-a, p. 409). 
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to wing my way through the clear air of Philosophy and the Sciences. Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 470) 
Reading from the top of Table 53 on page 496 History, which for Bacon is the same 
thing as experience Description Towards a Natural and Experimental History (F. 
Bacon, 1863g, p. 408), has as its object “individuals [entities] which are 
circumscribed by place and time” De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 
407, my square brackets) and he divides History into Natural History and Civil 
History.  
Table 53: Francis Bacon’s General Classification of Faculties of the Soul and Their 
Associated Categories of Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Pretergeneration catches monsters and portents resulting from errors in nature. Manufactured Nature is the product 
of arts by which nature is “moulded and made new … by the hand of man” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863a, p. 
410). (2) It is sacred and venerable as in parables. (3) “Which is also rightly called Divine Philosophy” (ibid., p. 477), the 
doctrine of “God, Unity, the nature of Good, Angels and Spirits [which] I have referred to Natural Theology” (ibid., p. 484. 
(4) There are many subdivisions as illustrated on page 502 of this enquiry. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1882). Advancement of Learning (pp. 470 - 480). Cambridge: 
Riverside Press. (F. Bacon, 1863c). 
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Natural History, which Bacon calls Mother History or Primary History Description 
Towards a Natural and 
Experimental History (F. 
Bacon, 1863g, p. 355) or 
Natural and Experimental 
History, is “the primary matter 
of philosophy” De Augmentis 
Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 1863f, 
p. 416), that “such as may 
serve to build philosophy 
upon” (ibid., p. 353). It 
contains the “primary material 
of philosophy and the stuff and 
subject-matter for true 
induction” (ibid., p. 358) and 
its three subdivisions in turn 
are defined by their objects. 
The first subdivision, generation of the species, has liberty or freedom in nature as its 
object and is further subdivided into five divisions as illustrated on page 497. The 
second subdivision, pretergeneration, has error in nature, for example monsters and 
freaks and their mineral and vegetable equivalents, as its object, and the third 
subdivision, manufacturing and the arts, has artificiality in nature as its object. Arts 
may be thought of as artificial products, manufactured things made through 
application of scientific laws. The three thus cover liberty, error and bonds in nature 
Aphorisms on the Composition of the Primary History Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, 1882a, p. 357). Bacon is “more induced to set down the History of the Arts as 
a species of Natural History” (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 410) which History of the Arts, he 
variously calls Experimental History, or History of Arts and Nature as Changed by 
Man (F. Bacon, 1863g, p. 362), and in it he would include mechanical arts, the 
operative side of the liberal sciences, and arts yet to eventuate (ibid., p. 362). 
 
 
Bacon’s Subdivisions of Natural History  
 
 
 
Notes: (1). Continues from Table 53 on page 496. A second mentioned 
division of Natural History which divides into Narrative and Inductive and 
prescribes the use and end (sic) of Natural History is not shown.  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (n. d.). De 
Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 385, 409 – 418, 437 - 439). Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company. (F. Bacon, n. d.-a). 
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Bacon’s subdivisions of the second major division of History, that is, Civil History, 
as illustrated in Table 53 on 
page 496 are Ecclesiastical, 
Literary and Civil History 
Proper of State or Empire and 
these subdivide further as 
illustrated on page 498. 
Bacon’s Catalogue of 
Particular Histories by Title 
(F. Bacon, 1863d, pp. 373 - 
381) contains an impressive list of 130 histories to be undertaken and the breadth and 
variability of the subject matter provides one measure of the extent to which Bacon 
took “all knowledge to be … [his] province” (F. Bacon, 1842, p. 2, my square 
brackets). 
Poetry, as Table 53 on page 496 reveals, is the second major sense-side division of 
understanding. Its object is: “ … individuals; that is, … individuals invented in 
imitation of those 
which are the subject of 
true history; yet with 
this difference, that it 
commonly exceeds the 
measure of nature, 
joining at pleasure 
things which in nature 
would never have come 
together, and 
introducing things 
which in nature would 
never have come to 
pass” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 
1863a, pp. 407 - 408).  
 
Of Natural or Experimental History: Part of Bacon’s Desperate Plea 
for Patronage of His Project 
Meanwhile what I have often said I must here emphatically repeat; that if 
all the wits of all the ages had met or shall hereafter meet together; if the 
whole human race had applied or shall hereafter apply themselves to 
philosophy, and the whole earth had been or shall be nothing but academies 
and colleges and schools of learned men; still without a natural and 
experimental history such as I am going to prescribe, no progress worthy of 
the human race could have been made or can be made in philosophy and the 
sciences. Whereas on the other hand, let such a history be once provided 
and well set forth, and let there be added to it such auxiliary and lightgiving 
experiments as in the very course of interpretation will present themselves 
or will have to be found out and the investigation of nature and of all 
sciences will be the work of a few years. Description Towards a Natural 
and Experimental History. (F. Bacon, 1863g, p. 354). 
 
 
Bacon’s Subdivisions of Civil History 
 
 
 
Notes: (a) Continues from Table 53 on page 496. (1) There is a second subdivision of 
Civil History Proper into Pure and Mixed. (2) There is a further two-fold subdivision 
of now-called Histories of Times, into Universals and Particulars and Annals and 
Journals. Bacon’s adds two appendices to History which respectively treat of History 
According to Words and, History According to Actions, the former treating of 
Speeches, Letters, and Apophthegms.  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (n. d.). De Augmentis 
Scientiaurum. (pp. 386, 418 - 439). Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-a). 
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Perhaps Bacon enjoyed selected poems of some of the now-called metaphysical 
poets (Donne, 1864; G. Herbert, 1907) but then, wow, he lived amongst foul-and-
fair-dagger-before-me-fearful-for-its-superstitious-age poetic imagery, irrespective of 
all those conjectures about the identity of the real Shakespeare. He lived in the age of 
the gunpowder plot, the publication of Shakespeare’s first folio, the establishment of 
the Jamestown, Jamaica colony, the landing of Mayflower in North America and 
appointment of his friend Ben Jonson as first Poet Laureate. 
Poetry is subdivided into three divisions, Narrative which imitates History and 
exaggerates beyond probability, Dramatic which has the 
theatre for its world and makes past History visible, and 
Parabolical, something sacred and revered which renders 
objects of the intellect represented in forms into objects of 
the sense Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863b, p. 
440). For example, as parable it might join divinity with 
humanity and as fable it might carry mystery to matters of 
state and philosophy Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
1863b, pp. 439 - 469). Bacon’s On Principles and Origins According to the Fables of 
Cupid and Coelum (F. Bacon, 1882e) provides a glimpse of Bacon employing what 
he calls fable and parable in exegesis of essences having no earlier cause, God 
excepted, older or first Cupid himself having no parent or cause, and as well, 
exegesis of Democritean atomism and of whether or not the number of principles are 
infinite, after the fable of Coelum (ibid., pp. 463 - 480). His Wisdom of the Ancients 
(F. Bacon, 1884, pp. 324 - 425) contains thirty-one applications of such writing 
which, for Bacon, is relatively direct in style. Bacon’s explanation of poetry provides 
a rare insight into utility of poetry in an era when imagination could not express itself 
through photography, moving film and television, radio, digital imagery and sound, 
and holograms, a time when written word could mainly ally with sculpture, painting, 
singing, balcony music and sound effects from cannon and fireworks.  
Giglioni (2012, pp. 62 - 86) develops a notion that fabula is to history what materia 
is to nature. Historia is history and fabula is fable (ibid., p. 65) and Natural 
Philosophy is predicated on a body of knowledge called Materia which is engendered 
Bacon’s Subdivisions of 
Poetry 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian 
Eddington from Bacon, F. 
(1882). Advancement of 
Learning. (pp. 439 – 469). 
Boston: Taggard and 
Thompson. (F. Bacon, 1863e). 
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by history and fable. Materia—the reader is appraised of its specific meaning in the 
last sentence of the paper (ibid., p. 86)—turns out to be a necessary body of 
knowledge without which the exercise of thinking may not be sustained. In between, 
Giglioni argues the semantics of history and fable to conjecture, inter alia, that for 
Bacon there can be no such thing as a pure use of reason, of which condition he 
leaves the reader informed only that pure use of reason is something different from 
reasoning about nature’s inner appetites which is pronounced impure (ibid., p. 62).  
Philosophy, the third major division of understanding illustrated in Table 53 on page 
496, divides into Natural Theology, Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Man, the 
rationale for the division being the respective predication of each of the named 
categories on their objects God, nature and man(kind). Philosophy’s object is not 
individuals or their immediate sense impressions but rather “abstract notions derived 
from these impressions; in the composition and division whereof according to the 
law of nature and fact its business lies” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863a, 
p. 408). 
Natural Theology is knowledge about God obtained from the study of God’s 
creatures. Enquiry about God’s existence, wisdom, prescience and power is 
permissible under Natural Theology Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 
478), likewise inquiry about the nature of angels and spirits (ibid., p. 479) and “it is 
no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits in Natural Theology, than to 
inquire the force of poisons in Physics, or the nature of vice in Ethics.” (ibid., p. 479 
– 480). As for the mysteries of faith: “‘Give unto faith the things which are faith's’” 
(ibid., p. 478). It is not safe for Natural Theology to go there.  
Natural Philosophy is knowledge about cause and effect and its subdivisions are 
illustrated in the hierarchy on page 501. Natural Philosophy is discussed further 
beginning on page 502. 
Philosophy of Man is knowledge about mankind. As shown in the bottom right hand 
subdivision of Table 53 on page 496, Philosophy of Man divides into Human 
Philosophy and Civil Philosophy respectively according to its focus on either
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man(kind) qua man, that is man segregated, or man(kind) in society, that is 
man(kind) congregated. Ongoing subdivisions of both Human and Civil Philosophy 
are shown in the accompanying boxed hierarchy on page 502 and Bacon groups 
Ethics with Logic under Use of Faculty as a subdivision of rational soul as shown in 
the purple-fill subdivision of that page 502 hierarchy. Further discussion of 
Philosophy of Man is held over until discussion of Ethics on enquiry pages 519 to 
page 558, including logic’s service to it, on pages 523 to 525. Again, for Bacon, the 
terms Science and philosophy are used interchangeably so that Natural Theology and 
Human Philosophy are, like Natural Philosophy, recipients of Bacon’s inductive 
method which is discussed below beginning on page 512.  
Table 54: Bacon’s Subdivisions of Natural Philosophy 
 
 
 
Notes: (a) The hierarchy continues from Table 53 on page 496. Of Natural Philosophy: “From the two kinds of axioms which 
have been spoken of, arises a just division of philosophy and the sciences … Thus, let the investigation of Forms, which are 
(in the eye of reason at least, and in their essential law) eternal and immutable, constitute Metaphysics; and let the 
investigation of the Efficient Cause, and of Matter, and of the Latent Process, and the Latent Configuration (all of which have 
reference to the common and ordinary course of nature, not to her eternal and fundamental laws) constitute Physics. And to 
these let there he subordinate two practical divisions: to Physics, Mechanics; to Metaphysics, what (in purer sense of the 
word) I call Magic, on account of the broadness of the ways it moves in, and its greater command over nature” Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1863f, pp. 177 - 178). (1) “Certainly nothing beyond nature: but of nature itself much the most excellent 
part” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 484). Thus Metaphysic has a new usage and understanding in Bacon’s 
new beginning, as the enquiry text explains. (2) Likewise Magic too has a new usage as also explained in the enquiry text. 
Bacon does not exclude the words Final Cause as a category from Metaphysics per se—“Division of Speculative doctrine 
concerning nature, into Physic (special) and Metaphysic. Whereof Physic inquires of the Efficient Cause and the Material; 
Metaphysic of the Final Cause and the Form” De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. d.-i, p. 388). Again “It follows that 
the true difference between them [Physic and Metaphysic] must be drawn from the nature of the causes that they inquire into. 
And therefore to speak plain and go no further about, Physic inquires and handles the Material and Efficient Causes, 
Metaphysic the Formal and Final” (ibid., p. 485). Bacon does though preclude use of Final Cause in Physic and operative 
Metaphysic. Hence in this classification of Natural Philosophy into Speculative and Operative and the first subdivisions of 
these, only Formal Cause is shown under Metaphysic. Bacon would have two appendices for the operative side: Inventory of 
the Possessions of Man and Catalogue of the Polychrests which are “things of general use” (F. Bacon, 1863e, p. 512), 
together with A Great Appendix on Mathematic relevant to both speculative and operative sides (ibid., p. 517 – 520). 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F, (n. d.). De Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 387 – 388, 480 - 517). Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company.(F. Bacon, n. d.-a). 
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In his division of Natural Philosophy into a speculative side consisting of Physic and 
Metaphysic, and an operative side consisting of Mechanic and Magic as set out in the 
attendant hierarchy on page 501 Bacon attributes new and specific meanings to the 
terms Physic, Metaphysic, Mechanic and Magic employed there and also to the terms 
Induction and Form employed elsewhere in association with Science.  
Bacon’s Subdivisions of Philosophy of Man  
 
Notes: (a) Continued from Bottom right cell of Table 53 on page 496. (1) The made soul or spirit through which the divine or 
rational soul operates in mankind, not simply the irrational sensitive soul shared with the beasts. (2) Logic subdivides into 
Invention, Judgement, Retention, and Tradition with further subdivisions as illustrated on page 523 and Ethics further 
subdivides into the Exemplar or Template of the Good exemplifying the nature of the good, and Culture of the Mind which sets 
out the rules for attainment of the Exemplar of the Good as illustrated on page 522. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1863). De Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 389 - 394). In Spedding, J. 
Ellis, R. and Heath, D. The Works of Francis Bacon. Boston: Taggard and Thompson (F. Bacon, 1863f); Bacon, F. (1882). De 
Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 13 – 357). Cambridge: Riverside Press. (F. Bacon, 1882a).  
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He “desires men to observe that … [he] use[s] the word metaphysic in a different 
sense from that which is commonly received” (F. 
Bacon, 1863f, p. 482) and in respect of this 
usage, and usage in general, where his 
“conceptions and notions are novel and differ 
from the ancient” (ibid., p. 482), his intention is 
to first retain “with scrupulous care the ancient 
terms” (ibid., p. 482) as signifiers, carriers and 
appropriate markers of his nuance and novelty of 
meaning. Those ancient terms he speaks of are 
not those of Aristotle and the Greeks, but are true 
ancient terms of earlier antiquity. Thus for 
example Metaphysic(s) is something different 
from Aristotle’s metaphysics and the 
Schoolmen’s renderings of it. In his next ink 
Bacon is again severe and spiteful on Aristotle 
and Plato, likening them to thieves of terms. 
Generally Bacon is able to acknowledge 
considerable wit in greats like Aristotle and 
Plato, and others too, but again here, as earlier cited, he might be named by some to 
be at what, in modern terms, might be called a mode of Greek bashing. 
Metaphysic says Bacon is not Primitive or Summary Philosophy “the common 
ancestor to all knowledge” (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 484) which has for its objects both 
“common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several 
sciences” (ibid., p. 484) nor the “Relative and Adventitious Conditions of Essences 
(which I have termed Transcendentals); as Much, Little; Like, Unlike; Possible, 
Impossible, and the rest; with this provision alone, that they be handled as they have 
efficacy in nature, and not logically” (ibid., p. 484). Rather, “Metaphysic is a branch 
or portion of Natural Philosophy” (ibid., p. 484). It is “certainly nothing beyond 
nature; but of nature itself much the most excellent part” (ibid., p. 484) and its 
essential nature may be understood by differentiating it from Physic. Thus, says 
Bacon, Physic addresses that which is most inherent in matter and therefore
 
Metaphysic and Its Object 
“So then always that knowledge is worthiest 
which least burdens the intellect with 
multiplicity; and this appears to be Metaphysic, 
as that which considers chiefly the simple forms 
of things (which I have above termed forms of 
the first class); since although few in number, 
yet in their commensurations and co-ordinations 
they make all this variety” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, pp. 507 - 508). 
 
“The second respect which ennobles this part of 
Metaphysic, is that it enfranchises the power of 
men to the greatest liberty, and leads it to the 
widest and most extensive field of operation … 
it being less restrained and tied in operation, 
either to the basis of the matter or to the 
condition of the efficient…” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 508). 
 
“Thus, let the investigation of Forms, which are 
(in the eye of reason at least, and in their 
essential law) eternal and immutable, constitute 
Metaphysics; and let the investigation of the 
Efficient Cause, and of Matter, and of the Latent 
Process, and the Latent Configuration (all of 
which have reference to the common and 
ordinary course of nature, not to her eternal and 
fundamental laws) constitute Physics. And to 
these let there be subordinate two practical 
divisions: to Physics, Mechanics; to 
Metaphysics, what (in purer sense of the word) I 
call Magic, on account of the broadness of the 
ways it moves in, and its greater command over 
nature” New Organon (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, pp. 177 
- 178). 
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transitory, vague and variable and does not search for the constant (ibid., p. 485)—
his example being that Physic would study fire qua heat applied to wax, its effect 
being melting or fire qua heat applied to clay, its 
effect being hardening—whereas Metaphysic, 
which focuses on the unified and constant, would 
address motion as the form or essence or one 
difference of heat which unites and explains all 
identified presences of it by Physic.  
Physic walks to Metaphysic in two steps, first the 
finding of various accidents in bodies and 
creatures, a lion may be brown or white, and 
secondly the finding of natures, for example heat 
or gravity, in various substances, heat for example 
being present in fire, sunlight, quicklime, 
decomposition and the like, and in these two steps 
it bridges Natural History with Metaphysic. In 
Natural History mode the mind works at observing, 
compiling and relating the facts—Bacon’s word—
of sense to Physic. In Physic mode the mind may 
investigate the variable, that is, the material and 
efficient causes, amongst the reported observations 
of Natural History. Metaphysic in turn investigates 
the formal cause of simple natures such as “dense, 
rare, hot, cold, heavy, light, tangible, pneumatic, 
volatile, fixed, and the like, as well configurations 
as motions, causes” (ibid., p. 505) inherent in cases 
Physic brings to it, Physic as earlier explained, 
being constrained to investigate only at the levels 
of material and efficient cause. Thus again, in the case of fire discussed in  the 
previous paragraph, Metaphysic would look beyond fire, an accident of hotness or 
heat, and proceed to isolating the form of hotness or heat per se which, as Bacon has 
elsewhere revealed, is motion Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 391). 
 
On Bacon’s Reform of Magic (a) 
The Fourth Section is, the Hiftory of 
Sympathy and Antipathy, Of this we have 
only the Aditus annexed to that of Hifioria 
Gravis & Levis, and a few Inftances in his 
Sylva Sylvarum (r). In this Hiftory he 
defigned to avoid Magical Fancies, which 
raife the Mind, in thofe things, to an un-due 
height and pretence of occultnefs of Quality, 
which layeth the Mind afleep, and 
preventeth further Inquiry into thefe ufeful 
fecrcts of Nature. Baconiana (Tennison, 
1679, p. 39). 
 
The Seventh and greateft Branch of the 
Third Part of the Inftauration is his Sylva 
Sylvarum, or Natural Hiftory, which 
containeth many Materials for the building 
of Philofophy, as the Organum doth 
Directions for the Work. It is an Hiftory not 
only of Nature freely moving in her Courfe, 
(as in the producftion of Meteors, Plants, 
Minerals); but alfo of Nature in conftraint, 
and vexed and tortur'd by Humane Art and 
Experiment. And it is not an Hiftory of such 
things orderly ranged; but thrown into an 
Heap. For his Lordship, that he might not 
difcourage other Collectors, did not caft this 
Book into exact Method; for which reafon it 
hath the lefs Ornament, but not much the 
left Ufe. In this Book are contain'd 
Experiments of Light, and Experiments of 
Ufe (as his Lordfhip was wont to 
diftinguifh); and amongft them fome 
Extraordinary and others Common. He 
underftood that what was Common in one 
Country, might be a Rarity in another: For 
which Reafon, Dr. Caiius when in Italy, 
thought it worth his pains to make a large 
and Elegant Defcription of Our way of 
Brewing. His Lordfhip alfo knew well, that 
an Experiment manifeft to the Vulgar, was a 
good ground for the Wife to build further 
upon. And himfelf rendred Common ones 
extraordinary by Admonitions, for further 
Trials and Improvements. Hence his 
Lordfhip took occafion to fay (w), that his 
writing of Silva Sylvarum, was (to fpeak 
properly) not a Natural Hiftory, but a high 
kind of Natural Magic: Because it was not 
only a defcription of Nature, but a breaking 
of Nature into great and ftrange Works(1).  
Baconiana (Tennison, 1679, pp. 41 - 42). 
 
Notes: (a) Letter s is sometimes represented 
by letter f. (1) Here experimental Science = 
magic. 
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Such Metaphysic, hitherto neglected says Bacon, lies at the heart of his newness and 
novelty. It collects and unites the axioms of sciences “into more general ones, and 
such as may comprehend all individual cases” De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. 
Bacon, 1863f, p. 507) doing so without the help of final cause, its focus being on 
unity and Forms of the various simple natures of which compound beings consist. 
The one to whom Metaphysic has revealed the Form of a simple nature “knows also 
the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter, and 
so is less restrained and tied in operation, either to the basis of the matter [material 
cause] or to the condition of the efficient [efficient cause]” (ibid., p. 508, my square 
brackets). Thus, by virtue of Metaphysic, of which more later, human understanding 
may employ formal cause in scientific interpretation of nature. Again, Bacon does 
not banish the words final cause from Metaphysic per se: “And therefore to speak 
plain and go no further about, Physic inquires and handles the Material and Efficient 
Causes, Metaphysic the Formal and Final” De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. 
d.-i, p. 485). He does though preclude Metaphysic’s use of final cause in natural 
philosophy qua Science “the inquisition of Final Causes … [being] barren, and like a 
virgin consecrated to God produces nothing” De Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 
n. d.-a, p. 512).  
Bacon’s identification of speculative and operative dimensions of Physic and 
Metaphysic is germane to his reformulation of Science. As earlier illustrated in the 
hierarchy box on page 501 Bacon has Physic and Metaphysic working on the side of 
Speculative Natural Philosophy and Mechanic and Magic, respective twins of Physic 
and Metaphysic, working on the Operative side of Natural Philosophy. He explains 
Mechanic as the operative side of the “inquisition of Efficient and Material causes” 
(ibid., p. 512) and Magic as the Operative side of “the inquisition of Forms and 
Metaphysic” (ibid., p. 512). Bacon understands Magic “as the science which applies 
the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operation; and by 
uniting (as they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of nature.” 
(ibid., p. 514). It is not the superstitious quackery that “flutters about” (ibid., p. 514) 
in astrology, and some parts of alchemy. Again, on the face of it, Bacon’s words final 
cause are not expelled from Metaphysics per se as a division of knowledge but they 
have no place in Metaphysic qua Science. 
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In short, Natural History, by observation and experiment, accumulates knowledge in 
readiness for further processing by Physic and 
Metaphysic and their respective twins Mechanic 
and Magic in search of simple natures or forms for 
further application through superinduction. This 
further processing occurs in compartments of new 
Science praxis framed by differing scientific 
domain and interrogation field subdivisions as 
shown in the accompanying illustration on page 
506. In a speculative domain Physic addresses 
efficient and material causes of simple natures in 
individual bodies and Metaphysic addresses Forms, 
those laws or causes common to various bodies in which differing groupings of 
simple natures are found present. In an Operative domain Mechanic, qua twin of 
Physic educes simple natures of efficient and 
material being in various individual bodies and 
Magic qua twin of Metaphysic educes Form, and 
may apply it, that law or cause accounting for the 
common presence of those simple natures in various 
individual beings identified by Physics, in 
superinduction. In this manner Metaphysic and 
Magic are respectively superior Sciences than 
Physic and Mechanic. My own reading of Bacon is 
that those domain and interrogation frame borders 
as I have called them can, cognitively, hardly be 
strictly mutually exclusive, but rather intersecting or 
porous sufficient to allow a seamless unified 
system. Mutual exclusivity of Bacon’s knowledge 
divisions remains a question of scholarly interest as 
the content of text box on page 507 attests. 
So far in this section I have addressed Bacon’s usage of the terms Physic, 
Metaphysic, Mechanic, and Magic and the nuance Bacon attributes to them. I have
Bacon’s Science: Domain by Interrogation 
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Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from 
Bacon, F. (1882). De Augmentis 
Scientiaurum (pp. 480 - 517). Boston: 
Taggard and Thompson. (F. Bacon, 1863a).. 
 
Superinduction and Where it Fits In 
“The rule or axiom for the transformation of 
bodies is of two kinds. The first regards a 
body as a troop or collection of simple 
natures. In gold, for example, the following 
properties meet. It is yellow in colour, heavy 
up to a certain weight; malleable or ductile 
to a certain degree of extension; it is not 
volatile, and loses none of its substance by 
the action of fire; it turns into a liquid with a 
certain degree of fluidity; it is separated and 
dissolved by particular means; and so on for 
the other natures which meet in gold. This 
kind of axiom, therefore, deduces the thing 
from the forms of simple natures. For he 
who knows the forms of yellow, weight, 
ductility, fixity, fluidity, solution, and so on, 
and the methods for superinducing them, 
and their gradations and modes, will make it 
his care to have them joined together in 
some body, whence may follow the 
transformation of that body into gold. … It 
must be said however that this mode of 
operation (which looks to simple natures 
though in a compound body) proceeds from 
what in nature is constant and eternal and 
universal, and opens broad roads to human 
power, such as (in the present state of 
things) human thought can scarcely 
comprehend or anticipate” Novum Organum 
(F. Bacon, n. d.-e, pp. 171 - 172).  
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also flagged Bacon’s nuanced usages of the terms Induction and Form. I discuss 
Induction further beginning on page 
516. Bacon’s nuanced usage of the 
term Form is an important marker of 
his departure from Aristotelian 
tradition in Science and political 
philosophy. For example, Aphorisms 
11 to 20 of Book 2 of Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1952b, pp. 140 - 
153) contain Bacon’s derivation of 
the Form of heat which derivation he 
uses to explain that part of his 
method called ‘the first vintage” 
(ibid., p. 152). Here Form is 
equivalent to true definition “relative 
to the universe and not to the sense” 
(ibid.). Elsewhere Forms are called 
“true differences of things (which are 
in fact the laws of pure act” Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 107) 
or “essences” of things De Augmentis 
Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, pp. 
410, 506) or the “true specific 
difference, or nature-engendering 
nature, or source of emanation (for these are the terms which come nearest to a 
description of the thing)” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 167). To discover 
Form “is the work and aim of Human Knowledge” (ibid., p. 167). 
The simple natures, for which Forms may be sought are few in number De 
Augmentus Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 508), hot, cold, dense rare, heavy, 
light, gravity, tangible, pneumatic, volatile, fixed, and the like—the last phrase 
growing the few-in-number to some forty-one possible candidates Advancement of
 
On Mutual Exclusivity of Bacon’s Divisions of Knowledge 
Bacon’s impressive and intricate hierarchy of knowledge, 
although quickly challenged during the 16th and 17th centuries 
(Hume, 1902, 2011; Kant, 1952a, 1952b, 1952c; Locke, 1912) 
continues to be of scholarly interest. For example Anstey (2012, 
pp. 11 - 31) reasons that within Bacon’s divisions of knowledge as 
these are set down in 1605 in Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
1882a), and subsequently in 1623 in De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. d.-a), Natural Philosophy converges 
and overlaps with Natural History, they not being discrete 
categories. Consequently Bacon’s distinction between speculative 
and operative Natural Philosophy differs from that employed in 
methodology used by members of the early Royal Society.  A 
recent paper by Manzo is generally relevant in respect of the 
question of mutual exclusiveness or otherwise of Bacon’s 
categorisation of human learning. Manzo (2012, pp. 32 - 61) 
compares Bacon's theory and practice of Natural History with 
those of Civil History through exegesis of the ways in which they 
connect with Natural and Human Philosophy and finds, in spite of 
their different subject content, sufficient commonality in 
methodology and assumption to suggest convergence of concept 
in them. Causes or axioms qua theoretical end-products of Natural 
History and precepts qua speculative outcomes of Perfect Civil 
History are sufficiently simpatico through their commonality as to 
affect change in both the state of nature and of man, respectively.  
 
In turn, Locke’s and Kant’s hierarchies of knowledge  with their 
insightful and intricate subdivisions, and in spite of their 
brilliance, also proved clinically unworkable during the march of 
practical Science, and in part because of mutual exclusiveness of 
division issues, yet on a basis of deep introspection of mind 
discerning mind, such hierarchies are so impressive. Today’s 
neuroscientists, who seek to locate mind function to particular 
regions of the physical brain also appear in turn to be facing 
problems of definitional mutual exclusiveness in their attempts to 
match grey-matter regions with specific operative sensory 
function (Oscar-Berman, 2004, pp. 159 - 160; Toga & Mazziotta, 
2002, pp. 1 - 32). Likewise, in immunology, the blood-brain 
barrier has lost some of its status as a safe working assumption 
(D'Ambrosio, 2005, pp. 244 - 246). To claim that the beautiful 
periodic table with its classification of elements bound with 
Bohr’s construct of the atom may one day become obsolete, is to 
ask to be laughed out of court, and so too is to suggest that 
biological taxonomies after the heritage of Linnaeus and Darwin 
may well fall to new classifications predicated on 
genome/phenome logic. Yet in the fullness of time such changes 
may well eventuate.  
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Learning (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 498) mentioned by Bacon. They are Forms of the first 
class (F. Bacon, 1863f, pp. 505-506, 508). Some possible forty-one simple Forms, 
some combination and permutations superinduction headache indeed, but then again, 
given the breadth of his reading Bacon might have been well aware of ancient 
estimates of combinations and permutations of ten axioms resulting in such numbers 
as more than 1,000,000 by Chrysippus (BC 280 - 207), or of (101,049)6 by 
Hipparchus, (BC 190 - 120), or of a reported estimate of 1,002,000,000,000 by 
Xenocrates (BC c.350) for the number of Greek alphabet syllables (D. Smith, 1958, 
pp. 524 - 531)—such quantities now being able to be compared with those serving 
human genome/phenome matrices, and dare it be said alphabets, there being to date 
four letters in the human genome alphabet and six billion words in its dictionary. 
Bacon’s knowledge of numbers might also lie behind his admission that knowledge 
of the Forms of compound beings might exhaust human reason. The first expression 
of the binomial theorem in the form nCr = n(n – 1) (n-s) ….(n-r+1)/r! occurred in 
Paris in 1643 (ibid., p. 527), that is, after 
Bacon’s death. However as the notes to the 
accompanying illustration on page 509 
reveal, Harriot was employing combination 
and permutation thinking in his analysis of 
language during Bacon’s lifetime. Yet 
Bacon’s comment on numbers reproduced 
in the accompanying box on page 508 might be taken to suggest an awareness of the 
numbers required by some forty-one possible Forms in their combinations and 
permutations participation in the plethora of observable beings. 
Nevertheless, Bacon employs a phoneme-letter-syllable-word-alphabet analogy in 
his Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, pp. 49, 152) and his Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1863a, pp. 505 - 506, 508) in elucidation of simple Forms and 
their functions. Thus says Bacon, just as the few letters of the alphabet make up 
countless words, so the simple natures or Forms “make up and sustain the essences 
and forms of all substances” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1860b, pp. 505 - 
506). Bacon’s various descriptions of the Forms cited in the enquiry text on page 507
 
Bacon on Mathematics in Science 
“And inquiries into nature have the best result, when they 
begin with physics and end in mathematics. Again, let no 
one be afraid of high numbers or minute fractions. For in 
dealing with numbers it is as easy to set down or conceive 
a thousand as one, or the thousandth part of an integer as 
an integer itself” (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 177). In his Great 
Appendix on Natural Philosophy both Speculative and 
Practical (F. Bacon, 1898a, pp. 147 - 150) Bacon would 
have mathematics serve both the operative and 
speculative sides of philosophy illustrated in the 
hierarchy on page 501 of this enquiry (ibid., p. 147).  
 
 509 
 
or assembled in the information box extending over pages 510 and 511, fall into two 
usage conventions. One usage admits Forms as essence or definition or differentia, 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 305), understood as the sum of the 
underived attributes which cause other 
attributes, that is, the sum of the essential 
accidents of the phenomena. The other 
usage admits Forms as laws or causes of 
natures or qualities of bodies Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1900b, pp. 368 - 369; 
Ellis, 1861, pp. 89 - 94). In Novum 
Organum Bacon collapses the first and 
second groupings into a succinct statement 
admitting Forms as “the true differences of 
things (which are in fact the laws of simple 
action)” (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 335). For 
Bacon the Forms are not Platonic ideals or 
abstractions nor Aristotelian entelechies, 
but exactly how not this latter, he does not 
appear to say. For example in general 
terms, how might motion per se as the 
Form of heat differ from motion per se as 
the entelechy of heat? Heat is not heat 
without motion, and motion and heat are inseparable if heat is to be present. This 
conundrum notwithstanding, the Forms are actual working laws, knowledge of which 
gives mankind power over nature. “The forms are fictions unless they are called by 
the name, laws of nature” (F. Bacon, 1900c, p. 322). The accompanying box on page 
512, which is a précis of columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 on page 54, highlight’s Bacon’s 
jump from forms qua geometrical shapes or unreachable numbers and presences in 
natures beings, or pattern templates not of this world, or entelechies, or Christ as 
Logos, to Forms knowable as God-ordained discernible laws of nature operable in 
superinduction, laws that through art may help mould nature for the benefit of 
mankind. Bacon’s treatment of the Forms remains a topic of scholarly interest 
(Fowler, 1899; Gaukroger, 2001; Peltonen, 1996; Rossi, 1987; Whitaker, 1970).  
Harriot’s Rudimentary Use Combination and 
Permutation Thinking in His Work on Phonetics 
 
 
Notes: The original is from Harrriot’s papers (BL Add 
MS 6782, f. 337) at the British Library. Stedall’s 
argument is that permutation and combination thinking is 
visible in Harriot’s work from the mid 1580’s but to be 
fair to Bacon most of Harriot’s work became public after 
Bacon’s death.  
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Stedall, J. 
(2007). Symbolism, Combinations, and Visual Imagery 
in the Mathematics of Thomas Harriot. (p. 381). Historia 
Mathematica, 34(4), 380 - 401. (Stedall, 2007). 
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The practical knowledge of Bacon’s Forms is power, operative power over nature (F. 
Bacon, 1900a, p. 369) which power 
travels with an attendant caveat that 
“we increasingly pray we may 
administer [that Science and its power] 
to the advantage and happiness of 
mankind” The Scaling Ladder of the 
Intellect (F. Bacon, 1850c, p. 520, my 
square brackets) of which more later in 
the chapter’s discussion on Ethics. 
Efficient and material causes are “mere 
vehicles conveying form to particular 
substances” (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 369) 
and as earlier demonstrated form, once 
known through Metaphysic, might be 
employed in Mechanic and in 
superinductions in Magic under 
Bacon’s clarified meaning of that term.  
Bacon claims that the “roads to human 
knowledge and human power lie close 
together and are nearly the same” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 169) and in 
discovery of the Forms, and their use in superinduction, the contemplative should 
serve the active for, in respect of true Forms, the active and contemplative “are one 
and the same thing; and what in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most 
true” (ibid., p. 171) which statement begs questions about the nobility of the 
operative above the speculative domain and vice versa. Truth and utility are one 
because they catch the “true marks of the Creator” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
1900c, p. 363) as these are imprinted on, and defined in, the matter of his creatures 
(ibid., p. 363). In particular: 
Human knowledge and human power meet in one; and where the cause is not known 
the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that 
 
Bacon on Simple Forms 
To God, truly, the Giver and Architect of Forms, and it may 
be to the angels and higher intelligences, it belongs to have an 
affirmative knowledge of forms immediately, and from the 
first contemplation. (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, p. 204). 
 
I have thought it my duty besides to make a separate history 
of such Virtues as may be considered cardinal in nature. I 
mean those original passions or desires of matter which 
constitute the primary elements of nature; such as Dense and 
Rare, Hot and Cold, Solid and Fluid, Heavy and Light, and 
several others. (F. Bacon, n. d.-e, pp. 48 - 49). 
 
The power of man cannot possibly be emancipated and freed 
from the common course of nature, and expanded and exalted 
to new efficients and new modes of operation, except by the 
revelation and discovery of Forms of this kind” The New 
Organon. (F. Bacon, n. d.-d, pp. 206 - 207). 
 
If a man be acquainted with the cause of any nature (as 
whiteness or heat) in certain subjects only, his knowledge is 
imperfect; and if he be able to superinduce an effect on certain 
substances only (of those susceptible of such effect), his 
power is in like manner imperfect. Now if a man's knowledge 
be confined to the efficient and material causes (which are 
unstable causes, and merely vehicles, or causes which convey 
the form in certain cases) he may arrive at new discoveries in 
reference to substances in some degree similar to one another, 
and selected beforehand; but he does not touch the deeper 
boundaries of things. But whosoever be acquainted with 
Forms, embraces the unity of nature in substances the most 
unlike; and is able therefore to detect and bring to light things 
never yet done, and such as neither the vicissitudes of nature, 
nor industry in experimenting, nor accident itself, would ever 
have brought into act, and which would never have occurred 
to the thought of man. From the discovery of Forms therefore 
results truth in speculation and freedom in operation. The New 
Organon (F. Bacon, 1863a, pp. 168 - 169). 
(Continued in the next page.) 
 
 511 
 
which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. Novum Organum (F. 
Bacon, 1863f, pp. 67 - 68, Aphorism III) 
Bacon’s Induction is predicated on simple cause and effect and Hume was in turn to 
kick down that logic, as Bacon had 
kicked down Aristotelian syllogism. 
Successive generations however 
employ induction and cause and effect 
thinking in the cut and thrust of 
everyday existence, even in cases 
where their lives depend on them. 
Nevertheless, in respect of the 
preceding quote, Bacon’s usage of 
obedience to nature is disputed. For 
example, Funari claims that it would 
be a mistake to interpret Bacon’s 
usage of obey in a sense of humble submission, before nature, of human initiative to 
know, and suggests that Bacon’s sense is closer to observe and correctly interpret 
nature (Funari, 2001, p. 5) and I return to this question below in the section on 
Ethics. God and his spirit as final cause cannot, as earlier discussed, be known 
through Science.  
In summary of this section—that is window (b) of the three insight opportunities 
identified on page 489, which treats of Bacon’s classification of knowledge, his 
situation of Science within that classification, and his nuance of terms prescription of 
that Science—Bacon’s Physic and Metaphysic, broadly examined, might not on the 
face of it be as different from received Aristotelian usage of these categories as he, 
Bacon, might have it believed. For Aristotle, Physics deals with individual beings 
subject to motion, coming to be, being and ceasing to be while for Bacon it addresses 
that which is most inherent in matter and therefore transitory, vague and variable and 
does not search for the constant. For Aristotle Metaphysic focuses on the immovable 
and unchanging, for Bacon it addresses the unified and constant. So much is evident 
from a comparison of the content of this section with that of the description of 
 
Bacon on Simple Forms  
(Continued from the Previous page.) 
For a true and perfect rule of operation then the direction will 
be that it be certain, free, and disposing or leading to action. 
And this is the same thing with the discovery of the true Form. 
For the Form of a nature is such, that given the Form the nature 
infallibly follows. Therefore it is always present when the 
nature is present, and universally implies it, and is constantly 
inherent in it. Again, the Form is such, that if it be taken away 
the nature infallibly vanishes. Therefore it is always absent 
when the nature is absent, and implies its absence, and inheres 
in nothing else. Lastly, the true Form is such that it deduces the 
given nature from some source of being which is inherent in 
more natures, and which is better known in the natural order of 
things than the Form itself. For a true and perfect axiom of 
knowledge then the direction and precept will be, that another 
nature be discovered which is Convertible with the given 
nature, and yet is a limitation, of a more general nature, as of a 
true and real genus, Now these two directions, the one active 
the other contemplative, are one and the same thing; and what 
in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most true. 
Novum Organum (F. Bacon, n. d.-e, pp. 170 - 171). 
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Aristotle’s terms provided on pages 211 and 212 of this enquiry. Yet the difference 
lies in the detail. 
For example Bacon rips metaphysics out of Aristotelian theology and places it, as 
Metaphysic, within nature, the best 
part of nature. He then discards final 
cause from Metaphysic qua Science. 
He makes the inseparable entelechies 
qua forms extractable and operational 
as Forms or laws of nature, outside 
the permission of final cause. He 
holds that Science is not Science 
without experimentation insisting on 
a higher order of operative Mechanic 
and Magic working towards 
superinduction above the yet vital 
speculative Physic and Metaphysic 
working to supply superinduction 
with its Forms. His Science is boldly 
utilitarian being for the betterment of 
mankind’s estate. Bacon’s nuanced 
usage of the terms Physic, 
Metaphysic, Mechanic, Magic, Form 
and Induction, the latter yet to be 
more fully discussed, when taken 
together with his exclusion of final 
cause from Science, are, in the methodology of this enquiry, confronting to 
Aristotelian syllogistic method in particular, and his received political philosophy in 
general.  
I continue articulation of the nature of Bacon’s Science through discussion of his 
scientific method, the role he ascribes to Induction within that method, and the nature 
Travelling Nuance for the Term Form 
Users Usage 
Presocratic 
Scientists 
The shapes, the things or beings, into which 
matter successively arranges itself. 
Pythagoreans 
The soul or mind found in humans and in nature 
as number. 
Plato 
The ideas - real objective existences accessible by 
the soul; patterns and templates through 
reminiscence of which the objects of the universe 
are able to be understood. 
Aristotle 
For inanimate natural beings: the entelechy of the 
body and that which defines what a thing is.  
 
For animate objects: “the first grade of actuality 
of a natural organised body” De anima II 
412a25–412b (Aristotle, 1952, p. 642; 1957, 
1984). It is the soul.  
 
For manufactured bodies: the ‘thisness’ or 
‘thatness’ brought to proximate matter, for 
example the shape, a Doric column say, of wood 
or bronze, of which proximate matter the artefact 
is made.  
Aquinas Christ as logos: all nature exists in God.  
Francis 
Bacon 
True differences of things, simple Laws of Nature 
which constitute the essence or definition or 
differentia of a phenomenon qua the sum of the 
essential accidents and which may bring mankind 
power over nature. For Bacon, Forms, unlike 
entelechies, are extractable. 
Thomas 
Hobbes 
There are no Platonic universal forms. Only 
singulars exist in reality and universals as names 
are only words or signs and exist nowhere. 
Universals are not essences, form or essence 
being the dominant accident which identifies the 
matter of the singular being or body (Hobbes, 
1913, p. 67). There are no independent formal or 
final causes, each of these collapses into efficient 
cause. Effects are caused by material and efficient 
causes acting together. 
 
Source: This box is a précis of columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 on 
page 54. 
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of that Induction itself, which articulation constitutes the work of (c), that third 
window into Bacon’s Science identified on page 489.  
Of the divisions and subdivisions of human understanding discussed over pages 495 
to 505 with the aid of illustrative 
hierarchy tables, those involving the 
interpretation of nature fall under a 
precept of scientific method requiring 
that investigation proceed under two 
caveats, one pertaining to how to “educe 
and form axioms from experience” 
Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 
178) and the other pertaining to how to “deduce and derive new experiments from 
axioms” (ibid., p.178). The former caveat, which frames eduction of axioms, 
employs all of sense, memory and mind and consists of eduction of a Natural or 
Experimental History—made “sufficient and good” (ibid., 178), through application 
of “Tables and Arrangements of Instances” (ibid., p. 178)—to serve as a foundation 
for the latter caveat which frames application of Bacon’s true Induction and 
procedures of method which house it. I discuss the nature of Bacon’s Induction, and 
experimentation within it, below beginning on page 514. 
Although the scientific method Bacon advocates appears cumbersome, he requires 
that natural philosophers, no matter how great their individual excellence, must 
conduct their investigations according to its process because it “levels men’s wits” 
Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 362) and replaces much of their superiority 
with “most certain rules and demonstrations” (ibid., p. 362). His method of science 
involves arriving at the Forms or causes of things by a rigorous process of “rejections 
and exclusions (ibid., p. 363).  
Before applying Bacon’s scientific method, investigators must first rid their minds of 
individual whim and preferences from which basis they ordinarily investigate nature. 
These whims or so-called “idols or phantoms” Plan of the Work (F. Bacon, n. d.-g, p. 
45) of the human soul are “prejudices, false conceptions, and errors of the mind” 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 306). They are explained in Table 55 
 
Eduction 
The Oxford English Dictionary’s reported first usage of the 
word is by Bulwer in 1649, that is after Bacon’s death, and 
in Bulwer’s usage it is “a leading forth or out, a putting 
forth” (OED, 1970c). Eduction as “the action of drawing 
forth, eliciting, from a state of latent, rudimentary, or 
potential existence; the action of educing (principles, results 
of calculation) from the data” (OED, 1970c. p. 45 for letter 
E) is tracked emerging from 1649 to 1865. On the Science 
and technology side Watt had, by 1782, patented eduction 
pipes (ibid.) which by 1829 were connected to eduction 
valves (ibid.). Eduction may well be a translator’s word but 
this speculation is not to say that it mistakes Bacon’s 
meaning. 
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on page 515, are four in number, and are induced from experience or are a kind of 
innate self-deception inherent in the human cognitive condition Plan of the Work (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-g, p. 45).  
The idols arise in the collective human condition, and in individual nature. They also 
arise in culture and education 
and the tyranny of words, and 
from false philosophies and 
theories. They are a block to 
scientific enquiry Advancement 
of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, 
pp. 156 - 159). Until individuals 
rid themselves of idols they are 
restricted to studying nature 
through a Turner-on-a-smudgy-
day filter and, even once freed of those idols, if freed they can be, Constable-on-on-
a-clear-day glimpses of nature’s formal togetherness may trend on the side of 
exception rather than rule, nature’s laws sometimes likely being so complex, so 
secret, so hidden, so through a glass darkly as to be beyond the reach of humans. 
While the painting analogy may adduce enigma or complexity in Bacon’s 
preparation for method, it hardly catches the full-souled painters. Constable can 
smudge exquisite storm pictures too (Constable, 1818 - 1819), and Turner also has an 
eye for detail (J. M. W. Turner, 1796, 1833). Nevertheless, once purified of the idols, 
mind might begin its task of mirroring nature. It must start with observation and, 
through eduction, systematically coordinate that accumulated sense experience into 
scientific propositions. Only when these propositions are made robust under further 
examination and experimentation, can they be used to make discoveries. As 
mentioned on page 513 the aim of Science is to find the causes or laws, qua Forms of 
natural phenomena, heat being explained there as a natural phenomenon or nature, 
the Form or cause of which Bacon was want to discover.  
There are a number of initial steps in Bacon’s scientific method each of which 
requires completion of tables “the office and use [of which he calls] the presenting a
 
The Idols(1) in a Different Cut of Ermine? 
In brief, our only direct view of the mind depends on a part of that very 
mind, a self process that we have good reason to believe cannot provide 
a comprehensive and reliable account of what is going on. At first 
glance, after acknowledging the self as our entry into knowledge, it 
may appear paradoxical, not to mention ungrateful, to question its 
reliability. And yet that is the situation. Except for the direct window 
that the self opens into our pains and pleasures, the information it 
provides must be questioned, most certainly when the information 
pertains to its very nature. The good news, however, is that the self also 
has made reason and scientific observation possible, and reason and 
science, in turn, have been gradually correcting the misleading 
intuitions prompted by the unaided self. Damasio, A. (2011). Self 
Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (p. 13). Random 
House. Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, p. 13). 
 
(1) Mention is made of a method by which reason in scientific 
observation might check and balance idols. Will neuroscience bring 
new insights for method?  
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review of instances to the understanding; and when this has been done induction may 
be brought into action” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 387, my square 
brackets). For example, in Aphorism 11 of Book 2 of the Novum Organum (F. 
Bacon, 1900a, p. 376), Bacon introduces his first table which he names the Table of 
Existence or Presence in which are recorded instances where the quality or nature 
under investigation, in this case heat, is present. For example, heat is present in dung, 
quick lime sprinkled with water, the sun’s rays, moulding vegetation, fire, animal life 
and other instances.  
In Aphorism 12 in the same work, Bacon explains that the investigator must then 
complete a Table of Deviation or of Absence in Proximity Advancement of Learning 
(F. Bacon, 1900a, pp. 376 - 382) in which are recorded instances analogous to 
affirmative instances but in which the nature or essence is absent. Bacon’s 
reasonable-for-its-time example is the absence of heat in the “middle regions of the 
air” [because that region] “is neither sufficiently near to the body of the sun whence 
Table 55: Bacon’s Idols of the Mind 
 
Idol Definition Example 
Of the Tribe 
Flaws in the tribe of mankind: a flaw associated 
with the species. 
Favouring the positive above the negative: three 
survivors of a shipwreck are evidence of 
Neptune’s providence, the multitude of the 
shipwrecked being ignored.  
Of the Den or 
Cave 
Deceptions emanating from the nature of both 
mind and body of the individual; accidents of 
the individual, and cultural and educational 
flaws associated with the particular man or 
woman. 
Not being able to see the wood for the trees; being 
too narrowly educated as and/or to be unable to 
grasp whole, integrated understandings. 
Of the Forum 
or Market 
Deceptions resulting from the tyranny and 
insincerity of words and devaluation of the 
meaning of words. 
Two kinds are identified in Novum Organum: (1) 
assigning a name to something that does not exist, 
or assigning “confused, badly defined, and hastily 
or irregularly abstracted from things” Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, p. 325) to actual 
objects, Bacon’s examples being fortune, the 
element of fire, the planetary orbits (sic), and the 
premium mobile, in Bacon’s day the outermost 
moving sphere of the heavens (ibid., p. 325) and 
(2) assignment of crude ill-fitting names to actual 
objects or conditions, for example moist, dense, 
heavy, light, and earth are examples of this type. 
(ibid., p. 325). The idol is inherent in conative 
word usage and one irremediable by strict 
definition in words, or in mathematical formula, 
because behind such definitions are more words.  
Of the Theatre 
Deceptions emanating from false philosophies, 
or theories, or the perverted laws of 
demonstration. 
Bacon named the whole Aristotelian edifice in its 
Scholastic form an Idol of the Theatre. 
Source: Compiled by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1900). Advancement of Learning. (pp. 156 – 159). In J. Creighton 
(Ed.), Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum. (pp. 1 - 297). London: The Colonial Press; Bacon, F. (1900). 
Novum Organum. (pp. 319 – 332). In J. Creighton (Ed.), Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum. (Revised ed., 
pp. 311 - 368). London: The Colonial Press. (F. Bacon, 1900b). 
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the rays emanate, nor to the earth whence they are reflected” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 376, my square brackets).  
To complete Bacon’s third table, his Table of Degrees or the Table of Comparative 
Instances Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, pp. 382 - 383), the researcher is 
process-bound to record instances where the quality or nature occurs in various 
intensities or degrees. For example heat is, as Bacon claims, present in saltpetre, 
naphtha and sulphur through their predisposition to flame but cannot be detected by 
touch (ibid., p. 283). Heat is present in animals to different degrees Novum Organum 
(1909b, Aph. 13, p. 384). 
Bacon’s completed tables prepare the ground for Induction, in which process they are 
used as follows. The first table is employed to exclude natures absent when the given 
nature is present, the second table to exclude natures which are present when the 
given nature is absent, and the third table to exclude natures which increase when the 
given nature decreases, or decrease when the given nature increases. For example, 
using the first table of deviation or absence in proximity, Bacon excludes the rays 
from the celestial bodies as the Form, or cause of the nature of heat, because heat is 
found in underground fires as volcanoes frequently attest. He also rejects the earth 
alone as the cause of heat because heat is found in the sun’s rays which come from 
elsewhere else (ibid., p. 389).  
Use of the tables in the manner explained in the previous paragraph produces only a 
“first vintage” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 390) of understanding. From 
this first vintage a “true and perfect induction” (ibid., p. 395) may proceed and Bacon 
provides twenty-seven “helpes to the understanding” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
1900c, pp. 395 - 469) for this purpose. Bacon gives these helps or prerogatives 
interesting names. For example, help or prerogative 16, the instance of the door or 
gate (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 424), assists understanding through the immediate action of 
the senses. He cites vision and the use of microscopes and telescopes. Instance 15, 
the instance of the cross Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 415) helps in sorting 
out which Forms and natures are most tightly bound and therefore might help in 
weeding out unlikely explanations. The cross is suggested by an intersection of roads 
and on one arm of a cross might be arrayed the possible natures, on the other the 
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possible causes, and one intersection might appear the stronger. Only after these 
helps had been applied to derive the highest level of induced knowledge would 
deduction of new discoveries and inventions proceed. 
Bacon differentiates his true Induction from that hitherto puerile kind “which decides 
from too small a number of facts” Novum Organum 
(F. Bacon, 1909b, p. 353) and “leads to uncertain 
conclusions” (ibid., p 353) by “being exposed to 
danger through one contradictory instance” (ibid., p. 
353) and hello Karl Popper and falsification (Popper, 
2005, pp. 15 - 19). Although he pardons Plato a little, 
that so called puerile induction is of the kind 
developed by Aristotle as discussed earlier on pages 
252 to 262 of this enquiry. As the accompanying text box quotation reproduced from 
that discussion reveals, Aristotle is cautions about the be-all and end-all inductive 
capture of true knowledge.  
Bacon’s method may well appear as blunt and cumbersome by comparison with 
present-day methodology, as on his own admission, Aristotelian syllogism seems to 
have appeared to Bacon himself. Irrespective of this claim, Bacon’s use of method to 
discover that “the very essence of heat, or the substantial self of heat, is motion and 
nothing else” (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 391) is astounding. For one in Australia schooled 
in the wash up of the electron theory (O. Richardson, 1914, passim) and Nils Bohr 
quantum leap and periodic table articulations of atomic theory (Bohr, 1913; Kragh, 
2012, p. 33), especially one who conscientiously drew successive circular periodic 
table proton-neutron-electron atoms, it might be difficult, but most likely incorrect, 
to imagine Bacon not, in some way, invoking thoughts of atoms in his explanation of 
heat qua motion. However such speculation is on thin ice: all of Bacon’s references 
to atoms and their existence in both Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum 
are negative or dismissive of their existence and when writing of movement in his 
derivation of heat, and elsewhere, his preferred word is particles. The wash up of the 
electron and Bohr atom continues to this day in secondary school Physics in 
Australia as an aid to explanation of kinetic theory qua heat as motion and the three 
 
Aristotle’s Caution about True 
Knowledge 
It is hard to be sure whether one knows 
or not; for it is hard to be sure whether 
one’s knowledge is based on the basic 
truths appropriate to each attribute—the 
differentia of true knowledge. We think 
we have scientific knowledge if we have 
reasoned from true and primary 
premises. But that is not so: the 
conclusion must be homogeneous with 
the basic facts of science. Posterior 
Analytics I 76a25 – 30 (Aristotle, 1952p, 
p. 104; 1960a) 
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states of matter, except that now, all matter, depending on its kind, has its Joule’s 
equivalent and heat capacity, matter is a form of energy, and that change in form 
from matter to energy, Trinity as Oppenheimer called it, might yet, in the hands of 
some, strike terror once again—an observation raised now in preparation for further 
comment in respect of Bacon’s prayer about the right use of Science by and for 
mankind. 
In summary, the last of the page 489 windows into Bacon’s Science, window (c), 
informs that Bacon’s new machine of science comes with an instruction manual 
requiring that users (a) check-list-out cognitive pathogen idols of mind, (b) become 
proficient in first vintage table technique in filtering out simple natures and forms, 
and (c) be appraised of, and skilled in use of, twenty-seven helps-of-mind procedures 
to aid the progress of true Induction. Bacon has scrapped Aristotelian syllogism as a 
tool for Science, redefined induction as Induction and placed it at the center of 
experimental Science.  
Conclusion to Bacon’s Science 
For Bacon, philosophical or scientific knowledge is generally sense knowledge 
engendered by memory, imagination and reason and more particularly knowledge of 
the Laws of Nature predicated on sense and experience.  
Its method consists of educing axioms during observation and further refining them 
through Induction and experiment before applying them in further experiment and 
discovery. Science’s sphere of operations is sensual experiential knowledge about the 
Forms or Laws of Nature, refined and made good through application of Science’s 
own method to nature, and made powerful over nature by virtue of its understanding 
of her Forms. Its constraints are the idols of the tribe of mankind, the secrecy of 
nature’s laws, and the complexity of scientific method—in this case the method 
Bacon has formulated.  
Bacon’s advocacy of applied Science, his nuance in terms usage and employment of 
those nuanced terms in a new scientific method, when taken together, exhaust the 
esoteric/exoteric dimension methodology that has served this enquiry thus far 
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because, with Bacon, the esoteric dimension cannot but help more directly flow into 
its exoteric form as experimental or applied Science.  
Bacon’s Ethics 
Bacon does not break the link between theology and Ethics and would discuss Ethics 
inductively Novum Organon (F. Bacon, n. d.-e, p. 159) it being amongst the branches 
of philosophy on the right hand or sense side of the 
hierarchy illustrated on page 494. The God of 
Genesis made the world and all things in it and in 
Bacon’s usage, Metaphysic, when occupying its 
place in a pyramid of Natural Philosophy 
knowledge, does not employ final cause in its 
operations but rather proceeds within a scientific 
method in compatibility with Bacon’s stated belief 
in God as creator Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 
1900a, pp. 366, 387 - 388). The accompanying 
illustration of Bacon’s natural philosophy 
knowledge pyramid located on page 519 of this 
enquiry was constructed from Bacon’s text De 
Augmentis Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 507) 
and in broad terms its content parallels that of the 
reproduced engraved title page of Sylva Sylvarum 
(F. Bacon, 1670) discussed further on page 561 of 
this enquiry. In the page 561 illustration the God of 
the Tetragrammaton from which light shines is 
named in Hebrew as YHWH or Yahweh and 
further comment on such use of symbolism is made, beginning on page 561.  
Bacon does not concern himself with detailed questions of soul and matter, that is, 
questions about nous and substance. For Bacon, created objects exist and humans can 
obtain knowledge about them through experience, perception, and experiment. He 
allows mankind two souls, a rational soul received as the breath of God, and an 
irrational soul shared with the brutes and received from ‘‘the elements” Advancement  
Natural Philosophy (a) as a Pyramid of 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
“For knowledges are as pyramids, whereof 
history and experience are the basis. And so 
of Natural Philosophy the basis is Natural 
History; the stage next the basis is Physic; the 
stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic. As 
for the cone and vertical point (‘the work 
which God worketh from the beginning to the 
end’(2) namely, the summary law of nature) it 
may fairly be doubted whether man's inquiry 
can attain to it” Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-a, p. 507). 
 
Notes: (a) Bacon calls natural philosophy 
Science. (1) God = Unity = The Single 
Pinnacle Point. (2) Ecclesiastes 3:11 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from 
the content of Advancement of Learning. (p. 
507). Boston:  Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company. (F. Bacon, n. d.-a). 
 
Metaphysic
Physic
Natural  History
God Creator of the Forms (1) 
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of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 125), that is, from the “dust of the earth” (ibid., p. 
125). Knowledge of the substance of the rational soul Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, 1900b, p. 126) and the mysteries of faith and precepts of moral principles 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 299 - 301) must, as discussed earlier 
on pages 494 to 495, be derived from divine revelation.  
The irrational soul also known as the spirit of the sensible soul might well be the 
subject of natural philosophy or 
Science because it is composed of 
corporeal elements and this division 
of human soul in part helps explain 
the range of investigations 
permissible under Natural Theology 
identified earlier on page 500. 
Nevertheless such knowledge might 
best be derived from sense and 
experience by virtue of Bacon’s 
scientific method Novum Organum 
(F. Bacon, 1900a, pp. 76, 316 - 317). 
As the body in brutes is the 
instrument of the irrational soul, so 
too, the irrational soul in humans is 
the instrument of the rational soul 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
1900b, p. 126 – 127).  
Bacon addresses his doctrine of the 
union of sensitive soul and body 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 
1898a, pp. 153 - 156) within his 
League of Mind and Body 
subdivision located in the position shown in the Human Philosophy hierarchy 
illustrated on page 502 and its two subdivisions, Indications and Impressions.  
 
Bacon on the Human Soul 
 
Notes: (1) The sensible or 
produced soul, also called the 
irrational soul in humans, is not 
a simple equivalent of that in 
brutes, that is, other animals.. 
Let us now proceed to the Doctrine which concerns the Human 
Soul, from the treasures 
whereof all other doctrines 
are derived. The parts 
thereof are two; the one 
treats of the rational soul, 
which is Divine; the other 
of the irrational, which is 
common with brutes. I 
mentioned a little before (in 
speaking of Forms) the two 
different emanations of 
souls, which appear in the 
first creation thereof; the 
one springing from the 
breath of God, the other 
from the wombs of the elements. … Now this [irrational] soul (as 
it exists in man) is only the instrument of the rational soul, and has 
its origin like that of the brutes in the dust of the earth. … 
Wherefore the first part of the general doctrine concerning the 
human soul I will term the doctrine concerning the Breath of Life; 
the other the doctrine concerning the Sensible or Produced Soul. 
The Works Published, or Designed for Publication, as Part of the 
Instauratio Magna (F. Bacon, 1882g, pp. 48 - 49, my hierarchy, 
my square brackets). 
 
For there are many and great excellencies of the human soul above 
the souls of brutes, manifest even to those who philosophise 
according to the sense. Now wherever the mark of so many and 
great excellencies is found, there also a specific difference ought 
to be constituted; and therefore I do not much like the confused 
and promiscuous manner in which philosophers have handled the 
functions of the soul; as if the human soul differed from the spirit 
of brutes in degree rather than in kind; as the sun differs from the 
stars, or gold from metals. The doctrine concerning inquiries 
touching its nature, whether it be native or adventive, separable or 
inseparable, mortal or immortal, how far it is tied to the laws of 
matter, how far exempted from them; and the like. Which 
questions though even in philosophy they admit of an inquiry both 
more diligent and more profound than they have hitherto received, 
yet I hold that in the end all such must be handed over to religion 
to be determined and defined.  … [The knowledge of the 
substance of the divine rational soul] … must be drawn from the 
same divine inspiration, from which that substance first proceeded 
(ibid., pp. 49 –50, my square brackets). 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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Indications subdivides into Physiognomy “which by the lineaments of the body, 
discovers the dispositions of the mind” (ibid., p 153) and Interpretation of Natural 
Dreams “which from the agitations of the mind discovers the state and disposition of 
the body” (ibid., p 153). Impression also divides into two parts and would address 
first, “how, and to what degree the 
humours and constitution of the body 
affect the soul” (ibid., p. 154), which is 
largely wanting and second, “how, and 
to what degree the passions and 
apprehensions of the soul may affect 
and work upon the body” (ibid., p. 154). 
Medicine is implicated in both 
subdivisions of Impressions and religion 
has strongly implicated itdelf in the first 
subdivision, the effect of body humours 
on the soul.  
Bacon would have the deep question of 
the impact of imagination on body investigated further (ibid., p. 155). In particular he 
would have new enquiry of the situation of the faculties of the sensible soul in the 
organs of the body. Neuroscientists, psychologists and psychiatrists are still at work 
on this question of body and soul although their domains are different, for example 
the functions of central nervous systems or the cerebral cortex itself (Damasio, 1995, 
1999, 2003, 2010; Edelman, 2004) or in multidisciplinary contributions now 
beginning to constitute a field of study known as embodied cognition (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & Núñez, 2001; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006; Varela, Thompson, 
& Rosch, 1991), there generally being acknowledgements to Descartes (AD 1596 – 
1650) and Kant (AD 1724 – 1804). Again, for Bacon, questions about substance and 
other essences of divine and rational soul are the province of religion (F. Bacon, 
1900b, p. 126) while questions about sensitive or produced soul are the province of 
philosophy or Science (ibid., p. 126 – 127). Bacon does not appear to go to detailed 
differentiation of soul from mind or to explanation of an actual physiology of the 
sensitive soul’s communication with either the divine element of human soul or with 
 
Bacon on the Human Soul  
(Continued from the Previous Page) 
The doctrine concerning the sensible or produced soul, 
however, is a fit subject of inquiry even as regards its 
substance; but such inquiry appears to me to be deficient. For 
of what service are such terms as ultimate act, form of the 
body, and such toys of logic, to the doctrine concerning the 
substance of the soul? For the sensible soul—the soul of 
brutes—must clearly be regarded as a corporeal substance, 
attenuated and made invisible by heat; a breath (I say) 
compounded of the natures of flame and air, having the 
softness of air to receive impressions, and the vigour of fire to 
propagate its action; nourished partly by oily and partly by 
watery substances; clothed with the body, and in perfect 
animals residing chiefly in the head, running along the nerves, 
and refreshed and repaired by the spirituous blood of the 
arteries; as Bernardinus Telesius and his pupil Augustinus 
Donius have in part not altogether unprofitably maintained. 
The Works Published, or Designed for Publication, as Part of 
the Instauratio Magna (F. Bacon, 1882g, pp. 50 - 51). 
 
For this [irrational] soul is in brutes the principal soul, the 
body of the brute being its instrument; whereas in man it is 
itself only the instrument of the rational soul, and may be 
more fitly termed not soul, but spirit. And so much for the 
substance of the soul (ibid., p. 51, my square brackets). 
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the human body although, as the content of the box on page 520 reveals, Bacon did 
hold an elementary theory of soul-body physiology.  
The faculties of the rational component of sensible soul named in Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 127) are understanding, reason, imagination, appetite, 
and will, memory not gaining a mention on this occasion, and those of the irrational 
component of soul are voluntary motion, 
sense and perception Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 129). 
Perception is unconscious action and 
reaction. For example, attraction 
between magnets is perception, so too 
visceral feeling in humans Advancement 
of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, pp. 129 - 
130). According to Bacon perception of 
this kind can be independent of sense 
although, as often is his position, he 
would have the matter investigated further. In some respects, Bacon is prior to 
present day usage of the term perception employed in psychology.  
Bacon’s Subdivisions of Ethics  
 
Notes: (a) Follows on from the Use of Faculties/Objects of Faculties subdivision in the hierarchy on page 502. Bacon would 
have an Appendix to Ethics named Congruity between the Good of the Mind and the Good of the Body. 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1882). De Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 191 – 230). Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company. (F. Bacon, 1882b). 
 
 
Bacon on Rhetoric, Logic, Imagination and Will 
“Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the 
understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be 
deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend 
the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the 
appetite and will. For we see that the government of reason is 
assailed and disordered in three ways; either by the 
illaqueation [snaring, trapping] of sophisms, which pertains to 
Logic; or by juggleries of words, which pertain to Rhetoric; or 
by the violence of the Passions, which pertains to Ethics. For 
as in negotiations with others, men are usually wrought either 
by cunning, or by importunity, or by vehemency; so likewise 
in this negotiation within ourselves, we are either undermined 
by fallacies of arguments, or solicited and importuned by 
assiduity of impressions and observations, or agitated and 
transported by violence of passions. And yet the nature of 
man is not so unfortunately built, as that those arts and 
faculties should have power to disturb reason, and no power 
to strengthen or establish it; on the contrary they are of much 
more use that way” De Augmentis  Scientiaurum (F. Bacon, 
1882g, p. 131).  
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All of the faculties of the rational soul are actualised through Ethics and Logic 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 127). Ethics facilitates will, appetite 
and affections in matters of individual and common good Advancement of Learning 
(F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 133) from its position in the hierarchy on page 522. Logic 
facilitates reason and understanding across a range of divisions of human 
understanding, as illustrated in the hierarchy on page 523. 
As earlier explained beginning on page 495, in Bacon’s architecture or geography of 
mind all three of the rational soul’s faculties of memory, imagination and reason 
flow from sense which opens the mind for understanding. Imagination is pronounced 
the currency of exchange between reason and will. Unfortunately, imagination can be 
destabilising Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 218) and frustrate 
reason in matters of religion, and more generally through “persuasion insinuated by 
Bacon’s Subdivisions of Logic 
 
 
Notes: (a) Follows from the Use of the Faculties/Object of the Faculties subdivision in the hierarchy on page 502. (1) Bacon 
would further subdivide Arts into Learned Experience and The New Organon. (2) Bacon would further subdivide Arguments 
into Promptuary and Topics, and Topics further into General and Particular. (3) Bacon would subdivide Memory Itself into 
Prenotion and Emblem. (4) Bacon would have an Appendix to the Arts of Judging titled Analogy of Demonstration 
[According to the Nature of the Subject]. (5) Notations of Things further subdivides into Hieroglyphs and Real Characters. 
(6) Speech is further subdivided into Literary and Philosophic and includes a Reference to Poesy in respect of metre. (7) 
Writing includes a reference to the Doctrine of Ciphers. (8) Bacon speaks of method being either Magistral (teaching) or 
Initiative (of intimation, of examination and enquiry) the terms being further explained in the dialogue box on page 525. (9) 
Bacon would have two Appendices to the Arts or Wisdom of Transmission respectively named Critical and Pedagogical. 
Bacon’s treatment of Rhetoric is contained in Chapter III of Book Six of De Augmentis Scientarium.  
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1882). De Augmentis Scientiaurum. (64 – 190). Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company. (F. Bacon, 1882b). 
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the power of eloquence” Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 134). 
Rhetoric is to be, but may not be, stabilising of reason.  
Again, but this time from an Ethics perspective, Bacon’s separation of Natural 
Philosophy and Natural Theology from Divine Theology earlier illustrated on pages 
494 and 496, and his prohibition of their use of final cause in Science, frees 
investigative reason from revelation in particular and philosophy qua Science from 
faith in general. In this way Bacon breaks from Aristotelian method and political 
philosophy and Scholasticism’s renditions of them. Yet as mentioned on page 519 he 
did not separate Ethics from theology so that the break is a kind of green-stick 
fracture although still one of substantial importance. 
For example, among today’s scientists there are those who return home after a day’s 
unencumbered rational and methodical research and experiment to live in conformity 
with religious and/or moral dictates. It is as though for Bacon Aristotle’s final cause 
is superfluous in Science given God’s position as the creator of things, as the 
pyramid hierarchy and title page engraving respectively depicted on pages 519 and 
561 of this enquiry suggest, so that experimental Science need not concern itself 
about the matter. 
However, as earlier discussed on page 476, banishment of the words final cause from 
Science, that is, banishment of final cause as a construct or technique pure and 
simple, was short-lived and to some extent Bacon’s own caveat on final cause qua 
human need for logic lets him down lightly on this count: 
… nevertheless the human understanding being unable to rest still seeks something 
prior in the order of nature. And then it is that in struggling towards that which is 
further off it falls back upon that which is more nigh at hand; namely, on final causes: 
which have relation clearly to the nature of man rather than to the nature of the 
universe … Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1863f, p. 81) 
and one may wonder if de Maistre would acknowledge Bacon’s own caveat even if 
he, Bacon, does go on to say that mankind’s past reliance on final cause in this way 
has “strangely defiled philosophy” (ibid., p. 81).  
Bacon’s treatment of mankind as either “separate or joined in society” Advancement 
of Learning (F. Bacon, 1909b, p. 106) calls forth and differentiates Civil Philosophy  
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from Human Philosophy as earlier illustrated in the hierarchy on page 502 of this 
enquiry. From Human Philosophy 
emerges Moral Philosophy. Ethics, 
moral philosophy’s attendant, is the 
doctrine of the will in search of the good 
understood as the welfare of the 
individual or society Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, pp. 133, 
177, 211, 220). Logic, which serves 
Ethics, is the doctrine of knowledge in 
search of truth. Truth and goodness are 
twins and logic provides the route to 
goodness. Rhetoric is stabilising not 
destabilising of reason’s search for truth and Ethics, logic, rhetoric, imagination and 
reason are linked in the following manner: 
The end of logic is to teach the form of arguments for defending, and not for ensnaring, the 
understanding. The end of ethics is so to compose the affections, that they may co-operate 
with reason, and not insult it. And lastly, the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination with 
such observations and images as may assist reason, and not overthrow it. Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, pp. 177 - 178) 
Ethics has two dimensions: first a so-called absolute good or theoretical model or 
template Exemplar of the Good, and second a Regiment or Culture of the Mind or 
Georgics of the Mind Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 210 - 211) qua 
practical derivation and application of rules through which human nature may be 
regulated in conformity with the theoretical model or template of the good 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, pp. 211, 210 - 213).  
Bacon claims that the appetite for absolute good is native to all existing beings 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 213). As the Ethics hierarchy on page 
523 of this enquiry illustrates, absolute good may be either a simple good or a 
comparative good. Simple good may be an individual or self-good, understood as 
good of a thing in its own right, or a good-in-communion, understood as good of a 
thing as part of a greater whole Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 213). 
 
Bacon’s Usage of Magistral  
Let the first difference of Method then be this: it is either 
Magistral or Initiative. … The magistral method teaches; the 
initiative intimates. The magistral requires that what is told 
should be believed; the initiative that it should be examined. 
The one transmits knowledge to the crowd of learners; the 
other to the sons, as it were, of science. The end of the one is 
the use of knowledges, as they now are; of the other the 
continuation and further progression of them. Of these 
methods the latter seems to be like a road abandoned and 
stopped up; for as knowledges have hitherto been delivered, 
there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and 
the receiver; for he who delivers knowledge desires to deliver 
it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be 
most conveniently examined; and he who receives knowledge 
desires present satisfaction, without waiting for due inquiry; 
and so rather not to doubt, than not to err; glory making the 
deliverer careful not to lay open his weakness, and sloth 
making the receiver unwilling to try his strength. 
 
Source: Bacon, F. (1882). De Augmentis Scientiaurum. (pp. 
122 - 123). Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. (F. 
Bacon, 1882b). 
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Individual self-good can be active or passive: in its active form it inheres in 
multiplying and propagating and in its passive form in self-preservation and defence. 
The active qua multiplication and propagation is more worthy than the passive qua 
self-preservation and defence, Hobbes’ good pen status with Bacon being all the 
more interesting for this, and so too Bacon’s Architect of Fortune Ethics of which 
more later.  
Whereas active individual self-good and good-in-communion may sometimes 
coincide, the default object of active individual self-good is one’s own gratification, 
not the service and benefit of others (ibid., p. 217). Individual passive self-good 
might be conservative, that is “the receiving and enjoying of things agreeable to our 
nature” (ibid., p. 218) or perfective, that is, aspiration and exaltation of inferior 
natures towards more noble natures, as towards their origin, or, in the imagination of 
a poet he invokes to aid his explanation, an “ethereal vigor … [aspiring to] celestial 
origin” (ibid., p. 217, my square brackets). Although the quote is not from Plato, is 
this borrowed depiction a Platonic de Maistre moment for Bacon? In any event 
“corrupt and preposterous imitation of perfective good is the pest of human life” 
(ibid., p. 218), creative of storms which sweep things away. Perfective individual 
self-good is more excellent than conservative individual self-good (ibid., p. 217).  
In human affairs such thwarting of the process by which inferior natures aspire to 
higher natures in search of perfection at the self-good level may compromise 
perfective good-in-communion and may become dysfunctional and inflict calamity 
on others Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 217). I take Bacon’s 
affirmation of a plague resulting from exaltation of place over nature to mean that 
humans, especially those in power, when they get above themselves, may cause 
considerable harm not only to themselves and others as well. 
What then is the simple good called good-in-communion? It is that good which 
inheres in duty to society Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 219). While 
Bacon requires that politics serves Civil Philosophy, in which service it addresses 
external goodness Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 235), his divide 
between Ethics and politics is sometimes fine.  
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For example, the good of man with respect to society, which in kind is a good-in-
communion, functions through duty. Duty is to 
the mind well-formed towards others, what 
virtue is to the mind well-formed and 
composed in itself Advancement of Learning 
(F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 219) and duty and virtue 
are inextricably interwoven. Duty so 
understood is, for Bacon, a part of Ethics 
rather than politics because it prepares a basis 
upon which politics might operate. Duty is that 
process by which the individual governs their 
behaviour towards others, not how the individual governs others (ibid., p. 219). 
There is a common duty which pertains to every man Advancement of Learning (F. 
Bacon, 1900b, p. 220), and a special duty 
which pertains to every man in his 
“profession, vocation, state, person and degree 
of particulars” (ibid., p. 220). Ethical choice is 
choice between comparative duties and it 
exists for both self-good and good-in-
communion “between man and man, case and 
case, private and public, present and future” 
Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1900b, 
p. 222). Ethics and moral philosophy should 
be subservient to theology (ibid., p. 224), 
Ethics, as earlier discussed, being a preparation for politics.  
Bacon does not situate self-good and good-in-communion in a simple good setting. 
Rather he places them in a comparative good framework after his usage of the term 
as it is outlined in the accompanying box located on this page, which situating 
requires that that earlier mentioned duty be discerned within competitive choice 
situations, as Aristotle might agree. Bacon ranks good-in-communion above self-
good by reference to Pompey’s decision to endanger his own life and sail for help 
during a storm rather than prolong starvation in his community, and by the Christian 
 
Bacon’s Usage of Comparative Good 
Again, for the nature of Comparative Good, they 
[the ancients] have also excellently well handled it, 
in their triplicity of good; in the comparison 
between a contemplative and active life; in the 
distinction between virtue with reluctation, and 
virtue settled and secured; in their encounters 
between honesty and profit; in their balancing of 
virtue with virtue, as to which outweighs the other, 
and the like; so that I find that this part is 
excellently laboured, and that the ancients have 
done their work admirably therein, yet so as the 
pious and earnest diligence of divines, which has 
been employed in weighing and determining 
duties, moral virtues, cases of conscience, the 
bounds of sin, and the like, has left the 
philosophers far behind. De Augmentis 
Scientarium (F. Bacon, 1882b, p. 195, my square 
brackets).  
 
 
Terms Usage 
Ovid or Video-sequor Moment(1) 
I see and approve of the better but follow the worse 
solution. 
Augustine-moment(2) 
God give me the strength but not just yet. 
Goethe-moment(3) 
I see no fault committed which I could not have 
committed myself  
Yahoo-moment(4) 
Self-deceived sensitive being so detestable on all 
accounts, ever present from Plato’s shadow boxers 
to Nietzsche’s last man. 
 
Notes: (1) Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or VII 25 – 
30 (Ovid, 1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144). (2) 
Anecdote. (3) (Goethe, 1906, p. 86). (4) (Swift, 
1800, pp. 54, 290, 295 - 297).  
 
Source: Short form statements of terms explained 
on page 190.  
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faith’s example of sacrifice for others. Theology he says knows nothing of a 
monastic life that stops at “merely contemplative and unexercised ecclesiastical 
duties such as continual prayer, the sacrifice of vows, oblations to God, and the 
writing of theological books for promulgating divine law” (ibid., p. 214), exercises of 
a kind, certainly in a different setting and era, but not necessarily unlike those Hadot 
(1995, 2002) attests necessary for medicining-in philosophy as a way of life, of 
which more later.  
Situating self-good and good-in-communion in a comparative good setting and 
defining good-in-communion as duty towards others predicated on a virtuous self-
good mind “well-formed and composed in itself” De Augmentis Scientarium (F. 
Bacon, 1882b, p. 207), ensures that for Bacon, as in the case of Aristotle too, virtue 
is an active commodity, a kind of performance test. Virtue’s existential condition 
consists of choosing between competing individual and societal good alternatives 
and then behaving them out in accordance with received moral precepts which 
informed those choices in the first place, moral precepts in Bacon’s system most 
likely being mainly supplied through Christianity. Unlike Aristotle who shys clear of 
specific advices or rules for specific action choice dilemmas, Bacon takes one step 
beyond saying what virtue is, one step into Goethe-moment existence by suggesting 
in his so-called Architect of Fortune Ethics, and elsewhere under such names as 
Rising in Life, or Self-Politician Ethics (F. Bacon, 1898b, pp. 319, 330, 335), or in 
general didacticism in his essays, what virtue may do, that is, what action man(kind) 
qua politique might be excused in particular circumstances. Henceforth in this 
enquiry such referents as Architect of Fortune Ethics, Civil Business Ethics and the 
like, whether used singularly or jointly, all exemplify newness and novelty on 
Bacon’s part and subsequent use of any one of them may confidently call the others 
into conversation. Architect of Fortune Ethics qua Civil Business Ethics is, in 
Bacon’s own words, a departure from Philosophical or Theological Ethics Essay 1: 
Of Truth (F. Bacon, 1909-1914b, n. d.), and beginning in the next paragraph, which 
commences on the following page to accommodate formatting and layout 
imperatives of the software, I discuss it further. 
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Bacon and Innovation in Ethics 
Recently, in the light of earlier exegesis of philosophy as a way of life (Hadot, 1995, 
2002), Bacon has been interpreted from philosophy as therapeutics and philosophy as 
medicine and/or cultivation of mind perspectives (Corneanu, 2011; Corneanu & 
Vermier, 2012; P. Harrison, 2012; Lancaster, 2012; Sharpe, 2014) and inter alia this 
interpretation reaches to, and engages with Bacon’s so-called Georgics of the Mind, 
that is, that “means to procuring the true moral habit of virtue” Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1900a, p. 306), that stairway by which mankind might ascend to 
the platform of the good. This recent and valuable work draws in part on medicine of 
mind ideas expressed by Hadot (2002), who, in his work cited in this sentence, does 
not mention Bacon. Before proceeding to discuss this new work, I provide a brief 
account of Hadot’s contribution for background purposes. Discussion of Hadot’s 
work occupies pages 529 to 532, and that of Bacon’s posited innovation in Ethics, 
which includes engagements with works discussing Bacon from medicine of mind 
perspectives, occupies pages 532 to 545 after which it merges into discussion of 
particular features Bacon’s Architect of Fortune Ethics by then, for enquiry purposes, 
also called Politique Ethics.  
Hadot and Philosophy as a Way of Life 
Hadot contends, for example, that unlike modern philosophy which “appears above 
all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists.” (Hadot, 1995, p. 
272), “ancient philosophy proposed for mankind an art of living” (ibid., p. 272). 
Ancient philosophy “is not wisdom, but a way of life and discourse determined by 
the idea of wisdom” (Hadot, 2002, p. 46, Hadot's italics). 
Hadot (1995, p. 57) derives his opinion from a survey of various ancient schools and 
depicts Socrates’ inquiry into, and erotic deepening of, the nature of wisdom 
Symposium 201d – 212c (Plato, 1925g; 1952u, pp. 162 - 168), and the good-at-what 
skills question for mankind discussed earlier on pages 87 to 90 of this enquiry, as 
foundational and central to (a) apperception of ancient philosophy as a way of life 
and discourse predicated on spiritual exercises which might assist the acquisition of 
true good understood as a will to effect absolute moral intent (Hadot, 2002, pp. 32 - 
36) and (b) apperception of wisdom as that which, even though sought for, is 
 530 
 
unlikely ever attained (ibid., p. 4). Plato’s Socrates is, for Hadot, the mother example 
of philosophy as a way of life and Socrates’ dialogical call in Apology 36c (Plato, 
1952a, p. 209; 1966a) for mankind to focus more on their being than their having, on 
what they cognitively and existentially are, rather than what they otherwise 
materially possesses, and what they can then contribute to others as well, appears to 
be Hadot’s absolute-value (sic) touchstone for moral intent.  
In ancient therapeutic philosophy, discourse illuminates and facilitates choice of a 
way of life, acceptance of 
which is tantamount to 
acceptance of, and 
participation in, existential 
protocols and procedures, so-
called spiritual exercises which 
capture, distill and occasion a 
particular school’s way-of-life 
being, and which frame one’s 
behavioural actions towards 
themselves and others. 
Ongoing articulation and 
discourse of this chosen way of 
life, including through spiritual 
exercises, is therapeutic and 
begetting of changed visions 
and perspective. 
For example in Plato’s 
Academy spiritual exercises 
might have been predicated on 
preparation for death and salvation of soul through living a philosophical life (Hadot, 
2002, pp. 62 - 65). In Aristotle’s Lyceum theoria, cradled through research and 
contemplation, leads to a philosophic life. Epicurean, Stoic, and Skeptical gatherings 
each had their philosophical way of life percepts, sustainable pleasure, life in  
 
Apology 36 b - 36c 
[Socrates] And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what 
shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? 
And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not 
keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and 
property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices 
and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was 
really too honourable [36c] to engage in those activities and live, refrained 
from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to 
myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually 
what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to 
care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather 
than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its 
interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. 
What, then, does such a man as I deserve.(Plato, 1952a, p. 209; 1966a, my 
square brackets). 
 
Symposium 203c - 204a  
[Socrates] Hence it is that Love from the beginning has been attendant 
and minister to Aphrodite, since he was begotten on the day of her birth, 
and is, moreover, by nature a lover bent on beauty since Aphrodite is 
beautiful. Now, as the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is in a peculiar 
case. First, he is ever poor, and far from tender or beautiful as most 
suppose him: rather is he hard and parched, shoeless and homeless; on the 
bare ground always he lies with no bedding, and takes his rest on 
doorsteps and waysides in the open air; true to his mother's nature, he ever 
dwells with want. But he takes after his father in scheming for all that is 
beautiful and good; for he is brave, strenuous and high-strung, a famous 
hunter, always weaving some stratagem; desirous and competent of 
wisdom, throughout life ensuing the truth; a master of jugglery, 
witchcraft, and artful speech. By birth neither immortal nor mortal, in the 
selfsame day he is flourishing and alive at the hour when he is abounding 
in resource; at another he is dying, and then reviving again by force of his 
father's nature: yet the resources that he gets will ever be ebbing away; so 
that Love is at no time either resourceless or wealthy, and furthermore, he 
stands midway betwixt wisdom and ignorance. The position is this: no 
gods ensue wisdom or desire to be made wise; such they are already; nor 
does anyone else that is wise ensue it. Neither do the ignorant ensue 
wisdom, nor desire to be made wise: in this very point is ignorance 
distressing, when a person who is not comely or worthy or intelligent is 
satisfied with himself. The man who does not feel himself defective has 
no desire for that whereof he feels no defect. Symposium 203c – 204a 
(Plato, 1925g; 1952u, pp. 163 - 164, my square brackets). 
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accordance with nature and reason, deferral of belief and the like, and their attendant 
existential exercises. Under imperial 
Rome before the closing of the 
academies, and under developing and 
changing teaching methods, gloss 
and commentary accompany existing 
spiritual exercises which, during a 
time of renewed interest in 
Platonism, were taught through texts 
appropriately graded for stages of 
spiritual development being taught 
and exercised for. For example a 
graded text approach to Plato might 
lead students through dialogues 
ranked upwards from those harboring 
mostly Ethics through to those 
permitting metaphysical 
contemplation of the highest spiritual 
order, in Plato’s case, the one. Hadot 
(1995, pp. 99, 118) offers Porphyry’s compilation of Plotinus’s Enneads (Plotinus, 
1956) as an example of a graded textual approach in Neoplatonic teaching and 
learning of philosophy as a way of life. Separation of self from worldliness, its 
ensuing spiritual development and attendant idea of sagacity qua a sage, says Hadot, 
are common to ancient schools of philosophy.  
Ongoing articulation and discourse of a chosen way of life is considered therapeutic, 
begetting of changed visualisations and a defense against passions predicated on 
false beliefs and misguided understandings and it provides succor in times when 
challenging life matters arise. Christianity, Hadot says, played a role in uncoupling 
ancient philosophy and discourse as a way of life. According to Hadot, grinding out 
of philosophy as a way of life extends beyond the closure of the pagan schools 
whereafter an almost total and final eclipse of it is conjectured to have occurred.  
 
Hadot’s Spiritual Exercises 
Spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy are participations through 
which humans might transform themselves into a way of being 
and act of living predicated on a search for wisdom. In function 
they are existential as well as moral, engage intellect, imagination, 
sense and will, and are accessible in a number of forms. For 
example spiritual exercise might engage contemplation and 
meditation, introspective knowledge of self, reflection, writing 
including gloss and commentary, exegesis, memorisation, vigilant 
attention, detached relaxation, indifference, listening, dialogue, 
inquiry, research, duty-task performance, mastery of passion and 
preparation and training for death. Socratic dialogue is a spiritual 
exercise in common. Spiritual exercises aim at bringing about 
states of autarkeia or self-sufficiency, ataraxia or tranquillity of 
soul and or cosmic consciousness, a surpassing of oneself to 
become part of a whole, part of a cosmic order. The reduction of 
philosophy from a way of life to detached philosophical discourse, 
except perhaps in some monasteries, occurred in the middle ages. 
One might be a philosopher in ancient times and have not written 
a word. So might one today, but they might not necessarily 
recognise their kind amongst philosophy departments in today’s 
universities, modern philosophy there and elsewhere presenting 
itself “above all as the construction of a technical language 
reserved for specialists” (Hadot quoted in A. Davidson, 1990, p. 
480) —hard words those. In ancient therapeutic philosophy 
spiritual exercises are formative, rather than informative and for a 
participation to qualify as a spiritual exercise it must make one 
change their attitude, opinion, or conviction through dialogue and 
struggle with oneself.  
 
Source: Extracted from Davidson, A. (1999). Spiritual Exercises 
and Ancient Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre Hadot. (pp. 
475 – 482). Critical Enquiry, 16. (A. Davidson, 1990); Hadot, P. 
(1995). Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from 
Socrates to Foucault. (passim). Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. (Hadot, 1995). 
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Yet Hadot glimpses embers of philosophy as a way of life tradition cindering on in 
works of such notables as Descartes (AD 1596 – 1650), Spinoza (AD 1632 – 1677), 
Rousseau (AD 1712 – 1778), Goethe (AD 1749 – 1832), Thoreau (AD 1817 – 1862), 
Heidegger (AD 1899 – 1976), Nietzsche (AD 1844 – 1900), and others (Hadot, 1995, 
pp. 65 – 66, 69, 108 – 109, 259, 260, 270, 272). Constructing possible particular 
espoused forms of existential and moral philosophical being, a posteriori, from those 
embers and/or from reported life practices of each of those notables named and cited 
above might not perhaps be done without ambiguity, if viably done it might be. 
Davidson urges that Foucault’s last two works (Foucault, 1986, 1990) if not his 
whole project of the history of sexuality is 
“guided and framed in terms of Hadot’s 
notion of spiritual exercises” (A. Davidson, 
1990, p. 480). For that matter spiritual 
exercises of a Hadot kind may well smolder 
on in present day lodge rituals and practice, 
armed and emergency service conditioning 
and bonding exercises, youth movements, 
sports coaching schools, morning recitations 
of creed in some Japanese business 
organisations, and in maintaining business 
culture within, for example, organisations like 
the Mondragon Corporation, this sentence, and its speculative supposition carrying 
no intended pejorative association of Hadot-type spiritual exercises, or any of the 
postulated possible present day homes of such Hadot-type exercises, with rabid 
indoctrination.  
One claimed legacy of Hadot’s conjectured uncoupling of ancient philosophy and 
discourse qua way of life is “that there are nowadays professors of philosophy, but 
not philosophers” (Hadot, 2005, p. 229; Thoreau, 1971, p. 14). Hadot qua philologist 
is aware of complexities—adoptions, revisions, false interpretations, dogmatisms, 
historical overlays and the like—which obscure identification of essential way of life 
pedagogical processes and methods of the various pagan schools.  
 
Bacon on God’s Creation of Nature’s Laws and 
Inherence in Nature 
I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, 
[The Legend of the Saints (de Voragine, 1483/1914)] 
and the Talmud and the Alcoran, than that this 
universal frame is without a mind. And therefore 
God never wrought miracle to convince [contest] 
atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is 
true, that a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to 
atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s 
minds about to religion. For while the mind of man 
looketh upon second causes scattered, it may 
sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when 
it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and 
linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and 
Deity. Of Atheism (F. Bacon, 1909 -1914, Vol. III, 
Part I, n. p., my square brackets). 
 
Bacon names God the maker of the universe and its 
laws and simple natures, the Forms, in Advancement 
of Learning (F. Bacon, 1860b, pp. 507 - 509; 1902a, 
p. 30 ). 
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After Hadot 
Corneanu (2011, p. 2) situates her discussion of Bacon’s cleansing human mind of its 
idols, if indeed humans are capable of it, within a seventeenth century medicine of 
mind therapeutics tradition predicated on partial restoration of mental power to its 
condition before mankind’s fall. In received interpretation of Chapters 2 and 3 of 
Genesis (Holy Bible, 1932) mankind’s pre-fall state appears to be one of innocence 
before eating the forbidden fruit, and afterwards, until expulsion, one of knowledge 
of good and evil. Subsequently, now outside the garden, mankind must till the earth, 
separated from Eden and its guarded tree of life. Corneanu uses the term prelapsarian 
to denote before-the-fall conditions thus introducing Calvinistic overtones. 
Corneanu’s so situating Bacon is thus not incompatible with apperception of Bacon 
as one insisting on God’s creation of, and perhaps inherence in, an ordered natural 
world, and a possibility of mankind’s access to God’s provisioning through 
obedience to His laws of nature in so far as knowledge of these can be fathomed 
through Bacon’s new machine of Science.  
Yet one may not jump too quickly from the page 532 boxed quotation about a 
presence of divine mind in the universal frame of nature to claim Bacon as an 
advocate or otherwise of God’s active daily presence in nature. Gascoigne (2010) 
demonstrates a fine line in Bacon’s balancing of a God who no longer, beyond the 
sixth day, inhered in His fixed given laws, and a God who sometimes intervened 
through miracles in apparent contradiction of those laws. Bacon, he says, holds that 
nature is ordered, not chaotic—a question still in contention amongst physicists—and 
that for Bacon order does not follow from Aristotelian immanent intelligent cause 
but rather, in accordance with a voluntarist tradition strong in Calvinism, from God’s 
imposition of laws before His first Sabbath day of rest (Gascoigne, 2010, pp. 220 - 
222). 
Corneanu argues that English philosophers Boyle (AD 1627 – 1691) and Locke (AD 
1632 – 1704) held firm views about acquisition and transfer of knowledge, reason 
and its constraints, and the right and proper conduct of scientific method, and that 
they framed these views within cure and cultivation of mind regimens existing by 
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virtue of a rational soul ordained in humans by the Creator. Bacon and his 
development of scientific method, and subsequent contributions by Royal Society 
virtuosi, namely Hooke (AD 1635 – 1703), Charleton (AD 1619 – 1717), Glanvill 
(AD 1636 – 1680) and Spratt (AD 1635 – 1713), are central to Corneanu’s exegesis 
of regimen of mind environments germane to Hooke and Locke. Corneanu states that 
marshalling of scientific method is a predominant part of a wider scientific and 
literary culture and cure of mind phenomenon in which European writers, for 
example Descartes (AD 1596 - 1650), Gassendi (AD 1592 – 1665), Pascal (AD 1623 
– 1662), and Arnauld (AD 1612 – 1694) and Nicole (AD 1625 – 1695) of Port Royal 
Abbey (Arnauld & Nicole 1964; Descartes, 1952; Gassendi, 1981; Pascal, 1952), 
were also involved (Corneanu, 2011, pp. 59, 87 – 89, 92 – 94, 99 – 100, 169, 252). In 
this wider culture of mind tradition, while experiment was linked to nature, those 
then-called natural philosophers might yet reach to, and work within, revealed 
scripture in their interrogations of nature as God’s creation (ibid., p. 3).  
Corneanu collects the works of these early modern medicine of mind writers under 
the descriptor medicina-cultura-animi, medicine of mind notions within those works 
having, inter alia, Patristic and/or Augustinian dimensions. The cultura animi genre 
is cross-disciplinary, uses a variety of prose forms, treatises, rhetorics, consolations, 
moral, religious and psychological discourse and the like, and crosses institutional 
boundaries. Corneanu conjectures that cultura-animi genre—it “interweaves Stoic, 
skeptical and Christian virtues … and relies on mitigated Augustinian accounts of 
human possibilities … [for inner reformations] … of the human mind” (ibid., p. 8, 
my square brackets)—might serve as an alternative to Aristotelian-Thomistic and 
hermetic-mystic lines of virtue exegesis.  
Late sixteenth and early seventeenth century cultura-animi tradition allows conjoint 
religious and philosophical regimens of mind and Corneanu interprets acquisition of 
scientific objectivity as a cultura animi regimen begetting of such personal virtues as 
constancy, humility, candor and the like, some of which, one may speculate, are not 
necessarily always found present in natural philosophers then, and practicing 
scientists now. Corneanu’s depiction, within early modern English cultura animi 
tradition, of culture of mind and culture of society being two sides of one coin, with 
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no diminution of the private in construction of the public, is in keeping with her 
depiction of cultura animi as therapeutical philosophy. Gatherings of early modern 
English philosophers are, first and foremost, medicine of mind imbibings of 
objectivity, some of which objectivity may eventually trickle across and pond in the 
wider community. I found Corneanu’s contribution, and contributions by some she 
names (Abernethy, 1622/1630; J. Hall, 1606/1863; Reynolds, 1640; Robert Burton 
also  known as Democritus Junior, 1621/1883; T. Wright, 1601/1971) as 
representative of cultura animi genre (Corneanu, 2011, pp. 16, 28, 31, 44, 46, 47, 53 
– 54, 55, 58, 63 – 64, 69, 70, 73 – 74, 119, 139, 140), most instructive to 
understanding a general shift of interest from reason to emotion and a possible 
literary background from which Hume (AD 1711 – 1776) may subsequently, in part, 
have drawn his “reason is, or ought to be, the slave of the passions” (Hume, 1739, p. 
415) conclusion.  
Corneanu’s skillful paraphrasing, and carefully worded naming of a core insight of 
post Hadot scholarship—detection of an early modern appropriation of “the ancient 
view of philosophy as fundamentally 
paideia or askesis [that] might 
effectively medicine in a 
transformational unshakeable way of 
life in the absence of Aristotelian 
theoria” (ibid., p. 6, my square 
brackets)—does not take me far enough 
towards understanding just how 
effective and transformational paideia 
or askesis might be in the absence of an Aristotelian kind of theoria or one of its 
many interpretations, irrespective of the level of the object being contemplated, or 
for that matter, in the case of techne guiding action when an artisan is in 
contemplation of right rules of their craft, my understanding being that Aristotle 
allows that all rational contemplation moves one closer to god or the unchanging. I 
would also like to know more about resolution of conflict between competing 
regimens of mind. 
 
Corneanu’s Terms Usage 
Paideia 
Paideia = preparation (education and training) for membership 
of an ideal Polis. 
Askesis 
Askesis = training oneself, transforming oneself towards a 
chosen state of being. For example, McGushin (2007) explains 
Foucault’s Collège de France lectures 1982 – 1984 (Foucault, 
2011, 2012) as not being first and foremost about discovery of 
new knowledge of the history of philosophy but rather about 
Foucault’s own askesis occasioned in the last stages of his life 
through acts of thinking that would transform him into 
becoming a philosopher.  
Theoria 
Theoria = that state of mind attained through speculative 
wisdom’s contemplation of the unchanging. 
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Short Speculative Ideas-Linking Digression: Situating Therapeutic Philosophy and Politique 
Ethics in 20/21st Century Settings 
To wit, and by way of a short but relevant passing digression designed to 
contemporize medicine of mind philosophical perspective in preparation for 
subsequent discussion of Bacon’s Politique Ethics otherwise referred to in this 
enquiry as Architect of Fortune Ethics, Rising in Life Ethics, and Civil Business 
Ethics, it is no offence to philosophy in general, or to impressive scholars in 
particular, to ask how medicine of mind philosophy, whether ancient or more recent, 
might morally solve problems of clashes between unshakably medicined-in but 
incompatible ways of life existences. 
The dialogical Socrates, Hadot’s epitomizing example of philosophy as a way of life, 
is worded to say that for his way of life 
existence he deserves to be given his 
meals in the prytaneum Apology 36d 
(Plato, 1952a, p. 209; 1966a) but his 
hemlock death is outrageous, shameful 
and sobering for many. So too was 
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, (AD 1945 - ) and assassination of Martin Luther 
King Jr. (AD 1929 – 1968) as examples of outcomes to practise of their respective 
way-of-life being. Can philosophy as a way of life regimen envelop communities to 
such an extent as to eradicate such Goethe and/or Yahoo-moment transgressions of 
natural law?  
For example, given a Hadot-type already-medicined-in particular, ugly and 
destructive philosophy as a way of life value construct, one rendering mind a 
formidable and unassailable citadel of those particular values, and actions they 
permit, how is new medicine to be prepared and administered and on what ingredient 
values might it be termed a medicine?  
To wit, one might be a devotee of Dionysian recitation and practice including its ugly 
sparagmos. If so, how might medicining in a Stoic management of passions proceed 
if management of passions is to be sought? This medicining of the passions question  
 
Terms Usage 
Goethe-moment 
I see no fault committed which I could not have committed 
myself.(1)  
Yahoo-moment(2) 
Self-deceived sensitive being so detestable on all accounts, ever 
present from Plato’s shadow boxers to Nietzsche’s last man. 
 
Notes: (1) (Goethe, 1906, p. 86). (2) (Swift, 1800, pp. 54, 290, 
295 -297). 
 
Source: Short form statements of terms explained on page 190.   
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is as relevant for therapeutic philosophy in today’s world of terrorist murder, let 
alone the obscenities of war, unequal wealth distribution and poverty, child sex 
slavery and sweatshops and the 
like, as it may be said to have been 
relevant to quelling of, and 
defence against, passionate 
persecution of Puritans in Bacon’s 
time, and the passionate tit-for-tat 
civil war atrocities of Roundheads 
and Cavaliers later in the century 
of Bacon’s death. Today’s 
medicining-of-mind scholarship 
may, in part, reflect recognition of 
postmodernism’s ongoing 
dilemma with a values relativism 
unable to bring new light to 
solutions of such problems. 
The question asked of philosophy 
as a way of life at the end of the 
penultimate paragraph in respect 
of its efficacy in resolving clashes 
between differing way of life 
existences may be asked of other 
domains. For example a unified 
and shared religious convention 
seems to have been ever 
compromised as an agreed upon 
values benchmark, governments appear to game ratified United Nations Conventions 
as guides for sustainable, just and peaceful being, and man-made laws have ever thus 
been violated over recorded eons. Shaw’s question worded through Walker to the 
Christian sole-saving, one might even say soul-medicining, Major Barbara during her 
desperate loss-of-faith-moments, “Wot prawce Selvytion nah?” (Shaw, 1917, p. 
 
“Wot prawce selvytion nah?”(1) Shaw as a Referent for Enquiry 
Purposes 
UNDERSHAFT. It is settled that you do not ask for the succession to 
the cannon business. 
 
STEPHEN. I hope it is settled that I repudiate the cannon business. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Come, come! Don’t be so devilishly sulky: it's 
boyish. Freedom should be generous. Besides, I owe you a fair start in 
life in exchange for disinheriting you. You can’t become prime 
minister all at once. Haven’t you a turn for something? What about 
literature, art and so forth?  
 
STEPHEN. I have nothing of the artist about me, either in faculty or 
character, thank Heaven! 
 
UNDERSHAFT. A philosopher, perhaps? Eh?  
 
STEPHEN. I make no such ridiculous pretension. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Just so. Well, there is the army, the navy, the Church, 
the Bar. The Bar requires some ability. What about the Bar? 
 
STEPHEN. I have not studied law. And I am afraid I have not the 
necessary push—I believe that is the name barristers give to their 
vulgarity—for success in pleading. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Rather a difficult case, Stephen. Hardly anything left 
but the stage, is there? (Stephen makes an impatient movement.) Well, 
come! is there a n y t h i n g you know or care for?  
 
STEPHEN (rising and looking at him steadily). I know the difference 
between right and wrong. 
 
UNDERSHAFT (hugely tickled). You don’t say so! What! no capacity 
for business, no knowledge of law, no sympathy with art, no 
pretension to philosophy; only a simple knowledge of the secret that 
has puzzled all the philosophers, baffled all the lawyers, muddled all 
the men of business, and ruined most of the artists: the secret of right 
and wrong. Why, man, you’re a genius, a master of masters, a god! At 
twenty-four, too! 
 
STEPHEN (keeping his temper with difficulty). You are pleased to be 
facetious. I pretend to nothing more than any honourable English 
gentleman claims as his birthright (he sits down angrily). 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Oh, that’s everybody’s birthright. …. You are all 
alike, you respectable people. You can’t tell me the bursting strain of a 
ten-inch gun, which is a very simple matter; but you all think you can 
tell me the bursting strain of a man under temptation. You daren’t 
handle high explosives; but you’re all ready to handle honesty and 
truth and justice and the whole duty of man, and kill one another at 
that game. What a country! What a world! 
 (Continued on the next page.) 
 
 538 
 
114), is devastating and loses little of its cut, when by extension to arts, philosophy, 
politics and the like Shaw raises the baffling question of right and wrong for Goethe-
moment humanity in conditions of moral and cultural plurality. 
A quotation illustrating Shaw’s take on the question of right and wrong in plural 
society is contained in the 
dialogue box spanning pages 537 
and 538. Shaw’s biting satire is 
confronting and arresting and is 
included as a contemporising 
marker and exemplar of an 
intractable human condition and 
moral enigma which Bacon, in his 
attempt at describing Civil Ethics, 
may have been addressing in his 
own way in his own times, of 
which more later. Like 
Undershaft, Bacon is confronted 
by appalling courts and 
parliaments, and is sanguine about 
the kinds of human nature best 
fitted to a life politique. Shaw is 
white hot in comparison with 
Bacon but then Bacon might be 
seen as breaking the news about 
an arriving new Ethics—Politique 
Ethics—for an arriving new era 
while Shaw is writing some 240 
years into that new era in 
development. Likewise Shaw 
might be considered white hot by 
comparison with early twenty-first 
century protestation about politique behaviour voiced some further 110 years since,  
 
“Wot prawce Selvytion nah?”(1) Shaw as a Referent for Enquiry 
Purposes 
(Continued from the previous page.) 
LADY BRITOMART (uneasily). What do you think he had better do, 
Andrew?  
 
UNDERSHAFT. Oh, just what he wants to do. He knows nothing; and 
he thinks he knows everything. That points clearly to a political career. 
Get him a private secretaryship to someone who can get him an Under 
Secretaryship; and then leave him alone. He will find his natural and 
proper place in the end on the Treasury bench. 
 
STEPHEN (springing up again). I am sorry, sir, that you force me to 
forget the respect due to you as my father. I am an Englishman; and I 
will not hear the Government of my country insulted. (He thrusts his 
hands in his pockets, and walks angrily across to the window. 
 
UNDERSHAFT (with a touch of brutality). The government of your 
country! I am the government of your country: I, and Lazarus. Do you 
suppose that you and half a dozen amateurs like you, sitting in a row in 
that foolish gabble shop, can govern Undershaft and Lazarus? No, my 
friend: you will do what pays us. You will make war when it suits us, 
and keep peace when it doesn’t. You will find out that trade requires 
certain measures when we have decided on those measures. When I 
want anything to keep my dividends up, you will discover that my 
want is a national need. When other people want something to keep 
my dividends down, you will call out the police and military. And in 
return you shall have the support and applause of my newspapers, and 
the delight of imagining that you are a great statesman. Government of 
your country! Be off with you, my boy, and play with your caucuses 
and leading articles and historic parties and great leaders and burning 
questions and the rest of your toys. I am going back to my counting 
house to pay the piper and call the tune. 
 
STEPHEN (actually smiling, and putting his hand on his father's 
shoulder with indulgent patronage). Really, my dear father, it is 
impossible to be angry with you. … It is natural for you to think that 
money governs England; but you must allow me to think I know 
better. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. And what d o e s govern England, pray?  
 
STEPHEN. Character, father, character. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Whose character? Yours or mine?  
 
STEPHEN. Neither yours nor mine, father, but the best elements in the 
English national character. 
 
UNDERSHAFT. Stephen: I’ve found your profession for you. You’re 
a born journalist. I’ll start you with a high-toned weekly review. 
There!  
 
Notes: (1) (Shaw, 1917, p. 114) 
 
Source: Shaw, G. B. (1917). Major Barbara. (pp. 125 – 128). New 
York: Brentano’s (sic). (Shaw, 1917). 
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by which time citizens, at least in some countries, have some modicum of 
institutional capital and ballet box redress to countervail beyond the pale politique 
behaviour. Neither Shaw’s white hotness, nor twenty-first century apparent sanguine 
acknowledgement of corrupt politicians, might, 
in and of themselves, not obscure a possibility 
that Bacon’s innovatory Politique Ethics is, for 
its times, a much more significant departure 
than it may first now appear. This contention 
and others are addressed in further discussion 
of Bacon’s Civil Business/Politique Ethics 
beginning on page 544 where discussion of 
Bacon’s step into Goethe-moment being and its 
consequences for Philosophical or Theological 
Ethics is further articulated. Until then, and 
beginning in the next paragraph I resume discussion of therapeutic philosophy left 
off for digression purposes on page 536. 
Discussion of Therapeutic Philosophy Continues 
In a work with Vermier (2012, pp. 183 - 236) Corneanu discusses the Baconian idols 
more specifically in a medicine of mind context 
which focusses on imagination and its possible 
role in so-called curative or therapeutic 
philosophy. Their investigation is predicated on 
medicine and healing metaphor found in 
Bacon’s writing and their exegesis allows them 
to claim explicit and implicit imagination-
bridging of various subdivisions of Bacon’s 
knowledge hierarchies like the one’s constructed throughout this chapter for 
explanation purposes. Their sweep is wide and encompasses the faculties of mind 
and their arts, the league of mind and body, and natural, moral and human 
philosophy. These authors also attribute Stoic overtones and parallels to Bacon’s 
medicine-of-mind idols physiology (ibid., pp 187 – 188) and more specifically Stoic  
 
Terms Usage 
Ovid or Video-sequor Moment(1) 
I see and approve of the better but follow the worse 
solution. 
Augustine-moment(2) 
God give me the strength but not just yet. 
Goethe-moment(3) 
I see no fault committed which I could not have 
committed myself  
Yahoo-moment(4) 
Self-deceived sensitive being so detestable on all 
accounts, ever present from Plato’s shadow boxers 
to Nietzsche’s last man. 
 
Notes: (1) Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or VII 25 – 
30 (Ovid, 1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144). (2) 
Anecdote. (3) (Goethe, 1906, p. 86). (4) (Swift, 
1800, pp. 54, 290, 295 - 297).  
 
Source: Short form statements of terms explained 
on page 190.  
 
 
And So Ethical Dilemma Continues 
“The people of our United Nations are not as 
different as they are told. They can be made to fear, 
they can be taught to hate, but they also respond to 
hope. History is littered with the failure of false 
prophets and fallen empires who insisted that might 
makes right, and that will continue to be the case. 
You can count on that. But we are called upon to 
offer a different leadership—leadership strong 
enough to recognize that nations share common 
interests and people share a common humanity.” 
President Obama’s closing sentences in his address 
to the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 15 September, 2015. (Obama, 2015, n. p.). 
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phantasia (ibid., p. 195) understood as sense impression and its cognitive affection in 
the material soul. It is sobering to recall that, in respect of all present-day 
interpretations of Stoicism, no complete work of any early and middle Stoic 
philosopher survives, those complete works 
which do survive being Roman texts of the 
late Stoa, Cicero being instrumental in 
conveying Stoic construct from Greece to 
Rome. Hadot is acknowledged in a footnote 
(ibid., p. 184).  
Corneanu and Vermier’s choice of Socrates’ 
contested resistance to Alcibiades’ erotic 
advances as a stand-alone abstracted example 
of control of passion pending clarification of 
mind might serve as equally efficacious as a 
stand-alone example in Puritan, Calvinistic, Schoolman settings, as it does in the 
Stoic setting in which the authors placed it, and there appears little acknowledgement 
of a Hadot qua philologist problem of the layers that might be peeled back, if peeled 
back they can be, to distill Stoicism itself, even though Bacon’s exposure to possible 
intermediate sources is acknowledged. 
Lancaster (2012, pp. 181 - 196) views 
Natural History as an introduction or 
kind of ideas reservoir or 
springboard—his term is 
propaedeutic—for self-betterment, and 
distinguishes Bacon’s construct of self-
betterment from a more general usage 
of it employed by renaissance humanist 
historians such as Gessner (AD 1516 – 
1565) and Topsel or Topsell (AD 1572 
– 1625), and also by Erasmus (AD 
1466 - 1536) and Rabelais (AD 1494 - 1553). He predicates Bacon’s expression of 
self-betterment in The Great Instauration (F. Bacon, n . d. ) on Christian charity qua 
 
Terms Usage 
According to Colish (1990, p. 51) Stoic theory of 
knowledge did not change significantly after 
Chrysippus (BC 279 – 206). True and certain 
knowledge about the real world is possible due to a 
current of rational logos from the hêgemonikon or 
control center to the sense organ, thence to the air 
surrounding the sense object, thence back to the mind 
where it dumps the sensed object as phantasia it 
carried back with it. The hêgemonikon now subjects 
the phantasia to a process of synkatathesis, that is, a 
free and conscious act of judging the correctness and 
moral status of the phantasia, this latter being an 
automatic action. Synkatathesis is complete if and 
when it certifies correctness and assigns moral value, 
which acts of certification and assignment convert 
phantasia into phantasia kataleptike bringing 
objective and subjective certainty to mind (ibid., pp. 
51 – 52). Watson (1998, pp. 208 - 209) detects 
phantasy in the modern senses of imaginary, unreal 
or ideal emerging around the time of Philostratus 
(circa A.D. 170 to 250 ) 
 
Samson and Delilah 
 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Echenagusía, J. 
(1884). (artist). Samson and Delilah. (oil on canvas). Bilbao: 
Museo de Bellas Artes de Bilbao. (Echenagusía, 1884). 
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social betterment, and in so doing differentiates it from a more general renaissance 
usage predicated on individual self-betterment. On this basis Lancaster detects a 
moral dimension in Bacon’s Natural History and its role in his Great Instauration (F. 
Bacon, n. d.-b), and interprets this differentiated usage as a transformation of 
renaissance Natural History. 
Sharpe (2014, pp. 89 - 121), in complement of Corneanu’s culture-of-soul-literary-
genre scaffolding of Bacon’s epistemology (Corneanu, 2011), articulates Bacon’s 
Georgics of the Mind from a philosophy qua therapeutics perspective. His twin 
purpose is to demonstrate first, how “Bacon’s conception of human nature, and the 
importance of habit and custom” (p. 89) and second, how, his, Bacon’s, sensitivity to 
“the proliferation of different rhetorical, and literary forms aiming at different 
pedagogic, therapeutic and psychogogic aims (ibid., p. 89), might each reflect “the 
ancient pagan thinkers’ justifications of philosophical therapeutics” (p. 89). Bacon’s 
sensitivity to those literary forms is taken as sensitivity to “another marker of ancient 
therapeutic philosophy as Pierre Hadot 
in particular, has recently presented it” 
(ibid., p. 89) and, in respect of 
reflection on those ancient pagan 
thinkers’ justifications, Sharpe detects 
in Bacon’s advocacy of practical 
exercises “a surprising proximity to the 
Stoics in particular” (ibid., p. 96), a 
proximity which he subsequently 
qualifies by acknowledging Bacon’s 
put-downs of aspects of Stoicism, and 
more generally in terms of Bacon’s 
acknowledgement of limitation of 
rhetoric per se (ibid., p. 101). However, 
by the end of Part 3 of Sharpe’s contribution the reader is fully appraised about 
newness and novelty in respect of Bacon’s therapeutic philosophy.  
Imagination in the Century of Bacon’s Death 
 
Of a Wilde Beast in the New-found World called SU 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Topsel, E. (1648). The 
History of Four-footed Bests and Serpents. (p. 411). London: 
Published by E, Cotes for G. Sawbridge at the Bible on 
Ludgate hill, T. Williams at the Bible in Little-Britain and T. 
Johnson at the Key in Paul's church yard. (Topsel, 1648). Not 
all engravings from Topsel are so fabulous and many can, 
without difficulty, be recognised today, by the names by which 
they are called in Topsel’s publication. 
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In his clarification Sharpe names the passions—they have the capacity to overpower 
judgement and affect best human theoretical and practical endeavour—as the object 
of his, Bacon’s, philosophical therapeutics (ibid p., 99); specifies the aim of Georgics 
of the Mind qua philosophical therapeutics “[as] ‘superinducing’73 new beneficent 
habits or ‘customs in the psyche’74” (ibid., p. 103, my square brackets), the numbers 
73 and 74 footnoting qualifications not discussed further in this inquiry; advocates 
rectification of bad habit as a key role for collection and memorisation of percepts 
and apothegms urged in Bacon’s Georgics (ibid., p. 105); and identifies “Bacon’s 
conception of human nature, and the importance of habit and custom” (ibid., p. 96) 
as one reflection of ancient therapeutical philosophy. A second reflection of such 
philosophy, in this case its appeal to a range of literary forms to “transmit knowledge 
or tradition” (ibid., p. 100), is drawn from Bacon’s recognition of poets and 
historians as doctors of knowledge (ibid., p. 100 - 101), and on page 104 Sharpe 
further articulates his second aim noting that the means to the cure of mind, those 
means declared by Bacon as “sadly neglected amongst the ancients” (ibid., p. 104), 
nevertheless resemble Hadot’s spiritual exercises qua “key markers of ancient 
therapeutic philosophy” (ibid., p. 104). A third reflection is detected in Bacon’s 
argument that “the only way philosophy could be able to move the passions 
therapeutically … is if it takes upon itself the charge of rehabilitating individuals’ 
characteristic ways of thinking and acting” (ibid., p. 102). A philosopher might 
occasion such a rehabilitation through mastery of a variety of literary forms subject 
to the nature of students’ engagement with them and their willingness to apply 
learnings in management of their own passions and lives (ibid., p. 102). Sharpe 
acknowledges involvement of religious faith in Bacon’s therapeutical philosophy 
(ibid., p. 104), imagination’s communication with reason in respect of medicining 
passions of mind towards goodness (ibid., p. 108), and efficacy of rhetoric, qua 
eloquence of persuasion, in winning imagination to the side of reason in its 
confrontation with the passions (ibid., p. 108).  
In Part 3 Sharpe questions whether Bacon qua philosophical therapist constitutes an 
exception to Hadot’s postulated disappearance of ancient medicining of mind 
traditions or whether he goes further, whether “Bacon’s ‘magistral’ philosophy 
significantly challenges some of the key substantive commitments of ancient pagan 
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philosophical ethics” (ibid., p. 109). Differences are addressed, for example Bacon’s 
reported unease with Platonic and Aristotelian private contemplation of good and his, 
Bacon’s, leaning towards an individual’s charitable participation in public good; a 
detected narrow and private nature of ancient philosophical medicining and its 
compromise of magnanimity; Bacon’s downplaying of Stoic attempts to eradicate 
passions and his, Bacon’s, perceived disaffection with ancient conditioning of 
uniformity and harmony of mind to the detriment of consideration of contrary notion; 
an Ethics more active in embrace of the adverse and contrary than Neostoicism might 
countenance; Bacon’s reach to literature and history for purposes of extending 
therapeutical Ethics beyond those narrow Stoicism-qua-referent of ancient 
therapeutic philosophy confines and last, but not least, Bacon’s architect-of-fortune 
call for an enabling Ethics of public life whereby active man[kind] qua politique 
might advance their progress and welfare. This last difference, “Bacon’s most 
remarkable departure from [the call of] philosophical ancients” (ibid., p. 116, my 
square brackets) for self-knowledge and attendant therapeutic exercise is to place that 
call “in the service of a new kind of half-Puritan, half-Renaissance-courtier ethical 
ideal” (ibid., p. 119). 
Given Sharpe’s instructive detection of threads of therapeutic philosophy in Bacon’s 
innovative lark to hawk (F. Bacon, 1898a, p. 319; 1909-1914b, p. 270) Civil 
Business/Politique Ethics, and given the qualification expressed earlier beginning on 
page 467 in respect of Bacon’s perceived enigmatic persona, his real-life pushing of 
his own advancement, and for him, Bacon, its tragic consequences, some might be 
quick to gainsay depiction of Bacon as a seventeenth century equivalent of a Hadot-
type sage within an Architect of Fortune Ethics he, Bacon, sketches. Given that an 
architect of fortune qua politique must make their way in civil business, and that 
truth for civil business is not theological or philosophical truth Of Truth (F. Bacon, 
1909-1914b, n. p.), a Hadot-type sage construct is hardly a suitable or even viable 
referent or criterion in these circumstances. Nevertheless, Bacon’s identification of 
Ethics for civil business as a separate category of Ethics is itself indicative of his 
innovation and insight and one wonders, without intended flippancy, or devaluation 
of Bacon’s contribution, or attribution of blame to Bacon, whether core promises and 
non-core promises, and tell-them-anything limited-shelf-life lies are now an  
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inevitable part and parcel of early twenty-first century politique truth permissions in 
election campaigns in countries like Australia. As mentioned in numerous places in 
this chapter, there are already those who name Bacon Machiavellian, atheist, 
Calvinist, Stoic, Patristic, Augustinian, sitting on a 
fence dividing religious from secular, and other 
names as well, and in this chapter’s section on 
Polis later following, I cite authors finding a 
strong Christian presence among other influences 
in New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1952a). This present chapter carries no intention to 
conjecture yet another name to add to the list already attributed to Bacon and in the 
next paragraph I resume discussion of Bacon’s step into the Goethe-moment being of 
his Politique Ethics suspended on page 539.  
Discussion of Bacon’s Innovatory Architect of Fortune Ethics Resumes 
Sharpe has spotlighted Bacon’s “half-Puritan, half-Renaissance-courtier ethical 
ideal” (2014, p. 119) and this illumination may in reply attract scholarly depictions of 
Bacon in Aristotelian clever-man versus moral-man, or continent-man versus 
incontinent-man terms. Other participants may emerge to interpret Architect of 
Fortune Ethics from a psychological perspective as a creative outpouring of Bacon as 
a particular personality type, selfish or unselfish as the case may be, emanating from 
his own Idol of the Cave or Den entrapment in court and public affairs. Irrespective 
of the validity or otherwise of such surmise, the discussion on therapeutical 
philosophy being lifted by Corneanu, Sharpe, Lancaster, and Harrison, and in related 
fields, for example medicining of melancholy by Schmidt (2007) and prolongation of 
life by Jackson (2010, pp. 140 - 371), offers a window for timely reflection about, 
and search for, a sustainable action Ethics to medicine-in open government, safe and 
civil society, and social and responsible business in today’s sometimes brutal and 
often complex values matrix. In respect of such a quest, philosophy is as much under 
challenge as politics, theology and humanism. In respect of such a quest Bacon might 
well be read alongside Heidegger and Arendt, and countervailing others too, in 
search of insights into good and bad conduct and performance of active above 
passive moral being, but surely not to the exclusion of Plato and Aristotle, or for that 
 
Goethe-moment(1) 
I see no fault committed which I could not 
have committed myself  
 
Notes: (1) (Goethe, 1906, p. 86).  
 
Source: Short form statements of terms 
explained on page 190. 
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matter even Aquinas, or in dismissal of Goethe whose no-crime-so-awful statement 
remains an ongoing and inconvenient confrontation and challenge for humanity.  
To wit, on the face of it, over the millennia of Western philosophic thought, it 
appears that the best of minds, in bringing forward their outstanding and instructive 
conversations on the nature and definition of Ethics and morality, have known of 
mankind’s brute presence, acknowledged it, sometimes offered general advice about 
how to act out good being in specific circumstances, and moved on without 
necessarily attempting to construct a self-service moral action algorithm that their 
identified Goethe-moment humans—that procession of Plato’s cave-dwelling 
murderers of returning enlightened ones, Aristotle’s most unholy and most savage of 
animals, Aquinas’ hopeless, faithless, loveless, Bacon’s pests, busy, mischievous and 
wretched vermin, Swift’s Yahoos, or unfortunate Struldbrugs, or those critics happy 
in perpetual possession of self-deception, and after all that, Nietzsche’s last men—
might adopt to occasion our own individual moral beings: yes G.B.S. what a species, 
what a challenge, what an impasse. 
The posited conjecture in the paragraph above does not focus on the scholarly 
delineations of ethical life discussed in earlier chapters, nor the repeated 
confirmations of Ethics as act, rather—given the claim made earlier on page 528 that 
Bacon issues suggestions about what a politique be excused of doing or not doing, 
and therefore of being or not being, in comparative good settings of Goethe-
moments—the focus is on how individuals may think and act to remain existentially 
ethical during such Goethe-moments of temptation, Goethe-moment transgression 
being understood as occurring outside of stated prohibitions, outside of preventive 
Ethics domains such as ten commandments for example. In preparation for 
discussion of Bacon’s novel confrontation of this impasse I provide a one paragraph 
recapitulation of Bacon’s Ethics as it has so far been discussed in this chapter. 
Bacon’s Philosophical or Theological Ethics is conventional in that there is in all 
native beings an appetite for perfective good. In humans it is active at a self-good 
level wherein rhetoric assists logic in regimenting imagination to will’s alliance with 
reason in its task of discerning ethical being qua correct choice between comparative 
good alternatives. In this process Ethics is the servant of theology. At a good-in-
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communion level Ethics manifests in a mind well-formed towards others, a mind at 
work in its duty to promote welfare of society. Yet, as Bacon’s lark to hawk 
metaphor (c.f. F. Bacon, 1898a, p. 319; 1909-1914b, p. 270) and other comments 
reveal, Bacon’s Architecture of Fortune Ethics is a subset of his formulation of 
Philosophical or Theological Ethics and in this subset form, Ethics is a compromised 
servant of Christian theology because in this domain Ethics serves other referents as 
well, for example, humanistic philanthropy and renaissance-courtier values.  
To continue, Sharpe has already clearly unearthed footings on which Bacon’s 
Architect of Fortune Ethics might be built. Other referents, for example fable, myth, 
proverb, classical literature ideals, outstanding example set by ancient personages, 
more general historical example taken from ancients and some nearer to Bacon’s 
own time, an amalgam of self-interest, and Stoic and sceptical virtue elements, are 
also implicated as this chapter subsequently reveals. Now in respect of Bacon’s step 
into Goethe-moment being, that is his step into articulation of actions excusable for 
politiques of fortune, this conundrum of Goethe-moment impasse may yet be 
approached, in words at least, with some optimism, because morality as good-in-
communion cannot completely disappear, irrespective of levels to which it might 
sink, while some individuals battle for good-in-self and in-common in comparative 
good settings—and battle they will by virtue of an appetite for perfective good found 
amongst God’s creatures. 
Yet it may well be a difficult optimism to defend. For example positions variously 
taken by both Aristotle and Bacon do not necessarily justify optimism. For example, 
Aristotle holds that when the ratio between the number citizens honouring just and 
good constitution and the number of citizens dishonouring it falls below a Rubicon 
value, societies will fail Politics IV 1296b15 (Aristotle, 1944; 1952r, p. 496) and 
Bacon, as earlier explained on page 526, allows that thwarting of perfective 
individual self-good, that is, thwarting of the process by which inferior natures aspire 
to higher natures, may tip society into calamity. How such societies are to recover is 
as pertinent a question today as it has been in the past and in some countries it may 
be a desperate question of whether it is down to Strauss’ few, if any, exceptional 
people in each generation.  
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In addition, to be optimistic in the face of sanguine hindsight about Bacon’s step into 
Goethe-moment being, one might, by way of imaginative and speculative 
challenging example, confront a possibility that there may be, bellied up to and 
thumping bars around the world, or more comfortably in chardonnay numbness in 
places high or low, those who hold Socrates and the Luther Kings of life complete 
and utter serve-themselves-right Quixotes, and contemptible for their stands, or 
alternatively a possibility of many desensitised other humans who hold, on the basis 
of our experience of the human condition alone, that to simply raise the question of 
morally bridging Goethe-moment impasse might be viewed with incredulity as 
gauche and get-a-life. Irrespective of such desperate image-making conjecture I 
contend that, wisely or unwisely, bravely or recklessly, or in some other condition as 
the case may be, Bacon did challenge that impasse by advocating an Architecture of 
Fortune/Art of Rising Life/Self-Politician/Civil Business Ethics, Advancement of 
Learning (F. Bacon, 1898b, pp. 319, 330, 335, 294 - 338) henceforth also called 
Politique Ethics, in which he ventures towards providing specific opinions about 
what passes for ethical conduct for those making their way in these domains. He 
builds a kind of half-way house for containment purposes. Certainly, as Bacon makes 
clear, Essay XIII: Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature (1909-1914d), a step away 
from Philosophical or Theological Ethics, qua a step towards Politique Ethics is a 
second best solution requiring relaxation or bending of some of the strictures that 
Philosophical or Theological Ethics would apply, but he does not give Politique 
Ethics free reign, he does not untie it from the perfecting example of Philosophical or 
Theological Ethics Essay I: Of Truth (F. Bacon, 1909-1914b, n. p.). 
Further, in respect of optimism, given that Bacon’s general discussion on Politique 
Ethics Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1898a, pp. 294 - 338), including 
Aphorisms I – XXXIV (ibid., pp. 300 – 319) is most instructive, and given that little 
offence might be taken to his circumlocution, slight-devilling of scriptures, and a 
kind of Tantalus predicament setting he employs for discussion purposes, some 
relaxations he elsewhere allows may well be considered appalling as subsequently 
discussed. In his general discussion Bacon glances from man to man, from man to 
God, from God to man—he is reminiscent of Plato’s Socrates “glancing in turn from 
one to the other of them” Republic (Plato, 1952r, IX, p. 419; 1969a) in his, that is, 
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Socrates’’ discussion of best kinds of men for best kinds of states and an attendant 
requirement of “virtue and happiness … of man in relation to man” (ibid., p. 418)—
and for so long as Bacon’s tantalised politique may not abandon his/their mind well-
ordered and composed in itself, well disposed towards others, and answering to 
theology, he/they may well have as much anxiety in receding with a falling tide of 
Philosophical Ethics as rising with an incoming tide of Architect of fortune Ethics to 
pick the first fruit that new machine of science, the novum organum, will offer those 
inheriting a New Atlantis. As earlier mentioned Politique Ethics is outside of New 
Atlantis. 
In addition, and gain in respect of optimism, given the questionable morality of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean courts earlier discussed, and given that theatrically 
humorous but sadly human parade of stereotypes soon to walk across page 549 of 
this enquiry, and postulating those 
givens as experiential bases from 
which Bacon might proceed to 
articulation of Architect of Fortune 
Ethics, it is a wonder that he found 
strength to proceed at all, even if 
such strength might, as some are 
bound to argue, emerge from a 
sense of his own misfortune rather 
than from a sense of good fortune 
for all. As earlier mentioned, a 
present day Ethics qua politique is 
writ large on a daily basis in media 
releases in countries like Australia 
whose citizens do, from time to 
time, appear to vote against excessive greed and the like, established institutional 
capital as earlier mentioned, serving to provide some relief. To apply such 
advantages of hindsight in analysis of Bacon’s case might not necessarily be 
disqualified on anachronistic grounds. Foibles of human nature were writ large in the 
media outlets of Bacon’s day as well—John Donne’s sermons, public standing pits 
Theatre in Fourteenth Century Country Europe 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from Pieter Brueghel the 
Younger, (1500s). A Village Fair or Village Festival in Honour of 
Saint Hubert and Saint Anthony. (oil on panel). Auckland: Auckland 
Art Gallery. A saintly procession, right above centre, passes by a 
performance at a country theatre.  
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and better seats at theatres like the Red Lion, Bear Garden, Swan and Globe, and 
campus and country stages too. Even Shakespeare aside, that whole procession of 
human condition is paraded for public consumption—here walks Sir Petronel Flash, 
Quicksilver and Gertrude (Jonson, Chapman, & Marston, 1605/1903), Squire Tub, 
Knowell and Brainworm (Jonson, 1601), Wasp and Overdo (Jonson, 2015a), Subtle, 
Force and Doll Common (Jonson, 1903), and that basket of unfortunates, Volpone 
the fox, Mosca the fly, Voltora the vulture, Sir Politic and Lady Would-Be and others 
(Jonson, 1616). Jonson, who had already spent a time in jail for murder, spent a 
second spell there for offending the Scots in Eastward Hoe (Jonson et al., 1605/1903, 
p. vi) and just how Bacon might have taken Johnson’s Alchemist (Jonson, 1903) and 
its mockery of alchemy and self-advancement would be interesting to know. As well, 
Greek myths and morality aside, just some of the books of the so-called Old 
Testament Bacon surely would have read abound with examples of petty and not so 
petty behaviour he allows his politiques and perhaps others. There the wisdom of 
Solomon appears lost on King David whose exhibitionism and sometimes awful 
death-plotting stratagems could, from 1611 on, be read about in English. There in the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Courts, and increasingly in their environs, having to 
acknowledge those Sirs Politic, Squires Tub and Dolls Common, a politique must 
seek his fortune amongst a mankind of “busy, mischievous, wretched thing[s]; no 
better than a kind of vermin” Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature. (F. Bacon, 
1909-1914d, n. p.) such “as it were, in season … not so good as the dogs that licked 
Lazarus’ sores; but like flies that are still buzzing upon any thing that is raw; 
misanthropi [haters of mankind],” (ibid, n. p., my square brackets) enough to make 
one hang oneself (ibid., n. p.). Yet persons carrying these dispositions which “are the 
very errors of human nature” (ibid.) are “the fittest timber to make great politics of” 
(ibid.). Whether such dispositions qua errors of human nature housed in great 
politiques make the truth for Civil Business or Politique Ethics a truth of 
pretergeneration is a question not discussed further in this enquiry yet it is an awful 
thought if such an interpretation correctly catches Bacon’s intended meaning. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the speculation of the previous sentence, in order to 
pass from “theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business” On 
Truth (F. Bacon, 1909-1914b, n. p.) politiques as pragmatic persons must exercise an 
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appropriate learning, one that is “not like a lark which can mount and sing and please 
itself and nothing else”; but rather one which “partakes of the nature of a hawk which 
can soar aloft and can also descend and strike upon its prey at leisure” (c.f. F. Bacon, 
1898a, p. 319; 1909-1914b, p. 270). Larks do though have to hunt for sustenance but 
Bacon’s metaphor seems to work and in any case a swooping hawk is a different 
kind of mind set from the one called for at Apology 36b - 36c (Plato, 1952a, p. 209; 
1966a) or expressed in the spirit of the so-called New Testament. Are such kinds of 
persons Bacon describes, armed with such kinds of thought, the politiques to whom 
Bacon would deliver Science’s discoveries of “new Instruments of Destruction, in 
the way of War, Poison, &c” Magnalia Naturae (F. Bacon, 1733, p. 30), or entrust 
with state management of mankind’s power over nature, those for whom he 
increasingly “pray[s] … may administer [Science and its power] to the advantage 
and happiness of mankind” The Scaling Ladder of the Intellect (F. Bacon, 1850c, p. 
520, my square brackets)? Again, given the weight of such a heavy apperception of 
political life as that expressed by Bacon, one may cling to optimism about it as best 
they can.  
While Bacon approaches his architect of fortune task soberly, feet on the ground—“it 
may seem a new and odd kind of thing to teach men how to make their fortunes ... 
for the things required to procure fortune are not fewer or less difficult than those to 
procure virtue … [it being] as rigid and hard a thing to become a true politician as a 
true moralist” (F. Bacon, 1898a, p. 319), and while private fortune might be no 
measure of moral worth, “as the instrument of virtue and doing good, [it] is a 
particular doctrine, worthy of consideration” (ibid., p 319, my square brackets).  
Yet Bacon appears divided about the basis upon which his human Ethics is built. For 
example whereas in Advancement of Learning all things were “indued with an 
appetite to two kinds of good” (F. Bacon, 1900b, p. 213), in his essay Of Goodness 
and Goodness of Nature (1909-1914d) he retains an earlier established qualified 
version:  
Neither is there only a habit of goodness, directed by right reason; but there is in some 
men, even in nature, a disposition towards it; as on the other side there is a natural 
malignity. Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature. (F. Bacon, 1909-1914d, n. p.) 
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and the countervailing medicine-of-mind he prescribes for his politiques in the face 
of such a divide between goodness and malignancy is what the “Grecians call 
philanthropia” Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature. (F. Bacon, 1909-1914d, n. p.), 
“the word humanity (as it is used) … [being] a little too light to express it” (ibid., n. 
p.), all be it a Greek philanthropia “dressed in the character of the Deity” (ibid., n. 
p.), predicated on theological charity or love, and whose only error is excess (ibid.). 
It is little wonder then, given that apparently intractable human dimension Bacon has 
faced up to, that the actions he sanctions as morally appropriate for politiques in 
particular situations are offered with such a pinch of sugar.  
Examples of actions excused in Politique Ethics mode are expressed in Aphorisms I 
– XXXIV of Chapter 2, Book VIII of Advancement of Learning (F. Bacon, 1898a, 
pp. 300 - 316), and in Bacon’s discussion on the doctrines of business, and rising in 
life in that same chapter (ibid., pp. 316 – 337). Some of his essays (F. Bacon, 1909-
1914a, 1909-1914b, 1909-1914c, 1909-1914d, 1909-1914e, 1909-1914f) reveal 
Bacon at work in elucidating his new Ethics. Here his technique admits fable, myth, 
proverb, classical literature ideals, outstanding examples set by ancient personages, 
more general historical example taken from ancients, Machiavelli, Christian 
scripture, and an amalgam of self-interest, Stoic, and sceptical virtue elements as 
Politique Ethics referents. 
In those works cited above in the previous paragraph Bacon identifies some actions 
as unethical, for example dissimulation, feigned 
friendship, less than plain speaking, broken 
promise and the like. Yet at the same time he 
admits exceptions, or spices his discussion by 
countenancing benefits that might accrue upon 
admission of a little of these unethical 
ingredients on certain occasions. In this reject-
then-countenance-a-little approach to self-
politician departures from ideal ethical behaviour—his adduction of Machiavelli to 
his cause (F. Bacon, 1898a, pp. 311, 317, 331 - 332) and then distancing himself 
from him at the end ibid., p. 335) is one example of this technique—there is a sense 
 
Terms Usage 
Ovid or Video-sequor Moment(1) 
I see and approve of the better but follow the 
worse solution. . 
Goethe-moment(2) 
I see no fault committed which I could not have 
committed myself  
 
Notes: (1) Metamorphoses VII, 20 - 30 or VII 25 – 
30 (Ovid, 1826, p. 159; 2008, p. 144). (2) (Goethe, 
1906, p. 86).  
 
Source: Short form statement of terms explained 
on page 190. 
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of inevitability about the presence of such defects, and although he seldom strays 
from declaration of philosophical and moral virtue being superior to self-politician 
architect of fortune virtue, Ovid-moment is discernible and might be conjectured as a 
frequent existential condition interrupting Goethe-moment awareness plausibly 
employed by seasoned politiques to filter everyday affairs of business of life. No 
suggestion is made that such Ovid-moment filtering of Goethe-moment mindset 
might be the only existential mode occurring. Given Bacon’s opinion about the stuff 
of which best politiques are made, even Yahoo-moment existence might not lightly 
be ruled out as default position for some. Certainly some of the actions Bacon 
pardons himself qua politique—they are outlined beginning on page 552 of this 
enquiry—might reasonably evoke alarm about efficacy and containment of an 
Architect of Fortune category of Ethics. 
Augustine-moment existence, qua slight differentiation of Ovid-moment being in 
that it carries a request for help, is, in heavy 
situations where any person will do any thing, 
although hardly pardonable, is understandable 
as a condition likely to occur among Bacon’s 
politiques and plausibly in the lives of many of 
us and possibly rarely in the lives of some very 
few.  
Specific actions permitted an architect of fortune are such as these: to deflect envy of 
one’s own virtues, ascribe them to “good Providence and Fortune” Essay XL: Of 
Fortune (F. Bacon, 1909-1914e, n. p.); to prevent a final downfall resulting from 
extreme self-love—are extreme narcissists so capable?—let reason separate self-love 
form action Of Wisdom for a Man's Self (F. Bacon, 1909-1914f, n. p.); when fame or 
opinion, secrecy in habit, or dissimulation fail to support desired projections of 
character, then develop a power to feign Of Simulation and Dissimulation, (F. Bacon, 
1909-1914a, n. p.); that in behaving to establish one’s reputation as a clear dealer, a 
little falsehood may act as an alloy just as introduced substances act to alloy gold and 
silver in coins Of Truth (F. Bacon, 1909-1914b, n. p.); and when honour is 
challenged out-gun competitors by outshining them at their own game including the 
 
Terms Usage 
Augustine-moment(1) 
God give me the strength but not just yet. 
Yahoo-moment(2) 
Self-deceived sensitive being so detestable on all 
accounts, ever present from Plato’s shadow boxers 
to Nietzsche’s last man. (2) (Swift, 1800, pp. 54, 
290, 295 - 297).  
 
Source: Short form statement of terms explained 
on page 190. 
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use of servants to communicate ostentation Of Honor and Reputation (F. Bacon, 
1909-1914c, n. p.). All of such behaviours might, in present times, regretfully or 
otherwise, be accepted by many as commonplace naked ape (Morris, 2005) 
stratagem and spoil, but whether such speculative comment is true or not, it implies 
neither an excuse for petty human behaviour nor condemnation of Bacon’s architect 
of fortune treatment of it. None of such politique strategies enhance personal 
integrity.  
Such sanctioned behaviour, written up so eloquently in Bacon’s essays and other 
cited works, and ridiculed so effectively in plays of his time and now arguably 
streamed de rigor day and night on radio and television, though despised and 
despaired of by some, might be reasonably tolerated in less than the best of perfect-
world political environments by voters in free democracies, and others too under 
more restrictive political duress, who, even possibly knowing their own 
shortcomings, clearly signal they would have their leaders not employ such 
behaviours. Dare it be said, that to pillory Bacon the man on such counts is to pillory 
a human condition from which none of us might be entirely free. Even so, such a 
dare-it-be-said is again a poor foil in defence of petty human behaviour.  
Yet when it comes to acknowledging behaviours that Bacon qua politique allowed 
himself as architect of his own fortune, serious behaviours such as some of those 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, and other get-above-the-rest behaviours 
intended for his own use and noted in his Commentaries Solutus sive Pandecta, sive 
Ancilla Memoriae (F. Bacon, 1868a), some present day voters might balk at 
pardoning such Uriah Heep-and-worse activity in their preferred candidates, even 
whether or not they recognise such behaviours in themselves. There in the 
Commentarius Solutus Bacon ratifies promoting his fortune through ingratiating 
himself to one in power and supporting that person’s views whether they are 
considered right or wrong; putting words into peoples’ mouths, that is their speeches, 
and planting ideas in their heads; courting acquaintance with the King’s Bedchamber 
for the sole purpose of access to the King; engaging eminent persons in public 
conversation to enhance his own reputation; undermining a current Attorney General 
whose position Bacon covets by urging on powerful people his, Bacon’s, superiority 
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and/or obsequiousness as the case may be; issuing compliments and/or messages of 
sympathy, and constructing stratagems mainly to induce persons to remember him in 
their wills; preparing his own way to office by throw away lines about, and casual 
ridicule of, carefully studied Achilles’ heels opportunities of those he would depose; 
and charting a course to gain practice in the Star Chamber (ibid., pp. 40-41, 45 – 49, 
52, 56 – 57, 63, 75, 93 – 94). 
Again, with perhaps the exception of the Star Chamber example, such activities 
might be portrayed as unfortunate and unavoidable dimensions of human political 
nature. Somehow though, permitted exceptions of this kind are received as more 
contemptible when Bacon issues them to himself, against the rest of us, than when he 
issues them to the rest of us so elegantly in his open essays. Is rhetoric at the service 
of truthful reason in his essays, as he says elsewhere rhetoric should so serve De 
Augmentis (F. Bacon, 1882g, p. 131), or is it helping to sell a Civil Ethics, or are his 
essays one big permissible architect-of-fortune dissemble?  
Given such a litany of qualifications in respect of Bacon’s Politique Ethics, can that 
stand for optimism made on page 546—namely that in spite of a Goethe-moment 
capacity in mankind, and in the face of Bacon’s advocating a relaxation of 
Philosophical Ethics standards for mankind in Politique Ethics mode, an optimistic 
position might yet be taken because of an appetite for perfective good inherent in 
God’s creatures—be other than risible? If an affirmative answer is given then, from 
hindsight, is it possible to be maintain and justify optimism about Architect of 
Fortune Ethics?  
Three justifications for optimism are offered. First, Politique Ethics may be 
interpreted in itself simply as a fortuitous public announcement about a kind of 
Ethics likely needed to accommodate the work that politiques, those likely new 
recipients of power in emerging and/or changing states, are likely to be faced with. 
While the King of New Atlantis “would join humanity and policy together” (F. 
Bacon, 1952a, p. 206) there is no hint of a politique in him even in his shadow, yet 
on occasions state policy is ethically a little flawed as evidenced first by Merchants 
of Light concealing their country’s identity under the names of foreign nations, that 
is under foreign flags, when sailing on fact finding and technology collecting 
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missions (ibid., p. 214), now-called industrial espionage missions—even though 
products and information collected were to be paid for, or their owners rewarded 
(ibid., p. 207)—and second by a policy strategy of “Colour[ing] techniques used for 
managing land leave for Bensalem’s own vulgar mariners [so as they do not give 
away New Atlantis’ location] under the names of different nations” (ibid., p. 207, my 
square brackets). Are small departures from Philosophical Ethics to be excused even 
in the New Atlantis? Variation on such disguised registration and colouring themes 
has in the past, and also in this twenty-first century, extended to policy for detention 
centre location and/or torture of suspected nine-eleven terrorists. Ethics it appears is 
seldom a simple matter.  
Secondly such a simple announcement, because it brings into open and public gaze a 
believable behaviour matrix for politiques—these public life operatives additionally 
likely to be trusted with stewardship and distribution of wealth and welfare fruits of a 
new Science—provides a focus upon which to design and or improve countervailing 
institutional-capital defences against their likely malfeasance, defences in the form of 
institutions, structures, statutes, processes, procedures and protocols to help contain 
excesses of politique behaviour and abuses of power. Thirdly, while it has been 
argued that Bacon’s Politique Ethics is an innovative departure from Philosophical or 
Theological Ethics, Bacon keeps his lower-than-dog politiques Essay XIII: Of 
Goodness and Goodness of Nature (F. Bacon, 1909-1914d, n. p.) on short leashes. 
Philosophical Ethics remains the benchmark, nowhere does Politique Ethics rise 
mankind morally above it, and always demeans the one employing it. Although 
Bacon cites Machiavellian opinion that they who keep to the good, when those 
around them keep to the bad, keeps on a path to their own destruction, his politiques 
may not follow Machiavelli all the way. 
It may well be argued—on the basis that transition of power from monarch to 
parliament and capture of parliament by commercial business interests were in their 
early stages during Elizabeth 1’s lifetime, and even so after her death in 1603 during 
the remainder of Bacon’s lifetime—that the first and second reasons for optimism 
might be dismissed as an imposition of anachronistic and misplaced hindsight, there 
being insufficient institutional capital then in existence for containment purposes in 
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the manner suggested. However a contrary view is taken in this enquiry predicated 
on evidence, in Bacon’s time, of a robust if rough institutional capital, for example 
statutes and laws, courts, legal procedures, and rules, and a plethora of political 
parties, merchant leagues, trade guilds and religious persuasions sufficient to engage 
with that capital in promotion of their own interests and containment of 
countervailing others. For example, Essex, Raleigh qua out-of-line merchant 
explorer, and Bacon qua bribe accepting judge and debtor in arrears, fell afoul of it, 
some might say even in rough ways. A battle between Elizabeth I and merchants, 
about favouritism in granting of monopoly right, occupied time in the House of 
Commons from 1571 to 1601 and is a good example, whether just or not, of public 
policy management of innovation and change in Bacon’s centuries (Sacks, pp. 272 - 
291). Coke’s Institutions of English Law (Coke, 1853) now widely held as a 
foundation for common law, began publication in 1628. The subject matter on which 
this volume is predicated is not confined to the some two years separating its 
publication from Bacon’s death. Rather it extends further back in time as the 
discussion on torture in the first section of this chapter reveals. Further, there was no 
shortage of street crowd anger on a range of issues. For example, Henry V 
(Shakespeare, 1952) performed in 1599 is, in one school of scholarship, interpreted 
as representing a growing questioning of authority during the 1590s (Herman, 2002, 
p. 206). In short, institutional capital, parliamentary debate and attendant 
vindictiveness is argued sufficiently developed to make the first and second claims 
for optimism plausible, even if marginally so and with some concession from 
credulity.  
It might be argued in respect of the third reason for optimism, that in the face of 
religious intolerance, so-called death of God in the West and philosophy’s unending 
struggle for acceptance and relevance, Bacon’s tethered-philanthropy and attendant 
Politique Ethics might be the next best of a bad lot. It is not unreasonable to 
speculate that without some kind of such limping humanity present in say the 
Security Council of the United Nations, its necessary political machinations might 
not work and instead degenerate into such a debacle as to rob it of the remaining 
efficacy it possesses, there yet being no suggestion made in this claim that humanity 
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alone could bring success in such a place without the presence of hard and 
sometimes brutal political imperative.  
It is a little disconcerting though to accept a possibility that in its rush to emulate so-
called positive Science, arriving market 
economics paid relatively little attention 
to Bacon’s reiteration that money wealth 
might be no measure of moral wealth and 
that, as market economics meandered its 
way into existence through that wealth of 
nations and its attendant moral sentiments 
(A. Smith, 1761, 1776/1952), 
pleasure/pain calculus (Bentham, 1823) and Marshallian supply and demand 
allocations of benefits and losses between producer and consumer (Marshall, 
1890/1895), to pool into so-called welfare economics (Feldman & Serrano, 2010; 
Hicks, 1939; Little, 1950; Mishan, 1969) with its dollar equivalent internalisation of 
human value, it did not carry with it much edification to Bacon’s question about 
“private fortune … as the instrument of virtue and doing good” (F. Bacon, 1898a, p. 
319). Here in market economics theoretical economists reallocate money benefits 
between consumer and producer surplus with scarcely a mention of those excluded 
from the market because they cannot meet the price and/or find sustaining jobs to 
admit their participation in the market, while in welfare economics, welfare criteria 
are applied in search of so-called second best distributions of wealth, highly likely, 
since Arrow (1951; Arrow & Debreu, 2002), unattainable or recognisable in terms of 
applied economic theory itself. 
Such questionable challenges to scarcity and wellbeing have, fortunately, generated 
alternative approaches in welfare theory and alternative criteria for practise of 
philanthropy, if not welfare economics per se. 
In general, Bacon allows the contemplative life as an aid to private good but 
dismisses it, that “mere contemplation, ending in itself, and casting no rays of heat  
 
Some Criteria Used in Welfare Economics 
Kaldor: Those gaining can compensate those loosing and 
still remain better off (W. Gorman, 1955, p. 25). 
Kaldor-Scitovsky: A proposal increases welfare if it 
satisfies Kaldor’s criterion but its later reversal does not 
(Broadway, 1974, pp. 926 - 939; W. Gorman, 1955, p. 25). 
Pareto Optimum: Exists when it is not possible to make one 
person better off without making another worse off.(Sen, 
1993, p. 521). 
Kaldor-Hicks: Exists if those made better off could 
potentially compensate (sic) those made worse off. There 
need be no actual compensation made some remaining 
worse off by the change (Hicks, 1939, pp. 696 - 712). 
 
 558 
 
and light on human society” Novum Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, p. 214), in favour of 
the practical life in matters of communal good. 
While, as earlier discussed, God is still in 
Bacon’s Politique-Ethics machine He is but one 
referent, Bacon being only slightly prior to 
Hobbes’ declaration that to be ethical is to obey 
the law, which law may well contain new statutes 
to countervail excessive politique behaviour, 
those new statutes themselves being an emerging 
form of the institutional capital mentioned in the 
pitch for optimism contained in the preceding 
paragraphs of this enquiry. Some of Bacon’s 
down-to-earth-advice on ethical behaviour begs 
anew that question on how humans might 
transform moral thought into moral action and, 
after all, such renewed begging of the question is 
an important outcome in itself, and hardly a basis 
on which to dismiss Bacon’s contribution. 
Conclusion to Bacon’s Ethics 
In summary, on the face of his writings Bacon’s 
Ethical method at first appears conventional and, 
subject to human rationality and the precepts of 
morality being God-given, it consists of logically directing the will to make correct 
selections between comparative duties. Ethics inheres in an appetite for good, native 
to the human mind and all existing things, and in this domain it expresses itself 
through the logical or truthful search for the good understood as the welfare of the 
individual or society. Ethics’ constraints are conventional. They consist of frustration 
of the natural movement from lower nature to higher nature by such human 
conditions as ambition.  
Yet Bacon’s Politique Ethics is a departure from the general condition because what 
passes for ethical behaviour is in part predicated on a range of referents and as 
 
What Does GDP Really Measure? 
“Even if we act to erase material poverty, there 
is another greater task, it is to confront the 
poverty of satisfaction—purpose and dignity— 
that afflicts us all.   
 
Too much and for too long, we seemed to have 
surrendered personal excellence and community 
values in the mere accumulation of material 
things.  Our Gross National Product, now, is 
over $800 billion dollars a year, but that Gross 
National Product - if we judge the United States 
of America by that - that Gross National Product 
counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, 
and ambulances to clear our highways of 
carnage.   
It counts special locks for our doors and the jails 
for the people who break them.  It counts the 
destruction of the redwood and the loss of our 
natural wonder in chaotic sprawl.  It counts 
napalm and counts nuclear warheads and 
armoured cars for the police to fight the riots in 
our cities.  It counts Whitman's rifle and Speck's 
knife, and the television programs which glorify 
violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet 
the gross national product does not allow for the 
health of our children, the quality of their 
education or the joy of their play.  It does not 
include the beauty of our poetry or the strength 
of our marriages, the intelligence of our public 
debate or the integrity of our public officials.  It 
measures neither our wit nor our courage, 
neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our 
compassion nor our devotion to our country, it 
measures everything in short, except that which 
makes life worthwhile.   
And it can tell us everything about America 
except why we are proud that we are Americans. 
 
If this is true here at home, so it is true elsewhere 
in world.”  
 
Source: Excerpt from a speech made by Robert 
Kennedy at an election rally, University of 
Kansas, on March 18, 1968. (R. Kennedy, 1968) 
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previously discussed, is questionable when measured against his Philosophical Ethics 
alone. The practicality of this kind of Ethics, together with Bacon’s advocacy of 
good-in-common above self-good in comparative good settings, including duty to 
govern others by governing oneself well towards others, again in comparative good 
settings, exhausts the esoteric/exoteric distinction employed in this enquiry.  
Bacon’s Polis. 
Differing constructions of ideal Poleis are germane to the period under discussion: 
City of the Sun (Campenalla, 1902), New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1902b), Oceana 
(Harrington, 1902), The Prince (Machiavelli, 1968), and Utopia (More, 1901). Those 
of Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Tommaso Campanella (AD 1568 – 1639) provide 
illuminating insights into the changing nature of the relationship between Science 
and Polis and Ethics and Polis and it is clear that Bacon acknowledges some of 
Machiavelli’s ideas. I discuss only Bacon’s New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1909a) in this 
enquiry.  
New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1909a), which Speeding thinks may have been written circa 
1624/25, was published posthumously in 1627 by Bacon’s chaplain William Rawley 
(AD 1588 – 1667) as a stand-alone piece in a volume containing Sylva Sylvarum (F. 
Bacon, 1670) in the place Bacon intended for it, the one, New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 
1909a), symbolising the end of the work of the other that he, Bacon, was beginning, 
namely the Sylva Sylvarum, symbolising his Natural History (Spedding, n. d, p. 349). 
Spedding claims that Bacon’s unrealised intention was to have the New Atlantis (F. 
Bacon, 1909a) contain a “model political constitution, as well as a model college of 
natural philosophy” (ibid., p. 350).  
Even in its existing form New Atlantis may be interpreted as a symbol of Bacon’s 
scientific method and heritage of wealth and prosperity his machine of Science might 
bring. A recent contribution by Colclough (2010) supplies convincing details of 
Speeding’s claim and debunks views offered by Ellis (1857, pp. 325 - 329) urging 
Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 1670) to be primarily a literary collection of information 
extracted from such notables—Ellis does not name all of them—as Aristotle (BC 384 
– 322), pseudo-Aristotle and Pliny (AD 23 – 79) and near contemporaries or 
contemporaries of Bacon, for example Scaliger (AD 1540 – 1609), Ficino (AD 1433 
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– 1499), Telesio (AD 1509 – 1588), Galileo AD 1554 - 1642, della Porta (AD 1535 – 
1615), Sandys (AD 1577 – 1644) and Cardano AD 1501 - 1576). Colclough admits 
such sources but demonstrates that Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 1670) contains 
Bacon’s own trials of some of the collected experiments it contains, and his 
reflections about causes of phenomena under experimentation (Colclough, 2010, p. 
182).  
Colclough (ibid., pp. 184 – 191) also argues against a view by Langman (2006, p. 3) 
that “publication of New Atlantis alongside Sylva Sylvarum in 1626/27 was more the 
result of William Rawley’s need to assert his own authority as the protector and 
disseminator of Bacon’s textual legacy than an appreciation of the work’s own 
qualities” (2006, p. 3). Publication of Sylva Sylvarum and New Atlantis side by side 
is not, says Colclough, evidence of a rush into print by Rawley. Colclough also 
counter’s Langman’s argument that Sylva is common to only (sic) 23% of New 
Atlantis (Langman, 2006, p. 69) by identifying additional sources (Pliny, 1601/1634; 
G. Sandys, 1621) common to both works. Langman’s thesis has since been published 
(Langman, 2007). Rees dispels accusations that Bacon collected so-called 
experiments from others without acknowledgement and locates Bacon’s attributions 
in the Sylva to other writers as well, not previously named in this paragraph (G. Rees, 
1981, pp. 389 - 390). Rees also convincingly argues that the Sylva is more than a 
simple collection or collage of plagiarised material (ibid., pp. 377, 388- 393). 
The complementary relationship of Sylva Sylvarum (F. Bacon, 1670) and New 
Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1909a) might also be evidenced through the pre-eminent act of 
the kings of Bensalem, the island of the New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1909a), in their 
storied erection of Salomon’s House “an order, or society ... [which is] the noblest 
foundation, as we think, that ever was upon the earth, and the lantern of this 
kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of the works and creatures of God” New 
Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1952a, p. 206, my square brackets) and is the “eye” of the whole 
society (ibid., p. 206). “The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and 
secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the 
effecting of all things possible” (ibid., p. 210). On pages 210 to 214 of that same 
edition Bacon discusses the “preparations and instruments we have for our works ...  
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the several employments and functions whereto our fellows are assigned and ... the 
ordinances and rites which we observe” (F. Bacon, 
1952a, p. 210). On the face of these pages, Bacon 
makes Science the legitimate experimentation of a 
likely Christian society, which trades in the light 
of God’s given reason. These pages contain 
mention of sounds that travel along pipes and 
wires, ships that go under the water, and machines 
that fly. The work of Salomon’s House extends to 
“diverse other things” (F. Bacon, 1952a, p. 214), 
likely those new foodstuffs and clothing materials, 
rapid germination in agriculture, new industrial 
material products, cure of disease, creation of new 
and beneficial species and others of the kind 
mentioned in Magnalia Naturae (F. Bacon, 1733, 
pp. 29 - 30), and presumably as well, to enquiring 
after “new instruments of destruction in the way of 
war, poison, &c” (ibid., p. 30). Bacon’s namesake 
Roger Bacon had, as discussed on page 446 of this 
enquiry, mentioned wonders similar to some of 
these. 
Colclough (2010, p. 182) makes a claim that 
“virtually every experiment described in New 
Atlantis has its equivalent in Sylva” (ibid., p. 187). 
In addition to citing Rawley’s report that Bacon 
himself desired the English editions of Sylva 
Sylvarum and New Atlantis to be published 
together (ibid., p. 187), Colclough detects shared 
symbolism and iconography linking New Atlantis 
and Novum Organum to each other and jointly to 
the purpose of The Great Instauration through an imagery of voyage and discovery 
shared by the three (ibid., p. 189).  
 
 
 
 
Sources: The top panel is a reproduction of an 
engraved title page from Novum Organum 
cropped by Ian Eddington from an image 
available from the Image Delivery Service of 
Harvard University Library (Anonymous, 
1648). The bottom panel is an image of an 
engraved title page of Sylva Sylvarum cropped 
by Ian Eddington from Bacon, F. (1670). 
Sylva Sylvarum: A Natural History in Ten 
Centuries. London: J. R. for William Lee. (F. 
Bacon, 1670).  
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For example, the title page of Sylva Sylvarum substitutes more elaborate Corinthian 
columns for the Doric columns framing the ships of new knowledge returning 
through those Pillars of Hercules qua existing limits to knowledge depicted on the 
title page of Novum Organum. Between the Corinthian pillars of the New Atlantis a 
global intellectual world, a Mundus Intellectualis, replaces the ships and it is 
illuminated by the certified light of YAWH—the Latin inscription above the globe is 
Genesis 1:4. “And God saw the light, and it was good” (Holy Bible, 1932)—under 
respectively focussed gazes of guardian cherubim which link mankind’s intellectual 
world to God’s illuminating glory. One cherub looks down upon the intellectual 
world, the other across to the Tetragrammation. The cherubim, says Colclough, 
reappear in New Atlantis where light is the principal item traded (ibid., p 190). They 
are, inter alia, depicted there as gold statues on the chariot of the father of Salomon’s 
House and signify the accompanying presence of God’s light to the very centre of 
Bensalem. In his study of philosophy and image patterns Vickers (1968, pp. 174 -
175, 174 - 201) states that voyage of discovery imagery is seldom used but to 
communicate extension of knowledge ideas, other words such as roads, open country 
and the like reinforcing associations of travel and discovery. 
Voyaging and acquisition is central to Bacon’s own Description of the Intellectual 
Globe (F. Bacon, 1882c, p. 403) on the first page of which he calls human 
understanding the vessel in which the faculties of the mind—memory, imagination 
and reason—sail the waters of philosophy and theology (ibid., p. 403).  
In is not difficult to associate Salomon’s House with heralding of the Royal Society 
and scholars continue to link Bacon with the name and/or founding of that society 
(Bruce, 2008, p. xxxi; Ewalt, 2008, p. 108; Fowler, 1881, p. 37; Glanvill, 1676; 
Gribbin, 2007, p. 51; Hunter & Wood, 1986; Langman, 2006, p. 13; Vickers, 2007, 
pp. 5 - 6; 2008, p. 788; Webster, 1975, p. 315). A rich literature, not discussed 
further in this enquiry, raises a plethora of questions about such matters as secular-
religious divide in the imagery and symbolism of New Atlantis, Bacon as the cause of 
God-deprived materialism, Bacon qua positive scientist, Bacon qua founder of 
modern social biology, origins of Baconian scientific ideas in law, and Rosicrucian 
imagery in New Atlantis, (Boesky, 1996; L. J. Cohen, 1977; Farrington, 1979; 
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Hacking, 1983; Keynes, 1921; Skolimowski, 1983; Weinberger, 2002; Wheeler, 
1983; White, 1968; Whitney, 1990; Yates, 2001). 
Bacon’s Polis is a peaceful, prosperous and Godly society in which Science, through 
the power over nature its knowledge brings, is wisely applied for the betterment of 
mankind.  
The method of Bacon’s Polis is the dutiful, wise and good application of Science’s 
power over nature for betterment of mankind. Its sphere of operations is Science’s 
power over nature and the stability it may bring to the state and empire of mankind. 
Its constraints are failure of the will under logic’s council as to the correct choice 
between comparable duties.  
Yet depiction of Bensalem as an esoteric Polis is compromised and difficult to 
maintain within the methodology constructed for the purposes of this enquiry and 
Bensalem might be signalled a P(p)olis. The twinning of New Atlantis with Sylva 
Sylvarum and its Natural History basis on which Second or Active Philosophy was to 
be built, Spedding’s report of Bacon’s likely intention to have colonized his New 
Atlantis with blueprints of a model constitution and college of practical science, 
Salomon’s House as a study centre of the works of nature and the enlargement of 
mankind’s material estate, Bensalem’s citizenry of workers, traders, and scientists 
engaged in practical experimentation of a kind outlined in Sylva Sylvarum, and 
Bacon’s voyage and discovery imagery of reformed Science’s acquisition of new age 
knowledge and technique, when taken together, render New Atlantis at esoteric-status 
odds with Plato’s heavenly city of ideas and heavenly template forms, or Aristotle’s 
entelechies and/or natural state prior to mankind, or Augustine’s and Aquinas’ cities 
of God. This rendering blurs the esoteric/exoteric divide and strains the thesis 
methodology, providing another indication of a challenge to the longevity of 
Aristotelian science and political philosophy. 
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 8 
The literature on Bacon is vast and during his lifetime and afterwards commentators 
have offered a variety of opinions about his character, and about the status of his 
contribution to Science and human welfare. I have found it difficult to discern a so-
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called real Bacon. Just as a number of consistent connected facts emerge as might 
assist depiction of Bacon as one kind of person or another, countervailing opposites 
and/or contradictions emerge. Bacon the man appears enigmatic, Bacon qua man of 
Science is alternatively praised or vilified, Bacon as innovator and change agent, 
although sometimes a subject of insulting debate, is difficult to deny. 
Bacon pronounces his new method of Science suitable for all philosophy and he 
situates it in a real world where it may maximise power over nature subject to his 
named constraints of right reason and true religion. Its method or new engine 
consists first of cleansing the mind of its idols and then Induction of axioms and laws 
through application of tables of exclusion and helps to the understanding in 
experimental Science, and application of those axioms and laws in Induction of 
further discovery. Its sphere of operations is sense knowledge engendered by 
memory, imagination and reason predicated on experience—sensual experimental 
knowledge about Forms or Laws of Nature residing in their own power over nature 
and operable through superinduction for the benefit of mankind. Its constraints are 
the idols of mind of mankind, the secrecy of nature’s laws, and the complexity of 
scientific method. Bacon’s new Science exhausts the esoteric/exoteric divide 
employed in the methodology of this enquiry because Induction and/or deduction, 
including its attendant inference is an applied or operational Science requiring 
experimentation and practical inventiveness and application.  
Ethics for Bacon is, inter alia, a preparation for politics and as Philosophical Ethics it 
answers to theology although, in Architect of Fortune Ethics, as distinguished from 
Philosophical or Theological Ethics, Bacon seasons its answering with a little 
philanthropia and other ingredients. Philosophical Ethics’ method is a making of 
choice between comparative good alternatives in both self-good and good-in-
communion domains, both present and future. Its sphere of operations is an appetite 
for good, native to the human mind and all existing things, and in humans its twin 
logical or truthful penchant for welfare of individual or society, inhering at self-good 
level in mind well-formed and composed in itself and at good-in communion level in  
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Table 56: Key Terms Nuance—Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
Descriptor 
Esoteric Dimensions of Science, Ethics and Polis at Dawn of the Modern Era—Bacon 
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
Science 
Induction of axioms and laws through first cleansing 
mind of its idols and then application of Bacon’s method 
of tables of exclusions and helps to the understanding in 
experimental Science, and the application of those 
axioms and laws in deduction of further discovery. 
Sensual experimental and experiential knowledge about 
the forms or Laws of Nature residing in their own power 
over nature and competent operation of that knowledge 
in superinduction of welfare benefits for mankind.  
Idols of the mind, complexity of nature, and complexity 
of scientific method. 
C
irca A
D
 1
5
6
1
 to
 1
6
2
6
 
Ethics 
Active logical management of the will in correct choice 
between comparative good alternatives in both self-good 
and good-in-communion domains in the interest of the 
welfare of the individual and society. It consists of 
internal goodness at the individual level and duty towards 
others societal level in present and future situations.  
Ethics inheres in an appetite for good native to all 
existing things including the human mind qua its truthful 
penchant for welfare of individual or society, inhering at 
self-good level in mind well-formed and composed in 
itself and at good-in-communion level in mind well-
formed towards others. It manifests in an attendant duty 
to govern others by governing oneself well towards 
others. Human rationality and the precepts of morality 
which marshal it are God given. 
Frustration of the natural movement from lower nature to 
higher nature by such human conditions as ambition, 
self-love and greed. 
Polis 
A cognitive gathering in a New Atlantis predicated on 
Godliness, peace and prosperity through  application of 
Science for the betterment of mankind. 
Power over nature which Science brings and stability and 
advancement it may bring to human society. 
The failure of the will under logic’s counsel as to the 
correct choice between comparable duties.  
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Table 57: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Thesis Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving recognition 
of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of a 
rapacious mankind in whom no part of reason is divine and for 
whom knowledge is power, which recognition provides an 
alternative to a long held standpoint that binding sentiment of 
Polis is situated in natural social instinct implanted in mankind 
for whom virtue is some kind of knowledge. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental 
Science 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1651 – 1626) and 
Dawning of A 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
The Polis is the peaceful, Godly and prosperous New Atlantis in which scientific knowledge is power over the Laws of 
Nature.  
Reason and the precepts of morality are divine. A focus on the right use of knowledge as power replaces a focus on the 
kind of knowledge of which virtue may consist. 
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science 
becoming valued in its own right for direct benefits it could 
bring to society and state. 
Chapter 7 
 
Experimental Science returns and the age of reason begins. Science understood as syllogistic demonstration is 
becoming replaced by Science as induction and deduction within the rules for reasoning in philosophy. 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1651 – 1626) and 
Dawning of A 
Modern Age 
Science is knowledge of the Forms or Laws of Nature derived from Bacon’s new kind of Induction applied through his 
new machine of method, his novum organum.  
Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good understood as the welfare of the individual or society. It consists 
of making the correct choice between self-good alternatives and good-in-communion alternatives in their respective 
comparative good settings. It inheres in mind well-ordered and composed in itself and mind well disposed towards 
others, and it answers to theology 
Metaphysic replaces Metaphysics. Metaphysic is inquisition of formal cause in operative Science and partly informs 
superinduction of welfare benefits for mankind.  
Practical Ethics is will working towards good of individual and society. At the individual level it is internal goodness 
and at the societal level it is politics or external goodness. 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
Chapter 7 
 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1651 – 1626) and 
Dawning of A 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance in the term Modern Age 
Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good understood as the welfare of the individual or society. It consists 
of making the correct choice between self-good alternatives and good-in-communion alternatives in their respective 
comparative good settings. It inheres in mind well-ordered and composed in itself and mind well disposed towards 
others, and it answers to theology. 
 
Integrating Summary of Part Three 
A fledgling experimental Science found in Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) had, by the time of Isaac Newton (AD 1643 - 1727), developed the basis of the method of Science practised in our times: observe, hypothesise, 
falsify or verify by testing, and tentatively accept verifications as theory. This long march of the development of experimental Science method occurred within a system of faith Ethics and in its own way, was part 
of the social, political, and cultural changes and discovery of the times: the renaissance and humanism, the reformation and counter reformation, the discovery of printing, the European discovery of the Americas, 
and the emergence of nation states. Towards the end of this period Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626)—and also Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) as Chapter 9 will reveal—addressed Science in a political 
philosophy so different as to constitute a clear change from Aristotelian political philosophy as it had become known in its Western Christian dress. Under Bacon, Polis as an eternal city of God is challenged by 
Polis as a New Atlantis, Science becomes a practical, experimental, operative activity in pursuit of advancement of learning and human welfare, a pursuit free from Aristotelian metaphysics and final cause, yet 
subject to Ethical constraints predicated on theology, and Ethics becomes active logical management of human will in correct choice between comparative good alternatives in both self-good and good-in-
communion domains in the interest of welfare of individual and society. It consists of internal goodness at the individual level and duty towards others at a societal level in present and future situations. Yet even in 
Bacon’s works an Ethics for politiques can be differentiated from that construct of Ethics provided on the previous sentence.  
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mind well-formed towards others. It manifests in an attendant duty to govern others 
by governing oneself well towards others. Ethics’ constraints are conventional. They 
consist of frustration of the natural movement from lower nature to higher nature by 
such human conditions as greed, envy and the like. Bacon’s preference for active 
man-in-communion Ethics over passive self-good Ethics, his insistence on a 
comparative good setting for ethical choice and his step towards an Architect of 
Fortune Ethics for practising politiques exhaust the esoteric/exoteric divide 
methodology of this enquiry.  
Again, Bacon’s Polis is a peaceful, prosperous and Godly society in which Science, 
through the power over nature its knowledge brings, is wisely applied for the 
betterment of mankind. The method of Bacon’s Godly and peaceful Polis is its 
institutionalisation of Science and dutiful, wise and good husbandry of it. Its sphere 
of operations is power over nature its scientific acumen occasions and partaking of 
welfare benefits resulting from an Ethical use of that power. Its constraints, if any, 
are failures of will to implement correct duties made under logic’s counsel. I cannot 
detect Bacon’s finding the relative isolation of his New Atlantis neither contradictory 
of its human welfare ideals, nor hindering to its progress and trade in light. Bacon’s 
New Atlantis deals in experiment and trade of ideas and actively embraces utilitarian 
welfare, and these exoteric dimensions and others earlier mentioned, substantially 
challenge its esoteric Polis standing sufficiently to compromise enquiry 
esoteric/exoteric divide methodology.  
Each of Bacon’s Science, Ethics and Polis compromises the enquiry’s 
esoteric/exoteric methodology and within the framework in which the enquiry is 
structured this compromise is taken as a marker of a dawning new era. 
Table 56 on page 565 summarises nuance Bacon brings to the key terms of the 
enquiry and Table 57 on page 566 carries that terms nuance to cumulative 
articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements. It was left to Hobbes to separate Ethics 
from religion. Hobbes was Bacon’s employee for a short time and the next chapter 
discusses Hobbes’ contribution. 
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Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1679) and Dawning of a Modern Age 
INTRODUCTION  
Hobbes, who “even in his youth, ... [being] temperate, both to wine and women” 
(Aubrey, 1898, p. 350, my square brackets), was no 
“woman–hater, neither  had he an abhorrence to good 
wine” (ibid.). He possessed a ‘harmonical soul’ (ibid., p. 
350) and “a curious sharp wit which was also sure and 
steady” (ibid., p. 349). It appears that, in spite of these 
attractive attributes, his birth and life during the period 
of the English Civil War and Thirty Years Wars 
(Hobbes, 1680, p. 2) may have led him to a somewhat 
confronting understanding of the nature of mankind. His 
stated view is that mankind is first and foremost egoistic 
and selfish (Hobbes, 1840, pp. 44, 45, 48 – 50, 261) and yet on this basis he attempts 
to construct a “highway to peace” (Hobbes, 1841, p. xiv), his sanguine understanding 
appearing partly to inform a unified system of philosophy he develops. 
Hobbes’ own life was not always peaceful, and the impact of his work was 
widespread in his own time. For example, in Behemoth (1889a) Hobbes attributes the 
cause of the civil war to ideological differences between religion and politics and 
implicates a variety of sects in his claims—Presbyterians (ibid., pp. 4, 20 – 23, 28, 
30, 56, 61, 79 – 82, 166 – 175) and “Brownists, Independents, Anabaptists, Fifth-
monarchy-men, Quakers, and diverse others, all commonly called by the name of 
fanatics” (ibid., p. 136). In his A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of 
the Common Laws of England (Hobbes, 1750) he attributes experienced civil strife to 
lawyers (ibid., 605 – 606 within 591 – 651) and is respectful but not necessarily 
uncritical of Sir Thomas Coke (ibid., pp.590, 594, 597, 59, 600, 605, 608 609). In 
some circles Hobbism became a pejorative word. Before parliament banned printing 
of Leviathan in 1666 new copies were selling for eight shillings but by 1868 second 
hand copies were selling for twenty-four shillings and new for thirty shillings (Pepys, 
1893/2015, n. p., entry for 3 September, 1668). Hobbes was from time to time 
 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington 
from Wright, J. M. (1669/70). (artist). 
Thomas Hobbes. (oil on canvas). 
London: National Portrait Gallery. (J. 
M. Wright, circa 1669-70). 
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rejected at court and was estranged and then reconciled with Charles II whom he had 
tutored. On more than one occasion he felt obliged, in fear of his life, to quit the 
country of his residency whether it was England or France. 
Commentary on Hobbes’ work is copious. For example there is scholarly interest in 
such topics as his professional relationships with Gassendi (AD  1592 - 1665), 
Mersenne (AD 1588 - 1648) and Galileo (AD 1564 – 1642), banning publication of 
his works, favour and disfavour at court, his travels and life in France, his claimed 
obsession with war, unity of moral and scientific wisdom in his works, his use of 
poetic mimesis, Hobbes as monist, materialist, mechanist, Pyrrhonist, royalist, 
Cromwellian, Hobbes versus Bramhall (AD 1594 – 1663) on liberty and necessity, 
Hobbesian man qua persona, will and agency and intelligent substance, education in 
Hobbes’ political philosophy, civil association in Hobbes’ political philosophy and 
such a list could run for pages. (Bejan, 2010; V. Chappell, 1990; J. R. Collins, 205; J. 
Hamilton, 2012; G. B. Herbert, 1989; Machamer, 2012; Oakeshott, 1975a; Reagan, 
2012; Simendic, 2012; Steinberg, 1988).  
Hobbes’ own writing, like the literature about him, addresses a range of subjects. In 
this chapter I engage mainly with a limited number of Hobbes’ works sufficient for 
derivation of understandings of his Science, Ethics and Polis (Hobbes, 1750, 1839a, 
1839b, 1840, 1841, 1889a, 1889b, 1913), and his contribution to breaking the link 
Elements of Philosophy: The First Part Concerning Body (Hobbes, 1839a, p. 10) 
compare between Science and theology.  
Hobbes announces in De Cive (Hobbes, 1841) that his unified system consists of 
three parts.  
... in the first I would have treated of a body, and its generall properties; in the second 
of man and his speciall faculties, and affections; in the third, of civill government and 
the duties of Subjects: therefore the first Section would have contained the first 
philosophie, and certaine elements of physick; in it we would have considered the 
reasons of Time, Place, Cause, Power, Relation, Proportion, Quantity, Figure, and 
motion. In the second we would have beene conversant about imagination, memory, 
intellect, ratiocination, appetite, will, good and Evill, honest and dishonest, and the 
like. What this last Section handles, I have now already shewed you [that is the 
sections of De Cive called On Liberty and On Dominion which constitute a basis for 
Leviathan. (Hobbes, 1841, pp. xix - xx, Hobbes' italics, my square brackets) 
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These three components constitute Hobbes’ Science, Ethics and Polis. I discuss each 
of them beginning, in the next paragraph, with Science, where I focus on so-called 
first philosophy in general and Science or physics in particular.  
HOBBES’ SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLIS 
Hobbes’ Science 
Hobbes’ first philosophy is concerned with establishment of definitions of those 
Galilean-type primary qualities such as quantity and figure, and with method 
(Hobbes, 1839a, pp. 65 – 90). Philosophy as physics or Science focuses on motion in 
bodies (ibid., pp. 69 - 73). 
Science informs all three parts of Hobbes’ unified system and this condition flows 
logically from his fundamental dictum that: 
 ... the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to 
say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and 
Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and 
consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no 
part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is 
Nothing; and consequently nowhere. (Hobbes, 1651, p. 497) 
The first of the two quotations above reveals Hobbes interest in Galilean primary 
qualities and mathematical measurement of nature’s laws. In both of these quotations 
Aristotle’s primary category, substance, lingers on through Galileo into Hobbes. 
There are but two types of bodies:  
For two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one another, offer themselves to 
such as search after their generation and properties; one whereof being the work of 
nature, is called a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth and is made by the 
wills and agreement of men. (Hobbes, 1913, p. 14)  
In today’s world of Body Corporate entities in real estate, and Limited Liability 
Companies as persons in law, we may think little of Hobbes’ calling Leviathan, his 
Commonwealth, a body. But to Hobbes it is a body by virtue of movement, a 
condition discussed further on pages 572 and 573 of this enquiry. From the two 
divisions of body outlined in the previous quotation: 
... spring the two parts of philosophy, called natural and civil. But seeing that, for the 
knowledge of the properties of a commonwealth, it is necessary first to know the 
dispositions, affections, and manners of men, civil philosophy is again commonly 
 571 
 
divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, is 
called Ethics; and the other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called 
politics or simply civil philosophy. (Hobbes, 1839a, p. 11) 
The quotation above clearly differentiates natural philosophy, Ethics and politics, 
each from the other. Hobbes calls Science “knowledge of consequences which is also 
called PHILOSOPHY” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 53, Hobbes' capitalisation). His 
classification of scientific knowledge, that is his classification of the Sciences, flows 
from this usage and understanding, and from his earlier discussed maxim that the 
entire universe is body and that there are but two kinds of body. His differentiation of 
natural philosophy or the “Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Natural” 
(ibid., p. 53) from civil philosophy, or the “Consequences from the accidents of 
Politique Bodies” (ibid., p. 53), today’s political Science, is clearly illustrated in 
tabular form in Leviathan (Hobbes, 1952, p. 72). His table provides another 
informative nomenclature allowing insight in to the nature of Science at the dawn of 
the Modern Age.  
More generally, Science is defined as a domain of philosophy: 
which treats of every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we 
may, by consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of 
composition or resolution, that is to say, every body of whose generation and 
properties we can have any knowledge . (Hobbes, 1839a, p. 10) 
Hobbes’ method of resolution and composition (Hobbes, 1839a, p. 66) is not 
controversial it being consistent with emergence of various new methods to replace 
scholasticism’s appeal to authority in matters of Science. Resolution, the analytical 
dimension, is a breaking down of a being into its constituent parts, for example the 
natural object signified by the word man may be resolved into rational, animated or 
moving and body, (Hobbes, 1839a, p. 24). Composition, the synthetical dimension, 
consists of assembly of component parts into a whole. Analysis proceeds forwards 
synthesis backwards (ibid., p. 310) and method is the shortest way of finding out 
causes by their known effects and vice versa (ibid., p. 66). Hobbes distinguishes his 
use of method in geometry from his use of it in physics which is the investigation of 
sense phenomena in the real world (ibid., p. 397 – 389). Whereas in geometry 
premises are known or accepted as true, such is not the case in physics where 
premises about its objects, those individual appearances or phenomena of nature qua 
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works of the author of nature, are less certain. Hobbes claims of physics that it may 
reveal the ways and means of generation or cause of the effects or appearances of 
nature, not that it will reveal them (ibid., p. 388). 
Neither is his generation qua movement controversial. It echoes back to Aristotle. 
Hobbes’ method of Science is served by syllogistic demonstration of truth beginning 
with premises and ending in established fact. Science:  
begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into 
generall Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is 
called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall 
Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called 
SCIENCE. But if the first ground or such Discourse, be not Definitions; or if the 
Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or 
Conclusion, is again Opinion. (Hobbes, 1929, p. 50, Hobbes' capitalisation)  
Like Francis Bacon, and like Aristotle for that matter, Hobbes questions 
mankind’s ability to agree on initial premises. He also allows that premises are 
conditioned by culture and experience (Hobbes, 1904, p. 109). He argues that 
such conditioning may be so diverse that resolution of differences might not be 
possible by mutual agreement or by force of authority. Hobbes’ discussion of 
natural phenomena, for example, lightning and thunder, gravity, light, heat and 
colour, the world and the stars can be found in Part 4 of his Elements of 
Philosophy (Hobbes, 1839a, pp. 387 - 508).  
For Hobbes, “where there is no generation or property there is no philosophy” 
(Hobbes, 1839a, p. 10). On this basis, Hobbes expels theology (ibid., p. 10), 
understood as the doctrine of God, from Science, because, of God, there is no 
property or generation, nothing to add or subtract. He also excludes the doctrine of 
angels (ibid., p. 10) because there is no place for ratiocination, by which he means 
computation or the capacity to add or subtract something. The addition and 
subtraction of ratiocination should not be thought of only as simple arithmetic, which 
it includes. Ratiocination applies to “all the kinds in which philosophy consists” 
(ibid., p. 5) which are “magnitude, body, motion, time, degrees of quality, action, 
conception, proportion, speed and names” (ibid., p. 5). Hobbes also excludes 
revelation, divine inspiration, astrology, and the doctrine of God’s worship from 
Science because they are unattainable by reason. History, both natural and political, 
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although necessary to philosophy, is also excluded because such knowledge is but 
experience or authority, but not ratiocination” (ibid., pp. 10 – 11).  
Although Hobbes’ method is somewhat cumbersome, he was not ignorant of extant 
developments in Science. He spent many years with the scientific elite in France. He 
visited Italy in his forty-sixth year to meet Galileo in his seventieth year, and learned 
more about his, Galileo’s, wider works and experimentation. He was Bacon’s 
secretary for a short time and, according to Aubrey (1898, p, 395), borrowed 
Induction from Bacon. He seems to see everywhere the motion of a clockwork 
universe and to apply the idea of motion to psychology, physics, political economy 
and Ethics, which is clearly revealed in his Leviathan (Hobbes, 1952) and De Cive 
(Hobbes, 2010). 
In summary, Science for Hobbes is ratiocination about qualities of body, reason 
understood as computation qua addition and subtraction, being its intellectual 
attendant. Its method is ratiocination in resolution and composition operational 
through syllogistic demonstration of fact. Its sphere of operations is knowledge of 
accidents and laws of bodies natural or political and the power brought by such 
understanding for construction of a peaceful and prosperous artificial state. Its 
constraints are nature’s complexity, problems of definition and deficiencies in 
syllogistic demonstration.  
POLIS 
Hobbes’ Civil Philosophy: Leviathan 
The Aristotelian thread found in generation as movement ties natural body and its 
Science physick to human body and its Science Ethics. In turn, it ties human body 
and Ethics to artificial body and its Science of politics. For example, bodies are 
entities that can be moved, and movement is interpreted widely. The movements 
found in mankind carry various names: will, emotion, imagination, and trains of 
thought are some examples. Natural bodies can possess movement from place to 
place, for example in waterfalls or landslides, but also through change in form from 
say water to ice or mist. Natural bodies, both lifeless and living, are moved according 
to the natural laws that govern them. Control of interactions between bodies should 
not be predicated on other than scientific understanding of those natural laws. It 
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follows says Hobbes that a Commonwealth or state as an artificial body which results 
as a consequence of control of inanimate and animate natural bodies—including 
human nature as a property of body—should be founded on his-called correct 
understandings of natural laws that account for those movements in those bodies.  
In what sense then is this Commonwealth or Leviathan an artificial body?  
Hobbes’ Leviathan is that political body which emerges as a consequence of the 
scientific management of the natural laws that correctly account for mankind’s 
behaviour.  
NATURE, (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World,) is by the art of 
man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial 
Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principall part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move 
themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what 
is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so 
many wheeles, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the 
Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of 
Nature, Man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-
WEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial Man; though of 
greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was 
intended … . (Hobbes, 1839b, p. ix, Hobbes' italics)  
It is interesting given Harvey’s 1628 publication (Harvey, 1889, p. 140) on 
circulation of the blood that Hobbes in 1651 names the heart a spring rather than a 
pump. Nevertheless beyond its existence as an artificial state, an artificial gathering 
or Polis, the Leviathan becomes simply that:  
 
... to which wee owe our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him [the 
Soveraigne] by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so 
much Power and Strength [88] conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled 
to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies 
abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define 
it,) is One Person, Of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and 
Common Defence. (Hobbes, 1904, p. 119, numbers in square brackets refer to page 
numbers in Hobbes' 1861 folio edition, Hobbes' italics.) 
Leviathan as Polis, coming as it did some nineteen centuries after Aristotle, is quite 
some turnaround. Mankind cognitively gathers in an artificial state and not the prior 
natural state suggested by Aristotle. Mankind is no longer a political animal in the 
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Aristotelian sense, one who colonises a natural state prior to man. Rather, mankind 
develops an artificial state, which it then colonises. Hobbes’ artificial 
Commonwealth leads to questions of what then, in Hobbes’s view, is the natural state 
of mankind which occasions the need for an artificial state, and on what natural laws 
of mankind might the artificial state be predicated.  
The natural state of mankind is a bleak one, says Hobbes. First, no predisposition to 
cognitively gather is implanted in mankind.  
There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so 
as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the 
use of his five senses. (Hobbes, 1839b, p. 16). 
To so exist, that is, to live by one’s five senses and by the train of thoughts they 
occasion is to live in a state of motion. This motion is driven by the felicity enjoyed 
through gratification of desire (Hobbes, 1904, 
pp. 37 - 38). This felicity relates to the here 
and now. “What kind of Felicity God hath 
ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a 
man shall no sooner know, than enjoy” (ibid., 
p. 38) such joy being now “as 
incomprehensible, as the word of Schoole-
men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible” (ibid. 
p. 38). The desire within is a response to the 
things without and in Hobbes’ weaving of this Aristotelian thread might be found 
meanderings of modern stimulus-response psychology.  
All other human cognitive faculties of that implanted live-by-the-five-senses 
imperative are acquired, and their development is possible through formal learning, 
or activity in industry, and all are made possible only through the invention of letters 
and words.  
For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no 
other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be 
improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures. 
(Hobbes, 1839b, p. 16)  
 
Movement Remains Crucial 
[Mind] maps are constructed when we interact with 
objects, such as a person, a machine, a place, from 
the outside of the brain toward its interior. I cannot 
emphasize the word interaction enough. It reminds us 
that making maps, which is essential for improving 
actions as noted above, often occurs in a setting of 
action to begin with. Action and maps, movements 
and mind, are part of an unending cycle, an idea 
suggestively captured by Rodolfo Llinás when he 
attributes the birth of the mind to the brain’s control 
of organized movement. Damasio, A. (2011). Self 
Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain 
(pp. 63 - 64). Random House. Kindle Edition. 
(Damasio, 2010, pp. 63 - 64) 
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Man is no longer distinguished from the beasts by divine soul, or by will, but rather 
by virtue of an innate capacity for reason after its further development under actions 
of the senses and 
experiential learning. 
Each new arrival may, 
through learning, 
separate themselves from 
the beasts to different 
degrees. The balanced 
virtue and rest of the 
harmonious Aristotelian 
soul is dismissed. 
Nonetheless, the capacity 
for reason “as an act of 
man's mind, that I can 
remember, naturally 
planted in him, so as to 
need no other thing, to 
the exercise of it” (Hobbes, 1839b, p. 16), mentioned above, seems to linger as a 
half-way house: for “every man brought Philosophy, that is Natural Reason, into the 
world with him, for all men can reason to some degree, and concerning some things” 
(Hobbes, 1839a, p. 1). If Hobbes’ natural reason is part of God’s creation of beings, 
that is, is part of natural law, then it must be God given, or from whence else did 
everyman obtain that natural reason carried with them into the world.  
For Hobbes, mankind’s natural state becomes a relentless pursuit for ongoing 
satisfaction of insatiable repetitive appetites which engenders “a perpetual and 
restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only after death” (Hobbes, 1929, p. 
77). The ceaseless desire is driven by such conditions as the need to assure sufficient 
resources to maintain present or better levels of satisfaction into the future, the desire 
for more power, and the love of flattery. The competition for “riches, honour, 
command, or other power” (ibid., p. 77) so generated would, except for the fear of 
violent death, result in enmity and war, because mankind would “kill, subdue, 
 
Now All the World’s a Leviathan 
In brief, single-cell organisms with a nucleus have an unminded and unconscious 
will to live and manage life suitably enough, for as long as certain genes allow them. 
Brains expanded the possibilities of life management even when they did not 
produce minds, let alone conscious minds. For that reason they too prevailed. By the 
time minds and consciousness were added to the mix, the possibilities of regulation 
expanded even more and made way for the kind of management that occurs not just 
within one organism but across many organisms, in societies. Consciousness enabled 
humans to repeat the leitmotif of life regulation by means of a collection of cultural 
instruments—economic exchange, religious beliefs, social conventions and ethical 
rules, laws, arts, science, technology. Still, the survival intention of the eukaryotic 
cell and the survival intention implicit in human consciousness are one and the same. 
Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (pp. 59 
- 60). Random House. Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, pp. 59 - 60). 
 
Behind the imperfect but admirable edifice that cultures and civilizations have 
constructed for us, life regulation remains the basic issue we face. Just as important, 
the motivation behind most achievements in human cultures and civilizations rests 
with that precise issue and with the need to manage the behaviors of humans 
engaged in addressing that issue. Life regulation is at the root of a lot that needs 
explaining in biology in general and in humanity in particular: the existence of 
brains; the existence of pain, pleasure, emotions, and feelings; social behaviors; 
religions; economies and their markets and financial institutions; moral behaviors; 
laws and justice; politics; art, technology, and science—a very modest list, as the 
reader can see. Life and the conditions that are integral to it—the irrepressible 
mandate to survive and the complicated business of managing survival in an 
organism, with one cell or with trillions—were the root cause of the emergence and 
evolution of brains, the most elaborate management devices assembled by evolution, 
as well as the root cause of everything that followed from the development of ever 
more elaborate brains, inside ever more elaborate bodies, living in ever more 
complex environments. Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the 
Conscious Brain (pp. 59 - 60). Random House. Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, pp. 
59 - 60). 
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supplant, or repel” in pursuit of them (ibid., p. 77). “Worst of all mankind will live in 
continual feare, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1958, p. 107). 
The fear of violent death, in Hobbes’ time, was made particularly clear by an 
ongoing state of war, but is ever present through mankind’s awareness that in general 
the difference between person and person—Hobbes usage is man and man—in terms 
of strength of body and mind is such “that the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the 
same danger with himself” (Hobbes, 1839b, p. 110). It is interesting in this regard 
that the face in the opening illustration of Leviathan is said to markedly resemble 
alternatively Cromwell or Charles I (K. Brown, 1980, pp. 410 - 411; Waller, 1904, p. 
v). The change of portrait may be attributed to flattery, or to fear, or to both, or for 
that matter be the result of none of these, pirated editions having various printing 
differences from the original. Rather than live in their natural state—which is “the 
warre of every one against his neighbour” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 224)—in the absence of 
the amenities brought by arts and letters, culture, trade, and industry, men construct 
and inhabit the artificial state, the Leviathan.  
Strauss (1966) gives a general explanation of the process by which the essential 
tension between rapacious self-interest and fear of violent death contributes to the 
emergence of a Leviathan. He interprets Hobbes’ denial that altruism is natural, and 
Hobbes’ assertion that mankind is essentially rapacious (ibid., p. 3), as a break from 
the tradition that mankind, through their gregarious inclination, is essentially good. 
The artificial state is a resolution of essential tension between two postulates. Under 
a postulate of appetite, vanity drives the natural appetite occasioned by animal nature 
and the experiences of the senses such that men, now mankind, from their very birth, 
and naturally, “scramble for everything they covert, and would have all the world, if 
they could, to fear and obey them” (ibid., p. 10). Under a postulate of reason, humans 
ascertain that avoidance of death is necessary for enjoyment of appetite. The fear that 
humans have of violent death, which is stronger than the appetite and desire for life, 
is the mechanism through which the postulate of reason checks and balances the 
postulate of appetite: ergo the artificial state.  
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Hobbes’ own explanation is more detailed. There is nature and its bodies both 
organic and inorganic and its domain of physics, there is mankind foremost among 
the beasts, and its domain of Ethics, and there is civil government and its domain of 
politics. Mankind is common to all three and is the link between nature and civil 
society. Mankind builds the artificial state through applying the Laws of Nature 
which govern his movements. According to Hobbes:  
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by 
Reason, [italics added] by which a man IS forbidden to do, that, which is destructive 
of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and [is forbidden] to 
omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. (Hobbes, 1904, p. 86, my 
square brackets, Hobbes’ capitalisation) 
Table 58 on page 579 contains the first four of Hobbes’ so-called Laws of Nature. 
Hobbes develops nineteen of them, or twenty, if that collection of such harms as 
drinking to excess, which work against one’s good, be counted the twentieth. His 
social contract and covenant theory flows from the second law. Should Hobbes’ 
exposition: 
seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; 
by whereof the most part are too busie in getting food and the rest too negligent to 
understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie 
sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, 
which thou wouldest not have done to thy self. (Hobbes, 1904, pp. 107 - 108)  
Unfortunately such easy-sum rules may, due to complexity of human nature, have 
their efficacy quickly compromised. The Laws of Nature, which are “Immutable and 
Eternall” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 108), are discovered by reason and are predicated on the 
true state of human nature. They underwrite the building of the Leviathan through 
which mankind might live a peaceful life of which it does not weary.  
In summary, the method of Hobbes’ Polis or Leviathan is to cognitively gather in an 
artificial state predicated on obeying the laws of that state, which laws themselves 
are Laws of Nature discovered by reason. Its sphere of operations is the Laws of 
Nature expressed as civil laws and through obedience to them the surrender of 
individual vanities to the state in return for peace, prosperity and advancement. Its 
constraints are, in foro interno, lack of true desire to obey those laws and thus to 
feign obedience to them, and in foro externo, permission not to obey the law when,
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in situations where others are not obeying it, harm might come to one who does obey 
it. 
I now turn to discussion of Hobbes’ 
Ethics, the second of the three 
domains of his philosophy mentioned 
on page 570. 
Hobbes’ Ethics 
Hobbes’ dismissal of crucial parts of 
an Ethics that Aquinas had developed 
by extending Aristotelian reasoned 
virtue has already been mentioned, 
on page 423, Hobbes claiming that 
there is no in-blown virtue, and no 
practical wisdom grasping its own 
first principles of natural law through synderesis. 
We have also already met Hobbes’ maxim of living by the senses and development 
of a fledgling human capacity for reason through experience and learning rather than 
reason’s presence as a divine spark, capacity for reason yet being part of God’s made 
nature. What then does Hobbes mean by Ethical action? His answer is that to be 
ethical is to obey the Laws of Nature 
including the Laws of the Leviathan 
or Commonwealth. 
Hobbes requires that the Laws of 
Nature bind mankind in foro interno 
(Hobbes, 1904, p. 108), that is in the 
inner court of conscience, in Hobbes’ 
usage meaning that mankind should truly desire to obey them. To truly desire to obey 
the Laws of Nature is a sufficient condition for morality. Feigned observance is 
immoral. Mankind is not bound to obey the Laws of nature in foro externo (ibid., p. 
108), that is in open court, the court of person-made law meaning in Hobbes’ usage, 
Table 58: Hobbes’ Laws of Nature 1 
Through 4 
 
 
(1) That every man, ought to endeavour Peace , as farre as 
he has all hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtain 
it, Law of that he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of Warre. 
 
(2) That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-
forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it 
necessary, to lay down this right to all things and be 
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himselfe. 
 
(3) That men perform their Covenants made. 
(4) That a man which receiveth Benefit from Gratitude 
another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, 
have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. 
 
 
Source: Constructed by Ian Eddington from Hobbes, T. 
(1904). Leviathan. (pp. 86 – 97). London: John Bohm 
 
Terms Usage 
Traditional Usage  
in foro interno = in closed court, in conscience. 
in foro externo = in open court, in person made law 
 
Hobbes’ Adaptation 
In foro interno as applied in the Laws of Nature is a personal 
wanting of things to occur. 
In foro externo as applied in the Laws of nature captures self-harm 
that may result from acting out or obeying law in situations where 
it is known that others are not obeying those laws.  
 
These terms are discussed further in the next section on Ethics 
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that a person is not bound to obey man-made law in situations where they know 
others are not obeying them, and where to continue to obey them would result in 
harm to the person so obeying. Observance of the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of 
the artificial state predicated on them, is at the heart of Hobbes’ Ethics or moral 
philosophy.  
The antithesis between natural appetite, driven by vanity, and the fear of violent 
death, invoking through reason the foundation of the artificial state, is the root of 
morality and the basis upon which government and the good state exist. The so-
called good state for Hobbes is one which delivers peace, and a tolerable life made 
possible by the flourishing of industry, arts and letters and other such goods as peace 
permits. For Hobbes, the end and good of mankind, which is always founded on self-
preservation, is said to be “nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, 
and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 
89). Only those virtues which lead to the founding of a state which removes the fear 
of violent death are moral virtues.  
For Hobbes, just and unjust actions cannot be judged so, independent of legislation. 
“Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice 
(Hobbes, 1839b, p. 115) and in war force and fraud are the cardinal virtues (ibid., p. 
115). Justice and injustice are not faculties of the body or mind (ibid., p. 115): they 
relate to man in society, not in isolation. The just man obeys the law simply because 
it is law and for no other reason. One who obeys the law for fear of punishment is, 
for example, not just.  
The surrender of personal power to the authority of the Leviathan is, Hobbes argues, 
mankind’s reasoned choice for peace (Hobbes, 1904, p. 115). These Laws are 
contrary to our natural passions, passions carrying such names as enmity, jealousy, 
honour, justice, pride, revenge (ibid., p. 115). Mankind’s surrender to civil law in 
exchange for peace is predicated on mankind’s essentially egotistical and selfish 
nature. The beginning of these Laws is found in the assertion that mankind is selfish 
in all respects.  
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For example, the scholastic idea of will as rational appetite is “not good” (Hobbes, 
1904, p. 36) because, were it so, the will could not act against reason. Rather, the 
“last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission 
thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing.” (ibid., p. 
36). Will is voluntary and “of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own 
Good” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 103). Even those human passions associated with altruism, 
for example love (Hobbes, 1840, p. 49), grief or pity (Hobbes, 1904, p. 35) are, like 
revenge (Hobbes, 1840, p. 43), done for selfish reasons.  
In the natural state man can do “whatever he listeth [liketh], to whom he listeth, to 
possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can” (ibid., p. 84, my square brackets). 
There, in the state of nature, is found the case of “all men having Right to all things” 
(Hobbes, 1840, p. 98) and there is nothing individuals: 
... can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his 
enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; 
even to one anothers body. (Hobbes, 1904, p. 87)  
Hobbes goes so far as to assert that “irresistible might, in the state of nature, is right” 
(Hobbes, 2004, p. 51). We have already met Plato’s convincing argument that justice 
is higher than might on page 112 of this enquiry.  
To avoid the natural state, mankind submits to the law of the artificial state and 
herein lies mankind’s morality: 
And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the 
way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, 
Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 
Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, 
is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the 
true Morall Philosophie. (Hobbes, 1904, p. 109) 
and  
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the 
conversation, and Society of man-kind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our 
Appetites, and Aversions. (Hobbes, 1904, p. 109) 
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The problem is that good and evil vary according to the “different tempers, customes, 
and doctrines of men” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 
109) and the differences may well be 
too great to resolve.  
Hobbes’s novelty was to make scientific 
understanding of the “movements” of 
mankind, that is, the Laws of Nature as 
they applied to inanimate bodies, 
humans and artificial bodies, an activity 
effected without direct reference to God 
or final cause. He separated Ethics from 
theology and divine reason but in 
respect of man qua citizen, more 
appropriately man qua subject, morality 
consists in obeying the law of the artificial state. This is a departure from both the 
Aristotelian and the Christian tradition but it does not amount to Hobbes’ expulsion 
of God from his system. At the end of the road, God is still in the machine. The 
sovereign is not bound to the specific Laws of the Leviathan as his subjects are, but 
like them he is bound to the Laws of Nature, which Laws are God’s architecture. The 
Sovereign answers to God to the extent of their failure in delivering a Leviathan.  
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the 
end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the 
safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an 
account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety 
here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which 
every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall 
acquire to himselfe. (Hobbes, 1904, pp. 242 - 243) 
The Church is the State. The Sovereign is the supreme pastor. He alone answers to 
God. The pastors to whom he, the Sovereign, delegates the work of the Church carry 
out that work civilly on his behalf. The way to enter the city of God is to obey 
Christ’s laws but this is mankind’s own affair and it is not the morality of the Polis. 
For Hobbes, the Sovereign must be Christian and were he not, the subject might 
disobey the Sovereign, but then only when the Sovereign orders the subject to 
 
At the time of the painting, the Scientific Revolution, 
occasioned in part by the new Science of Bacon and Hobbes, 
was in progress and the full Industrial Revolution was in 
waiting. Wright’s subjects were people of industry and 
commerce, optimistic about progress. 
 
Source: Cropped by Ian Eddington from (Joseph Wright of 
Derby, 1764-66). (artist). A Philosopher Lecturing with a 
Mechanical Planetary. (oil on canvas). Derby, England: 
Derby Museum and Art Gallery. (Joseph Wright of Derby, 
1764-66). 
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disavow their faith. Martyrdom then is the only alternative. Thus in this manner, for 
Hobbes, morality in the Polis remains a matter of both politics and theology. 
It is easier to accept that Hobbes’ morality is largely a political morality than it is to 
accept it as a God-given stand-alone antecedent morality prior to, and discoverable 
by, each generation of mankind. To wit, the Laws of Nature, those laws which 
govern movement, including the movement within mankind, those passions, are said 
to be eternal and immutable.  
They can thus, over and over, be found out by reason, some of which capacity for 
reason is for Hobbes innate, and other of which is learned through experience. In a 
universe which consists only of bodies, these immutable and eternal Laws must exist 
amongst the totality of those bodies. That is, they must exist in nature, including 
mankind which is a part of nature, and in the artificial Leviathan too, which is 
predicated on so-called correct understanding of those natural Laws. Nature in its 
own right is the work of God so that obedience to the laws of nature, including the 
law of a divine-right Leviathan, is just a divine Sovereign’s step removed from a 
given prior eternal morality. Resolution of this enigma, that is, the possibility of an 
eternal immutable God-created morality prior to every generation, rather than 
morality of simple obedience to state law by each generation, is difficult to find in 
Hobbes. Enigmatically the state of nature is desperate but in the eternal laws of that 
desperate state mankind’s reason is able to discern rules for a workable artificial 
state. Failure to address such enigma does not dull the force of Hobbes’ argument 
that moral philosophy is the philosophy of right and wrong, good and evil, found 
expressed in words such as love, valour and their opposites, predicated on correct 
understanding of animate and inanimate natural condition, including human 
condition.  
In summary, Ethics’ method is to obey the Laws of Nature as these are expressed 
through the laws of the Leviathan. Its sphere of operations is control over movement 
in bodies in accordance with the Laws of Nature and the laws of Leviathan—will 
qua last appetite in act of improving individual and societal welfare. Its constraint is 
mankind’s egotistical selfish natural state and its propensity to occasion a failure of
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Table 59: Key Terms Nuance—Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1679) 
 
Descriptor 
At the Dawn of the Modern Era—Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1679)   
Method Sphere of Operations Constraints Era 
Science 
Its method is ratiocination in resolution and composition 
operational through syllogistic demonstration of fact. 
Movement or generation of bodies natural or 
political; scientific understanding of accidents and 
laws of those bodies and the power brought by 
such understanding for construction of a peaceful 
and prosperous artificial state. 
Its constraints are nature’s complexity, problems of 
definition and deficiencies in syllogistic demonstration.  
C
irca A
D
 1
5
6
1
 to
 1
6
7
9
 
Ethics 
To be ethical is to obey the Laws of Nature as these are 
expressed through the laws of a Leviathan. Politique 
Ethics, a subset of Philosophical Ethics and discussed in 
detail in the enquiry, challenges the esoteric/exoteric 
methodology employed by the enquiry, and is not included 
in this table. 
The will in act of improving individual and societal 
welfare. Movement in bodies and its control in 
accordance with the Laws of Nature and the laws 
of a Leviathan. 
Its constraints are mankind’s egotistical selfish natural 
state and mankind’s failure of virtue understood as a 
failure to found an artificial state immune from a fear of 
violent death—a triumph of bad passions, similarly 
understood, over good passions.  
Polis 
Cognitive gathering in an artificial state, a Leviathan or 
Commonwealth, predicated on obeying the Laws of Nature 
discovered by reason. 
Laws of Nature expressed as civil laws and through 
obedience to them the surrender of individual 
vanities to the state in return for peace, prosperity 
and advancement.  
In foro interno lack of true desire to obey those laws and 
thus to feign obedience to them, and in foro externo 
permission not to obey the law when, in situations where 
others are not obeying it, harm might come to one who 
does obey it. 
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Table 60: Progressive Articulation of Thesis Proposition Statements—Thomas Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1679) 
 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements  
1 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the 
psyche of a rapacious mankind in whom no part of reason is 
divine and for whom knowledge is power, which recognition 
provides an alternative to a long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in natural social instinct 
implanted in mankind for whom virtue is some kind of 
knowledge. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental 
Science 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1561 – 1626) and 
Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Polis is the peaceful, Godly and prosperous New Atlantis in which scientific knowledge is power over the Laws of 
Nature. Reason and the precepts of morality are divine. A focus on the right use of knowledge as power replaces a 
focus on the kind of knowledge of which virtue may consist. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes 
(AD 1599 – 1679) 
and Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age 
Some capacity for reason appears to come ready made into the world with birth, after which, reason per se is learned 
both formally and also vicariously through industrial arts and activity. No part of reason is divine. 
Apperception of knowledge as power continues to override focus on the question of what kind of knowledge might 
constitute virtue. To be morally virtuous is to obey the law because it is the law and not to feign to obey the law. It 
allows mankind to dominate nature and/or to lift mankind from its natural state. The virtuous person acts to maintain 
peace and improve the conditions of life. The Polis is an artificial state or Leviathan predicated on Laws of Nature 
discovered by reason and maintained by the ongoing surrender of vanity to peace and prosperity.  
2 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a conscious 
excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, 
Science ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity and, in its new form as conditional fact, Science 
becoming valued in its own right for direct benefits it could 
bring to society and state. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental 
Science 
Experimental Science returns and the age of reason begins. Science understood as syllogistic demonstration is 
becoming replaced by Science as induction and deduction within the rules for reasoning in natural philosophy. 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1561 – 1626) and 
Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age. 
Science is knowledge of the Forms or Laws of Nature derived from Bacon’s new kind of Induction applied through his 
new machine of method, his novum organum.  
Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good understood as the welfare of the individual or society. It consists 
of making the correct choice between self-good and good-in-communion alternatives in comparative domains. It 
inheres in mind well-ordered and composed in itself and mind well disposed towards others, and it answers to theology 
Metaphysic replaces metaphysics. Metaphysic is inquisition of formal cause in operative Science and partly informs 
superinduction of welfare benefits for mankind.  
Practical Ethics is the will working towards the good of the individual or society. At the individual level it is internal 
goodness and at the societal level it is politics or external goodness. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes 
(AD 1599 – 1679) 
and Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
There is no nuance of the term Modern Age 
Science is ratiocination about qualities of body effected through resolution and composition itself a product of 
syllogism and reasoned fact. Ethics and theology are expelled from Science. Ethics is no longer the servant of 
theology.  
Practical Ethics is the act of obeying the law of Leviathan. 
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Table 60 (Continued) 
 
PART THREE OF THE ENQUIRY 
# Proposition Statements Enquiry Chapter Shifting Sands: Key Terms Nuance Brought to Interpretation of Thesis Proposition Statements 
3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active 
obedience to the law of the state. 
Chapter 7 
Re-emergence of 
Experimental 
Science 
Not applicable 
Chapter 8 
Francis Bacon (AD 
1561 – 1626) and 
Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
To act ethically is to make a correct choice between comparative duties. Ethics is a servant of theology and its end is 
the good of the individual and society. 
Chapter 9 
Thomas Hobbes 
(AD 1599 – 1679) 
and Dawning of a 
Modern Age 
To act ethically is to obey the law because it is the law and not to feign to obey the law. Its end is the peace and 
prosperity of Leviathan or Commonwealth. 
Integrating Summary of Part Three 
A fledgling experimental Science found in Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) had, by the time of Isaac Newton (AD 1643 - 1727), formed a basis for a method of Science presently in practice: observe, hypothesise, falsify 
or verify by testing, and tentatively accept verifications as theory. This long development of experimental Science method occurred within a system of faith Ethics and in its own way, was part of the social, 
political, and cultural change and discovery of the times: renaissance and humanism, reformation and counter reformation, European discovery of printing, European discovery of the Americas, and emergence of 
nation states. Towards the end of this period two scholars, Francis Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) addressed Science in political philosophies so different as to constitute a clear 
change from Aristotelian political philosophy as it had become known in its western Christian dress. Under Bacon Science became a practical, experimental, operative activity in pursuit of advancement of learning 
and human welfare, a pursuit free from Aristotelian metaphysics and final cause, yet subject to Ethical constraints largely predicated on theology, Politique Ethics being predicated on other referents as well. . Under 
Hobbes, Ethics was no longer monopolised by theology and to be Ethical was to obey the laws of the state. The enquiry esoteric/exoteric divide methodology is increasingly difficult to sustain because induction 
and/or deduction, including its attendant inference, is increasingly linked to experimentation and invention and with both Bacon and Hobbes Science applies itself at the level of nature, man and society and its 
knowledge is a power which occasions mankind’s advancement through peace and economic development. Aristotle’s naturally good state and good life had fallen to an artificial state in which mankind obeyed the 
law in return for security and prosperity that Science as power over nature’s laws would bring under a peace occasioned by obedience to civil law. Divine reason no longer separated mankind from the brutes, rather 
capacity for reason learned and developed through sensual experiential occurrence. A Leviathan or a New Atlantis—and others too—were available as alternative Polies to cities of God, a republic of ideas, or a 
natural state prior to man. Ethics had descended to the will’s correct selection of the means to individual and communal welfare through simple obedience to civil law. Science had become induction and deduction 
of truths about nature, mankind and society, its knowledge being applied to gain power over nature for utility and advancement of mankind and human condition.  
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virtue understood as a failure to found an artificial state immune from a fear of 
violent death—a triumph of bad passions, similarly understood, over good passions. 
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 9 
For Hobbes, Science is knowledge of consequences. It is a domain of philosophy that 
treats of generation and properties of body. Science as knowledge is accessible 
through resolution and composition. Physics emerges from consequences of the 
accidents of bodies natural. Civil philosophy emerges from the consequences of the 
accidents of bodies political and is subdivided into Ethics, the consequences of 
mankind’s disposition and manners, and politics, the consequences of mankind’s 
civil duties. Each of these Sciences flows naturally from movement in or of bodies, 
and the remainder of the Sciences flow from these. The knowledge of Science is 
power, power to build an artificial state for mankind’s peace, and economic and 
social welfare (Hobbes, 1839b, p. 7). Science’s method is ratiocination in resolution 
and composition operational through syllogistic demonstration of fact. Its sphere of 
operations is knowledge of accidents and laws of bodies natural or political, and 
power brought by such understanding for construction of a peaceful and prosperous 
artificial state. Its constraints are complexity, problems of definition and deficiencies 
in syllogistic demonstration. 
Morality consists of mankind’s act of maintaining peace and improving the 
conditions of life and to act ethically is to obey the law of Leviathan. Internal human 
virtues involved in this process go by such names as justice, equity and mercy. Ethics 
is freed from theology understood as a personal affair predicated on other than man-
made law. Ethics’ method is to obey the Laws of Nature as these are expressed 
through the laws of Hobbes’ Leviathan. Its sphere of operations is control of 
movement in bodies in accordance with the Laws of Nature and the laws of 
Leviathan—the will in act of improving individual and societal welfare. Its 
constraints are mankind’s egotistical selfish natural state and its propensity to 
occasion a failure of virtue understood as a failure to found an artificial state immune 
from a fear of violent death—a triumph of bad passions, similarly understood, over 
good passions.  
 588 
 
In method Polis is a cognitive gathering in an artificial state predicated on obedience 
to Laws of Nature discovered by reason. Its sphere of operations is those Laws of 
Nature expressed as civil laws and through obedience to them, surrender of 
individual vanities to the state in return for peace, prosperity and advancement. Its 
constraints consist of in foro interno lack of true desire to obey those laws and thus 
to feign obedience to them, and in foro externo permission not to obey the law when, 
in situations where others are not obeying it, harm might come to one who does obey 
it. The cognitive gathering in its real world form is a utilitarian trade off in which, 
through a scientific Ethics, mankind obeys the law and one in which the end of 
scientific knowledge is power over nature, knowledge no longer being simply some 
kind of virtue.  
The nuance Hobbes brings to the enquiry’s key terms, like that of Bacon, exhausts 
the enquiry’s methodology and again this is taken as a marker of a dawning of a 
modern age. Hobbes’ Science is an active applied Science requiring investigation 
and control of movement in real world bodies towards real world utilities for 
mankind. His Ethics is active and requires will to obey person-made law, a will to act 
or not act in a real world. His Polis is a real Polis, a constructed artificial Polis rising 
above a state of nature, and a Polis which, unless actively maintained, will fall to a 
natural state of chaos.  
Hobbes’ Science, like that of Francis Bacon, incorporates nature, man and society 
and its knowledge is a power which might occasion mankind’s advancement through 
peace and economic development. Hobbes’ work Leviathan is among the first so-
called modern age works holistically written from a scientific perspective. Hobbes, 
like Francis Bacon, contributed substantially to a divorce of Science from 
metaphysics and theology, and advanced the separation of theology from Ethics. 
Together, without banishing a Christian God from their machines, Bacon and Hobbes 
all but extinguished the divine spark in reason. Mankind henceforth was to develop 
their reasoning powers through sensual experiential learning in domains that now 
might be called theoretical and practical. Table 59 on page 584 outlines the nuance 
Hobbes brings to the enquiry’s key terms. Table 60 on page 585 brings that key 
terms nuance to integrating articulation of the Thesis Proposition Statements. 
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Chapter 10  
Veracity of the Thesis Proposition Statements, Original Contribution and 
Closure of the Enquiry 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this enquiry, Relationships amongst Science, Ethics and Polis in Pre-
Modern Times, is the name given to an enquiry into Pre-Modern heritage and its 
basis for, and possible contributions to, fundamental conditions from which a new 
era, subsequently named the Modern Age, may have begun to emerge. The enquiry 
does not then identify tenets of modernism and search for their Pre-Modern origins. 
Rather it focuses on Western political philosophy prequels to what later came to be 
called modernism.  
Page 1 of the enquiry’s Introduction provided a statement of the enquiry’s aims. In 
review, the major aim of the enquiry is to offer a multiple-voice interpretation of 
conditions of political philosophy both prequel to, and then metamorphosing 
coincident with, detected emergence of a new era subsequently named the Modern 
Age. 
There is one minor aim, namely, to focus from a geography of mind perspective on 
mankind’s struggle with the fact-value divide, and glean from that focus and from 
insights gained from ongoing application of enquiry methodology, an opinion about 
contributions philosophy might offer to ongoing enquiry about human condition and 
consciousness, and twenty-first century speculation about Polis.  
Consequently, in respect of the major aim, the completed enquiry consists of three 
Thesis Proposition Statements demonstrated plausible through progressive 
measurements of nuance in the key terms of those statements, the demonstration 
itself being effected within a methodology specifically constructed for enquiry 
purposes. For the minor aim, the enquiry consists of discussion of insights about the 
fact/value divide gleaned as a byproduct of application of procedures suggested by 
enquiry methodology itself. The methodology which, in part, relies on foundational 
attributions of denotative unchanging key terms meanings is housed within, and 
confined to, an unchanging ideas hierarchy linking those attributed key terms 
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meanings. While both exoteric and esoteric dimensions of key terms are explained, 
enquiry focus is on the latter of these.  
Beginning in the next paragraph, and drawing on individual chapter content and 
conclusions, I offer a précis of the case for demonstrated plausibility of those Thesis 
Proposition Statements and then, after commenting first on the kind of original 
contribution the enquiry may contain, and second on insights gained about the fact 
value divide and on implications for further contributions philosophy may make to 
Polis/P(p)olis studies research—pages 606 to 629—I bring the work to a close 
through a brief comment on achievement of aims. 
In particular, the précis of the case for demonstrated plausibility is drawn from 
Summary Table 13 beginning on page 192 and Summary Table 14 beginning on 
page 196 and, where my summarisation in those tables has been too severe, directly 
from the text of the enquiry. Tables 13 and 14, despite their early location in the 
enquiry, were assembled from summary tables developed on a chapter by chapter 
basis, which chapter tables in turn progressively and respectively summarise 
measured key terms nuance and articulation of Thesis Propositions Statements 1, 2 
and 3 in terms of that nuance. Changing relationships amongst key terms is, within 
the foundational ideas hierarchy attribution earlier mentioned, interpreted as 
changing political philosophy so that the traced key terms nuance also traces 
changing political philosophy.  
DISCUSSION OF THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THESIS PROPOSITION STATEMENTS 1, 2 AND 3 
Discussion of Thesis Proposition Statement 1 Begins 
Thesis Proposition Statement 1. Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with arriving 
recognition of a binding sentiment of Polis situated in the psyche of a rapacious 
mankind in whom no part of reason is divine and for whom knowledge is power, 
which recognition provides an alternative to a long held standpoint that binding 
sentiment of Polis is situated in a natural social instinct implanted in mankind for 
whom virtue is some kind of knowledge.  
Thesis Proposition Statement 1 contains the key term Polis, the term Modern Age 
being simply a marker term as explained on page 3. In its enquiry appearance under 
Plato, Polis or cognitive gathering is a city of ideas, a republic of ideal and absolute 
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forms. The gathering is bound by four classical Greek virtues which reside in the 
human soul: wisdom, courage, justice and temperance. Through these virtues 
mankind may pursue its collective work of attaining happiness with justice through 
obedience to law, minding their own business, and temperance. Virtue is some kind 
of knowledge about the good-at-what. Plato’s Polis is a just and happy Polis in 
which a hierarchy of citizens mirrors a hierarchy of soul and in which the collective 
good-at-what, justice with happiness, emerges from Greek values. 
Aristotle rejected Plato’s ideal forms as an explanation of being. He argued that the 
eternal forms exist in nature and found a binding glue of Polis in a natural state prior 
to man. Aristotle’s esoteric Polis is a cognitive realisation of a social instinct 
implanted in man by nature. The Polis so understood is the final cause of the good 
life. It is predicated on balanced soul in contemplation of mankind’s end of 
happiness with justice and honour. The natural cognitive state in which mankind 
gathers is stable and good and virtue as some kind of knowledge remains relevant for 
apperception of Aristotle’s Polis.  
Aristotle’s Polis was transformed into a city of God during a time of intermingling of 
Judeo-Greek heritage with Christianity in development. The binding substance of the 
city of God became personal acceptance of God in Christ as Logos and all in all. 
Nature, including mankind’s prior necessity to gather, had become a Christian moral 
order and proving ground for mankind’s end in God. The Polis as city of God 
prevailed under progressive interpretation and modification by Magnus (AD 1193 – 
1280) and Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274) and others during times of a rediscovery of 
Aristotle’s wider corpus and a re-emergence of experimental Science until the 
seventeenth century when its position faced considerable challenge.  
First, under Bacon, mankind could investigate God’s moral realm of nature by using 
a Science of which God, other than through the gift of reason, was no part. The 
cognitive glue of this new Polis, this New Atlantis, (F. Bacon, 1952a) consists of 
belief in God as the architect of nature and reason, and belief in, and commitment to, 
power over nature as the key to mankind’s advancement. This change in the nature of 
Polis is substantial. It strains the enquiry’s method of tracing Polis mainly by its 
esoteric dimension alone because belief in power over nature in Bacon’s New 
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Atlantis (F. Bacon, 1952a) can only be sustained through experimental scientific 
engagement with existing nature. 
Secondly, under Hobbes, God is excluded from reasoned investigation of the 
physical realm. Reason is not divine, and mankind must live as best they can by their 
wits, and separate themselves from the beasts by experience and learning. Neither is 
the natural state prior to mankind and potentially good. The natural state is selfish 
and rapacious. Mankind cognitively gathers in an artificial state, a Leviathan, 
occasioned by their surrender of the rapacious and selfish, to the fear of violent 
death, and to law, in return for the prosperity of peace. This change in the nature of 
Polis is also substantial. It exhausts Aristotelian political philosophy. The natural 
state had become predicated on evil rather than good, and obedience to law became 
the binding glue of the artificial state and Polis that replaced it. In this artificial state 
might be seen the emerging idea that mankind can go its own way and seek its own 
power over God’s created nature, without God’s permission or assistance. In the 
Leviathan no divine presence, whether Greek logos or Christian Logos, is 
instrumental in binding the gathering and this departure is taken to signal a possible 
beginning of a new era. Certainly both Plato and Aristotle require obedience to law, 
but that law was not simply statute law as it is now known, it being informed by 
virtue and elements of natural law as it was then understood. It is not simply the law 
of an artificial state in which the ruler is not bound by that law.  
I posit that the transition from a Polis predicated on a natural state prior to man, and 
subsequent variations of it, with its virtue as some kind of good-at-what knowledge 
and its end in happiness with justice, to a Polis predicated on a natural state which, 
because it is rapacious, evil and destructive, is rejected in favour of a Polis 
predicated on an artificial state in which virtue is obedience to civil law, knowledge 
is power over nature, and whose end is peace through a trade-off of vanity and 
personal power for relief from a fear of violent death, is so significant a transition as 
to signify dawning of a new era. Specifically, validity of Thesis Proposition 
Statement 1 thus rests on the strength or otherwise of this enquiry’s demonstration 
that a quickening transition of Polis from city of God through New Atlantis to 
Leviathan might not only reveal an emerging new era but also provide a way to 
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identify and surrogately measure that emergence, and on the basis of enquiry 
demonstration, and within the confines of the enquiry methodology and the measure 
it adopts, I consider Thesis Proposition Statement I plausible.  
Discussion of Thesis Proposition Statement 2 Begins 
Thesis Proposition Statement 2. Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science 
ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own right for direct benefits it could 
bring to society and state.  
Thesis Proposition Statement 2 contains the key terms Science and Ethics and also 
shares the term Ethics with Thesis Proposition Statement 3, reproduced for reference 
in the accompanying text box.  
I discuss Science first. There is evidence of an early 
Western flowering of experimental Science 
occasioned by mankind’s speculations about the world, and about what it is made of, 
and how it functions.  
The dialogical Socrates’ dissatisfaction with scientific matters and his second turning 
is consistent with Plato’s formulation of scientific knowledge as infallible 
knowledge, knowledge about the unchanging, and the highest form of knowing. 
Through dialogue, Plato urges that humans are capable of misunderstanding sensory 
information and pronounces scientific knowledge to be knowledge of absolute ideal 
forms gained by virtue of the human soul’s partaking of those forms through mind 
and intelligence. Human intellect as nous accesses the ideal forms while the animal 
and vegetable desires of the body, aided by the senses, help with access to their 
glass-darkly earthly resemblances. The final Science is a partaking of Plato’s so-
called one or ontological principle of being. 
Aristotle was soon to reject Plato’s forms and explanation of Science predicated on 
them. For Aristotle natural beings exist. They consist of form and matter and the 
human mind accesses them in a two-step process. Perception receives the forms  
 
Thesis Proposition Statement 3 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval 
with a challenge to practical Ethics as 
reasoned moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of the state.  
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passively which forms are then accessed through active reflection and reason. The 
forms are eternal and follow imperatives of a final cause of thought thinking itself. In 
the chain of being, the efficient cause carries form to matter. There are four causes of 
being respectively known as formal, material, 
efficient and final and scientific knowledge is 
knowledge of all of the four causes of being. 
Aristotle calls humankind’s highest intellectual 
virtue, its highest good-at-what of the mind, 
philosophical wisdom and it consists of Science 
as reasoned demonstration, and intuition. 
Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of 
experience which consists of sense perception 
plus memory, sense perception in the first place 
being congenital to mankind. Intuitive 
knowledge is indemonstrable knowledge. 
Science is demonstrated knowledge. Science 
occurs through the reasoned demonstration of the 
syllogism in which an intuitive grasp of the 
premises is, through induction the syllogism 
allows, carried to a deduction of a universal body 
of fact. Universals, which are of the mind, are the currency and lingua franca of 
Science. Science is the active mind’s derivation of universals not the itinerant soul’s 
beholding of the forms, and Aristotelian Science involves both induction and 
deduction. It informs contemplation of natural beings, mathematics and the gods, and 
adjudicates on behalf of practical wisdom. 
Aristotelian Science as syllogistically demonstrated fact fell to revealed truth as an 
explanation of the all-in-all of a Christian God’s created universe. As Christianity 
spread it developed its own education and training needs both secular and spiritual. 
These needs were supplied in part through monastery and cathedral schools and their 
liberal arts curricula. By the time of Abelard (AD 1079 - 1142) reason was found 
useful in defending Church teachings. Reason consisted of syllogistic demonstration 
in dialectic and yes-and-no disputation and in this form, under authority of the 
 
Source: Magritte, R. (1965). (artist). Carte 
Blanche. (oil on canvas). Washington DC: 
Mellon Collection, National Gallery of Art. 
In this beautiful picture the mind makes a whole 
of what otherwise may have been conflicting 
sensory information. Bacon’s idols are ever 
present. Here, from the experience of tribe, den, 
market and theatre, the viewer constructs a 
meaningful reality from the visible and invisible. 
From whence, in a more complex life situation 
of substantial change and unknown certainty, 
when idols are traumatised, and real and virtual 
world experience are in conflict, comes a Polis 
to bind a possible next age? 
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mysteries of faith, it begot the Science of theology. Science as syllogistic 
demonstration per se had been rehabilitated subject to revealed faith constraints. As 
an indispensable part of reason it attended to proofs of God’s existence and is 
surrogately present in a coalescence of rhetoric and dialectic into logic. Some interest 
in experimental investigation of God’s created natural world began to re-emerge with 
such scholars as Grosseteste (died AD c. 1252) and Magnus (AD 1193 – 1280) in the 
thirteenth century, continuing on into the fourteenth century with, for example, 
William of Ockham (AD 1287 – 1347), notwithstanding traces of such an interest 
being found in Gerbert (AD c. 946 – 100) and Adelard of Bath (AD 1080 – 1152).  
Aquinas (AD 1225 - 1274), in rehabilitating Aristotle’s rediscovered works, made 
reason a necessary precondition for engagement with the mysteries of faith. Through 
reason, mankind might obtain objective knowledge, and when philosophy extended 
beyond theology, matters were settled by reference to Aristotle. Aquinas made 
theology the Science of God, the Science which illuminates the rules of natural 
reason, that divine gift from God. Syllogistic demonstration, ever necessary to 
reason, is named an intellectual virtue in the Greek sense, along with wisdom and 
understanding. Science as syllogistic demonstration serves wisdom which answers to 
the infused theological virtue of love. Generally defined, Science had become 
theology. Narrowly defined, Science had become the intellectual virtue of syllogistic 
demonstration in dialectic and logic within the confines of revealed faith. 
By the middle of the fourteenth century, less than 76 years from the shadow of 
Aquinas, this high compatibility of Science and faith was weakened as scholars both 
sacred and profane explored Aristotle further and, as universities began to emerge 
and interest in experimental Science continued to grow, metaphysics and philosophy 
took their leave from theology, and reason tasted its first days of freedom from the 
constraint of the mysteries of faith. Science began its change back into syllogistic 
reasoning of the true from the false in the realm of experimental knowledge, that is, 
knowledge of sensation, intuition and reason. It once again proceeded from 
fundamental premises induced from unfettered experience. This estrangement of 
metaphysics from theology and Science, together with syllogistic demonstration’s 
freedom to return to experimental Science and investigation of nature, is early  
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evidence of an excision of metaphysics from Science. This evidence is germane to 
enquiry demonstration of the plausibility of Thesis Proposition Statement 2. This 
beginning rift between metaphysics and theology, and syllogistic reasoning’s return 
to experimental Science both temporarily enhanced theology’s sway over Ethics.  
Free now on its own terms to investigate the rich phenomena of God’s creation—
rainbows, moons, planets, hot springs, volcanoes 
and the like—Science in general, and experimental 
Science in particular, were drawn into developing 
appropriate methods.  
From the time of Grosseteste (died AD c. 1252) to 
the time of Newton (AD 1643 - 1727) the Aristotelian syllogism progressively fell to 
new scientific methods developed to accommodate the return of experimental 
Science occasioned by social developments of the times. Induction and deduction 
remained then, as they do now, indispensable to reason in general, and Science in 
particular. Experimental Science had re-emerged and Science generally had become 
an art of practical applied Science in search of true causes in nature. Narrowly 
understood, Science became known by its doing as this was revealed in a series of 
methods culminating in Newton’s rules for reasoning in Science. Science in this form 
is a substantial change which strains the esoteric-exoteric divide used in the 
enquiry—a condition I associate with, and consider symptomatic of, emergence of a 
new era. 
Works by Bacon (AD 1521 – 1626) and Hobbes (AD 1588 – 1679) were to 
contribute substantially to setting Science free from theology, philosophy and Ethics. 
Bacon freed Science from Aristotelian metaphysics, Ethics, and theology but it was 
for Hobbes to free Ethics from theology.  
Bacon developed a new method, an innovative new machine of Science. Science, 
now predicated on sense experience, strives for knowledge of the Laws of Nature 
derived through a method of rejections and exclusions which allows experimentally 
induced and tested axioms to be applied in deduction of new discovery. Science is an 
experimental activity which brings power over God’s created nature. Science stands 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (2) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident 
with a conscious excision of Aristotelian 
metaphysics from scientific enquiry, Science 
ceasing to inform practical Ethics as reasoned 
moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming valued in 
its own right for direct benefits it could bring 
to society and state. 
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alone from theology, Ethics and metaphysics, a development germane to the 
plausibility of Proposition 2. Science, newly independent in its own free knowing-
doing domain, is taken as symptomatic of an arriving new era. Hobbes differentiated 
Ethics from Aristotelian type metaphysics and from theology and pronounced Ethics 
to be obedience to civil law, leaving theology and metaphysics to go their own 
respective ways. 
Hobbes posits Science to be composition and resolution of facts about bodies which 
exhibit generation. Science proceeds through syllogism and the induction and 
deduction it permits in pursuit of ratiocination, that is, in search of addition or 
subtraction which constitutes generation. No part of human reason is divine and 
mankind may investigate God’s nature without God’s guidance in a Polis in which 
Ethics is free from theology. Hobbes’ Science focuses on discovery of nature’s laws 
and the operative power over nature these laws bring. Hobbes’ Science, like Bacon’s 
Science, stands alone in its own practical domain and severely strains this enquiry’s 
esoteric-exoteric methodology. I associate these emerging Sciences, each with its 
applied method and new Polis, as indications of a substantial change coincident with 
dawning of a new era. Thus the validity of Thesis Proposition Statement (2) partly 
rests on the plausibility of this enquiry’s demonstration of a trend towards 
independence of the new scientific disciplines from Christian theology, from 
Aristotelian type metaphysics and from Ethics. Nevertheless, demonstration of the 
validity of Thesis Proposition Statement (2) cannot be complete until questions about 
how Hobbes removed Ethics from metaphysics and made it, Ethics, the subject of 
civil law, are addressed. I complete this requirement in the next section. 
Evaluation of Thesis Proposition Statement 2 Continues and Evaluation of Thesis Proposition 
Statement 3 Begins 
Thesis Proposition Statement (3). Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as active obedience 
to the law of the state.  
As earlier mentioned, Thesis Proposition Statements 2 and 3 share the key term 
Ethics.  
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In turning from Science in search of better explanations of the world of nature and 
the human condition within it, Plato’s 
dialogical Socrates reaches back to 
classical Greek virtues found in Homer 
and enshrines them in his ideal republic of 
ideas. Plato predicates mankind’s moral 
and intellectual condition on human soul. He links the principle of order or kosmos 
with best choice and makes this relationship a basic principle of practical Ethics. The 
dialogical Socrates’ act of turning is interpreted to constitute an incremental 
movement from nature towards society, that is, a movement away from an Ethics of 
place predicated on a unified tribal behaviour required to allow mankind to extract its 
sustenance from its occupied totem habitat. It is also a return to an efficiency 
interpretation of virtue in the sense of a Greek good-at-what based on habitual 
behaviour, and a temporary stay to the moral interpretation of good which can be 
seen emerging in the writings of Aeschylus (BC 525 - 456).  
The Socratic turning is also interpreted as a movement of thymos, the spirited part of 
the soul without which the virtue of courage is impossible, away from the 
ungoverned powerful courage of classical times, to the reasoned courage of Socrates. 
It is a small shift of thymos to the side of nomos as law and a big shift in mankind’s 
ethical emergence from nature, and a shift away from absolute justice of the gods. In 
all, it is a complex movement which is not without its own internal contradictions. In 
the technical Ethics of the first republic of ideas, mankind’s good-at-what as a 
technical virtue is happiness with justice. Mankind achieves its work through 
wisdom which discerns between the harmful and the unharmful.  
Aristotle, like Plato, treats Ethics as an extension of soul. Desire, a faculty of soul, 
prompts mankind to act in order to satiate their passions. Again, like Plato, Aristotle 
employs a tripartite soul and a good-at-what technical usage of virtue in his 
discussion of Ethics. The work of the rational soul is carried out in the highest tier by 
its good-at-what virtues, which he names intellectual virtues. The rational soul may 
be scientific or calculative. Scientific reason and intuition singularly, or combined as 
philosophical wisdom, are the intellectual virtues of the rational scientific soul. Art, 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (2) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from 
scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical 
Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own 
right for direct benefits it could bring to society and state. 
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in the sense of making things, and practical wisdom, are the intellectual virtues of the 
rational calculative soul.  
The remaining tiers of the soul house its irrational elements. These tiers are its 
vegetative faculty which shares in no rational principle and is not served by virtues, 
and its appetitive faculty which is served by the moral virtues. The moral virtues 
such as honour, temperance, magnificence and liberality are states of mind and 
character predicated on correct adjustment of the passions. The moral virtues emerge 
when, through discerning choice, raw involuntary passions are tailored to correctly 
and justly fit the circumstances in which they arise.  
The moral virtues are means between two extremes arrived at by discernment under 
the guidance of kalon, a combination of nobleness, fineness and beauty. The mean 
adopted is the discerned response to the situations at hand. There are no hard and fast 
rules and the irrational soul has no rational principle of its own. The moral virtues 
can only emerge through the office of practical wisdom, the virtue of the calculative 
rational soul. Practical wisdom differentiates clever action from virtuous action by 
providing the right rule. Moral virtue is the end and practical wisdom is the means to 
the end.  
While practical wisdom’s main work as an intellectual virtue centres on correct 
choice in everyday changing matters of mankind, family and state, it also liaises with 
philosophical wisdom and refers questions of the lower moral virtues to it. 
Philosophical wisdom serves contemplation of the unchanging natural beings, 
mathematical beings and metaphysical beings. 
Philosophical wisdom is a higher intellectual 
virtue than practical wisdom. It is just this fall 
of reasoned moral activity as practical Ethics 
in the form Aquinas rendered it, to Ethics as obedience to civil law as Hobbes 
rendered it, that confirms the plausibility of Proposition Statement 3. 
Aristotle finds mankind’s work to be happiness with justice and honour and carefully 
articulates each of these terms. Happiness is “the best, noblest and most pleasant 
thing in the world” Nicomachean Ethics I 1099a25 (Aristotle, 1926; 1952g, p. 344). 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (3) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law of 
the state. 
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It is that which is sought for its own sake and towards which all of the pleasures of 
the soul flow. It is Plato’s happiness of harmony of the soul but where Plato would 
have justice as the end of ends, Aristotle has justice done for the sake of happiness. 
Justice for Aristotle can be general or particular justice. General justice consists of 
obedience to the law as virtue towards others under constitutions which serve the 
common good. Particular justice is either distributive or commutative. Particular 
distributive justice is equality and fair dealings by the state in its distribution of its 
resources and honours amongst citizens, and it is based on merit. Particular 
commutative justice is equality in exchanges citizens make with one another.  
There is also political justice which consists of upholding natural law and rights. 
Natural law cannot be rescinded while natural rights are conferred by the state. 
Justice is bound by duty which differentiates it from the other virtues which are 
based on choice. Justice is done for another’s good. 
As explained in the opening paragraphs of this discussion on Aristotle’s Ethics, the 
virtues may be moral, or they may be intellectual, and together they constitute a 
system of rational Ethics. Without nous, that spark of the impersonal divine one, 
Ethics, nor Science for that matter, are possible. All rational contemplation moves 
humans closer to the divine. 
With the intermingling of Greek and Jewish ideas and the advancement of 
Christianity, rational moral virtues were transformed into absolute virtues of 
Christian faith. Faith Ethics replaced rational Ethics. Under faith Ethics nature first 
became a moral order in which no evil existed. Subsequently, the apostle Paul found 
sin in the flesh of mankind, a sin which infected nature more widely and from which 
mankind could escape only through Christ as Logos. Ethical act had now become the 
overcoming of absolute sin through grace and faith in a personal Christ. This 
condition is not without some very broad similarity to an Orphic condition of a fallen 
soul trapped in the flesh of mankind, discussed earlier on page 66.  
Reason was gradually to return to the service of Ethics so that, by the twelfth century 
under the influence of Anselm (AD 1033 - 1109) and Abelard (AD 1079 – 1142), 
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Ethics became reasoned understanding of the religious truths revealed in the 
scriptures, and of church dogma, and adherence to those truths by the will’s refusal 
to transgress Christian prohibitions.  
In the light of the return of Greek learning to the West and the syncretisation of 
reason and faith under Aquinas (AD 1225 – 1274), Ethics once more became a 
sophisticated practice. The rediscovered Aristotle was folded into Christian 
understandings of cosmology and soul. Aquinas accepts that the contemplative life is 
of greater merit than the active life and that there are three intellectual virtues which 
he names theoretical wisdom or prudence, Science or syllogistic reasoning, and 
understanding or intellect. He accepts four moral Greek virtues, namely prudence, 
justice, temperance and courage and renames them cardinal or principal virtues. 
These cardinal virtues are mirrored by four divine cardinal virtues which might, 
under grace, be infused into humans in which case humans act for their own good but 
for God’s sake. The cardinal virtues are made accessible in this manner: first, as 
mentioned, by infusion of grace, and secondly, by infusion of three theological 
virtues faith, hope and charity or love, which lead to God. Love captains the 
theological virtues, wisdom captains the intellectual virtues, and prudence the moral 
virtues. 
As captain of the moral virtues, prudence acts in the manner of practical wisdom and 
officiates over relationships between individuals thereby informing justice. In 
adjudicating over the internal passions prudence informs temperance and fortitude. 
Temperance is that virtue which emerges when prudence prevents reason’s fall to 
concupiscible passions. Fortitude emerges when prudence prevents reason’s fall to 
irascible passions such as fear, and dislike of work.  
Human moral virtue thus understood becomes a reasoned habit of the appetitive 
faculty which results in the good use of free will. The good of the will, its end, is 
happiness, and the will, an intellectual appetite, has a contingent dimension fixed to 
happiness as its end, and a free choice dimension which chooses among means to the 
fixed end. Only when divine vision reveals God as mankind’s end in happiness can 
mankind reach the happiness of beatification.  
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Just as reason partakes of the first principles of understanding, so too will partakes of 
the precepts of natural law which it grasps through synderesis. Synderesis is at the 
heart of Aquinas’s Ethics. It is that process which occurs when the free will, under 
the contingent will’s necessary adherence to happiness, is guided by prudence, which 
grasps the first principles of natural law and 
reasons from them, through syllogistic 
demonstration, to correct choice conclusions. To 
grasp the first principles of natural law is to grasp 
God’s presence in nature. Synderesis is the highest activity of the moral sense. 
Reason, which grasps the first principles of understanding, informs will. Without 
synderesis, mankind cannot find the perfect happiness which can only exist in one 
with God. Without synderesis mankind must, as in Greek rational Ethics, labour with 
their own moral virtues, from experience, and without recourse to hard and fast rules. 
The validity of Thesis Proposition Statement 3 thus rests in part on demonstration of 
a demise of practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity—irrespective of whether the 
reasoning was through synderesis via the will, or through practical wisdom via 
reason’s partaking of the first principles of understanding and application of these in 
the calculative soul under the aegis of philosophical wisdom. 
Aquinas’ syncretisation of reason and faith was to fracture. Duns Scotus made the 
will spiritual and higher than reason. Intellect and sense are received from without. 
The will is its own cause and beatitude is obtained through the will’s partaking of 
grace and love, not reason’s partaking of them. Under Duns Scotus (AD c.1270 – 
1308), theology does not need reason in that it, theology, goes directly to perception 
of transcendental principles. Science, metaphysics and philosophy became further 
estranged from theology. Under Ockham (AD 1280 – 1349), the will was 
pronounced able to understand the scientifically indemonstrable and under Buridan 
(AD c.1300 – c.1358, through free will’s choice, Ethics became mankind’s 
responsibility for its own actions. Acts of will, rather than the presence of reason, 
now separate mankind from the beasts, and Ethics is active adherence to God’s will 
revealed in the scriptures, occasioned by the will’s adherence to that revelation.  
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (3) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a 
challenge to practical Ethics as reasoned moral 
activity by Ethics as active obedience to the law 
of the state.  
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Bacon (AD 1561 – 1626) maintained a conventional link between theology and 
Ethics, even in the presence of his substantial new method of Science and his 
Architect of Fortune innovation in Ethics. He would study Ethics inductively but 
investigation of matters transcendental as they were understood before Kant, and of 
the substance of divine soul, was not part of Science. As discussed respectively on 
pages 494, and 503 to 505, Bacon separated both metaphysics qua final cause, and 
theology qua sacred theology, as opposed to divine philosophy, from Science. 
In Bacon’s moral philosophy, Ethics is the doctrine of the will in search of the good 
understood as the welfare of the individual and society. This shift of emphasis is, for 
its era, a slight movement of the focus of 
Ethics away from God and towards society 
and might, on another occasion, be 
interpreted in terms of an enigmatic 
qualified variation on a theme of physis to 
nomos genre, an opportunity not pursued in this enquiry. I know of no analysis yet 
taken of similarities and differences within a series of such shifts possibly present in 
the history of ideas. 
This shift to Ethics qua good as welfare of individual and society strains, rather than 
breaks the relationship between Ethics and theology. But the focus is on society, and 
ethical choice is the practice of directing the will to make the best choice for 
individual and society. Bacon’s new Science had no part in informing Ethics in the 
manner expressed in Thesis Proposition Statement 2. Human rationality and the 
precepts of morality are God-given and to proceed ethically is to logically direct the 
will to make the correct choice between competing duties. Ethics has two 
dimensions—an absolute model or template of the good, and a practical derivation of 
the rules for governing human nature in attainment of that absolute model or 
template of the good. Bacon pronounces the appetite for absolute good native to the 
human mind and all existing beings. 
In realising this appetite mankind acts for self and for community. For self, it 
actively seeks self-preservation and passively seeks perfection, perfection being the 
higher order of the two. For community, the realising principle is duty to society, 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (2) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from 
scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical 
Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its new form 
as conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own 
right for direct benefits it could bring to society and 
state. 
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duty being to a mind well-formed towards others what virtue is to the mind well-
formed in itself. Duty is the governing of oneself not the governing of others and 
Ethics is a preparation for politics. Bacon makes Ethics a practical affair and while 
providing little guidance outside of his aphorisms and general essays by way of 
detailed working rules for its attainment yet provides relaxations to Philosophical 
Ethics by way of concessions to mankind in Politique Ethics mode. As mentioned, 
while the King in New Atlantis desires to join humanity to policy, there is no hint of 
the politique in him. Yet policy per se has possible Politique Ethics flaws evidenced 
by Merchants of Light concealing their country’s identity under the names of foreign 
flags when sailing on fact finding and technology collecting missions, and by 
disguising techniques used for managing shore leave for Bensalem’s own vulgar 
mariners under the names of other nations. In Bacon’s New Atlantis (F. Bacon, 
1952a) mankind wins welfare through power of knowledge over nature, a power 
rightly managed. Again while the focus of Bacon’s Ethics may be shifting from God 
as creator of the forms, towards the good of man and society, God is still in Bacon’s 
greater machine. 
It is Bacon’s erstwhile secretary Hobbes (AD 1599 – 1697), who, by breaking the 
link between Ethics and theology, provides 
complementary evidence which attests to 
the plausibility of Thesis Proposition 
Statements Propositions 2 and 3. Whereas 
Hobbes purports to recognise God as the 
creator, he plays down His presence as 
divine reason in human investigation of 
created nature. Nor does Hobbes allow infusion of virtues. Mankind is no longer 
required to enlist theology or metaphysics in order to discern how to be Ethical. In 
both the esoteric and exoteric Leviathan, to be Ethical is simply to obey statute law.  
This new prescription of Ethics substantially challenges the enquiry’s esoteric 
dimension of Ethics because now, to be ethical, means to follow laws which are of 
mankind’s making, using reason which is, beyond innate rudiments, substantially of 
man’s own making and experience, rather than of the divine. In their natural state 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (2) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coincident with a 
conscious excision of Aristotelian metaphysics from 
scientific enquiry, Science ceasing to inform practical 
Ethics as reasoned moral activity and, in its new form as 
conditional fact, Science becoming valued in its own 
right for direct benefits it could bring to society and state. 
 
Thesis Proposition Statement (3) 
Dawning of the Modern Age is coeval with a challenge to 
practical Ethics as reasoned moral activity by Ethics as 
active obedience to the law of the state. 
 
 605 
 
mankind is rapacious and evil and in the artificial state occasioned by obeying the 
law, peace might be achieved and welfare enhanced. Until the time of Hobbes, the 
divine, whether pagan or Christian had been a substantial presence in Science and 
Ethics and I associate its beginning estrangement from these domains with the 
emergence of the a new era. On this basis Thesis Proposition Statements 2 and 3 are 
rendered plausible and discussion on plausibility is now closed. 
Having addressed the plausibility of Thesis Propositions 1, 2 and 3, I summarise the 
main ideas flow of the enquiry. Under Platonic political philosophy mankind gathers 
esoterically in a happy and just city of ideas informed by classical Greek values, in 
which city, truth informs reason. Science, which informs truth, is the-that-which-can-
be-no-other, and occurs through receiving the forms and beholding the one, a process 
which also facilitates learning through reminiscence of the forms. Ethics is wisdom 
discerning between the harmful and unharmful and virtue is some kind of 
knowledge. In turn, according to Aristotle, mankind gathers in a cognitive natural 
Polis in which Science, occasioned by divine reason, informs Ethics understood as 
the rational pursuit of happiness with justice and honour. Science is syllogistic 
demonstration. Ethics, in esoteric dimension, consists cognitively of right reason and 
just desire appropriate to circumstances in play. After Augustine (AD 354 - 430) and 
under Greek political philosophy transformed into medieval Christian political 
philosophy, mankind again gathers in a cognitive city of God predicated on 
beatification achieved through grace and the will’s surrender to infused intellectual 
and moral virtues under a process of synderesis. In the esoteric city of God divine 
reason informs the will and Ethics, in esoteric dimension, is a state of unwillingness 
to transgress Christian prohibitions. Science, at first irrelevant, gradually returns as 
syllogistic reasoning in matters of theology, other than in the mysteries of faith. 
Emergence of a new age is conjectured coincidental with a transition from the 
political philosophy of the city of God, via a New Atlantis, to a political philosophy 
of a Leviathan in which mankind gathers in an artificial Polis predicated on a 
surrender of vanity and selfishness to fear of death, in which divine reason is not part 
of Science, in which Science is free from theology and Ethics, and in which Ethics 
consists of a mind to obey the law in return for a state of peace. Knowledge brought 
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forth by Science is valued as that which occasions power over nature rather than a 
condition or state of which virtue might consist. 
Perhaps a most telling indication of an emerging new political philosophy might be 
discerned from a quickening segment in the journey of the forms themselves, from 
their ideal template existence in the Platonic Polis, to Aristotelian formal cause in 
earthly beings, to the Logos in Christ and finally to Laws of Nature themselves, 
independently discoverable through mankind’s own learned and experiential reason, 
without God’s permission, in a Polis predicated on dominance over nature, 
mankind’s mandate to investigate nature on their own terms arriving relatively in 
something a rush. 
I now turn to integrating discussion of original contribution, minor aim findings 
about the fact-value divide, and possible further contributions philosophy might 
make. 
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
The enquiry makes an original contribution in two ways. First its methodology is 
new and different and generates its own criterion for discernment of a new era in 
development. Second, it employs an ideas update writing strategy also suggested by 
enquiry method, applied separately from it, but ancillary to it. This ideas update 
writing strategy—used (a) throughout the enquiry to 
link Pre-Modern geography of mind prequel 
understandings of human condition to neuroscientific 
understanding of human condition based on self 
coming to brain making mind, and (b) in Chapter 8 
by employing Bernard Shaw (AD 1856 - 1950), 
Robert Kennedy (AD 1925 - 1968) and Barack 
Obama (AD 1961 - ) to progressively re-situate 
Bacon’s innovative Politique Ethics in intermediate 
and present day ideas settings for comparison 
purposes—once adopted generated new thoughts 
which, in the case of geography of mind linkages, led 
to tentative conclusions about how, through alliances with neuroscience, philosophy 
 
Geography of Mind? 
For example, all of the hierarchies 
constructed to help explain Bacon’s 
divisions of knowledge in Chapter 8, if 
joined together, constitute a geography of 
mind. Likewise the information in the text 
box on page 540, if converted into a chart, 
might better represent another geography 
of mind. Similarly the content of Table 23 
on page 230 might form part of Aristotle’s 
geography of mind, if one dare be 
constructed from the five components of 
soul he names—nutrition, perception, 
cognition, imagination and desire—and 
interrelations amongst them, and one for 
Aquinas drawn up on the basis of 
interrelationships amongst the virtues 
outlined on page 416, and explanations of 
synderesis and infused cardinal virtues 
explained in the accompanying text. 
Hobbes has his Bacon-hierarchy 
equivalent and so too Kant and so on up to 
neuroscience’s ongoing mapping.  
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might maintain and enhance the efficacy of its own contribution as well as that of 
neuroscience, and perhaps redress something of a Cassandra condition philosophy 
might be conjectured to be enduring. This geography of mind linking, also unplanned 
as it was and gradually intruding in its own way during articulation of the minor aim 
as the enquiry progressed, and low key as it is, accesses neuroscience, including 
criticism of it, through the works of Damasio (1995, 1999, 2010) with signposting 
along the way by others (Edelman, 2004; Everson, 1996; Lear, 2001; B. Oliver, 
2012; Oscar-Berman, 2004; Searle, 1997; Ubersax, 2012), that is through a very thin 
sample. It and the mainly Shavian updating of Bacon’s Ethics in Chapter 8, 
combined as a group and articulated under the umbrella of the minor aim, are 
considered the lesser of the two claims for original contribution. Conclusions based 
on these updating strategies, although considered plausible and important, are offered 
as tentative conjecture in the nature of ideas in progress, inviting further inspection 
of their potential as markers for future areas of research. These update strategies 
serve the minor aim of the enquiry through what may be described as an all-
philosophy or macro approach, as differentiated from non-pejoratively termed micro 
approaches, those predicated on various perspectives, iconography, linguistics, 
papyrology, archaeology and the like, or serving one of a number of possible foci, for 
example exegesis of happiness, or love, or morality, which have informed other parts 
of the enquiry.  
Beginning in the next section I discuss each of the two claims for originality in turn, 
that is (a) construction and application of a new method in the first case, and (b) low-
key application of ideas update strategies as a group, in the second case.  
Original Contribution Based on Development and Application of a Methodology 
Given wide definition of society to include both Polis and P(p)olis so that by default, 
within the foundational meanings attributions of this enquiry, society includes Ethics, 
then studies of Science and society germane to the time span of the enquiry may be 
classified according to the ways in which they approach their goals. Some such 
studies focus mainly on Science and Ethics at the expense of society, others on 
Ethics and society at the expense of Science and yet others on society and Science at 
the expense of Ethics. Some, in similar combinations, focus on technology rather 
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than Science. Some include all three areas, others focus on any two of the three, 
within particular identified framing perspectives, or in other ways.  
Thus for example, some take a historical perspective by chronologically focussing on 
say either scientific theory or technological innovation or scientific method 
themselves, with discussion of their possible emergence from society, or 
contributions to it, allocated varying degrees of sidelight (A. C. Crombie, 1952, 
1995, 1996; Losee, 1972; Whewell, 1837). Other such studies appear to integrate 
Science and society more substantially (Pullman, 2001) and/or reach more sharply to 
ideology and politics (Bernal, 1965), or alternatively focus on say Science, 
technology and society in a particular era or time span (A. C. Crombie, 1952, 1953; 
Merton, 1970; D. Stewart, Mackintosh, Playfair, & Leslie, 1835). Yet again other 
studies focus on a particular scientific concept for example the atom and trace its 
history, sometimes from a narrow perspective say of structure and performance (R. 
A. Smith, 1856) and sometimes within a wider history of ideas context (Ede & 
Cormack, 2012). Likewise, similar contributions are made from specific Science 
perspectives, mathematics say, or natural philosophy qua physics, or magic as quasi-
Science (E. Grant, 2007; D. Smith, 1958; Thorndike, 1923a, 1923b). One particular 
contribution, Berkeley’s Siris (Berkeley, 1871), a study of properties of so-called tar-
water, links a theory of spiritual cause of substance with Plato and Neoplatonism, by 
drawing, inter alia, on botany, chemistry, physiology, optics and mechanics of his 
time, as well as ancient metaphysics and theology of mind and philosophy of fire 
over the ages. Other scientific studies emerge directly out of philosophical-ethical 
concerns. For example Berkeley’s An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1820) 
is likely informed in part by its author’s interest in Platonic light as God’s substance, 
such a dynamic continuing beyond the time span of the enquiry into the nineteenth 
century—innovation in mathematics for example emerging from work by Euler (AD 
1707 – 1783), Laplace (AD 1749 – 1827) and Lagrange (AD 1736 – 1813) within a 
general endeavour to scientifically explain perturbations in God’s otherwise perfect 
clockwork universe (Andrianov & Manevitch, 2002, p. 139; C. A. Wilson, 1980, pp. 
109-304). Studies of Ethics and society also take various forms. Some approach their 
subject from a history of religion perspective (K. Armstrong, 1994; González, 2010a, 
2010b; Jevons, 1906) other perspectives being atheism (R. Dawkins, 2008), critical  
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Tabular Illustration of a Process by Which Chapeau Questions are Reiteratively Applied to Esoteric Key Terms Referents to Discern Esoteric Key Terms Meanings for Subsequent 
Application in Detecting Nuance in those Terms and in Political Philosophy Composed of Them 
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Locational Marker 
Names for Political 
Philosophy Prequels 
Composed of S, E and P 
Republic of Ideas 
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Prior to Mankind 
Christ as Logos 
and All in All 
City of God City of God 
Re-emergence of 
Applied Science 
Method 
New Atlantis Leviathan 
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(Nuance in esoteric key terms is tracked through changes in key terms meanings discerned by progressive chapeau questioning of esoteric-dimension referents. Nuance in political philosophy is in 
turn tracked through discerned change in political philosophy composed of those nuancing key terms.)(6) 
  
   Notes: (1) An important qualification must accompany the chapeau-question process for Ethics method. As the enquiry progresses Ethics is early on, and then repeatedly, found not to exist until 
knowing, through active thought, is transformed into a condition of being qua doing or action. Thoughts per se are neutral and Ethics might ontologically be when thoughts are actioned. Early on, 
Ethics is as much a question of ontology on the side of the exoteric as it is of epistemology on the side of the esoteric—notwithstanding, as explained, that the other key terms also have their exoteric 
existential dimensions. It, Ethics, is a kind of active state of knowledge. This particular caveat acknowledges a general enigmatic problem inherent in the methodology as it has been constructed and 
of human condition in general. Yet, were the methodology somehow constructed on chapeau questions primarily predicated on ontology rather than epistemology, it very likely would not have 
survived the distance of the enquiry, and its efficacy might soon have been exhausted. Nevertheless, some kind of visible working methodology, warts and all or not, is necessary if the planned 
enquiry is to proceed. (2) Again, long since before Descartes, there has been appreciation of a view that to think is to be Nicomachean Ethics 1170a25 – 1175b (Aristotle, 1934; 1952g, p. 424), that is, 
a recognition that being and knowing are closely related. Nevertheless all chapeau questions are framed as epistemology rather than ontology. (3) S = Science, E = Ethics, P = Polis, RME to CTE = 
Rational Moral Ethics to Christian Theological Ethics, Ret. Exp. Sc. = Return of Experimental Science. (4) Were space available the aqua tinted columns of this matrix would display the specific 
answers for S, E and P for Plato through Hobbes, and in the multiple tinted row below them, (Republic of Ideas through Leviathan) the corresponding prequel political philosophies composed from 
those answers would be outlined. Tables 13 and 14 together covering pages 192 to 202 contain this information. (5) Each chapeau question is asked of each of S, E and P for each named prequel 
Republic of Ideas through Leviathan. (6) This illustration of method complements progressive explanations of method contained in an overview box on page 12 and in Tables 11 and 12 respectively 
on pages 183 and 186 and together with them more fully illustrates method.  
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historical moral philosophy (MacIntyre, 1998/2005), Ethics per se (Irwin, 2007), 
chronologically ordered stand-alone essays on moral and political philosophy (L 
Strauss & Cropsey, 1987; Wolff, 2014) or natural history (Tomasello, In Press) 
which latter work, if the advanced publication proves accurate, may well be 
compatible with Cambridge Ritualist interpretations of emergence of ethical society 
from nature. Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche, 2014) reaches to Ethics and Polis in 
its own inimitable ‘will to power’ way while Aphorisms 1 - 92 of Bacon’s Novum 
Organum (F. Bacon, 1900c, pp. 315-349) treats of efficacy of scientific method. 
Studies of Science, Ethics and Polis, and relationships among them, are also 
available in the form of histories of philosophy, religion, dogma and the like, these 
being written from various perspectives and in different styles (Adamson, 2014, 
2015; Blakey, 1850; D'Onofrio & Studer, 2008; Eliade, 1981; E. Grant, 2007; 
Guthrie, 1965; Harnack, 1997; Hegel, 1892-96/1995; Reale, 1990; Russell, 1945; 
Schaff, 1997; W. Turner, 1903/2012; Ueberweg, 1889; Weber, 1897/2012; 
Windelband, 1914) which often, but not always, nor neither necessarily uniformly, 
appear to make links between Ethics and society slightly more than they do between 
Science and society. 
Works like those cited in the previous paragraph, and other formative contributions 
with more specific and targeted focus mentioned elsewhere throughout the enquiry, 
provide a wealth of information, insight, methods, creativity and scholarship 
germane to the time horizon of the enquiry, and beyond, but no one of them provides 
a sufficiently singular, cogent and stringent methodology which might be replicated 
for the purposes of this enquiry and achievement of its main aim. The methodology 
constructed from first principles to solve this problem of lacuna constitutes an 
original contribution because, inter alia, its detection of an emerging new era is 
predicated on (a) unchanging foundational attributions of key terms meanings and 
relationships among them, (b) overt methodological separation of the unchanging 
from the changing or nuancing, (c) esoteric and exoteric dimension understandings 
of enquiry key terms informed by meanings usage of the words esoteric and exoteric 
different from previous well established usages of them (d) a ‘representitive firm’ 
selection and naming of premodern prequel political philosophies, (e) measurement 
of esoteric key terms meaning through consistent application of transform procedures 
 611 
 
and processes of chapeau questioning of three vectors of esotericism inherent in each 
key term, the chapeau questioning being based, in so far as it might be, on 
epistemology before ontology, (f) quickening exhaustion of esoteric/exoteric divide 
as a marker of an emerging new era, and (g) construction of multiple discipline and 
multiple voice exoteric backgrounds to frame and time-mark its esoteric ideas 
progress, for example, historic milestones and/or works of art, inventions, notable 
particular speeches and the like.  
The surrogate indicator of a new era—quickening exhaustion of the esoteric/exoteric 
divide—is a product of the method itself, a something which emerged from method’s 
internal procedures and processes during application, and not foreseen at the outset, 
but adopted once realised, and in a sense it is in some degree different to, and/or a 
step removed from, arbitrary and/or reasoned imposition of a criterion. It is an 
indicator which emerged from a form of proacting logic within a method which 
became a kind of living instrument itself in that it also prompted writing strategy 
solutions to help countervail interpretive difficulties when they arose, of which more 
later in the next section. As explained on pages viii to xi in the preface materials, the 
enquiry employs, inter alia, a transform measure of key terms meanings nuance. 
Furthermore there is no suggestion that the derivation and use of this part of enquiry 
method is anything beyond a containment of the words-meanings conundrum and 
certainly not a solution to it because the method is applied to translations of foreign 
language works and is thus itself dependent on the quality of discernment of original 
nuance and/or connotation of various individual words by translators in the first 
place, and their English language wording of it in the second place, notwithstanding 
the next link in the chain between reader and text elsewhere addressed within the text 
box on page 10 through insights provided by James (1892, p. 153), none of these 
issues being a problem for this enquiry alone. Nevertheless, the method so 
constructed attempts to bring a consistent, transparent and manageable 
methodological approach to the enquiry, and on the brighter side it is difficult to 
deny that for a long time now humans have been able to agree on word meanings and 
exchange qualified construct in terms of them.  
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Enquiry findings are thus applicable within a boundary rendered expansive by virtue 
of a generality of denotative key terms attributions and the ideas hierarchy they 
support, yet subject (a) to the constraints of a three-vector measure of esotericism 
and its attendant ‘representative firm’ construct earlier explained on page xi, (b) the 
singularity of quickening exhaustion of esoteric/exoteric divide as a referent for 
emergence of a new era, (c) a problem of hindsight qua an ever present human 
condition requirement of each generation’s having to discuss historical events and 
writings in words containing meaning and emotional content loaded in their own 
generation, and (d) that ever present problem of the knowing-being enigma 
underlying epistemological formulation of its chapeau questions. But on this last 
constraint, who yet has found a way to introduce themselves to themselves each 
waking morning without an involuntary presence of body, that is, first of body 
housing mind’s knowing, and then of other bodies in apparent relative proximity to 
themselves.  
I now turn to the second and lesser claim for original contribution. 
Originality Based on Application of Ideas Update Strategies Suggested by the Enquiry Method 
Just as the enquiry measure of a new era in development emerged from the principles 
of enquiry method per se, so too as mentioned earlier on page 606, did ideas update 
strategies which help distinguish between different individual previous-era 
innovations in Ethics and in explanation of prequel geographies of mind, by bringing 
them respectively to common bases for comparison purposes. These update strategies 
are effected through juxtaposition processes in which Bacon’s Politique Ethics in the 
one case, and prequel geographies of mind in the other, are respectively contrasted 
with one same modern or postmodern base referent as the case may be, cited or 
contained in boxed text accompanying those articulations. As explained, the base 
referent used throughout the enquiry in the case of geography of mind prequels is 
one predicated on neuroscience (Damasio, 2010). Those used in Chapter 8 to 
progressive re-situate Politique Ethics from the seventeenth century to the twenty-
first century are a play by G. B. Shaw, and speeches by Bobby Kennedy and Barack 
Obama (R. Kennedy, 1968; Obama, 2015; Shaw, 1917). Writings selected for update 
purposes were chosen with a focus on ideas content rather than ideology which may  
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well be drawn from and/or attributed to the words if searched for. I discuss the case 
for Bacon first. 
To wit: different understandings and usages of terms can sometimes be discerned 
from their contexts and definitions. Terms 
common to say Aristotle and Galileo—terms like 
quantity, number, quality, place, time size, shape, 
motion, rest, position, and state serving Aristotle’s 
categories and Galileo’s primary and secondary 
qualities being good examples—may validly lead 
an enquirer into different era understandings of 
Science and Polis less dependent on, but 
impossibly never entirely free from, meanings 
loaded through own-life somatically marked 
experience. In other cases context alone may cloud 
workable discernment of difference. 
For example, comparison of a politique understood 
in terms of ethical discretions/indiscretions Francis 
Bacon permits them, with a twenty-first century 
politician in Australia say, understood in terms of 
media scrutiny and condemnation for exercise of 
some of those same ethical 
discretions/indiscretions Bacon earlier 
countenances, may generate a jaded twenty-first 
century quelle difference so-what’s-new 
impediment to assessment of the possible 
significance for its time of Bacon’s innovation, 
that is of his step outside of Philosophical Ethics made through his formal 
articulation of Politique Ethics. The enquiry method itself exposed such problems 
and pointed a way to the ideas update device used in Chapter 8 to progressively 
situate Bacon’s seventeenth century innovation in different time, ideas and attitude 
settings, for evaluation purposes. I claim that the method of reaching back to Bacon 
 
Reading Caveat 13 
Some of Damasio’s work (Damasio, 1995, 
2010) has been used in a simple manner as a 
common contrasting basis for comparison of, 
and differentiation between, geographies of 
mind sequentially encountered as the enquiry 
progressed. Works of some others (Edelman, 
2004; Freud, 1957-1981a, 1957-1981b; James, 
1892, 1902, 1910, 2009; Oscar-Berman, 2004) 
have been used for similar purposes but to a 
lesser extent. However nothing further is 
made of this usage and certainly no detailed 
critique of the works used is implied. Similar 
conditions prescribe the use of works by 
Bernard Shaw, Robert Kennedy and Barack 
Obama (R. Kennedy, 1968; Obama, 2015; 
Shaw, 1917) for updating Bacon’s Politique 
Ethics. 
 
For the record, while some Presocratic writers, 
may, like Damasio, involve atoms in their 
explanations of mind and consciousness, 
others do not. Yet ancient and later attempts to 
explain consciousness and mind frequently 
appear to jump out of Damasio’s work. There 
is absolutely no suggestion that Damasio may 
have borrowed such possible presences but 
rather that compatible findings to similar 
problems may be inferred emerging from 
different approaches to those problems. Such 
intrusive involuntary associations are not 
investigated in this enquiry but are intriguing. 
While the decisions to use Damasio and others 
as bases for comparison of different era 
explanations of phenomena and/or to update 
Politique Ethics flowed from use of the 
method constructed for enquiry purposes, in 
hindsight, the decisions might just as easily 
emerged as nothing other than a continuation 
of the enquiry process of time marking the 
esoteric against exoteric events, in these cases, 
particular theatrical productions, specific 
cases in neurophysiology, celebrated speeches 
made, or official United Nations General 
Assembly Presentations. However the 
decisions were generated coincident with 
thinking about method, not when thinking 
about exoteric time marking of the esoteric. 
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in the manner exemplified in parts of Chapter 8 contains a small element of novelty, 
newness and original contribution and adds to the ways in which the significance of 
Bacon’s formalisation of Politique Ethics might be assessed.  
I turn to discussion of the second update strategy, namely that used throughout the 
enquiry to provide a common basis for comparison of various geography of mind 
prequels. Such geographies or compartmentalisations of mind surfaced early in 
esoteric measurement of key terms meaning but over historical time they are clearly 
predicated on differing underlying bases—
divine reason plus variant categories of 
punished soul, divine reason plus experienced 
intuition plus natural endowments, various 
intellectual and lower moral virtues, God in 
all, infused values, inherent capacity for 
reason honed by experiential learning and the 
like. Irrespective of their differing bases, I 
find all of these attempts at explaining human condition in terms of cognitive 
compartmentalisation of brain/mind activity informative, insightful and relevant in 
terms of their introspection and applicability. Early twenty-first century investigation  
of brain made mind and self coming to mind has its own geography predicated on 
electro-chemical and evolutionary bases and from time to time in the enquiry, the 
different geographies of mind were given an ideas update for comparison purposes 
by referring them, as earlier explained, to rudiments of electrochemical geography as 
revealed in the work of Damasio (2010) with brief signposting along the way by 
others (Edelman, 2004; Freud, 1957-1981a, 1957-1981b; James, 1892, 1902, 1910, 
2009; Oscar-Berman, 2004). This simple decision to ideas update various 
geographies of mind to a common Damasio base, in turn, generated ideas about 
possible new horizons for philosophy and lead independently within this enquiry, but 
as it now appears, a little later than some others (Churchland, 1986, 2002, 2011; 
Flanagan, 2009; Goldman & de Vignement, 2009; Prinz, 2007; Schroeder, 2004), to 
considerations of philosophy and neuroscience. Of those cited in the last sentence 
Patricia Churchland is accredited with the 1986 formalisation of neurophilosophy, 
the others being subsequent examples of those micro approaches mentioned earlier  
 
Neuroscience: Proceed with Caution 
Moreover, I realize that the study of consciousness 
has expanded so much that it is no longer possible to 
do justice to all contributions being made to it. That, 
along with issues of terminology and perspective, 
make current work on consciousness resemble a walk 
through a minefield. Nonetheless, at one’s own peril, 
it is reasonable to think through the questions and use 
the current evidence, incomplete and provisional as it 
is, to build testable conjectures and dream about the 
future. Damasio, A. (2011). Self Comes to Mind: 
Constructing the Conscious. (p. 6). Random House. 
Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, p. 6). 
 
 615 
 
on page 607. For example Flanagan examines the neurophysiology of happiness, 
Prinz that of 
emotion or of moral 
conscious self, 
Schroeder that of 
desire, Goldman 
whether social 
cognition is 
embodied or not. 
Patricia 
Churchland’s 2002 
work examines 
neurophysiological 
bases of soul, will 
and the like—no 
more heaven, no 
more hell, 
consciousness gone 
when the body 
goes, no more 
“spooky” stuff 
(ibid., p. 2)—and 
her 2011 work 
examines a 
neurophysiological 
basis for morality. 
Recent works by 
Prinz focus on 
cultural and 
emotional shaping 
of mind, and 
attention and 
experience (Prinz, 2012, 2015). Such approaches are consistent with  
 
Behind the Text: Why Neuroscience Before Psychology or Psychiatry is Chosen for 
Update Referent Purposes 
Post-Modern psychology’s wider custodianship of pure-Science investigation of soul per se, 
psyche, brain-made mind and self, all of these words signifying present day inheritance of 
that procession of contenders from that reincarnating wandering pilgrim forwards, is likely 
challenged by its own preoccupation with positive Science, measurement of human values 
through statistical analysis of simple scale surveys of surrogate measures of value, its 
changing weighting towards applied research in industry under profit maximisation 
conditions or in the service sector under dollar value measures of efficacy, and its underdog 
position to psychiatry credentialed to reach to prescription of clinical medicine. Such shaping 
trends are not dismissed as lacking utility, nor is psychology arbitrarily dismissed on such 
bases. The claim being made is that from a point of view of pure research into soul-psyche-
mind and human values, and fully acknowledging that some psychologists are among those 
at the forefront of brain-makes-mind research, psychology may nevertheless be verging on 
that kind of ineffectualness associated with market failure. In turn, psychiatry as a 
professional doctrine, again from a perspective of pure research into brain-made-mind issues 
and again with supportive caveats about its worthwhileness, may also have a relatively short 
or compromised or asymmetrical custodianship on pure research aspects of soul-psyche-
mind and human values, in that its now five-yearly reviews of its working manuals 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organisation, 2015) may be leading 
it down a Duns Scotus path of definitional sub-division so complex as to further cloud and 
compromise diagnosis and/or crowd out longer term pure speculative research about root 
causes in favour of its yet worthwhile focus on sought after relief of symptoms through 
prescription of helpful, effective and acutely needed drugs some of which, admittedly are 
sometimes plagued by side effects. Relative to neuroscience, when viewed from a multi-
discipline perspective, psychiatry and psychology are largely closed shops.  
 
Neuroscience, created as a name by Otto Schmitt in the early 1960’s (Adelman & Smith, 
1998, p. 10; Oncley, Schmitt, Williams, Rosenberg, & Bolt, 1959, passim) and formalised as 
a discipline with the establishment of the Society for Neuroscience in 1969 is an expanding 
discipline which reaches to, and admits, interdisciplinary perspectives in research into brain, 
nervous system and human behaviour. By virtue of its physiology content neuroscience now 
claims in hindsight a heritage beginning with Ptolemy’s Optics (C. Ptolemy, 1996, pp. 63 - 
229),—Ptolemy (AD 90 - 168)—and continuing on to and past Ragnar Granit (AD 1900 – 
1991) and his work on the bioelectromagnetism of the retina (Creed & Granit, 1933, pp. 419 
- 441; Granit, 1933, pp. 207 - 230; 1946, pp. 45 - 53; Granit R & M., 1937, pp. 239 - 256). In 
the years between Ptolemy and Granit some of those claimed contributors are names known 
in different ways in philosophy—for example Thomas Hobbes for his sinews and machine 
analogy in Leviathan (1839b, p. ix), John Locke (AD 1632 – 1704) for his mind as white 
paper written over in the ink of experience analogy in his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (Locke, 1825, p. 51), Thomas Reid (AD 1710 – 1796) An Inquiry into the 
Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (Reid, 1813, 1823) for his championing of 
common sense over Berkeley’s imagined idealism, David Hume (AD 1711 – 1776) for his 
Treatise of Human Nature (Hume, 1739) and its portrayal of science based on human nature 
and association of ideas, Kant (AD 1724 – 1804) for his pure reason as a product of innate 
cognitive patterning activity (Kant, 1896), Thomas Brown (AD 1778–1820) for his muscular 
system as an organ of sense Lectures on the Philosophy of Human Mind (1830, pp. 138, 150 
- 175), John Abercrombie (AD 1780–1844) for his case studies Pathological and Practical 
Researches of the Brain and the Spinal Cord (1828) rather for his more philosophical 
treatments of brain and mind under the titles Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers 
and the Investigation of Truth. (1849) and Philosophy of Moral Feelings (1859), William 
Hamilton for his criticism of Reid and Stewart’s versions of common sense philosophy (W. 
Hamilton, 1852), Descartes for his work on vision and his conjecture that une petite glande 
H is instrumental in communications between body and mind Traité de l'Homme (Descartes, 
1908, pp. 119 - 202), George Berkeley for his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision 
(1820), and Francis Bacon for his Novum Organum Bacon, (F. Bacon, pp. 368 - 476) and its 
content on method. 
 
A perusal of the works of those named in the preceding paragraph reveals (a) that their 
admission to neuroscience from a single discipline perspective, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, is an admission to the fold of almost as many uncorked genies of philosophy, 
and (b) with the exception of Bacon and Hobbes those named fall outside the time frame of 
this enquiry. Nevertheless philosophy is in the neuroscience machine and has some powerful 
questions to ask. As the text reveals beginning on pages 619 other contributors who do fall in 
the time duration of the enquiry also provoke substantial questions.  
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neurophilosophy as a discipline applying neuroscientific discovery to core issues of 
philosophy, as differentiated from philosophy of neuroscience which tends to 
question methodological issues in neuroscience from philosophy of science 
perspectives. Churchland’s ‘silent spring’ for 
received metaphysical philosophy aside, the 
examples of micro approaches cited above in this 
paragraph are, while indicative of rich, copious and 
progressive research in neurophysiology, also 
serendipitously supportive of enquiry caveats 
notifying that questions, both specific and general, 
soon to emerge in the next section from the macro 
philosophy dimensions of this chapter, may well 
appear premature, irrelevant or even incredulous. 
These caveats, which appear in the next headed 
section, not in the text box on page 616, are given 
on the basis that, in spite of advances made in 
neuroscience, there is a long way to go before the 
electro-chemical bases for happiness, love, will, 
bravery and the like are known and integrated into a 
holistic understanding of human condition. Yet in 
the fullness of time such questions as those asked in the next headed section may 
appear a better fit and considerably more plausible than they might presently seem to 
be. 
In particular, the whole update mechanism, that is the bringing of prequel 
geographies of mind to an electrochemical base for comparison purposes is, like its 
index number equivalent in economics, compromised by slight mismatch of regimen 
commodities—in this case, sensation, perception, reason, passion, imagination—
between each prequel basket and the other, and between each prequel basket and the 
base or neuroscience basket: strictly, a Granny Smith apple in one basket is not a 
Jonathan in another basket, is not a Bloody Plowman in another basket. However, a 
mismatch is present in the prequels case mainly because, while there is considerable 
consistency of regimen basket commodities across the ages—imagination, reason, 
 
General Caveats Qualifying Use of 
Elements of Damasio as a Base Referent 
General caveats govern the use of 
neuroscience as a base referent. Thus a 
choice of neuroscience in general and 
Damasio in particular as a common basis for 
ideas update carries no covert opinion about 
the superiority or otherwise of 
neuroscience’s ability to cross the positive-
normative divide by providing explanations 
about human consciousness and questions of 
morality and human value. Nor does it 
necessarily demolish utility and applicability 
of geographies updated, or infer their total 
obsolescence, or for that matter infer that 
everyday thoughtfully wordsmithed 
explanations of electro-chemical geography 
of mind in respect of how human ethical and 
social problems might be resolved are more 
effective, or less effective, than those 
provided by some of the geographies so-
called updated. Nor do juxtaposition 
quotations chosen for the purpose purport to 
represent or carry a full explanation of 
Damasio’s work or suggest that 
neuroscience has not attempted workable 
answers to some of the questions asked. 
Neuroscience does provide its answers, both 
in terms of positive Science and value laden 
words, Damasio’s work being chosen, inter 
alia, for its attempt to elucidate a unified 
neuroscience explanation of human 
consciousness in terms of Science and such 
ordinary value laden words as well. 
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passion and the like earlier mentioned—such, as mentioned on page 614, is not 
always the case for the bases on which those regimen commodities are predicated, 
even though there are some similarities. Thus if the update mechanism is to work in 
the manner applied in this enquiry it is to work at a general level for broad 
comparison purposes only. Perhaps explaining a prequel problem of philosophy by 
analogy to index number theory in this minor way is pushing interdisciplinary 
thinking a little too far, that is to say, analogous reasoning by way of craft construct 
is a little questionable, but then Plato employed something like it on a much grander 
scale in his skills explanation of virtue, and so too Heidegger and Arendt, perhaps 
not so successfully, in their respective attempts to make phronesis a foundational 
ontology of human existence or interpret it as political action qua prudence in a 
public domain setting. 
Nevertheless, I continue discussion of originality of content in the next section under 
the umbrella of the minor aim which, inter alia, as mentioned, addresses 
contributions philosophy may make to ongoing study of the fact-value divide, human 
condition and Polis/P(p)olis.  
Discussion of Original Contribution Continues.  
Discussion About the Fact/Value Divide and Further Contributions Philosophy May Offer 
Begins 
What questions then, as claimed in the last paragraph in the text box on page 615, 
might a liaison between philosophy and neuroscience engender? From Locke and 
Berkeley, who will write the electro-chemistry of the blind man made to see and 
identify the dominant domains involved, their rank order and/or the ordinal/cardinal 
nature of that order, or their matrix form as the case may be; from Reid, Stewart, 
Thomas Brown and William Hamilton, what are the molecules in the electro-
chemical strands of so-called common sense, how do these strands impart so-called 
common sense its function including its judgemental intuition in mind, and by what 
routes and processes do conscious emotions and feelings raised through organs 
common to sense communicate with once mindless homeostatic control explained 
otherwise than through chemical flows and/or separate-yet-joined domains of 
mapped experience, that is, explained in ethical or moral human value terms, what 
kind of common sense and emotional intuition might emerge from excessive hours  
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spent in avatar-land; from Hobbes and possibly Kant, what is the origin and 
electrochemistry of innate reasoning ability and/or pure pattern making structure and 
after that what are the implications in human values and 
human condition terms; from Descartes, well then, how does 
self come to mind, and well then again, does not Aristotle’s 
treatment of Sophia, phronesis and techne well frame 
embodied cognition, or for that matter my own I-thinking-
amness-and-amness-calling-forth-I-ness go a long way too, 
and from Bacon and others, myriad questions about validity 
of method.  
Again, neuroscience has its answers, impressive answers too, 
given in terms of a short cut of chemicals (Damasio, 2010, p. 
274), of explanations of cell structure, of claims of 
involvement of both brain and other body structures in 
making of mind and emergence of self, and of theories of value beginning initially 
before DNA, beginning in a mindless imperative for survival, dare it be said for 
being, given that the intersection of so-called unconscious being—quite some 
epistemological enigma that—from so-called conscious being is yet to be 
electrochemically specified. Neuroscience it appears has not yet reached its own big 
bang equivalent resting point from infinite regress but it does offer suggestions about 
the origins of human values (Glimcher & Fehr, 2009; Montague, 2006). Again, to be 
sure, those named in the text box on page 615 and recalled in the previous paragraph 
for question formulation purposes, could not and might not expect answers in terms 
of electrochemistry of soma, but they might well rejoice in understandings of these 
interpreted across the fact-value divide and expressed in terms operable for 
understanding and management of human feeling and emotion in everyday life 
situations. Yet what positive Science has not stumbled in carrying its valuable 
findings across the fact/value divide? Likewise for balance purposes, what men and 
women of the highest prudence and intention have not stumbled in translating 
philosophical insight into action? 
That Petite Glande H 
Communicating Between 
Mind and Body 
 
 
Source: Figure 33 from 
Oeuvres de Descartes, Volume 
XI. (1908). Paris: Léopold 
Cerf. (C. Adam & Tannery, 
1908, n. p.). This figure and 
others like it are at the end of 
the book on unnumbered pages 
and were drawn by illustrators 
after Descartes’ death. 
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As mentioned in the last paragraph of the page 615 text box, while some 
philosophers hitherto cited do 
not fall within the timespan of 
the enquiry, there are, among 
many giants falling within it, 
Plato and Aristotle. Plato, 
various possible motives 
acknowledged, shifted focus 
from a positive observation of 
physical beings side to a 
cognitive knowing and feelings 
side and its question of human 
values, without abandoning 
observation and search for truth. 
Aristotle, without abandoning 
big questions of human value 
and of what it means to be human and ethical, brought new perspectives to knowing 
and being, and relationships between them. Both are entitled to ask, like Descartes, 
not only for a values interpretation of electro-chemical explanations of how self 
comes to brain-made mind—if indeed self coming to brain-made mind is per se 
unambiguously measurable electro-chemically, or if the brain-makes-mind-comes-
self linear order is correct or rather of matrix form—but also for an explanation of 
how such knowledge might be applied in education and training, service industries, 
and ethical government in P(p)olis. Damasio treats of some of these issues 
throughout his work (Damasio, 2010). Other leading questions from philosophy 
might follow. Who will be the first to write the electro-chemical version of the 
charioteer soul, locate its physical domains, certify the chemistry of its emotion, 
write its knowledge code and operationalise modes of introspection through which 
each of us might bring that charioteer more effectively into unharmful play? Who 
will write an everyday workable, thoughtful and functional version of the electro-
chemistry of Aristotle’s three states to be avoided, vice, incontinence and 
brutishness, or their opposites virtue, continence and superhuman virtue? Who 
electro-chemically will differentiate between Aristotle’s continent and incontinent  
 
Damasio on How Self Comes to Mind Repeated 
It goes without saying that the construction of a conscious mind is a very 
complex process, the result of additions and deletions of brain 
mechanisms over millions of years of biological evolution. No single 
device or mechanism can account for the complexity of the conscious 
mind. The different parts of the consciousness puzzle have to be treated 
separately and given their due before we can attempt a comprehensive 
account. Still, it is helpful to start with a general hypothesis. The 
hypothesis comes in two parts. The first specifies that the brain 
constructs consciousness by generating a self process within an awake 
mind. The essence of the self is a focusing of the mind on the material 
organism that it inhabits. Wakefulness and mind are indispensable 
components of consciousness, but the self is the distinctive element. The 
second part of the hypothesis proposes that the self is built in stages. The 
simplest stage emerges from the part of the brain that stands for the 
organism (the protoself) and consists of a gathering of images that 
describe relatively stable aspects of the body and generate spontaneous 
feelings of the living body (primordial feelings). The second stage results 
from establishing a relationship between the organism (as represented by 
the protoself) and any part of the brain that represents an object-to-be-
known. The result is the core self. The third stage allows multiple 
objects, previously recorded as lived experience or as anticipated future, 
to interact with the protoself and produce an abundance of core self 
pulses. The result is the autobiographical self. All three stages are 
constructed in separate but coordinated brain workspaces. These are the 
image spaces, the playground for the influence of both ongoing 
perception and of dispositions contained in convergence-divergence 
regions. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. (2011). 
(p. 181). Random House Kindle Edition. (Damasio, 2010, p. 181) 
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persons, or between his person of practical wisdom and his merely clever person, 
and/or incontinent smart person, 
or provide neuro-scientific 
answers to temperance, spirited 
righteous indignation and the 
like, and most important of all, 
operationalise beneficial findings 
of such differentiations for 
personal and Polis use? Again 
Plato and/or Aristotle could not 
be looking for electro-chemical 
solutions but simple questions 
asked in their names might, 
through the challenges they 
invite, occasion new directions 
for research.  
To be sure, neuroscience 
presently makes no brave claims 
that it fully understands how 
brain makes mind and how self comes to mind and again, in this light, such questions 
as those asked above in the names of philosophers might be premature, 
inappropriate, or even pronounced gauche by some. After all there is quite a 
difference between digital scanning and mapping technique approaches to brain 
making mind, and deep introspection about felt emotion and observed bodily action 
approaches to such phenomena, and for many the two cultures divide (Snow, 1959, 
1998) appears to remain insurmountable. Yet each culture and its method, seems 
incomplete without the other.  
Nevertheless, philosophy, like Science, is a questioning preoccupation. For example, 
if a neuroscientist were to report that the chemical flows and physical brain sectors 
and the like that light up when a smart person is contemplating the benefits they will 
enjoy through embezzling some bank holdings are identical to those lighting up in a  
 
Behind the Text: The Precarious Condition of Philosophy’s 
Seemingly Contested Relevance  
From the controversy of the herms, through the debates about universals, 
to Cambridge Ritualist claims about origins of Ethics and so on to 
present day exchanges about Orphic Cults and Greek religion, 
philosophy has progressed in steps of sometimes white hot debate, which 
seldom fails to impress. From hindsight such episodes of discovery may 
appear thin and their findings questionably ambiguous and complex. 
Similarly such brilliant positive-science breakthrough discoveries as 
universal gravitation and the like might appear overly trivial: after all are 
not some of these the subject of only one or two lessons in secondary 
Science education courses. Such views are hardly suitable views on 
which to pillory philosophy and/or Science irrelevant.  
 
Other conditions might support a perception of diminishing relevance. 
First the attitude of elected parliamentarians who, in house in one breath 
dismissingly pronounce theory and ideology to be just academic, and in 
the next breath justify their own personal and party actions, sometimes 
even perhaps unknowingly and often glibly, in terms of great ideas by 
past philosophers. Philosophy here is a captive slave to subterfuge and 
canard in very antithesis of its core values. Second, in their busy world, 
policy makers have little time for philosophical questioning of procedure 
and process, while anger generated by perceived free riding and rorting 
behind such questioning may fall on philosophy per se rather than on 
cheating perpetrators. Thirdly, although enrolments in available 
philosophy courses remain significant, such courses are thin relative to 
other disciplines. Fourthly, with the coming of the digital age, and use of 
sophisticated and impressive electronic mapping of what neuroscientists 
presently conjecture is brain making mind, deep introspection of brain 
making mind as a tool of philosophy may, on the face of it, appear a 
spent force. This latter reason is hardly the case. For example is there 
such a world of difference between Plato’s attempting to explain 
intemperance, soul in body and the like by analogy with watertightness 
rather than a sieve Gorgias 493 (Plato, 1952g; 1967b, p. 276) and 
Damasio attempting to explain in body mind-mapping theory by 
comparison of a slice of brain to a map of Manhattan Island minus 
Broadway (Damasio, 2010, p. 66)?  
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person of prudence or practical wisdom contemplating the social benefits they will 
bring through philanthropic distribution of those, their deposited funds, the 
philosophical question asked in terms of a practical solution might be to what 
phenomenon or criterion is explanation of the difference, here prudence qua practical 
wisdom versus smart immorality, to be referred? Such a question becomes more 
acute in the everyday psychopathy of business life (S. Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013, pp. 
204 - 218) if, say, behind a twinkle in the eye of a charismatic manager about to sack 
a number of employees in the interests of greater bonus payment for that manager 
themselves, and the twinkle in the eye of a charismatic union organiser—well 
perhaps not in all parts of Australia in late 2015—or a statesman-minister attempting 
to prevent it, lie the same light ups and chemical flows, then again what is the 
difference and to what electrochemistry and/or human values criteria do we reach to 
resolve the difference? What practical applicable ameliorative mind techniques might 
follow neuroscientific explanation? The significance of these quelle difference 
questions cannot be underestimated when they are asked in the context of global  
 
 
Source: Gaugin, Paul. (1897). (artist). Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going? [oil on canvas]. 
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston: Mark Harden’s Artchive. Picture is to be read from right to left. 
 
Does each generation ask itself Gaugin’s questions? Even in an avatar Polis mind of zeros and ones there is no escaping these 
questions. Yet, if humans cannot imagine beyond the bounds of those markers set down by emotion, and consolidated through 
memory as stored experience and reflection, and if real world loadings of these are challenged by digitally and/or 
hallucinogenic generated versions, might not the dawning of new ages be something beyond the individual, and real world 
culture, something of a digital herd stampede, against which more conservative positions may be hard pressed to defend 
themselves. To be sure digital image making until now is a product of imagination dependent on experience gained in the real 
world. The question is about whether a poker-machine industry kind of manipulation of emotions might become the norm 
whether, planned or accidental, if digitally loaded somatic experience becomes to inform real world action. Why on such a 
possibility are twenty-first century authorities so surprised at an ability by terrorists to motivate youth to commit atrocities. 
Might digital invasion compromise esoteric Polis? Might the charioteer itself contain artificial figment vicarious from those 
generated real world emotions it is charged with coordinating? Might multiple charioteers emerge? Might such ersatz 
charioteers themselves have little option but to accompany their difficult charges all the way to hell in their chariot baskets or 
not.  
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power struggle and political hegemony and it is a question which asks neuroscience 
to top its electrochemical explanation with a working human values solution to the 
rogue leader/rogue state problem. Neither should philosophy stop at simply asking 
the questions. 
To pose such questions is in no way to 
denigrate or downplay the positive-science 
side of neuroscience and again, on closer 
inspection, some of these questions may 
themselves prove premature, defective, 
irrelevant, or gauche but it is early times in 
neuroscience, and surely it goes without 
saying that those suffering mental affliction 
and/or physical brain lesions, and those who 
know and love them, and perhaps some others 
of us too, can hardly not be appreciative of 
relief brought by medication developed as a 
result of positive neuroscience research. 
However the contention being proposed 
advocates philosophy’s more vigorous membership of the neuroscience matrix of 
disciplines and a suggestion that within that membership it should continue to 
maintain its core tenet of applying as best it can, to all disciplines of enquiry, 
including itself, the test of the that-which-can-be-no-other in both positive Science 
and values interpretation fields. So situated, philosophy may plausibly, in its own 
way, countervail its seemingly precarious condition of contested diminishing 
relevance by asking questions which, when further explored through positive 
Science, may lead to new discoveries, even discoveries rivalling the brilliance of 
those 𝐹 = 𝐺
𝑚1𝑚2
𝑟2
,  W=JH, E=MC2, general and specific relativity, Avogadro’s 
number, and DNA helix breakthrough findings, but which may also, on the human 
values side, help enhance the benefits such conjectured possible new discoveries 
might bring to ethical progress of Polis and P(p)olis. Such a claim, like other claims 
and questions raised elsewhere, may again be considered risible by many, yet as 
earlier mentioned, the history of Science abounds in examples of positive science  
 
Scientific Method: Descartes 
Le premier était de ne recevoir jamais aucune pour 
vraie que je ne la connusse evidemment etre telle: 
c’est-à-dire d'éviter soigneusement la précipitation, 
et la pérvention et de ne comprendre rien de plus 
en mes jugemens, que ce qui se présenterait si 
clairement et si destinctément à mon esprit je 
n’eusse aucune occasion de le mettre en doute. 
 
Le sécond, de diviser chacune des difficultés que 
j'examinerais en autant de parcelles qu'il se 
pourrait et qu'il serait requis pour les mieux 
résoudre. 
 
Le troisîème de conduire par ordre mes pensées, en 
commençant par les objets les plus simples, etles 
plus aisés à connaitre, pour monter peu à peu 
comme par dégres jusques a la connaissance des 
plus composés et supposânt meme de l'ordre entre 
ceux qui ne fe prcèdent point naturellement les uns 
les autres.  
 
Et le dernier de faire partout des dénombremens si 
entiers et des revues si générales, que je susse 
assuré de ne rien omettté. 
 
Source: Descartes, R. (1657) Discours de la 
method pour bien conduire sa raison, & cherchcr 
la vérité dans les sciences. Plus la dioptrique et les 
meteors qui font des essais de cette method. (p. 
20). Paris. Chez Theodore Girard, dans la Grand 
Salle du Palais, proche la Porte de la Gallerie 
Dauphine. (Descartes, 1657, p. 20) 
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breakthroughs emerging from exploration suggested by, and conducted within, 
normative values architecture. It is telling of many scientists, when—either out of 
sheer sincerity, dedication and belief in their work, or at gaming in search of research 
funding and/or sought-after prizes and 
awards—they justify their activities in terms 
of one normative criterion or another, are, 
whether they may realise or admit it or not, 
already in normative values theoria 
considerations of the foremost, the better or 
the perfect. That is, although it might not need 
saying, many scientists are clearly capable of 
thinking normatively in human values terms. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the conjecture 
of the previous two sentences, when it comes 
to maintenance of social and responsible 
business and safe and civil society through 
right and just behaviour of governments the 
stakes appear high and ridicule, if it is to apply, might better be applied after some 
consideration of the usefulness or otherwise of the claim that philosophy and 
neuroscience in combination might occasion eureka breakthrough findings.  
Of the names behind that parade of breakthrough discovery in the last paragraph 
Newton’s philosophical side is well discussed (Dobbs, 1976/2008, passim; 1991, 
passim; Manuel, 1968, passim; 1974, passim; McGuire & Westman, 1977, pp. 95 - 
142). Joule is known as a Christian believing in the scientific veracity of the 
scriptures and of God’s ordered world (Joule, 1930-1931, p. 110), Einstein is known 
as a philosopher physicist Einstein to Thornton, December 7, 1944, EA 61 - 574 
(cited in Janssen & Lehner, 2014, p. 357), one believing in the importance of 
philosophical thought for physics, Jean Baptiste Perrin is known as an atheist and 
socialist (Berberan-Santos, 2001, p. 17), James Watson is known as an atheist who 
signed the 2003 Humanist Manifesto III with its emphasis on rational observation of 
nature within unguided evolution, on Ethics emerging from human need, on 
happiness emerging from participation of humane acts by persons endowed with a 
 
 
Source: Munch, E. (1893). (artist). The Scream of 
Nature. (oil, tempera and pastel on cardboard). 
National Gallery, Oslo: Mark Harden’s Artchive. 
 
How many are listening?  
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social instinct, and on P(p)olis in which working for society brings individual 
happiness. Francis Crick, who like Watson signed the Humanist Manifesto III, is 
named a neuro-philosopher and is known as an agnostic leaning towards atheism 
(Crick, 1990, p. 10) and one believing that human problems of value are to be solved 
in moral and intellectual domains, and that a basis for biochemical theology might 
one day be uncovered (Crick, 1970, p. 615). Even were a full electro-chemical 
understanding of soul qua mind, embodied or otherwise, now available, and a 
presence of myriad such souls measured, philosophy might still ask the questions of 
which soul, for purposes of Polis and P(p)olis, and on whose decision, and on what 
values basis chosen. And if Crick’s hunch about a more speedy evolution is correct, 
as appears to be increasingly entertained, in the presence of new findings about 
plasticity in brain and central nervous system mechanisms, and if someone comes up 
with a science-fiction or a comedian hunch that soon computers will come equipped 
with Soul 1 software with update assurances, then philosophy must still ask, whose 
soul-type for safe and civil society government versions, and whose soul-type for 
social and responsible business versions and again by whom chosen and on what 
bases—philosophy the gadfly ever in the ointment of Science, or philosophy qua one 
of the compounding chemists. 
Coexisting normative values and positive Science dimensions appear to inform the 
lives and works of those famous persons exemplified above. Are not Plato and 
Aristotle, and others too, examples of full-soulness in such a sense, full soulness as 
attributed to those moderns above, but not denying human defects? Is it not possible 
that philosophy and neuroscience might constitute a still more fruitful combination, 
and if so what aspects of human condition and situation might they address? There 
are, no doubt, many answers to these questions, and again considerable possibility of 
a short shrift reply from both courts to a suggestion that neuroscience might be 
enhanced through ongoing liaison with philosophy and vice versa. Yet many an idea, 
grand or otherwise, has often to proceed through some or a number of phases—
ignored, ridiculed, persecuted, appropriated and adapted, then claimed by others and 
applied (Spurling & McMurray, n.d., no time marker available)—before its 
usefulness is realised. Nevertheless, as addressed in the next section, two general 
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divisions of human condition might be fruitfully investigated through philosophy in 
neuroscience under the aegis of four general areas of research. 
Discussion of Originality of Content and Philosophy’s Potential Research Contribution 
Continues and Concludes.  
Discussion of Philosophy in Neuroscience and Analysis of Human Condition Begins and 
Concludes 
To wit: the first division is a domain of hitherto formative and socialising constancy 
in human condition: birth, life, aging and death; 
learning by contact with physical and non-physical 
referent objects and reflection on their somatically 
mapped recordings, and through reflection and 
imagination about metaphysical and/or other 
beings; incessant dictates of repetitive needs and 
the driving desire to fulfil wants; and questions of 
partner, family, and security. Taxes we might do 
without in this present context although they too are 
likely candidates in Damasio’s wide-cast leviathan 
world (Damasio, 2010, pp. 59 - 60). 
The human condition so expressed and framed 
remains, but it remains in the presence of 
experiential conditions some of which, although 
similar in kind to those known before, differ 
significantly in scale, intensity and degree. Of this 
kind are population stress, loss of biodiversity 
which supports human habitat, a rapidly changing 
East-West political hegemony, the destructive 
capacity of chemical and biological weaponry, 24/7 
social media demonstration-effect exposure of 
inequalities combined with social media’s own 
potential for trending-now hysteria within an environment of poll-driven 
government, and intense hatred amongst fundamentalist religious groups, likely to 
deploy such horrible weapons as earlier mentioned, if and when they have them. 
Viewed historically, when peaceful resolution of differences has failed, conditions 
 
 
Source: Iannaccone, A. (2011). (artist). 
“L'uomo è a misura di tutte le cose (di quelle 
che sono in quanto sono e di quelle che non 
sono in quanto non sono). Protagora”(1). 
[digital, on photographic paper]. 
celeste.network. (Iannaccone, 2011) 
 
Note: (1) Man is the Measure of all Things 
(Those Which Are as they Are and Those 
Which are Not Because They are Not). 
Protagoras”.  
 
The historical Protagoras of page 56 of this 
enquiry returns anew with his enigma. 
Mankind may take its being from the 
existing natures of the real physical world or 
attribute natures to them. But now, given that 
litany of possible DNA changing influences 
mentioned in the text discussion about that 
second division of human condition, might 
not the enigmatic Protagoras itself be on a 
journey towards little other than being a 
measure of digitally and chemically 
remastered pawndom, a half-minded 
directionless journeyman of unfolding 
chance? However constructed and whichever 
way interpreted the Protagoras enigma, and 
its implications for Polis, remain complex. 
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often become brutal and ugly, and there can be no cessation of enquiry into human 
mind and each generation’s capacity, through it, to address human condition 
constancies for maintenance of life and society purposes. Both philosophy and 
neuroscience remain relevant for this first division of human condition. 
A second division of human condition is predicated on a possibility that 
environmental, social, and behavioural factors might well influence the very bases on 
which the constancy of the first division rests, extending even to change in genome 
operations, and in consequence, to both 
biological and moral values meanings of 
human condition itself. This second set of 
conditions in which self coming to brain 
made mind persists is arguably so new and 
different, and is occurring, relatively, over 
such a short time span, as to possibly 
overwhelm timely solution of social 
problems that such relatively rapid changes 
of bases for stable human condition might 
bring. Examples of such developments are 
advances in gene technology, new 
materials body organs and robotics, 
including bionic experimentation, a re-
emergence of eugenics disguised as 
designer baby technology and/or vanity cloning, human genome technology’s 
admirable prospect of a disease free, long and youthful life and its implications for 
living room, a profit-sector version of a possible Mars project synthetic food 
equivalent and its possible biological consequences, yesterday’s soilent green 
hopefully remaining a taboo in even the worst of situations, even though its water 
provision equivalent is presently safely in commercial operation, intermingling of the 
virtual experience gained in avatar-land with that gained in the physical world and its 
possible modification of that real physical world experience, harmfully or 
unharmfully, including the prospect of an Etruscan style exit, wry smile, reclining 
nonchalance and all, for now privileged and even not so privileged races and/or  
 
Philosophy and the Ideas-Action Divide 
Just as positive Science has difficulty in bridging the fact-
value divide, so too philosophy has difficulty in bridging 
the ideas-action divide. For example, notions of Polis 
have informed and continue to inform new settlement 
actions—Thurii, and other places like it, Huguenots in 
Africa and elsewhere, Brownist English dissenting 
pilgrims to New Plymouth, Berkeley’s failed Bermuda 
intentions but later heritage success in California, 
Wakefield’s plans for New Zealand and South Australia 
and a multitude of unmentioned examples in between, 
large and small. Yet as history reveals, the actioning of 
such ideals is questionable every which way. Present 
examples of ideas-action divide stumble may be found in 
mankind’s best Millennium Goal and climate agreement 
efforts, informed by Science and anvilled within 
philosophical and values frameworks including hard-
nosed geo-political wrangle. After government delegates 
return home from highly principled and scientifically 
informed UN meetings, governments they represented 
there are often compromised in actioning their pledges. It 
is telling, although understandable and logically 
necessary given that Polis/P(p)olis and Ethics are 
functions of living being, that much space-exploration 
Science is focussed on survival on the way to, and in, 
planned colonies on Mars and other planets, but relatively 
little on what kind of Polis might be wished for and 
safely constructed there. What might philosophy’s view 
be on this question? 
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socio-economic groups, occasioned through human beings, in isolation, or in droves, 
plugging in or otherwise injecting deceptive virtual substitute wonderlands of self 
and Polis/P(P)olis sustained in part 
through private and public purchase of 
complementary real-world comfort toy 
look-alikes and props, some detrimental 
others not—talking robot friends and 
flatters, avatar-land economic game 
successes, oil-funded unsustainable island 
states of wonderful architecture, and digital 
indoctrination of belief in future secure-
state paradises and the like in return for 
present destruction of culture and habitat. 
If measured against a harsh and seemingly 
severe criterion that some humans will 
continue to exist somewhere in some kind 
of condition then, in one sense, none of 
these conjectured human-condition-
altering prospects, either alone or in 
combination through disruptive synergies, 
may prove incapable of mitigation. After 
all, in respect of the first of the two divisions of human condition outlined on pages 
625 to 627, yesterday’s future shock rebranded as today’s disabling technology is 
apparently to be solved, in Australia at least, through funding of multi-faceted 
innovation, on an assumption that such innovation itself will not further destabilise 
the economy, nor serendipitously harm or impact on genome process and that, 
simply for want of funding, is ready to emerge in a nation whose learn-by-doing-and-
making opportunity has, for some decades, largely been exported to job opportunity 
and technical research and development elsewhere. And solved it may well be for a 
relatively short time, if such funding serves as a new currency of business welfare 
and wage subsidy payments, notwithstanding the caveats mentioned in the last 
sentence. Nevertheless, given a world in which developments in artificial 
intelligence—deep learning, pattern recognition, language and text analysis and their 
 
Environment, Culture and Polis and What it May 
Mean to be Human 
“… distinct levels of processing—mind, conscious mind, 
and conscious mind capable of producing culture—
emerged in sequence. That should not leave the 
impression, however, that when minds acquired selves, 
they stopped evolving as minds or that selves eventually 
stopped evolving. On the contrary, the evolutionary 
process continued (and continues), possibly enriched and 
accelerated by the pressures created by self-knowledge, 
and there is no end in sight. The ongoing digital 
revolution, the globalization of cultural information, and 
the coming of the age of empathy are pressures likely to 
lead to structural modifications of mind and self, by 
which I mean modifications of the very brain processes 
that shape the mind and self. (Damasio, 2010, p. 182) 
 
As humans debate the benefits or perils of cultural trends, 
and of developments such as the digital revolution, it may 
help to be informed about how our flexible brains create 
consciousness. For example, will the progressive 
globalization of human consciousness brought on by the 
digital revolution retain the goals and principles of basic 
homeostasis, as current sociocultural homeostasis does? 
Or will it break away from its evolutionary umbilical 
cord, for better or worse? (Damasio, 2010, p. 29) 
 
It goes without saying that the way in which human brains 
manage life requires both varieties of homeostasis in 
continuous interaction. But while the basic variety of 
homeostasis is an established inheritance, provided by 
everyone’s genome, the sociocultural variety is a 
somewhat fragile work in progress, responsible for much 
of human drama, folly, and hope. The interaction between 
these two kinds of homeostasis is not confined to each 
individual. There is growing evidence that, over multiple 
generations, cultural developments lead to changes in the 
genome. (Damasio, 2010, p. 27) 
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implications for unemployment—appear to be progressing more quickly than 
neuroscience’s ability to fathom how brain makes mind itself, it seems reasonable on 
precautionary grounds, to enquire into environmental, social and behavioural 
alteration of human condition fundamentals, and imagined consequences of it for 
social embodyment of so-called permanent human condition, and philosophy is well 
placed to formulate relevant questions and, if acknowledged, to pursue them in 
liaison with neuroscience.  
In respect of the second of the two divisions of human condition outlined on pages 
625 to 627, if mankind can only know what it experiences, and if experience can be 
avatared in, or in the future, long term memory conditioned, or ‘new’ long term 
memory epigenetically protein moleculed into the cell on the outside of the DNA, 
that is behind synaptic firing-and wiring sensory nerve memory research findings of 
the past three decades (Chen et al., 2014, pp. 1-21), or diseases snipped out or 
biological and environmental terrors snipped in, then what does it matter if the 
children, let alone the grandchildren, have much or any comprehension at all about 
prequel understandings of what it might mean to be human? Any number of that 
digitally or chemically remastered Protagoras on page 625 may be available on 
demand, or for worse or better, by decree. Such a question may be asked with or 
without bitterness or spite, and on behalf of anything but a canard for hedonism 
and/or abandonment of some kind of intergenerational Ethics. A cynical asking of it 
may as much disguise an element of caring as it might an element of not caring, even 
though a common functionally binding basis for care is difficult to verify either 
philosophically or neuroscientifically.  
These possible bases-changing conditions, which in relative terms are new and less 
noticed and understood, are big changes, and it is very early times for those wishing 
to future guess outcomes and resolutions. These changes are occurring during a 
period of disempowerment engendered by an ethical relativism which has possibly 
devalued discussion about right action, and are possibly being led by Science in 
general not necessarily well focussed on full Science, Ethics and Polis implications 
of its work, and further exacerbated in rogue states or elsewhere through work on 
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scientific projects of imaginatively terrifying consequences, anthrax carrying drones, 
bionic and chemically engineered insect soldiers, and the like.  
How the interplay between the two divisions of human condition postulated—
experiential and existential condition resulting predominantly from those lifecycle 
constants within an overcrowding and 
seemingly more urgent and intense real world 
situation on one hand, and human condition 
foundationally shaken by those lesser known 
and understood possible genome changing 
environmental, chemical, digital, and bionic 
forces on the other—might work itself out, is a 
big question. Finding answers to questions 
about the next Polis and next age, and the role 
of Science and Ethics within them, is likely to 
remain difficult. It is conceivable, although not 
provable, that without philosophy’s particular 
kind of questioning presence, unified future 
society might be less salutary and more 
difficult to achieve than it needs be, and even 
on such a slim contention philosophy’s 
presence in neuroscientific probing of mind 
and consciousness is advocated even though, 
as outlined in the text boxes on pages 620 and 626, upon inspection of its own 
condition, philosophy is not without its own ideas-to-action divide. Nevertheless, 
micro research in philosophy and neurophysiology might, apart from particular 
contributions each work makes, be ordered and ranked through integrating 
metanalysis aimed at better understanding and management of human condition 
within four overarching and coordinated research domains, viz (a) the fact–value 
divide, (b) thought-action divide, (c) the truth-anger enigma and (d) a common and 
binding basis for care in a relative values world.  
 
 
Source: Hans Holbein the Younger. (1532).  
Hermann von Wedigh III. (oil and gold on oak). 
New York. Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art. 
(Hans Holbein the Younger, 1532). 
 
The handwriting on the paper within the book reads 
“truth breeds hatred’ a line raised by (Terence, 
1893, pp. 8, 369), a wisdom those returning to the 
cave might glean from Plato The Republic 517a 
(Plato, 1952r, p. 389; 1969a), and no doubt an 
observation not lost on whistleblowers and others in 
public life who report what they saw and heard, and 
stand by it. Philosophy and Science may well feel 
hatred they effect.. 
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The conjecture that philosophy and neuroscience together may prove a beneficial 
combination, and that through cooperation they may together better contribute to 
understanding of four perplexities of human condition is, in summary form, a main 
outcome of the minor goal, and is offered as a speculative conclusion and predicated 
on a minor and constrained claim about original contribution qua procedural method. 
CONCLUSION TO THE ENQUIRY 
The major aim of the enquiry was to effect a multiple-voice interpretation of 
conditions of political philosophy both prequel to, and then metamorphosing 
coincident with, emergence of a new era subsequently named the Modern Age. This 
aim was effected by designing a new analytical method and applying it consistently 
in measurement of representative prequels to so-called modernism and articulation of 
Thesis Proposition Statements purporting to identify elements of substantial and 
quickening change in political philosophy. The minor aim of the enquiry was to 
apply a geography of mind focus across the prequel series generated in the major 
aim, and on the basis of insights gained, specify contributions philosophy might 
make to ongoing enquiry about human condition and Polis/P(p)olis. The minor aim 
was effected, inter alia, by respectively bringing identified prequels in the one case, 
and Politique Ethics in another case, to twenty-first century bases for comparison 
purposes.  
Among other things, the enquiry engaged with “many opinions about the gods and 
the generation of the universe, Timaeus 29c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 447), and with 
enquiry into “fine and just actions” Nicomachean Ethics I 1094b10 – 15 (Aristotle, 
1926; 1952g, p. 339) consistent with politics qua good for man” (ibid., p. 339). 
Given that in matters of gods and universe it is not always possible “to give notions 
which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another” 
Timaeus 29c (Plato, 1925h; 1952w, p. 447) and that in respect of gods and matters of 
state “we … are speaking about things which are only for the most part, true and with 
premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better” Nicomachean 
Ethics I 1094b20 (Aristotle, 1926; 1952g, p. 339), there should be little surprise with 
a caveat to the effect that most key statements and conclusions in this enquiry are 
contestable, precision in certain classes of things being attainable only “as far as the 
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nature of the subject admits” Nicomachean Ethics I 1094b25 (Aristotle, 1926; 1952g, 
pp. 339 - 340). 
Notwithstanding the caveat of the closing sentence of the last paragraph, and subject 
to the constraints of enquiry method discussed in the Introduction, and Chapters 2 
and 10, major and minor aims are posited achieved. The minor aim, which inter alia 
carries key issues troublesome to Western understandings of human condition and 
Polis for some two and a half millennia, to neuroscience presently in the sixth decade 
of its precocious infancy, offers an all too much, all too soon kind of a finding, yet 
the four areas of research suggested offer an opportunity for philosophy and 
neuroscience together to integrate micro research findings as they occur along the 
way, and apply them to better understanding of political gathering and P(p)olis, and 
practical solution of perceived problems. 
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